Weekly report on israel’s terrorism on Palestinians (11 July – 17 July 2019)

Israeli violations of human rights in the occupied Palestinian territory for the week of 11- 17 July, 2019.

74 Palestinian civilians injured; 24 of them were children, a woman, 2 journalists including a female, and a paramedic at the Great March of Return in the Gaza Strip.

5 civilians, including a child, injured in the West Bank.

  1. Shootings, i.e. killings and injuries
  • At approximately 02:30 on Thursday, 11 July 2019, officers from the Israeli “Mista’arvim”undercover unit dressed like Palestinian civilians sneaked to al-Duheisha refugee camp, south of Bethlehem, driving 2 civilian vehicles with Palestinian registration plate. They raided and searched a house belonging to Sami Ismail al-Ja’fari (33) and then arrested him. Meanwhile, dozens of Palestinian children and youngsters gathered and threw stones and empty bottles at Israeli soldiers while the soldiers fired live and rubber bullets and tear gas canisters at them. As a result, 2 civilians were shot with live bullets to the lower extremities. They were taken to Al-Hussein Hospital in Beit Jala for treatment.



  • At approximately 22:00 on the same Thursday, Israeli soldiers stationed along the border fence with Israel, northern Beit Lahia in northern Gaza Strip, opened fire and arrested at Majed Mohammed Husein al-Shafei (44) after crossing the village. As a result, he sustained a live bullet to his lower extremities. According to field investigations, al-Shafei left his house in Jabalia approximately 21:30 on the same day and then disappeared. At approximately 11:00 on Friday, 12 July 2019, his brother Mazen received a phone call informing him that his brother is injured and detained by Israeli forces.


  • At approximately 10:30 on Friday 12 July 2019, Israeli forces stationed along the border fence with Israel, east of Khan Younis in southern Gaza Strip in the vicinity of a Palestinian border control point. The shooting continued for few minutes, but no casualties were reported.


  • At approximately 06:30 on Saturday, 13 July 2019, Israeli gunboats stationed off Rafah Shore opened fire at Palestinian Fishing boats sailing within 6 nautical miles. The Israeli gunboats then surrounded one of the boats manned by Mohammed Isma’el Isma’el al-Bardawil (40) and his nephew, Ahmed Wael Isma’el al-Bardawil (16); both from al-Mawasi neighborhood, west of Rafah. The Israeli naval soldiers then ordered the fishermen to take off their clothes, jump into the water and swim towards the gunboat. They were arrested and their boat was confiscated. At approximately 18:00, Ahmed was released through Beit Hanoun “Erez” crossing while Mohammed al-Bardawil is still under arrest and their fishing boat is still confiscated.


  • At approximately 13:35 on Sunday, 14 July 2019, Israeli forces stationed along the border fence with Israel, east of Khan Youni in southern Gaza Strip, opened fire at agricultural lands in eastern ‘Abasan village, west of the border fence. The shooting continued for few minutes, but no casualties were reported.


  • At approximately 16:30 on Monday, 15 July 2019, Israeli forces stationed along the border fence with Israel, east of Kahn Younis, in southern Gaza Strip, opened fire at eastern Khuza’ah village. The shooting continued for few minutes, but no casualties were reported.


  • Also on Monday evening, Israeli forces opened fire at Fares Ahmed Mahmoud ‘Azem (34), when he was between Ramina and Bazaria villages, east of Tulkarm. As a result, he sustained a live bullet wound to the back, causing him internal bleeding in the lungs. ‘Azem was taken to Dr. Thabet Thabet Hospital in Tulkarm. Due to the serious injury, ‘Azem was transferred to Beilinson Hospital in Israel. An eyewitness stated that:

“At approximately 22:00 on Monday, 15 July 2019, I received a call telling me that a person from my village was wounded and screaming of pain and that the caller is trying to rescure him. I immediately headed to the site and knew that the victim is from Thanabeh village, carries an Israeli ID card and drives a vehicle with an Israeli registration plate. He was taken via an ambulance to Dr. Thabet Thabet hospital in Tulkarm and then transferred to Beilinson Hospital in Israel due to his serious injury.”


‘Azem’s father said to PCHR’s fieldworker that:

“I received the news of my son’s injury and then headed to Israel to follow-up on his health condition. Doctors only informed me that his injury was serious and he suffers from bleeding in the lungs as the bullet penetrated his back to the lungs. We do not know how this happened to our son; he was probably visiting his in-laws in Ramin village. We are waiting until he wakes up to find out what happened with him.”


  • At approximately 17:35 on Tuesday, 16 July 2019, Israeli forces stationed along the border fence with Israel, east of Kahn Younis in the southern Gaza Strip, opened fire at ‘Abasan al-Kabirah. The shooting continued for few minutes, but no casualties were reported.


