Zionists Form Group to Promote Kurdish Statehood

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By Richard Edmondson

Perhaps at some point we’ll see a sly Zionist pop up somewhere claiming the Kurds are an “ancient biblical people.”

(And doubtless, if so, he’d have plenty of money to buy off plenty of historians to “verify” his claim).

And maybe in the not-so-distant future we could even anticipate publication of a brand new modern English translation of the Bible with a rewording of the Book of Genesis to include the following: “So Abraham and his wife Sarah and his nephew Lot set out from Harran, but on the way they stopped off and got down and partied with their cousins, the Kurds, before heading off to conquer the land of Caanan.”

Don’t laugh. In the world we’re presently living in absurdities of this nature are well within the possible.

A group of prominent Zionists have now formed the Jewish Coalition for Kurdistan–an organization with the stated objective of promoting “the legitimate rights of the Kurdish people to self-determination”–which may sound like a reasonable goal, but of course establishment of a Kurdish state would likely result in the breaking off of parts of Syria and possibly Iraq, and maybe even Turkey or Iran as well.

In other words, depending upon how successful this new group turns out to be, there’s a high likelihood we could see more bloodshed and violence in the Middle East with more waves of refugees flooding into Europe.

The JCFK is headquartered in Belgium. Its president is Joël Rubinfeld, who has served as secretary-general of the Belgium-Israel Friendship Society, president of the Jewish Community of Belgium, and vice-president of the European Jewish Parliament.

However prominent American Jews are involved with the JCFK as well. Rabbi Abraham Cooper serves on its Honorary Board. Cooper is with the Simon Wiesenthal Center, based in Los Angeles, an organization now building a “Museum of Tolerance” on top of a Palestinian cemetery in Jerusalem. And another member of the Honorary Board is Alan Dershowitz, Harvard law Professor Emeritus and regular contributor on CNN and Fox News.

I posted an article about Dershowitz last week discussing a recent piece he published attacking Congresswoman Betty McCollum over her sponsorship of the “Promoting Human Rights by Ending Israeli Military Detention of Palestinian children Act” in Congress. Dershowitz appears to have something of a bi-polar view of the Middle East (hate the Palestinians/love the Kurds), and while he has been described as a “civil liberties lawyer,” he has also publicly clashed with civil libertarians such as Noam Chomsky, Norman Finkelstein, and Alice Walker. (The latter he accused of “bigotry”–for refusing to allow an Israeli publisher to publish her book, The Color Purple.)

Kurds have long enjoyed support from Israelis as well, although in the past that support has often been kept under wraps for political reasons. Now, however, it is coming out in the open–big time. On Wednesday, November 29, the Israeli Knesset hosted an international conference entitled “Kurdistan and Israel: Together Towards Peace and Stability in the Middle East” (notice the use of the word “Kurdistan,” as if such a state already exists).

The event took place, significantly, on the 70th anniversary of the UN resolution on the partitioning of Palestine, and one of the participants was Rubinfeld, who was there along with a delegation from the European Kurdish Society. A host of prominent Israelis, including Tzipi Livni and Michael Oren, also attended, and the occasion sparked the introduction of a Knesset bill calling for the right of Israelis to travel freely between Israel and Kurdish-controlled areas. The following is from a report here that discusses the bill (emphasis added):

The bill, a copy of which was given to The Times of Israel, makes no explicit distinction between Kurdish-controlled areas in Iraq–known as the Kurdish Regional Government (KRG), where Israelis can travel fairly safely–and other Kurdish areas, whether in northern Syria or in Iran.

The vagueness is intentional, the bill’s author told The Times of Israel. The legislation is currently meant to refer just to Iraqi Kurdistan, though that could change in the future.

On Tuesday, November 28, one day prior to the Knessett event in Jerusalem, a number of pro-Kurdish events were held in New York as well. One of these was a screening at the UN of a documentary entitled “Peshmerga,” directed by French-Jewish “philosopher” Bernard Henri-Levy. Peshmerga is the name of the troops operating under the aegis of the Kurdish Regional Government of Northern Iraq. Sponsored by the  French and British missions to the UN, the film screening was attended by some 700 people, while François Delattre, France’s UN ambassador, spoke of the “historic rights of the people of Kurdistan.”

The Kurds, it may be remembered, held a referendum for independence back in September. Three days after the vote,  The Forward published an article under the headline “The Secret Friendship Behind Israel’s Support of Kurdish Independence.” Discussing the “deep affinity” between Israel and the Kurds, the writer notes that:

In some ways, Israel’s view is pragmatic. The Middle East could do with another secular democracy.

Yes, the Middle East could do with another secular democracy, but of course the writer, one Michael Goldfarb, omits any mention of the fact that Israel has been trying to overthrow the democratic, secular government of Syria. The piece nonetheless is somewhat revealing, for Goldfarb offers up a quote from an Israeli by the name of Eliezer Gheizi Safrir, described as “Mossad’s station chief in Kurdistan in the mid 1970s.”

“They [Kurds] called me Kak Gheizi,” he said proudly.  Kak or kaka means brother. It is a term of friendship. “These are good people, ” says Gheizi. “They share the same values as Jews.”

The fact that a former Mossad chief is a fan of the Kurds might not be all that surprising. Back in mid-to-late summer of this year, Sarah Abed published a series of articles about the Kurds that focused on, among other things, the close ties that have developed over the years with Israel. In one of the articles, here, she writes:

Documents leaked by WikiLeaks in 2010 suggested that Israeli Mossad Chief Meir Dagan wanted to use Kurds and ethnic minorities to topple the Iranian government. The Israeli spy service was aiming to create a weak and divided Iran, similar to the situation in Iraq, where the Kurds have their own autonomous government, the spy chief told a U.S. official.

The Partiya Jiyana Azad a Kurdistane (PJAK), a militant Kurdish nationalist group based in northern Iraq, has been carrying out attacks on Iranian forces in the Kurdistan Province of Iran (Eastern Kurdistan) and other Kurdish-inhabited areas. Half the members of PJAK are women. The PJAK has about 3,000 armed militiamen. They represent yet another example of the Kurds finding themselves in the middle of a conflict and being used as a pawn by the West.

The party is closely linked to the PKK. Iran has often accused PJAK and other Kurdish nationalist groups from Iran of being supported by Israel. Journalist Seymour Hersh has also claimed that the U.S. supported PJAK and other Iranian opposition groups. However, both the U.S. and Israel have denied supporting PJAK. In fact, the U.S. Treasury branded PJAK as a terrorist organization in 2009.

