‘UAE stabbed us in the back’: MBS

July 18, 2023

Source: The Wall Street Journal

In this Wednesday, Nov. 27, 2019, photo released by the Ministry of Presidential Affairs, Abu Dhabi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Zayed Al Nahyan, right, meets Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman in Abu Dhabi, United Arab Emirates. (AP)

By Al Mayadeen English

The once close officials, MBS and MBZ, are head to head, competing over who has more influence and presence in the region.

Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman (MBS) convened a small group of local media in Riyadh for a rare off-the-record briefing in December and delivered a shocking message, according to the Wall Street Journal. During the meeting, MbS said that the UAE, Saudi Arabia’s longtime ally, had “stabbed us in the back,” he claimed. “They will see what I can do,” he told the group, according to people at the meeting.

A rift has developed between MBS and his former mentor, UAE President Sheikh Mohamed bin Zayed Al Nahyan (MBZ), reflecting the struggle for geopolitical and economic clout in the Middle East and global oil markets. That said, the two royals are now feuding over who calls the shots in a Middle East where the US is playing a deteriorating role, according to WSJ. 

US officials are concerned that the Gulf competition will make it more difficult to form a coherent security alliance to confront Iran, end the eight-year war on Yemen, and expand Israeli normalization agreements with Arab nations. That said, the rivalry that the US was so determined to orchestrate took a wrong turn, and the latest developments are definitely not in its favor. 

“These are two highly ambitious people who want to be key players in the region and the go-to players,” a senior Biden administration official said, adding that “On some level, they still collaborate. Now, neither seems comfortable with the other being on the same pedestal. On balance, it’s not helpful to us for them to be at each other’s throats.”

According to close sources, as per the WSJ, the once-close MBS and MBZ haven’t spoken in more than six months, people close to them said, and their private disputes have spilled out into the open. On that note, the UAE and Saudi Arabia have competing interests in Yemen, undermining efforts to reach a peace agreement in the country, while Emirati resentment of Saudi pressure to boost the global price of oil is causing new schisms in the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC).

Economic competitors 

The UAE and KSA are both increasingly economic competitors.

In an effort to end the KSA’s economic reliance on oil, MBS is pushing companies to move their regional headquarters to Riyadh, the capital of Saudi Arabia, from UAE’s Dubai, which has become a tourist hub for Westerners. 

He’s also initiating plans to establish digital hubs, attract more visitors, and build logistical hubs to contest the UAE’s status as the Middle East’s commercial powerhouse, according to the WSJ. MBS announced in March the establishment of a second national airline to compete with Dubai’s highly regarded Emirates.

In terms of soft power, the Saudi purchase of Newcastle United, England’s soccer club, in 2021, and investment in worldwide superstar players occurred at the same time as Manchester City, controlled by a senior member of Abu Dhabi’s ruling family, won the English and European soccer titles.

The Saudi rapprochement, deal with Iran

A UAE official, speaking for the government, said claims of strained relations were “categorically false and lack foundation,” and a Saudi official called the idea “simply not accurate.”

As mentioned in the WSJ report, the Saudi official added that “The UAE is a close regional partner of Saudi Arabia, and our policies converge on a wide range of issues of mutual interest,” adding that the two countries work together with other Gulf neighbors on political, security, and economic coordination.

The UAE official said their “strategic partnership is based on the same objectives and vision for regional prosperity, security, and stability.” 

During his meeting with local media outlets, the Saudi leader stated that he had issued a list of requests to the UAE, according to the sources in the UAE, adding that MBS warned that if the smaller Gulf nation did not comply, Saudi Arabia was prepared to take harsh measures, similar to what it did against Qatar in 2017 when Riyadh broke diplomatic relations with it for more than three years and imposed an economic blockade with the support of Abu Dhabi. MBS warned, according to sources who were present, “It will be worse than what I did with Qatar.”

MBS’ step toward diplomacy, away from MBZ

Since the meeting in December, MBS took a step towards diplomacy and ended the political isolation imposed on him after the killing of journalist Jamal Khashoggi in 2018. He turned to China for assistance in mending Saudi Arabia’s relations with Iran and then coordinated Syria’s return to the Arab League, a process that the UAE had begun several years before, according to the WSJ. 

MBS is also in talks with the US about formally recognizing “Israel,” which the UAE did in 2020. Moreover, the Crown Prince is also leading diplomatic efforts to quash violence in Sudan, where the UAE backs the opposing side. 

MBZ privately criticized the Saudi ruler for his actions, accusing him of undermining ties between the two nations, critically pointing out MBS’ relationship with Russia and its oil policies and “risky moves,” in reference to the deal with Iran. 

Read next: Saudi Arabia, UAE try to lobby EU countries to restore ties with Syria

That said, the Emirati official skipped an Arab summit MBS called for, and also the Arab League’s vote in May to allow Syria back into the circle. On the other hand, MBS himself was absent when MBZ met with Arab leaders at a hastily arranged regional summit in the UAE in January.

“Tensions are rising between them, in part because MBS wants to step out from under MBZ’s shadow,” said Dina Esfandiary, a senior advisor at the International Crisis Group’s Middle East and North Africa Program, adding that “Things are going to get worse because both countries are getting more confident and assertive in their foreign policy.”

A deteriorating alliance 

The Saudis and Emiratis have considered themselves the closest of allies, yet their relationship has been strained even before the United Arab Emirates achieved independence from Britain in 1971.

Sheikh Zayed al Nahyan, the UAE’s founding father, resented Saudi dominance of the Arabian peninsula, and then-Saudi King Faisal refused to acknowledge his Persian Gulf neighbor for years, seeking leverage in several territorial conflicts. The United Arab Emirates canceled plans for a unified Gulf central bank in 2009 due to its proposed site in Riyadh. There are still territorial conflicts between the two countries over oil-rich terrain.

With the simultaneous rise of MBZ and MBS, the two countries grew closer. When MBZ’s half-brother, President Sheikh Khalifa bin Zayed, had a crippling stroke in 2014, the Emirati monarch became de facto ruler of his country at the age of 54. When MBS’s father, King Salman, took power in 2015, MBZ began mentoring the young Saudi prince, who was just 29 years old at the time.

According to WSJ, the two men had never met before an overnight camping expedition in the vast Saudi desert. Sources that were present revealed that the outing was accompanied by trained falcons and a small entourage; the outing—roughly equal in Gulf tradition to a round of presidential golf—was a watershed moment in their friendship.

MBS sought advice from MBZ and employed some of the same banks and consultants that the Emiratis used for a similar strategy a decade earlier while developing a plan to change and open up his country. On that note, MBS and MBZ formed a foreign-policy alliance that launched the war on Yemen, assisted Egypt’s Abdel Fattah Al Sisi in a coup, armed Libyan militants in the country’s divided east, and boycotted Qatar.

OPEC competition, dispute

The schism erupted last October when OPEC agreed to cut output, surprising the Biden administration. The UAE agreed to the decrease but privately told US officials and the media that Saudi Arabia had forced them to do so, according to the WSJ. 

The dynamic highlighted an ongoing dispute between Saudis and Emiratis over OPEC policy, which Riyadh has long dominated as the world’s top petroleum exporter, WSJ wrote, adding that the Emiratis have increased their oil-production capacity to more than four million barrels per day, with aspirations to exceed five million, but are only allowed to pump roughly three million under OPEC regulation, costing the country hundreds of billions of dollars in lost revenue.

Read next: Saudi Arabia slashes July oil output, OPEC+ extends April cut to 2024

On a more crucial point, the Emirati increase in oil production capacity presents the potential ability to move output up and down and with it global oil prices. Until recently, only Saudi Arabia wielded that sort of market power. Disagreements between the two officials are threatening to derail continuing negotiations to end the war on Yemen, which pits the Saudis, Emiratis, and a variety of Yemeni factions against the Yemeni Armed Forces.

The UAE signed a security agreement with the Saudi-backed Yemeni presidential leadership council in December, granting Abu Dhabi the authority to interfere in Yemen and the waters off its coast. Officials in Saudi Arabia saw it as a challenge to their Yemen strategy. In turn, Saudi Arabia had intentions to construct a pipeline that spreads from the kingdom to the Arabian Sea, through the Yemeni province of Hadramout. However, the plans were jeopardized by UAE-backed forces. 

Biden could lose ambitions in Gulf

The rivalry between Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates has irritated the Biden administration, which wants friendly Gulf capitals like Riyadh and Abu Dhabi to help build a united front against Iran. On critical issues such as Ukraine and China, neither MBS nor MBZ is completely aligned with Washington.

On that note, in reference to the obvious new political dynamics in the region, US authorities are growing concerned about MBZ’s outreach to Beijing and Moscow, which, like MBS, has strengthened connections with them.

Biden and MBS 

Biden took office promising to treat the kingdom as a pariah state in the aftermath of the Khashoggi assassination, which MBS has stated he did not order. Instead, in July 2022, Biden visited Saudi Arabia, helping to end his isolation.

Companies in the United States who were previously unwilling to engage with the kingdom are now reconsidering. This desire is anticipated to grow as a year-end deadline approaches for companies with Saudi government contracts to establish a base in Riyadh rather than flying in from Dubai.

Read next: Biden goes home with no Saudi commitment on oil production: WSJ

The WSJ explains that according to those familiar with the case, the Biden administration arranged a meeting on May 7 between MBS and the Emirati president’s younger brother, Sheikh Tahnoun bin Zayed, who was once seen as a confidant of the Saudi crown prince. Tahnoun had been frozen out, making at least six trips to the kingdom without gaining a meeting with MBS until he received assistance from the US, according to the sources.

With regard to decisions concerning Yemen, MBS told his advisors “I don’t trust them anymore,” before telling them to keep policies as is. 

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أميركا في سوريا: الحل ممنوع

الجمعة 7 تموز 2023

اطّلعت «الأخبار» على مجموعة من الوثائق الديبلوماسية التي تُظهر السعي الأميركي المحموم إلى عرقلة عملية التطبيع العربي مع سوريا، والحيلولة دون انفتاح الأبواب المغلقة بين دمشق وأنقرة. في ما يلي، أبرز ما جاء في تلك الوثائق

وثائق ديبلوماسية تفنّد حملة العرقلة | أميركا لحلفائها: لا حاسمة للتطبيع مع سوريا

الجمعة 7 تموز 2023

الأميركي المحموم إلى عرقلة عملية التطبيع العربي مع سوريا، والحيلولة دون انفتاح الأبواب المغلقة بين دمشق وأنقرة. في ما يلي، أبرز ما جاء في تلك الوثائق

موسكو | أكّدت مساعدة وزير الخارجية الأميركية لشؤون الشرق الأدنى، باربرا ليف، في لقاء مع سفراء دول الخليج في واشنطن، أن الإدارة الأميركية ترفض عودة سوريا إلى الجامعة العربية، في مقابل تأييد دول عربية عدّة عودتها. وأفاد تقرير أعدّته الأمانة العامة لـ»مجلس التعاون الخليجي» بأن ليف قالت، في جلسة أمام لجنة العلاقات الخارجية في مجلس الشيوخ الأميركي في حزيران 2022 (تضمّنت انتقادات لدول تتواصل مع سوريا ولمشاريع الغاز لصالح لبنان)، إن الإدارة الأميركية لن تساند الجهود الرامية إلى تطبيع العلاقات مع نظام الأسد، مضيفةً أنه جرى نقل هذه الرسالة إلى جميع العواصم العربية، وعلى أعلى مستوى. وفي الجلسة نفسها، عارض عدّة شيوخ جمهوريين أيّ مساندة لإعادة إعمار المناطق التي تخضع لسيطرة النظام في سوريا، ومرور مشاريع الكهرباء والغاز عبر سوريا إلى لبنان بإعتباره انتهاكاً لـ»قانون قيصر».

كذلك، أبلغ دبلوماسيون أميركيون، دولاً عربية، باعتراض واشنطن على أيّ تقارب مع سوريا. وقال نائب السفير الأميركي في المنامة، ديفيد بروانستين، للقائم بالأعمال الأردني، إن الولايات المتحدة تتفهّم رغبة الدول العربية في تحسين العلاقات مع سوريا لأسباب سياسية أو اقتصادية، إلّا أنها لا تتّفق معها على أن يتمّ ذلك من دون محاسبة النظام السوري. وقالت مديرية شؤون الخليج في الخارجية الأميركية، إيفينيا سيدارياس، لدبلوماسي خليجي في واشنطن، إن المسؤولين الأميركيين تفاجأوا من قيام سلطنة عُمان برفع مستوى تمثيلها الدبلوماسي في سوريا، وإنهم يعارضون هذه الخطوة. وكشف مسؤول في ملف الخليج في مجلس الشيوخ الأميركي، لدبلوماسي خليجي في الولايات المتحدة، أن الولايات المتحدة أعربت للسلطنة عن استيائها من استضافة الأخيرة وزير الخارجية السوري، فيصل المقداد، في 21 آذار 2021، خصوصاً أن مسقط لم تبلغ الإدارة الأميركية بالزيارة مسبقاً. أيضاً، تعهّد ديبلوماسيون أميركيون لوفد من «الائتلاف السوري» المعارض، خلال لقاء بين الجانبين، بمنع محاولات إعادة تعويم النظام السوري إقيلمياً ودولياً، وطلبوا من الائتلاف الاستمرار في المشاركة في اجتماعات «اللجنة الدستورية» برغم تحفّظاته على مخرجاتها. أمّا مدير إدارة الشرق الأوسط في الخارجية البريطانية، ستيفن هيكي، فقال لسفير خليجي في لندن، إن التوجّه نحو تطبيع العلاقات بين أغلب الدول العربية وسوريا بات أمراً واقعاً، وإنه لذلك يُستحسن أن يتمّ الأمر مقابل ثمنٍ معقول. وأقرّ بأن قيام دول خليجية وعربية بإعادة فتح سفاراتها في دمشق، أضعفَ الجهود المبذولة دولياً لعزل النظام السوري.

بدائل أميركية

تواصلت الإدارة الأميركية، في شهر آذار من العام الجاري، مع عدد من الحكومات العربية في المنطقة، وسلّمتها دعوة إلى اجتماع بعيد عن الأضواء في عمّان في 21 آذار 2023، على أن يُعقد على مستوى المبعوثين الخاصين حول سوريا. وحدّدت واشنطن أهداف الاجتماع بتنسيق جهود الإغاثة بعد الزلزال الذي ضرب سوريا، وخلق مناخ تعاطف عام مع الشعب السوري، وشدّدت على ضرورة عدم ربط المساعدات الإنسانية بإعادة الإعمار المحظورة أميركياً حتى إشعار آخر. كما أبدت الاستعداد للعمل مع الدول التي تتواصل مع النظام السوري لتشجيعها على استخدام تأثيرها من أجل الحصول على «تنازلات» من دمشق. كذلك، أبلغ الجانب الأميركي، المدعوّين، أن النظام السوري لم يقُم بما هو مطلوب لإعادة سوريا إلى «جامعة الدول العربية». والجدير ذكره، هنا، أن الدعوة الأميركية شملت دولاً أوروبية عدّة، ولا سيما بريطانيا وألمانيا وفرنسا، إلى جانب تركيا والسعودية ومصر والإمارات والعراق وقطر والأردن، فيما سجّل عدد من الدول العربية تحفّظاته على اللغة التي صيغت بها الدعوة، خاصة لجهة اعتبارها أن عودة سوريا إلى الجامعة لم تتوفّر شروطها بعد.

كانت قد ظهرت إشارات إلى تحوّل في الموقف السعودي المناهض للنظام السوري عام 2019

في المقابل، أكّد دبلوماسي مصري في واشنطن، أمام دبلوماسي خليجي، أن إعادة سوريا إلى «الحضن العربي» تُعدّ من أولويات مصر في المنطقة. لكن يُستشفّ من مصادر متقاطعة أن الموقف المصري من هذه المسألة أحاطه بعض الفتور في وقت من الأوقات. وقال دبلوماسي روسي في واشنطن، لدبلوماسي خليجي، إن السعودية والإمارات بادرتا إلى طرح أفكار تتعلّق بسوريا وعودتها إلى الجامعة العربية خلال زيارة قام بها وزير الخارجية الروسي، سيرغي لافروف، إلى المنطقة في آذار 2021. وأضاف أن الجانب الروسي رتّب لقاء بين رئيس مكتب الأمن الوطني السوري اللواء علي مملوك، ومسؤولين سعوديين. كذلك، أبلغ السفير الروسي لدى سلطنة عمان، ديمتري دوغادكين، سفيراً عربياً، أن وزير الخارجية الروسي لمس خلال هذه الجولة موقفاً إيجابياً من جانب الإمارات، وعدم ممانعة سعودية تجاه عودة سوريا إلى «الجامعة العربية»، في مقابل رفض قطري وموقف مصري غير متشجع. وربط السفير موقف القاهرة هذا، واقترابه آنذاك من موقف قطر، باستثمارات قطر المتزايدة في مصر.

