Around 8000 Sudanese Mercenaries Killed or Injured: Officials Mulling Withdrawal from Yemen

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Around 8000 Sudanese Mercenaries Killed or Injured: Officials Mulling Withdrawal from Yemen

November 2, 2019

The Yemeni army spokesman General Yehya Sarea announced that the around 8000 Sudanese mercenaries were killed or injured since the beginning of the Saudi-led aggression on Yemen, adding that 2000 of them were claimed during the past month.

General Sarea displayed during his press conference testimonies of some of the Sudanese kidnapped by the Yemeni forces, stressing that Sudan’s participation in the aggression imposed on Yemen to take counter measures.

In this context, media reports noted that the Sudanese officials are mulling a decision to withdraw 10000 of the troops in Yemen due to the augmenting losses inflicted upon them there.

Source: Al-Manar English Website

Armed Forces Spokesman Reveals Loss of Sudan Mercenaries

The Yemeni Armed Forces spokesman, Brigadier Yahya Sare’e, revealed the toll of killed Sudanese mercenaries involved in the aggression on Yemen, stressing that it exceeds 8,000 killed and injured.

Brigadier Saree said in a televised statement on Saturday that the Sudanese killed in the south, Taiz and the west coast, until last month, in all fronts reached 4253 soldiers. He pointed out that in 2015 and 2016 the number killed reached 850.

He pointed out at the press conference, in which he presented testimonies of Sudanese prisoners and pictures of bodies left in the deserts, and during the past two years recorded crimes and violations committed by Sudanese mercenaries amounted to rape, stressing that the inclusion of children in the fighting among the crimes and violations committed by the leadership of mercenaries of the udanese army.

Brigadier Yahya Sare’e said that the aggression alliance depends on the Sudanese army mercenaries and does not deal with them like mercenaries working in foreign security companies, pointing out that all prisoners of the Sudanese army were treated with all humane in accordance with religion and ethics.

He considered that the continued participation of Sudan in the aggression on Yemen serves only the agendas of the Authority and the coalition of aggression. He pointed out that there are Sudanese brigades stationed on the fronts under the supervision of Saudi Arabia and others in the south and west coast under the supervision of the UAE.

He pledged that “the continued participation of Sudan in the aggression on Yemen will make our forces take serious steps to force them to leave.”

“The Sudanese forces inside Yemen are legitimate targets and any other formations that support the aggression coalition no matter where they are,” he said. Brigadier-General Saree said that the Sudanese people have been subjected to a campaign of media misinformation like other peoples of the region to withhold facts.

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أمن المصريّين الاستراتيجيّ في خطر؟

أكتوبر 7, 2019

د. وفيق إبراهيم

استطاعت معاهدة كمب ديفيد التي وقّعها الرئيس المصري السابق أنور السادات مع الكيان الإسرائيلي في 1979 إلغاء الدور الإقليمي الكبير لمصر وحولته بلداً ثانوياً في الشرق الاوسط مستتبعاً لدول الخليج النفطية والأميركيين و»إسرائيل».

هذا ليس اتهاماً بقدر ما هو وصفٌ دقيق للوضع السياسي لمصر من كمب ديفيد وحتى الآن.

إلا أن معاهدة جديدة تلوح في الأفق، قد يكون له أثر وتداعيات أعمق من كمب ديفيد حتى على مستوى تهجير المصريين من بلدهم.

وهذه الخطة ليست جديدة لأنها بدأت قبل ثماني سنوات بمشروع بناء سد النهضة على نهر النيل في جانبه الإثيوبي ما أحدث في حينه اضطراباً في العلاقات المصرية الإثيوبية استدعت سلسلة لقاءات بين البلدان التي يعبرها نهر النيل العظيم. وتعهّدت فيها إثيوبيا باحترام المعاهدات والأعراف والقانون الدولي الذي ينظم اقتسام المياه بين البلدان ذات الأنهار الدولية العابرة للحدود.

ومنها نهر النيل الذي يعبر ست دول أفريقية قبل وصوله الى مصر، يكفي أن أبا التاريخ هيرودوت اليوناني الإغريقي قال إن مصر هبة النيل.

