‘Regime change’ in Hamas and a return to Syria

The removal of Khaled Meshaal from power was necessary for normalization with Damascus to occur

September 26 2022

Photo Credit: The Cradle

By The Cradle’s Palestine Correspondent

In mid-September, Palestinian resistance movement Hamas issued a statement indicating that it had restored relations with Syria after ten years of estrangement, effectively ending its self-imposed exile from Damascus.

After the outbreak of the Syrian crisis in March 2011, at the height of the so-called Arab Spring, Hamas – in line with its parent organization, the Muslim Brotherhood (Ikhwan) – turned its back on its once-staunch Syrian ally and threw its support behind the mostly-Islamist “revolution.”

As governments collapsed in key Arab states, the Ikhwan felt the time was ripe for their organization to ascend to a leadership role from Gaza to Egypt, Libya, Tunisia and Syria.

Yet the decision by Hamas’ leadership to leave Damascus was met with strong opposition from influential circles within the movement, especially in its military arm, the Al-Qassam Brigades.

Despite Hamas’ official position toward Syria, internal opposition to the break in relations remained for years, most notably from Hamas co-founder Mahmoud Al-Zahar, and a number of Al-Qassam Brigades leaders such as Muhammad al-Deif, Marwan Issa, Ahmad al-Jabari and Yahya al-Sinwar.

Today, that balance has shifted notably. Sinwar is currently Hamas’ leader in the Gaza Strip, and his alliance is in strong ascendence within the movement.

From Amman to Damascus to Doha

But back in 2011, the person with the final say over the decision to abandon its Syrian ally was the then-head of Hamas’ Political Bureau, Khaled Meshaal.

Meshaal was the director of the Hamas office in Amman in 1999 when the Jordanian government decided to expel him. He travelled between the airports of a number of Arab capitals, which refused to receive him, under the pretext that there were agreements with a superpower requiring his extradition.

Only Damascus agreed to receive him. Despite the tension that historically prevailed in the Syrian state’s relationship with the Muslim Brotherhood, Meshaal was given freedom to work and built a personal relationship with Syrian President Bashar Al-Assad. In the years that followed, Hamas was granted facilities and resources that it did not enjoy in any other Arab capital.

Syria opened its doors to train hundreds of resistance fighters from the Al-Qassam Brigades and to manufacture quality weapons, such as missiles and reconnaissance drones.

One Syrian source told The Cradle that the privileges enjoyed by Hamas leaders and members in Syria were not available even to Syrian citizens. In addition to the high cost of Meshaal’s residence and security in Damascus, the state provided him and his associates with dozens of luxury homes in the capital’s most affluent neighborhoods.

Syria was also at the forefront of countries that facilitated the arrival of high-quality weapons into the besieged Gaza Strip. A source in the resistance tells The Cradle that the first Kornet missile to reach Gaza between 2009 and 2011 came from Syria with the approval of President Assad, and was received by then-Chief of Staff of Al-Qassam Brigades Ahmed al-Jabari.

Also crucial to the Palestinian resistance was the arrival of Iranian and Russian missiles that entered Gaza via Syrian arms depots.

Meshaal chooses Doha

It is important to recognize that while the decision to leave Damascus was not by any means unanimously agreed upon within Hamas, as political bureau chief, it was ultimately Meshaal’s call.

A Hamas source informed The Cradle that in September 2011, six months after the outbreak of the Syrian crisis, Meshaal received an invitation from the Qatari Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs at the time, Hamad bin Jassim al-Thani, to visit Doha. Recall that Qatar was one of the first states to fund and arm the Islamist opposition in the brutal Syrian war.

According to al-Thani’s estimates, the “Syrian revolution” was likely to end in the overthrow of the Assad government. He is reported to have advised Meshaal to abandon the sinking ship, so to speak, because if the rebellion is successful, “those who stayed with him [Assad] will drown, as happened with the late President Yasser Arafat, when Saddam Hussein was defeated in Gulf War,” the source described.

In an attempt to win over Hamas from Iran’s patronage, al-Thani offered to financially support the movement and to provide a geographical space for operations in the Qatari capital and in Turkish territory.

Meshaal is said to have informed his host that such a decision could not be taken unilaterally, and that he needed to refer to Hamas’ Political Bureau and Shura Council for buy-in.

Internal dissent 

On his way back to Damascus, Meshaal made pit stops in a number of regional countries to inform Hamas’ leadership of the Qatari offer. Suffice it to say, the deal was rejected by the majority of members of the Political Bureau and the Al-Qassam Brigades.

The Hamas source says: “The second man in Al-Qassam, Ahmad Al-Jabari, rejected the treachery against the Syrian leadership, along with Mahmoud al-Zahar, Ali Baraka, Imad al-Alami, Mustafa al-Ladawi, and Osama Hamdan.

On the other hand, Meshaal had the support of Musa Abu Marzouk, Ahmed Yousef, Muhammad Ghazal, Ghazi Hamad and Ahmed Bahr, in addition to a number of the movement’s sheikhs such as Younis al-Astal, Saleh Al-Raqab, and Ahmed Nimr Hamdan, while the head of the Hamas government in Gaza at the time, Ismail Haniyeh, did not have a decisive position.

Meshaal’s opponents were of the opinion that as Hamas is a resistance movement, it would be ill-advised to sever ties with the region’s Axis of Resistance – Iran, Hezbollah and Syria – and that leaving this alliance left little options other than to join the “Axis of Normalization” [with Israel].

Meshaal then received a call from Kamal Naji, Secretary-General of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP), in which he was informed that the Syrians “are aware of all the details of your visit to Qatar, and of the discussion taking place in the Hamas leadership.”

According to the source, Naji advised Meshaal that Hamas “will not find a warm embrace like Syria, and that despite its historical disagreement with the Muslim Brotherhood, Damascus will not ask Hamas to take any declared position on the Syrian crisis.”

The source in Hamas told The Cradle: “The Qataris felt that Meshaal was unable to take such a fateful stance.” At this point, Sheikh Yusuf Al-Qaradawi (considered to be the spiritual guide of the Ikhwan) intervened to pressure both Haniyeh and Abu Marzouk, who had not yet made up their minds.

Fateful meetings

Meshaal was later invited to visit Turkey, where he met leaders of Syrian armed groups, accompanied by the Qatari Minister of Intelligence and officers from Turkish intelligence.

They convinced him that “a few steps separate the opposition from the Republican Palace in the Mezzeh neighborhood of Damascus, and that the days of the Assad regime are numbered.”

The meeting of Hamas’ political bureau in Sudan was the turning point. In that gathering, to the surprise of some participants, both Haniyeh and Abu Marzouk weighed in to side with Meshaal, and it was decided to “discreetly” withdraw from Damascus.

After the decision was taken, the Qataris worked to further enhance Meshaal’s position within Hamas, through an extraordinary visit by the Emir of Qatar, Hamad bin Khalifa al-Thani, to the Gaza Strip – the first for an Arab head of state. During this visit, al-Thani provided generous support with more than $450 million provided for reconstruction and the implementation of development projects.

Hamas’ fateful decision to abandon Damascus, however, was not met with the same enthusiasm by the movement’s military wing, who believed the move made little strategic sense.

Back to Damascus

In the following years, major regional changes contributed to the downfall of Khaled Meshaal and his removal from his position leading Hamas’ Political Bureau.

The Syrian state remained steadfast in the face of collective NATO-Gulf efforts to unseat Assad; Russian military intervention altered the battlefield balance of power; the Syrian political and armed opposition began to disintegrate and suffer heavy losses; the Ikhwan’s rule in Egypt and its control over Libya and Tunisia began to collapse; and a stand-off with Qatar caused Saudi Arabia and the UAE to alter their position on Syria.

With these stunning regional setbacks, it quickly became apparent that neither Qatari nor Turkish support offered any real strategic value for Hamas’ resistance model – nor could they hope to fill the void left by the reduction in Iranian and Syrian military support.

Moreover, Al-Qassam Brigades found itself facing severe financial difficulties, unable to secure the salaries of its members, let alone sustain any meaningful armed resistance against Israel’s continuous assaults and occupation.

At the time, Hamas’ revenues were derived mainly from taxes imposed on Gaza’s residents, while Qatari support, under US supervision, was limited to providing the expenses of the Hamas leadership in Qatar, and providing seasonal financial grants to government employees in Gaza.

Meshaal’s fall from power  

Cumulatively, these events and the stagnation of the Palestinian resistance convinced Hamas’ leadership of the need to reshuffle its regional cards. The freed prisoner, Yahya al-Sinwar, was the initial spark to revamp a fresh new agenda, following his sweeping victory as the new Hamas leader in Gaza.

Sinwar, one of the historical leaders of Al-Qassam Brigades, decided to reset relations with Iran and Hezbollah, and work toward the movement’s eventual return to Damascus.

Meshaal, realizing that regional changes were no longer in his favor, tried to flatter the Syrian state more than once in media statements. But a firm decision had already been taken across the Axis of Resistance that Meshaal was no longer a welcome or trustworthy figure.

This was especially the case after it became clear to the Syrian security services that Meshaal was involved, along with dozens of Hamas members, in supporting armed groups, exposing secret sites of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) and Lebanese resistance Hezbollah, smuggling weapons to armed opposition in the strategically-located Yarmouk refugee camp and eastern Ghouta region, and providing them with expertise in digging secret tunnels.

Meshaal’s isolation became crystal clear at the end of December 2021, when Hezbollah refused to receive him during a Beirut visit, even though he was officially the external relations officer for Hamas.

According to the Hamas source, Meshaal tried to disrupt the consensus of the leadership of the Political Bureau and the Shura Council on restoring relations with Syria, when he “leaked, at the end of last June, the decision taken in the Political Bureau meeting to return to Damascus.”

Hamas, post-Meshaal

Meshaal’s leak caused media chaos, followed by attempts to pressure Hamas to reverse course. A statement issued by eight of the most important Muslim Brotherhood scholars, advised Hamas to reconsider its decision because of the “great evils it carries for the Ummah.”

Meshaal meanwhile, remained busy trying to restore relations with Jordan, in parallel with Iran, Lebanon and Syria. However, with the recent announcement by Hamas that it would return to Syria, “the efforts made by Meshaal and the Qataris behind him have gone unheeded,” says the movement’s source.

The normalization of relations between Hamas and Syria is significant, not only for the military dividend it could reap for the Palestinian resistance, but also because it can pave the way for Turkey and Qatar to re-establish their Syria ties, although Doha would do so very reluctantly.

With the decision to sideline the Meshaal camp within Hamas, it would seem that Hamas – and not Syria – has ultimately been the subject of regime change in this regional geopolitical battle for influence.

The views expressed in this article do not necessarily reflect those of The Cradle.

Hezbollah Emerging as Winner from ‘Israel’-Lebanon Maritime Talks

September 24, 2022 

By Tony Badran | FDD.org

‘Israel’ and Lebanon are apparently close to a final agreement delineating their maritime border after a Lebanese government delegation met with the Biden administration’s energy envoy, Amos Hochstein, this week in New York. If the deal goes through, the Biden administration will have turned Hezbollah into a significant player in the Eastern Mediterranean energy industry, a development that will both enrich the group and expand its regional influence.

While the Lebanese delegation consisted of government officials, the real, if indirect, interlocutor for the Biden administration was always Hezbollah. The group’s chief, [Sayyed] Hassan Nasrallah, set the parameters and the tempo of the negotiations and has found an eager and cooperative partner in the Biden team. In fact, Hochstein leveraged Hezbollah’s threats to obtain major ‘Israeli’ concessions.

With talks apparently headed toward the finish line, Nasrallah reiterated last week the ultimatum that has framed the talks. As before, Nasrallah threatened to ‘attack’ ‘Israel’s’ Karish offshore gas rig, unless the US and ‘Israel’ agreed to his conditions before starting to pump gas from Karish. The Hezbollah leader said, “our red line is the start of extraction at Karish. … We cannot allow for oil and gas extraction from Karish before Lebanon obtains its rights.” Nasrallah added, “our eyes and our missiles are [fixed] on Karish.”

Nasrallah’s threats are cost-free, especially as he knows the Biden administration has leveraged them to impose a sense of urgency on ‘Israel’s’ caretaker government to concede Lebanon’s demands and conclude the agreement without any escalation.

Based on official Lebanese statements and reports in pro-Hezbollah media, the talks are in their final stage and Hochstein is supposed to submit a formal draft agreement shortly. While the details of a final agreement have not been made public, the satisfied assessments from the Lebanese side indicate that Washington has managed to extract critical concessions from ‘Israel’ that meet Hezbollah’s demands. First, ‘Israel’ will cede the entire disputed area of 854 square kilometers of Mediterranean waters. It will also cede the whole of a prospective gas field that protrudes into ‘Israeli’ waters beyond Line 23, which Lebanon has filed as its border.

‘Israel’ has reportedly requested a buffer area extending a few kilometers out to sea from its land border with Lebanon. UN peacekeepers would presumably monitor the area, although ‘Israel’ would still cede sovereignty to Lebanon. The details of this buffer area and its coordinates were reportedly the final item to be determined. Once the agreement is finalized, French energy giant TotalEnergies would begin operations in Lebanon’s Block 9.

Despite concerns of a conflagration before the end of September, given Hezbollah’s threats against Karish, Nasrallah’s speech affirmed the likelihood of that scenario was small. He was clear that an ‘Israeli’ test of the gas transport system from the Karish platform to the shore and back would not cross Hezbollah’s red line.

The key Hezbollah condition was for production at Karish to be frozen until the consortium led by TotalEnergies had agreed it would begin drilling for gas in Block 9 of Lebanon’s Exclusive Economic Zone, which ‘Israel’ now will have conceded in full. The Biden administration sought to satisfy that condition, meeting with French officials and TotalEnergies executives to discuss the start of operations.

If a border agreement is finalized, the Biden administration will have set a terrible precedent by leveraging Hezbollah threats to secure ‘Israeli’ concessions that enrich and empower the group. The administration will also have turned Hezbollah into a significant player in Eastern Mediterranean energy, enshrining the group’s partnership with France and its investments in Lebanon. The precedent might even extend beyond Lebanon as now Hezbollah is encouraging Hamas to follow its lead with gas fields off the coast of Gaza.

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‘Israeli’ Navy Checks Efficiency of New of Anti-ship Missiles Amid Fears of Hezbollah Action

22 Sep 2022

By Staff, Agencies

As the ‘Israeli’ military is worried about a possible action by the Lebanese resistance group, Hezbollah, over the dispute on the Karish gas field, the ‘Israeli’ Navy double-checked the efficiency of its latest generation of anti-ship missiles last month.

The Gabriel V is the fifth generation of the anti-ship missile developed by the ‘Israeli’ Aerospace Industries and the War Ministry’s research and development division, known by the Hebrew acronym MAFAT.

The “complex” trial in August witnessed a Saar 6-class corvette INS Oz launching a missile at a mock ship.

The Gabriel V missiles are being deployed on the navy’s Saar 6-class corvettes, replacing the Gabriel IV, developed in the 1990s.

The ‘Israeli’ announcement came amid fears of Hezbollah’s threats regarding the Zionist regime’s gas installations at the Karish Field before the US-mediated talks over a maritime dispute reach a solution.

The maritime dispute escalated in early July after the Zionist regime moved vessels into the Karish Gas Field, which lies in in the disputed territorial waters between the ‘Israeli’-occupied Palestine and Lebanon.

The Lebanese resistance movement of Hezbollah does not rule out going to war with the ‘Israeli’ occupation regime over the its attempts at impinging on Lebanon’s natural resources.

Hezbollah Secretary General His Eminence Sayyed Hassan Nasrallah has warned earlier that the resistance’s attitude and behavior towards the ‘Israeli’ regime in the case depend on the results of ongoing indirect negotiations between Beirut and Tel Aviv over the disputed maritime area.