As Hersh noted in 2004: “The Israelis have had long-standing ties to the Talibani and Barzani clans [in] Kurdistan and there are many Kurdish Jews that emigrated to Israel and there are still a lot of connection. But at some time before the end of the year [2004], and I’m not clear exactly when, certainly I would say a good six, eight months ago, Israel began to work with some trained Kurdish commandos, ostensibly the idea was the Israelis — some of the Israeli elite commander units, counter-terror or terror units, depending on your point of view, began training — getting the Kurds up to speed.”

You’ll recall the comment of Eliezer Gheizi Safrir, the Mossad station chief, as quoted by Goldfarb in The Forward article. Recall also that Gheizi served in his post in the mid 1970s. Interestingly, a man by the name of Abd al-Aziz al-Uqayli, who was Iraq’s defense minister in the 1960s, made some rather revealing remarks concerning efforts under way at that time to create a “second Israel” in his own country. According to a report here (emphasis added):

In 1966, Iraqi defense minister Abd al-Aziz al-Uqayli blamed the Kurds of Iraq for seeking to establish “a second Israel” in the Middle East. He also claimed that “the West and the East are supporting the rebels to create [khalq] a new Israeli state in the north of the homeland as they had done in 1948 when they created Israel. It is as if history is repeating itself.”

Perhaps, on top of all his love for secular democracies, Goldfarb might delight even more at the creation of a “second Israel”–although there are plenty of people who would likely shudder at the thought. Among these are Middle East Christians who have had some nightmarish run-ins with Kurds. This is something discussed by Abed in a separate article here:

On the Nineveh plains of northern Iraq, the Kurds dwell in cities such as “Dohuk” (formerly known by the Assyrian name of Nohadra). But these cities are “theirs” only in that they have established a relatively recent presence there.

Employing the criteria of cultural identity and thousands of years of historical authenticity, these lands are, and have been, uniquely Assyrian. The Kurds were essentially “given” these lands in the early 1970s as a means of drawing their eyes away from the oil-rich lands in and around the Iraqi city of Kirkuk. To this end, there were large migrations of Kurds into Dohuk which displaced, often forcibly, Assyrians who had far greater legal and historical claims to these lands.

This is a tactic commonly employed by the Kurds when attempting to ascribe validation to their “sacred quest” of establishing a Kurdish state – something which has never existed at any point in recorded history. By defining “Kurdistan” as any place where Kurds happen to dwell at any given point, they seem to be going by the maxim “possession is nine-tenths of the law” – which may work well in determining criminal liability, but not so well in determining one’s homeland….

In 2011, imams in Dohuk encouraged Sunni Kurds to destroy Christian churches and businesses. In response, shops were attacked and clubs were besieged by mobs of people numbering in the hundreds. Hotels and restaurants were attacked with small arms fire.

In recent years, Kurds have continued acting disingenuously towards Christian minorities, including Assyrians and even Yazidis…This was also seen when they took refuge in northern Syria in the early 19th century and proceeded to drive Arabs and Armenians out of numerous towns.

In July 2014, as Daesh began its incursion into Iraqi territory, the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) began its systematic disarmament of Assyrians and several other ethnic groups so that it could use their weapons in its own struggle.

Notices were circulated threatening severe punishment for noncompliance. Assurances were given that the Peshmerga would provide some degree of protection.

But as Daesh advanced, the Peshmerga took the weapons and fled, following the same example as the Iraqi Army.

This left the Assyrians and Yazidis with no means to resist or defend themselves against Daesh. Reports even surfaced of these same Peshmerga gunning down Yazidis who tried to prevent them from fleeing with all the weapons.

Haydar Shesho, a Yazidi commander who managed to procure weapons from the Iraqi government, was then arrested by KDP authorities for organizing an “illegal” militia.

This scene was repeated elsewhere throughout the country, as 150,000 Assyrians were forced to flee the Nineveh plains, their ancestral land.

These actions can only be seen as a deliberate ploy by the Kurdish leadership to allow foreign forces to violently cleanse these areas of all non-Kurdish residents and then, with the help of their U.S. allies, retake and “liberate their lands.”

Abed also reports that Kurds “have a centuries-long history of persecuting minority groups,” and she supplies a link to a web page entitled Genocides Against the Assyrian Nation, documenting attacks against Assyrians (not all of them carried out by Kurds) dating all the way back to the fall of Ninevah in 612 BC (the title “ancient biblical people”–were one to conjure up such a laurel–would seem rather more meritoriously applied to the Assyrians than the Kurds).

Moreover, it would appear that the Kurds also participated in the genocide against the Armenians (see inset below).

New York Times–Sept. 24, 1915:

The records of the State Department are replete with detailed reports from American Consular officers in Asia Minor, which give harrowing tales of the treatement of the Armenian Christians by the Turks and the Kurds. 


During the exodus of Armenians across the deserts they have been fallen upon by Kurds and slaughtered, but some of the Armenian women and girls, in considerable numbers, have been carried off into captivity by the Kurds.

One would think that, rather than making common cause with the Kurds, Jews would be at the forefront demanding Turkish and Kurdish reparations for the Armenians, but we don’t seem to hear much about that. In fact, in 2015, when the rest of the world was marking the 100th anniversary of the Armenian genocide, Israel pointedly refused to recognize that the genocide had even occurred.

“It’s important to differentiate between Kurdish people who have assimilated in the countries they now reside in and reject the idea of establishing an illegal Kurdistan and those who are power hungry and are allowing themselves to team up with the West and Israel to assist in the destabilization of the region,” says Abed–and this for sure is an important point to consider. In other words, one is wise not to paint with too broad a brush stroke.

The Feyli Kurds are cited by Abed as a prime example. She comments that this particular Kurdish faction, located in northern Iraq, opposed the September referendum, fearing that “it could lead to an escalation of the area’s ongoing crisis.” Perhaps we could think of the Feylis as the “self-hating Kurds.” But judging from the results of the referendum–with more than 90 percent voting in favor of “Kurdish independence”–they seem to be in the minority.

The establishment of a Kurdish state is consistent with the goals outlined more than 30 years ago in Israel’s Oded Yinon plan — that is to say the goals of breaking up or balkanizing Muslim countries into smaller, weaker statelets. This seems to have been the motivation behind Israel’s support of Sunni extremist forces in Syria over the past six years or so, and now, with that effort having largely been scuppered (thanks to help from Russia, Iran, and Hezbollah), the strategy seems to be shifting in the direction of an all-out drive toward formal establishment of a Kurdish state…presumably in Iraq, although “that could change in the future,” as the author of the Knesset bill seems to feel.