يمكن هنا الاضافة أنها من دونه لا قدرة لها على الاستمرار ككيان سياسي لأن المصريين ينفقون 90 في المئة من الكميّات التي تصلهم وهي 55,5 مليار متر مكعب على مياه الشرب والزراعة أي أن مئة مليون نسمة من المصريين يرتبطون بهذا النهر بشكل حيوي استراتيجي.

وبما أن مصر هي البلد الأكبر بين دول النيل وذات القدرة السياسية الأكبر في حوضه، فإنها ظلت قادرة على استهلاك معظم حاجاتها من النيل بمعدل 90 بالمئة منه و10 في المئة من مياه الأمطار.

ما كان ينظم تحاصص مياه النيل هي معاهدة رعتها الدولة المستعمرة في حينه بين بلدان الحوض، اشارت صراحة الى ضرورة امتناع اي بلد من بلدان النهر بأي بناء عليه تسيء الى حصة مصر. هذا الى جانب الأعراف والعادات المعتمدة تاريخياً وهو ما يشير اليه القانون الدولي ايضاً، واخيراً يرى القانون الدولي ان غياب المعاهدات والأعراف تفرض اللجوء الى معايير نسبة عدد المستفيدين ومرور النهر في كل بلد ومراعاة بلدان المنشأ والمصب.

وهذه عناصر تدعم بشكل واضح مصر التي يزيد سكانها عن سكان كل بلدان عبور النيل، كما أن مجراه فيها هو الأكبر لأنه في البحر المتوسط بعد اختراقه الحدود السودانية.

لكن كل هذه المعطيات القانونية لم تمنع إثيوبيا من بناء سد النهضة أكبر سد في افريقيا لحجز كميات ضخمة من مياه النيل أكبر من الحصة المصرية، وبشكل لا يراعي ضرورة التخزين في مدد طويلة وليس بسرعة لأنها تنعكس سلباً على مياه الشرب والزراعة في مصر.

سياسياً دعمت «إسرائيل» إثيوبيا في سدّ النهضة هندسياً وتمويلياً بالإضافة الى تجاهل أميركي لم يكلف نفسه عناء تدبر أي تسوية بين مصر والحبشة، أما الأكثر طرافة فجاء في بيان أميركي صدر بعد لقاء ثلاثي بين مصر وإثيوبيا والسودان في الخرطوم لم يتوصل الى اي اتفاق وسط انسداد كامل في المواقف، لكن البيان الأميركي رأى في هذا اللقاء عنصراً إيجابياً يعكس حسن العلاقات بين أطرافه.

أما الأكثر طرافة فبيان للرئيس المصري السيسي اعلن فيه عدم التوصل لأي اتفاق مع إثيوبيا واعداً المصريين بأنه لن يسمح لسد النهضة بتعطيش مصر.

لذلك فهناك موقفان مشبوهان: الاول هو الموقف الأميركي المحتجب في هذه الأزمة، تواطؤ مكشوف. وموقف الدولة المصرية التي سمحت لإثيوبيا بالتعاون مع «إسرائيل» ببناء سد النهضة منذ ثماني سنوات وهي الملمّة بأضراره الأكيدة على الاستقرار الاجتماعي المصري هذه المرة، وليس لتخفيض زيادة مائية مصرية تأخذها ارض الكنانة من مياه النهر الخالد. وهي عملياً بحاجة لكل قطرة ماء لتلبية الزيادة المرتفعة للسكان.

أما المعطيات التي تثير المزيد من القلق فتبدأ بعرض إثيوبي لمصر بتزويدها عشرين مليار متر مكعب فقط أي بخفض 35 ملياراً، مما تستهلكه حالياً ورفضته مصر بحدّة.

كما أن السودان بدوره عرض على مصر حصة تصل إلى 35 ملياراً بخفض نحو عشرين مليار عن استهلاكه الحالي.

إلا أن تطويق مصر مائياً لا يقتصر على إثيوبيا والسودان بتشجيع أميركي، فهناك «إسرائيل» التي طالبت بقناة من مياه النيل تصل الى فلسطين المحتلة عبر سيناء، وذلك مقابل دعمها حصة مصر في إثيوبيا.