The Zionist regime launched two wars against Lebanon. In both cases, it was forced to retreat after suffering a humiliating defeat at the hands of Hezbollah.

‘Israel’ Surrenders to Hezbollah: Zionist Media

September 20, 2022

The various Zionist media outlets and political analysts mocked the statement of the Israeli government which announced that gas extraction from Karish field will start regardless of the indirect agreement with Lebanon on the maritime border demarcation.

The Israeli circles confirmed that Hezbollah managed to impose its formulas on the Zionist side regarding the maritime dispute, adding that Sayyed Nasrallah’s threats are the main factor taken into consideration by the decision makers in Tel Aviv.

The Arab affairs expert Zvi Yehezkeli said that the postponement of the gas extraction from Karish is not technical, as announced, adding that Nasrallah’s threats affect ‘Israel’.

The Israeli security institution is concerned about facing more of Hezbollah provocative acts, such as flying drones over Karish rig, according to the Zionist military expert, Roi Sharon.

According to media reports, the Lebanese Deputy House Speaker Elias Abou Saab met with the US energy envoy, Amos Hochstein, in the margins of the UN General assembly in New York.

Meanwhile, the Zionist media concentrated on the scene of the direct confrontation between Al-Manar reporter Ali Shoeib and the Zionist soldiers on Lebanon’s southern borders, considering that this comes in the context of the upcoming war between the two sides.

Source: Al-Manar English Website

Netanyahu ‘blows a fuse’ over Lapid’s Karish concessions to Hezbollah

21 Sep 2022

Source: Al Mayadeen Net

By Al Mayadeen English 

Former Israeli PM Benjamin Netanyahu says Yair Lapid panicked and retreated following Sayyed Nasrallah’s threats, thus yielding to Lebanese demands.

Former Israeli occupation Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and his political rival, Israeli PM Yair Lapid

    Former Israeli occupation Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu slammed Tuesday his political rival, Israeli PM Yair Lapid, saying that the latter retreated following Hezbollah Secretary-General Sayyed Hassan Nasrallah’s threats.

    In a video message posted on his Twitter account, Netanyahu said Sayyed Nasrallah threatened Lapid that Hezbollah will attack “Israel” in the event of operating the Karish field before signing an indirect gas agreement with Lebanon.

    The former Israeli Prime Minister considered that Lapid panicked and failed to operate Karish, noting that now, he [Lapid] wants to give Lebanon – without any Israeli supervision – a gas field worth billions of dollars that would help Hezbollah possess thousands of missiles and shells that will be target “Israel”.

    Addressing Israelis, Netanyahu said that on November 1, the Likud party, under his presidency, will replace Lapid’s weak and dangerous Israeli government with a stable right-wing government for the next four years; a government, according to Netanyahu, that will restore security and the dignity of “Israel”.

    “Israel” made concessions to avoid escalation in Karish: IOF official

    Earlier, the Israeli Maariv newspaper quoted Amos Yadlin, former IOF Military Intelligence Directorate as saying that “Israel has made concessions in favor of Lebanon to demarcate the border to ward off the danger of escalation.”

    “Israel is showing leniency in the demarcation of the maritime borders,” Yadlin said, threatening Lebanon that the IOF does not want it to turn into Gaza.

    He highlighted the prominent role played by Hezbollah Secretary-General Hassan Nasrallah in this case, “which is indicative of the fact that he controls what is happening in Lebanon politically and militarily, which may push the Lebanese and the Israelis to a place that the two do not want,” as he put it.

    The former IOF official claimed that “Israel today has accepted the Lebanese line, and therefore, there is no place for Nasrallah’s demands concerning the Ras Al-Naqoura area.”

    Read more: Lebanese-Israeli maritime talks to end in few days: official

    Referring to the area adjacent to an area the IOF usurped from the Palestinians and consequently occupied, Yadlin insolently demanded “compensation for ceding the maritime economic zone in Ras Al-Naqoura and all the region to the south Qana field.”

    “We insist on these points,” he said, claiming that Sayyed Nasrallah “here has been trying to cause distortion.”

    Furthermore, Yadlin claimed that Karish is “purely Israeli” and that “we have to pump gas from there,” continuing to say, “The moment you concede to Nasrallah just once, you have to follow it with setting limits, because if the situation deteriorates toward an inevitable war, we know that we have done everything we can to prevent it.”

    This comes as Israeli media reported Monday that the signing between “Israel” and Lebanon of the agreement “on the maritime borders” is very close, stressing that what remains are “some technical details.”

    Similarly, Lebanese President Michel Aoun confirmed that negotiations related to the demarcation of the maritime border with “Israel” are in their final stages.

    Read next: US mediator made new proposal to Lebanese-Israeli maritime issue

    Fearing escalation, IOF request clarification on Karish statement

    Last week, Israeli media said that “it was the Israeli army that requested that clarification be issued regarding [an Israeli statement regarding] the Karish field, in order not to provoke tensions against Hezbollah.”

    Israeli Channel 13 stated that “the fear of a confrontation with Hezbollah has increased in recent weeks regarding the Karish gas platform. Despite Israel’s announcement that the next stage regarding the activation of the platform will begin soon, it has indicated, exceptionally, that the talk is not about extracting gas from it.”

    Channel 13 political affairs correspondent, Moriah Wahlberg, pointed out that “this clarification was not made in vain, but is rather aimed primarily at the ears of Hezbollah, as they in Israel do not want to create, provoke, and increase tensions, especially since these tensions already exist on this issue.”

    Wahlberg pointed out that “there is a disagreement in the Israeli leadership regarding the text of this statement, which was issued by the Ministry of Energy,” stressing that “some parties believed that this clarification should not be given in the matter of natural gas extraction, but parties in the army requested that this clarification be issued in order to avoid tensions with Hezbollah.”

    Read more: “Israel” fears military escalation against the Karish platform

    It is noteworthy that a source familiar with the matter revealed to Al Mayadeen, on September 11, that the US envoy for the demarcation of the maritime border, Amos Hochstein, handed Lebanon the coordinates of the line of maritime buoys, explaining that these coordinates constitute the “last point that is being negotiated,” in preparation for sending his [Hochstein’s] “full offer” next week.

    اسرائيل تقرّ بمعادلة المقاومة: الاستخراج بعد الاتفاق

    ما هي الرسالة التي بعث بها حزب الله؟ خلافات إسرائيلية يحسمها قرار رفيع بإعلان تأجيل الاستخراج

    الإثنين 19 أيلول 2022

    علي حيدر  

    أحدثت رسائل حزب الله شرخاً في التقدير والموقف لدى قيادة العدو وجيشه حول كيفية التعامل معها، في ضوء المخاطر الكامنة في كل من الخيارات الماثلة أمامهم. وفرضت مواقف السيد حسن نصر الله نفسها على المشهد في كيان الاحتلال، وخصوصاً إعلانه الأخير، السبت الماضي، عن رسالة بعثت بها المقاومة الى العدوّ تحذّر من بدء الاستخراج من حقل «كاريش» قبل الاتفاق مع لبنان. فيما استكمل الفريق التقني اللبناني الدراسة الأولية حول واقع الخطوط الحدودية، على ضوء مقترحات عاموس هوكشتين الأخيرة، مع تقديرات تشير الى احتمال الوصول الى حل لـ«المنطقة الأمنية» بما يرضي الجانبين

    شكّلت الرسالة التي أعلن الأمين العام لحزب الله السيد حسن نصر الله أن المقاومة وجّهتها إلى العدو والأميركيين، بعيداً من الإعلام، ومفادها أنه «سيكون هناك مشكل في حال بدء الاستخراج من حقل كاريش قبل الاتفاق مع لبنان»، إطاراً كاشفاً لخلفية البيان التوضيحي الذي أصدرته وزارة الطاقة الإسرائيلية وأكدت فيه أن ما ستقوم به في الأيام المقبلة ليس سوى إجراء اختباري لنظام الضخ. ومنعاً لأيّ التباس، سمحت الأجهزة الأمنية لوسائل الإعلام بالكشف عن أن الجيش هو الذي طلب من وزارة الطاقة إصدار البيان وأنه هو من أملى صياغته أيضاً. في غضون ذلك، أملت ‏وزيرة الطاقة الإسرائيلية كارين الهرار، أمس، « بصدق أن نتمكن من التوصل إلى اتفاق. لدينا التزامات تجاه السوق المحلي والدولي، لذلك يجب أن يتدفق الغاز في أقرب وقت ممكن».

    وكشفت القناة 13 العبرية عن خلافات داخل المنظومتين القيادية والأمنية، بين مؤيد ومعارض لإصدار البيان التوضيحي. وبلغ الخلاف حدّ رفعه إلى رئيس مجلس الأمن القومي إيال حولاتا الذي حسم الموقف لمصلحة إصدار البيان. فيما لم يجر تناول طبيعة الرسالة التي بعث بها حزب الله.
    ويبدو أن معارضي الرد على رسالة نصر الله، بإصدار بيان توضيحي، ينطلقون من تقدير أن هذه الخطوة ستُقدِّم إسرائيل كمن يخشى المواجهة العسكرية مع حزب الله، وتؤشر الى تسليم عملي بالمعادلة التي أرساها الحزب. كما ستؤدي الى تعزيز موقف لبنان الذي سيلمس مسؤولوه بشكل لا لبس فيه حجم حضور المقاومة وفعاليتها، ما يؤثّر سلباً على الموقف التفاوضي الإسرائيلي.

    على أن مؤيدي إصدار البيان التوضيحي لا يمكنهم إنكار هذه الدلالات. لكنهم تصرّفوا بواقعية وتعاملوا وفق مبدأ الخشية من أن يدفع الامتناع عن التوضيح حزب الله الى خطوات تؤدي الى تطورات دراماتيكية، وتضع إسرائيل أمام اختبار ميداني مفصلي، وهو ما تسعى حتى الآن الى تجنّبه. ويعكس موقف هؤلاء أيضاً حقيقة أنهم يأخذون تهديدات حزب الله بكامل الجدية، ويحرصون على ضرورة إفساح المجال للمفاوضات من أجل بلورة اتفاق يحول دون المواجهة. أضف الى ذلك أن هذا الموقف يتلاءم مع التوجه الأميركي الذي عبَّر عنه الرئيس الأميركي جو بايدن في اتصاله الأخير برئيس الوزراء الإسرائيلي يائير لابيد، وأكد فيه ضرورة التوصل الى اتفاق مع لبنان خلال الأسابيع المقبلة.

    نصرالله أهم تهديد لإسرائيل

    نقلت القناة 12 العبرية، أمس، عن قائد شعبة العمليات السابق في أركان جيش العدو اللواء إسرائيل زيف أن الأمين العام لحزب الله السيد حسن نصرالله «يشكل بالنسبة للجيش والمؤسسة الأمنية، أهم تهديد منذ انهيار الجيوش النظامية في محيطنا»، داعياً إلى «مراقبة شخصيته وطريقة تفكيره. وهذا دائماً ما كان على رأس جدول أعمال ضباط كبار، وبالتأكيد بالنسبة لي شخصياً».

    مع ذلك، فإن الخلاف داخل المنظومة المهنية – الاستخبارية يعكس أيضاً عمق هذا الخلاف وعدم استعداد أيّ من الطرفين للتنازل عن موقفه. وهو أمر مفهوم وغير مفاجئ في ضوء المعادلة الحادّة التي فرضها حزب الله: إما استخراج لبنان وكيان العدو للغاز، أو لا استخراج للطرفين مهما كانت الأثمان والتداعيات، وخصوصاً أن قيادة العدو وجدت نفسها أمام خيارين (الاتفاق أو فشل المفاوضات)، ستكون لهما تداعياتهما التي تتعلّق بموقع المقاومة في معادلة الردع، وبصورتها كضرورة وطنية لانتزاع ثروات لبنان وحمايتها، وهو ما يتعارض مع الجهود التي تبذلها واشنطن وتل أبيب بهدف إظهارها كعبء على لبنان والمنطقة.

    «حماس»: عائدون إلى سوريا

    الجمعة 16 أيلول 2022

    رجب المدهون

    تبادَل مسؤولو الحركة والمسؤولون السوريون، خلال لقاءات دورية جمعتْهم، ملاحظات حول فترة القطيعة وما سبقها (أ ف ب)

    أخيراً، وبشكل رسمي، وبعد صدور العديد من المؤشّرات المتلاحقة والمتسارعة في هذا الاتّجاه، أعلنت حركة «حماس» قرارها العودة إلى سوريا، مؤكدةً العمل على ترجمته لإنهاء سنوات طويلة من القطيعة مع دمشق، التي «احتضنت شعبنا الفلسطيني وفصائله المقاوِمة لعقود من الزمن»، كما قالت الحركة. ويأتي بيان الأمس ليُتوّج، بحسب معلومات «الأخبار»، سلسلة من اللقاءات التي جرت بين مسؤولي «حماس» والمسؤولين السوريين، وتخلّلتها مراجعات للفترة السابقة، وتبادل ملاحظات حول الملفّات التي «تجب معالجتها بشكل جدّي»، ليصل العمل حالياً إلى مرحلة «بناء الثقة»، تمهيداً للتطبيع الشامل والواسع

    غزة | كما كان متوقّعاً بعد سلسلة لقاءات ومباحثات رعاها «حزب الله»، أصدرت حركة «حماس»، أمس، بياناً أعلنت فيه وقوفها إلى جانب سوريا في وجه «المخطّطات الهادفة إلى تقسيمها»، مؤكّدة سعيها لترجمة قرارها باستعادة علاقاتها مع دمشق. وبحسب ما علمته «الأخبار» من مصادر «حمساوية»، فإن البيان يأتي في ضوء استمرار اشتغال الحركة على تطبيع هذه العلاقات بعد سنوات من القطيعة، و«مواجهة العقبات التي تحاول أطراف خارجية وضعها في طريق تسوية جميع الخلافات مع السوريين». وكشفت المصادر أن مباحثات عدّة انطلقت بعد معركة «سيف القدس» بين «حماس» والقيادة السورية، برعاية من الأمين العام لـ«حزب الله» السيد حسن نصرالله، حيث تمّ كسر الجمود كخطوة أولى، بينما وصل العمل في الفترة الأخيرة إلى مرحلة «بناء الثقة تمهيداً لاستعادة العلاقة بشكل أكبر وأوسع». وتبادَل مسؤولو الحركة والمسؤولون السوريون، خلال لقاءات دورية جمعتْهم، ملاحظات حول فترة القطيعة وما سبقها، والملفّات التي «تجب معالجتها بشكل جدّي لإنهاء الخلاف»، مع إبداء ملاحظات حول كيفية تجاوُز المسبّبات الخارجية والداخلية التي أعاقت التطبيع سابقاً. وأكدت المصادر أن هذا المسار سيتسارع خلال الفترة المقبلة، «في ضوء المتغيّرات والتحدّيات الإقليمية والدولية التي تُواجه محور المقاومة ككلّ، في ظلّ تَشكّل تحالف التطبيع بين الدول العربية ودولة الاحتلال برعاية أميركية، بما يشكّل تهديداً للمحور وأطرافه».