By the way, the bill’s author is Ksenia Svetlova, a member of the Zionist Union party who was instrumental in organizing the gala Kurdistan-in-the-Knesset affair on November 29 and who also outlined her air castle of dreams for a Kurdish state in an article that appeared in the Huffington Post on September 25–the same day of the Kurdish referendum.

Wholly ignoring the Oded Yinon plan and Israel’s regime-change schemes in Syria and elsewhere, Svetlova claims that one of the main reasons Israelis support the Kurds has to do with “morality”– informing Huff-Po readers that “many Kurds identify their own suffering with that of persecuted Jews.”

So now we have another “suffering” people, it seems.

Svetlova also asserts that if the Kurds get a state then “Iran’s dream of extending hegemony over the Kurdish region will be ruined,” and she accuses the Iranians of “imperial ambitions in the Middle East” and of endeavoring to “rule over the vast territory between Tehran and Quneitra (Syria).”

You may perhaps have heard of the “Greater Israel Project,” but Svetlova seems to be hoping to foster the notion of a “Greater Iran Project” almost.

This seems to be the hokum being sold by Benjamin Netanyahu as well in a video, here, uploaded recently by RT’s Ruptley video service and in which the Israeli prime minister can be seen comparing Iran to Nazi Germany. Of course, leaving aside the “Nazi” Doppelganger, one might do a simple comparative analysis between, say, Iran and Israel, in which case the proneness  to peaceful coexistence with neighbors seems well on the side of Iran, which has not invaded another country in more than 230 years.

An Israeli singer by the name of Hadassa Yeshurun has also taken up the Kurdish cause, this in the belief that the “Peshmerga deserves more support as they fight evil on behalf of the world,” and you can go here to see a video of her singing and waving the Kurdish and Israeli flags while dressed in combat fatigues.

Also Google supplies plenty of photos of Kurds waving Israeli flags (and to some extent vice versa), and Rubinfeld, the director of the JCFK, has a theory about all this ostentatious flag waving. In an interview with the JTA, he proffers the opinion that the Israeli flag is a second national symbol to many Kurds “because they identify with Israel and the Jews.”

And apparently Kurds, unlike Palestinians, are popular with the Israeli general public as well. According to Rubinfeld, “widespread understanding” as to the “rightfulness of the Kurdish cause” can be found throughout the Zionist state’s populace. Whether that includes West Bank settlers as well he leaves unstated.

But it definitely does seem to apply to Goldfarb, author of The Forward piece quoted above and who adds a personal note to his thesis on the matter:

“I first reported from Kurdistan in 1996 and felt this inexplicable affinity for the place. Don’t laugh when I say it felt like my ancestors must have passed through 1500 years ago on their way north to the Black Sea and into the heartlands of Ashkenaz.”

I opened this article by suggesting, somewhat half tongue-in-cheek, that we may at some point see a Zionist pop up and proclaim the Kurds to be an “ancient biblical people,” and in that regard, you may be unsurprised to learn that a study conducted by Hebrew University has purported to find a “close genetic connection between Jews and Kurds.”

Whether the same astonishing “genetic similarities” were found between Kurds and descendants of the Khazars, as presumably may exist between Kurds and Mizrahi Jews, or whether this even figured at all in the researchers’ data, is unclear from the Haaretz report on the study. But then why bother the public with details like that? The world is in dire need of a Kurdish state, and perhaps that’s all we really need to know.

Moreover, should a “Kurdistan” incubus of some sort actually be born, Israel would likely be one of the first countries to establish formal diplomatic ties with it, but this doubtless would be founded upon political considerations much more so than upon any presumed blood ties.

Propensity for acts of brutality after all have far more to do with ideology than with genetic composition. Self love and a sense of chosenness can create oceans and rivers of blood, whereas genes as a general rule do not.


Please Help Support this Website

It is time once again for our twice-yearly fundraising drive. If you would like to make a donation please click the button below. My purpose in maintaining this website is two-fold: I try to call people’s attention to political issues, such as the efforts under way now to create a Kurdish state, but I also endeavor to animate the teachings of Christ, and to awaken people to the dire need–particularly at this dangerous hour we’re living in–for spirituality and faith in God. The Creator of every living thing is God. In a poem I wrote some twenty years ago I referred to Him as “The Flower Maker.”

Pleases and thank-yous
Mill about his flower stand,
Green-studded DNA
Caught in the stems,
Caverns of light
Taller than the mind
Awakened hearts.
After they killed
The flower maker’s son
They took thirty
Pieces of silver and
Purchased a field
To be used
For a cemetery.

The poem as I say is an old one–far older than this website. (It originally appeared in a book I published in 2002 entitled American Bus Stop: Essay and Poems on Hope and Homelessness.) But in a strange way I kind of view this website as a small, modest little flower stand. And maybe, with help from the master flower maker, we–all of us together–can find a way to change things for the better…before we end up turning this world into a mass cemetery.

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South Front

This analysis originally appeared at southfront.org on November 11, 2017, after the Syrian and Russian defense ministries for the first  time announced the liberation of al-Bukamal. On November 19, the Syrian Arab Army and its allies once again liberated the city from ISIS. Thus, the terrorist group lost its last stronghold in Syria.

The liberation of al-Bukamal become another turning point marking the start of a new phase in the Syrian conflict. ISIS has lost all important cities, which it used to control in Syria, thus becoming just a terrorist group rather than a terrorist state.

The terrorist group still controls some villages in an area between al-Bukamal and Deir Ezzor, a part of the border between Syria and Iraq, a part of the Yarmouk Refugee Camp in Damascus and a chunk of territory near the Israeli-occupied Golan Heights.

Many ISIS members are now fleeing the country in an attempt to reach safe havens around the world. The remaining terrorists will be involved in a guerilla war against the Syrian government and US-backed forces.