فماذا يجري؟

سدّ النهضة هو الجزء الثاني من كمب ديفيد وربما يشكل خطراً اكبر منه لأن إنقاص حصة مصر من نيلها يؤدي الى تراجع كبير في قطاعها الزراعي وتهجير الفلاحين فيها الى اقصى زوايا العالم، باعتبار ان الاقتصاد المصري مضطرب ومتراجع وعاجز عن تلبية أي تدهور اقتصادي، خصوصاً في قطاع الزراعة الذي لا يزال يشكل عمود الاقتصاد المصري، لذلك فإن سد النهضة هو في جانب من جوانبه مشروعاً لإنماء إثيوبيا لكنه في جوانبه الاخرى يؤدي الى إفقار مصر وتهجيرها ووضعها في خدمة الأميركيين والخليج و»إسرائيل» في آن معاً.

فهل ينزح المصريون؟ هناك اعتقاد بأن النظام المصري هو المهدّد بالنزوح لعجزه عن الدفاع عن بلده ومكانتها الإقليمية ومياه نيلها واستمراره في التبعية لـ»إسرائيل» والأميركيين، ما يبقي مصر في دائرة الدول المنصاعة والفقيرة ولا حلّ إلا بعودتها من كمب ديفيد و»إسرائيل» الى بلدها العربي للعودة الى قيادة الإقليم نحو مستقبل تتعاون فيه الدول العربية لتحقيق التطور في الشرق الأوسط وصون النيل من كل مكروه.

Saudi Arabia Won’t Attack Iran. But It May Pay Someone Else To

Saudi Arabia Won’t Attack Iran. But It May Pay Someone Else To

By Nesrine Malik, The Guardian

There is a longstanding joke told in the Middle East about Saudi Arabia’s reluctance to fight its own wars. “Saudi Arabia will fight until the last Pakistani,” the punchline goes, in reference to the fact that Pakistani troops have long supported Saudi’s military endeavors.

The punchline has expanded lately to include the Sudanese, a recent addition to the Saudi army’s ground troops. Saudi Arabia is accustomed to buying labor that it deems too menial for its citizens, and it extends that philosophy to its army.

There is always a poorer country ready to send cannon fodder for the right price. The military assault in Yemen is sometimes referred to as “the Arab coalition”, a respectable term for a Saudi-led group of combatants that, in addition to allies in the Gulf, includes forces from Egypt, Jordan and Morocco, as well as Sudanese child soldiers, whose deaths are handsomely compensated for with cash paid to their families back home. When asked what fighting in Yemen under the command of the Saudis had been like, some returning Sudanese troops said that Saudi military leaders, feeling themselves too precious to advance too close to the frontline, had given clumsy instructions by satellite phones to their hired troops, nudging them in the general direction of hostilities. Where things were too treacherous, Saudi and coalition air forces simply dropped bombs from high-flying planes, inflating civilian casualties. This is how Saudi fights: as remotely as possible, and paying others to die.

It is baffling, in the light of last week’s attacks on two Saudi oil facilities, that there is so much speculation about Saudi and Iran going to war. Saudi does not “go to war”: it hires proxies, and depends on US gullibility to continue the lie that it is the regional peacekeeper, and that any threat to the country destabilizes the region. The US and Saudi Arabia have repeatedly accused Iran of being behind the attacks, which were claimed by Yemen’s Houthi movement, a group aligned with Iran and fighting the Saudi-led alliance in Yemen’s war. The Pentagon has announced that it will be sending hundreds of US troops, in addition to air and missile defense equipment, to Saudi Arabia as a “defensive” move.

Why does a country that was the world’s largest arms importer from 2014 to 2018, according to a report by the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, need so much help?

In 2018, the US provided 88% of all weaponry sold to the country. By the end of 2018, Saudi was responsible for 12% of global arms purchases. It is clearly not in need of more military kit from the US to defend it against drone attacks.