  • At approximately 08:10 on Wednesday, 17 July 2019, Israeli forces stationed along the border fence with Israel, east of Kahn Younis in the southern Gaza Strip, opened fire at Khuza’ah village. The shooting continued for few minutes, but no casualties were reported.
    • Settlement Expansion and settler violence in the West Bank including occupied East Jerusalem


  1. Demolitions and attacks on civilian property for settlement expansion


  • At approximately 10:00 on Thursday, 11 July 2019, Israeli forces backed by military construction vehicles and Israeli Civil Administration officers moved into Beit Ummer village in northern Hebron. They then stationed in Wadi al-Shaiekh neighborhood, where the Israeli Civil Administration officers handed Mohamed ‘Ali al-‘Alami a 96-hour demolition notice, under the pretext of non-licensing.  Mohamed’s house was under-construction and built on an area of 150 square meters. On 17 April 2018, the Coordinator of Government Activities in the occupied Territory (COGAT), under the direct control of the Former Defense Minister Avigdor Lieberman, issued a military order that makes it possible for Israeli forces to demolish Palestinian homes in Area C within 96 hours after delivering demolition orders. Under the order, COGAT excuses itself from informing Palestinian homeowners directly that their homes are slated for demolition and only requires demolition orders be placed “next to” targeted structures 96 hours before Israeli forces arrive to execute demolitions.
  • At approximately 11:00, Israeli forces backed by military construction vehicles and Israeli Civil Administration officers moved into Kherbit Shabouqa in western Hebron, where they handed Amjad Nofal Sulimah a notice to demolish his 150-sqaure-meter barn under the pretext of non-licensing in Area C, and gave him until 24 July 2019 to challenge.
  • At approximately 12:30 on Thursday, 11 July 2019, Israeli forces backed by military construction vehicles moved into ‘Izbit Salman in southern Qalqiliyia, and demolished an agricultural barrack belonging to Dawoud Mahmoud Yousef Ahmed under the pretext of non-licensing. Dawoud said to PCHR’s fieldworker: “I returned from France 3 months ago and my family told me that they found a notice in my land written on it “this is the second notice to demolish the agricultural barrack”. My family, who live in Qalqiliyia, told me that they did not see the first notice as they usually go there for picnic. On Thursday evening, 11 July 2019, our neighbors phoned and informed us that Israeli forces are demolishing the barrack in our land, so they went there and found the barrack was already demolished. We told both the Israeli and Palestinian Liaisons and they informed us that we could challenge the demolition.”
  • At approximately 14:00 on Thursday, Israeli forces dismantled a sit-in tent established by the Wall and Settlement Resistance Committee in Wadi al-Humis neighborhood in Surbaher village, south of occupied East Jerusalem, protesting at the Israeli decision to demolish 12 residential buildings under the pretext of being near the annexation wall. Eyewitnesses said that Israeli forces attacked civilians staying in the tent and fired tear gas canisters at them. As a result, dozens of them suffocated due to tear gas inhalation, and agricultural crops were burned. It should be noted that the Israeli Supreme Court issued a decision to demolish 16 residential buildings, comprising of 100 apartments, few weeks ago under the pretext of being close to the annexation wall and pose a security threat. This gives the green light to the Israeli forces to demolish all buildings near the annexation wall in the West Bank, including occupied Jerusalem. In 2003, the residents of Surbaher village submitted a petition against the annexation wall route, which passes in the center of their village, so the route was changed and the neighborhood was annexed within the wall.
  • At approximately 09:00 on Tuesday, 16 July 2019, Israeli forces backed by military construction vehicles and Israeli Civil Administration officers moved into Wadi al-Ghrouz area in eastern Hebron. Israeli soldiers were deployed in the area and the construction vehicles demolished a concrete pool used for irrigating plants under the pretext of non-licensing. The pool belongs to Zayid Nimer Mohamed al-Ja’bari (65), whose family attempted to stop the demolition, but Israeli border guard officers attacked and beat them. The Israeli border guard officers also attacked two photographers identified as ‘Abed al-Hafeez Daib ‘Abed al-Hafeez al-Hashlamoun (55), who sustained minor wounds in his hands and legs; and Mashhour Hasan Mahmoud al-Wahwah (34), who sustained minor bruises in his hand. Zayid al-Ja’bari said the Israeli authorities handed him a notice to stop construction works 3 months ago and handed him a demolition notice on 14 July 2019. Zayid was intending to file documents to the Israeli court for challenging the demolition.
  • At approximately 16:00 on Tuesday, Israeli forces backed by military construction vehicles and Israeli Civil Administration officers moved into Khelet al-Foron area in eastern Hebron. The construction vehicles demolished a water well used for irrigating plants. The well belongs to Nayif No’man Shokri Da’nah, who was handed a demolition notice on 10 July 2019. It should be noted that the well was partially funded by the Palestinian Ministry of Agriculture.
  • At approximately 17:00 on Tuesday, Israeli forces backed by military construction vehicles and Israeli Civil Administration officers moved into Ghoween al-Foqah area in southern Hebron. The construction vehicles demolished a 100-sqaure-meter barrack built of concrete and tin plates and used for breeding livestock, under the pretext of non-licensing. The barrack belongs to Ahmed Mohamed Mousa Hawamdah (44), who was handed a 96-hour demolition notice on 03 July 2019, so there was no enough time to challenge the demolition.
  • At approximately 04:00 on Wednesday, 17 July 2019, Israeli forces backed by military construction vehicles and Israeli Civil Administration officers moved into al-Khalilah neighborhood in al-Jeep village, northwest of occupied East Jerusalem. The construction vehicles demolished a 80-sqaure-meter garage and store belonging to Waddah Wasfi Abu Dayyiah, under the pretext of non-licensing. It should be noted that the garage and store were demolished for the 3rd time.
  • In the same context, Israeli construction vehicles demolished a 900-sqaure-meter commercial barrack and a concrete floor belonging to al-Natshah family in Beit Haninah village, north of occupied East Jerusalem. The construction vehicles also demolished a 400-sqaure-meter car wash belonging to ‘Atiyah and Bakirat families in Surbaher vilolage, south of occupied Jerusalem.
  • At approximately 13:00 on Wednesday, 17 July 2019, Israeli construction vehicles demolished 5 shops built 4 years ago on an area of 250 square meters in Abu Tayieh neighborhood in Silwan village, south of occupied East Jerusalem’s Old City, under the pretext of non-licensing. Eyewitnesses said that a large force of Israeli police officers and Special Forces accompanied with bulldozers moved into Abu Tayieh neighborhood, where they surrounded 5 shops belonging to Mohamed Hamdan al-‘Abasi. The shops were demolished after the Israeli Supreme Court refused a petition submitted by Mohamed’s lawyer. The eyewitnesses also said that the Israeli forces forcibly disperse the neighborhood’s residents from the area and beat them up. Meanwhile, the Israeli forces arrested Mahdi Hamdan al-‘Abasi after beating him. It should be noted that al-‘Abasi family headed to the Israeli Supreme Court in order to freeze the demolition order and license the shops, but it refused.
  1. Closure policy and restrictions on freedom of movement of persons and goods