Now, Syria could be divided into 7 sectors controlled by various parties:

  1. The Syrian government, backed by its allies – Iran, Hezbollah and Russia, controls the biggest part of the country, including the cities of Aleppo, Hama, Homs, Deir Ezzor, Damascus, Latakia, as-Suwayda and Tartus. However, the militant-held pockets inside the government-held area pose a significant security threat. The situation is especially complicated in Eastern Ghouta and the Yarmouk Refugee Camp. The pockets of Bayt Jinn, Jayrud and Rastan are relatively calm.
  2. The situation is complicated in Daraa where Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (formerly Jabhat al-Nusra, the Syrian branch of al-Qaeda) and its allies are in control of a part of the provincial capital. The Russia-US de-escalation zone agreement in southern Syria allowed the intensity of fighting there to decrease. Despite this, clashes erupt from time to time in Daraa city and near the Golan Heights. Militants in southern Syria are mostly backed by Jordan, the US and Israel. Tel Aviv often uses tensions in the area to justify its strikes against Syrian forces and describes its support to local militants as a humanitarian assistance to the local population. It is interesting to note that Israel has no problems with the ISIS-linked Khalid ibn al-Walid Army, which operates near its forces. The so-called local armed opposition does not seek to fight ISIS there either.
  3. The at-Tanf area on the Syrian-Iraqi border is controlled by the US-led coalition and a few US-backed Free Syrian Army (FSA) groups. FSA units are concentrated around the US garrison at at-Tanf and in the nearby refugee camp. The US says that it needs this garrison to fight ISIS while in fact it is just preventing Syria and Iraq from using the Damascus-Baghdad highway as a supply line. US forces respond with airstrikes and shelling to any Syrian Arab Army (SAA) attempts to reach at-Tanf.
  4. Northeastern Syria, including the cities of Raqqa, Tabqah, Hasakah and a part of Qamishli, is controlled by the US-backed Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF). Kurdish militias YPG and YPJ are a core of the SDF and the Kurdish Democratic Union Party (PYD) de-facto controls this area. A notable number of US military facilities and troops in this area are an important factor contributing to the SDF’s confidence. Some aggressive SDF statements against Damascus can serve as an illustration of this fact.
  5. Northwestern Syria is also controlled by the SDF. However, the US influence in this area is lower and local Kurdish militias maintain better military relations with the Syrian-Iranian-Russian alliance. They also face more pressure from Turkey and its proxies.
  6. Turkey and pro-Turkish militant groups control a chunk of the border area, including al-Bab, Azaz and Jarabulus, in northern Syria. Ankara has a strong position there and pro-Turkish militants have repeatedly clashed with SDF members near Tall Rifat.
  7. Turkish forces are also deployed at the contact line with the SDF in the province of Idlib. However, almost the entire province is still controlled by Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS). This means that Ankara and the terrorist group have reached a kind of agreement over the deployment of the Turkish troops. Ankara actively uses various militant groups to pressure Kurdish forces, which it sees a part of the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK). The PKK operates in Turkey and northern Iraq and has been seeking for a long time to establish an independent Kurdish state there.

Clashes of various intensity between the SAA and HTS have been ongoing in northern and northeastern Hama since October. This clearly shows that the Idlib de-escalation agreement is not working and creates HTS positions in the area, which will be an obvious target for the expected SAA operation after ISIS is driven out from the rest of villages in the Euphrates Valley. According to pro-government sources, the SAA has already started redeploying elite units from Deir Ezzor to Hama.

Experts believe that the mid-term SAA goal there is to further expand buffer zone along the Ithriyah-Khanaser-Aleppo highway and to liberate Abu ad-Duhur. This will allow to shorten frontline and increase a concentration of troops and equipment on the contact line when the so-called opposition decides that it’s time to negotiate.

Another possible hot point is Daraa. Local militants will resume their military activity in the city if they see that their Idlib counterparts have become a target of a large-scale SAA operation.

Now, Russia, the US, Turkey, Iran and Syria are increasing their diplomatic activity in order to find a way, which could allow work to start on developing a final political settlement of the crisis. They all have objective limits to their influence on the ground and some contradictory goals. This complicates the situation, especially amid a lack of strategic vision from the US which, according even to American experts, has no long-term strategy for Syria. The US elites and their Israeli and Saudi counterparts are especially dissatisfied with the strengthened position of Hezbollah and Iran.

If the sides are not able to find common ground in the nearest future, the conflict may easily give rise to a new round of violence.


Nasser Kandil: Hypocrisy and deceit sign weakness المناوة والخداع علامة ضعف

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Saudi Role in Kurdistan Crisis Revealed: Report

October 23, 2017

Saudi King

The British writer, David Hearst, revealed a Zionist-Saudi attempt to employ the Kurds in curbing the ‘Iranian influence’ in the region, tackling a number of indicators which stress the failure of this scheme.

Hearst noted that although ‘Israel’ did consider the PKK a terrorist group, Yair Golan, a former deputy chief of the Israeli army, told a conference in Washington that he personally did not. “When you look at Iran in the east, when you look at the instability in the region, a stable and unified Kurdish entity in the middle of this swamp is not a bad idea.”

In this context, the British writers said that for public consumption, Saudi King Salman stood four square behind the unity of Iraq.

“Behind the scenes the Royal Court dispatched a series of emissaries to encourage Barzani in his project to split the Iraqi state and question the territorial integrity of Turkey and Iran.”

“A secret visit by the Saudi minister for Gulf affairs, Thamer al-Sabhan, to Raqqa in Syria raised eyebrows.”

SourceMiddle East Eye

كركوك وانتحار البرزاني

كركوك وانتحار البرزاني

ناصر قنديل

أكتوبر 17, 2017

– عندما هدّد داعش كركوك وصار على أبوابها هبّت واشنطن لتعلنها خطاً أحمر، وتركت البشمركة تتموضع فيها وفي حقول نفطها، وكما سعت قبل أيام لنقل الوحدات الكردية إلى حقول نفط دير الزور وترك الرقة لتنظيم داعش، منعاً لاقتراب الجيش السوري، عادت فنقلت وحدات داعش إلى هناك للهدف نفسه، وها هي ترفع الصوت عالياً لقيام الجيش العراقي بدخول كركوك وحقول نفطها.

– عندما أعلن مسعود البرزاني الاستعجال بالاستفتاء على انفصال كردستان، كان واضحاً أن الأمر لا صلة له بسبب يتعلق بحق تقرير المصير الذي انتظر شهوراً لنهاية داعش وانعقاد حوار عراقي شامل لرسم خريطة المستقبل، وقد انتظر عشرات السنين. فالاستعجال هو لاستباق نهاية داعش وفرض أمر واقع يتصل بالاحتفاظ بكركوك التي تمّت السيطرة الكردية عليها تحت غطاء إبعاد داعش عنها. كما كان واضحاً أن نتيجة الاستفتاء الكردي ستكون سلبية إذا كانت كردستان من دون كركوك. كما كان واضحاً أكثر أن الاستفتاء الذي قد تخضع شرعية إجرائه في المحافظات الكردية الثلاث لكثير من الاجتهادات والنقاشات، إلا أن إجراءه من طرف واحد في كركوك هو غير شرعي وباطل، ومشروط بتوافق وإشراف الحكومة المركزية في بغداد، طالما كركوك مصنفة كمحافظة متنازع عليها، وبالتالي يصير واضحاً أنه بقدر ما النيات المبطنة للاستفتاء تقوم على السطو على كركوك، فإظهار حسن النية يبدأ بإعادة كركوك للسيادة العراقية وإلغاء نتائج الاستفتاء فيها، والرفض في هذه الحال يعني قرار حرب.

