Qatar Crisis: Origins and Consequences

The current crisis surrounding Qatar represents the most severe conflict among Gulf Arab states since the end of the Cold War. While these oil-rich, autocratic OPEC members have historically been at the most allies of convenience united by common fears (USSR, Saddam Hussein, Iran, etc.), their mutual mistrust has arguably never escalated to the point of demanding to what amounts to a complete surrender by one of its members. Several interesting features of this crisis immediately jump out.

First of all, the breaking off of diplomatic relations by Saudi Arabia and several other major regional powers including Egypt, and depriving Qatar of the ability to use land and air transport routes through or over the territory of Saudi Arabia and other Gulf states, including Egypt came suddenly and without any warning. There was no ongoing visible dispute between Qatar and any of its neighbors, no major recent provocative policy moves. This suggests it was a premeditated and planned move by Saudi Arabia and its partners.

While the US role in the crisis is still ambiguous, it is unlikely in the extreme that Saudi Arabia would have undertaken something so drastic without coordination with the US, particularly since this action comes literally on the heels of President Trump’s high-profile visit to Saudi Arabia.  While initially silent, President Trump ultimately took to Twitter to back Saudi Arabia against Qatar, even as the US still maintains major military presence in that country.

The nature of the accusations leveled at Qatar is nothing short of extreme. Both US and Saudi leaders accused Qatar of about the worst offense currently available, namely supporting violent Islamic extremism. Trump went so far as to say that Qatar’s change of policies would be a major step toward resolving the problem of terrorism.

The nature of the crisis suggests it represents tensions that long bubbled under the surface but now have finally burst into the open.  The Qatari-Saudi falling out, and the make-up of the pro-Saudi faction, suggests that several factors at work here.

Not the least trivial of them is the drop in energy prices in recent years.  Saudi Arabia’s costly wars in Syria and Yemen only make that problem worse. Since Qatar’s main line of business is natural gas whose production is outside OPEC’s purview, it may be that Saudi Arabia is attempting to force Qatar, whose per-capita GDP is the highest in the world, to share some of its wealth with the failing Saudi monarchy

This drastic step would likely have not been needed had the Saudi and Qatari ambitions in Syria been realized by now. The objective was, after all, the laying of pipelines through the territory of Syria and also seizing Syria’s oil fields using ISIS as a proxy, all very much with the tacit approval of the Obama Administration. While the outcome of the war in Syria is still uncertain, it is all too clear the Saudi and Qatari efforts to expand their wealth at Syria’s expense have failed.

The Saudis are also attempting to establish their political dominance within the region, as part of the “Sunni NATO” concept. Qatar’s independent foreign policy which often ignored or even undermined Saudi aims in Syria and Libya, was naturally an obstacle in reaching that objective. Moreover, Qatar’s freelancing also appears to be the reason why countries like Egypt and Israel have backed Saudi moves. Qatar is a major sponsor the Muslim Brotherhood and of Hamas which are major irritants for these two countries, respectively.

The other major show of Qatari independence has been its Iran policy, where it is also sharply at odds with the hard-line Saudi approach. Since the “Sunni NATO” is aimed squarely at Iran and should Saudi Arabia succeed in crushing Qatar’s independence, it will establish itself as the unquestionably dominant political power within the Arabian Peninsula. The harsh disciplining and humiliation of Qatar would also serve as a long-term warning for any other minor Gulf power which might attempt to pursue a foreign policy independently of Saudi Arabia. The importance of Iran to the Saudi-Qatar conflict has been starkly demonstrated by Iran’s willingness to supply Qatar with food to overcome Saudi blockade, and the terrorist attack in Tehran that was attributed to Saudi Arabia by Iranian authorities. Tehran also opened its airspace for Qatar Airways aircraft and expanded unofficial efforts to draw Doha into own sphere of influence.

With that in mind, Trump’s recent visit to Saudi Arabia which culminated with the rather bizarre “glowing orb” ceremony, acquires a new meaning. While we do not yet know just how much leeway Washington is giving Riyadh in its dealings with Doha and how much coordination and communication there are between the two powers, Trump’s behavior while in Saudi Arabia was likely intended to send a message that Saudi Arabia has the full faith and confidence of the United States, though evidently Qatar had failed to heed the warning. If the Saudi action does result in Qatari abandonment of Muslim Brotherhood and Hamas, it will help the US restore some of its political standing in the region by drawing both Israel and, especially, Egypt, closer toward the US. Qatar’s emasculation furthermore promises to bring the wars in not only Syria but also Libya to a closer conclusion by eliminating a significant player pursuing an independent objective. Last but not least, Qatar also enjoys rather better relations with both Russia and Turkey than Saudi Arabia, which no doubt raised additional fears in Washington that Russia is about to take the US’ place as the most influential external power in the Middle East. The emergence of a Russia-Iran-Turkey-Qatar constellation as a result of Russian diplomacy and Turkey’s own regional ambitions is a nightmare scenario for both Riyadh and Washington.

It is not yet clear whether the Trump Administration compelled Saudi Arabia to undertake this course or whether Trump had no choice but to endorse and acquiesce in the Saudi course of action, with some accommodations made to respect US interests outlined above.  On the one hand, Trump could have easily used the same “support for terrorism” cudgel on the Saudis that in the end he used on the Qataris. On the other hand, the power of the Saudi lobby in Washington and the absence of a proxy power capable of doing to Saudi Arabia what Saudi Arabia is doing to Qatar means that the Saudis are not simply following Washington’s orders.

However, in light of Trump’s upcoming visit to Poland and the participation in the so-called Three Seas Initiative summit, one must also entertain the possibility that the US saw in Qatar an unwelcome competitor for the liquid natural gas (LNG) market. It is becoming apparent that the US will continue to expand its role as hydrocarbon exporter in the future, which will naturally bring it into conflict with not only Russia, but also Qatar, and even Saudi Arabia. It is also becoming apparent that at least some of that expansion will take place in Europe, or the market which Qatar had hoped to access by sponsoring jihadists in Syria who would ultimately pave the way for its gas pipelines into Europe.

The falling out between the US and Qatar appears to have had a sobering impact on Qatar’s leaders who, evidently fearing that any show of weakness might lead to their overthrow and even death, have dug in their heels and began to seek support from unorthodox sources. That process, in turn had shown both the extent of anti-Saudi sentiment in the region and the limits of US influence. Turkey’s President Erdogan came out strongly in support of Qatar, and went so far as to reaffirm the Turkey-Qatar military alliance and send troops to Qatar. Pakistan similarly decided to send a military force to Qatar, and collectively these actions are likely sufficient to dissuade any Saudi military adventurism, possibly with cooperation with dissatisfied factions of Qatari military. At this stage, it would take a direct US military intervention to bring down the Qatari government, but the US clearly prefers to do its dirty work through proxies. Moreover, there is no sign of an effort to interdict or block Qatar’s LNG tanker traffic. Even though Egypt had joined the anti-Qatar coalition, it has not blocked LNG tankers carrying Qatari gas from passing the Suez Canal.