Gaza Strip

As the Israeli closure of the Gaza Strip enters its 14th consecutive year this July, severe restrictions on the freedom of movement of persons and goods enhance the de facto separation of the Gaza Strip and the West Bank.

The most significant implications of the continued Israeli closure of the Gaza Strip are:

  • Movement of goods and persons to and from the Gaza Strip is restricted on all three functioning crossings: Rafah border crossing, under Egyptian control; Beit Hanoun “Erez” checkpoint and Karm Abu-Salem Commercial Crossing, under Israeli control.


  • The Rafah Border Crossing operates only 5 days a week with severe limitation on travel of persons (300 travelers/day).


  • Beit Hanoun checkpoint, designated for the movement of persons, is under severe restrictions for exit and entry of the Gaza Strip. Only limited categories are issued Israeli permits to cross the checkpoint after an exhausting and lengthy security process that may subject civilians to the threat of arrest and often blackmail by Israeli forces.[1]


  • Karm Abu-Salem crossing, designated for the movement of goods, bans the export of Gaza Strip products, except for agricultural goods. Also, Israeli forces continue the 12-year ban on the import of 118 goods considered as “dual-use items.” [2] While Israeli authorities announced on Friday, 05 July 2019, that 18 of the banned dual-use items would be allowed into the Gaza Strip; the operating officers at Karm Abu-Salem crossing denied receiving new instructions in this regard.


  • Electricity crisis: with power cuts of at least 12 hours a day, the electricity crisis continues to haunt the Gaza Strip and paralyze all sectors of life, including health, education, the economy and the environment.


  • Naval blockade: Israel continues to restrict movement within the Gaza Sea, primarily on fishing. Despite imposing a 15-nautical-mile restricted fishing area, Israeli forces launch daily attacks on fishermen while at sea even within 1 – 6 nautical miles, including shootings, arrests and confiscation of fishing boats and equipment. It also restricts the import of necessary fishing equipment.

West Bank

Israeli forces continue to strangle West Bankers with continued restrictions on their freedom of movement, especially with frequent checkpoints between governorates. Currently, 92 permanent military checkpoints exist along the connecting roads between West Bank governorates, some of which have permanent military presence and others are staffed irregularly. Some of these checkpoints act as a terminal into Israel, even though they are located within Palestinian territory.

It should be highlighted that Israel continues to corporatize and privatize its occupation of the Palestinian territory by contracting military security corporations who operate checkpoints with fully armed civilian guards; yet, they act under the umbrella of the Ministry of Defense.

Israeli occupation’s presence in the West Bank is not limited to permanent checkpoints, as temporary checkpoints are haphazardly erected across the territory on a daily basis. These temporary checkpoints impede traffic between Palestinian cities, with illegal searches of civilian vehicles and long wait times. These temporary checkpoints are used to ambush civilians as hundreds of arrests are reported at these checkpoints annually.

This week, Israeli forces established 110 temporary checkpoint across the West Bank and arrested four Palestinian civilians. A civilian was arrested while returning via King Hussein Bridge.

Additionally, with the ongoing closure of 30 key roads in the West Bank, Palestinian’s’ freedom of movement is heavily restricted especially in areas adjacent to the illegal Israeli settlements.

Israel allows holders of West Bank IDs (men over 55 and women over 50) to access East Jerusalem without a pre-issued permit; nonetheless, they have to undergo security checks.

In terms of the movement of Palestinians to and from the occupied territory via King Hussein Bridge, Israeli forces continue to impose security measures that threaten the well being of civilians by forcing them to go through a body-search machine that subjects them to harmful radiations. It is also a common practice to arrest civilians at the crossing or deny them travel.