    وأعلنت حركة «حماس»، في بيان أمس، بعنوان «أمّة واحدة في مواجهة الاحتلال والعدوان»، مُضيّها في «بناء وتطوير علاقات راسخة مع الجمهورية العربية السورية، في إطار قرارها باستئناف علاقتها مع سوريا الشقيقة، خدمةً لأمّتنا وقضاياها العادلة، وفي القلْب منها قضية فلسطين، ولا سيّما في ظلّ التطوّرات الإقليمية والدولية المتسارعة التي تحيط بقضيتنا وأمّتنا»، مُجدّدةً تمسّكها بـ«استراتيجيتها الثابتة، وحرصها على تطوير وتعزيز علاقاتها مع أمّتها ومحيطها العربي والإسلامي، وكلّ الداعمين لقضيتنا ومقاومتنا». ودانت الحركة «بشدّة، العدوان الصهيوني المتكرّر على سوريا، وخاصة قصف مطارَيْ دمشق وحلب أخيراً»، مؤكدةً «وقوفنا إلى جانب سوريا في مواجهة هذا العدوان». وأعربت عن تقديرها «للجمهورية العربية السورية قيادةً وشعباً، لدورها في الوقوف إلى جانب الشعب الفلسطيني وقضيته العادلة»، متطلّعةً إلى أن «تستعيد سوريا دورها ومكانتها في الأمّتَين العربية والإسلامية»، مبديةً دعمها لـ«كلّ الجهود المخلصة من أجل استقرار وسلامة سوريا، وازدهارها وتقدّمها». وإذ كرّرت «موقفنا الثابت من وحدة سوريا أرضاً وشعباً»، و«رفضنا أيّ مساس بذلك»، فقد جزمت «(أننا) ننحاز إلى أمّتنا في مواجهة المخطّطات الصهيونية الخبيثة، الهادفة إلى تجزئتها وتقسيمها ونهب خيراتها، ونقف صفاً واحداً وطنياً وعربياً وإسلامياً لمقاومة العدو الصهيوني، والتصدّي لمخطّطاته». كما دعت إلى «إنهاء جميع مظاهر الصراع في الأمة، وتحقيق المصالحات والتفاهمات بين مكوّناتها ودُولها وقواها عبر الحوار الجادّ، بما يحقّق مصالح الأمّة ويخدم قضاياها». ولفتت إلى «التطوّرات الخطيرة التي تمسّ بشعبنا الفلسطيني وقضيّته العادلة، وأبرزها مظاهر التطبيع ومحاولات دمج العدو الصهيوني ليكون جزءاً من المنطقة، مع ما يرافق ذلك من جهود للسيطرة على موارد المنطقة، ونهب خيراتها، وزرع الفتن والاحتراب بين شعوبها ودولها، واستهداف قواها الفاعِلة والمؤثّرة، الرافضة والمقاوِمة للمشروع الصهيوني»، مشيرةً في هذا السياق إلى «استمرار العدوان الصهيوني على سوريا الشقيقة، بالقصف والقتل والتدمير، وتصاعُد محاولات النيل منها وتقسيمها وتجزئتها، وإبعادها عن دورها التاريخي الفاعل، ولا سيما على صعيد القضية الفلسطينية»، مُذكّرةً بأن «سوريا احتضنت شعبنا الفلسطيني وفصائله المقاوِمة لعقود من الزمن، وهو ما يستوجب الوقوف معها، في ظلّ ما تتعرّض له من عدوان غاشم».
    وكان نائب رئيس حركة «حماس» في قطاع غزة، خليل الحية، أكد، في حديث إلى «الأخبار» أواخر حزيران الماضي، أن ثمّة قراراً اتُّخذ بـ«السعي إلى استعادة العلاقة مع دمشق»، بعد «نقاش داخلي وخارجي على مستوى الحركة شارك فيه قياديون وكوادر ومؤثّرون وحتى معتقلون داخل السجون». وأوضح الحية أنه «تمّت مناقشة الظروف والتوقيت والشكل»، كما «تمّ وضْع خطّة سيتمّ تنفيذها بمساعدة الحلفاء»، مضيفاً أن «هناك تَوجّهاً نحو البيئة الأوسع، التي تشمل أصحاب الرأي والمفكّرين والعلماء، ومن ثمّ الأطر الشعبية الأوسع»، متابعاً «(أننا) وضعنا تركيا وقطر في أجواء تَوجّهنا هذا، وهما لا تُعارضانه». وسبق كلامَ الحيّة بأسبوع، حديثٌ مشابه نقلته وكالة «فرانس برس» عن مسؤول رفيع المستوى في «حماس»، جاء فيه أن «الاتّصالات مع سوريا في تَحسّن، والعلاقات في طريق عودتها بالكامل إلى ما كانت عليه»، وأن «زيارات عدّة قام بها قادة الحركة إلى سوريا». وإلى جانب تلك التصريحات، أعلن الأمين العام لـ«حزب الله»، غير مرّة، في أحاديث صحافية، اهتمامه «بشكل شخصي» بتسوية العلاقة بين «حماس» وسوريا، مؤكداً أن الأخيرة منفتِحة على هذا المسار الذي وصفه بـ«الإيجابي».

    «حماس»: سوريا احتضنت شعبنا الفلسطيني وفصائله المقاوِمة لعقود من الزمن


    يُذكر أن مصدراً قيادياً في «حماس» أكّد لـ«الأخبار»، بالتوازي مع انتهاء معركة «سيف القدس» في أيار 2021، أن لدى الحركة قراراً مسبقاً ببحْث عودتها إلى الأراضي السورية عندما تحين الفرصة المناسبة، «وفي ضوء الرسائل الإيجابية التي نقلها لنا عدد من قادة فصائل المقاومة في سوريا عقب لقائهم الأخير بالرئيس بشار الأسد، وترحيبه بجميع الفصائل من دون استثناء، وتوجيهه التحيّة إلى حماس»، فإن هذا القرار سيتعزّز. وأشار المصدر، آنذاك، إلى أن الحركة ستبدأ مشاورات مع «حزب الله» وإيران خلال الفترة القريبة، بهدف جسّ نبض السوريين حول عودة العلاقة معهم، متوقّعاً أن تكون الردود السورية إيجابية، ومن دون شروط مسبقة، الأمر الذي سيفتح الباب أمام التطبيع، كخطوة أولى تتبعها عودة قيادات «حمساوية» إلى الأراضي السورية في وقت لاحق. ولم يُخفِ المصدر، في ذلك الوقت، وجود محاولات سابقة من قِبَل أطراف في محور المقاومة لترميم العلاقة بين الحركة والسوريين، غير أن تلك المحاولات اعتراها عدد من العقبات، آملاً أن يكون الانتصار الذي حقّقته المقاومة في غزة خلال معركة «سيف القدس» بوّابة لإزالة العقبات المذكورة، في ظلّ الاتفاق على برنامج المقاومة ومواجهة الاحتلال الإسرائيلي، وتمسّك «حماس» بمبدأ عدم التدخّل في الشؤون الداخلية للدول العربية، وتعزيز العلاقات معها بهدف تجميع طاقات الأمة لدعم المقاومة.

    فيديوات ذات صلة

    May 31, 2018

    مقالات ذات صلة

    Sayyed Hadi Nasrallah: Hezbollah Leader’s Migratory September Bird

     September 12, 2022

    Marwa Haidar

    “We in Hezbollah’s leadership, we sacrifice our sons. We feel proud when our sons go to frontlines. We hold our heads high when they fall as martyrs,” Hezbollah Secretary General Sayyed Hasan Nasrallah said on September 13, 1997, a day after the martyrdom of his son, Hadi, known as ‘Migratory September Bird’.

    On September 12, 1997, Hezbollah fighters ambushed an Israeli force in Jabal Al-Rafi’a area in south Lebanon, killing four Israeli occupation soldiers. However, the fighters engaged in a deadly clash with occupation troops while returning from the mission, and three of them were martyred.

    One of the three fighters, who initially went missing, was Hadi, the eldest son of Sayyed Nasrallah.

    “At that night, I was informed that three of our fighters went missing. The brother who was talking to me on the phone didn’t tell me that Hadi was one of the three, though I felt this due to his repetitive calls to update me on the issue,” Sayyed Nasrallah said in a 2018 interview with Al-Manar, narrating how he knew about the martyrdom of his son.

    Martyrdom of the three fighters was confirmed in the next day by the resistance’ operations room which was overseeing their mission. Sayyed Nasrallah was informed that his son was among the martyrs.

    Sayyed Nasrallah, the Firm Leader

    Despite the saddening news, Sayyed Nasrallah took part in a preplanned ceremony on that day (September 13, 1997), and delivered a speech in which he proudly announced the martyrdom of his son.

    “I thank Allah, who bestowed mercy upon us by looking at my family and choosing a martyr from it,” Sayyed Nasrallah said at the ceremony.

    “As all resistance Mujahideen (fighters), Hadi chose this way and he was fully aware of it…. The Israeli enemy may think that it has secured an achievement by killing Hezbollah secretary general’s son. The Israeli enemy didn’t assassinate Hadi in Haret Hreik. Hadi was in the frontline in south Lebanon. He was carrying a Jihadi mission against the Israeli occupation.”

    Bodies of Hadi and the other two martyrs, Ali Kawtharani and Haytham Mughniyeh, were captured by the Israeli occupation. A video released by Israeli media showed the bodies which were retrieved, later in June 1998, as part of a swap deal between the resistance and the Israeli occupation that saw exchange of 60 Lebanese prisoners and bodies of 40 Hezbollah martyrs for the bodies of Israeli soldiers killed in south Lebanon in 1997.

    Martyrdom of Hadi Nasrallah turned out as waves of emotional gushing and respect to the Hezbollah Secretary General. Few years after the end of the civil war in Lebanon, no one ever saw that a son of one of the leaders of the political groups, which took part in the civil war, has been killed in the war.

    Sayyed Nasrallah, the Loving Father

    Along with this pride and firmness, Sayyed Nasrallah has openly shown the emotional phase behind the martyrdom of his son.

    “Yes, for sure I cried. At the end, I’m a father, I’m a human,” Sayyed Nasrallah answered a question by Lebanese talk show host Zaven Kouyoumdjian during an interview few months after Hadi’s martyrdom.

    In a touching poem, Sayyed Nasrallah mourned Hadi as the ‘Migratory September Bird’ during that year.

    “I’m your orphan O’ my son…

    Here you go, and my tear has choked me during my night loneness …

    I will miss you… Whenever a bird migrates in September,” excerpts of the poem by Sayyed Nasrallah read.

    Source: Al-Manar English Website

    إسرائيل تميل إلى الاتفاق لكنها تخشى منح المقاومة صورة انتصار

     الأربعاء 14 أيلول 2022

    كاريش.. هامش المماطلة ضيق

    يحيى دبوق

    فاوض لبنان الرسمي أكثر من 12 عاماً على الحدّ البحري الاقتصادي مع العدو، اتّسمت المقاربة الإسرائيلية خلالها بالتناقض واتّباع الخيارات المفعّلة لمواجهة حزب الله، وبمحاولة فرض الإرادة على لبنان وتحصيل ما أمكن منه، سياسياً واقتصادياً وأمنياً.

    كانت إسرائيل معنية بالتوصل إلى تسوية، لكن بشروطها وخدمة لأهدافها. لكن ميزان القوى في لبنان، وموقف الرئيسين ميشال عون ونبيه بري، منعاها من تحصيل المكاسب التي أرادتها عبر التسوية البحرية. فكان القرار الأميركي – الإسرائيلي: لا استخراج غاز في لبنان قبل الخضوع للشروط الإسرائيلية – الأميركية.
    إلا أن هذه الشروط فاضت عن حدّها، وباتت جزءاً لا يتجزأ من المقاربة العدائية للبنان وفي خدمة المعركة الكبرى التي تقودها واشنطن وحليفتها لإخضاعه عبر استغلال الأزمة الاقتصادية وتسعيرها، من أجل التوصل إلى اتفاق، ومن ثم رفع الفيتو عن استخراج الغاز، مقابل سلّة فوائد لإسرائيل وأميركا، من بينها إمكان تقييد حزب الله ودوره الحمائي، والتطلع إلى «نزع» سلاحه.
    في المقابلة التي أجرتها قناة «الحرة»، منتصف حزيران الماضي، مع «الوسيط» الأميركي عاموس هوكشتين، كان لسان حال الأخير يقول: ارضوا بما يعطى لكم، وكفى عناداً. لا يوجد حق وحقوق، ليس لديكم شيء، وأي اتفاق أفضل لكم من لا شيء.
    انتظرت تل أبيب وواشنطن الخضوع اللبناني تحت وطأة الأزمة الاقتصادية التي كانت تتفاقم يوماً بعد يوم، ومعها تفاقم الضغط على اللبنانيين.
    وكما هو معلوم، الضغط المدروس والحكيم والهادف لا يطلق على عنانه، وإذا زاد عن حدّه المعقول، فسيستسهل من يتعرّض للضغط أي خيار مهما كانت نتائجه، في محاولة لإزالة الضغط. وهو ما حصل فعلاً: إن كان الموت جوعاً أمراً محتوماً، فليكن الموت عبر الحرب، إذ في الخيار الثاني احتمال أن يعقب الحرب أو ربما يسبقها خروج من الجوع ومن الموت نفسه.
    على خلفية هذا الواقع، جاءت تهديدات الأمين العام لحزب الله السيد حسن نصر الله لتقلب التموضعات رأساً على عقب: لا استخراج للغاز من حقل «كاريش» ما لم يتمكن لبنان من استخراج غازه. المعادلة واضحة. وأُتبعت لاحقاً بجرعات تأكيد للجدية، عبر المسيّرات وغيرها من العمليات، التي أعلن عنها أو لم يعلن.
    لم يكن في إمكان إسرائيل أن تهضم التهديدات، وخصوصاً أنها عبّرت عن قرار اتخذ بالمبادرة، ولو أدى إلى حرب. مع التقدير المسبق لدى تل أبيب بأن أي مواجهة، على خلفية المنشآت الغازية وبنيتها التحتية وصولا إلى استهدافها هي نفسها، هو واقع لا يمكن للدولة العبرية أن تتعايش معه، وستكون تبعاته السلبية عالية المستوى، مهما كانت التبعات على الطرف المقابل.
    ورغم الإرباك وتجاذب المواقف المجبولة صمتاً وصراخاً، وطلب التهدئة مع إطلاق التهديدات، والتشديد على ضرورة الحل التسووي في سياق التهديد العسكري، كانت المحصّلة على الشكل الآتي:
    أولاً، إعطاء لبنان كل المنطقة الاقتصادية المتنازع عليها وفقاً للخط 23 الذي فاوض عليه العدو ما يزيد على 12 عاماً.
    ثانياً، إعطاء لبنان حقل قانا كاملاً مهما توغّل حدّه الجنوبي ضمن المياه الاقتصادية لفلسطين المحتلة.
    ثالثاً، تمكين شركات التنقيب من العمل في الحقول اللبنانية بعد رفع الفيتو الأميركي عنها.
    والى حين الاتفاق والتوقيع عليه، فهم وإدراك ضمنيان لدى الأطراف الثلاثة، لبنان وإسرائيل والولايات المتحدة، بأن المبادرة الميدانية وإمكانات التصعيد والمواجهة مرتبطة باستخراج الغاز من كاريش.
    تداعيات الخضوع الإسرائيلي متداخلة ومتشعبة وهو ما تعمل حكومة العدو حالياً على الحؤول دونه. إذ إن دفع إسرائيل للتنازل والتراجع، تحت تهديد حزب الله، يعني أن إسرائيل تخشى المواجهة مع الحزب وأن ردعه لها أكثر بكثير مما كان ظاهراً. وبالتالي، فإن الخشية لدى العدو في أن يكون حزب الله، لاحقاً، أكثر ثقة وإقداماً ومبادرة في كل ما يتعلق بالرد على الاعتداءات، وأن تقوده الثقة الى المبادرة الميدانية الابتدائية. ومن شأن خضوع إسرائيل أن ينهي أو يحدّ من استراتيجية الضغط الأميركية بحصار لبنان ومفاقمة أزماته.
    إلا أن أهم التداعيات هو إدراك إسرائيل، وكذلك حزب الله، أن الوافد الجديد على المعادلة الردعية بين الجانبين، وهو المنشآت الغازية وبنيتها التحتية، من شأنه إبعاد تل أبيب أكثر مما هي عليه الآن، عدائياً عن الساحة اللبنانية، في موازاة رفع مستوى الردع لدى حزب الله. وهذا «السلاح» (المنشآت) يوازي في كثير من أوجهه فاعلية وتأثير السلاح النوعي الدقيق.