Even so, Qatari leaders were concerned enough to send their Foreign Minister to Moscow for consultations. Nevertheless, considering that Saudi Arabia responded to Turkey’s support of Qatar by expressing its own support for the Kurdish cause–so far only verbal–it does appear that Russia, Turkey, and many other countries in the region do not wish to see Qatar brought to heel. Russian military spokesmen also noted that in the meantime the war in Syria had greatly diminished in its intensity as the Qatar- and Saudi Arabia-backed militants now find themselves in a very confused situation where it’s not clear who is supposed to be their enemy, Syrian forces or other rebel groupings. However the situation evolves in the future, it is unlikely in the extreme Qatar will be close collaborator in any Saudi schemes. Instead it is more than likely Qatar will gradually drift further away from Saudi policies and bolster its ties with Turkey, and therefore indirectly also with Russia and Iran.

As a final note, one cannot but help reflect on the fact this is a severe and potentially very dangerous confrontation between, after all, two important US allies.  Considering that both Qatar and Saudi Arabia are members of the “Free World” (sic) of which the US is the undisputed leader, the fact that a few policy disagreements among these members can no longer be managed by means short of blockade and threats of war does not speak highly of the US ability to continue to maintain its empire. While the Saudi-Qatari conflict is unprecedented in its intensity, it is far from being the only internal “Free World” conflict which the US is apparently powerless to resolve. We have already seen Brexit, the looming “two-speeds EU”, the Turkey-EU and Turkey-NATO spats, the failure of TTIP and TPP multilateral US-centric trade deals, and other signs of US weakness. The use of Saudi Arabia against Qatar suggests the US might be moving toward a different model of imperial governance, namely “divide and rule” among its own client states. In the short term this may well be successful. However, it is US client states’ awareness that is driving them to seek help from Moscow, which in turn gives us narratives of “Russian meddling”, including now in the case of Qatar.

The chemistry between Putin and Macron…. and Syria كيمياء بوتين ماكرون… وسورية


The chemistry between Putin and Macron…. and Syria

يونيو 15, 2017

Written by Nasser Kandil,

كيمياء بوتين ماكرون… وسورية

The Russian circuits closer to the President Vladimir Putin talk about a chemistry that he discovered through his relation with an international political leader, then it is shown that this leader has a position on the chess map which is run by the professional player Putin, and that this role starts from reading the important influence of his country on the main file in the Russian agenda, a role that is drawn by the same ability to bear the dispute and the crises, along with the ability to tolerate and to grant opportunities. The basis depends on a quiet reading of the interests of the country and the well-established status of the leader, and on the paths which Russia will impose on the file which it wants a partnership in it, a reading of how the concerned leader adapts to the variables, and the ability to take his country by the force of his influence towards the choices which he finds them interact with his interests and aspirations towards the historic leadership between leaving the imprint which he looks for it on one hand, and between the interests of his country and their effective forces in it on the other hand.

This has happened with the Turkish President Recep Erdogan and the French President Emanuel Macron, in case of Erdogan, the beginning was not through the convergence of the Russian and the Turkish polices on the pivotal issue of the foreign policy of the two countries, namely the war on Syria, however the chemical relationship started between Putin and Erdogan, in other words, it means a Russian aspiration to attract Turkey to play a role, while Turkey was leading the war axis on Syria against the bank led by Russia, but when the collision occurred by a Turkish decision, Putin seemed firm and resolving, but he soon showed tolerance and presented the inducements to pave the way for the new role.

By virtue of the geography of the Middle East, Putin’s vision seems to be inclined to establish two strategic partnerships in managing the solution in Syria, one with a Turkish –Iranian bilateral from Astana, it manages the security file in its political and military dimensions to prevent the division of Syria, and to  arrange the integration of the armed groups which are sponsored by Turkey into a apolitical solution that ends with a unified government under the leadership of the Syrian President Bashar Al-Assad, in preparation for a new constitution and parliamentary and presidential elections according to the UN resolution 2254. The second partnership is still in the beginnings, it may be under crises and disputes as the first one, but it opens up to tolerance and paving the role for a new role, it revolves around the files of reconstruction and the return of the displaced,  it is a French-Chinese bilateral. The funding imposed by the file of reconstruction and the displaced along with its economic and security importance to Europe and France in particular is not possible for the Gulf which is bankrupt and divided to offer, and it cannot be thought of without China. France which complains from the absence of the European vision and the fragmentation of its forces and interests, and from the US political weakness is anticipating to reserve a role and a seat, since it sees the Gulf and what it suffers, and it sees the opposition and its divisions, so it is not obliged to enter in the direct political search under conditions that alienate it from its allies, but on the contrary they will follow it if there is a path that is similar to Astana that is open on the planned negotiation paths that remain Russian and American in essence.

Macron studies the call for an international regional Syrian conference about the reconstruction and the displaced, hosted by Paris and in which the Syrian government and figures from the private sector whether loyalists or from the opposition, the experts, the United Nations and its bodies, the donor countries from Europe, the Gulf, Japan, the funds, and the concerned international banks, along with China participate. This role requires to open the French embassy in Damascus, and to benefit from the revenues of that in having a Syrian cooperation in the file of terrorists from French ancestries which exerts pressure on Paris as a dire necessity. There will not be a problem if France adopts a diplomatic speech that commensurate with an acceptable role by all the concerned parties in the Syrian crisis to reserve a role for itself.

It is the beginning of the chemistry between Putin and Macron that produces an interaction in Syria!

Translated by Lina Shehadeh,

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كيمياء بوتين ماكرون… وسورية

يونيو 15, 2017

ناصر قنديل

كيمياء بوتين ماكرون… وسورية

– عندما تتحدّث الدوائر الروسية القريبة من الرئيس فلاديمير بوتين عن كيمياء اكتشفها في علاقته بزعيم سياسي دولي، لا يلبث أن يظهر أنّ لهذا الزعيم موقعاً على خارطة الشطرنج التي يديرها اللاعب المحترف بوتين، وأنّ هذا الدور يبدأ من قراءة تأثير هامّ لهذه الدولة في ملف رئيسي على جدول أعمال روسيا، وأنه دور يرسم بنفس طويل وقدرة على تحمّل الخصومة والأزمات، ولكن معها قدرة على التسامح ومنح الفرص، وأنّ الأساس مبني على قراءة هادئة لمصالح الدولة ومكانة الزعيم الراسخة فيها، وعلى المسارات التي ستفرضها روسيا للملف الذي تريد شراكة فيه، وقراءة لتكيّف الزعيم المعني مع المتغيّرات وقدرته على أخذ بلده بقوة تأثيره نحو الخيارات التي يراها تقاطعاً بين مصالحه وطموحاته نحو الزعامة التاريخية وترك البصمة التي يبحث عنها من جهة، وبين مصالح بلده والقوى المؤثرة فيها، من جهة أخرى.