A 6-month research conducted by the Applied Research Institute of Jerusalem (ARIJ), stated that Palestinians lose about 60 million hours of work per year, due to the checkpoints and restrictions imposed by the Israeli forces on Palestinian movement between the towns and villages of the West Bank. ARIJ estimated the loss at about $ 270 million per year, according to the wage of workers per hour, in addition to extra fuel consumption at about 80 million liters per year, estimated at $ 135 million. The consumption of this amount of fuel leads to an increase in carbon dioxide emissions, by about 196 thousand tons per year.

Full document available at the official website for the Palestinian Centre for Human Rights (PCHR).


التدخل الروسيّ للإفراج عن أسرى سوريين

أبريل 30, 2019

ناصر قنديل

– لسنا بصدد النقاش حول حدود القدرة التفاوضية الروسية مع كيان الاحتلال في الضغط للإفراج عن أسرى سوريّين وفلسطينيين، طالما قاموا بتسليم بقايا جندي السلطان يعقوب. فقد قلنا ما يجب قوله في العملية في حينها، وما نحن بصدده هو مناقشة العلاقات الروسية السورية التي وجد البعض في عملية تسليم بقايا جندي السلطان يعقوب فرصة للانقضاض عليها ونعيها، وتوزيع مواعظ النصح حول عقم الرهان على صواب هذه العلاقة، وصولاً للقول إن روسيا تبيع حلفاءها من العرب كرمى لعيون نتنياهو، وأنها خاضعة للوبيات الصهيونية ولا تستطيع رد طلباتها.

– الأكيد أن موسكو التقطت ردود الأفعال التي أعقبت العملية، خصوصاً الموقف الرسمي للدولة السورية الذي قام بمراعاة العلاقة بروسيا، لكنه عبر عن امتعاضه بالإعلان عن عدم وجود أي علاقة له بها أو معرفة بحدوثها قبل تاريخ تنفيذها، كما وصلت إلى موسكو تعبيرات العتب والغضب في الشارع السوري وفي بيئة المقاومة. وهنا يصير السؤال له قيمة عن كيفية التصرف الروسي وفقاً لسلم الأولويات الذي يرسم سياسات موسكو في المنطقة.

– الخطوة الأولى كانت الإعلان القاسي الذي صدر عن موسكو للرد على الإدعاءات الإسرائيلية حول عملية تسليم وشيكة لبقايا العميل الإسرائيلي إيلي كوهين، وتعمّد أن يأتي الرد على لسان وزير الخارجية الروسية سيرغي لافروف، والخطوة الثانية جاءت بإعلان المبعوث الروسي الخاص حول الأزمة السورية ألكسندر لافرنتيف أن روسيا طلبت قيام إسرائيل بالإفراج عن عدد من الأسرى السوريين والفلسطينيين تعبيراً عن الامتنان لقيام روسيا بتسليمها بقايا جندي السلطان يعقوب، وتنفيذاً لطلب الرئيس الروسي.

– قيام كيان الاحتلال بالإفراج عن أسيرين سوريّ وفلسطينيّ من سجونه، لا يعادل بالتأكيد ما كان ممكناً تحصيله لو أدارت موسكو مفاوضات تبادل حول بقايا جندي السلطان يعقوب، لكنها رسالة روسية ذات مغزى تقول إن روسيا تعتذر عن التسرّع وترغب بطي الصفحة بما يضمن سلامة وصحة التحالف الذي يجمعها بسورية وقوى المقاومة. وهذا هو موضوعنا، لأن جوهر ما قاله المتربّصون بهذه العلاقة، هو أن روسيا تعمّدت تنفيذ العملية بالطريقة التي تمّت لأنها تريد أن تقول للعالم وللرأي العام في روسيا، ولـ«إسرائيل»، ولنا، أن روسيا لا تقيم حساباً لمن يسمّيهم الآخرون بحلفاء موسكو في المنطقة عندما يتعلق الأمر باسترضاء «إسرائيل»، وها هي موسكو تقول إنه يعنيها كثيراً ألا يترتب على العملية وما رافقها من نقص أو ضعف، أي تأثير سلبي على نظرة حلفائها وجمهور الحلفاء وبيئتهم الشعبية، وإنها لأجل ذلك مستعدة للقيام بخطوات ترميمية لا تشبه الأصل، لكنها توصل رسالة التمسك وتحدد مكان الأولوية.

– ما جرى يشبه ما كان قد تمّ في منتصف العام 2016 عندما اعتذرت تركيا عن إسقاط الطائرة الروسية ورعت موسكو إطلاق مسار أستانة، واتفاق الهدنة في حلب، وقامت الجماعات المسلحة باستغلال الهدنة لبناء قدراتها والاستعداد للمواجهة، وشعرت سورية وقوى المقاومة بأن السعي الروسي لاكتساب تركيا بات مكلفاً وأن سورية وقوى المقاومة يلحق بهما الأذى من هذه السياسة الروسية، وخرجت حينها الأصوات ذاتها تتحدّث عن روسيا التي باعت حلفاءها لتركيا لأن أولوية روسيا هي تركيا وقد استعملت حلفاءها لتصل للمبتغى وها هي تتركهم، في لغة تشبه ما سمعناه قبل اسابيع قليلة عن الاهتمام الروسي بـ»إسرائيل» واستعمال سورية وقوى المقاومة معبراً نحو هذا الهدف. ويومها مرت شهور قاسية انتهت بتحرير حلب بشراكة روسية ظاهرة، وجهت درساً قاسياً وهزيمة شنعاء لتركيا، مؤكدة مرة جديدة قواعد الأولويات الروسية.