    إذا ما تلمّست تل أبيب تراجعاً في إرادة استخدام السلاح فستتراجع من الغد عن خضوعها البحري – الغازي


    وإلى حين الإعلان عن الاتفاق وفقاً لما تبلور إلى الآن، يسعى العدو إلى محاربة شكل الاتفاق وصورته فيه، عبر منع ما أمكن عن الوعي الجمعي لدى جمهور الطرفين: إسرائيل لن تتراجع على خلفية تهديدات نصر الله، وهي أرادت فقط مساعدة اللبنانيين للخروج من أزمتهم عبر تنازلها (أنسنة الخضوع الإسرائيلي)؛ تأجيل استخراج الغاز من كاريش غير مرتبط بالتهديدات وهو نتيجة أعطال تقنية (يبدو أنها لا تنتهي إلا مع الاتفاق)؛ وإطلاق التهديدات وتسعير نبرتها ووتيرتها، كي تلطف من خضوعها، في سياق خدمة مصلحتها بأن لا يقدم حزب الله على جرعات تذكيرية خلال عملية التفاوض. وهي مقاربة لا تلغي أهمية إدراك حزب الله موقع المنشآت الغازية الإسرائيلية في معادلة الصراع مع الدولة العبرية.
    قد يُظنّ نتيجة هذه المقاربة أن الحل، وفقاً للإرادة اللبنانية، بات قريباً. الظن، هنا، لا يخلو من وجه صحة، بل هو الأقرب على خلفية أرجح التقديرات، لكن ما قد يعترض هذه النتيجة أنها مرتبطة دائماً بوجود السبب الذي دفع إسرائيل إلى الخضوع. فإن تلمّست تل أبيب تراجعاً في السبب (سلاح حزب الله) وإرادة استخدامه، ستعمد من الغد إلى التراجع عن خضوعها البحري – الغازي، قبل الاتفاق وخلاله وبعده. فالعلاقة السببية لا تنفك بين السلاح والغاز.


    الاتفاق «استسلام لنصر الله»
    «ما يتبلور بين لبنان وإسرائيل بوساطة أميركية، هو خطأ استراتيجي كبير ستدفع إسرائيل ثمنه غالياً، وهو استسلام كامل لنصر الله». التوصيف يعود للوزير الإسرائيلي السابق، رئيس حزب الليكود العالمي، داني دانون، الذي أكد أمس أن إسرائيل ولبنان على وشك توقيع اتفاق على الحد البحري، يعدّ استسلاماً لجميع المطالب اللبنانية، ويتضمّن تمكين لبنان من حقل قانا حصراً، وقال إن «لبنان تنازل عن الخط 29 بعد تقديرات الخبراء بأن هناك حقلاً ضخماً للغاز في المنطقة المتنازع عليها، أي حقل قانا، يمتد حتى حقل كاريش»، إلى الجنوب منه. ووفقاً لدانون الذي تولّى طويلاً منصب سفير إسرائيل الدائم لدى الأمم المتحدة، فإن الاتفاق مع لبنان سيّئ لعدة أسباب:
    – تخلّت إسرائيل عن حقل غازي ضخم يقدّر عائده بمئات المليارات من الشواقل (3.4 للدولار الواحد)، وهو عائد مالي كبير يعطى للبنان، ومن شأنه أن يعزز حزب الله.
    – يشكل الاتفاق سابقة يبنى عليها في المفاوضات على الحد البحري مع الجانب القبرصي (حقل أفروديت – يشاي) وغيره من حقول الغاز التي تكتشف لاحقاً بين إسرائيل ودول أخرى في المنطقة، وربما على الحدود مع مصر.
    – الاتفاق يعني استسلاما كاملاً لتهديدات حزب الله الذي سيدرك أن إسرائيل ترضخ للتهديدات.
    من جهته، دافع رئيس شعبة الاستخبارات العسكرية في الجيش الإسرائيلي، أهارون حاليفا، عن الاتفاق البحري، عبر التأكيد على وجود مصلحة لإسرائيل بأن تكون للبنان منصة بحرية يستخرج منها الغاز، مضيفاً أنه لولا «خطف» لبنان من قبل إيران، لكان انضم إلى ركب التطبيع مع إسرائيل.
    وأضاف حاليفا في كلمة أمس في مؤتمر «معهد سياسات مكافحة الإرهاب» في هرتسيليا، أن لحزب الله ثلاث هويات: المدافع عن الطائفة الشيعية، ووكيل إيران، والمدافع عن لبنان الذي خطف الشعب اللبناني. وقال «إن نصرالله يحظى بتقدير كبير في إيران، وفرضية العمل لديّ ولدى الجيش الإسرائيلي أنه ليس تابعاً بل شريك في اتخاذ القرارات مع الإيرانيين»، لافتاً إلى أن هناك احتمالاً في بعض الأحداث أن ينضم حزب الله، ونصرالله على رأسه، إلى دائرة العنف الإيرانية.
    وإزاء التهديدات التي أطلقها نصرالله ضد منشآت الغاز في إسرائيل، قال حاليفا: «رفعنا إلى متخذي القرارات (في تل أبيب) تقديراتنا عن احتمالات التصعيد في الساحة الشمالية، وآمل في أن لا يستهين نصرالله بالرد الإسرائيلي إذا قرر التحرك. وأنا أذكر أننا أسقطنا الطائرات المسيرة التي أطلقها نصرالله باتجاه المنصة (سفينة الإنتاج في كاريش) إلا أنه لم يكن هناك أي رد فعل من حزب الله، رداً على المسيرات»، في إشارة منه إلى ما قال إنها «القوة الإسرائيلية العظيمة جداً»، في محاولة لقلب التموضعات بين فعل حزب الله الابتدائي، وانكفاء إسرائيل عن الرد.

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    On Russia vs. Ukraine, ‘I’m on US side’: Israeli general

    September 13, 2022 13:50

    Source: Israeli Media

    By Al Mayadeen English 

    The outgoing chief of the Israeli occupation’s Northern Command says “Israel” had learned “a lot” from the war in Ukraine that was “relevant” to a potential war with Hezbollah.

    The head of the Israeli occupation Military Intelligence, Aharon Haliva

    The head of the Israeli occupation Military Intelligence, Aharon Haliva, stressed Tuesday that he sides with the United States, “Israel’s” “most important strategic partner.”

    During a conference, Haliva said that “I’ve been asked if I’m on the Ukrainian or Russian side. I’m on the side of the US,” adding that the “relationship with the US is one of Israel’s most important assets.”

    In a similar context, the outgoing chief of the Israeli occupation’s Northern Command, Amir Baram, claimed that “Israel” had learned “a lot” from the war in Ukraine that was “relevant” to a potential war with Lebanese Hezbollah.

    “We are examining the conflict, and will implement lessons learned for a future war in the north,” Baram said during an IOF ceremony.

    Israeli firm selling anti-UAV systems to Ukraine through Poland

    However, Israeli media said Monday that an Israeli arms manufacturer is supplying anti-UAV systems to Ukraine via Poland, citing a source in the arms firm, noting that the sales were conducted through Warsaw to circumvent “Tel Aviv’s” refusal to sell advanced arms to Ukraine.

    The firm reportedly informed the Israeli Ministry of Security that it was selling arms to Poland, though it pretended not to know the latter was then giving the weapons to Kiev to use against Russia.

    The anti-UAV systems enable their users to intercept and disrupt drones. Classified as “advanced defensive technology,” the systems are not approved for sale to Kiev, though “Tel Aviv” did not seem to be interested in foiling the deal.

    It is noteworthy that the Israeli occupation uses anti-drone systems around the Gaza apartheid wall, the Palestinian-Lebanese borders, and the Palestinian-Syrian borders, with “Israel” claimed to be one of the world’s top developers and manufacturers of the technology with the involvement of various Israeli arms manufacturers, such as IAI, Elbit, and MCTECH.

    Russian-Israeli tensions rising in recent months

    In recent months, relations between Russia and the Israeli occupation have been tense.

    On July 15, Israeli media reported that Russian President Vladimir Putin had signed a new Russian law to “paralyze Jewish and Israeli organizations,” commenting that “the fear is that the new law will create an impossible situation for Jewish and Israeli organizations to operate in Russia.”

    Israeli media then reported on there being “great tension between Russia and Israel,” against the background of reports from Moscow that the Jewish Agency had been suspended, noting that this matter was linked to “Prime Minister Yair Lapid’s statement regarding the war in Ukraine,” describing the suspension of the agency as “political punishment”.

    Russian Foreign Ministry summons Israeli occupation Ambassador

    Last April, the Israeli newspaper website Haaretz reported that Russia summoned the Israeli occupation Ambassador to Moscow, Alexander Ben Zvi, to the Russian Foreign Ministry.

    This came after the Russian Foreign Ministry slammed Lapid for his statements following the suspension of Russia from the UN Human Rights Council over the war in Ukraine.

    Lapid had accused the Russian forces of committing “war crimes against a defenseless civilian population. I strongly condemn these war crimes.”

    Mathew Levitt: You Have to Take Hezbollah’s Radwan Forces Seriously

    September 13, 2022

    By Staff, Jpost

    While no one wants to drag the region into a war, the “Israelis” are more cautious to prevent the eruption of a full-fledged war with the Lebanese resistance group Hezbollah in the light of the worsening security situation in the “Israeli”-occupied Palestinian territories.

    In recent month, the apartheid “Israeli” regime has been preoccupied with the Iran nuclear deal, in addition to constantly delaying natural gas extraction from the Karish field after warnings by the resistance group. Thus, for “Israel”, going to war means that there is much at stake.

    For its part, Hezbollah, which launched drones toward the Karish gas field in July, has warned the “Israeli” entity of a military action against it if it proceeds with gas extraction from the gas rig.

    Referring to Karish, Hezbollah Secretary General His Eminence Sayyed Hassan Nasrallah warned in early August that “the hand that reaches for any of this wealth will be severed.”

    But Hezbollah’s warning to the “Israelis” do not come from void.  

    According to Matthew Levitt, director of the Jeanette and Eli Reinhard Program on Counterterrorism and Intelligence at The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, Hezbollah has grown “with an estimated 150,000 rockets and munitions that can hit anywhere” in occupied Palestine.

    Levitt believed that “in the next war, Hezbollah will try to fire close to 4,000 rockets per day to start, followed by some 2,000 per day until the last day of the conflict.”

    In a recent interview with Walla, the “Israeli” Occupation Forces [IOF]’s Northern Command, Maj.-Gen. Uri Gordin said the IOF will prioritize the northern part of the entity, “since 50% of Hezbollah’s arsenal is aimed at cities 15 km from the border with Lebanon, including Nahariya, Acre, Safed and Kiryat Shmona.”

    “Another 40% of Hezbollah’s missiles can reach Haifa and surrounding areas. Only 5% can reach targets further to the south,” he added.

    “Hezbollah has not given up on work on its precision munition project,” Levitt said. He believes that the majority of the “Israeli” airstrikes in Syria are part of the “Israeli” entity’s so-called “war between the wars” campaign and that these airstrikes have been targeting components for the project.

    Levitt adds that Hezbollah has sophisticated drones that can be used for reconnaissance missions or carry munitions to hit targets.

    To add salt to the wound, former “Israel” Air Force [IAF] Commander Maj.-Gen Amikam Norkin has said the IAF lost its aerial superiority over Lebanon.

    Nonetheless, Hezbollah is believed to have gained significant battlefield e experience throughout its involvement in Syria.

    Hezbollah’s elite Radwan forces are a force to be feared and are spread across southern Lebanon waiting for the order to wage a military action in the “Israeli”-occupied Palestinian territories.

    “You have to take the Radwan forces seriously,” said Levitt.

    In addition to the on-the-job training and weapons [including American-made AR-15s], the Radwan forces “are disciplined,” Levitt noted.

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    Saad Hariri and the collapse of Lebanon

    The Syrian regime-change war and Lebanon’s economic collapse happened under Saad Hariri’s watch, but the Future Movement leader is seldom mentioned for the pivotal role he played in Lebanon’s unravelling

    Photo Credit: The Cradle

    September 12 2022

    By William Van Wagenen

    In 2005, US neoconservatives centered around then-Vice President Dick Cheney’s office began collaborating with Saudi Prince Bandar bin Sultan, defected former Syrian Vice President Abd Al-Halim Khaddam, and the Syrian Muslim Brotherhood to topple the Syrian government.

    Washington did so as part of an effort to topple the governments of seven countries in five years, including Libya and Iran, using the so-called ‘War on Terror’ as a pretext.

    However another crucial, though overlooked collaborator in the regime change effort was pro-Saudi Lebanese politician Saad Hariri. And his actions would soon see massive repercussions unfold in his own country.

    The dynastic Hariris

    In 2005, Saad’s father, former Lebanese prime minister Rafiq Hariri, was assassinated in a massive car bombing, which a highly-politicized UN-backed court pinned on two individuals affiliated with Lebanese resistance group Hezbollah. In the wake of Rafiq’s death, Saad came to head not only the Saudi-supported Future Movement – Lebanon’s leading Sunni political party – but also the multi-billion-dollar Hariri business conglomerate established by his father in Saudi Arabia.

    Initially, the US, French, and Israeli governments quickly blamed Syria for Rafiq’s killing. Presumably, Saad was motivated to participate in the US-led regime change effort in Syria as a result.

    But business interests also played a role as Saad wished to gain control over Syria’s telecommunication sector. This is something his father had previously tried, but failed to accomplish.

    As French journalist Georges Malbrunot details in his book The Road to Damascus, Syria first launched its mobile phone industry in the early 2000’s, and Lebanon’s prime minister at the time, Rafiq Al-Hariri, wanted to invest in one of the two Syrian companies that had just been created for this purpose.

    But Rami Makhlouf, cousin of Syria’s President Bashar Al-Assad and the dominant investor in the sector, blocked Rafiq’s efforts. Malbrunot notes further that according to a lawyer close to the Syrian government, “there was an immediate veto from the intelligence services against Hariri.”

    While the Baath Party may have considered the telecommunications sector to be of strategic importance – and therefore not open to outsiders – Assad would have also been concerned about Hariri’s direct role in bribing top Syrian officials, including then-Vice President Abdul Halim Khaddam, prior to his defection, among a broad slate of other grievances.

    In the wake of Rafiq’s assassination, Saad was quick to pick up his father’s baton. At the time the Christian Science Monitor reported that:

    “[Saad Hariri] may be a newcomer to Lebanese politics, but Hariri is no neophyte. He ran his father’s massive construction company, Saudi Oger, for over a decade and has extensive financial interests in telecommunications in the Middle East. He is ranked at 548 in Forbes Magazine’s annual list of billionaires with an estimated fortune of $1.2 billion. His father was ranked 108th with $4.3 billion. Hariri has adopted his father’s globe-trotting existence, holding talks with Jacques Chirac, the French president and a close family friend, Vice President Dick Cheney, and Middle East leaders.”

    Saad’s support of Salafi-jihadists

    In addition to running his deceased father’s business conglomerate, Saad was active in protecting Al-Qaeda affiliated militant groups in Lebanon.  Journalist Seymour Hersh notes that according to a 2005 International Crisis Group (ICG) report, Hariri had helped release four Salafist militants from prison who had previously trained in Al-Qaeda camps in Afghanistan and were arrested in Lebanon while trying to establish an Islamic state in the north of the country.

    Hariri also used his influence in parliament to obtain amnesty for another 29 Salafist militants, including seven suspected of bombing foreign embassies in Beirut a year prior. Hersh notes that according to a senior official in the Lebanese government, “We have a liberal attitude that allows Al-Qaeda types to have a presence here.”