– حدث هذا مع الرئيس التركي رجب أردوغان ويحدث مع الرئيس الفرنسي إيمانويل ماكرون. وفي حالة أردوغان لم تكن البداية بتلاقي السياسات الروسية والتركية تجاه القضية المحورية في السياسة الخارجية للبلدين، وهي الحرب في سورية، بل بدأت العلاقة الكيميائية بين بوتين وأردوغان، وهي هنا تعني تطلعاً روسياً لجذب تركيا للعب دور، فيما كانت تركيا تقود محور الحرب على سورية بوجه الضفة التي تقف عليها روسيا وتتصدّرها. وعندما وقع التصادم بقرار تركي، بدا بوتين حازماً وحاسماً، لكنه لم يلبث أن أظهر التسامح وفتح الباب لطيّ الصفحة، وتقديم المغريات لفتح الباب أمام الدور الجديد.

– بحكم الجغرافيا الشرق أوسطية تبدو رؤية بوتين متّجهة نحو إنشاء شراكتين استراتيجيتين في إدارة الحلّ في سورية، واحدة بثنائية تركية إيرانية تنطلق من أستانة، تدير الملف الأمني بأبعاده السياسية والعسكرية، منعاً لتقسيم سورية وتمهيداً لدمج الجماعات المسلّحة التي ترعاها تركيا في حلّ سياسي ينتهي بحكومة موحدة في ظلّ الرئيس السوري بشار الأسد تمهيداً لدستور جديد وانتخابات نيابية ورئاسية، وفقاً للقرار الأممي 2254. أما الثانية التي لا تزال في البدايات، وتحتمل كالأولى مرور أزمات وخلافات، لكنها مفتوحة الأبواب لاحقاً على التسامح وطيّ الصفحة وفتح الباب للدور الجديد، فتدور حول ملفات إعادة الإعمار وعودة النازحين، وهي ثنائية فرنسية صينية، فالتمويل الذي يفرضه ملف الإعمار واللاجئين، بأهميته الاقتصادية والأمنية لأوروبا، وفرنسا في قلبها، لا يملك الخليج المفلس والمنقسم قدرة تقديمه، ولا يمكن التفكير به من دون التطلّع نحو الصين، وفرنسا التي تتذمّر من غياب الرؤية الأوروبية وتشتت قواها واهتماماتها، ومن الضعف السياسي الأميركي تتطلع لحجز دور ومقعد، وترى الخليج وما يعانيه والمعارضة وانقساماتها، وليست مضطرة للدخول في حقل ألغام البحث السياسي المباشر بشروط حلّ قد يبعدها اليوم عن حلفائها، لكنه سيجعلهم يلحقونها إنْ أنشات طاولة تشبه طاولة أستانة مفتوحة الأفق على مسارات التفاوض المقرّرة التي تبقى في جوهرها روسية أميركية.

– ماكرون يدرس الدعوة لمؤتمر دولي إقليمي سوري حول الإعمار واللاجئين، تستضيفه باريس وتشارك فيه الحكومة السورية وشخصيات من القطاع الخاص معارضين وموالين، وخبراء، والأمم المتحدة وهيئاتها، والدول المانحة من أوروبا والخليج واليابان والصناديق والبنوك العالمية المعنية، لكن مع الصين، وما يستدعيه هذا الدور يبدأ بفتح السفارة الفرنسية في دمشق، والإفادة من عائدات ذلك في الحصول على تعاون سوري في ملف الإرهابيين من أصول فرنسية الذي يضغط على باريس كحاجة ملحّة، ولا يفترض أن تكون هناك مشكلة إن اعتمدت فرنسا خطاباً دبلوماسياً يتناسب مع دور مقبول من كلّ الأطراف المعنية بالأزمة السورية لتحفظ لنفسها هذا الدور.

– بداية كيمياء بين بوتين وماكرون تنتج تفاعلاً في سورية!

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Will Turkey freeze its membership in the NATO? هل تجمّد تركيا عضويتها في الأطلسي؟

Will Turkey freeze its membership in the NATO?

يونيو 8, 2017

Written by Nasser Kandil,

The Russian announcement of discovering a conspiracy between the Democratic Forces of Syria and ISIS that depends on handing over the area of Raqqa by ISIS peacefully in exchange of securing the withdrawal to the Syrian Badia under the auspices of the US flight formed an expression of the political fall of all the armed Kurdish groups and its sponsor Washington, which announced coincidently its supplying them with new qualitative weapons quantities. Thus the question posed by the Turkish National Security Council; if Raqqa will be given without fight, so why this weapon?

There is a Russian-Turkish-Iranian discussion about the premise of an implicit US decision to establish a strong unannounced Kurdish entity in a constitutional and legal way that provides the cover for a long-term presence of the US troops in Syria and on the borders with Iraq and Turkey, in coincidence with the prevention of the Syrian-Iraqi connection across the borders, and disabling the efforts of the political settlements through transferring the reference of the political opposition which participates in the negotiations from Ankara to Riyadh, and raising its ceiling to prevent any settlement. Thus leaving Syria without a political solution through a suspended project of forming capable recognized country internationally as a recovered country, breaking up its relation with the Eastern depth especially Iran through dominating groups affiliated to Washington and thus the Kurdish entity will allow the cover of the US stay under the title that the war on terrorism is not over, ISIS withdrew to Badia and the war will continue there.

Russia and Iran are approaching the fears and the considerations in terms of sticking to a serious concept of the war on ISIS, a similar concept of the political solution, and the establishment of the Syrian state. The certainty of the US manipulation in the two concepts raises a question about the status of the armed Kurdish groups in the war on terrorism and in the political solution. It is the main subject for the dispute of Russia and Iran with Turkey, but it seems to be disappearing after the Russian announcement of the plot of the safe corridors which Moscow was obliged to bomb with caliber cross-continental missiles.