What, then, does a country that is involved in one military campaign, in Yemen, and which appears so vulnerable to attack and in need of constant protection, do with so many weapons? Buying the weapons, rather than deploying them, is the point. These multimillion-dollar purchases maintain commercial relations with western allies from whom it imports arms, and who in return turn a blind eye to Saudi’s human rights abuses, assassinations and kidnappings, because there is too much money at stake. Saudi Arabia’s entire foreign policy model is based on using its wealth to buy friends and silence.

And so Saudi must continue to play on US fears about Iran, ensuring that its bodyguard is always “locked and loaded”, as Trump stated in a sabre-rattling tweet after the drone strikes. At the same time, Saudi continues to destabilise the region by meddling in the internal affairs of other Arab countries, passing on arms to other dictatorships in the Middle East and North Africa, and launching aggressive social media intimidation and disinformation campaigns. Even Twitter clamped down on Saudi accounts last week. And still the country is perceived to be a vulnerable innocent, a bulwark against chaos in the Middle East.

Bellicose in the extreme, and yet aware that it is highly unlikely to suffer the consequences of its pugnaciousness, Saudi is currently locked in escalating conflicts with Iran, Qatar and Yemen, propping up military regimes in Sudan and Egypt, messily meddling in Lebanon, and continuing to fund random Sunni hardline endeavours all over the world – and generally getting away with it. Saudi will not go to war with Iran, but the US may do so on its behalf. Meanwhile, Saudi looks on – as ever, the indulged and unpunished provocateur of the Middle East.

Yemen’s Interior Ministry Mourns Martyr Ibrahim Badreddine Al-Houthi as Clashes among Mercenaries in Aden Escalate

August 9, 2019

Capture

The Yemeni Interior Ministry on Friday mourned the martyr Ibrahim Badreddine Al-Houthi, who had been assassinated at the treacherous hands of the Saudi-Israeli aggression.

The ministry confirmed in a statement that it would not hesitate to prosecute and capture the puppets of criminal aggression that carried out the assassination.

In Aden, the clashes between the gunmen backed by UAE and those who follow the fugitive president Abd Rabbu Mansour Hadi have escalated and reached the presidential palace in Al-Maashiq as reports have indicated that a number of them were either killed or injured.

Yemen has been since March 2015 under brutal aggression by Saudi-led Coalition, in a bid to restore control to fugitive president Abd Rabbu Mansour Hadi who is Riyadh’s ally.

Tens of thousands of people have been killed and injured in the strikes launched by the coalition, with the vast majority of them are civilians.

The coalition, which includes in addition to Saudi Arabia and UAE: Bahrain, Egypt, Morocco, Jordan, Sudan and Kuwait, has been also imposing a harsh blockade against Yemenis.

Source: Al-Manar English Website and Al-Masirah

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النأي يالنفس Self-distancing

Sudan’s Path Forward; Advice to the Protest Movement in Light of National Security Concerns

June 10, 2019

by Aspelta for The Saker Blog

Several months of mass protests in Sudan have succeeded in ousting the thirty-year presidency of Omar Al Bashir and gaining significant international attention, with a Transitional Military Council now in place comprised of many leading officials from Bashir’s government. With negotiations between protesters and the council stalling, and with the council itself divided between military officials and the leadership of independent militias such as the Janjaweed, the country appears to be growing only more divided as the threat of state collapse and possibly open civil war looms. For the leaders of the protest movement, the future of the country largely remains in their hands – namely in how they proceed to deal with the military council and whether they can reach an accommodation. By continuing on their current path – making somewhat unrealistic demands for an immediate transfer to civilian government – a protracted conflict and the eventual quashing of hopes for reform are effectively guaranteed. An understanding of the current threats to national security, the nature of the external actors which have interests in seeing certain outcomes from a transition of power in Sudan, and the broader national interest, are all vital for the protest movement to move forward and reach an accord with the Military Council for the benefit of both parties.