    In the wake of the radical Fatah Al-Islam’s 2007 battle with the Lebanese army, which destroyed the Nahr Al-Bared Palestinian refugee camp, Charles Harb of the American University of Beirut (AUB) observed that Saad was giving “political cover” to “radical Sunni movements” that could be directed and employed against the Resistance Axis of Iran, Syria, and Hezbollah.

    Harb also noted the involvement of Saudi intelligence in cultivating these groups. He explained that “Several reports have highlighted efforts by Saudi officials to strengthen Sunni groups, including radical ones, to face the Shia renaissance across the region. But building up radical Sunni groups to face the Shia challenge can easily backfire.”

    Start of the ‘Syrian Revolution’

    In early 2011, US planners exploited dissatisfaction among certain segments of Syrian society – not only pro-western liberals but also the country’s Salafi community – to spark initial ‘Arab Spring’ type protests in the country.

    Saad Hariri’s interest in gaining control of the Syrian telecommunication network via any successful regime-change operation was hinted at during the first protest in Daraa, a predominantly Sunni governorate, on 18 March, 2011.

    As Syrian sociologist Muhammad Jamal Barout revealed, protestors in Daraa chanted against Rami Makhlouf and demanded that his businesses be expelled from the province (recall that Makhlouf held the dominant position in Syria’s telecommunications sector).

    Salafist militants, including from Al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI), quickly began attacking Syrian security forces under the cover of the early protests. US planners facilitated these attacks (with the help of Prince Bandar), in the hope of unleashing a sectarian civil war on the country comparable to that which had destroyed Iraq starting in 2003.

    The Future Movement and Salafi terror

    Prominent opposition and human rights activist Haitham Manna provided evidence that elements close to Saad Al-Hariri were among those funneling weapons to the Salafist militants in Syria, including in Daraa, in part to secure financial interests.

    According to Muhammad Jamal Barout, Manna’ publicly disclosed in an interview on Al-Jazeera on 31 March, 2011, that “he had received offers to arm movements from Raqqa to Daraa three times by parties he did not identify in the interview.”

    Barout additionally writes that, according to Manna, there were secret communications between some Syrian businessmen abroad who found themselves bent on revenge against the Assad government because their interests had been harmed by the network of the pro-government businessman Makhlouf.

    Furthermore, these groups were willing to fund and arm opposition movements throughout the country. Barout notes that these businessmen apparently had relations with professional networks capable of delivering weapons to any location in Syria and that some members of the Future Movement in Lebanon were among those arranging these weapons shipments.

    One name pops up more than others: Okab Sakr, the MP from Hariri’s Future movement made infamous in phone conversations leaked to Lebanese media outlet Al Akhbar, in which he directly discusses large weapons transfers to Syrian militants.

    Writes The Guardian of Hariri’s close confidant: “Every time Okab is in town the weapons start to move across the border,” said a rebel colonel from the Jebel al-Zawiya region, who calls himself Abu Wael.

    Sakr eventually fled the country to avoid repercussions for his illicit activities, and admitted to his role in arming the Syrian conflict, which dragged Lebanon into the messy and dangerous fray.

    Within no time, Fatah Al-Islam and other militants previously under the protection of Hariri and Saudi intelligence in Lebanon were soon identified on the battlefield in Syria. Dr. Haytham Mouzahem, director of the Beirut Center for Middle East Studies explained that, “When the uprising in Syria began in 2011, many of the remaining Fatah al-Islam members crossed the border and joined groups in the Free Syrian Army [FSA].”

    This provided one indication among many that the FSA – as it was known then – was not secular, democratic, or comprised primarily of army defectors, as is often claimed, but rather consisted primarily of Salafist militants, including many affiliated with Al-Qaeda.

    The role of Al-Qaeda militants from Lebanon came further into focus in the summer of 2011, when Der Spiegel reported that a prominent Salafist cleric in Tripoli was sending fighters into Syria as early as summer 2011 because, in his view, “Assad is an infidel” and “There is a holy war in Syria and the young men there are conducting jihad. For blood, for honor, for freedom, for dignity.”

    According to one of the fighters interviewed by the German magazine, around 60 percent of the Lebanese fighters crossing the border from Tripoli to Homs had previously fought in Iraq.

    Syrian fallout: Refugees flood into Lebanon

    As the months and years passed, more and more jihadists flooded into Syria. As they did, and as fighting with the Syrian army and its allies intensified and became more brutal and sectarian, more and more Syrian civilians flooded into Lebanon to flee the conflict back home.

    With the onset of war in Syria in 2011 and subsequent US sanctions, the Syrian economy began to massively contract, which in turn caused the closely connected Lebanese economy to gradually slow as well.

    Given that Lebanon is a small country facing its own disastrous economic crisis, it has been unable to provide decent living conditions for even its own 5.5 million residents, let alone for the 1.7 million Syrian refugees present in the country.

    Because US planners, along with their many regional collaborators including Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, Lebanon and others, launched a dirty war on Syria in 2011 causing millions of Syrians to flee their homes and seek refuge in bordering states, it is the US and its close allies that bear most of the responsibility for the current refugee crisis Lebanon now faces.

    Accommodating such a large number of refugees would always be difficult, but this became near impossible after the October 2019 Lebanese banking crisis, which in turn caused what the World Bank described as a “brutal” economic contraction of a magnitude “usually associated with conflicts or wars.” Even relatively prosperous and middle-class Lebanese were plunged into poverty, losing most of their life savings, as the Lebanese lira quickly plunged.

    A Hariri legacy: Lebanon’s economic collapse

    The origins of the crisis can be traced to the creation of a banking infrastructure based on efforts to maintain a currency peg between the Lebanese lira and US dollar.

    This system was established by Lebanese central banker Riad Salameh in the 1990’s in the wake of the Lebanese civil war, presumably to restore economic stability needed after the wild currency swings seen throughout the conflict.

    Then-prime minister Rafiq Hariri had appointed Salameh – his personal money manager at US brokerage firm Merrill Lynch – as governor of Lebanon’s Central Bank.

    To maintain the peg, Salameh effectively established a Ponzi scheme that enriched wealthy Lebanese as well as the bankers themselves. As the New York Times explained:

    “Lebanon’s Central Bank promised that 1,507 Lebanese lira would be worth exactly $1 and that Lebanese banks would always exchange one for the other. That policy brought stability, but it also required Lebanon’s banks to hold a large store of U.S. dollars . . . so the banks could make good on the promise to exchange 1,507 lira for $1 at any point. Lebanese firms also needed dollars to pay for imported goods, a large part of the economy in a country that produces little of what it consumes. . . . To keep dollars flowing in, the head of Lebanon’s Central Bank developed a plan: Banks would offer very generous terms — including an annual interest of 15 percent or even 20 percent — to anybody who would deposit dollars. But the only way for banks to make good on these terms was by repaying the initial depositors with money from new depositors. Of course, there is a name for this practice: a Ponzi scheme.”

    The receipt of such high interest rates on deposits allowed wealthy Lebanese both at home and abroad to slowly loot the country. Commercial bankers benefitted as well, by receiving a handsome spread on the interest rate paid by the central bank and forwarded to depositors. The Hariri family benefited directly from the system, both as owners of huge US dollar deposits as well as owners of their own commercial bank, Bankmed.

    Riad Salameh personally benefitted from the system as well, setting up a brokerage firm with his brother, Forry Associates, that took some $330 million in fees for brokering the sale of government bonds between 2002 and 2015, $200 million of which were allegedly transferred to Salemeh’s personal accounts with various Lebanese banks, including with Hariri’s Bankmed. These transfers led to the ongoing investigation of Salemeh by European officials on charges of money laundering and embezzlement.

    As the protracted Syrian war – aided by Hariri and his allies -across Lebanon’s only viable land border tore into Lebanon’s fragile economy, and the flow of new US dollars entering the Lebanese banking system also began to slow, Salameh’s Ponzi scheme became unsustainable, and finally began to collapse in October 2019.

    Lebanese banks began to restrict US dollar withdrawals for small depositors to minor amounts, while secretly allowing wealthy and connected clients to pull out huge sums for transfer abroad. Soon, small depositors, who had themselves deposited dollars, were restricted to withdrawing an unreasonable equivalent in Lebanese liras instead.

    The value of the lira quickly dropped by some 90 percent, wiping out the life savings of many and causing mass poverty as prices of everything, including essential goods, skyrocketed. According to banker and political commentator, Ehsani, the total losses for depositors amount to roughly $111 billion.

    According to Syria’s President Assad, some $40 billion of those frozen deposits may be of Syrian origin, with huge negative ramifications for the country’s finances and reconstruction efforts.

    The October 2019 economic collapse was accompanied by wide-spread protests expressing anger against Lebanon’s broader political class, pressuring Saad Hariri to step down as prime minister.

    Despite the key role played by the Hariri-Salameh political clique in establishing, benefitting from, and finally collapsing the Lebanese banking system, and subsequently the entire economy, both Hariri and Salameh continue to enjoy diplomatic and political support from their backers in Washington.

    In February 2020, amidst criticism of Salameh’s role in precipitating the crisis, US ambassador to Lebanon Dorothy Shea suggested to Lebanese TV it was “a mistake to scapegoat any one person or institution for Lebanon’s economic collapse” and that Salameh, still “enjoys great confidence in the international financial community.”

    The reason for this was provided, at least in part, in April 2019 when Lebanese newspaper Al-Akhbar published minutes of a meeting between the US Assistant Secretary of the Treasury for Terrorism Financing and Financial Crimes, Marshall Billingsley, and the (former) Lebanese Economy Minister, Mansour Bteish. The minutes cite a US official saying:

    “We need a governor of the Banque du Liban [central bank] and a deputy governor who we can trust, and who is sensitive and with whom confidential information about terrorist financing and money laundering can be exchanged. The situation today is that we trust Governor Riad Salameh and (former) Deputy Governor Muhammad Baasiri.”

    As US planners have not been fighting terrorism, but rather funding and arming al-Qaeda affiliated groups to use as proxies in their war against Syria between 2011 and 2017, this suggests Salameh continues to enjoy US protection to avoid details of terrorist financing, in particular Saad Hariri’s role in arming terrorist groups in Syria on behalf of US planners, from coming to light.

    It is difficult to imagine that Lebanon can emerge from its current crisis, or deal with corruption and poor governance plaguing the country, while US influence over Lebanese affairs remains dominant and oppressive US sanctions against Syria remain in place.

    The views expressed in this article do not necessarily reflect those of The Cradle.

    العدو يخاطر بالحرب: الاستخراج من كاريش لن يؤجل | فخ هوكشتين: وصاية دولية على البحر؟

     الإثنين 12 أيلول 2022

    (أ ف ب )

    الأخبار  


    الأجواء الإيجابية التي راجت في شأن قرب التوصل إلى اتفاق لترسيم الحدود البحرية، لا تلغي الحذر الشديد من مناورة إسرائيلية – أميركية لمرحلة ما بعد الترسيم لناحية فرض وصاية دولية على البحر من خلال دور جديد لقوات الطوارئ الدولية كما هي الحال على البر. ووسط تأكيد مصادر معنية في بيروت أن لبنان ينتظر أن يتسلّم من المبعوث الأميركي لترسيم الحدود البحرية عاموس هوكشتين ورقة خطية خلال ثلاثة أيام، جرى تداول أنباء أمس عن أنه سلّم مسؤولين لبنانيين إحداثيات خط العوامات البحرية تحضيراً لإرسال عرضه الكامل الأسبوع المُقبل. فيما عادت إسرائيل إلى التهويل

    عاد الإسرائيليون أمس إلى لهجة التهويل من زاوية تعيين قائد جديد للقيادة الشمالية وتسريب هذه القيادة تهديدات لحزب الله. وتحدثت القناة 12 عن تقرير للقيادة الشمالية خلاصته أنه هناك «إمكانية لمواجهة مع حزب الله قريباً». في وقت حذّر قائد المنطقة الشمالية المعيّن حديثاً اللواء أوري غوردين أن «المنظر الخلاب الهادئ في الجليل الأعلى والجولان يمكن أن يكون خادعاً، ولا يعكس عدم الاستقرار والأرض المضطربة إلى الشرق والشمال».

    وقد كان لافتاً ما نقلته صحيفة «إسرائيل اليوم» عن مسؤول سياسي أنه «بمجرد أن تصبح منصة كاريش جاهزة للعمل، سنقوم بتشغيلها كما هو مخطط لها. وسيكون حزب الله قد ارتكب خطأ كبيراً في الحسابات إذا هاجمها». كما نقل موقع «مكور ريشون» اليميني عن مصدر سياسي أن «الأسابيع المقبلة حرجة للغاية. نحن نحقق تقدماً ولكن لا يزال هناك الكثير من العمل الذي يتعين القيام به. وعلى الحكومة اللبنانية أن تقرر أنها تريد اتفاقية».
    من جهته تحدث موقع «واللاه» العبري أمس عن تدخل الرئيس الأميركي جو بايدن شخصياً في مفاوضات الترسيم. ونقل أن بايدن أكّد خلال المحادثة الهاتفية الأخيرة مع رئيس الحكومة الإسرائيلية يائير لابيد «أن ترسيم الحدود البحرية بين لبنان وإسرائيل ملف مهم ومُلح… وعدم وجود اتفاق بينهما قد يؤدي إلى عواقب وخيمة على المنطقة»، معرباً عن «اهتمامه بالتوصل لاتفاق خلال الأسابيع القليلة المقبلة».

    فخ هوكشين
    أما في بيروت، ورغم ظهور مناخات إيجابية لدى الرؤساء الثلاثة بعد زيارة هوكشتين الجمعة الماضي، إلا أن الجميع لاحظ أن ما يؤرِق الكيان والولايات المتحدة والأوروبيين هو ضبط الأصابع القابضة على الزناد لتجنيب منطقة الشرق الأوسط حرباً مفتوحة ومدمرة، مع العمل على الوصول إلى اتفاق وفق توقيت يناسب إسرائيل. وبعد الفشل في انتزاع ضمانات من المقاومة بعدم التصعيد، لجأوا إلى المماطلة الديبلوماسية للإيحاء بأن الأمور تسير على المسار الصحيح في انتظار جلاء بعض التفاصيل… حيث يكمن الشيطان عادة.
    ففي كل مرة يأتي هوكشتين يسحب من قبعته مطلباً إسرائيلياً جديداً للإيحاء بأن هناك نقاطاً عالقة تحتاج مزيداً من الوقت. وآخر هذه الأوراق «الخط الأزرق البحري» المعبر عنه بشريط العوامات القائم في البحر قبالة ساحلي لبنان وفلسطين المحتلة، طالباً تثبيته لأن إسرائيل لا يمكنها «التهاون فيه لأسباب أمنية». أما الإيجابية التي تحدث عنها، مستنداً إلى «موافقة إسرائيل على المطالب اللبنانية»، فقد تبيّن أنها غير محسومة، إذ أكد أنه يستطيع «ضمان موافقة إسرائيل على الخط 23 بنسبة 90 في المئة»، ما يعني أن كيان العدو لم يوافق على المطالب اللبنانية. علماً أن هذه النقطة أساسية، بالتالي فإن ما يطلبه هوكشتين هو تأجيل المواجهة والترسيم معاً.
    عملياً، يمارس الوسيط الأميركي عملية «خداع» لإيهام لبنان بأنه حصلَ على غالبية مطالبه، ويخترع نقاطاً جديدة لإطالة أمد التفاوض. والدليل، ما بدأ التداول به حول الجهة التي سترعى تنفيذ الاتفاق في حال أُنجِز. وفي الإطار، قالت مصادر متابعة، إن «الحديث كله يصبّ عندَ الأمم المتحدة». فعلى وهج خيار الحرب الشاملة الموضوع على الطاولة، والذي لاحت مؤشراته مع ارتفاع درجة الاستنفار، تُحاول «إسرائيل» انتزاع موافقة من بيروت على مخرج للنزاع البحري وفي بالها فرض «وصاية دولية» في منطقة معينة في المياه من خلال صيغة شبيهة للوضع في الجنوب بعد عدوان تموز 2006، فيكون هناك 1701 بحري تشرف على تنفيذه قوات الطوارئ الدولية التي ليست لها أي صلاحيات في المياه اللبنانية. لذا فإن اعتماد الأمم المتحدة كمرجع لمراقبة تنفيذ اتفاق الترسيم سيستدعي تعديلاً في مهامها وفي قدراتها وهيكلها، وربما استغلال المهمة الجديدة لتمرير تعديلات في جوهر مهماتها ودورها، وهو ما لا تتوقف إسرائيل عن المطالبة به، وتحقق بعضه في قرار التجديد هذا العام… بفعل تخاذل الدولة اللبنانية أو تغافلها.
    وهذه الورقة قد يستخدمها الوسيط الأميركي لاحقاً، في حال احتاجَ العدو الإسرائيلي مزيداً من الوقت، خصوصاً أن البحث في الجهة التي سترعى تنفيذ الاتفاق لا يقل أهمية عن الاتفاق نفسه. ولأنهم يعرفون تماماً، حساسية فكرة توسيع مهام قوات اليونيفل بالنسبة للبنان، ما يعني أن الاتفاق حوله لن يكون سريعاً.
    وبذلك يكون العدو الإسرائيلي قد ظفرَ بعصفورين: إرجاء الترسيم أسابيع الأمام مع إبعاد شبح المواجهة عنه، وتأمين نفسه بقوات دولية تكون عينها على طول الخط الأزرق البحري، وهما أمران غير مضمونين لأن أيلول سيبقى شهر الحسم.