Moscow and Tehran seem concerned in closing the Syrian Badia in front of ISIS; the military battles covered by air by Moscow and where Iran mobilizes allied forces in them are taking place to resolve the countryside of the eastern of Hama towards Salamieh and the countryside of Homs towards Al Sokhneh to secure a coherent land closure that prevents any military displacement of ISIS from Raqqa to Badia. Moscow and Tehran with a similar seriousness and determination provide the elements for a fierce war to reach the borders between Syria and Iraq at an opposite point for each of the Syrian army and the Popular Crowd which each one of them is advancing and ISIS in front of it. In the areas of the Syrian Badia the Syria army is proceeding towards Al-Anbar where is ISIS, while the Popular Crowd is proceeding in the western of Mosul opposed by the Democratic Forces of Syria in Syria, so the only point that must be reached by the two parties is Al-Kaem from the Iraqi side, and Boukamal from the Syrian side, while the Americans are racing them from the points of Tanf and Hasaka through armed groups supported by Washington, and which were bombed by Russia yesterday.

On the Turkish side, a strategic reading of the critical moment is being read, where Ankara which seems after it invested everything with America has been dealt by Washington according to the equation of the poker players either everything or nothing, this was applied by Washington on the former Qatar Prince before his resignation, so either Turkey wins in Syria along with America and forms its Ottoman Sultanate in which it includes Egypt, Tunisia, Libya and elsewhere, or it loses everything substituted by a mysterious Kurdish entity on its borders to prolong the US presence in Syria, there is a hidden war to expel Turkey from all the region, so this explains what is going on with Qatar, Libya, and Gaza.

Today in Ankara they are wondering about the presence of US plan that is implemented successively to isolate Turkey, Saudi Arabia participated in it against Qatar, Egypt against Libya, and Israel against Gaza, and where the armed Kurds in Syria form its front, they wonder whether the presence in the NATO becomes a burden on Turkey, because it is the time to turn the table and to participate with Russia and Iran in Astana under the title of the war on terrorism and the political solution, provided with the unity of the Syrian territories under the leadership of the current Syrian state and its president and postponing the issues of the Syrian internal dispute after removing the threat which the Turks consider it a danger on their national security that worth the risk, and maybe freezing the Turkish membership in the NATO.

Translated by Lina Shehadeh,

هل تجمّد تركيا عضويتها في الأطلسي؟

يونيو 1, 2017

ناصر قنديل

 شكّل الإعلان الروسي عن اكتشاف مؤامرة بين قوات سورية الديمقراطية وداعش يقضي بتسليم داعش منطقة الرقة سلمياً مقابل تأمين خط انسحاب آمن إلى البادية السورية برعاية الطيران الأميركي، تعبيراً عن السقوط السياسي لكلّ من الجماعات الكردية المسلّحة وراعيتها واشنطن، التي أعلنت بالتزامن تزويدها بكميات سلاح جديدة ونوعية، ليصير السؤال الذي طرحه مجلس الأمن القومي التركي، ما دامت الرقة ستسلّم بلا قتال، فلماذا هذا السلاح؟

– يدور نقاش روسي تركي إيراني حول فرضية وجود قرار أميركي ضمني بإقامة كيان كردي قويّ وغير معلن بصيغة دستورية وقانونية، يوفر الغطاء لبقاء مديد للقوات الأميركية في سورية وعلى حدود العراق وتركيا، بالتزامن مع منع التواصل السوري العراقي عبر الحدود، وتعطيل جهود التسويات السياسية بنقل مرجعية المعارضة السياسية المشاركة بالمفاوضات من أنقرة إلى الرياض ورفع سقوفها لمنع التوصل لأي تسوية، فتبقى سورية بلا حل سياسي بمشروع معلّق لقيام الدولة القادرة والمعترف بها دولياً كدولة متعافية، وتقطع صلتها بالعمق الشرقي، خصوصاً إيران بسيطرة جماعات تابعة لواشنطن، ويصير للكيان الكردي الرمادي ما يمنح تغطية البقاء الأميركي، تحت شعار أنّ الحرب على الإرهاب لم تنته، فقد انسحب داعش إلى البادية والحرب ستستمرّ هناك.

– روسيا وإيران تقاربان المخاوف والحسابات من باب التمسك بمفهوم جدّي للحرب على داعش ومفهوم مشابه للحلّ السياسي وقيامة الدولة السورية. ويشكل التيقن من التلاعب الأميركي بالمفهومين باباً للتساؤل حول مكانة الجماعات الكردية المسلحة في هذه الحرب على الإرهاب وفي الحل السياسي. وهو الموضوع الرئيس لخلاف روسيا وإيران مع تركيا. وهو ما يبدو في طريقه للزوال بعد الإعلان الروسي عن مؤامرة الممرّات الآمنة التي اضطرت موسكو لقصفها بصواريخ الكاليبر العابرة للقارات.

– على خط موازٍ تبدو موسكو وطهران معنيتين بإغلاق البادية السورية أمام داعش وتدور معارك عسكرية تغطيها موسكو جوياً بقوة وتزجّ فيها إيران قدرات حليفة لها، لحسم ريف شرق حماة تجاه السلمية، وريف حمص تجاه السخنة، لتأمين إغلاق بري متماسك يقطع أي فرص نزوح عسكري لداعش من الرقة إلى البادية. كذلك تقوم موسكو وطهران بجدّية وحزم مشابهَيْن بتوفير مقومات حرب ضروس لبلوغ الحدود بين سورية والعراق في نقطة متقابلة لكل من الجيش السوري والحشد الشعبي، اللذين يتقدّم كل منهما ومقابله داعش. ففي مناطق البادية السورية يتقدم الجيش السوري قبالة الأنبار حيث داعش، بينما يتقدّم الحشد الشعبي غرب الموصل وقبالته على الجانب السوري قوات سورية الديمقراطية. والنقطة الوحيدة التي يجب أن يبلغها الطرفان ليلتقيا هي القائم من الجهة العراقية والبوكمال من الجهة السورية، بينما يسابقهما الأميركيون من نقطتي التنف والحسكة بالجماعات المسلحة المدعومة من واشنطن والتي نالت نصيبها من القصف الروسي أمس.

– على الجانب التركي تجري قراءة استراتيجية للحظة الحرجة، حيث تبدو أنقرة وقد وضعت بيضها في السلة الأميركية قد عوملت من قبل واشنطن وفقاً لمعادلة لاعبي البوكر إما كل شيء أو لا شيء. وهو ما سبق وطبّقته واشنطن على أمير قطر السابق قبل تنحيته، فإما تنتصر تركيا في سورية وتنصر أميركا معها وتقيم منها سلطنتها العثمانية وتضمّ مصر وتونس وليبيا وسواها، وإما تخسر كل شيء ويكون كيان كردي غامض على حدودها هو البديل لإدامة الحضور الأميركي في سورية، وتدور حرب خفية لطرد تركيا من المنطقة كلّها، يفسّر هذا ما يجري مع قطر وفي ليبيا وغزة.