– ستبقى التباينات تطلّ برأسها بين حين وآخر بين سورية وقوى المقاومة من جهة وروسيا من جهة أخرى، وسيبقى المتربّصون من أعداء وأعدقاء، يطلون برؤوسهم مع كل محطة تباين، لكن ستبقى العلاقة الروسية بسورية وقوى المقاومة تثبت أنها الأساس في رسم الأولويات الروسية في المنطقة.

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A Night of Atrocities at “Israeli” Prison: Bleeding Palestinians Left in Rain with No Food or Toilets

By Staff, Haaretz

Here’s what happened on the night of March 24 in Ketziot Prison in Al-Naqab:

Far from the eyes of the public: 100 Palestinian prisoners, bound hand and foot with plastic handcuffs, were thrown to the ground, beaten with clubs and shot with Tasers. When morning broke, the plastic cuffs were replaced with steel ones, and they were shackled to one another in pairs. They were left like that for a day and a half, under the open sky in the desert cold, without water, without food, without toilets. Most were wounded, some were bleeding. The rain that fell on them mingled with the blood flowing from their injuries.

They were wounded when Special Forces of the “Israel” Prison Service, Border Police and regular police force – a total of about 300 warders and officers – invaded their wing.

The situation had become particularly fraught between the Ketziot warders and the prisoners after the latter’s cellphones were jammed – by means of measures that terrified the prisoners because of their perceived radiation hazard, and infuriated them as well because now they were even more cut off than ever from their families. Afterward came the stabbing and then the brutal acts of punishment and revenge by the IPS and police forces against the inmates in wing A-4. They used Tasers and clubs on nearly every prisoner in the wing. Dozens were wounded, eight were taken to the hospital by helicopter.

Very little about these events was reported in the media. This week, however, an opportunity arose to hear a full report about what actually happened last month, from a prisoner who was released from Ketziot two weeks ago. He, too, was wounded in the furor and needed hospital treatment even after his release.

Mohammed Salaima, his wife, Ruseila, and their two children – 2-year-old Yazar and 8-month-old Mayis, who was born while her father was in Ketziot – live in a small one-room apartment in the neighborhood of Jabel Kurbaj in Al-Khalil [Hebron]. He’s a smiling, stocky baker of 25.

On March 29, five days after the unrest broke out at Ketziot, Salaima finished his jail term and returned home. For three hours, Salaima described the events of the night of March 24, which he referred to as the “night of the crimes” and the “night of the atrocity.”

The trouble began with the announcement of the installation of jamming devices on February 18, in wing A-4 where more than 110 prisoners are housed in six tents. At the time, there were three or four smuggled cell phones in the wing, and the inmates used them in rotation: A prisoner could make one 15-minute call every three days.

The prison warders informed the inmates about the jamming devices, Salaima says, confirming that the decision was made by “Israeli” Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and Public Security Minister Gilad Erdan, ahead of the election on April 9, as a show of their toughness with Hamas detainees.

The prison management announced that a search would be carried out in wing A-4 and that the inmates would be moved elsewhere while it was being conducted. There were now about 100 prisoners in the cellblock, some having been released in the meantime. At first, “Israeli” service claimed that the move would only last for two hours. Then they said it was for the night, but ultimately the inmates were ordered to take their gear with them because they were being moved to wing A-3, which had been evacuated, for two weeks. The transfer proceeded quietly at first, with 10 inmates walking over at a time, until only a few detainees remained in A-4.

The whole transfer procedure was accompanied by members of Special Forces from the IPS and the police: Masada, Yamam, Yamar and Keter. Now they burst inside, forcibly. Some 300 of them were arrayed against the inmates, most of them already in A-3, a few still in A-4. Not one prisoner escaped the blows of the clubs or the Taser, says Salaima, adding that the beatings were indiscriminate and that they turned the prison wings into a battlefield. Forty-five inmates were wounded. He tried to hide in a corner but was clubbed; the scars on his forehead and his nose testify to that.

“They broke legs, arms, noses, chins, ribs,” he says, about the Special Forces that had been brought in. “Masada shot, and Yamar, Yamam and Keter did the beating.” About 340 Taser shells were fired at the Palestinian Prisoners, and around 15 to 20 dogs also took part in the operation to suppress the prisoners, and wounded a few of them. The melee lasted for three or four hours, into the night, according to Salaima.

That was followed by the shackling of prisoners’ hands and feet, who were then left outside, under the nighttime sky. For 36 hours the inmates remained like that – bound, hungry, thirsty, bruised, and exposed to the cold, on the ground.

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Palestinians behind «Israeli» Bars

Designed By Abeer Mrad

In the Occupied Palestinian territories, the “Israeli” entity has built 22 prisons in which it unjustly detains approximately 7000 Palestinians among those are men, women and children of all walks of life.