    إسرائيل: لا نفهم عقل نصرالله وحزب الله سيحصد النتائج
    ينصبّ الاهتمام الإسرائيلي على النتائج غير المباشرة لأي اتفاق ترسيم يتم التوصل إليه مع لبنان تحت ضغط المقاومة. وفي هذا السياق، كشفت قناة كان في التلفزيون الإسرائيلي أن التقدير لدى الجيش الإسرائيلي هو أن الأمين العام لحزب الله السيد حسن نصرالله، «رغم تهديداته، يريد الحصول على اتفاق يجلب الكثير من المال إلى لبنان، ويهمه أن يبدو كمن حقق هذا الإنجاز»، في إشارة إلى المخاوف الإسرائيلية من تكريس صورة حزب الله كقوة توفر الحل الاقتصادي والمالي للبنان. وأضافت أن «الأجهزة الأمنية والعسكرية تقر بأن أحداً لا يستطيع فعلاً الدخول إلى رأس نصرالله»، و«أنهم في الاستخبارات الإسرائيلية أصحاب خيبات في محاولة التوغل في عقله». ولذلك «يعززون الاستنفار في الجيش الإسرائيلي منذ تموز حين أرسل مسيراته إلى منصة كاريش. وهو ما دفع رئيس أركان الجيش أفيف كوخافي لتوجيه رسائل إلى نصرالله» أمس. فقد حذر كوخافي من أن «أي محاولة لإلحاق الأذى بدولة إسرائيل في أي ساحة ستقابل برد حاد أو بمبادرة استباقية». واعتبر أن القرار 1701، لا ينفذ و«القذائف الصاروخية والصواريخ المضادة للدبابات تملأ جنوب لبنان» مشدداً على أن كلاً من «دولة لبنان وحزب الله سيتحملان العواقب إذا تضررت سيادة دولة إسرائيل أو مواطنيها».

    تسريبات في تل أبيب عن ضغوط أميركية… ولبنان تسلّم إحداثيات الخط الأزرق البحري؟


    من جهته، وصف الرئيس السابق لدائرة الأبحاث في الاستخبارات العسكرية، أمان، العميد يوسي كوبرفاسير، الوضع الذي يواجهه حزب الله بأنه «معقد، فمن جهة هو منظمة قوية ومركزية في لبنان، وعلى رأسها قائد مقدر جداً كونه نجح في إيصاله إلى المكان الذي وصلت إليه. لكن، من جهة أخرى، هناك الكثير من التطورات الإشكالية التي تؤدي إلى تآكل هذا الوضع القوي لحزب الله. بالتالي فإن الحديث عن ضعف حزب الله وقائده غير صحيح». وأكد على «ضرورة فهم طريقة تفكير حزب الله، والتي ليست بالضرورة طريقة تفكيرنا». وعارض الذين يستبعدون بأن يقدم حزب الله على خطوات عملية ضد إسرائيل، لافتاً إلى أن «اكتفاء حزب الله فقط برسائل تهديد لردع إسرائيل هي تفكيرنا نحن، وليست بالضرورة تفكيره».
    إلا أن الأهم الذي برز في العديد من القراءات التي وردت على لسان العديد من الخبراء وتحديداً الذين كانوا يتولون مناصب رفيعة في الاستخبارات والجيش هو بروز حزب الله كقوة وفرت الحل الاقتصادي للبنان، وأنه حامي الثروات. ويعكس هذا الأمر حجم القلق من نتائج هذا الخيار.

    فيديوات متعلقة

    مقالات متعلقة

    Israeli Media: No one can get into Nasrallah’s head

    12 Sep 2022

    Source: Israeli Media

    By Al Mayadeen English 

    Israeli media points out that “in the security and military establishment they understand that no one can really know what the Secretary-General of Hezbollah, Sayyed Hassan Nasrallah, thinks.”

    Hezbollah Secretary-General Sayyed Hassan Nasrallah

    Israeli media said on Sunday that in the security and military establishment they understand that no one can really know what Hezbollah Secretary-General Sayyed Hassan Nasrallah thinks.

    The media pointed out that “in the security and military establishment, they understand that no one can really get into Nasrallah’s head. The Israeli intelligence’s attempts to do so have failed and were disappointing.”

    The Israeli Kan channel stated that “amid tension against Hezbollah and weeks away from the start of the work to extract gas at the Karish platform, in addition to Nasrallah’s threats, IOF chief Aviv Kochavi issued a warning.”

    Kochavi claimed, “Rockets, rocket-propelled grenades, anti-armor missile sites, command, and control rooms are scattered in large areas of Lebanon,” according to the channel.

    Israeli media pointed out that “‘Israel’ is optimistic about the possibility of reaching an agreement with Lebanon” since the two parties understand that stopping the escalation comes in the best of Israeli and Lebanese interests.

    “Therefore, they have also been strengthening the alertness of the Israeli forces since July, when Nasrallah sent drones to the Karish rig, in addition to this evening’s message from the Chief of Staff to Nasrallah,” the media added.

    The escalation between the occupation and Lebanon has entered a new phase ever since the Israeli occupation government announced the start of drilling to extract gas from the Karish field, and since the entry of the Energean Power vessel last June.

    The escalation reached its peak with Sayyed Nasrallah’s threats that the extraction of gas by Israelis is prohibited without reaching a demarcation agreement that guarantees Lebanon’s getting its rights and wealth, which will contribute to improving its economic situation.

    Lebanese Resistance: Lebanon’s rights or escalation

    On August 19, the Secretary-General of Hezbollah rejected any link between the Lebanese border demarcation file and other files and noted that “If Lebanon does not obtain the rights demanded by the Lebanese state, we are heading toward an escalation whether or not the nuclear agreement is signed.”

    Last month, Nasrallah threatened the Israeli occupation over its attempts to forcibly extract gas from the contested region, warning, “If Lebanon does not obtain the rights demanded by the Lebanese state, we are heading toward an escalation whether or not the nuclear agreement is signed.” 

    He called on the Lebanese state “to benefit from the strength of the resistance and not to delay in obtaining Lebanon’s rights to gas in the Mediterranean.”

    On July 31, the Islamic Resistance in Lebanon military media published a video that displayed the coordinates of the Israeli occupation’s gas rigs off the coasts of occupied Palestine in a clear message to “Tel Aviv”.

    In July, Hezbollah launched three UAVs in the direction of the disputed area at the Karish field, on reconnaissance missions, stressing that “the marches accomplished the required mission and delivered the message.”

    بدعة هوكشتين: ترسيم الخط الأزرق البحري أولاً!

     الأخبار  

    السبت 10 أيلول 2022

    (هيثم الموسوي)

    بين الحديث عن صعوبات حقيقية أو عن تسويف من الجانبين الأميركي والإسرائيلي، انتهت زيارة الوسيط الأميركي عاموس هوكشتين السريعة إلى بيروت بنتيجة واحدة: ثمة نقطة نزاع تحتاج إلى علاج حتى تسير الأمور نحو اتفاق سريع. ومع التدقيق تبين أن الأمر يتعلق بتثبيت «الخط الأزرق البحري» المعبر عنه بشريط العوامات القائم في البحر قبالة ساحلي لبنان وفلسطين المحتلة. وهو الخط الذي قال هوكشتين إن إسرائيل لا يمكنها «التهاون فيه لأسباب أمنية»، واعداً بأن يرسل للبنان الإحداثيات خلال أيام قليلة.

    ومع أن المصادر الرسمية والمشاركة في الاجتماعات أشارت إلى «إيجابية وتقدم»، وأشارت إلى أن الوسيط الأميركي أظهر وجود استجابة لمطالب لبنان وأن حكومته تريد إنجاز الأمر خلال ثلاثة أسابيع، لكن الحذر أطل برأسه بعدما تبين أن الولايات المتحدة تعرب عن شكوك في إمكانية التوصل إلى اتفاق في حال لم يستجب لبنان للمطالب الإسرائيلية الخاصة بالخط الأزرق البحري، خصوصاً أن غالبية سياسية ابدت تخوفها من مناورة إسرائيلية تستهدف التطرق إلى نقطة على الحدود البرية من شأنها التفريط بمزيد من الحقوق اللبنانية. علماً أن مسؤولين شاركوا في الاجتماعات قالوا بأن الأمر جرى التطرق إليه من قبل رئيس الحكومة نجيب ميقاتي الذي فاجأ الوسيط الأميركي بالحديث عن نقاط الخلاف الخاصة بالحدود البرية وعن إمكانية العمل على تسويتها في الوقت نفسه. لكن هوكشتين أبلغه بأن الأمر معقد قليلاً، وأن الفريق الذي يتفاوض معه في إسرائيل معني بالحدود البحرية وأن إثارة الملف البري سوف يعقد الأمر ويحتاج إلى وقت أطول ما يؤثر سلباً في المفاوضات الحالية. واتفق على إقفال النقاش في هذا البند. لكن المشاركين في الاجتماعات شددوا على أن ما طلبه هوكشتين لا يلزم لبنان بأي تنازل في النقطة B1 على الإطلاق، ولبنان يرفض هذا الأمر أصلاً.
    وعلق مصدر سياسي معني بالملف على ما يجري تداوله بشأن الخط الأزرق البحري بالقول: «نحن نعلم أن لبنان جدد مطلبه بالحصول على جواب خطي، لأن الوسيط لم يحمل جواباً خطياً، وما قاله لا يؤكد قبول إسرائيل بالخط 23. لكنه قال إنه يستطيع أن يضمن موافقتهم بنسبة 90 في المئة، والجديد هو المطالبة بالانطلاقة من نقطة في البر تمتد شمالاً مساحة 500 متر في البحر ثم تعود في اتجاه الخط 23. وهذه المسافة تريدها إسرائيل منطقة أمنية لحين البدء بالترسيم البري، ولدى القوى اللبنانية المعنية خشية حقيقية من أن يؤثر الأمر في الترسيم البري».

    الرواية الرسمية
    وقال مصدر مواكب للاجتماعات التي عقدها الوسيط الأميركي في بيروت أمس أن الزيارة، على قصر وقتها، كانت مناسبة لقول الكلام المباشر من الجانبين، وأن الوسيط الأميركي كان محدداً في عرضه. وقد أبلغ الرؤساء الثلاثة الآتي:
    أولاً: إن واشنطن تؤكد أن الحكومة الإسرائيلية الحالية تريد اتفاق الترسيم وهي صاحبة مصلحة في توقيعه قبل موعد الانتخابات الإسرائيلية المقبلة.
    ثانيا: إن الولايات المتحدة وأوروبا تعتقدان أن على لبنان وإسرائيل الاستفادة من الواقع السياسي القائم الآن في إسرائيل، لأن أحداً لا يضمن أن تأتي حكومة جديدة لا يكون لديها جدول أعمال آخر يؤخر الاتفاق.
    ثالثا: إن إسرائيل تعتبر أن حقل قانا هو من حصة لبنان كاملاً كما حقل كاريش من حصتها كاملاً ولا جدال حول البلوكات كافة.
    رابعاً: إن الولايات المتحدة اتفقت مع فرنسا على آلية لتعاون بين شركة توتال وبين الجانب الإسرائيلي لتقديم أي تعويض تطالب به إسرائيل، وإن واشنطن وباريس تلتزمان موقف لبنان الرافض لأي نوع من الشراكة في حقل قانا مهما كان حجمه، حتى ولو تبين أن خزانه يمتد إلى أماكن أخرى، وأن مسألة التعويضات بين توتال والإسرائيليين لا تخص لبنان ولا يمكن احتساب أي مبلغ من أرباح لبنان المفترضة من الحقل المذكور. كما أكد أنه حصل على تعهد رسمي من إدارة توتال ومن السلطات الفرنسية بأن العمل سيبدأ مباشرة بعد الإعلان عن توقيع الاتفاق.
    خامساً: إن إسرائيل تسعى إلى بدء عملية الاستخراج من حقل كاريش خلال أسابيع قليلة، وأن أي تأجيل بعده تقني وليس سياسياً، وأن إدارة الشركة اليونانية تلتزم المباشرة بالاستخراج والبيع في تشرين الأول المقبل. ولذلك يفترض أن يتم الاتفاق قبل ذلك.
    سادساً: إن العقبة الأخيرة أمام الاتفاق، هي تثبيت الخط الأزرق البحري بين البلدين، وأن يصار إلى تثبيت النقاط التي تزرع عليه العوامات الفاصلة بين الحدود البحرية الآن، وقد وعد هوكشتين بأن يرسل إلى لبنان منتصف الأسبوع المقبل الإحداثيات الخاصة بهذا الخط وينتظر الجواب اللبناني.
    سابعاً: إن البحث في الخط الأزرق البحري لا يمكن اعتباره بحثاً في الحدود البرية، وإن واشنطن وتل أبيب والآخرين ليسوا في حالة جاهزية لترسيم الحدود البرية الآن، وأن الأمر يتعلق بالمسافة الفاصلة بين شريط العوامات وبين النقطة البرية.

    الموقف اللبناني
    وبحسب المصدر فإن هوكشتين سمع مواقف متطابقة من الرؤساء الثلاثة ومن نائب رئيس المجلس الياس بو صعب والمدير العام للأمن العام اللواء عباس إبراهيم، وتركز الموقف اللبناني على الآتي:
    – إن لبنان غير معني على الإطلاق بأي نقاش حول الخط 23 أو مصير البلوكات والعمل في حقل قانا، وإنه غير معني بأي نقاش أو تسويات تحصل بين إسرائيل وبين فرنسا أو شركة توتال بشأن تعويضات مالية أو خلافه، وإن لبنان سيحتفظ بكل أرباحه من دون أي تنازل وتحت أي ظرف.
    – إن لبنان ليس مستعداً للبحث في نقطة الحدود البرية المعروفة ب B1، وإن لبنان يريد إحداثيات واضحة لما خص الخط الأزرق البحري، وسيكون له جوابه على الطرح بمجرد وصوله خطياً من الوسيط الأميركي. وإن لبنان لا يرى أن هناك مجالاً لتضييع المزيد من الوقت بعدما صارت الأمور واضحة تماماً.
    – إن لبنان مستعد في حال تثبيت نقاط الاتفاق للانتقال إلى الناقورة لإطلاق آلية العمل الأخيرة التي تسبق التوقيع على الاتفاق.