– يستاءلون في أنقرة اليوم عن وجود خطة أميركية لعزل تركيا تنفذ بالتتابع، ويشترك في حلقاتها كل من السعودية ضد قطر ومصر في ليبيا و»إسرائيل» في غزة، ويشكّل المسلحون الأكراد في سورية رأس الحربة فيها، ويتساءلون ألم يصبح الوجود في حلف الأطلسي عبئاً على تركيا، وقد آن الأوان لقلب الطاولة وخوض غمار التشارك مع روسيا وإيران في مظلة أستانة، تحت عنوان الحرب على الإرهاب والحل السياسي، ولكن بشرط وحدة التراب السوري تحت مظلة الدولة السورية الحالية ورئيسها، وتأجيل ملفات الخلاف الداخلي السوري لما بعد إبعاد شبح التهديد الذي يعتبره الأتراك خطراً على أمنهم القومي يستحق المجازفة، وربما تجميد العضوية التركية في الأطلسي.

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“No Kurdish entity in Syria” is the title of the next Astana لا كيان كردي في سورية عنوان أستانة المقبل

“No Kurdish entity in Syria” is the title of the next Astana 

يونيو 7, 2017

Written by Nasser Kandil,

The deal disclosed by the Russian Caliber missiles and the declarations of the Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov between ISIS and the armed Kurdish groups through a barter of peaceful handing over of Raqqa in exchange of ensuring secure withdrawal corridors to the Syrian Badia revealed the priority of the formation of a local Kurdish authority in the provinces of Raqqa, Deir Al Zour, and Hasaka according to these Kurdish groups to their belonging to Syrian national auspices, that includes the right of participation in making the form of the new regime and constitution based on the sticking to the unity of the Syrian territories. The threats issued by these groups to the Popular Crowd not to enter the Syrian territories in the provinces of Hasaka and Deir Al Zour even through an understanding with the Syrian state to fight ISIS emphasize this priority on one hand, and the exclusiveness of the US reference in formulating orientations of these groups on the other hand, even at the expense of their Syrian identity and the credibility of the war on ISIS at the same time.

During the war years, the Kurdish armed groups have got a special sponsorship and a distinctive treatment from the Syrian country and from Russia. Despite the special relationship with Washington which was apparent from a long time, the Syrian state did not hesitate to overlook the bloody events which affected it by these groups in the province of Hasaka, on the contrary it tried to protect them in Manbej against the Turkish threat at the moment of the apparent US abandonment, it facilitated opening the road Al Qamishli-Aleppo-Damascus-Beirut, while Russia has waged battles to impose the participation of these groups in the rounds of the negotiation in Geneva despite the absence of the US pressure on its allies to impose the Kurdish component and its presence, till the scandal of the deal with ISIS occurred, so it was as “the straw that broke the camel’s back”.

The deal with ISIS at the expense of the war with the organization which took the title of the Kurdish armed formations and the title of the American occupation of part of Syria is bigger than a tactical event or field performance, it is an expression of US strategy that accepted by the Kurds, and which draws the priorities according to the Russian and Syrian reading, it based on the priority of forming Kurdish military economic and political privacy inspired by the experience of Iraqi Kurdistan with which the efforts of the political solution have been disrupted, it expands the war on ISIS by transferring the organization from one place to another through which Washington gets a coverage for its occupation as an associate of a local group that has legitimacy, rights, and privacy. In the north east of Syria there are oil and agricultural wealth and a limited number of populations that will be reduced with the hegemony of one part of the region components. This makes it more attractive to the Americans as an alternative of the failure in having control over all of Syria. The unannounced Kurdish state in Syria is useful for the Americans through its connection with the project of the seeking to expand through other groups to complete having control of the Syrian-Iraqi borders even in a short depth of the Kurdish dominance areas, so what is the need of Washington for a political solution in Syria while the management of chaos seems more useful?

Strategic shifts will result from the Syrian, Russian, and Iranian clarity for what is going on, it is a clarity that seems Turkish as well, so this will make next Astana meeting more important than before with a priority entitled the prevention of turning the Kurdish privacy into a project of targeting the unity of Syria. This is the significance of the speech of the Russian President about the concern of the risks of dividing Syria, as it is the significance of using the strategic caliber missiles to send a message that the matter is a red Russian line.

The equation since Geneva I till Geneva XI was under the title of no political settlement except the priority of the war on terrorism. Today the equation became no credibility of the war on terrorism without sticking to the unity of Syria. As the seeking was for an alliance based on the partnership in the war on terrorism as an entrance for the partnership in the political solution in Syria, the seeking becomes for an alliance based on the sticking to the unity of Syria as a condition for the partnership in the alliance of the war on terrorism and the political solution in Syria, Astana seems a title that indicated to the next task.

Translated by Lina Shehadeh,

لا كيان كردي في سورية عنوان أستانة المقبل

يونيو 3, 2017

ناصر قنديل

– كشفت الصفقة التي فضحتها صواريخ كاليبر الروسية وتصريحات وزير الخارجية الروسي سيرغي لافروف بين داعش والجماعات الكردية المسلحة بمقايضة تسليم سلمي للرقة بتأمين ممرات انسحاب آمن منها إلى البادية السورية، أولوية قيام سلطة كردية محلية في محافظات الرقة ودير الزور والحسكة لدى هذه الجماعات الكردية على انضوائها في ظلال وطنية سورية، تتضمّن حق المشاركة في صياغة شكل نظام الحكم والدستور الجديدين من ضمن منظومة التمسّك بوحدة التراب السوري. وجاءت التحذيرات الصادرة عن هذه الجماعات للحشد الشعبي بعدم دخول الأراضي السورية في محافظتي الحسكة ودير الزور ولو من ضمن تفاهم مع الدولة السورية لقتال داعش، تأكيداً على هذه الأولوية من جهة، وعلى حصرية المرجعية الأميركية في صياغة توجّهات هذه الجماعات، ولو على حساب هويتها السورية وصدقية الحرب على داعش في آن واحد.