وكانت قد ظهرت إشارات إلى تحوّل في الموقف السعودي المناهض للنظام السوري عام 2019، من بينها امتناع السعودية عن التصويت على مشروع قرار غربي حول حالة حقوق الإنسان في سوريا في مجلس حقوق الإنسان في آذار 2019، وقد علّق مندوب قطر أمام عدد من الدبلوماسيين على ذلك بالقول إن السعودية تستعدّ لاستئناف علاقاتها الدبلوماسية مع سوريا، بهدف التأثير على أيّ عملية انتخابية قد تجري فيها مستقبلاً. أمّا الانعطافة الإماراتية حيال دمشق فقد بدأت في أواخر 2018، حين أعادت أبو ظبي افتتاح سفارتها هناك. ويومها، قال أنور قرقاش، وزير الدولة للشؤون الخارجية في الإمارات، في تغريدة له، إن الأزمة السورية بحاجة إلى مقاربة واقعية جديدة، داعياً إلى دور عربي لإنهاء العنف والقتال.

وخلال لقاء بين ملك الأردن، عبدالله الثاني، ووزير الخارجية الأميركي، أنتوني بلينكن، في 26 أيار 2021، قال الأول إن بلاده تواجه تداعيات اقتصادية صعبة جراء الوضع الحالي في سوريا، وقد يكون الوقت مناسباً لبلورة رؤية جديدة بحيث تتمّ إعادة العلاقات تدريجياً مع دمشق، مع مطالبتها بتغيير طبيعة علاقاتها بطهران، وفق ما روى مسؤول في لجنة العلاقات الخارجية في مجلس الشيوخ الأميركي لدبلوماسيين عرب في واشنطن. وكانت مديرة شؤون العراق وسوريا في مجلس الأمن القومي الأميركي، زهرة بيل، قالت لدبلوماسيين من دول الخليج، في ربيع العام الفائت، إن بلادها ستسمح للشركات الخاصة في الولايات المتحدة والدول «الصديقة» والمنظمات غير الحكومية، بالعمل في مشاريع الصحة والإسكان والتعليم في المناطق الخارجة عن سلطة الحكومة السورية، وتحديداً تلك الخاضعة للقوات الكردية شمال شرق سوريا، وكذلك الخاضعة للسيطرة التركية في إدلب. وقال أحد مسؤولي ملف سوريا في الخارجية الأميركية، جيف جونغ، إنه في نطاق المبادرة المُشار إليها، ستحظى هذه الشركات بإعفاءات من العقوبات الأميركية.

من ملف : أميركا في سوريا: الحل ممنوع

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IN THE SERVICE OF ISRAEL: BIDEN ADMIN BREATHES NEW LIFE INTO TRUMP’S ABRAHAM ACCORDS

JUNE 30TH, 2023

Source

Miko Peled

HR. 3099 was Introduced in the House of Representatives on May 5, 2023. This bill, known as the “Special Envoy for the Abraham Accords Act,” is the latest act by the United States in the service of Israel.

This bill establishes the position of Special Envoy for the Abraham Accords within the Department of State. For anyone who does not remember, the Abraham Accords are agreements to normalize relations between Israel and Arab states that do not recognize Israel. It is an anti-Palestinian accord more than anything. It should be named “a bill to guarantee that governments who go against the wishes of their people and are willing to turn their backs to the plight of the Palestinian people will be rewarded.”

The first four members of the Arab League to sign this accord were the United Arab Emirates, Bahrain, Morocco, and Sudan. The initial signing took place in the White House during the Trump administration, and it should be noted that President Trump and Prime Minister Netanyahu were the only heads of state present. The other countries sent their foreign ministers, ostensibly so as not to be seen signing this disgraceful agreement. It is worth noting that there was extensive widespread opposition to normalizing relations with Israel in all countries that signed the accords.

A US AMBASSADOR IN THE SERVICE OF ISRAEL

According to the bill’s text, the Special Envoy, who shall have the rank and status of ambassador, shall serve as the primary advisor to the U.S. government for expanding and strengthening the Abraham Accords. The duties of the Special Envoy include:

• Encouraging countries without diplomatic relations with Israel to establish formal diplomatic, economic, security, and people-to-people ties;
• Expanding and strengthening existing relationships between Israel and Muslim-majority countries; and
• Coordinating efforts across the U.S. government and engaging diplomatically with foreign governments, nongovernmental organizations, and other stakeholders to expand and strengthen the Abraham Accords.

The language in the bill demands that we ask why in the world is the U.S. government engaged in serving the interests of Israel so blatantly. Indeed, the U.S. will be selling arms to these countries, but a larger picture here is not being discussed, at least not enough. You have to hand it to Israel and even more to the Israeli lobby here in the U.S.: They got a superpower to work as Israel’s sales agent and pay for it. American taxpayers will now be paying additional millions of dollars to solicit – or rather bully – countries who have not yet established relations with Israel to do so. Is this the best use of American taxpayer dollars? Does this serve Americans in any way? The answer to both questions is “No!”

IMPORTANT NEWS

Needless to say, this bill was reported by the Israel press as another step in advancing the good relations between Israel and the United States. The Times of Israel reported that “the US House of Representatives overwhelmingly passed legislation mandating the Biden administration to appoint a special envoy for the Abraham Accords. The special envoy will encourage additional countries to follow the lead of the United Arab Emirates, Bahrain and Morocco, which normalized relations with Israel in 2020.”

If there was any doubt regarding the role the Anti-Palestinian, pro-apartheid lobby, AIPAC, played in passing this bill, Representative Ritchie Tores ensured it was set aside. In a tweet, Congressman 703748 thanked AIPAC for its role in passing the bill. He further said that the future belongs to peace and love, not BDS. In other words, the anti-Palestinian bill pushed down the throat of Americans by the Apartheid defending genocide supporting AIPAC will lead to a future of love and roses.

In contrast, the Palestinian call for freedom and justice is equivalent to a hate-filled future. Once again, anti-peace anti-Palestinian legislation is poorly masked with good intentions.

Exporting Occupation: Israeli Business is Booming in Morocco-Occupied Western Sahara

EXPORTING OCCUPATION: ISRAELI BUSINESS IS BOOMING IN MOROCCO-OCCUPIED WESTERN SAHARA

According to the Times of Israel piece, during his announcement of the administration’s decision to establish the new position, Secretary of State Anthony Blinken said, “Israel’s further integration in the region contributes to a more stable, a more secure and more prosperous region. That’s why President Biden has made it a cornerstone of his Middle East policy.”

“We will soon create a new position to further our diplomacy and engagement with governments and private sector, nongovernmental organizations, all working toward a more peaceful and a more connected region,” he added.

THE SAUDI CARD

Those who had expectations that the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia would join the accords suffered a blow when instead of opening an embassy in Tel-Aviv, Riadh reopened its embassy in Tehran. For Israel and especially for Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, having Saudi Arabia capitulate and sign the Abraham Accords would be the greatest of rewards. According to a piece in the Jerusalem Post quoting one of the sponsors of the Bill, Representative Mike Lawler, Republican of New York, “The addition of a special envoy will be critical for bringing Saudi Arabia into the accords.”

The warming of the relations between Riyadh and Teheran was ostensibly a result of Chinese intervention. At the same time, the U.S. was busy with more important things, like passing anti-Palestinian legislation. Now Israel has got President Biden nominating and paying for a full-fledged ambassador to try to bring Saudi Arabia back to fold, as it were.

The question is, of course, what is in it for the Saudis? Apparently, they want nuclear power plants, which Israel and the U.S. will never allow, but Teheran might be able to help them develop. Israel is seriously undermining the Arab and Muslim custodianship of the Holy Basin, which includes the Al-Aqsa Mosque, in a manner so egregious that the Saudis can no longer ignore it.

Still, one must not lose hope because Congress passed a bill, and President Biden will nominate an envoy. So, for now, the legislative and the executive branches are following the marching order of every Palestinian-hating, apartheid-loving, warmongering, racist lobby working for Israel. The two branches of the United States government are in sync as they serve Israel.

The Greater Eurasia project: Building bridges and breaking barriers

June 22 2023

Photo Credit: The Cradle

If you’re counting on Asia’s many new power centers to compete and clash – don’t. The Greater Eurasia Partnership is set to integrate them all – from the SCO, EAEU, and BRICS, to emerging new currencies – in order to replace the ‘rules-based order.’

By Pepe Escobar

On July 4, at a New Delhi summit, Iran will finally become a full member of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO).

That will be one of the key decisions of the summit, held via video-conference, along with the signing of a memorandum on the path by Belarus to also become a member state.

In parallel, Russian Deputy Prime Minister Alexei Overchuk has confirmed that Iran and the Russian-led Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU) should sign a free trade agreement (FTA) by the end of 2023.

The FTA will expand an interim deal that already lowers customs duties on hundreds of categories of goods.

Russia and Iran – two key poles of Eurasia integration – have been getting closer and closer geoeconomically since the west’s sanctions tsunami that followed Russia’s February 2022 Special Military Operation (SMO) in Ukraine.

The EAEU – as much as the SCO and BRICS – is on a roll: FTAs are expected to be clinched, from middle to long term, with Egypt, India, Indonesia, and the UAE.

Overchuck admits negotiations may be “very difficult” and “take years,” considering “the interests of all five EAEU member states, their businesses, and their consumers.” Yet despite the obvious complexities, this high-speed rail geoeconomic train has already left the station.

This way for a SWIFT exit

In a parallel track, the members of the Asian Clearing Union (ACU), during a recent summit in Iran, decided to launch a new cross-border financial messaging system this month as a rival to the western-centric SWIFT.

The ACU comprises the Central Banks of India, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Bhutan, Maldives, Nepal, Sri Lanka, Myanmar, and Iran: a healthy mix of West Asia, Southeast Asia, and South Asia.

It was the Central Bank of Iran – still under harsh sanctions – that developed the new bank messaging system, so new it’s not yet known by its own acronym.

Crucially, the Governor of Russia’s Central Bank took part in the ACU summit as an observer, along with officials from Belarus, which applied for ACU membership two weeks ago.

Iranian Central Bank Governor Mohammad Reza Farzin confirmed not only the interest of potential members to join the ACU, but also the drive to set up a basket of currencies for payment of bilateral trade deals. Call it a de-dollarization fast track.

As Iran’s first Vice President, Mohammad Mokhber summed it up: “De-dollarization is not a voluntary choice by countries anymore; it is an inevitable response to the weaponization of the dollar.”

Iran is now at the heart of all things multipolar. The recent discovery of a massive lithium field holding roughly 10 percent of the world’s reserves, coupled with the quite possible admission of Iran into the expanded BRICS – or BRICS+ – as early as this year, has bolstered scenarios of an upcoming BRICS currency backed by commodities: gold, oil, gas and – inevitably – lithium.

All this frantic Global South-led activity stands in sharp contrast to the sputtering deceleration of the Empire of Sanctions.

The Global South has had enough of the US sanctioning and banning whoever, whatever, and whenever they like, in defense of a hazy, arbitrary “rules-based international order.”

Yet exceptions are always made when the US itself badly needs to buy, for instance, Chinese rare earth and EV batteries. And while China continues to be harassed and threatened non-stop, Washington quietly urges it to continue to buy American corn and low-end chips from Micron.

This is what’s called “free and fair” trade in the US today.

The BRICS have other ideas to escape this vicious circle. Much will rely on an enhanced role for its New Development Bank (NDB), which comprises the five BRICS members as well as Bangladesh, the UAE, and Egypt. Uruguay will be joining soon, and the membership requests of Argentina, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and Zimbabwe have also been approved.

According to Brazil’s former head of state and current NDB President Dilma Rousseff, decisions on new members will officially be announced at the upcoming August BRICS summit in South Africa.

Meanwhile, in Astana, Kazakhstan, the 20^th round of the interminable Syrian peace process took place, congregating the foreign vice-ministers of Russia, Syria, Turkey, and Iran.

That should be the defining step in a “normalization road map” proposed by Moscow last month to finally regulate the role of the Turkish Army operating inside Syrian territory. Russian Foreign Vice-Minister Mikhail Bogdanov once again confirmed that the US is going all out to prevent a normalization between Damascus and Ankara – by supporting oil-stealing Kurdish militias in northern Syria.

A “broad integrative configuration”

All interlinked developments concerning SCO, BRICS, EAEU, and other multilateral mechanisms – now happening at breakneck speed – are converging in practice into a concept formulated in Russia back in 2018: the Greater Eurasia Partnership.

And who better to define it than Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov: “Our flagship foreign political project is to [build] support for the concept of the Greater Eurasian Partnership. What we’re talking about is facilitating the objective process of forming a broad integrative configuration that is open for all countries and associations across our vast continent.”

As Lavrov routinely explains now in all of his important meetings, this includes “interlinking the complementary development plans” of the EAEU and China’s BRI; expanding interaction “within the framework of the SCO with the involvement of SCO observer states and dialogue partners;” “strengthening the strategic partnership” between Russia and ASEAN; and “establishing working contacts” among the executive bodies of the EAEU, SCO, and ASEAN.

Add to it the crucial interaction between the upcoming BRICS+ and all of the above; literally, everybody and their neighbor all across the Global South is queuing up to enter Club BRICS.

Lavrov envisions a “mutually beneficial, interlinking infrastructure” and a “continent-wide architecture of peace, development, and cooperation throughout Greater Eurasia.” And that ought to be expanded to the whole Global South.

It will help to have other brand new institutions jumping in. That’s the case of a new Russian think tank, the Geopolitical Observatory for Russia’s Key Issues (GORKI), to be led by Former Austrian Foreign Minister Karin Kneissl, and set as a division of St. Petersburg State University focusing on West Asia studies and energy issues.

All of these interpolations were discussed in detail during the St. Petersburg forum last week.

One of the key themes in that spectacularly successful Global South-oriented forum was, of course, the reindustrialization and reorientation of Russia’s export-import channels away from Europe and toward Asia, Africa, and Latin America.

The UAE had a strong presence in St. Petersburg, pointing to a West Asia emphasis, where Russia’s geoeconomic future is increasingly developing. The scope and breadth of Global South-led discussions only underlined how the self-marginalized collective west has alienated the Global Majority, perhaps irretrievably.

On Vladimir Solovyov’s immensely popular political talk show, Russian film director Karen Shakhnazarov may have found the best way to succinctly formulate such a complex process as the Greater Eurasia Partnership.

He said that Russia is now reassuming the role of global champion of a new world order that the Soviet Union held at the start of the 1920s. In such context, the rage and uncontrolled Russophobia by the collective west is just plain impotence: howling the frustration of having “lost” Russia, when it would have been a no-brainer to keep it on its side.

The views expressed in this article do not necessarily reflect those of The Cradle.

The US plan to counter China and Iran in West Asia

June 08 2023

Source

Photo Credit: The Cradle

The US recognizes China’s influence and Iran’s dominance in West Asia, but its sluggish and ineffective responses not only hamper Washington’s ability to counterbalance the eastward shift but also inflicts damage on its dwindling reputation as a trusted partner.

Mohammad Hasan Sweidan

In his keynote address on 4 May at a seminar organized by the Center for Near Eastern Studies in America, Jake Sullivan, the US National Security Adviser, shed light on Washington’s strategy towards the West Asia region.

Sullivan emphasized that the driving force behind US foreign policy in the foreseeable future, as articulated by President Joe Biden, is the intense competition for global influence among international powers – one that will shape the trajectory of US foreign policy for decades to come.

On the international stage, the US acknowledges China as its primary strategic rival. However, in the context of West Asia, the US maintains that Iran represents the most prominent threat to its interests in the region.

Iran, after all, has its own “Look to the East” strategy, involving enhanced ties across multiple fields with Russia and China. Amidst this deepening interconnectivity across Eurasia, the region is fast transforming into a hub for vital economic and geopolitical initiatives, placing mounting pressure on a Washington excluded from the party.