Palestinians behind «Israeli» Bars



كلمات عتب لروسيا الحليفة والصديقة

أبريل 6, 2019

ناصر قنديل

– لن تتأثر العلاقة التحالفية العميقة التي تجمع روسيا بسورية ودول وقوى محور المقاومة، بقيام موسكو بتسليم بقايا جثة جندي السلطان يعقوب، لحكومة كيان الاحتلال، خارج منظومة التنسيق، وموجبات التحالف، ومقتضيات احترام السيادة السورية. ومستلزمات الخصوصية التي يختزنها حدث بهذا الحجم ارتبط غالباً بمفاوضات تبادل ترتبط بها حرية الآلاف من الأسرى السوريين والفلسطينيين، لكن مقتضيات التحالف والحرص تقتضي المصارحة وتسجيل اللوم والعتب، وقوله علناً، طالما صار الأمر علناً، والرد من قلب العتب واللوم وربما الغضب، على كل الذين يحلو لهم تشويه صورة روسيا ورسم شبهات حول خلفياتها، أو ينخرطون منذ بدء الحرب على سورية بمحاولات النيل من صورتها كدولة سيّدة تتمسك بسيادتها.

– يعني الكثير أن تقول سورية إنها لم تكن على علم بقضية تسليم البقايا، بعد قول الرئيس الروسي فلاديمير بوتين أن استعادة الرفات تمّت بالتعاون بين العسكريين الروس والسوريين. وهذه رسالة سيادية كبيرة في قلب علاقة التحالف والصداقة، عنوانها أن ما جرى أكبر من أن يسهُل تمريره تحت الطاولة والاكتفاء بالحديث عنه في الغرف المغلقة التي تتمّ فيها مناقشة الخلافات بين الحلفاء. فالصورة التي نقلت عبر الفضاء ووصلت للأسرى في سجون الاحتلال وأشعرتهم بالغصّة والمرارة، تقتضي من الدولة السورية التبرؤ منها، وتستدعي القول لروسيا كحليف وصديق إن خطأ جسيماً تم ارتكابه بتوهم أن العلاقة التحالفية تحتمل تمرير أمر كهذا لتحقيق مكاسب إعلامية لصورة روسيا كدولة حريصة «إنسانياً» على استعادة رفات الجنود الذين يقتلون في الحروب وتسليمهم إلى ذويهم، وتقديم هذه الهدية لرئيس حكومة الاحتلال بنيامين نتنياهو عشية الانتخابات، ضمن تنافس أميركي روسي على الاستثمار في فوز نتنياهو الانتخابي.

– بات معلوماً أن «إسرائيل» أدارت قضية البحث عن الرفات بالتعاون مع الجماعات الإرهابية التي سيطرت على مخيم اليرموك، وأن مخابرات كيان الاحتلال فتحت باب التفاوض مع موسكو لتأمين نقل هذا الرفات إلى موسكو من ضمن التفاوض على انسحاب الجماعات المسلحة من مخيم اليرموك. وهنا لا صحة للكلام عن قيام روسيا من وراء ظهر الدولة السورية بعمليات البحث عن الرفات والقيام بنقله. كما لا صحة للكلام عن حسابات روسية أبعد من المكاسب الآنية، وكل ما ينسجه بعض الخيال المريض عن مشاريع تسويات روسية أميركية تتم تحت الطاولة على حساب سورية، وتتصل بأمن «إسرائيل»، منافٍ لحقيقة أن ما يقوله الروس هو أنهم وضعوا أمام نتنياهو شرط التوقف عن الغارات على سورية كثمن لهذا التعاون، وما تقوله وقائع الشهور الماضية أن روسيا قامت بترميم شبكات الدفاع الجوي السورية وأنها زودت سورية بالحديث والجديد منها، وما يقوله المنطق إن روسيا في وضع السيد القوي وليس ثمة ما يستدعي أن تتصرف بضعف أمام «إسرائيل»، وإن الأمور الجارية في المنطقة تؤكد صحة منطق الرئيس بوتين مع رئيس حكومة الاحتلال حول اتفاق فك الاشتباك الموقع عام 1974، والكلام منشور علناً، يربط هذا الاتفاق بقرارات الأمم المتحدة بعودة الجولان إلى سورية، ووقف أي عمل عسكري ضد سورية، وثمّة الكثير الذي يعرفه الروس وسيحدث على هذا الصعيد بعد الإعلان الأميركي الاعتراف بضم «إسرائيل» للجولان. – كان المطلوب ببساطة أن تصارح موسكو حليفتها دمشق بما يجري منذ بداية القضية، وأن تطلب تفويضها بإدارة مفاوضات لتسليم الرفات، بما يضمن مطالب روسية معينة، هي حق روسيا، لكنه يضمن الإفراج عن آلاف الأسرى السوريين والفلسطينيين، وإبلاغ تل أبيب عندما طلبت وساطة موسكو لتسلم الرفات ونقله، بأن القبول مشروط بقبول تل أبيب بهذا التفاوض المتعدد الأطراف، وما كانت حكومة نتنياهو قادرة على الرفض.