 – خلال سنوات الحرب حظيت الجماعات الكردية المسلحة برعاية خاصة ومعاملة مميّزة من الدولة السورية ومن روسيا. فرغم العلاقة الخاصة بواشنطن التي بدت ظاهرة منذ زمن غير قصير لم تتردّد الدولة السورية في التغاضي عن أحداث دموية أصابتها على يد هذه الجماعات في محافظة الحسكة، وفتحت الباب لحمايتها في منبج بوجه التهديد التركي في لحظة تخلٍّ أميركي بائن، وسهّلت فتح طريق القامشلي حلب دمشق بيروت بالتنسيق معها، بينما حرصت روسيا على خوض معارك فرض مشاركة هذه الجماعات في جولات التفاوض في جنيف، رغم الغياب الأميركي عن ساحة الضغط على حلفائها لفرض المكوّن الكردي وحضوره، حتى وقعت فضيحة الصفقة مع داعش فكانت القشة التي قصمت ظهر البعير.

 – الصفقة مع داعش على حساب الحرب مع التنظيم المتخذ عنواناً للتشكيلات الكردية المسلحة وللاحتلال الأميركي لجزء من سورية، أكبر من حدث تكتيكي أو ممارسة ميدانية، بل هو تعبير عن استراتيجية أميركية يرتضيها الأكراد ترسم الأولويات وفق القراءة الروسية والسورية، تقوم على أولوية نشوء خصوصية كردية عسكرية اقتصادية سياسية تستوحي تجربة كردستان العراق، تعطّل معها مساعي الحلّ السياسي، وتمدّد لحسابها الحرب على داعش بنقل التنظيم من بقعة إلى بقعة، وتحصل خلالها واشنطن على تغطية احتلالها بصفتها معاوناً لجماعة محلية ذات مشروعية وحقوق وخصوصية، وفي الشمال الشرقي لسورية ثروات نفطية وزراعية وعدد محدود من السكان سينقص أكثر مع هيمنة لون واحد من مكونات المنطقة على سائر الألوان، ما يجعلها أشدّ إغراء للأميركي كبديل عن الفشل في الإمساك بكلّ سورية. فالدويلة الكردية غير المعلنة هي سورية المفيدة بنظر الأميركيين، بالتواصل مع مشروع السعي للتمدّد بجماعات أخرى لإكمال الإمساك بالحدود السورية العراقية، ولو بشريط رقيق يستند عمقه لمناطق السيطرة الكردية، وعندها ما حاجة واشنطن لحلّ سياسي في سورية، بينما تبدو إدارة الفوضى أشدّ فائدة؟

– تحوّلات استراتيجية سينتجها الوضوح السوري والروسي والإيراني لما يجري، وهو وضوح يبدو أنه تركي أيضاً، ما سيجعل لقاء أستانة المقبل أشدّ أهمية من قبل لأولوية سيصير عنوانها منع تحوّل الخصوصية الكردية إلى مشروع استهداف لوحدة سورية. وهذا مغزى كلام الرئيس الروسي عن القلق من أخطار لتقسيم سورية، كما هو مغزى استخدام صواريخ كاليبر الاستراتيجية لإيصال رسالة مفادها، أنّ الأمر خط روسي أحمر.

– كانت المعادلة منذ جنيف 1 حتى جنيف 6 تدور تحت عنوان لا تسوية سياسية إلا بأولوية الحرب على الإرهاب. واليوم يبدو أنّ المعادلة صارت لا صدقية للحرب على الإرهاب بلا تمسّك بوحدة سورية. ومثلما كان السعي لحلف قوامه الشراكة في الحرب على الإرهاب كمدخل للشراكة في الحلّ السياسي في سورية، سيصير السعي لحلف قوامه التمسك بوحدة سورية شرطاً للشراكة في حلف الحرب على الإرهاب والحلّ السياسي في سورية، وتبدو أستانة عنواناً يرمز للمهمّة المقبلة.

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Iran and Turkey vow to boost bilateral trade and deepen cooperation

BEIRUT, LEBANON (5:17 P.M.) – The Iranian President Hassan Rouhani and the Turkish President Tayip Erdogan, agreed on a plan to deepen the bilateral cooperation and boost their trade volume. The two Presidents held a conversation via phone in which the ambitious goal of reaching a 30 billion USD annual trade volume was proposed by Rouhani.

He told Erdogan, that “over the past four years big steps have been taken to deepen Iran-Turkey ties, but a leap must be made […] toward reaching an annual trade volume of $30 billion”. Furthermore he called for more cooperation in the banking sector.

Erdogan agreed with these goals, mentioning that he saw no obstacles for the deepening of bilateral ties. This is not the first time for the trade partners set out this target. In June 2016 the Turkish trade Minister Bulent Tufenkci stated, “my country has serious plans to triple trade with Iran to 30 billion.”

Despite Iran already being sanctioned, the trade volume with Turkey reached 20 billion in 2012, but drastically dropped, after harsher sanctions were implemented the same year. The sanctions excluded, financial institutions and banks implicated in Iran’s oil trade from the SWIFT bankig system, which was the only system to enable transactions between banks until 2015.

As big parts of the sanctions were gradually lifted due to the nuclear agreement reached in 2015, the bilateral trade volume had already halved to only 10 billion, but was set to rise fast again. But despite an additional trade agreement with a wide array of 300 tariff cuts, the trade volume diminished furher by 100 million the next year, as can be seen in the graphic below:

Henri Feyerabend | Al-Masdar News

Nevertheless a lot seems to have changed recently and the Turkish Economy Minister Nihat Zeybekci could announce March this year, that the trade volume is now increasing by 30% each month.

This development reflects improved relations between the two countries, which despite supporting opposite warring parties in the Syrian conflict, have recently agreed together with Russia on plans to implement de-escalation zones in Syria, which could prove as a first step, for ending the now 6 year long conflict.

In the talk with Rouhani Erdogan emphasized the importance of this political agreement, reached May 4 this year in the Astana talks. Further details and steps for the concrete implementation of the de-escalation zones in Syria are to be set out in a new round of talks early in June.

The conflicts in Iraq and Syria, threaten state control in the region. Both Turkey and Iran had securtiy issues in their border regions, close to these two conflict zones, especially with kurdish groups. Territorial control by the various groups in Iraq and Syria is shown in the map below:

Henri Feyerabend | Al-Masdar News

Trump Backs Sunni Takfiri “Wahabism” over Revolutionary Islam

Trump Backs Sunni Radical Islam over Moderate Shi’ism


Trump Backs Sunni Radical Islam over Moderate Shi’ism

President Donald Trump signaled to the nations of the Middle East and Muslim world that he strongly backs radical Sunni Islam, mostly embodied by Saudi Arabia’s brand of Wahhabism, over the emerging moderate Shi’ism on display in Iran. Trump’s first visit to another country as president was Saudi Arabia. Trump was also the only president to make Saudi Arabia his first stop after taking office. The decision to honor Saudi Arabia with such U.S. presidential protocol was a calculated one.