So, how exactly will the US navigate and respond to this multifaceted challenge in West Asia?

A five-point strategic approach

During his speech, Sullivan outlined the US’s strategic approach towards West Asia, highlighting five key points. First, is the forging of partnerships to strengthen Washington’s collaboration with regional states and foster closer ties.

But why this need when the US already has strong relations in the region? As the final report of the Munich Security Conference held in February stresses:

“The United States and Europe will have to rethink their approaches to development cooperation with countries in the Global South. They need to make their development models more attractive, as China offers an alternative model based on a narrative of solidarity and mutual benefits.”

Second, is the importance of securing deterrence, underscoring the need to deter threats and safeguard US interests; third, is prioritizing diplomatic options and de-escalation with the primary focus of countering Beijing. Sullivan’s fourth point concerns regional integration, and is most pertinent to this article:

“A more integrated, interconnected Middle East [West Asia] empowers our allies and partners, advances regional peace and prosperity, and reduces the resource demands on the United States in this region over the long term without sacrificing our fundamental interests or our involvement in the region.”

The fifth and final point revolves around the mandatory, yet selective, commitment to democratic values and human rights.

These five points illustrate Washington’s interest in recalibrating its West Asian strategies to align with its global challenges – not just the rise of major competitors, but equally, the collapse of the US-led order. A prime example following the Ukraine conflict, was the widespread resistance from the Global South to participate in western sanctions against Moscow.

Alarm bells rang across the Atlantic when that happened. Not only did these countries reject the sanctions demand, but they moved to strengthen their respective relations with China and Russia, pursuing diverse objectives while capitalizing on the growing competition between Washington, Beijing, and Moscow.

Disrupting China’s BRI with an American I2U2

The urgency to counter its competitors in West Asia has led to a US-led infrastructure initiative, which aims to establish a network of railways to connect Arab states (without traversing Iran) and to link Persian Gulf states to India’s ports.

The concept for this adventurous project was initially introduced during talks at the I2U2 forum last year, comprising the US, Israel, UAE, and India, whose focus was strategic infrastructure projects in West Asia. One notable proposal put forward by Israel at the meeting was the establishment of railways connecting the region.

Since its establishment in 2021, the forum’s objective has been to enhance India’s foothold in West Asia as a counterweight to China, as well as to promote economic normalization between Arab states and Israel.

If Washington’s inclusion of India in its grand plans is meant to rattle China’s West Asian designs, it may have already failed at the first hurdle. India is a principal partner in the International North South Transportation Corridor (INSTC), along with Iran and Russia, a project that is already operational, continues to expand, and is comfortably synergistic with China’s multi-trillion dollar Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) that seeks to connect entire continents.

Chart showing when West Asian and African states joined the Belt and Road Initiative

In early May, Sullivan visited Riyadh, where he held meetings with Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman (MbS), UAE National Security Adviser Tahnoun bin Zayed Al-Nahyan, and Indian National Security Adviser Ajit Duval.

The discussions aimed to advance the shared goal of creating a more secure, prosperous, and interconnected region, with a particular focus on the West Asian rail connectivity project and India’s involvement in it.

Washington realizes that to effectively counter China, it will need to provide regional states with competitive economic incentives and offer cooperation based on mutual benefit, not US diktats. Although this is an urgent foreign policy priority, the US is also aware that time is not on its side, given Beijing’s significant lead with the Belt and Road Initiative, in which West Asia plays a crucial role.

Therefore, to counter China’s influence, Washington is proposing a parallel project in the region, one that also involves connecting with the other Asian economic powerhouse capable of implementing it – India.

But is that altogether true? China, arguably, has the best infrastructure outside the developed world, whereas India still grapples with often highly-unsafe domestic transportation networks. Importantly, New Delhi remains excluded from some of Asia’s most important trade agreements, such as the western-led Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) and the Chinese-led Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP).

Consequently, having failed to prevent regional states from jumping on Beijing’s bandwagon, the US has belatedly begun to dangle half-baked competing projects to draw their interest.

Iran’s ‘Railway of Resistance’

But China’s continental infrastructure labyrinth is not Washington’s only regional obstacle. In the realm of West Asian competition, the proposed US project also finds itself pitted against Iran’s long-standing infrastructure endeavors.

The Iranians have been diligently working to connect the port of Imam Khomeini on the Persian Gulf, situated in Iran’s Khuzestan province, to Iraq, the Albu Kamal crossing on the Syrian border, and ultimately to the Mediterranean port of Latakia.

Tehran’s ambitious project, if realized, will attract the interest of various regional countries, with Saudi Arabia at the forefront due to its significant economic benefits and recent Chinese-brokered rapprochement.

In order to counter a project that would connect Iran in the Persian Gulf to the Mediterranean Sea that traverses four strategic West Asian states, Washington needed to introduce a parallel initiative, which had the potential to connect allied regional states through an alternative route.

Although Israel was not represented at the meeting in Riyadh to discuss the project, it was originally an Israeli proposal, and normalization with the kingdom remains an implicit yet clear objective. Economic connectivity between nations raises the costs of tensions and encourages the development of relations to safeguard shared economic interests. US sources have also affirmed that Israel’s absence from the project does not signify its exclusion in the future.

Ultimately, the project aims to prevent Iran from translating its military triumphs into economic ventures that bolster the growth of the countries and entities in the Axis of Resistance.

The Iran-Iraq and Syria railway linkage project constitutes a step towards connecting the allied nations and aligns with their economic aspirations. As such, for Washington, it becomes imperative to put forth projects that mitigate the region’s economic reliance beyond its sphere of influence, thus averting the consolidation of economic dependence.

Unreliable States of America

Past experiences demonstrate that relying on cooperation with projects proposed or sponsored by Washington usually proves to be futile. The examples are rife: despite signing the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) in 2016 – a proposed trade agreement between the US and 11 other Pacific Rim countries – the US withdrew from the deal in January 2017 and did not ratify it.

Similarly, negotiations on the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) between the US and the EU, initiated in 2013, remain unresolved.

More recently, although the US proposed a plan to transfer Egyptian gas and Jordanian electricity, via Syria, to energy-deficient Lebanon, Washington has become the project’s biggest obstacle, still refusing to approve sanctions waivers necessary for the flows to begin.

The US not only withdraws from economic projects but also reneges on initiatives that no longer serve its geopolitical interests. For example, despite Turkiye’s payment of $1.4 billion for F-35 fighter jets, Washington halted delivery when Ankara purchased S-400 missiles from Russia – without offering any compensation for the payments.

The US’ inconsistencies in the realm of economics and trade have not gone unnoticed and highlight a fundamental distinction between Beijing and Washington: while the former operates on the principle of cooperation for mutual benefit, the latter imparts “lessons” on the unreliability of keeping promises.

This diminishing trust in the US has also affected its diplomatic reputation. After decades of its one-sided policy on the Israel-Palestine issue, a poll conducted by YouGov in May found that most Palestinians favor mediation by Russia and China in potential negotiations with Israel, while 60 percent of respondents also said they did not trust the US to mediate in the conflict with the occupation state. 

Cooperation trumps capitulation

Undoubtedly, China has skillfully outmaneuvered the US by advancing its global economic initiatives on the basis of mutual interest and benefit. In doing so, China has emerged as a formidable obstacle to western influence worldwide, challenging the western paradigm of “donor-receiver” with its own principle of “mutual benefit.”

West Asian nations increasingly view China as a robust economic partner. In parallel, Beijing has dramatically enhanced its diplomatic profile in the region, achieving notable success in its recent brokering of the Saudi-Iranian reconciliation deal.

With the unipolar era in fast decline – and “running out of time” – it is unlikely the US can sufficiently alter its modus operandi and entrenched foreign policy habits to accommodate the growing demands of states keen to advance their own interests. Certainly not without offering compelling incentives, massive financial investment, and rock-solid follow through. More likely than not, West Asia will continue to partner with nations that can deliver, and do not disturb their own national interests.

Saudi-Russian concord is the secret behind OPEC+

June 07 2023

Behind the raft of OPEC+ production decisions riling the collective west lies a tight Russian-Saudi strategy and enhanced Russian-Iranian energy cooperation.

Photo Credit: The Cradle

By MK Bhadrakumar

A curious thing happened in Vienna on Sunday just as the 35th Ministerial Meeting of OPEC+ was about to start at its headquarters. Three princely western news organizations – Bloomberg, Reuters, and the Wall Street Journal – were barred from entering the OPEC premises. When asked about it, pat came the reply: “This is our house.” 

Indeed, OPEC officials were left with no option other than an unorthodox way of “mood setting,” given their heightened sensitivity about the wild stories disseminated in the western media about disagreements between Saudi Arabia and Russia, the two high flyers in OPEC+. 

To be sure, OPEC+ touches raw nerves in Washington even seven years after the group took shape as the brainwave of Russian President Vladimir Putin and Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman (MbS). The two leaders intended that they would have more control over the global crude oil market. The impetus to realism on the part of Moscow and Riyadh has only grown since 2016, and will crystalize further after the US-led G7 inserted itself into rule making in the world oil market last year, threatening to fragment the entire ecosystem. 

Saudi Arabia’s BRICS aspirations

Neither Russia nor Saudi Arabia can afford a break-up of OPEC+. In fact, had there been no OPEC+ today, there would be an urgent need to create one, as both Moscow and Riyadh have, in different ways, come under US pressure on account of their global pre-eminence as energy producers. 

Their potential to be key players in the emerging multipolar world is giving Washington the jitters. Saudi Arabia has formally applied for BRICS membership and sought to join the New Development Bank, the multilateral development bank established by the BRICS states and headquartered in Shanghai, China.

In fact, Saudi Foreign Minister Prince Faisal bin Farhan Al-Saud was present in Cape Town last week for the BRICS ministerial meeting. On the sidelines, Bin Farhan met Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov. The Russian readout underscored the depth and profundity of the current level of relations between the two counties. 

Saudi Arabia is tiptoeing toward BRICS at a historic juncture when the group is reportedly all set to create its own currency at its forthcoming summit in Durban, South Africa. This, of course, will be a calamitous development for the petrodollar – the pillar of the western banking system – and holds the potential to create a new global oil market. 

Russia-Iran oil cooperation

To digress a bit, on 18 May, Russia and Iran signed 10 documents for cooperation in the oil industry, comprising six memorandums of understanding, two contracts, one agreement, and a roadmap related to bilateral cooperation in the fields of industry, transfer of technology, and oil recovery enhancement.

These agreements allow Russia (together with China in separate agreements) to have its companies present in any oil and gas field in Iran that Moscow chooses. Following the signing ceremony in Tehran, the visiting Russian Deputy Prime Minister Alexander Novak, who is also the co-chair of the Permanent Russian-Iranian Commission on Trade and Economic Cooperation, stated that the two countries held negotiations on banking interactions and using their national currencies in the bilateral transactions.

Quite obviously, Iran’s strategic ties with Russia is a spectre that haunts the administration of US President Joe Biden. In that context, Saudi Arabia’s gravitation toward BRICS adds to the angst in the western mind. It is hardly surprising that feverish US attempts are afoot to undermine OPEC+. 

Agreement on oil production cuts

No sooner than the OPEC+ ministerial at Vienna ended, Deputy PM Novak made clear that Russia and Saudi Arabia were in lockstep on the OPEC+ deals:

“No, there were no [Russian-Saudi] differences. We always find common solutions. For years, our agreements have been in force in the interests of the market, in the interests of the countries participating in the agreement, and in the interests of both exporters and producers. We always find common solutions with Saudi Arabia. Naturally, we always have preliminary discussions, but nevertheless we always reach concord.” 

In Moscow on Monday, Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov told reporters: “The Russian Federation is a member of the joint understanding (in Vienna). The OPEC+ format continues its work, there are common agreements that, of course, everyone will follow. Of course, this format retains its importance and its significance for ensuring stability in international energy markets.” 

The decisions taken by the OPEC+ ministerial after seven hours of talks amply bears out the Saudi-Russian “concord”: An agreement on pegging the 2024 baselines at 40.46 million barrels a day, against which the production cuts are to be measured; reduction of overall production targets from 2024 by a further 1.4 million bpd in total; the deep cut by Saudi Arabia to its output in July on top of a broader OPEC+ deal to limit supply into 2024 as the group seeks to boost flagging oil prices; Russia’s extension of its voluntary oil production cut by 500,000 barrels daily till end-December 2024, which will be calculated from the 2024 quota, which in turn has now been reduced to 9.828 million barrels a day as part of the deal. 

OPEC+ seeks ‘stability and market balance’

Novak told Russian TV on Sunday that OPEC Plus nations have taken “an important decision to extend the voluntary cuts announced by the countries from 1 May, 2023 in order to balance the market. This is 1.66 million barrels a day on top of what was announced last October … So, in aggregate terms, it is 3.66 million barrels undertaken by the OPEC+ countries to ensure stable market operation.” He continued: 

“The agreement is in force until the end of 2023, that is why we discussed the issue of its possible extension until the end of 2024 for quite a long time today. Two major decisions have been passed: first, to extend the existing agreement until the end of 2024, and, second, to extend throughout 2024 voluntary cuts by 1.66 million barrels a day starting 1st May undertaken by nine countries.” 

“This will make it possible to have long-term forecasts of the effect of our agreement for 18 months ahead. These are key decisions we discussed and passed today… Naturally, we have possibilities to adjust our decisions. If necessary, we will do so to ensure the market stability so that it is balanced and clear for investors, buyers, and exporters. For all market players.” 

Indeed, as the Saudis have sought, oil prices rose on Monday, with global benchmark Brent oil climbing toward $78 a barrel. On the whole, if there has been any “winner” in the OPEC+ talks on Sunday, it must be the UAE, which gets a boost to its production limit for next year at the expense of some African members who were asked to give up part of their unused quotas. 

The finely balanced OPEC+ decisions “to achieve and sustain a stable oil market, to provide long-term guidance for the market, in line with the successful approach of being precautious, proactive, and pre-emptive,” – to borrow from the OPEC press release on Sunday – have only been possible due to the trust and mutual confidence among the key players within the group, Russia and Saudi Arabia, in particular. 

The views expressed in this article do not necessarily reflect those of The Cradle.

Iran, Saudi Arabia, UAE, Oman to form joint naval force under China auspices: Report

Friday, 02 June 2023 10:37 PM  [ Last Update: Friday, 02 June 2023 10:37 PM ]

File photo of an Iranian destroyer in the Persian Gulf (Photo by Tasnim News Agency)

A Qatari website has reported that Iran, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, and Oman are to form a joint naval force under China’s auspices towards enhancing maritime security in the Persian Gulf.

Al-Jadid carried the report on Friday, saying China had already begun mediating negotiations among Tehran, Riyadh, and Abu Dhabi aimed at reinforcing maritime navigation’s safety in the strategic body of water.

Back in March, Beijing successfully mediated talks between Tehran and Riyadh that led to the Persian Gulf littoral states’ signing of a deal enabling the restoration of their diplomatic ties.

Iran, Saudi Arabia agree to resume relations, re-open embassies
Iran and Saudi Arabia agree in the Chinese capital of Beijing to restore their diplomatic relations seven years after they were severed over several issues.

According to observers, the Persian Gulf states’ consent to Beijing’s mediation in such sensitive matters serves to indicate China’s growing influence in the region as opposed to Washington’s waning clout.

Since the 1979 victory of Iran’s Islamic Revolution, the Islamic Republic has invariably opposed foreign meddling and presence in the region, asserting that the regional issues have to be addressed by the regional players themselves.

The latest instance of the opposition came last Friday when the commander of the Islamic Revolution Guards Corps (IRGC) Navy categorically dismissed the US military’s presence in the Persian Gulf under the pretext of securing the maritime region.

‘You are damn wrong to be in our region’: IRGC Navy chief warns US military
The commander of the IRGC Navy has categorically dismissed the US military’s presence in the Persian Gulf under the pretext of securing the strategic maritime region.

Rear Admiral Alireza Tangsiri said only Iran and other regional countries would ensure the security of the Persian Gulf and there was no need for the US and other countries to be present in the waterway. “If we back down against the enemy, it will definitely dominate us and we have no choice but to stand and resist, which is the path to the victory of our nation,” he said.

UAE quits US-led naval force

The UAE has, meanwhile, announced quitting a United States-led naval force.