It is critical to understand that the military has legitimate concerns, both for national security and for their personal security, which must be addressed if any sort of agreement can be reached. For officials personally, amnesty from trial for actions which a new republican government may term crimes against the state committed under the Bashir presidency and since remains essential to them reaching any agreement. This is critical for both the military themselves, and the leadership of the Janjaweed (Rapid Support Forces) and paramilitary forces responsible for the killings in Darfur and what is today South Sudan. By threatening these individuals with trial, and very likely imprisonment, execution and a repossession of their assets, the protesters are ensuring that these powerful individuals will be forced to employ all means at their disposal to prevent any sort of transition of power – which they will equate with an imminent threat to their own and their families’ personal survival.

Regarding national security concerns, officials in the military and intelligence will naturally be weary that the coming to power of a republican government based on a Western style system will lead to a serious undermining of the state’s security apparatus, even if temporary, which will leave the state vulnerable to external intervention by hostile states outside the country. States with their eye on Sudan’s resources, which would likely seek to exploit the deposing of the security forces and coming to power of an inexperienced civilian government, are many. Foremost among these are the Western Bloc states – namely Western European powers and the United States – which have for decades benefitted from fostering instability and division within the country. Admittedly, the policies of the Nimeiri and Bashir governments took few measures to counter Western attempts to foster separatism and foment armed rebellion in the country. Sudanese security officials and the former president have repeatedly alluded to the Western Bloc’s aspirations to “split Sudan into five countries,” all weak states and dependencies on the Western Bloc which are beholden to Europe and the United States in their foreign policymaking. Given both Western actions against the Sudanese state in previous decades, including the alleged backing of militants in Darfur and South Sudan which, due to improper and overly heavy-handed responses by the government in Khartoum sparked major conflicts, and considerable Western support for protests today, it is evident that the Western Bloc seeks an undermining of the Sudanese state through the grievances of the protestors. From messages of solidarity from Google executives, to vocal support from officials such as President Donald Trump’s National Security Adviser John Bolton, strong comparisons are drawn to the Libyan protests of 2011, the Umbrella Revolution and Tiananmen Square incident among other examples. While the latter two failed to cripple the Chinese state as their sponsors desired, the devastating results for neighboring Libya which saw thousands of Sudanese workers brutally executed by Western backed militias are evident. The government in Khartoum appears considerably more fragile than even Tripoli did at that time, much less Beijing, which makes the Western threat particularly dire.

The second threat comes from Egypt in the north, which not only occupies a part of Sudanese territory the size of Slovenia or Israel in the Hala’ib triangle, but has also long perceived its former colony and its people with some degree of contempt and sought to assert its authority to shape Sudan into part of its sphere of influence. Access to the Sudanese resource base on favorable terms is also considered a potentially invaluable lifeline for the struggling Egyptian economy, which suffers the effects of endemic corruption, environmental decline and serious overpopulation due to uncontrolled growth. For all its faults, the Omar Al Bashir government strongly denounced Egyptian meddling in Sudan’s internal affairs, its occupation and more recent exploration for fossil fuels in the Hala’ib triangle, and its demands that Khartoum alter its foreign policy to align with Egyptian interests. Egypt seeks to engineer the coming to power of a government, whether republican or military, which is weak enough that it need comply with Cairo’s demands – whether in foreign policy, in economic concessions or in acquiescence to Egyptian territorial claims. Egypt’s strong support for the Transitional Military Council, where Arab Gulf States have supported the power of various militias in particular the Janjaweed, indicates that Cairo seeks a stable dependency in Sudan.

The Arab Gulf States for their part, namely Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, have a primary interest in ensuring continued Sudanese participation in their ongoing war effort against Iranian backed Ansurullah coalition forces in Yemen. Sudanese forces have taken the bulk of casualties against coalition units in Yemen, and formed a valuable frontline which has shielded the casualty averse gulf troops from attack. Attesting to the importance of the Sudanese presence to the war effort, a member of a Sudanese contingent in Yemen, Mohamed Suleiman al-Fadil stated in a recent interview with the New York Times: “Without us (Sudanese forces), the Houthis would take all of Saudi Arabia, including Mecca.” Gulf states have in turn provided considerable economic assistance aimed at propping up the Military Council and in particular its deputy leader Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo – commander of Janjaweed forces. As pressure from the protests continues to grow, the Military Council’s reliance on assistance from the Gulf and resulting weakness and lack of independence will only grow.