Trump’s first official act after he landed in Riyadh was to ink a $300 billion arms package with Saudi Arabia. The United States agreed to supply the Saudis with the Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) anti-ballistic missile system, maritime littoral combat ships for close-in shore combat, and so-called «precision-guided munitions» responsible for so many civilian «collateral damage» deaths in Syria, Iraq, Yemen, Libya, Afghanistan, Somalia, and Pakistan.

Considering the Wahhabist kingdom’s past and current support for the very same radical jihadists who are committing acts of terrorism in Syria, Yemen, and other nations, it is hypocritical that Trump claimed the U.S. and Saudi Arabia are «jointly» battling against terrorism. It was as if, in the leadup to World War II, President Franklin Roosevelt traveled to Berlin to meet with Adolf Hitler and FDR proclaimed from the Reich Chancellery that he and Nazi Germany were jointly fighting against anti-Semitism.

Ironically, as Trump was praising Saudi Arabia’s «efforts» against jihadist terrorism, Iran overwhelmingly re-elected moderate President Hassan Rouhani. Rouhani ran on a platform of bestowing more freedoms on the Iranian people and opening the country to the rest of the world. A day after Trump’s anti-Iran speech in Riyadh, reformists won all 21 seats in Tehran’s municipal election. Across the board, Iranians, particularly women and minority religious groups, enjoy many more rights than do the Saudi Arabs. Whereas in Iran, Christians, Jews, and Zoroastrians can worship openly and even enjoy representation in parliament, across the Persian Gulf, Christians, Hindus, and Buddhists are banned from constructing churches or temples and displaying religious symbols. Donald Trump’s ignorance of Middle Eastern religions is a severe and dangerous handicap for an American president.

While the Saudi princelings are free to get drunk, use drugs, and heinously abuse women behind their palace walls, standing immune to the whims of the mutawa religious police, the rank and file of Saudi Arabia live in a country governed by centuries-old laws embracing misogyny, public beheadings, and religious persecution. While women are banned from driving vehicles and movie theaters are prohibited in Saudi Arabia, across the Persian Gulf in Iran, women drive freely and Iran has a vibrant movie industry and numerous theaters as attested to by that nation’s winning of several international film awards, including Hollywood’s Oscar.

Trump waxed on about moderate Islam in the capital city of the country that gave birth to Wahhabism. Saudi Arabia has nurtured with its financing, propaganda, government-subsidized clerics, and other support jihadist groups from Morocco to Indonesia and Fiji to Trinidad. Trump had the gall and audacity to accuse Iran of funding terrorists and promoting a «craven ideology,» i.e., Shi’ism.

Trump’s speech was largely written by Stephen Miller, a right-wing strongly pro-Israel creature of Santa Monica, California and an acolyte of the Islamophobe extremist David Horowitz. Trump’s speech in Riyadh did nothing to bridge the differences between Islam and his administration and everything to do with laying down a gauntlet to not only Shi’ism but the Alawite, Zaidi, Sufi, Alevi, Ibadi, Ahmadiyya, and Ismaili sects of Islam. Trump even managed to slip the phrase «Islamic extremism» into his speech rather than the less offensive «Islamist extremism». Even though a committed Islamophobe, Miller, wrote the speech, Trump’s spokespeople in Saudi Arabia insisted that the president was merely «exhausted» from his trip and that is why he said «Islamic extremism».

Trump called for the end of the Iranian and Syrian «regimes» and the international isolation of both. Trump’s speech, if it had not been written by Miller, could have easily been written by any Saudi or Israeli government propagandist.

Trump’s previous meeting in the White House with Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan gave American sanction to the Ankara government’s war against secular Islam as envisaged by Kemal Ataturk. In a massive psychological warfare operation, Trump, who proclaimed his hostility to «radical Islamist terrorism» prior to his trip to Saudi Arabia and embrace of Erdogan, has, instead, embraced it.

Trump told his Saudi hosts and the Wahhabi potentates from Qatar, Bahrain, United Arab Emirates, and Kuwait who gathered in Riyadh that «the path to peace begins right here». Riyadh was also the path crossed by many of the terrorists who have attacked the United States and other nations, including on September 11, 2001. Iranian Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif, whose nation was called a «promoter of terrorism» by Trump in Riyadh, issued a call for Trump to discuss with his Saudi friends ways to avoid them sponsoring another September 11th-like attack.

Trump’s rhetoric against Iran, Hezbollah, the Syrian government, the Yemeni Houthis, Hamas, and, given Trump’s strong support for the Bahraini Wahhabist regime, the majority Shi’as of Bahrain, could be taken as a call to arms for continued Saudi, Bahraini, Yemeni, Libyan, Syrian, Iraqi, Emirati, Qatari, Kuwaiti, Pakistani, Indonesian, Malaysian, and Sudanese repression of non-Sunnis within their countries. Trump signaled his support for continued Bahraini repression of its Shi’as by stating that the United States and Bahrain «have a wonderful relationship together, but there has been a little strain, but there won’t be strain with this administration».

Trump, in language befitting a religious fanatic, lumped together Shi’a Iran and Lebanese Shi’a members of Hezbollah with radical Sunni Al Qaeda and the Islamic State and exhorted the Arab and Muslim leaders gathered in Riyadh to «Drive them out! Drive them out of your places of worship. Drive them out of your communities. Drive them out of your holy land. And drive them out of this Earth».

In a display of sheer hypocrisy, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates pledged $100 million to Trump’s daughter’s «Women Entrepreneurs Fund». During the presidential campaign against Hillary Clinton, Trump tweeted biting criticism of the Clinton Fund, which received from Saudi Arabia and the UAE only about 25 percent of that received by the Ivanka Fund. Trump wrote, «Saudi Arabia and many of the countries that gave vast amounts of money to the Clinton Foundation want women as slaves and to kill gays. Hillary must return all the money from such countries!» For Trump. It was only an outrage when the Clintons accepted donations from Saudi Arabia and the UAE. Yet, when Ivanka Trump received three times as much money from the same countries, Trump was effusive in his praise of them. If Ivanka Trump wanted to help women entrepreneurs in Saudi Arabia, she could have told old King Salman to let them drive cars first.

Trump actually referred to Iran as a «terrorist safe harbor». Trump and his speech writer Miller completely ignored the fact that it was Saudi, Qatari, and Emirati funding, military, and other support that permitted the creation of Islamic State and other jihadist «safe harbors» in Raqqa, Syria; Mosul, Iraq; Derna, Libya; and Mukalla, South Yemen. While standing before Saudi, Turkish, and Qatari officials, Trump called Syrian President Bashar al Assad a «war criminal,» ignoring the fact that the Saudis, Turks, Qataris, and their client jihadist groups committed countless war crimes in Syria, Iraq, Yemen, and Libya.