On Wednesday, the website of the Emirati foreign ministry said Abu Dhabi had withdrawn from the Joint Maritime Forces that operate in the Red Sea and the Persian Gulf.

The ministry said the Emirates had decided to ditch the naval coalition following an extensive evaluation of its security needs.

Analysts say Abu Dhabi has chosen the withdrawal in line with its ambition to diversify its security relationships.

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Assad in Jeddah: Tangibly, what does this mean for Syria?

May 30 2023

Photo Credit: The Cradle

Arab reconciliation with Syria is a two-way street, with both sides seeking important concessions from each other. While all solutions can be found within a grand regional compromise, not all Arab states will be willing to challenge Washington’s red lines.

By Giorgio Cafiero

Twelve days after Syria regained its membership in the Arab League, Syrian President Bashar al-Assad addressed the pan-Arab body at its 19 May summit in Jeddah. This was Assad’s first Arab League meeting in 12 years. It was also his first visit to Saudi Arabia since October 2010, making the kingdom the third Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) member – after Oman and the UAE – to welcome him for an official visit this year.

His participation at the gathering was a watershed in Damascus’s return to the region’s diplomatic arena and a sign of a collective desire by most Arab governments, with the notable exception of Qatar, to reintegrate Syria into the fold and ends it isolation.

During Assad’s first speech at an Arab League summit since his country’s November 2011 suspension, he lambasted the west and said that “for Syria, its past, present, and future is Arabism.” The Syrian president called for an end to outside interference in Arab countries’ internal affairs. His address centered on the recognition of a new multipolar geopolitical order and highlighted Syria’s reconciliation with various regional governments.

“Today we have an opportunity in a world with several poles as a result of western dominance, which lacks principles, manners, friends, and partners.”

“This Arab League summit is a historic opportunity to address regional issues without foreign interference, which requires us to reposition in the world that is forming today in order for us to play an active role in it as we take advantage of the positive atmosphere following the reconciliations that preceded the summit today.”

Reasserting Arab independence

The Syrian president also told summit attendees that he hopes the event will mark “the beginning of a new phase of Arab action for solidarity among us, for peace in our region, development, and prosperity instead of war and destruction.”

Commenting on Assad’s address, Dr. Joseph A Kechichian, a senior fellow at the King Faisal Centre in Riyadh, tells The Cradle:

“It was ironic that Syrian President Bashar Assad thanked Saudi Arabia for promoting the reconciliation in the region… Still, much of what was discussed in public at Jeddah was superficial, although one assumed that far more substantial conversations occurred behind closed doors.

While embracing his fellow Arabs, Assad lashed out at Turkiye and Israel during his address. Despite Damascus and Ankara’s gradual movement toward reconciliation under Russian auspices, the Syrian president condemned Turkiye’s military deployment into northern Syria and its sponsorship of various anti-government militias.

By citing the “danger of expansionist Ottoman thought” and the Muslim Brotherhood, Assad likely resonated with some attendees whose governments share Syria’s view of the Brotherhood as a terrorist organization. He also declared that “there are many issues for which there are not enough words or summits, including the crimes of the Zionist entity [Israel]… against the resisting Palestinians.”

While Assad’s speech carried significant rhetoric and symbolism, the question remains whether Syria’s regained Arab League membership and its warm welcome in Saudi Arabia will deliver the tangible changes the country desperately needs.

Here are five of the most pressing issues facing Syria today, each of which can be solved inter-regionally, if western pressures are held at bay:

Sanctions circumvention

First, with Washington doubling down on its Caesar Act, Damascus will be looking to find Arab partner states to help circumvent or undermine these sanctions, and devise tactics to do so. Thus far, the US’s crippling sanctions on Syria have deterred the wealthier GCC states from investing in the country’s reconstruction and redevelopment.

Camille Otrakji, a Damascus-born, Montreal-based Syria specialist, tells The Cradle that, presently, “Arab states find themselves benefiting from the temporary [sanctions] respite provided by the 180-day general license issued by the Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC)” in response to the devastating 6 February earthquake.

“Additionally, these states have forged an understanding with the Biden administration, recognizing that engagement with Syria can yield mutually advantageous outcomes…Nevertheless, there exist indirect avenues through which the Arabs can extend support to the Syrian government without transgressing the boundaries of existing sanctions.”

The Syrian leadership is trying to loosen the US sanctions noose with help from fellow Arab League members, particularly those such as the UAE which have considerable clout in Washington. Arab states also have options for doing business with Syria in ways that could escape the US Treasury Department’s radar – in local currencies, for instance.

These include going through the Russians and Iranians or “construct[ing] barter-like relationships and buy[ing] into long-term shares of things that are constructed in the form of direct transfers of regional currencies,” as Dr. Hussein Ibish, a senior resident scholar at the Arab Gulf States Institute in Washington, DC, recently told CNN.

Regardless of how US President Joe Biden or his eventual successor approach Syria and the Caesar Act, officials in Damascus may conclude that time is on their side, even if patience is necessary. The Syrian government is banking on a new, less west-centric, and more multipolar world order emerging over the next few years.

As Otrakji tells The Cradle, “President Assad, during his address at the Arab summit, articulated Syria’s strategy as one of patient waiting, capitalizing on opportunities while the United States grapples with a diminishing hold on global affairs.”

Indeed, as the world moves toward de-dollarization, US sanctions will have less of an impact everywhere. Influential Arab capitals like Abu Dhabi and Riyadh, now openly engaging and transacting with US-sanctioned Russia, Iran, and China – may be less deterred from doing business with Syria. Others more aligned with or dependent on Washington may be hesitant to do so, which is why Damascus may be hoping for the Saudis and Emiratis to first blaze that path.

Iran’s role

Second, Arab governments eager to bring Syria back to the Arab League may try to leverage these relations to reduce Iran’s role in the war-torn country. For now, according to Arab League Assistant Secretary General Hossam Zaki, the institution’s members “put aside” their demand that Iranian forces withdraw from Syria.

If true, this would be a major concession on the part of GCC states – one that would add to Tehran’s sense of confidence in the region following the 10 March diplomatic agreement with Saudi Arabia that eased the Islamic Republic’s regional isolation.

It is fairly certain that Arab states will continue trying to leverage their reengagement with Damascus in ways aimed at reducing Syria’s strategic dependence on Iran, regardless of whether this is realistic or not. But many experts are doubtful about Saudi Arabia and other GCC/Arab states succeeding on this front.

“History matters,” explains Dr. Marina Calculli, a Columbia University research fellow in the Department of Middle Eastern, South Asian and African Studies, to The Cradle.

“The alliance between Syria and Iran has an ideological origin. It is grounded in the conviction that Syria and Iran do not have the space they deserve in the international order. Internal opposition to this alliance within the Assad [government] has been obliterated. It is unlikely that Syria will trade its alliance with Iran for some business investments lightly.”

The Captagon trade

Third, is a regional desire to stem the illicit Captagon trade, which Washington and others have largely attributed to Syria and its government. Although Assad did not address this topic in his 19 May Jeddah speech, it is an important agenda item for Arab states flooded with the illicit “war drug.”

The hope is that reestablishing relations with Damascus can mobilize the Assad government to target drug trafficking. With the country still under heavy US sanctions, including the CAPTAGON Act, trade in the highly-addictive amphetamine provides Syrian and other regional dealers with billions in revenue each year.

The Caesar Act has not worked: impoverishing Syria further inhibits access to financial resources that can target the drug trade. Regardless, Iraq and Jordan have reportedly agreed to cooperate with Syria’s government in tackling the Captagon trade across their borders. Whether Damascus’s cooperation on this front has just been about optics and short-term political calculations or reflects a genuine desire to work with other regional states on the issue is unclear.

“Captagon is Assad’s golden card, its strategic asset in the normalization game. He would be willing to take down the Captagon trade only in exchange for meaningful restoration of economic relations with Arab countries and beyond,” argues Dr. Calculli.

The illegal US occupation

Fourth, is the glaring issue of the illegal US military presence in northeastern Syria. Damascus has consistently called on US forces to leave the country, and now Assad’s government is obtaining stronger support from other Arab states – along with Russia, Iran, and China – when making this demand.

In early May, Egyptian, Iraqi, Jordanian, and Saudi officials met with their Syrian counterparts and expressed their collective desire to see Assad’s government take full territorial control of Syria. Whether these US-friendly Arab states supporting the Syrian government’s position on the US occupation of Syria will have any effect on Washington’s policies remains an open question.

Yet, some experts doubt that the Syria’s return to the Arab League will impact the US military presence in Syria where American troops persistently exploit the country’s natural resources. Fatima Alghool, a Damascus-based Syrian journalist, believes what will matter most for the future of the US occupation of Syrian land is the outcome of the 2024 presidential election. She explained to The Cradle that there are two likely scenarios whereby the US military would retreat from Syria:

“The first is an agreement with Damascus, which is unlikely in the foreseeable future. The second is the repetition of the Iraqi scenario, and the withdrawal of the American forces due to the high costs they pay, whether financially or morally.”

Syrian refugee crisis

Fifth, is the conundrum over what to do with more than 5.5 million externally displaced Syrian refugees in the region. As underscored by the way the Syrian refugee issue played out in this month’s Turkish elections, those countries hosting millions of displaced Syrians since 2011 have had to deal with extreme economic challenges in doing so. Today, there is much pressure on these governments to push ahead with plans to repatriate Syrian refugees.

Within the context of normalization talks, Jordanian officials have emphasized the need to bolster the Syrian economy and issue amnesty for refugees – many of whom distrust Assad’s government – so that they are assured of safety and a home to return to. But given the stark reality of economic conditions and political dynamics in Syria, the proposals will require a lot more planning, investment, and wrangling of guarantees than currently exists.

Alghool tells The Cradle that while Lebanon, Jordan, and Turkiye are pushing for repatriation, “Damascus always links the return of refugees to reconstruction as a precondition for their return, arguing that these refugees must find homes to live in.” But how to do this without lifting or bypassing western sanctions aimed at Syria’s reconstruction sector?

“The Saudi vision in this regard coincides with the vision of Damascus, which links the return of refugees to securing the necessary infrastructure and improving living conditions in Syria, indicating Saudi intentions to contribute to the reconstruction of Syria,” she adds.

A Republican win in the next US elections may pave the way forward, suggests Alghool. She points to the “good relationship” between the GOP and the Gulf states, especially Saudi Arabia, and says Riyadh can apply certain pressures on a Republican president to ease up on Syria “and ensure that Washington will not oppose it.”

Concessions, rehabilitation, and rivalries

Today, most Arab states regard Syria in ways that starkly diverge from Washington’s goal of isolating and sanctioning Damascus into collapse.

There does remain a divide in how far these states may be willing to proceed with Syria. Arab League members like Egypt and Jordan are taking very incremental steps forward, trying to wrest concessions from Damascus for each move along the normalization path. Others like Tunisia and the UAE, on the other hand, seem to demand nothing from Assad’s government in exchange for reconciliation.

There are yet others, such as regional mediator Oman, which never split with Damascus even when the Sultanate’s fellow GCC members did. It comes as no surprise then that Muscat, “the city of secret negotiations,” has recently hosted direct “secret talks” between Syrian and US officials to discuss a variety of pressing issues.

Following Assad’s speech in Jeddah, the Syrian government feels emboldened and will try to push for further reintegration into the Arab world’s diplomatic fold while making as few concessions as possible.

But things are moving quickly in both regional and global geopolitics. How the different Arab League members choose to engage Damascus and how their own rivalries play out in relation to Assad’s government – and western pressure on Syria – will become clearer this year and next.

The views expressed in this article do not necessarily reflect those of The Cradle.

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China’s Peace in West Asia

May 18, 2023

Source: Al Mayadeen English

By Janna Kadri 

The Chinese-brokered agreement emerged in retaliation to the US as the latter continues to wage a series of provocations aimed at destabilizing China’s domestic stability with regard to Taiwan.

Under the auspices of China, Iran and Saudi Arabia agreed to restore diplomatic relations on March 10. At the time of the deal’s announcement, US President Joe Biden said better relations between “Israel” and their Arab neighbors are better for everybody rather than relations with Iran. Better for “everybody” depends on what is meant for everybody. If it means the US financial classes and their Arab and Zionist comprador in the region, then Biden is spot on. However, for the masses of the Arab World that experience declining living standards, whether by peace or war, the US-Israeli aggression against them will not stop. What must be understood is that the aggression is necessary for Western wealth-making because it extracts regional resources, which should otherwise better Arab social conditions, and ships them to US-European markets in order to feed exponential growth and profits.

Moreover, the aggression, whether military or ideological, is itself an industry in its own right, which fuels wealth accumulation. At a first-principle level, the policies that dominate the air-waves, all aim to foment wars. To extoll the virtues of the market, erect a cultural identity that aborts the potential of labor as a historical agent, and push down the throat of indebted states policies of privatization and private property, leaves little resources for the peoples of the region and delivers them into inter-communal strife. The case of Sudan is one such blatant example. The wars visited upon the Arabs drive away their resources and are therefore a must for the global financial class.

However, capital or the principal social relation governing the remaking of the global order is a two-pronged process. At first, capital is of the same class fabric, and it initially aims at oppressing workers everywhere. This capital against labor is a first contradiction. A second but not secondary contradiction is the inter-capitalist competition for power, which determines the shares of the various circles of capital. For instance, the US sits atop the capital pyramid and receives a fallout in rent depending on its power standing. It would not want lower suzerains to catch more of the rents. It sometimes sacrifices its bourgeois allies to grab their shares. Saudi Arabia was one such candidate readied to be sacrificed along with some sections of its ruling class.

With the rise of China, the global balance of forces shifted, and bourgeois classes disgruntled with the US’s avarice for rents saw a window of opportunity to save themselves. After years of war with Yemen at the behest of empire to secure the Mandeb straits, it was left weakened and alone. Sensing the danger of bourgeois fratricide, the Saudis intelligently decided to maneuver into a position backed by Chinese guarantees of security. China builds capacity and détente abroad, which are measures anathema to US imperialism whose goal is to destabilize in order to snatch resources.

For the US, War Masquerades as Peace

In efforts to normalize relations between “Israel” and the Arab world, the US brokered a series of agreements called The Abraham Accords. They propose a strategy of forging alliances with “Israel” to counterbalance the Axis of Resistance. They base the rationale for joining Arab and Israeli forces on an alleged Iranian threat. Already, these Arab ruling classes were extensions of and under the purview of the US-Israeli ruling classes. Their coming out is nothing less than a sign of weakness to reposition forces around a strengthening Axis of resistance.

These Abrahamic shenanigans provide new venues for class allies to enhance their own aggressive capabilities through the purchase of arms from “Israel”. “Israel”, by the way, is the largest exporter of arms per capita in the world. So far, “Israel” normalizes with Oman, Bahrain, the UAE, Morocco and Sudan, in addition to the earlier trophies of peace, Jordan and Egypt. It shares an informal relation with Saudi Arabia and Doha. It for instance conducts diamond trade in Doha while Saudi Arabia has recently opened its airspace for Israeli commercial airplanes.

The so-called Abraham Accords are an unthinkable ‘promise’ for peace without Palestine and the right of return. They supposedly foster incremental developments with the GCC by precluding even the lowly option of a two-state solution which was endorsed by the Arab Peace Initiative (API). Saudi Arabia maintained that its position remains solely expressed through its commitment to the API, wherein normalization with “Israel” would only be conceivable once the conditions listed in the Arab-brokered initiative are fulfilled. But the fact that UAE, Sudan, Morocco, and Bahrain normalized their relations with “Israel” is indicative of consent by Saudi Arabia. As observed by Israeli writer Henrique Zimmerman, the signatories of the Accords “would not have signed the agreement without the approval of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, which is the most influential country in the Arab world.” So what would have really prevented an alliance between “Israel” and Saudi Arabia?

In a previous article, I showed how the US failed to fulfill its security commitments toward Saudi Arabia. Whereas Saudi Arabia has boosted the US status as a world hegemon by denominating its oil in dollars, the US has failed to stick to its side of the bargain by ensuring that the Saudi Kingdom has all its security needs, foremost its regime, or ruling class security answered. Fearing the tightening grip of the Axis of resistance around it, normalization with “Israel” went out of the window, while China provided the face-saving arrangement with Iran.  