Ultimately the protest movement in Sudan must recognize that by setting unreasonable demands and working against rather than seeking to cooperate with the government, the state overall is weakened which benefits only external powers. The three factions which today strive for power, the militias led by the Janjaweed, the military and the protestors, are all increasingly forced into a greater dependency on their external sponsors – the Arab Gulf States, Egypt and the Western Bloc respectively. As the parties continue to weaken one another through conflict, this ensures that whichever triumphs it will be a considerably weaker and less sovereign government than that of Omar Al Bashir which preceded it – which for all its faults remained largely independent in its foreign policymaking.

Should the protest movement proceed on its current trajectory, all three parties will continue to be weakened and the serious undermining or collapse of Sudanese statehood for the interest of external powers will become a real possibility. It is thus in the interests of both the nation and the protest movement to propose more reasonable terms to the military council which can unify the interests of both parties for the sake of the national interest. This can include formation of a transitional council comprised of a balance of military officials and civilian leaders selected by the protest movement – perhaps in an assembly with 55:45 representation. Demands must be not for the ousting and punishment of officials, which remain wholly unacceptable, but rather for the reform of the state to better suit national interests. A joint military-civilian government which prioritizes the protection of national sovereignty, economic and military modernization, and the protection of the rights of all ethnic groups, remains a viable alternative to protracted and seemingly unending conflict. The latter point remans particularly vital, given the use of ethnic conflict by the Western Bloc to undermine the state and the alienation of many parts of the country from the political process by the Omar Al Bashir government which increased polarization and fueled separatist sentiments. An enshrined equality for these groups, and guaranteed representation in whatever council or assembly governs the state, will be key to reducing chances of civil war and undermining Western efforts to support separatism. (A similar approach was taken by Indonesian revolutionary forces in 1945, and guaranteed participation in the political process and parliamentary representation for all ethnic groups was key to undermining Western efforts to foster division and recolonize the country.)

Finally, it is important for the protest movement not to assume that the only alternative to the corruption and stagnation of the Omar Al Bashir and Gaafar Nimeiry years is a Western style liberal democracy. States which pursue such a course in an atmosphere of serious national security threats and from a position of economic underdevelopment have almost without exception failed – with often severe consequences. A progressive and nationalist party state or military government, however, poses a far more viable alternative. The Chinese CCP, DPRK’s Worker’s Party, South Korea’s Park Chung Hee military government, Singapore’s Lee Kwan Yew military government and Taiwan’s Jiang Jieshi and Jiang Jing Kuo military governments are all prime examples, some of the few, of third world states which have managed to quickly modernize and progress while retaining sovereignty and self-determination despite considerable national security threats. The writer suggests that it is by looking to these examples, and certainly not to the Western Bloc whose models have provided repeated failure and whose policies towards Sudan are demonstrably hostile, that a brighter, more secure and more prosperous future for the Sudanese state can be achieved.

Aspelta is a former resident of Sudan (2018) writing under pseudonym. Well known defence and security analyst with over 900 publications widely cited in over a dozen languages. Expert on international politics specialising in East Asia and U.S. foreign policy.

 

 

Houthi forces seize important city in southern Yemen as they make new push towards coast

BEIRUT, LEBANON (8:00 A.M.) – The Houthi forces scored an imperative advance this week when their troops captured the provincial capital of Dhale in southern Yemen.

Backed by heavy artillery and missiles, the Houthi forces were able to expel the UAE-backed troops in Qatbah city on Friday, putting an end to their reign over the provincial capital in Dhale.

Following the capture of Qatbah, the Houthi forces pushed their way south to the town of  Sabah, where they are now involved in a fierce battle with the UAE-backed troops.

The Houthi forces are making a new push towards the southern coast of Yemen in a bid to alleviate the pressure on their troops in the northern part of the country.

With the ongoing ceasefire in the coastal city of Hodeidah, the war in Yemen has shifted to the northern and southern parts of the country.

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