– هي غلطة… وغلطة الشاطر بألف، لكنها ليست خيانة ولا مؤامرة. وبين الحلفاء تحدث تباينات ويقع البعض بالتسرّع، ويتورط البعض بحسابات فئوية تُغري بالتجاوز، لكن التصحيح يجب أن يتم من ضمن منظومة التحالف، وروسيا ستبقى صديقاً وحليفاً وشريك الانتصارات الكبرى التي تغيّر العالم، و»إسرائيل» ستبقى العدو الذي تنتظره مقاومة في الجولان والذي سيدفع الثمن في مفاوضات تبادل لاحقة لبقايا جنوده الآخرين، حرية لآلاف الأسرى والمعتقلين.

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رفات الجندي الإسرائيلي بدل حرب؟

أبريل 6, 2019

روزانا رمّال

تبدو القوات المسلحة الروسية العاملة في سورية على أهبة الاستعداد من اجل تنفيذ أجندة واضحة يرى الكرملين فيها مصلحة عليا بمعزل عن أي محاولة للإيحاء بشراكات تفرضها عليه طبيعة وجوده على الأرض السورية، أكان لجهة مشاركة الإيرانيين في بعض وجهات النظر او المعارك او لجهة المشاركة جنباً واحداً مع السوريين ذلك لان الساحة السورية فرضت روسيا فيها لاعباً أساسياً وفتحت حساباً منعزلاً عن باقي الملفات، خصوصاً بعد تضرّر قواتها الجوية والبرية من مواجهات عدة مع الأتراك والإسرائيليين. وعلى هذا الأساس صار يمكن الحديث على اعتبارات روسية صرفة، لكن ومع كل هذا الحساب لا يمكن اعتبار ما يتعلق بـ»إسرائيل» جزءاً لا ينسجم مع طبيعة المصلحة السورية او المحور بشكل عام، الا ان هذا لا يعني ان تعتبر سورية جزءاً ضمن عملية البيع والشراء. والحديث هنا عن نقل رفات جندي إسرائيلي يدعى زخاريا باومل قتل مع عدد من الجنود الإسرائيليين في معركة السلطان يعقوب بعد أسبوع من الاجتياح الإسرائيلي للبنان عام 1982.

نقل الرفات اليوم يشبه نقل الدبابة الإسرائيلية وبالطريقة نفسها بالأمس. والحديث عن هدية قدمها بوتين لنتنياهو بالحالتين. وبالمقارنة لم يؤدّ تسليم الدبابة تلك الى تنازل روسيا عن معركتها في دعم الدولة السورية الممثلة بالرئيس بشار الأسد ولا سجلت أي تراجع محوري في عملية التقدم السياسي او العسكري على مختلف الجبهات. وبالتالي صارت المسألة لا تتعدى المعنويات الإسرائيلية التي يحتاجها أي مرشح إسرائيلي غالباً ليتخلص من كابوس الخسارة، فكيف بالحال عندما يتعلق الأمر ببنيامين نتنياهو «آخر» صقور «إسرائيل».

آخر الصقور هذا لا يبدو حسب المشاريع الموعودة قادراً على تحقيقها بما يتعلق بصفقة القرن التي تجمّدت بقرار فلسطيني أولاً. الأمر الذي يجعل أي شريك عربي فيها مكشوف حكماً لتتوالى سلسلة الردود العربية الرافضة شكلاً، ولو كانت مؤيدة ضمناً.

من الطبيعي أن يشكل نقل رفات الجندي خضة في الشارع السوري والعربي بين من يتهم فيها سورية بالتغاضي عن القرار الروسي من جهة، ومن يعتبر روسيا أنها تصرّفت من تلقاء نفسها بدون استشارة سورية. وفي هذا ما يكفي من الفوقية والاستهتار بسورية وحساباتها. وفي الحالتين الامر مرفوض حكماً. لتبقى العودة الى موقف الرئيس الروسي فلاديمير بوتين نقطة العبور الأبرز نحو المرحلة التي ترغب فيها روسيا تقديمها للمنطقة و»إسرائيل» تحديداً.

نقل الرفات بجهود روسية، كما قال بوتين، هو دعم روسي واضح لنتنياهو قبيل ساعات من الانتخابات الإسرائيلية الحساسة، لكنها تؤكد أيضاً أن روسيا صارت لاعباً بنتائج الانتخابات الإسرائيلية بعد ان صارت لاعباً بنتائج الانتخابات الأميركية وهي التهمة التي لم يتخلّص من ذيولها ترامب حتى الساعة. وبهذا الموقف يقدم بوتين مساعدة مباشرة محسوبة النتائج، لكنها لا تنسف شيئاً من حساب الربح والخسارة في معركة استراتيجية كبرى، لكنها بكل تأكيد تفرض روسيا «وسيطاً» موثوقاً لدى «إسرائيل» في المرحلة المقبلة لجهة التنقيب عن النفط في المنطقة ولجهة التوسط في حل سياسي شامل فيها. وكل هذا يحتاج الى وسيط تأتمن له «إسرائيل» ويمكنه في الوقت نفسه أن يكون جهة موثوقة عند السوريين والإيرانيين.