An agreement “Made in China”

Unlike the US, China needs peace to expand. The Chinese-brokered agreement emerged in retaliation to the US as the latter continues to wage a series of provocations aimed at destabilizing China’s domestic stability with regard to Taiwan. It is retaliatory because it presents a strategic threat to US interests and its hegemonic influence across the Arab region. It is also retaliatory because it threatens to undermine the petrodollar system upon which the dollar supremacy is based on. Since the Saudi-Iran agreement went into effect, it is only fair to characterize the scale of the changes that ensued following its implementation as unprecedented. Very much like a drop of water falling into a puddle, the agreement rippled across the region, bearing fruits in Yemen and Syria.

First are the developments that ensued between Yemen and Saudi Arabia. For eight years Yemen endured a US-sponsored war that has claimed the lives of nearly half a million people. On April 9, Saudi officials met with high-ranking officials from the Sanaa government for peace negotiations, and on April 14, the International Committee of the Red Cross announced that a massive prisoner exchange operation had kicked off. On April 29, senior member of the Ansar Allah political bureau Ali Al-Qahoum admitted that China played a pivotal role in the negotiations for restoring regional peace and warding off Western hegemony. Some challenges however remain with regards to US and UK interference in pushing for another escalation. Yet a positive outlook persist as officials from both sides mobilize efforts for dialogue. 

Secondly, there has been the push to re-integrate Syria into the Arab League through the collective efforts of several Arab countries, including Saudi Arabia, which has in spearheaded the move. The US and the UK had on the other hand reaffirmed their commitment to remain opposed to the restoring of ties with Damascus but they would continue to work with Arab states that rekindle diplomatic relations.  

Thirdly, there has been news of Saudi Arabia expressing an interest in holding talks with Hezbollah. Saudi Arabia was largely a precursor for designating Hezbollah as a terror organization both at the GCC level as well as in the Arab League. With a shift in policy that appears to be more driven from the Saudi side than from Iran, prospects for political stability in Lebanon are also looming. But the fact remains that Lebanon is sickened with a sectarianism fueled by geopolitical rents that easily plays into the hand of “Israel” and the US.

Fourthly, prospects for normalization with Hamas are likewise on the horizon as talks were recently held between Hamas and Saudi officials. On April 16, the two parties had met in Riyadh to hold discussions on the release of Hamas-affiliated individuals detained in Saudi jails. There are also hopes for relations to improve between Saudi Arabia and Iraq’s movement for resistance, the Kataib Hezbollah.

Finally, whether the deal restores relations between Turkey and Syria is still up to discussion. However, chances are they might broach the issue considering that the project of restoring peace in Syria is part of the wider Iran-Saudi deal agenda. Yet the presence of US troops in Syria remains problematic for two reasons: the first, US troops are stationed in Syria for the sole purpose of toppling the government of Bashar al-Assad. To loot Syria’s oil resources in the north is simply means towards that end; and secondly, because Saudi Arabia’s institutions are closely tied to the US, while the latter holds much leverage inside the Kingdom. As a key regional player, Saudi Arabia could exert pressure to restore Ankara-Damascus relations, but it is unclear how able it is to do so. 

What now?                      

The US has been setback by the China-sponsored peace. Its “rules-based” world order hangs by a thread, while its dollar supremacy wanes. Doubtless, the blow was hard for Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu who just a month prior to the Iran-Saudi deal said that “Israel” and Saudi Arabia were planning to join forces on the basis of a common goal of stopping Iran. By more sober analysis, normalizing with “Israel” for any regime in the region is an act of suicide, unless the march of history eliminates the working classes as subject of history.

After all the Israeli-Arab war is a war of capital against labor. The principal lesson learnt so far is that regional peace is global-relations-derived peace. The saddest part of this is that Arab progressive forces still prioritize internal demands for higher working-class wages over struggles against imperialism. Without Arab national security, there is no working-class living security.  While the region’s future and much of the Third World will depend on how China unseats the US hegemon, the Arab vanguard is fast asleep.

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Iran-Saudi detente is a setback for Israel

May 17 2023

Source

The China-brokered Iran-Saudi deal marked a significant shift toward establishing Persian Gulf and regional stability, but is a major setback for Israelis who have cultivated Arab-Iranian divisions for years.

By Stasa Salacanin

The recent rapprochement between regional arch-rivals Saudi Arabia and Iran has added a new layer to the already complicated geopolitical landscape in West Asia, especially as the kingdom was once touted to be the next major Arab state to normalize relations with Israel.

Signed in March, the Chinese-brokered agreement, which reestablishes diplomatic relations and reopens embassies in Riyadh and Tehran after a seven-year hiatus, is seen by many as a watershed moment that could potentially reduce bilateral animosity and ease tensions throughout the region.

However, the deal has caused great dismay in Tel Aviv and caught Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu off guard.

It is understandable why Israel is disappointed, as the prioritization of the Abraham Accords has been a cornerstone of Israeli foreign policy in recent years. The accords, initially involving Israel, the UAE, and Bahrain in 2021, was a major foreign policy victory for Netanyahu and part of a broader strategy to isolate Iran in the region.

And normalizing relations with Saudi Arabia, the most influential Arab state today, would have solidified Israel’s ambition to establish diplomatic ties with its Arab neighbors and further enhance its diplomatic influence in West Asia.

Regional stability: A setback for Israel

Consequently, the Saudi-Iran deal is viewed by many observers as a setback to Israel’s ambitions, with some analysts even perceiving it as a diplomatic victory for the Iranians. Importantly, Riyadh’s resumption of diplomatic ties with Tehran has shifted perceptions across the Arab region, creating conditions that make the Saudis joining the Abraham Accords less likely than ever.

Equally, the resetting of relations does not necessarily mean that Iran and Saudi Arabia are putting their differences aside. As Professor Shahram Akbarzadeh of the Middle East Studies Forum at Deakin University, explains to The Cradle, “It does mean that both countries realize that escalation of tensions and the prospects of all-out conflict would be detrimental for both.”

He emphasizes that “diplomatic ties ensure viable lines of communication to ensure the cold war between the two remains on ice.”

Matteo Colombo, a researcher at Clingendael’s Conflict Research Unit, concurs, saying that a major indirect consequence of the shift in the Saudi-Iranian relationship is that regional conflicts are likely to become less violent than in previous years.

Uncertain impact on Saudi-Israeli ties

The impact of the Saudi-Iran detente on Saudi-Israeli ties remains uncertain. Russell Lucas, a professor of international relations and domestic politics and culture of the Middle East at the University of Michigan, believes that while Iran-Saudi normalization does not directly impact Saudi-Israeli relations, one should not expect dramatic moves between Tel Aviv and Riyadh who will maintain mostly discreet ties.

Akbarzadeh argues that expecting a normalization of relations between Israel and Saudi Arabia was always going to be a challenging prospect. He highlights the deep sense of injury among Muslims and Arabs due to Israel’s continued occupation of Palestinian lands:

“How could Saudi Arabia overlook this sense of injustice and join the so-called Abraham Accords? … such a move would have delivered a major setback to Saudi’s self-image projection as the global champion of Islam.”

Dr. Mehran Kamrava, a professor of government studies at Georgetown University in Qatar, views Israel’s friendship with certain Arab states as purely instrumentalist, driven by the need to contain threats such as Iran. “A simple review of Israeli policies clarifies that Israel is among the biggest contributing factors to regional insecurity and tensions,” he tells The Cradle.

Arab reluctance to normalize

In fact, any prospects of further rapprochement between Israel and other Arab states, particularly Saudi Arabia, are complicated under the current far-right Israeli government. This may lead countries that were previously considering normalizing their relations with Tel Aviv to reevaluate their decisions.

While countries that have already normalized relations with Israel are unlikely to reverse the process, they may “apply the brakes at any time” on their joint initiatives in certain sectors, such as military collaboration.

Both Lucas and Akbarzadeh agree that one of the key effects of the Saudi-Iran rapprochement is the reluctance of Riyadh and other Arab states to be drawn into a confrontation with Iran on behalf of Israel. According to Lucas:

“Public opinion in the [Persian] Gulf registering concern about Israel’s right-wing government’s treatment of the Palestinians and fear of escalation has reached leaders in states like Saudi Arabia and the UAE.”

Therefore, the current developments suggest that Saudi Arabia and other Persian Gulf states now hold more leverage in their negotiations with Israel as a result of Riyadh’s deal with Tehran, giving them more license to shape their future dealings with Tel Aviv.

Saudi intent matters

Not all views are as rosy, however. Last month, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu said in a CNBC interview that the agreement between Saudi Arabia and Iran has very “little to do with Israel,” claiming that Saudi Arabia, “has no illusions about who their adversaries are and who their friends are in [West Asia].”

Nader Hashemi, director of the Center for Middle East Studies at the University of Denver, tells The Cradle that Netanyahu is actually right when he talks about Saudi Arabia’s orientation:

“Riyadh’s foreign policy is much more aligned with Israel while the recent reduction of tensions between Iran and Saudi Arabia are to be very temporary – rooted in trying to reduce tensions so that Saudi Arabia can invest in its long term plan of trying to enhance economic development, attract tourists, more foreign investment, and to expand its new policy of modernization under Crown Prince Mohammad bin Salman (MbS).”

Hashemi thinks that “behind the scenes, the Saudi crown prince and Netanyahu both have similar visions for the future of the Middle East [West Asia] rooted in blocking regional democratization, trying to contain Iran, and influence/expand the Abraham Accords between Israel and various Arab states.”

Furthermore, he predicts that “if Donald Trump or the Republicans take the White House, Saudi Arabia’s relations with Iran will go back to the period of 2017 when Saudi Arabia was very much supportive of Trump’s hawkish policy towards Iran.”

Israel’s miscalculation

But Netanyahu’s understanding of the shifting sands in Persian Gulf states – and his claims that Israel is “an indispensable partner for the Arab world in achieving security, prosperity, and peace” – may be oversimplified.

Kamrava, for example, observes that for a long time, Arab and Israeli policies toward Tehran have been guided by the assumption that Iran can be effectively marginalized and excluded from regional security arrangements:

“But the actual experience has shown that such an assumption is indeed incorrect. In fact, efforts to marginalize or exclude Iran only lead to further reactions from Iran. It is for this reason that first the UAE, and now Saudi Arabia, have changed course and have decided to engage with Iran,” he notes.

Tehran, on the other hand, “has consistently shown that it responds positively not to threats but to constructive engagement,” says Kamrava. So, “if a change in Iranian foreign policy is what regional states are after, then talking to Tehran is the best way of achieving that, rather than working to overthrow the entire Islamic Republic system, which is what Israel is advocating,” he explains.

Others concur. Israel would be mistaken to assume that hostility towards Iran is the defining dynamic in the region, as it has been for a significant part of the last decade, argues Matteo Colombo. This, he adds, “makes it more challenging for Tel Aviv to advocate for normalizing diplomatic relations with other countries in the region to contain Iran.”

The China factor

Hashemi offers another hypothesis for Saudi Arabia’s overriding strategy in its rapprochement with Iran. He believes that Riyadh’s latest moves may be viewed as a message to Washington: “Give us what we want in terms of weapon sales and security guarantees and new strategic vision arrangement that Saudi Arabia is demanding from the US for long-term commitments.”

If the US does not provide these guarantees, says Hashemi, “then Saudi Arabia may symbolically break from the US policy and start to engage with some US adversaries, including China.”  He notes that these are very short calculations, as the Saudis are still closely engaged with the west.

But the Beijing-brokered Saudi-Iran detente has created great unease in Tel Aviv and Washington, where the deal is viewed as a loss of US diplomatic initiative and influence on the world stage.

While the agreement has received broad international support, generating optimism for its potential impact against the backdrop of rapidly developing multipolarity, uncertainties persist regarding its specific outcomes. There is a lack of information over of tangible incentives and guarantees from China in ensuring the deal’s success – even while there is confidence in the motivations and commitments of the parties involved.

In terms of impartial and honest mediation, China is regarded more favorably than the US due to its positive and established relationships with both Saudi Arabia and Iran, and its vested interests in maintaining peace and stability in the Persian Gulf, from which it derives much of its energy supplies.

Yemen warns Saudi Arabia against ‘procrastinating’ ending war

May 15 2023

(Photo credit: AFP)

The Yemeni official also lauded the resistance’s recent victory against Israel, and warned the coalition that Tel Aviv cannot protect it

ByNews Desk

During a march of solidarity with the Palestinian people on 14 May, a member of the Sanaa government’s Supreme Political Council, Muhammad Ali al-Houthi, accused the Saudi-led coalition of “procrastinating” with its recent promises to end the war and lift the blockade against Yemen.

Houthi said during the march that the Yemeni people must remain “vigilant and constantly prepared.”

“The enemy has so far been procrastinating in stopping the aggression and lifting the siege on Yemen,” he said.

In recent months, Saudi Arabia has been involved in Omani-mediated peace talks with the Ansarallah resistance movement, which have resulted in some progress, including a prisoner exchange, as well as agreements on an eventual lifting of the blockade against Hodeidah port and Sanaa International Airport.

Saudi Arabia has also agreed to pay the salaries of all government employees in the territories of the National Salvation Government (NSG) in Sanaa, among other things.

However, as obstruction of peace efforts by Washington and the UAE continue, Saudi Arabia’s newfound willingness to end the war has been overshadowed – and recently, the coalition has resumed its violations of efforts to solidify a truce by launching border attacks and shelling regions such as Saada province and other areas.

Meanwhile, Ansarallah has maintained its siege over the strategic southwestern province of Taiz.

“We see Saudi Arabia and the UAE today, broken in the face of Yemen … it sees the Iron Dome [in Israel] and how it failed to protect the Zionists. So how can they [the Zionists] protect the normalizing countries, now?” Houthi said, referencing the malfunctions in Israel’s Iron Dome defense system during recent rocket fire on the occupied territories in last week’s battle.

Ansarallah has repeatedly warned that if peace efforts fail, it is prepared for all out war against the coalition, and is ready to strike the depths of both Saudi Arabia and the UAE with missiles.

During the march, Houthi also renewed Ansarallah’s support for the Palestinian cause and resistance, and declared its readiness to confront Israel.

“We affirm, as the Yemeni people, our loyalty to Palestine …  we are present for actual and direct participation,” he added.

The Ansarallah movement is known to possess missiles that are capable of reaching Israel, including the Zulfiqar missile, which it has used against Saudi Arabia in the past.

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UAE welcomed Israeli military aid following 2022 Yemeni airstrikes: Report

May 10 2023

A partial view of Abu Dhabi’s Musaffah industrial district, the area that came under aerial attack by Yemeni missiles in April 2022. (Photo Credit: AFP)

ByNews Desk

Israel’s haste to aid its Arab partner came in stark contrast to the muted response of the US

The UAE received extensive security assistance from Israel in April 2022 following a series of missile and drone strikes deep inside Abu Dhabi launched by Yemen’s Ansarallah resistance movement.

According to an updated version of the book “Trump’s Peace” by Israeli journalist Barak Ravid, Tel Aviv sent a delegation of Mossad and army intelligence officials and transferred a shipment of batteries from the SPYDER air defense system to the UAE following the daring attacks that also rocked Saudi Arabia.

“We really appreciated it,” an Emirati official is quoted as having said in the book.

Tel Aviv’s haste to help its Arab ally came in stark contrast to the muted response of the US. This situation caused great discontent in Abu Dhabi and fueled ongoing tensions with President Joe Biden.

Ravid goes on to claim that former Israeli prime minister Naftali Bennett proposed developing a so-called “Middle East Air Defense Alliance (MEAD)” to Emirati leader Mohamed bin Zayed (MBZ) just months before the Ansarallah strikes.

This system would reportedly entail “a network of radars around the region that would operate under the umbrella of the US Central Command (CENTCOM).”

Abu Dhabi and Tel Aviv normalized ties in 2020 under US sponsorship. Since then, the two nations have significantly bolstered trade and defense cooperation.

The UAE has also helped shield Israel at the UN Security Council for its abuses against Palestinians and the illegal expansion of settlements in the occupied West Bank.

The two nations are also coordinating on the occupation of Yemen’s Socotra Archipelago in a bid to have joint military control of a strategic maritime area where at least 20,000 shipping vessels pass through this year.

‘Israel’ Anticipates “Black Days”: It’s About a Multi-Front War

 April 28, 2023

Illustrative photo displaying flags of movements within the Axis of Resistance.