    هوكشتين: لابيد لديه مصلحة في إنجاز الاتفاق قبل الانتخابات الإسرائيلية


    وبحسب المصدر، فإن هوكشتين قال إنه في حال وافق لبنان على معالجة ملف الخط الأزرق البحري، ستكون هناك إمكانية لاتفاق قبل نهاية هذا الشهر، وإنه في حال كان جواب لبنان سلبياً ستتوقف المفاوضات. وكرر خشيته من أن أي تبدل سياسي في إسرائيل من شأنه تعريض المفاوضات للخطر. لكنه أشار إلى أن بلاده تدعم الوصول إلى اتفاق قبل شروع الشركة اليونانية في الاستخراج من حقل كاريش، وهو أشار إلى أن الشركة تعتبر أنها ستكون قادرة على البدء بالعمل مطلع الشهر المقبل.
    ولفت المصدر إلى أن هوكشتين سمع كلاماً واضحاً حول مسائل تتعلق بالمفاوضات، ومفاده أن لبنان يريد العودة سريعاً إلى الناقورة، فرد بأنه في حال لم يكن هناك تفاهم مسبق على جميع النقاط فإن إسرائيل ليست بصدد العودة إلى الناقورة الآن، وأن حكومة لابيد سوف ترى في ذلك ما يضعف موقفها في الانتخابات الداخلية.
    وفي ما خص الاستقرار الأمني، قال هوكشتين إن الجميع يريد تثبيت الاستقرار. فسمع كلاماً رئاسياً بأن الاستقرار يحصل عند حصول الاتفاق وعند حصول لبنان على كامل حقوقه، وأن الوقت ليس في مصلحة أحد، وأن الرئيس عون يمكنه لعب دور كبير في حفظ الاستقرار في حال جرى التوقيع على الاتفاق قبل مغادرته القصر الجمهوري، وفي حال تم تأخير الاتفاق فإن أحداً لا يضمن عدم حصول تطورات سلبية من شأنها تهديد الاستقرار الأمني لكل عملية استخراج الغاز من شرق المتوسط برمته.

    غموض في إسرائيل: تفاهم لا اتفاق | «إنرجيان» ترفض ضغوط واشنطن وتل أبيب

    تعاطت وسائل الإعلام الاسرائيلية بكثير من الحذر حيال فكرة الاتفاق. وقال تقرير لـ«موقع يديعوت أحرونوت» إن «مصدراً سياسياً أشار إلى أنه حتى الساعة لا يتوقّع توقيعاً على الاتفاق مع لبنان، لأن حزب الله لا يسمح للحكومة بالتوقيع على اتفاق ثنائي مع إسرائيل، وعلى ما يبدو ستنتهي القضية بتفاهمات واتفاقات، وعلى الأكثر سيتم إيداع ورقة في الأمم المتحدة يفصل فيها خط الحدود المتفق عليه».
    أمّا ألون بن دافيد، فكتب في «معاريف» أن إسرائيل «تدخل ولبنان في هذه الأيام المرحلة الأخيرة من المفاوضات حول ترسيم الحدود البحرية. إذا لم تنبثق معوقات اللحظة الأخيرة، السنة الجديدة قد تجلب معها بشرى اتفاق، أهميته الاستراتيجية لإسرائيل لا تقل عن أهمية اتفاقات أبراهام بل وحتى تفوقها. وفي نهاية هذا الأسبوع سيعرفون في إسرائيل مقترح الوساطة الأخير الذي جلبه معه المبعوث الأميركي عاموس هوكشتين. الفجوات بين الطرفين بقيت مقلصة، وفي الظاهر يبدو أنه يمكن التوصل إلى اتفاق في غضون أسابيع».
    وقال التقرير إن «إسرائيل أظهرت مرونة في المفاوضات ووضعت مقترحاً هو Win-Win (رابح-رابح). بحسب المقترح الإسرائيلي، خط الحدود سيُعدّل بحيث أن كل حقل الغاز «كاريش» وكذلك هوامشه الأمنية ستبقى في الجانب الإسرائيلي، وكل حقل «قانا» سيكون في الجانب اللبناني. الفكرة هي إنتاج ميزانٍ مستقر: مقابل المنصة الإسرائيلية ستكون هناك المنصة اللبنانية، وكل طرف سيعلم أن استهداف منصة الطرف الثاني سيؤدي أيضاً إلى خسارته لمورده من الغاز».
    وتحدّث عن «قلق الاستفزاز مع حزب الله». وقال إنه سيتم غداً (الأحد) تغيير قائد المنطقة الشمالية حيث يتنحى اللواء أمير برعام ويتولاها اللواء أوري غوردين المستنفر إلى أقصى حد «لاستباق استفزازٍ من حزب الله». وقال التقرير إن برعام «يقدّر، بخلاف كثيرين في الجيش الإسرائيلي، أن حزب الله سيحذَر من عملية مغامرة يمكن أن تقوده إلى مواجهة واسعة وخسارة فرصة لبنان للاستفادة من موارد الغاز. إذا عمل حزب الله، يقدّر برعام، هذا سيكون بطريقة مدروسة ومحسوبة، التي ميّزته في السنوات الأخيرة، عدم المخاطرة بتدهور إلى مواجهة. شيء ما على شاكلة الطائرات المسيّرة التي أرسلها في تموز».
    الضغوط على «إنرجيان»
    من ناحية ثانية، أورد موقع «غلوبس» تقريراً يشرح حقيقة الارتباك الذي رافق الحديث عن تأجيل الاستخراج من حقل «كاريش». وقال أنه «في الأسابيع الأخيرة رفضت شركة إنرجيان ضغوط إسرائيل والولايات المتحدة، وهي مصرة على بدء الإنتاج في 20 أيلول الحالي»، وأن الرئيس التنفيذي للشركة ماثيوس ريجاس أبلغ المستثمرين في الشركة بأنه لا تراجع عن بدء العمل في 20 أيلول، وأن الشركة على علم بالمفاوضات الجارية بين إسرائيل ولبنان بوساطة الولايات المتحدة الأميركية ولدينا ثقة كاملة بإسرائيل وبحكومتها وقدرتها على حماية مصالحها».
    وقال التقرير إنه في الأسابيع القليلة الماضية «كانت هناك ضغوط متزايدة من قبل إسرائيل والأميركيين على الشركة ورئيسها لتأجيل إنتاج الغاز حتى انتهاء المفاوضات حول الحدود البحرية. تخشى بعض المصادر في إسرائيل أن ينفذ حزب الله تهديده بمهاجمة منصة كاريش ومنصتي تمار ولفيتان، مما سيؤدي إلى إفشال المفاوضات والتصعيد، كما تسعى إيران التي تقف وراءه».
    واللافت، بحسب التقرير، أن للشركة «إنرجيان، وريجاس نفسه، اعتبارات مالية وجدولاً زمنياً موعوداً للعملاء والمستثمرين في بيانات رسمية. وأن رئيس الشركة ليس من هؤلاء الذين يخافون الضغط، لا من حزب الله ولا من المسؤولين في إسرائيل والولايات المتحدة».
    ولفت الموقع إلى أن النقاش في إسرائيل معقّد حول مسألة الاستخراج، ونقل عن مصادر سياسية أنه «في نقاشات أجريت في لقاءات مختلفة من بينها مجلس الأمن القومي، جرى اعتبار تأجيل الإنتاج بمثابة خضوع لحزب الله». وقال التقرير إن «الضغط على إنرجيان جاء هذه المرة من الجانب الأميركي، حيث طلب الوسيط مساحة زمنية أوسع للمفاوضات، وسط مخاوف من أن يؤدي بدء الإنتاج إلى رد من حزب الله قد يؤدي إلى نسفها».

    Who benefits from UNIFIL’s new amendments to its mission in Lebanon?

    September 3, 2022

    Source: Al Mayadeen

    By Al Mayadeen English 

    An unprecedented UNSC statement is released: UNIFIL does not require “prior authorization or permission from anyone” to conduct missions “independently.”

    As UNIFIL announces the renewal of its mandate in Lebanon, the United Nations body consisting of 10,000 military personnel attempts to extend its set of privileges over the population in the South by not requiring “prior authorization or permission from anyone to undertake its mandated tasks, and that it is allowed to conduct its operations independently.”

    The statement, shockingly and unapologetically, “calls on the parties to guarantee UNIFIL’s freedom of movement, including by allowing announced and unannounced patrols.”

    The UN body’s latest statement arrives against a tense backdrop where confrontation may be at the door between Lebanon and the Israeli occupation over the latter’s threat to occupy the Karish gas field, stripping Lebanon of its own maritime territory and right. Secretary-General of Hezbollah, Sayyed Hassan Nasrallah, has vowed that the Lebanese Resistance will target the drilling platform in case a demarcation agreement with the Lebanese government is not reached in addition to enabling Lebanon to explore its own resources. 

    UNIFIL has been patrolling South Lebanon since 1978, and was established under UN resolution 425 to “monitor the cessation of hostilities between Lebanon and Israel” as it claims, in addition to supporting “the Lebanese authorities in keeping the area south of the Litani River free of unauthorized armed personnel, weapons, or other related assets.” 

    The latest addition to the UN’s mandate raises questions (and eyebrows) on whether UNIFIL not needing prior permission to perform its missions is an Israeli demand that falls within Washington and “Tel Aviv’s” attempts to expand the scope of UN missions in the South. 

    Within this context, Lebanese Brigadier-General Hisham Jaber spoke to Al Mayadeen “UNIFIL’s missions have been stipulated since it began its missions in Lebanon, and there have been minor amendments to it that were made by the Security Council – which determines its tasks – not the United Nations or its secretary-general.” 

    Contrary to the UN statement’s demands, Jaber stresses that the mandate “needs prior permission if it wants to deviate from the tasks entrusted to it,” and that the intention behind this statement can be interpreted by keeping in mind that “Israel” has, for long, “been trying to incite the modification of UNIFIL’s missions to make it police its missions, and search for weapons even inside Lebanese neighborhoods and villages.” 

    Jaber pointed out that “UNIFIL has repeatedly tried to enter homes and schools to search for weapons, in deviation from the tasks entrusted to it at the behest of Israel,” in an attempt to normalize the situation for the Lebanese, attempting to make searches a regular reality for the population. 

    UNIFIL has long condoned Israeli violations despite 16 years since Resolution 1701 was passed by the UN Security Council, which calls for the full cessation of hostilities between Lebanon and “Israel.” According to Jaber, UNIFIL forces have not been able to detect abt violations from the Lebanese side, but it is trying, through installing cameras and surveillance, to cater to the Israeli desire to register a Lebanese violation of resolution 1701. 

    He explained that the Lebanese Army’s presence in the South is Lebanon’s guarantee that UNIFIL will stick to the tasks assigned to it and will not deviate from them. However, its statement calling for ‘independence’ from Lebanese jurisdiction will most likely serve “Tel Aviv.”

    Lebanese political commentator and journalist Hassan Olleik warned that such a move would, in fact, jeopardize the very continuation and existence of UNIFIL in South Lebanon. He told Al Mayadeen, “UNIFIL’s [top] priority is to secure the stability of its forces, because the closer it comes to playing the role that Israel and the US want for it, the higher the level of tension will be between the UNIFIL and the residents of the South, and this matter puts UNIFIL’s leadership, elements, mechanisms and assets at risk.” 

    He added that the “inspection of private property requires permission from the Lebanese Army and judiciary, because UNIFIL’s mission cannot bypass Lebanese law, and for this reason, the Lebanese authorities treated this amendment with some indifference.”

    UNSC Resolution 1701, which was passed after the 2006 war, entails monitoring the cessation of hostilities, monitoring the deployment of the Lebanese army along the Blue Line, and Israeli withdrawal from the South, in addition to ensuring that the area between the Blue Line and the Litani River is free of any armed manifestations. The resolution also assists the Lebanese government, at its request, in securing its borders and crossings to prevent the entry of any weapons without its consent.

    Modifying the missions of UNIFIL has always been a demand by the US and “Israel” that has been translated into several attempts in recent years within the Security Council to push for the expansion of these missions to include all of the South, allowing it to monitor any movements that could be a prelude to some security or military action on the borders. Attempts have also been made to expand these missions to include the Lebanese-Syrian border.

    These attempts clashed with the opposition of major countries, including France and Russia, and mainly to a categorical Lebanese rejection at the official and popular levels as well. The area north and south of the Litani has witnessed many problems between the people and UNIFIL soldiers, in refusal of the international forces’ attempts to change their rules of operation on their own.

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    Israeli media: Hezbollah ‘show of force’ brought Lebanon achievements

    September 1, 2022 

    By Al Mayadeen English 

    Source: Israeli

    An Israeli expert on Arab affairs says “Israel” must take the initiative and not allow Hezbollah to change the rules of the game.

    Karish oil rig

    The Israeli expert on Arab affairs, Yoni Ben Menachem, commented on the developments in the file of demarcating the maritime borders between Lebanon and the Israeli occupation.

    On Twitter, Ben Menachem said Hezbollah’s show of force against “Israel” secures major achievements for Lebanon in the ongoing negotiations on the maritime borders.

    He underlined that this step is a dangerous precedent, stressing that “Israel” must take the initiative and not allow Hezbollah to change the rules of the game.

    A few days ago, Israeli media reported that an agreement with Lebanon is very close after “Israel” accepted that the Qana field be completely controlled by Lebanon, in exchange for the entire Karish field.

    However, Lebanese Deputy Speaker Elias Bou Saab slammed all the latest negative and positive reports about the course of negotiations, whether by Israeli or international media, as “mere speculations that are not based on any information or official stances.”

    In the same context, Israeli media said that the Americans are very concerned about the possibility of the situation deteriorating between “Israel” and Hezbollah.

    According to the media, it seemed that US President Joe Biden was not interfering in the border demarcation matter, but on Wednesday the White House entered with full force on the issue of the agreement with Lebanon.

    Read more: US ‘highly prioritizes’ Israeli-Lebanese maritime border dispute

    Sayyed Nasrallah: ‘Israel’s’ threats regarding demarcation deal are worthless

    It is noteworthy that Hezbollah Secretary-General Hassan Nasrallah warned that “If Lebanon does not obtain the rights demanded by the Lebanese state, we are heading toward an escalation whether or not the nuclear agreement is signed.”

    Sayyed Nasrallah stressed that “the focus in Lebanon must be on Karish and the Lebanese [maritime] border, as well as the US mediator that is still wasting time amid a time constraint.”

    On August 9, the Lebanese leader warned that any attempt to plunder any of Lebanon’s wealth will be thwarted, indicating that the party is waiting for the Israeli enemy’s response to Lebanon’s demands regarding border demarcation.

    He also noted that it is necessary to prepare for all possibilities, adding that Hezbollah is serious about this file to the utmost.

    Sayyed Nasrallah addressed the Israeli occupation by saying that Lebanon and its people will no longer accept the looting of their wealth.

    The Lebanese leader affirmed that the Resistance is stronger than ever, warning the Israeli occupation against committing any mistake in Lebanon.

    On the 40th anniversary of the establishment of Hezbollah, Secretary-General Sayyed Hassan Nasrallah stressed that the Israeli threats are to no avail, adding that Hezbollah’s decision and approach are clear and “we are waiting for the coming days to act accordingly.”

    Hezbollah’s messages to the Israeli occupation

    It is noteworthy that on July 31, the military media unit of the Islamic Resistance in Lebanon published a video that displayed the coordinates of the Israeli occupation’s gas rigs off the coasts of occupied Palestine in a clear message to “Tel Aviv”.