– جاءت مواقف العراق وسورية وتركيا وإيران تقول لقادة إقليم كردستان إنها تأخذ شعبها للانتحار بالعناد الذي تبديه بالسطو على كركوك. وكانت قيادات كردية عاقلة ومعتدلة لا يُستهان بوزنها، وعلى رأسها الاتحاد الوطني الكردستاني، حزب الرئيس الراحل جلال الطالباني، تدعو لاستثناء كركوك من الاستفتاء وربط مستقبلها بالتوافق العراقي، وتسريع تسليمها للحكومة المركزية في بغداد، وصار التوافق العراقي الإيراني التركي السوري أن يجد نقطة لقاء مع هذه القيادة الكردية عنوانها، إلغاء نتائج الاستفتاء في كركوك، وإعادة كركوك إلى حضن الدولة العراقية كمدخل لحوار هادئ ينهي القضايا العالقة ومن ضمنها يبحث مصير الاستفتاء.

حمل الجنرال قاسم سليماني الصورة كاملة لقيادة البرزاني، داعياً لتلقف الفرصة قبل الدخول في مرحلة يصعب معها العودة إلى الوراء، فكان الردّ باستجلاب عناصر حزب العمال الكردستاني إلى كركوك، عشية انتهاء المهلة ليل الأحد الإثنين. وبدأت العملية التي استعد لها الجيش العراقي ووحدات الحشد الشعبي. واتخذت فصائل البشمركة في كركوك موقفاً إيجابياً، وهي في غالبها تتبع لحزب الطالباني، ومثلها العاصمة الكردية الثانية في السليمانية التي تسعى لتوافق مع دول الجوار ومع الحكومة المركزية في بغداد، بخلاف أربيل وزعيمها البرزاني، ما جنّب العراق والمنطقة حرباً أهلية تجتمع فيها حكومات العرب وإيران وتركيا بوجه الأكراد، لتنقذ الحكمة الطالبانية المنطقة من الخطة «الإسرائيلية» الهادفة لحروب تقوم على اصطفافات عرقية صافية. كما حدث عندما أحبطت حلب ودمشق حلم الحرب المذهبية في سورية.

ما جرى في كركوك سيشكل نقطة تحوّل في مصير المنطقة. فهو من جهة يقول للأكراد في سورية والعراق أن الأميركيين والسعوديين و»الإسرائيليين» الذين يشجّعونهم على التصعيد نحو الانفصال لن يقدموا لهم شيئاً ساعة الصفر. ويقول للعرب والإيرانيين والأتراك، إن المواجهة سياسية وليست عرقية ولا قومية، وإن القيادة الحكيمة للسليمانية شريك في إعادة صياغة العلاقة بين مكوّنات شعوب المنطقة بطريقة تقوم على الاحترام المبتادل للخصوصيات، والعيش السلمي الواحد، وإحباط مشاريع الفتن والحروب الأهلية.

البرزاني ينتحر بعدما لعب ورقة حظه الأخيرة، بكامل الرصيد الكردي والإقليمي والدولي، وفقاً لمعادلة «يا قاتل يا مقتول»، وها هو يخرج مقتولاً، من دون أن ينجح بدفع المنطقة للاقتتال. فالمعادلة المطروحة اليوم أمام الأكراد كردية كردية وليست بين الاستقلال والتبعية، فقد منحوا مشروع البرزاني تفويضاً مفتوحاً للسير بدولة الانفصال وفشل بتوفير المقوّمات وتجمّد عند الخطوة الأولى وثبت خطأ حساباته وتحالفاته، ليكون الخيار المقابل الداعي للتعقل والذي يمثله تيار الطالباني بين الأكراد خشبة الخلاص الكردية بعقلانية وروح المسؤولية التي أبداها تجاه مستقبل ناسه وعلاقات الأكراد بجيرانهم، الذين عاشوا معهم آلاف السنين التي مضت وسيعيشون معهم آلاف السنين التي ستأتي.

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A negotiation to barter the referendum with sanctions تفاوض لمقايضة الاستفتاء بالعقوبات

A negotiation to barter the referendum with sanctions

أكتوبر 9, 2017

Written by Nasser Kandil,

All the available information from the scenes of the regional and the international relations that surround the project of the secession of Kurdistan ensures that the project was born dead, and that the stable convictions of the supports of the Kurdish leadership in the West in particular prove that the opportunities of success are nil, and that the ceiling of what can be done is the escalation to stop it by issuing a common international position that based on a bilateral; the unity of Iraq and the rights of the Kurds, through a negotiation that leads to an exit that face-saving those who got involved in the quest for secession in exchange of their smooth retreat of the sanctions which it seems that their continuation will drop all the gains achieved by the project of Kurdistan over the years.

The supporters of the secession were surprised at the size of harmony of the Turkish, Iranian, and Iraqi positions to the extent that some people described them with the ambush that was set for Al-Barazani to go in for the referendum and to fall in the trap through the standstill of Baghdad’s position throughout the period that separated between the declaration of the determination on the referendum, and the date of its holding. Baghdad did not show any vigor or determination, and there were not any indicators for Turkish- Iranian –Iraqi coordination as the size which appeared suddenly, after it was hidden for ten years at least, it appeared strongly contrary to all the expectations which depended on the apparent data, and which expected political warnings, mediations,  and admonition, they did not expect a decisive decision of suffocating blockade to the extent of threatening the state of secession by falling and maybe by the military invasion or at least extracting Kirkuk by force from it, along with Iraqi bordered line that links Iraq with Turkey and Iran, and besieges Kurdistan.

The supporters of the secession were surprised that the Russian position which supports the rights of Kurds considers that the unity of Iraq and the unity of Syria a red line for the stability in the region, and that the Turkish-Iranian understanding towards the state of secession constitutes a sufficient reason for the inclusion of Russia. It is the owner of a Russian- Iranian- Turkish- Syrian- Iraqi project that is achieved under the title of confronting the threat of the fragmentation of the region entities. Thus the understandings which the west  wants in Washington and the European capitals about Syria has become conditioned with the formula of the Turkish-Iranian understanding which is supported by Russia and which attracts Syria and Iraq. Its main condition is the fall of the state of secession.