Ali Haidar – Al-Akhbar Newspaper (April 21, 2023)

Translated by Al-Manar English Website staff

Day after another, the Israeli army becomes convinced by an old hypothesis that the Zionist entity will engage in a multi-front confrontation. The recent resistance operations extending from the north to the south, all the way to occupied Palestine interior- the latest of which could have rolled into a wide round of fighting- only weighed this hypothesis as well.

Meanwhile, the recent operations imposed a pressure on both the political and security institutions in the occupation regime, as it deepened the state of confusion within the Israeli leadership.

However, such Israeli estimations not only did begin with the outbreak of the last “rocketry round” in the third week of the holy month of Ramadan, but rather that the latter represented a modest translation of a scenario present by the occupation leadership years ago.

Perhaps the “Chariots of Fire” military exercise, which was scheduled for 2021 and was postponed till 2022 due to the “Seif Al-Quds” battle, indicated that this scenario had been on the table since before.

According to Israeli estimates, Iran has made significant strides in its plan to deploy missiles, drones and advanced weapons around the Zionist entity, turning the occupied territories from the north to the south into a real battlefield.

As a result, the enemy lives with an obsession that it will face a harsh confrontation that simultaneously includes Lebanon, Syria, Iraq and Yemen, all the way to the Gaza Strip and the West Bank, especially since it is expected, in this case, to be subjected to destruction on scales that it has not witnessed throughout its history.

These estimates raised the level of concerns in the Israeli regime living with a permanent state of fear over any conflict in the region.

And what makes the picture more bleak for ‘Israel’ is that the multi-front war scenario, with its military and strategic risks, comes at a time when the Zionist entity finds itself “drowned in the most serious internal crisis in its history, while its prime minister is Benjamin Netanyahu, who promised to put Iran at the top of his priorities, is busy trying to save himself from the court’s ruling, as the people are divided,” said Chuck Freilich, former deputy national security adviser, as reported by Yedioth Ahronoth (April 19,2023).

Freilich added, “Saudi Arabia and the UAE have restored their relations with Iran, and Egypt is on the way to do so, as the regional alliance that Israel sought to build is disintegrating, with Iran’s relations with China and Russia deepening, and the crisis in our relationship with the United States is deep,” to conclude that “all the strategy that Netanyahu built has collapsed.”

The battles on more than one front have ceased, but the messages behind Megiddo operation and the subsequent missile strikes from Lebanon, Syria and Gaza against ‘Israel’ are still echoed by assessment and decision-making bodies across the Zionist entity.

In depth, the enemy’s institutions view the security developments that have taken place in recent weeks as a new phase that is highly intertwined, complex, and completely different from what they are familiar with in the maneuvers that simulated such scenarios.

Perhaps what frightens ‘Israel’ in this stage is that if it decides to retaliate it will find itself engaged in a multi-front battle that it fears and has been trying to avoid, while if it refrains from doing so, it will have accepted the erosion of its deterrent power.

The Israeli Minister of Defense, Yoav Gallant, confirmed in a security assessment session (on April 20) that ‘Israel’ is “at the end of the era of limited confrontations,” and that it is thus entering “a new security era that poses a real threat in all arenas at the same time.”

Israeli Defense Minister Yoav Gallant

Gallant remarks reflect a shift in the conscious of the Israeli security institution and anticipate the Israeli decision makers’ cautious behavior towards its options in a bid to avoid a dangerous scenario that is seen by the Israelis as the “Day of Resurrection”.

The Israeli DM summed up this shift by the Israeli military establishment, and behind it the political establishment as well, by saying: “We have worked for years to assume that we can engage in limited conflicts, but this phenomenon is disappearing. Today there is a clear phenomenon, which is the united fronts.”

Gallant also expressed that Iran is the “driving force” for this phenomenon by providing “resources, ideology, knowledge and training for its proxies,” adding that the increasing dependence of all these powers on Iran prompts the Islamic Republic to “defy Israel.”

On the other hand, Hezbollah Secretary General Sayyed Hasan Nasrallah was clear in his recent speech on the occasion of “International Al-Quds Day” (April 14), where he warned the enemy against relying on a policy that aims at engaging in a single battle based on the assessment that the people of the region do not want a war.

“This is a dangerous game,” Sayyed Nasrallah said, warning that the occupation’s calculations may drag the region into an all-out war, which will necessarily be multi-fronts.

For its part, the Israeli cabinet held a session on the threat emanating from Lebanon and Syria. Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu deliberately coincided the session with the “Holocaust” anniversary, and “in the presence of all the security leadership in ‘Israel’, with the aim of sending a message of strength”, according to the Hebrew “Kan” channel.

Other reports stated that the session discussed the scenario of escalation on the northern front, as a result of a possible escalation in Gaza, according to the estimates of the Israeli security and military establishments.

As a result, the Israeli stances, as well as the political performance, reveal that the Zionist regime deals with all seriousness with the fact that the region has entered a new phase, with which the hypothesis of the multi-front battle has become more present on the table, prompting ‘Israel’ to discuss its possible options regarding it, especially in light of doubts over Tel Aviv’s readiness to wage such a battle.

Hence, the occupation’s limited response during the latest round is understood, as well as its focus on neutralizing “Hezbollah”, in a bid to avoid acts of reprisals.

Nevertheless, the realization of the multi-front scenario depends on a number of factors, including the possibility of the Israeli miscalculations, which will make it as if it is treading a regional mine that will explode and topple its internal front and the interests of its American sponsor in the region.

Axis of Resistance Benjamin Netanyahu Hezbollah Iran Israel Lebanon Palestine Sayyed Hasan Nasrallah Yoav Gallant

Sudan crisis is extension of that in Yemen: Al-Bukhaiti to Al Mayadeen

25 Apr 2023

Source: Al Mayadeen Net

By Al Mayadeen English 

Al-Bukhaiti says had the Sudanese army commanders not been involved in the war on Yemen, this wouldn’t have happened in Sudan.

Member of the political bureau of the Ansar Allah movement Mohammad Al-Bukhaiti

Member of the political bureau of the Ansar Allah movement, Mohammad Al-Bukhaiti, considered on Monday that the Sudan crisis is an extension of the Yemeni crisis.

In an interview for Al Mayadeen, Al-Bukhaiti pointed out that “had the army commanders not been involved in the war on Yemen, this wouldn’t have happened in Sudan, especially since those fighting in Sudan now were involved in fighting in Yemen before.”

Al-Bukhaiti to #AlMayadeen, "The conflict in Sudan is an extension of the crisis in #Yemen, had the army commanders not been involved in the war on Yemen, this wouldn't have happened in Sudan, especially since those fighting in #Sudan now were involved in fighting in Yemen… https://t.co/YawuaxkzLB

— Al Mayadeen English (@MayadeenEnglish) April 24, 2023

Al-Bukhaiti regretted the inability of the Sanaa government to provide aid to the Yemenis in Sudan due to the aggression, the blockade, and the situation forced onto the Sanaa government.

He also highlighted the Sudanese government’s relationship with the forces of aggression and not with the Sanaa government.

Read more: Era of guardianship over Yemen is over: Sanaa MoD

The Yemeni official indicated that recent visits of the Saudi delegation to Sanaa “broke many barriers that constituted an obstacle to any negotiations,” explaining that many achievements have been made, yet without reaching an agreement on a complete and comprehensive peace.

According to Al-Bukhaiti, many matters were agreed upon with the Saudi delegation, especially with regard to the humanitarian situation.

He said that Sanaa is waiting for the implementation of what was agreed upon, warning against procrastination, because the situation of the Yemeni people no longer allows any delay in the implementation of the agreed points.

Member of the Ansar Allah political bureau, Mohammad Al-Bukhaiti, to #AlMayadeen, "There are a lot of terms we agreed on with the #Saudi delegation, especially those pertaining to the humanitarian crisis. We are waiting for the delegation to fulfill the agreement, and we warn… https://t.co/6FnbQvXfUs

— Al Mayadeen English (@MayadeenEnglish) April 24, 2023

He also noted that the negotiations with the Saudis were halted due to the Eid Al-Fitr holiday, affirming that these negotiations “will be resumed soon.”

Al-Bukhaiti mentioned that Sanaa and Riyadh are now in a stage of de-escalation, but he affirmed that Saudi Arabia and the UAE realize that any escalation will be met with escalation, and this will not be in their interest.

The Ansar Allah official specified that “negotiations with the Saudis at this stage are based on re-opening the airports and ports, set to be finalized in later stages to achieve a permanent and comprehensive peace.”

Al-Bukhaiti considered that the Yemeni internal dialogue should include all Yemeni political components and figures that have popular bases, noting that the individuals and militias directly linked to Saudi Arabia and the UAE will attempt to obstruct reaching any solution, which, if reached, will cause them to lose their jobs with whoever hired them.

Al-Bukhaiti revealed to Al Mayadeen that during the negotiations, emphasis was placed on the withdrawal of all foreign forces from Yemen and on Yemen’s restoration of its sovereignty over all of its lands.

“Peace means the exit of the American forces from the occupied Yemeni provinces… We do not accept any foreign presence in Yemen, and we will be in direct confrontation with any foreign military forces present on Yemeni soil,” he underlined.

Al-Bukhaiti warned that the United States does not want peace in Yemen, adding that Washington had a negative impact on the negotiations between Sanaa and Riyadh.

It is noteworthy that this month, Yemen witnessed three batches of prisoner exchange deals. Earlier, the Sanaa government revealed arrangements to hold a new round of negotiations to discuss the release of 1,400 Yemeni prisoners with the Saudi-backed government in May.

The government said a future deal that included 700 prisoners will be concluded.

Read more: Aggression countries will ‘inevitably’ lose if they escalate: Sanaa

• Sanaa
• Saudi coalition
• Ansar Allah
• Yemen
• Sudan
• Mohammed Al-Bukhaiti
• Saudi Arabia

Stand with Yemen

For the past seven years, Yemen has been enduring an aggression by the Saudi-led coalition that butchers civilians on a daily basis, destroys civilian infrastructure and residential areas, and starves innocent Yemenis – all amid international silence and complicity. It is time for this war to end… Yemen can’t wait any longer…

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The US balks at thriving UAE-Russia relations

April 21 2023

The leak of classified documents suggesting Emirati-Russian intel against the US has caused uncertainty about the future of US-UAE relations amid significant shifts in the geopolitics of the Persian Gulf.

Photo Credit: The Cradle

By Stasa Salacanin

The leak of highly classified Pentagon documents, including reports of the UAE’s alleged intelligence collusion with Russia against the US and UK, has captured headlines both regionally and globally.

According to the US intel reports leaked to the Associated Press, a document implicating the Russian Federal Security Service (FSB) entitled “Russia/UAE: Intelligence Relationship Deepening” states:

“FSB officials claimed UAE security service officials and Russia had agreed to work together against US and UK intelligence agencies, according to newly acquired signals intelligence.”

However, while US officials have declined to comment on the document, the Emirati government has vehemently denied any such accusation, calling it “categorically false.”

Although it is impossible to verify the authenticity of the leaked report, western officials and analysts have nonetheless been closely following increased cooperation between Abu Dhabi and Moscow, particularly since the outbreak of conflict in Ukraine.

Ties flourish between Russia and UAE

The claims are certainly credible, as close personal ties exist between the Kremlin and the Emirati ruling elite, and the two governments share similar views on several regional issues. The war in Ukraine has further boosted mutual commercial ties and cooperation between the Russia and the UAE, with non-oil trade increasing by 57 percent during the first nine months of the last year.

In early December 2022, Russia’s First Deputy Prime Minister Andrey Belousov estimated that mutual trade between Russia and the UAE will exceed $7.5 billion by the end of 2022 compared with $5.5 billion in 2021, reaching an all-time record in the history of their trade relations.

Additionally, UAE President Mohamed bin Zayed Al-Nahyan’s (MbZ) decision to support the OPEC+ move to slash oil production by two million barrels a day (bpd) in October despite pressure from the US and other countries, has been greatly praised by Kremlin.

It’s worth noting that the emirate of Dubai has witnessed an uptick in investments from affluent Russians, as real estate purchases by Russian nationals in Dubai surged by 67 percent year-on-year. Furthermore, the UAE continues to rank high on the list of preferred travel destinations for Russians, with over a million Russians having visited or relocated to the Emirates in 2022 – an impressive 60 percent increase from the previous year.

In light of the UAE having emerged as a significant destination for wealthy Russians seeking to circumvent western-imposed sanctions, Andreas Krieg, an associate professor at King’s College in London, has labeled the UAE as “the most crucial strategic partner for Russia in both the Middle East [West Asia] and Africa.” 

A ‘country of focus’ for the US

This flourishing partnership between Moscow and Abu Dhabi has not gone unnoticed in the west, and there are concerns about how cozying up with Russia may affect the UAE’s relations with the west, especially in light of the recent leak of compromising Pentagon intel.

As evidence of this, US Treasury official Assistant Secretary Elizabeth Rosenberg has explicitly designated the UAE as a “country of focus,” noting Russia has been able to evade sanctions and “obtain more than $5 million in US semiconductors and other export-controlled parts, including components with battlefield uses.”

While the UAE has historically been aligned with the US, it has developed its own foreign policy in recent years, according to Dr. Giuseppe Dentice, an expert on International Relations of the Middle East from Centro Studi Internazionali Ce.S.I and a teaching assistant at the Catholic University of the Sacred Heart in Milan. As Dentine explains to The Cradle:

“The UAE has positioned itself as a free rider in the international arena, able to dialogue with the west and Russia and China. This has led the UAE to pursue its own agenda increasingly distant from the US and western interests, but in any case still extremely connected to many of Washington’s objectives in the large quadrant between the Mediterranean, Africa and Asia.”

For Joost Hiltermann, program director of the Middle East and North Africa section at the International Crisis Group think tank, Abu Dhabi is not likely to turn against the US in a major way. Despite pursuing closer ties with Beijing and Moscow, the UAE and other Persian Gulf states have emphasized that the US remains their primary external security partner.

Persian Gulf states pursue strategic balancing

In essence, “the UAE and other Gulf Arab states pursue a foreign policy of strategic balancing and hedging among both regional and global actors,” he tells The Cradle.

Yet, the UAE, along with other Persian Gulf countries, has refrained from aligning with the US in the new cold war, which has become evident in the case of US escalation over Taiwan and the war in Ukraine. In this context, the UAE does not want to miss out on the lucrative opportunity to engage with wealthy Russians, even if it means turning down the west and its preoccupation with the proxy war in Ukraine.

Dentice observes that many regional powers, especially those in the Persian Gulf have taken advantage of this new competitive environment to raise their own ambitions and develop their interests. The case of Russia and its businessmen is emblematic of this condition.

While the US does not necessarily oppose Russians visiting and residing elsewhere, Hiltermann notes that:

“They have an issue with the UAE becoming a hub for sanctions-busting and illicit economies, and they’ve had this concern for some time as US concerns relate to Russia sanctions violations and Iran and Syria sanctions violations.”

However, Hiltermann points out that the US has not always been clear on its sanctions policies and enforcement, which has confused and frustrated regional actors like the UAE. He says “Gulf Arab officials express significant dissatisfaction with US sanctions politics in the region, and often underline their lack of impact and how much they hurt local populations.”

Feeling the pressure

Additonally, Dentice emphasizes that the “UAE must be very careful to balance its own interests with the ambitions of the great powers.” Abu Dhabi should avoid any unnecessary confrontations or the risk of being labeled as a “pariah state” as this could harm its development and reputation as a commercial hub.

Irrespective of growing ties, the UAE has introduced some strict requirements for Russian businessmen and real estate investors who find it ever more difficult to purchase or rent space in Dubai. According to reports, financial and consultancy firms have are being closely observed by US financial regulators, so country business subjects have to be more cautious when dealing with Russia.

Also, despite its “free-rider” foreign policy approach, which requires a difficult balancing act, the UAE as well as other Persian Gulf states still heavily rely on US security arrangements, so many observers believe that sooner or later the UAE will have to agree on some compromise related to western sanctions issues.

Due to US pressure, the UAE has already canceled a license it had issued to Russia’s MTS Bank, and Russia’s largest bank Sberbank was also forced to close its office in Dubai.

Abu Dhabi’s diplomatic dilemma  

Despite efforts by Abu Dhabi and other Persian Gulf capitals to appeal to Washington about the importance of maintaining ties with Moscow by supporting de-escalation measures between Russia and the west – such as prisoner exchanges – it is becoming increasingly challenging to maintain good relations with a Russia so profoundly vilified in western capitals.