    The video displayed footage of the drillships and the floating production units alongside information pertaining to the specifics of their geolocation, giving their coordinates and information regarding the origin and details of the ships at sea based on the flags they bear. Moreover, the video displayed the exact distance of each ship from Lebanese shores.

    The video was entitled: “[You are] in our crosshair… stalling is not beneficial.”

    Similarly, Hezbollah sent out three UAVs on a recon mission over the Karish gas field before they were shot down by the Israeli occupation forces, stressing that “the mission was completed and the message was delivered.”

    ’Israel’ Postpones Karish Extraction Citing ’Technical Issue’, Still Worried of Hezbollah’s Threats

    August 29, 2022

    Source: ‘Israeli’ Media | Translated by Al-Ahed News

    The Tel Aviv regime unveiled on Sunday what it referred to as the format of the deal being made with Lebanon to solve the maritime border dispute.

    The ‘Israeli’ announcement was released by ‘Israeli’ Channel 12 as part of the leaks meant to circulate to test the other side’s reaction ahead of suggesting the official proposal by US mediator Amos Hochstein who is supposed to visit Lebanon in the next few days.

    The Channel claimed in a Sunday report that a US-mediated deal between Lebanon and the ‘Israeli’ occupation entity will soon be reached.

    The maritime borders will be “re-demarcated”, the report claims, in which two gas platforms will be constructed; the first will be in Lebanon and the second in the ‘Israeli’-occupied Palestinian waters.

    However, part of the Lebanese gas platform will present in the ‘Israeli’-occupied marine area, which will be compensated financially.

    The two platforms will be 5 kilometers apart in which the ‘balance of horror’ would be achieved to ‘prevent certain sides from attacking the ‘Israeli’ platform.’ The report also suggested that gas production from the Karish Platform would kick off in October, unlike estimations that preceded Hezbollah threats, in which the platform was set to start operating in September.

    The ‘Israeli’ entity’s media claimed on Sunday that the date of extraction has been delayed until October due to ‘technical issues.’

    Nevertheless, the ‘Israeli’ channel alleged that Hezbollah will take advantage of the time difference to escalate its messages against the ‘Israeli’ entity as ‘it wants to score an achievement in the naval struggle between Lebanon and ‘Israel.’ As a result, the ‘Israeli’ security establishment is readying for the possibility of a major escalation or even an all-out confrontation in wake of Hezbollah’s threats.

    Hezbollah: Forty Dimensions of Uniqueness [3/3] – The Necessities of Building an Incubation Environment

    August 29, 2022 

    By Housam Matar | Al-Akhbar Newspaper

    Translated by Al-Ahed News
     
    Hezbollah is a small organization fighting “Israel”, which is a regional entity and project with unlimited international support. Therefore, it needed material and financial assets, cadres, an incubating environment, a logistical structure, a dynamic and charismatic leadership, and a strategic geopolitical depth (national and supranational). How did Hezbollah achieve this? 

     
    In the third and final article of our three-part series detailing the emergence of the party and its forty years of existence, we continue to explore Hezbollah’s many dimensions. The following text focuses on the building of its incubation environment.
     
    31. A leadership capable of transformations: The party leadership believed in this ability to resist due to its understanding of the historical impact of Imam Khomeini’s revolution in Iran, whose success cannot be explained solely through material factors.
     
    An in-depth study by the RAND Corporation concluded that popular support for military organizations has several sources, including the effectiveness of the institution. This is determined by, among other things, the presence of a strategic, charismatic, and effective leadership. The general public interprets reality through the eyes of the leadership that it believes in.
     
    Hezbollah would not have built an incubation, cohesive, and committed environment without such leadership. Belonging to the party and its project is fraught with many risks and burdens and requires an enhanced ability to inspire, persuade, influence, and attract others in order to secure an adequate incubation environment capable of advancing its resistance project.
     
    Analyses, especially hostile ones, are unanimous in the fact that Hezbollah’s leadership (especially Sayyed Hassan Nasrallah) influences the group’s successes. It is a self-sacrificing, honest, charming, emotional, and wise leadership that lives the concerns of its people.
     
    Thus, the supporters feel that their leader is part of them and integrated with them. This is reflected in a form of recognition or understanding among segments of the environment that embrace the leadership’s decisions, even if the adopted decision or position does not convince everyone.
     
    For all this, Hezbollah’s leadership (which is a collective leadership in which decisions are made by consultation and consensus in general) is a victim of intense and systematic misinformation campaigns locally and regionally. These are designed to undermine the group and prompt people to question its motives and morals.
     
    32- The originality of the idea of resistance: In other words, Hezbollah made the issue of resistance its main project that governs its identity, policies, and behavior. It is not a circumstantial or a tactical issue or an issue subject to bargaining.
     
    Resistance is a second nature to the party; it is a resistance movement that practices politics and not a political movement that practices resistance. This is linked to two essential factors: the party’s identity (it is a jihadist faith movement) and its reading of the region’s crisis in that it is a crisis fueled by the state of subjugation to American hegemony.
     
    On this basis, the party molded its incubation environment, linking the resistance to the religious/Husayni dimension, the history of the sect, and national interests.
     
    Therefore, the party treats its resistance as a natural part of the history of the sect and the nation, by recalling the contributions of others from national, Islamic, leftist and nationalist forces.
     
    The party repeatedly tells its supporters in its various constituencies (Shiite, Lebanese, Muslim, and Arab) of the offers it receives to compromise on the issue of resistance and the pressures it endures for refusing to make concessions.
     
    It insists that it represents the real struggle in the nation and the homeland. This originality of the party’s resistance project tightens the bonds between its popular incubators and shapes their perceptions of the resistance. As such, people are more willing to bear burdens and risks.
     
    33- Ethical pillar: Building a symbiotic environment requires the existence of a solid moral ground that enhances social stability, deepens cooperation and peace, and imposes behavioral and political discipline.
     
    The importance of this increases with the availability of all this material force that can push for forms of authoritarianism and impoverishment, especially with the nature of the Lebanese reality.
     
    The party’s discourse and educational process emphasize the ethical aspects of religiosity (good deeds, charity, solidarity, relief, piety, care for the rights of others, family ethics, etc.) based on the rich heritage of hadiths and biographies of the Prophet and his household (PBUH).
     
    The impact of this is evident in the current economic crisis, where it is easy to notice a high level of social solidarity within the party’s environment, both residents and expatriates.
     
    34- Producing party cadres: The party pays great attention to building its cadres, especially the young ones, in order to provide them with the knowledge and skills necessary to carry out tasks that are increasingly complex.
     
    The party takes advantage of the many students and university graduates in its circles to select those best qualified to be its working cadres.
     
    The cadres are also involved in extensive field work directly related to addressing the people’s needs, which enhances their awareness of the social, political, and cultural reality, as well as academic knowledge.
     
    These cadres, within the different organizational levels, serve as fulcrums in the party’s body, where circles of influence and efficacy are built around them and are integrated into pre-designed networks.
     
    The construction of institutions and qualifying cadres contribute to transferring the party’s culture and experiences from the higher echelons of power to young cadres (especially for the generation that joined the party after the liberation of the south in 2000).
     
    This contributes to the renewal of the organization. In the course of this process, part of the internal partisan dialogue takes place, which allows the leadership to listen and engage in dialog with cadres who have intense contact with the different levels of the organization as well as with the public.
     
    35- Intensive mass communication: It is a process that makes the party more like the nervous system of the resistance community.
     
    Hezbollah communicates with the public through several channels. There is direct and daily communication through political and religious events (official and private), sports, scouting and entertainment activities, political meetings in villages and neighborhoods, and the provision of services through a huge network of party institutions and units. Then, there is media communication in all its forms (traditional and digital, memorials, billboards, exhibitions, etc.).
     
    It is rare to see a political organization that is involved at this level with its supporters; party leaders and cadres visit villages and neighborhoods all year round and hold political seminars in which they listen, answer, and discuss; its leadership continuously address them, presenting its positions, visions, and interpretations.
     
    Thus, the party communicates with the supporters from different angles that reflect its professional, age, regional, and scientific characteristics, hobbies and needs.
     
    Thus, the public receives consistent messages that confirm the narratives promoted by the party. At the same time, this intense communication allows the party to listen and understand its supporters’ trends (this is in addition to the continuous opinion polls that the party silently conducts). Hence, this is an additional factor in the decision-making process, in how the decision is presented, or in how the topics of public discourse are determined.
     
    36- Comprehensiveness of social services:  From the beginning, the party owned modest service institutions to meet the needs of its resistance fighters and their families. Then, it began to expand to respond to the reality of its marginalized public environment.

    Providing these services is the shortest way to the minds and hearts of the public, and it is pleasing to God according to Islamic culture and loyalty to the people who embrace the resistance.
     
    These institutions have expanded enormously and are now meeting the needs of hundreds of thousands of citizens (dispensaries and hospitals, lending, subsidized schools, agricultural and animal development support, rehabilitation centers for addicts and neurological diseases, student grants, student guidance, care for vulnerable groups, food stores at subsidized prices, in-kind donations, etc.).
     
    These services make the party closer to the people, and large numbers of volunteers who carry the party’s message participate in providing them.
     
    They are provided as part of jihad represented in lifting deprivation and defending the weak. Thus, these services enhance the resistance of the Islamic identity within the community.
     
    Researchers have concluded that these services are an important factor in explaining popular support for the party but not the main reason, because many of those who do not benefit from it (either they are not in need or are expatriates) are supporters of the party.
     
    They concluded that the most prominent reason for the party’s support within its environment stems from the security it provides and making those who are part of that environment feel strong and empowered. This service network has given the party flexibility to deal with the financial and economic collapse in Lebanon by expanding the range of services to mitigate the effects of the collapse on the downtrodden segments.
     
    37- Giving meaning to the movement of society: Hezbollah created a historical task for its society to organize and manage its affairs through it, which is to bear the responsibility for the resistance project.
     
    The party has done this by defining this mission as a religious, historical, national, and humanitarian duty, as well as linking the issue of resistance to the daily interests of the people.
     
    The choice of resistance, apart from being a natural extension of the group’s religious and political history, as the party sees it, is part of its material interests in the present and the future.
     
    The fierce media and political attacks against the party help create a kind of social solidarity within the party’s environment over the concept of resistance, which has become the centerpiece of the collective identity that is threatened and a source of pride at the same time.
     
    Here, partisan institutions evoke the history of the Lebanese Shiites and their men and show their roles in resisting the various forms of occupation.
     
    38- Honest and balanced discourse: Hezbollah needs to talk to several social incubators from different cultural backgrounds, including within the Shiite community itself.
     
    It also needs a state of internal stability, and it does not struggle for power in the traditional sense. Therefore, the party cannot present an extremist discourse.
     
    Here, the party benefited from the experience of its “embryonic” discourse in the 80s, as it worked on developing it after discovering the reality of local peculiarities.
     
    In its discourse, the party emphasizes the inclusive elements, reiterating its Lebaneseness, Arabism, Islamism, and identity as a national liberation movement, which allows it to build bridges with different environments with varying degrees of strength.
     
    The party’s rhetoric is based on extremism regarding the struggle with the enemy and on openness, recognition, and understanding in other issues, which sometimes provokes blame from its supporters, who consider it too soft, or criticism from others who see it as a conciliatory discourse with the current situation in Lebanon.
     
    39- Getting out of the narrow partisan mentality. With the rise of the party’s strength and prestige, it no longer needed to engage in traditional party rivalries.
     
    So, over time, it tended to act as an entire community/nation rather than a party. This allowed the party a measure of flexibility to communicate and build bridges with segments that differ with its culture and agree with it in other issues, foremost of which is the resistance.
     
    On many occasions, the party launches media campaigns that miss its official slogan, contributes to supporting activities and institutions that are not within the party’s structure, and non-partisan figures in ministerial, union, and administrative positions.
     
    Within this context, Hezbollah tends to work through broad national alliances and partnerships as much as possible on the basis of its strategic options related to the resistance, with the necessary consensus, stability, and political leverage. The margins of differentiation between the party and its allies in local politics narrow and widen according to the topic and stage.
     
    40- Focusing on religiosity: The party is interested in spreading religiosity within its society and allocates great resources to that as an Islamic and faith movement in the first place.

    It believes that the religious dimension preserves the project of resistance and the authenticity of its society’s identity and protects it from penetration and disintegration.
     
    However, as much as the party is concerned with the form of religiosity in the private and public spheres, it was keen from the beginning to revive the revolutionary dimension of Shiism. It also made belonging to the resistance and support for the Palestinian cause a political component of the Shiite and Islamic identity.
     
    This is most evident in the party’s Ashura discourse, which sees America the Yazid of the age and relies on this revival of popular mobilization to fight and prepare for sacrifice.
     
    As much as the party is concerned about the emergence of forms of atheism, it is also concerned about the emergence of forms of non-political, non-revolutionary religiosity that does not have a project related to the challenges of the era.
     
    Therefore, as much as the party is keen on the strength of religiosity in its social environment, it is also keen that religiosity be against domination and occupation.
     
    Conclusion
     
    For 40 years, Hezbollah has continued its upward trajectory in building power equations against the “Israeli” enemy. For 40 years, it chose to engage with challenges, face crises, deal with deficiencies, seize opportunities, learn, and develop. 

    In its last decade, the party faced complex regional and local challenges that are likely to become more complex due to the stormy crises within the regional and international spheres.
     
    This series shows what emerged from the party’s experiences with attitudes and practice. But writings about the party should have a measure of caution since it is a resistance movement first and foremost, and its jihadist component forms its heart and soul.
     
    The ambiguities, secrets, and mysteries surrounding the party are extensive, and this is one of the sources of its deterrent power. After the 2006 war, the “Israeli” enemy was stunned (six years had passed since the liberation) at what it had found, to the extent that one of the “Israeli” conclusions was that the “Israeli” army must be an army of “black swans”, that is, be prepared for all surprises and for all that can be imagined before fighting Hezbollah in the future.
     
    But will that be enough? We won’t know until after the war, but the enemy’s reluctance to attack helps us in speculating about the answer.
     
    The great challenge facing the party today is how to manage the problems arising within all of these factors, in connection with generational changes, rapid and intertwined internal and external transformations in the political, social, cultural, and technological fields, the increasing complexity of the tools of its enemies, and organizational facts in the party’s structure.
     
    Interaction with these challenges will determine much of Hezbollah’s image, position, and role in the next 40 years.

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    MP Raad: Blockade on Lebanon aimed at Disarming Hezbollah, Righteous People Never Surrender

     August 27, 2022

    Head of Hezbollah’s Loyalty to Resistance parliamentary bloc MP Mohammad Raad said on Saturday that the aim of the blockade imposed on Lebanon is to disarm Hezbollah, stressing that “righteous people never surrender.”

    In a local ceremony in south Lebanon, MP Raad said: “To walk on Imam Hussein’s path means that we are committed to slogan ‘Humiliation… never’, and we will never surrender.”

    “They have been imposing a blockade and fighting us with harsh livelihood conditions. The blockade aims at humiliating and disarming the resistance. We are righteous people who will never surrender,” MP Raad in remarks carried by Al-Manar.

    He lashed out at Lebanon’s enemies, saying that they have been breaching the national sovereignty.

    “The resistance considers defending sovereignty as a national and moral duty,” MP Raad said, stressing that Hezbollah has been firm on preserving Lebanon’s maritime wealth in a bid to cope with the current economic crisis.

    On the coming presidential election, the Hezbollah lawmaker said: “Either we will have a strong president who will commit to the national sovereignty, or we will have a president who will be dictated by foreign powers and forced to sign (peace) treaties (with enemies).”

    Source: Al-Manar English Website

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