The Europeans who sponsored historically and traditionally the Kurdish project in Iraq despite its political subordination to Washington and its distinctive relations with Israel and the Gulf have understood well the Syrian lesson. The goals on which Europe has drawn the foreign policy have changed. As the French President Emanuel Macron who called for a negotiation that preserves the unity of Iraq and the rights of the Kurds, and avoids the escalation said that the policies of spreading democracy and the human rights do not worth taking a risk of stability, because the generalization of the European values must not be at the expense of the security of Europe, the intension here surely is not the values but the colonial policies that are covered by these values. The war on Syria to overthrow the regime prove that the European cost was the dangerous population change through the flow of the displaced people, and the major security concern through the expansion and the rootedness of terrorism, in addition to the economic regression, the unemployment, and the recession. Those who concerned about the immigration of the Syrians will not take the risk of dismantling Turkey after Iraq and receiving tens of millions of the displaced people along with the chaos of the spread of terrorism.

The West which is preoccupied with the outcome of its long failed war on Syria cannot bear an adventure of ten years for another long failed war that dismantles Iraq and Turkey. The Gulf and Israel are incapable of providing the necessities for the continuation of igniting the war on Syria alone; they do not have what is needed to ignite other new wars. Thus the war of Syria seems to be the last war. It seems that the war of the Kurdish secession is weaker than to be born, but as a cold war of negotiation, in order to achieve the organized deterrence for hasty steps that lost the consideration of time and place.

Translated by Lina Shehadeh,


تفاوض لمقايضة الاستفتاء بالعقوبات

سبتمبر 30, 2017

ناصر قنديل

-تؤكد المعلومات المتوافرة كلّها من كواليس العلاقات الإقليمية والدولية المحيطة بمشروع انفصال كردستان أنّ المشروع قد ولد ميتاً، وأنّ القناعات الراسخة لدى المؤيدين للقيادة الكردية في الغرب خصوصاً، صارت بأنّ فرص النجاح باتت معدومة، وأنّ سقف ما يمكن هو الدخول على خط التصعيد لوقفه باستصدار موقف دولي جامع يقوم على ثنائية وحدة العراق وحقوق الأكراد، وتفاوض يحقق مخرجاً يحفظ ماء الوجه للذين تورّطوا بالسعي للانفصال مقابل تراجعهم السلس لقاء التراجع عن العقوبات التي يبدو أنّ مواصلتها سيسقط المكاسب كلّها التي حققها مشروع كردستان خلال سنوات طوال.

-فوجئ مؤيّدو الانفصال بحجم حدة وانسجام المواقف التركية والإيرانية والعراقية، لدرجة وصفها البعض بالكمين الذي نُصب للبرزاني للسير بالاستفتاء والوقوع في الفخ، عبر برودة موقف بغداد طوال الفترة الفاصلة بين إعلان العزم على الاستفتاء وموعد إجرائه، حيث لم تظهر بغداد أيّ حدة أو حزم، ولا ظهرت مؤشرات على تنسيق تركي إيراني عراقي بالحجم الذي ظهر فجأة. وهو وليد تحضير عمره شهور على الأقلّ بقي طيّ الكتمان حتى ظهر بقوة وزخم مخالفاً كلّ التوقعات المبنية على الظاهر من الأمور، والتي كانت تتوقع تحذيرات سياسية ووساطات وعتب، لكنها لم تتوقع قراراً حازماً بحصار خانق يصل حدّ تهديد دولة الانفصال بالسقوط، وربما بالاجتياح العسكري، أو على الأقلّ انتزاع كركوك بالقوة منها، ومعها شريط حدودي عراقي يربط العراق بتركيا وإيران ويسوّر كردستان.

-فوجئ مؤيّدو الانفصال بأنّ الموقف الروسي الداعم لحقوق الأكراد يعتبر وحدة العراق ووحدة سورية خطاً أحمر لصناعة الاستقرار في المنطقة، وبأنّ التفاهم التركي الإيراني تجاه دولة الانفصال يشكل سبباً كافياً لتنضمّ روسيا إليه، وهي صاحبة مشروع خماسية روسية إيرانية تركية سورية عراقية، وجدتها تتحقق تحت عنوان مواجهة خطر تفتيت كيانات المنطقة. وبالتالي صارت التفاهمات التي يريدها الغرب في واشنطن والعواصم الأوروبية حول سورية صارت حكماً مشروطة بصيغة التفاهم التركي الإيراني الذي تدعمه روسيا ويجذب حكماً سورية والعراق، وشرطه الأساس سقوط دولة الانفصال.

-ظهر الأوروبيون الذين رعوا تاريخياً وتقليدياً المشروع الكردي في العراق، رغم تبعيته السياسية لواشنطن وعلاقاته المميّزة بـ«إسرائيل» والخليج، وقد استوعبوا الدرس السوري جيداً. فالأهداف التي عملت أوروبا لرسم السياسة الخارجية على أساسها قد تغيّرت، كما قال الرئيس الفرنسي إيمانويل ماكرون الذي دعا لتفاوض يحفظ وحدة العراق وحقوق الأكراد ويتجنّب التصعيد، بأنّ سياسات نشر الديمقراطية وحقوق الإنسان، لا تستحقّ المغامرة بالاستقرار لأنّ تعميم القيم الأوروبية لا يجوز أن يتمّ على حساب أمن أوروبا، والقصد طبعاً ليس القيم بل السياسات الاستعمارية التي تغلّفها هذه القيم. وجاءت الحرب على سورية لإسقاط دولتها تقول إن الثمن الأوروبي هو تغيير سكاني خطير عبر تدفق موجات النازحين، وقلق أمني كبير عبر تمدّد وتجذر الإرهاب، عدا الركود الاقتصادي والبطالة والكساد، ومن أقلقته هجرة السوريين فلن يتحمّل المجازفة بتفكيك تركيا بعد العراق وتلقي عشرات ملايين النازحين ومعهم فوضى انتشار الإرهاب.

-الغرب المنهك بحاصل حربه الطويلة والفاشلة على سورية، لا يستطيع تحمل مغامرة عشر سنوات لحرب طويلة فاشلة أخرى تفكّك العراق وتركيا، والخليج و«إسرائيل» العاجزتان عن توفير مقومات السير بتوفير مستزمات وقود اشتعال الحرب في سورية وحدهما، لا تملكان بالتأكيد ما يلزم لإشعال حروب جديدة، لتبدو حرب سورية آخر الحروب، وتبدو حرب الانفصال الكردية أضعف من أن تولد، إلا كحرب تفاوض على البارد، بما يحقق الترادع المنظم لخطوات متسرّعة لرؤوس حامية أخطأت الحساب في المكان والزمان.