Hiltermann doubts whether this approach will be effective in the long run. He points out that while the “US claims that it does not push Gulf Arab states to choose sides, Russia has turned into an existential issue for the US and Europe in many ways, and sooner or later western pressures on the UAE will increase.”

It is clear that the UAE’s foreign policy approach is complex and involves a delicate balancing act between its own interests and the ambitions of great powers. Withstanding its efforts to maintain good relations with both Washington and Moscow, the UAE is increasingly feeling the western pressure to untangle from Russia, especially in the form of sanctions threats.

While Abu Dhabi’s strategic partnerships with a broad range of countries have reaped economic benefits, in the foreign policy realm, the same choices have caused acute diplomatic challenges.

But the UAE cannot merely focus on the great power contests unfolding abroad. Closer to home, Abu Dhabi has had to navigate the changing dynamics in West Asia, including peace talks to end the conflict in Yemen and the game-changing, Beijing-brokered rapprochement between Iran and Saudi Arabia.

The UAE’s success and stability in its own region will ultimately hinge on its proficiency in managing these local shifts. Meanwhile, the entry of China and Russia into West Asia offers Abu Dhabi some further leverage in managing Washington’s demands. Unless and until the US decides to draw a hard red line, the Emiratis will likely play all their cards in all arenas.

The views expressed in this article do not necessarily reflect those of The Cradle.

Russiatourismtrade and investmentUAE

Dozens killed, hundreds injured in ongoing armed confrontations: Sudan

April 16, 2023

Source: Al Mayadeen Net + Agencies

The Sudan Armed Forces say clashes are ongoing, but the situation is heading toward stability.

Heavy smoke bellows above buildings in the vicinity of the Khartoum airport on April 15, 2023, amid clashes in the Sudanese capital. (AFP)

By Al Mayadeen English 

The Central Committee of Sudan Doctors announced that the death toll from the armed clashes in the country has risen so far to 56 and the injuries to 595, while heavy bombing and intense gunfights are ongoing across the country, BBC reported on Sunday.

25 people, including 17 civilians, were killed in the country’s capital Khartoum, the organization said, further noting that the latest records do not include victims that are still unaccounted for due to the ongoing military confrontations, which disrupt rescue efforts.

The General Command of the Sudanese Army said warplanes will be sweeping areas in search of RFS members, calling on all citizens to remain indoors.

“The Sudanese Air Force will conduct a complete sweep of the rebel Rapid Support militia’s presence. The Air Force calling on all citizens to stay inside their houses and not to go out,” the statement said.

This comes a mere two weeks after Sudan’s political process parties decided to postpone the signing of a final agreement providing for the establishment of a transitional civil authority in the country. The final agreement was set to be signed on April 1, after which a transitional constitution was to be adopted on April 6.

A spokesperson for the Sudanese Armed Forces stated that the army had taken control of all the headquarters of the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) in Omdurman and had seized all equipment and vehicles on site left behind by the retreating units.

The military is conducting ongoing air and land operations to force the RSF to surrender, the spokesperson added.

According to the report, three employees of the World Food Programme (WFP) were killed during an exchange of fire at a military base in Kabkabiya western Sudan.

Read more: Sudanese army chief orders disbanding of RSF: Khartoum

BREAKING: Planes on fire at Khartoum airport after coup attempt in Sudan pic.twitter.com/aWdyMv23xs

— BNO News (@BNONews) April 15, 2023

The Sudanese military is led by lieutenant general Abdel Fattah Al-Burhan, who overthrew the government in a military coup in October 2021, declared a state of emergency, and established a transitional sovereign council under his guidance.

The Rapid Support Forces, on the other hand, are led by Al-Burhan’s deputy, paramilitary commander Mohamed Hamdan Daglo.

The RSF on Thursday reportedly carried out a sudden redeployment of its forces near the airport in Merowe, northern Sudan, with the Sudanese army responding by issuing a statement saying the redeployment was illegal and was not coordinated with Khartoum.

Clashes broke out earlier on Friday, culminating with the RSF claiming control of the Republican Palace in Khartoum and the airports in Khartoum and Merowe. The national army denied the presidential palace’s takeover and said it was bombing RSF bases near Khartoum.

International organizations and various countries, including Russia, have called on the Sudanese adversaries to cease fire and kickstart talks. Two large airlines, EgyptAir and Saudia, have temporarily suspended flights to Sudan, citing insecurity.

Read more: Sudan close to officially joining normalization accords: Israeli media

De-escalation calls

US Secretary of State Antony Blinken says hostilities in Sudan must end without pre-conditions, and the safety of civilians in the country must be ensured, a stance shared by Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates (UAE).

US Secretary of State Antony Blinken said following talks with the Saudi and UAE ambassadors that fighting parties in Sudan must immediately halt military actions “without pre-condition”.

“I welcomed the opportunity April 15 to consult with Faisal bin Farhan al-Saud, Foreign Minister of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, and Abdullah bin Zayed al-Nahyan, Foreign Minister of the United Arab Emirates, about the dangerous fighting between the Sudanese Armed Forces and the Rapid Security Forces [RSF], which threatens the security and safety of Sudanese civilians and undermines efforts to restore Sudan’s democratic transition. We agreed it was essential for the parties to immediately end hostilities without pre-condition,” he said in a Saturday statement.

The top US diplomat also urged the commanders of both forces to work toward reducing tensions and “ensure the safety of all civilians,” stressing that negotiations are the only solution to end this crisis.

“We continue to remain in close touch with our Embassy in Khartoum and have full accountability of our personnel. We also have been communicating with American citizens who may be in the region about safety measures and other precautions.”

Sputnik reported on Saturday, citing a UN source, that the United Nations Security Council will convene behind doors on Monday to discuss the developments in Sudan.

The League of Arab States (LAS) Secretary-General Ahmed Aboul Gheit voiced his condemnation of arms use and urged for an immediate ceasefire.

In its statement, the LAS said that “Aboul Gheit condemns the use of arms in Sudan and calls for an immediate ceasefire,” adding that Aboul Gheit requested the stop of escalations and stressed that the organization is prepared to intervene and look into the situation. 

The Egyptian Foreign Ministry said on Saturday that the Council of the League of Arab States (LAS) was called to an urgent meeting on the level of permanent representatives on Sunday by Egypt and Saudi Arabia to discuss the situation in Sudan.

The African Union also urged in a statement “the political and military parties to find a fair political solution to the crisis.”

UN Spokesperson Stephane Dujarric said on Twitter late on Saturday that UN chief Antonio Guterres held talks with Al-Burhan and Dagalo and demanded an “immediate stop to the violence and a return to dialogue.”

Guterres also discussed ways to “de-escalate the situation” with Egyptian President Abdel Fattah El-Sisi and the head of the African Union Commission (AUC) Moussa Faki and urged regional states to push efforts to stabilize the situation.

and to RSF Leader Lt. General Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo, calling for an immediate stop to the violence and a return to dialogue.

He offered his good offices, in close co-ordination with ongoing efforts, to restore security and conclude the ongoing political process.

2 of 2

— UN Spokesperson (@UN_Spokesperson) April 15, 2023

On his part, EU foreign policy chief Josep Borrell condemned on his Twitter account on Sunday the armed clashes between both forces and said that he is in contact with African leaders on the matter.

I condemn the outbreak of fighting between the Rapid Support Forces & the Sudanese Armed Forces in Sudan.

I’m engaging with the AU and leaders in the region & reaffirm the commitment of the @UN to support the people of Sudan in their efforts to restore a democratic transition.

— António Guterres (@antonioguterres) April 15, 2023

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The first China-UAE gas deal in yuan: A new blow to dollar dominance

April 06 2023

Chinese allies control 40 percent of OPEC+ oil reserves, and the GCC controls another 40 percent. With this China-UAE gas trade settled in yuan, the petrodollar today is under serious threat.

Photo Credit: The Cradle

ByA Cradle Correspondent

On 28 March, the Shanghai Petroleum and Natural Gas Exchange (SHPGX) made history by announcing the first-ever deal on importing 65,000 tons of liquefied natural gas (LNG) from the UAE, settled in the Chinese yuan currency. China National Offshore Oil Company (CNOOC) and French TotalEnergies finalized the transaction, and TotalEnergies confirmed that the LNG imported was from the Persian Gulf state.

China’s Global Times in a report the following day, cited the chairman of the SHPGX, Guo Xu as saying that the deal is:

“A meaningful attempt to promote multi-currency pricing, settlement and cross-border payment in international LNG trading. It also provides a new channel for international players to participate in the Chinese market, helping to build a new pattern of dual circulation in China.”

Beijing pushes yuan for energy trade

The yuan settlement of international LNG trading is a “major event in China’s market-oriented oil and gas reform, which will help promote the docking of international and domestic markets,” the report quoted experts as saying.

The development comes after Chinese President Xi Jinping announced in December 2022, during a landmark visit to Riyadh, that his country should make “full use” of the SHPGX as a platform to carry out yuan settlement of oil and gas trade.

This deal represents a departure from the decades-long practice of conducting global oil sales exclusively in US dollars. A prominent economist, who spoke to The Cradle, speculated that “the French either resorted to the yuan due to the acute shortage of Russian gas supplies to the European continent, or they have reserves in the Chinese currency that they want to use.”

The deal came as a surprise, as French President Emmanuel Macron typically does not take such steps without the approval of the US. As for the UAE, the move is part of a larger trend of Persian Gulf countries opening up to China in the aftermath of the US withdrawal from Afghanistan and the Biden administration’s shift in regional policies.

The yuan payment also follows the global polarization taking place over the Ukraine war and further demonstrates the reluctance of Persian Gulf states to align with western hostility toward Russia, China, and other US adversaries. According to the same economist, “The Emirati move cannot be separated from the changes taking place in the world. Abu Dhabi and Riyadh sense the global imbalance of power, and decided to expand the margins of their international relations.”

Yuan’s growing acceptance

Given the current global geopolitical shifts, the yuan is gaining increased acceptance as an international currency. Since President Xi Jinping assumed office, China has settled agreements with several countries in its local currency in an attempt to challenge the dominance of the US dollar in global trade.

As a result, the yuan has become the world’s fifth-largest payment currency, the third-largest currency in trade settlement, and the fifth-largest reserve currency. According to the Global Times, the yuan today accounts for 7 percent of all foreign exchange trades worldwide and has experienced the most significant expansion in currency market share over the past three years.

Experts have noted that “with the recovery of the momentum of China’s economic growth and the further opening of the financial market, the investment and hedging function of the yuan has gradually increased.”

In an article earlier this year for The Cradle, Pakistani analyst F. M. Shakil cited the Currency Composition of Official Foreign Exchange Reserves (COFER) report by the International Monetary Fund (IMF), which shows that:

“The percentage of US dollars in central bank reserves has decreased by 12 percent since 1999, while the percentage of other currencies, particularly the Chinese yuan, have shown an increasing trend with a 9 percent rise during this period.”

Shakil also noted that the “cumulative cross-border yuan settlement handled in Xinjiang (western China), the financial hub between China and Central Asia, exceeded 100 billion yuan ($14 billion) as early as 2013 and reached 260 billion yuan in 2018.”

He concluded that “dollar reserves are dwindling and the influence of the United States of America is receding in the global economy, which represents an opportunity for regional powers’ currencies and alternative payment systems.”

Rise of the petroyuan

Since 2009, Beijing has implemented a policy to reduce its reliance on the US dollar in commercial transactions. This policy includes settling the majority of its goods in foreign markets in its local currency, establishing mutual lines of credit with several central banks worldwide, and negotiating with West Asian and North African countries to conduct trade using the yuan. These efforts have started to show results recently, with a number of Asian governments partially adopting the Chinese currency.

Iraq is one of the countries that have partially adopted the yuan in trade. In February, the Iraqi Central Bank announced plans to allow direct settlement of trade from China in yuan to improve access to foreign currency and compensate for the dollar shortage in local markets, largely due to measures imposed by the Federal Reserve on money transfers leaving Iraq to prevent them from reaching Tehran and Damascus. Egypt also announced its intention to issue yuan bonds last August.

Russia has played a significant role in changing the course of the yuan by signing the Eastern Natural Gas Pipeline Agreement from Russia to China and converting the currencies of gas payments from the US dollar to the Chinese yuan and the Russian ruble.

According to the latest data from the Russian Central Bank, the yuan has become a major player in Russia’s foreign trade, with its share of import settlements increasing from just 4 percent in January 2022 to 23 percent by the end of the year. The yuan’s share of exports rose from 0.5 percent to 16 percent in the same period.

During his trip to Saudi Arabia, the Chinese president encouraged Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries to use the SHPGX for yuan-based energy deals. The visit also saw China and Saudi Arabia sign over $30 billion in trade deals, which some analysts believe marks the rise of the petroyuan.

According to US-based Credit Suisse analyst Zoltan Pozsar, Russia, Iran, and Venezuela – all allies of China – account for 40 percent of OPEC+’s proven oil reserves, with the GCC making up another 40 percent. If these three states alone settle their energy exports in yuan, the petroyuan is here to stay.

A response to US policy 

In a January interview with Bloomberg, during the World Economic Forum in Davos, Saudi Finance Minister Mohammed al-Jadaan said that “the kingdom is open to trading in currencies other than the US dollar in order to improve trade.”

Interestingly, despite being a stalwart US ally for decades, Riyadh is deepening its ties with key trading partners, including Beijing, as China imported over 500 million tons of crude oil and over 100 million tons of natural gas, including 63.44 million tons of LNG, in 2022.

Middle East Briefing suggests that this shift towards national currencies in global trade “is partly due to Washington’s sanctions policy against Russia.” Riyadh is now “following an increasing trend of hedging against US dollar use in trade” amid concerns that the US may use its currency as a weapon for trade and sanctions.

The trend towards using national currencies in global trade chains has continued to mature, with recent developments, including the announcement of two large-scale investment plans in China by Saudi oil giant Aramco.

The first plan involves building an integrated refining and chemicals plant in Liaoning Province, while the second plan involves Aramco’s acquisition of 10 percent of the shares of Rongsheng Petrochemical Company.

Meanwhile, the emirate of Dubai has opened its door to dealing in the Chinese currency in its global financial center, and Brazil and China have agreed to ditch the dollar and use their local currencies in their commercial dealings. In addition, Brazil and Argentina have announced the start of work on launching a common currency in their commercial dealings, dubbed “Sur.”

The petrodollar under threat

Petrodollars refer to US dollars used to purchase crude oil following a 1974 deal struck between Washington and Riyadh. The agreement not only ensured the military defense of the kingdom through US guarantees but also secured a steady stream of foreign purchases of US Treasury bonds and debt, which is a strategy of recycling the petrodollars back to Washington through Saudi Arabia’s reserves.

This transformed the ability of oil-rich Arab states to weaponize their vast energy resources against malign western policies – into a powerful economic weapon for the Americans, who, overnight, became the masters of the oil market. Today, however, with China’s rapid steps to challenge this entrenched system, there is a global spotlight on the rise of the Petroyuan versus the decline of the Petrodollar.

Asia Financial describes China’s deal with TotalEnergies as a “step forward in China’s long-term battle to reduce the power and reach of US dollar hegemony,” adding that “further such moves appear to be in the winds.” Importantly, according to Viktor Katona, lead crude analyst at Kpler:

“While the dollar will likely remain the dominant global currency in the near future, the rise of a so-called petroyuan will gain momentum as China leverages its status as the world’s largest oil importer.”

Saudi Arabia is reportedly considering accepting payment for its oil exports to China in yuan. However, any such shift is likely to be marginal, as most West Asian currencies are pegged to the US dollar, and accepting payments in other currencies increases foreign exchange risk.

Researcher P.S. Srinivas opined last year that oil deals with countries in West Asia “do not constitute a threat to the US dollar,” and the likelihood of the yuan replacing the US dollar as the benchmark currency for pricing is even more remote due to China’s capital controls and the yuan’s lack of convertibility.

While the possibility of the yuan gaining greater prominence in the global oil trade cannot be ruled out, it is unlikely to replace the US dollar as the primary currency for pricing in the oil and gas industry in the short term.

Most West Asian nations continue to maintain a vested interest in preserving the strength of the dollar, and any shift towards accepting payments in other currencies is likely to be minimal, at first. In the next few years, it will be important to keep an eye on China’s slow but steady ascent to global economic dominance and the growing usage of the yuan in international trade.