At the end of his speech, Trump slipped and called King Salman «King Solomon». Trump, whose command of Biblical history is wanting, may want to know that King Solomon was known for wisdom and fairness. There was nothing wise or fair in Trump’s speech in Riyadh.

عبد الباري عطوان: اللعنة السورية تطال اردوغان.. تركيا تحت شبح التقسيم

تاريخ النشر : 2017-05-13

وكالة أوقات الشام الإخبارية

عبد الباري عطوان

الرئيس التركي رجب طيب اردوغان غاضب هذه الأيام على الجميع، الحلفاء والاعداء معا، غاضب على الولايات المتحدة، غاضب على أوروبا، غاضب على ايران والعراق، وغاضب على دولة الاحتلال الإسرائيلي، وناقم على اليونان، وبات من الصعب ان نجد دولة واحدة راض عنها، او غير غاضب عليها على الأقل.

هذا الغضب له تفسيرات عدة، ابرزها في نظرنا حالة الإحباط التي يعيشها الرئيس التركي من جراء خذلان حلفائه التاريخيين له، والامريكان على وجه التحديد بعد الخدمات التي قدمتها بلاده لهم، من خلال عضوية حلف الناتو على مدى اكثر من ستين عاما.

يوم الثلاثاء المقبل سيحط الرئيس التركي الرحال في واشنطن للقاء الرئيس الأمريكي دونالد ترامب الذي عوّل عليه كثيرا في دعم سياسته، أي اردوغان، في سورية، والشق المتعلق منها بإطاحة حكومة الرئيس بشار الأسد، وإقامة مناطق عازلة، وعدم تقديم أي دعم عسكري او سياسي للاكراد.

فرص نجاح زيارة الرئيس اردوغان في تحقيق أهدافها تبدو محدودة، واحتمالات الفشل اكبر بكثير من احتمالات النجاح، فادارة الرئيس ترامب لن تسلّم الداعية فتح الله غولن، المتهم بالوقوف خلف الانقلاب العسكري، وأعلنت الخميس على لسان العقيد دون دارن، المتحدث باسم قوات التحالف الدولي لمحاربة “الجهاديين”، انها ستسرع تنفيذ قرارها بتسليح قوات حماية الشعب الكردية السورية بدبابات وصواريخ واسلحة حديثة تؤهلها لشن الحرب لاستعادة مدينة الرقة من “الدولة الإسلامية”، بغطاء جوي ومشاركة برية أمريكية.

والاهم من ذلك ان الرئيس اردوغان شن هجوما شرسا على إسرائيل، واتهمها بالعنصرية على غرار نظام جنوب افريقيا الأبيض، ووصف الحصار المصري لاسرائيلي لقطاع غزة بأنه لا محل له بالانسانية، واعرب عن رفضه لقرار إسرائيلي بمنع الآذان من مآذن مساجد القدس المحتلة، ويأتي هذا الهجوم بعد اشهر من الصمت وتطبيع العلاقات.

وزارة الخارجية الاسرائيلية ردت على الرئيس اردوغان قائلة “ان كل من ينتهك حقوق الانسان بشكل منهجي في بلاده لا ينبغي ان يعظ حول الاخلاقيات للديمقراطية الوحيدة في المنطقة”.

الهجوم بهذه الشراسة على إسرائيل، الدولة التي تحكم حاليا البيت الأبيض، لا يمكن ان يقع بردا وسلاما على قلوب الرئيس ترامب وصهره جاريد كوشنر، اقرب مستشاريه ووزير الخارجية الأمريكي الفعلي، اللهم الا اذا كان هذا الهجوم غير جدي، وغير نابع من القلب، مثلما وصفه يواف غالنت، وزير الإسكان الإسرائيلي في حديث لاحد الصحف الإسرائيلية، الذي قال “ان تركيا وإسرائيل بحاجة الى الحفاظ على العلاقات بينهما.. ان ادلاء اردوغان بتصريحات محرضة بين الفينة والأخرى يعكس مصالحه الخطابية السياسية.. دعوه يتكلم ونحن نعرف كيف نتكلم”.

ما اغضب اردوغان من حليفه الإسرائيلي امران، الأول عدم تهنئة بنيامين نتنياهو له بالفوز في الاستفتاء، والثاني، تمزيق الأخير لوثيقة “حماس″ الجديدة والقائها في سلة المهملات امام عدسات التلفزة، فالاخير، أي نتنياهو، يعلم جيدا ان اردوغان يقف خلف هذه الوثيقة، وما تضمنته من أفكار تمسح ميثاق الحركة وتقبل بدولة فلسطينية على حدود عام 1967 على امل تخفيف الحصار الاسرائيلي والغربي عليها، وفتح ميناء ومطر، في غزة بالتالي بدعم تركي قطري.

الحقيقة التي ربما يرفض الرئيس اردوغان الاعتراف بها علنا، هو شعوره بالخديعة، من قبل من يدّعون انهم حلفاؤه، أي الامريكان، الذين استخدموه، وورطوه في الملف السوري، طوال السنوات الست الماضية، ونسفوا بذلك كل إنجازاته الشخصية والحزبية، ودمروا بالتالي طموحاته السياسية، ثم تخلوا عنه لصالح الد اعدائه، أي الاكراد.

دعم الرئيس ترامب للاكراد السوريين الذين تضعهم تركيا على قائمة الإرهاب، وتعتبرهم خطرا وجوديا عليها، وتسليحهم بدبابات ومدرعات وصواريخ حديثة متطورة، واعتمادهم كحليف مؤتمن لـ”تحرير” مدينة الرقة، يعني وضع النواة الاصلب لجيش الدولة الكردية، التي يمكن ان تمتد على طول الحدود التركية السورية، وتهدد الوحدة الترابية والديمغرافية لتركيا.

الامريكان استخدموا الاتراك، والرئيس اردوغان تحديدا لطعن العرب في الظهر، وتفتيت دولهم المضادة لهم (أي للامريكان وإسرائيل)، وبعد ان حققوا معظم مهمتهم في العراق وسورية وليبيا، هاهم الآن يخططون الاستخدام الاكراد، وربما غيرهم، لتفتيت تركيا.

الفرصة سانحة امام الرئيس اردوغان لمراجعة سياساته، وتقليص الخسائر، وإنقاذ تركيا والمنطقة من مخططات التدمير والتفتيت، فهل يفعل ذلك؟

لدنيا الكثير من الشكوك.. ونأمل ان لا تكون في محلها، وان يثبت الرئيس اردوغان عدم صحتها.

رأي اليوم

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