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The Iraqi Kurdistan is neither the Western Sahara nor the Southern of Sudan كردستان العراق ليست الصحراء الغربية ولا جنوب السودان

The Iraqi Kurdistan is neither the Western Sahara nor the Southern of Sudan

أكتوبر 8, 2017

Written by Nasser Kandil,

Despite the interconnectedness which is made by many people between the movements of the secession and the division of the region entities, and the colonial projects which Israel is not far from, and despite the reverse linkage which other people make between these movements and the historical aspirations of the nations which suffered historically from the persecution due to their identity, and looked for a suitable timing for independence, the experiences which were witnessed by the entities which were created by the external projects that encourage fragmentation, and the local aspirations for the dream of independence and the formation of a state do not seem livable or successful experiences, whether regarding what it seemed at the moment of birth driven by a national anti-western option as the experience of the declaration of the Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic in the Western Sahara of Morocco, or what was publicly depended on the coordination and the cooperation with Israel as the southern of Sudan, or  which its experience was suffered from the lack of resources and population as the Western Sahara, or whose its experience was full of population capacities and natural wealth as the Southern of Sudan.

Those who look at the map of the region will see in its south the southern of Sudan and in its west the Western Sahara, in its north-east the Iraqi Kurdistan and will see the occupied Palestine where the occupation entity is in the middle, and will find that there is a link between the projects on the sides and the project which is in the middle, thus cannot ignore the image of the encircling of the Arab countries with three states that have seceded from their surrounding and link them with one virtual plan. The question which comes immediately into the mind is about the contradiction of the political identities of their governments. Despite the separatist aspect of the Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic, it did not turn into an entity that is affiliated to the West or has any relationship with Israel, but it is still has a good relationship with Algeria and Mauritania, the positions of the two countries are known through their supporting the Palestinian cause, the sticking to the independence from the West, and resisting its projects and its wars in the region, while the Southern of Sudan is boasting of its distinctive relation with Israel, and the Kurdish leaderships which led the secession movement have historical relations with Israel but they do not boast of it publicly as the southern of Sudan.

The course of the experiences of the Western Sahara and the Southern of Sudan declines politically, economically, and morally during the years that followed the declaration of independence. The Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic has lost more than three-quarters of the diplomatic recognition which it knew during the declaration, it lived harsh socio – economic conditions despite its limited population, and it does not seem that it is capable of going on so long in the steadfastness. While despite the mineral and oil resources of  the Republic of the Southern of Sudan it got involved in conflicts, wars, and coups, so the life of its people was so bad, furthermore, it was classified by the United Nations among the worst countries concerning poverty, health, education ,and the human rights, which means that the size of support for its formation did not grant it the feature of the strategic project for the major countries, however, it puts the support of the secession in the field of the tactic political employment, and it does not grant the other secession projects which the current project of Kurdistan forms an encouraging example, the conditions to last or the actual support, despite all the analyses about its representation as a base for the American and Israeli positioning on the borders of Iran. So it seems a dream rather than a realistic verifiable opportunity.

Despite the similarities between the situation of Iraqi Kurdistan and the Southern of Sudan, the situation of the Iraqi Kurdistan is more difficult and worse than the southern of Sudan, and surely more difficult and worse than the Western Sahara implicitly. The radical difference between Kurdistan and the two experiences of the Western Sahara and the southern of Sudan is the size of readiness to recognize the new state, and the formation of commercial and diplomatic relationships with it in general, and its relationship with the neighboring countries, their position, and the degree of their tension against the formation of the state of secession in particular, in addition to the status of these countries, their influence, and the deterrent reaction which stems from their positions regarding the opportunities of the openness to the state of secession. Sudan as the first concerned country along with the Organization of African Unity as a regional concerned party, and supported by the United Nations were the forefront welcoming parties of the Southern state of secession, while Mauritanian and Algeria which are the closest neighboring countries to the Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic were the main supporters of the establishment of the state of secession supported by the Organization of the African Unity as a regional concerned party, and more than eighty countries have taken the lead in recognizing immediately the emerging state. While in the situation of Kurdistan we are in front of closed borders of four important, effective, active, sensitive countries namely Turkey, Syria, Iraq, and Iran, they object strongly the formation of the state of separation, knowing that there is no regional linkage or international framework that will dare to deal with the state of secession, since the size of the siege imposed by the neighboring countries is suffocated and existential towards its entity.

The Kurdish separatist movement comes in a context that does not foreshadow of success on one hand, and it will be accompanied by conditions and data more severe than its previous ones, so this makes it mere a project of political suicide.

Translated by Lina Shehadeh,


خسائرُ محقَّقة بأرباحٍ وهمية

كردستان العراق ليست الصحراء الغربية ولا جنوب السودان

سبتمبر 27, 2017

ناصر قنديل

– ربما يكون الاستفتاء على انفصال كردستان كخطوة نحو ولادة كيان جديد في المنطقة، كوعدٍ من زلماي زادة السفير الأميركي السابق في العراق الذي وضع الدستور يشبه وعد بلفور قبل مئة عام تماماً، وبدعم «إسرائيلي» غير مستور، مصدرَ قلق لكلّ حريص على استقرار المنطقة وحرية شعوبها وكلِّ من يريد لانتصارات محور المقاومة في سورية والعراق ومعادلات القوة الجديدة التي تمثل روسيا عنوانها دولياً أن تأخذ مداها في رسم معادلات دولية وإقليمية جديدة.

– ما يجب التنبّه إليه هنا هو أنّ الأكراد ليسوا كالمستوطنين الصهاينة، فهم مكوّن أصيل بين شعوب المنطقة، وهذا بقدر ما يستدعي لغة الأخوة مع الشعب الكردي، يستدعي الانتباه إلى أنّ مغامرة مسعود البرزاني مهما كانت قادرة على تحريك العواطف، فهي عندما تتسبّب بكارثة ستنتج معادلة كردية جديدة تُطيح البرزاني. فالقضية هنا لا تشبه ما قاله «الإسرائيليون» للبرزاني افعل ما فعله بن غوريون، حيث مقامرته تضع مصير مستوطنيه بين الفوز بالكيان أو الموت، وقبل الاستفتاء يقوم صراع سياسي كردي كردي سيكبر وتتسع فجواته وشقوقه، كلما تبيّنت نتائج الكارثة التي جلبها البرزاني على الأكراد، وسيكون أول برلمان كردي مناسبة لظهور هذه التكتلات وتحوّل صراعاتها لمصدر تغيير في وجهة الأكراد سياسياً.