لم تدّعِ روسيا يوماً عداوة لـ»إسرائيل»، بل أن زيارات نتنياهو لها في الفترة الاخيرة هي الأكثر على الإطلاق من مرحلة ما قبل عام 2011 لمسؤول إسرائيلي. الامر الذي يؤكد اعتماد «إسرائيل» بشكل كبير على موسكو كمرجعية حل وربط في الأزمة السورية تحديداً لا يمكن تخطيها. ويمكن الجزم أنه لولا الأزمة السورية لما كبر موقع روسيا الدولي ولا تنامى.

لكن الدفاع عن نظام يسهل ويمرّر شريان حياة لمنظمات مسلحة تقاتل «إسرائيل» مثل حزب الله من قبل روسيا ليس أمراً مبرراً عند «إسرائيل». وبأي حال من الاحوال اعتراف روسيا بهذه القوى وإطلاق تسمية «المقاومة» عليها بحسب دبلوماسي روسي رفيع لـ»البناء» يتكفّل بنسف الثقة بين «إسرائيل» وروسيا، والمحطات كثيرة التي احبطت فيها روسيا مخططات إسرائيلية وأكبرها منع إسقاط الرئيس السوري بشار الاسد سياسياً في معركة كبرى خاضتها الدبلوماسية الروسية في مجلس الأمن، وعسكرياً بعد استقدام الجيش الروسي اي ان التموضع الروسي الى جانب السماح لاستمرار معادلة المقاومة، لا بل اعتبار عناصر حزب الله شركاء الدم بالقتال على الأرض السورية وهذا يبقى أكبر من أي شيء في هذه المعادلة ولا يمكن لتسليم رفات جندي توضع في خانة رفع معنويات نتنياهو المضطربة جراء انتخابات مقلقة أن تنسف الموقف الروسي. ولا يمكن ايضاً الذهاب بعيداً باعتباره موفقاً لا يتماشى إلا مع المصلحة السورية الصرفة. فلروسيا حساباتها في كل المشهد قبل كل شيء.

يخوض نتنياهو الانتخابات وفي يده إنجازان يحملهما للداخل الإسرائيلي من أجل اعتباره جواز مرور امام الخصوم على أساس انه قادر على ادارة المرحلة المقبلة ومتابعة الأحلام الكبرى وأهمها صفقة القرن أكثر من غيره لأنه يحظى برضى قوتين دوليتين بحجم الولايات المتحدة وروسيا الإنجاز الأول الإعلان الأميركي للجولان إسرائيلية والثاني تسلم رفات الجندي الإسرائيلي.

الأهم من كل ذلك هو الاحتمالات المفتوحة جميعها والتي بدأت في غزة عبر معركة عسكرية أو حرب كادت تتوسع يحتاجها نتنياهو للانتخابات أيضاً. الامر الذي يجعل من الرفات نقطة لجم وكبح لجماحه يقدمها له الروس تغطية لحرب عاجز عن شنها أكان بوجه الفلسطينيين أو السوريين او مع حزب الله قطعاً.

Israeli Media: No Attempt to Intercept Tel Aviv Rocket, Gaza Strikes Selective

Tel Aviv rocket

March 26, 2019

Tackling the tensions between Palestinian resistance and Israeli occupation, an Israeli analyst sees that Tel Aviv did not make an attempt to intercept Palestinian rocket launched at Tel Aviv on Monday.

In an article entitled “Israel Launches Gaza Campaign That May Last Several Days,” Amos Harel said: “Like last time, there was no attempt to intercept the rocket,” referring to an incident ten days ago, when a rocket was also fired at Tel Aviv from Gaza.

“The army does not reveal information about the deployment of the Iron Dome, but the two incidents could point to two problems. One is a gap in intelligence and analysis of the Palestinian organizations’ intentions. The other is a gap in Iron Dome deployment, whether due to operational mistakes or a shortage of batteries,” Harel, who is a media expert on military and defense issues wrote.

He noted that the first wave of Israeli air strikes which started Monday focused on Hamas military targets and a few government ministries.

“It was clear that the attacks, which continued into the night, were very selective. In a few cases the “knock on the roof” procedure was used to warn those inside the buildings to evacuate before they were bombed. What happens next is very much dependent on how Hamas reacts and the success of Egypt’s mediation efforts, which had already begun Monday.”

Discussing hypotheses about the rocket fire on Monday morning, the Israeli expert said “it could have been Hamas’ way of disrupting Netanyahu’s visit to Washington. Or it might have been a reaction to an incident at Ketziot Prison, where 12 Hamas prisoners were wounded after two prison guards were stabbed.”

Meanwhile, he didn’t rule out that the rocket fire could be related to the demonstrations against Hamas over economic situation in Gaza.

However, he said that the rocket launch cannot be dissociated from the yearlong demonstrations along the Gaza border and developments on other fronts, from Israeli prisons to the latest attacks in West Bank.

“In the background, Hamas is continuing its preparations for this coming Friday, on which the anniversary of the March of Return demonstrations along the Gaza border fence is being marked,” Harel noted.

“The military escalation will continue to haunt the election campaign. If it intensifies, the political discourse will focus on it, at the expense of the latest scandals, from (Benny) Gantz’s hacked phone to the conduct of (Benjamin) Netanyahu and his associates in the submarines affair,” the Israeli expert concluded.


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