– بعقل بارد يمكن لمحور المقاومة التعامل مع هذا الحدث واعتماد السياسات التي تشتغل على الداخل الكردي بعناية، وفي مقدّمتها الإجراءات القانونية والاقتصادية. ويكفي الحكومة العراقية حسم كركوك ومنع السيطرة عليها لتتمكّن من الانتظار ما لا يملك البرزاني القدرة على دعوة الأكراد للانتظار مثلها، وبعقل بارد سيكون بمستطاع محور المقاومة احتساب معادلة ما يمكن أن يقدّمه الأميركيون والسعوديون و»الإسرائيليون» لمشروع الانفصال ليكون الحاصل صفراً.

الأميركي بين معادلات صعبة. فالإعلان عن دعم الحكم الانفصالي سيعني العداء مع حكومتي بغداد وأنقرة فوراً، والبقاء بلغة التنديد والتحذير لكردستان سيجلب الإحباط لجمهور كردي وعده البرزاني بأنّ الأمر الواقع سيفرض نفسه، وأنّ الأميركيين سيعاجلون لتبني القرار الكردي، والمال السعودي باعتباره الشيء الوحيد الذي يمكن للسعوديين تقديمه، لا يملك طريقاً للوصول إلا عبر بغداد أو أنقرة، والحسابات المصرفية والفروع البنكية دخلت مرحلة الرقابة والتجميد، أما «إسرائيل» فما تريده هو أن يفرض الأكراد بعذاباتهم وتضحياتهم وجود كيان يُعادي بغداد وطهران ويقع على حدود مؤثرة، لتستثمره «إسرائيل» بلا أكلاف. وبالتالي فهي لا تملك أن تقدّم شيئاً سوى التشجيع على الانتحار بكلام وأوهام.

تركيا لا تملك خيارات للمناورة وهوامش للحركة، فقضيتها وجودية مع الكيان الكردي، وربع سكان تركيا من الأكراد وهم أكبر تجمع كردي في المنطقة، وسيكون تصرف أنقرة مع كردستان العراق نموذجاً تقدّمه أنقرة لما سيكون عليه تصرفها مع مشروع انفصالهم، والسباق بين الحكومة التركية والقيادات الكردية في تركيا على معادلة ما بعد انفصال كردستان العراق فإذا نجح أكراد العراق بتجربتهم سيكون اليوم التالي في تركيا مواجهة خطر الانفصال الكردي، وإذا فشلت التجربة الكردية في العراق، فسيكون اليوم الثاني في تركيا صيغاً حوارية لمعادلة علاقة جديدة، لذلك تتصدّر تركيا المواجهة، ولذلك سيكون مصير التجربة قضية وجود لتركيا، بينما تملك تركيا كلّ شرايين الحياة لكردستان، بعدما كانا الشريكين في الحلف الذي تقوده واشنطن ضدّ إيران وسورية والعراق، وجاء أوان الفراق. فأصاب البرزاني بوضع بيضه كله في السلة التركية ما أصاب «الإسرائيليين» يوم وضعوا كلّ منشآتهم الحيوية على الحدود مع لبنان باعتباره «الجار» الأقلّ خطراً، وها هم يعيشون القلق منه اليوم أكثر من أيّ حدود أخرى.

الأهمّ الذي أصاب الأميركيين و»الإسرائيليين» والسعوديين، هو أنّ الاستقطاب الجديد الذي خلقته الأزمة الكردية، تكفل بإنهاء خطوط الفتنة المذهبية في المنطقة، فتوحّدت جهود سنة وشيعة العراق لحفظ وحدة بلدهم، وليس لديهم المجال لترف التفرقة، وتوحّدت بمصالح وجودية عليا الدولتان الأهمّ في الإقليم، أكبر دولة شيعية وأكبر دولة سنية، إيران وتركيا. وهما تتصدّران خط الاشتباك مع ولادة الكيان الجديد، وتملكان داخل المجتمع الكردي العراقي الكثير من الخيوط والخطوط. وهذا تحوّل هائل الأهمية وعظيم التأثير في معادلات المنطقة وإسقاط سياسات التخريب والعبث بنسيجها الاجتماعي، ليصحّ القول في هذا الزلزال، ربّ ضارة نافعة، خصوصاً أنّ أميركا التي تراهن عليه لشراء الوقت لا تستثمر على خطة هجوم وقد فقدت قوة الدفع اللازمة للتقدّم، بل كقتال تراجعي ومثلها «إسرائيل»، والتاريخ يقول إنّ مناورات المهزوم تؤخّر هزيمته، لكنها لا تحوّلها نصراً.

– وحده غباء وجشع القيادة الكردية يفسّر قبولها لعب هذه المقامرة.

كتب ناصر قنديل


داعش للصخب والدولة لكردستان

– ليس جديدا التأشير على حجم الصخب الذي أحدثه ويحدثه تحرك داعش

– داعش يتشبه بإسرائيل بكسر المعادلات ويلقى دعمها الخفي لكن ليس إسرائيل ثانية

– دولة الخلافة فيل في مخزن الخزف يكسر كل شيئ ثم يخرجونه

– لا مصلحة لأحد بتحويل ساحل المتوسط لسيرك للفيلة

– كائن مثل داعش لا يمكن تحمله في تورا بورا فكيف ببوابة أوروبا والخليج ؟

–  المتزامن الوحيد مع ولادة داعش الذي يتسم بالجدية هو ولادة كردستان المستقلة عدا عن الفرصة التي يوفرها التفاهم على مواجهته من تبرير لقاء وتحالف الخصوم الذين بلغت  بينهم المواجهة حد إحراق السفن وكسر الجسور دون ان يبدو أحدهم مهزوما

– خطوات إنفصال كردستان جدية وثابتة و مدروسة

– إعلان نتنياهو دعم دولة كردية مستقلة جدي ومدروس أيضا

– رفض إيران سياسي وليس وجودي فالدولة الكردية لا تهدد بتقسيمها وكذلك سوريا فالجاليات الكردية فيهما بفعل النزوح وحصلت على حقوق المواطنة بينما المشكلة في تركيا وجودية فهل تقلع تركيا أوشاكها بيديها أم أن إمبراطورية بني عثمان باتت عبئا على حلفائها ؟

ناصر قنديل

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