The views expressed in this article do not necessarily reflect those of The Cradle.

Yemen and Saudi Arabia Meet to End War

 APRIL 9, 2023

Mohammad Ali Al-Houthi, member of the Supreme Political Council in Yemen

Posted by INTERNATIONALIST 360° 

Saudi delegation arrives in Sanaa to discuss details of the final peace plan with member of the Supreme Political Council Mohammad Ali Al-Houthi on Sunday.

A Saudi delegation traveled to Sanaa to meet with high-ranking officials from the Ansar Allah movement to discuss further details of the final ceasefire agreement and the end of the 8-year Saudi-led war on Yemen.

The delegation arrived on Saturday evening and held talks with Mohammad Ali Al-Houthi, a senior member of Yemen’s Supreme Political Council and important figures of the National Salvation Government of Yemen.

Pictures were circulated in Yemeni media outlets today, showing a Saudi official shaking hands with Al-Houthi. The Saudis reportedly asked for their identities to remain secret in the meantime.

According to sources of Yemen’s Saba news agency, issues such as the “removal of the tight naval and air blockade on Yemen, an end to the eight-year-long aggression, the restoration of Yemeni national rights, the payment of civil servant salaries, and payments related to oil and gas revenues,” were discussed with Mahdi Al-Mashat, the Chairman of the Supreme Political Council.

The recent visit adds to the diplomatic efforts taken by both sides.

Omani Mediation

On April 8, Saudi Arabia’s Ambassador to Yemen, Mohammed Saeed Al-Jaber met with members of the National Salvation Government and the Ansar Allah movement under Omani mediation.

Sources told Al Mayadeen on April 8 that the meeting is part of the effort to extend the armistice between the two parties and lift the blockade on Hudaydah port.

The Omani and Saudi team met with the head of the Sanaa delegation, negotiator Mohammad Abdul Salam, who said, “We hope that this will be achieved, that the damage will be remedied, and efforts will be crowned with a peace agreement that meets the demands of our dear Yemeni people, from Saada to Mahra.”

Informed Yemeni sources revealed on Friday that Saudi officials met with the Yemeni Presidential Leadership Council to inform them of their decision to end the war and conclude the Yemeni file permanently.

The officials also detailed a two-year transitional period which includes a future form of the state and the ruling government. The sources added that the Saudi vision for a solution comes in accordance with its understanding of Sanaa which is still being discussed and is almost final.

The UAE is Unbothered

The UAE, which occupies strategic Yemeni territory including the Socotra island, has not made any diplomatic initiative yet.

Mohammad Al Bukhaiti told Al Mayadeen on Friday that Sanaa will “not allow the presence of any UAE forces on any inch of Yemeni territory.”

However, Al Bukhaiti also stated that Sanaa supports “proposals and efforts by Saudi Arabia or other parties to pacify the Yemeni crisis and reach a comprehensive political resolution to the conflict.”

This might indicate a possible rift between the Gulf countries’ approach to the Yemen war.

Improved Saudi Iranian Relations

Regional conflicts have begun to ease after China mediated diplomatic talks between Iran and Saudi Arabia in early March.

Talks between the two countries produced the first meeting between the Foreign Ministers of both countries in 7 years.

China played a crucial role in the restoration of ties between the two countries. However, it is speculated that the success of Ansar Allah in Yemen has pushed Saudi Arabia to the negotiation table after 8 tormenting years of what was supposed to be a quick military victory for the country.

Al Mayadeen

Syria, Yemen, Saudi Arabia, Turkiye: Truces, not peace

April 04 2023

As reconciliation efforts sweep through West Asia to mend ties between old foes, the new China- and Russia-brokered deals will not usher in real peace until the US stops prolonging conflict.

By Hasan Illaik

The mid-March Moscow summit between Syrian President Bashar al-Assad and his Russian counterpart Vladimir Putin was notable for being publicized in advance. Since the outbreak of the Syrian war, Assad’s foreign visits have not been publicly revealed until after they have occurred. This small but significant detail suggests the Syrian president has a newfound confidence in the political and security conditions outside his national borders.

While the participants kept a tight lid on leaks, informed sources from both Moscow and Damascus disclosed to The Cradle that the Syrian and Russian presidents discussed the following issues:

Economic ties: With a focus on Syria’s energy sector, Putin expressed Russia’s readiness to invest in the production of electricity in the Levantine state, which post-conflict, suffers from a 75 percent deficit in production. Putin also expressed Moscow’s willingness to help Syria meet its vital grain needs.

Relations with Turkiye: While in Moscow, Assad reportedly refused to hold a four-way meeting between the deputy foreign ministers of Syria, Turkiye, Russia, and Iran. The Syrian president reiterated that Turkiye occupies Syrian lands, and negotiations between the two countries cannot advance from the security to the political level without a clear and public pledge from Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan to withdraw his military forces from the occupied territories, and open the main roads linking Syrian provinces – particularly the Latakia-Aleppo road, known as the M4 highway.

However, Moscow pressed its case, and reportedly reached an agreement between Damascus and Ankara stipulating that their negotiations would continue and move to the political level, with the main item on the table being Turkish withdrawal from Syrian lands. The basis for a much-awaited summit between Assad and Erdogan will be discussed at a later date.

The sources say that, for domestic political purposes, Erdogan needs to meet Assad before Turkiye’s May presidential elections, to convey to voters that he seeks to stop the war at his country’s southern borders, intends to repatriate the approximately three million Syrian refugees back home – a hot topic for voters – and to assure the Turkish Alevi electorate that he is not hostile to their sect, to which his rival Kemal Kilicdaroglu belongs.

Relations with Saudi Arabia: Putin, who has been leading the mediation efforts to normalize Saudi-Syrian relations, briefed Assad on the results of his talks with Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman (MbS). According to official sources in Damascus and Moscow, Putin’s initiative has made progress in reactivating critical communication between Damascus and Riyadh.

Saudi Arabia’s strategic shifts

On 23 March, 2023, the Saudi Ministry of Foreign Affairs announced the start of talks with Syria to reactivate consular work, which is a prelude to the return of normal diplomatic relations between the two countries, as reported by Saudi daily Al-Sharq Al-Awsat.

Sources speaking to The Cradle have confirmed that any potential progress in Syrian-Saudi relations are the result of these Russian mediation efforts, and are unrelated to the game-changing Saudi-Iran agreement struck in Beijing on 10 March. The sources believe that a meeting between Riyadh and Damascus may occur after the end of the month of Ramadan.

While the success of Saudi-Iran negotiations under Chinese auspices, and the potential breakthrough in Saudi-Syria relations under Russian sponsorship, suggest a strategic eastward turn for the kingdom, sources close to Riyadh emphasize that there is no change in the Saudi-US relationship.

While Riyadh’s relations with Washington have experienced declines in the past, recent shifts in the global political, economic, and military landscapes have prompted MbS to diversify his country’s partnerships, while preserving the strategic alignment with Washington.

Yemen: Riyadh’s regional albatross

Today, the Saudi crown price is pursuing a “zero problems” policy with neighboring countries. After failing to “transfer the [regional] battle into Iran,” and after his war on Yemen transformed Yemeni Resistance movement Ansarallah from a small organization into a regional force, MbS has realized that his domestic economic, financial, and entertainment mega-projects are doomed without ensuring calm on the kingdom’s borders.

Therefore, since late 2022, he began earnest negotiations with Iran, responded assertively to Russian efforts to mediate with Syria, and began direct talks with Ansarallah in their Sanaa stronghold. The discussions reportedly made significant progress, then stalled in January over several key points, including Riyadh’s “inability” (or unwillingness) to lift the siege on Yemen, the withdrawal of foreign forces from the country, and agreement over an internal political solution to the Yemeni crisis.

As things stand, Riyadh claims that it “cannot force its partners” in the aggression – the UAE and US, in particular – to withdraw their forces from Yemeni territory.

Several Ansarallah allies have assessed that the Saudis want to end the war, but have been prevented from doing so by the US, UK, UAE, and France. However, this estimate changed after Saudi Arabia retracted a number of the pledges it made in the negotiations.

After initially ceasing restrictions on the port of Hodeidah, the UN has returned to obstructing the arrival of some ships to the port. The siege renewal coincided with a visit by US Ambassador to Yemen Stephen Fagin to the UN Verification and Inspection Mechanism (UNVIM) personnel in Djibouti which is tasked with inspecting ships bound for Hodeidah.

In a renewed escalation of tensions, Ansarallah threatened to expel the UN mission in Sanaa within 72 hours if a container ship seized by inspectors in Djibouti was not released. Indeed, before the deadline expired, the UN released the ship.

Although the threat coincided with the US ambassador’s provocative visit, and while it appears that the Americans were trying to undermine the Saudi-Ansarallah understandings, Yemeni sources tell The Cradle that the obstruction of the ships was not exclusively a US decision, but also a Saudi one.

Furthermore, the UN explicitly informed the Sanaa government that the detention of ships proven to be weapons-free was carried out by a decision of the “coalition leadership” – that is, from the Saudis.

So what is Riyadh up to, and who is really obstructing a final solution to the war in Yemen? Is it the Saudis or the Americans?

Sources close to the Sanaa government say that “a comprehensive US-Saudi consensus” still exists over Yemen. The two allies may differ sometimes, but until now, they say:

“Washington and Riyadh still agree on calming things down in Yemen, while keeping the blockade in place. They also agree that Yemen should not be an independent and strong country, capable of controlling its resources or exploiting its geographical location, because that entails strategic risks for Saudi Arabia’s regional role, and for US and Israeli interests in West Asia, the Horn of Africa, and the Red Sea.”

The sources add: “Saudi Arabia and America cannot afford to grant Ansarallah conditions that would enable it to accumulate additional strength and a larger and more effective arsenal.” Simply put, the duo are not seeking an actual end to the war, but are instead pursuing a drawn-out truce.

MbS wants some calm to ensure that missiles and drones do not rain down on his ambitious entertainment and development projects, while the US and the UAE want to keep Yemen fragmented, persist in the theft of its vital oil resource, and at the same time, hold Ansarallah (in northern Yemen) responsible for managing a country that continues to buckle under siege.

Truces, not peace – yet

In short, from Yemen in the south, to Iran in the east, and Syria, Iraq and Turkey in the north, West Asia has entered the post-Arab Spring phase, where once-battling neighbors are seeking to reconnect.

This is a phase governed by ‘armistice agreements’ between countries that have fought each other, directly or via proxies, for more than a decade. Armistice agreements, it should be noted, are not peace treaties, and what this suggests is the continuation of the US-style legacy of “managing conflict,” and never actually ending it.

As multipolarism beckons the world around, it is yet to be seen if Chinese and Russian efforts to stabilize the region in order to advance sweeping connectivity, economic, and development projects will be able to overcome the old “conflict management” and “forever wars” paradigm of the declining unipolar order.

The views expressed in this article do not necessarily reflect those of The Cradle.

See Also

• Turkish withdrawal condition for reconciliation: Syrian deputy FM
• Saudi Arabia ignores US threats over oil cuts
• Tunisia moves to reinstate diplomatic mission in Syria
• Iran, Saudi Arabia to open joint trade office
• Sanaa – Riyadh: Signs of a Nigh Accord, Sought by the UN
• Civilians killed by fourth Israeli attack on Syria in less than a week

Syria: A State that Withstood a Global War and Emerged Victorious (Part II)

March 31, 2023

Illustrative photo prepared by Al-Manar Website on the 12th anniversary of the war in Syria.

Somaya Ali

Translated by Areej Fatima Husseini

“It is impossible to continue with Assad. How can we look forward with a Syrian president who has murdered over a million of the country’s citizens?”

Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan said at a press conference in Tunisia in December 2017.

The Turkish president’s claims show that he did not consider the prospect of Bashar Al-Assad staying as Syria’s president. Undoubtedly, he has begun to notice the failure of his ambitions since 2018 when the battlefield track has shifted to a large extent in favor of the Syrian army. He was not the only one who had high expectations for the war, which erupted in Syria in the summer of 2011. Many Arabs, as well as the West and the USA, took part in this.

Throughout ten years, they all fantasized about a new Syria that “has no room” for Bashar Al-Assad and his government. Damascus was suspended from the Arab League. Instead, Moaz Al-Khatib, the leader of the so-called opposition alliance represented Syria at the summit conference in March 2013.

All diplomatic relations were severed. Moreover, the UN-sponsored sessions of negotiations were a formality, as they imposed unrealistic conditions on Damascus to force its surrender.

Syria was subject to the toughest sanctions, the last of which was the “Caesar Act”, as its entire territory faced death and bloodshed. However, the scale was tipped in favor of the Syrian state and its allies. Whoever wins eventually imposes his demands, and that exactly what happened.

‘Marathon’ of Restoring Ties

Twelve years after the start of the Syrian war, experts in Syrian affairs classify the countries’ relationship with the regime into two camps: those who are “enthusiastic about normalizing relations, such as Turkey and the UAE, and those who link the normalization with a political solution in Syria, such as the United States, the European Union, and Qatar.”

There is also a third camp which observes the situation, waiting for the image to clarify before determining its position. This camp is represented by Saudi Arabia, in addition to Egypt and Jordan, to a lesser extent.

Following the devastating earthquake that shook Turkey and northwest Syria, the latter group made a remarkable advance into Syria. Egypt offered aid to Syria, as President Abdel Fattah El-Sisi contacted his Syrian counterpart and Foreign Minister Sameh Shoukry visited Damascus.

🇸🇾🇪🇬 Egyptian Foreign Minister Sameh Shoukry arrived in Damascus earlier today and met with his Syrian counterpart. This visit falls down within the process of breaking siege on Damascus .. Egypt and Syria have always been key players in the Middle East political scene ! pic.twitter.com/BPNGL0Z5lO

— ميّ (@MayeM358) February 27, 2023

Further, Jordan’s relationship with the Syrian government improved by the end of 2021, after being for years one of the prominent backers of the terrorists and the role it played the “MOC” operations room. At the time (in late 2021), Jordanian King Abdullah II discussed measures to boost bilateral relations with Syrian President Bashar Al-Assad during a phone call that coincided with a meeting between Syrian Minister of Defense General Ali Ayoub and Jordanian Chief of Staff Major General Yusef Al-Hunaiti. Moreover, the “Nassib-Jaber” border crossing, Jordan’s northern lung, was reopened.

Nassib crossing, main border post between Jordan and Syria (photo from archive).

As for the Saudi which was a major player in the war in terms of armaments and even the media war, Foreign Minister Faisal bin Farhan recently confirmed that “consensus is growing in the Arab world that isolating Syria is unlikely to work and that dialogue with Damascus is required.” The top Saudi diplomat also hinted at Syria rejoining the Arab League, which is set to convene in Riyadh in May.

Turkey Enthusiastic for Normalization with Syria

Back to the first camp, or the ‘enthusiasts,’ Turkey prevails. Despite its primary role and direct engagement in the war through its military presence in northern Syria, Turkey’s interests in Syria have shifted after the formation of the alliance between the US and the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF). This gave the SDF power in the Syrian north, which Ankara deemed to be a threat to its national security, prompting it to work with Russia to prevent the emergence of a “Kurdish entity.” This was in return for relinquishing the objective of “toppling the regime” and forging a sort of a ceasefire in Idlib, where Turkey has direct control over the armed groups.

However, the February 6 earthquake in Kahramanmaraş had terrible consequences for Ankara, which was already in the grip of an economic crisis.

As a result, addressing the Syrian refugee issue became an urgent demand for Ankara, as well as a major key to increase Erdogan’s prospects of winning the coming presidential elections in May. It became obvious herein that the Turkish wooing towards Syria increased, as did the reiteration on the need for mending ties and demonstrating seriousness in this regard, as shown in communications through Iranian and Russian mediators.

This was not the first attempt of its kind, as Erdogan officially declared at the end of November 2022 that he had proposed to President Vladimir Putin a tripartite route to go forward with the normalization process. As a result, on December 28, a conference in Moscow was convened with the defense ministers of Russia, Turkey, and Syria, as well as intelligence officers from the three countries.

Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan has arrived in Tehran for talks with his Iranian and Russian counterparts on the Syria peace process. pic.twitter.com/rIFUVrMjo0

— Press TV 🔻 (@PressTV) July 19, 2022

What About the United Arab Emirates?

The UAE regarded eliminating Assad in 2011 as a “blow to Iran,” but it also backtracked due to the scheme’s failure. It reopened its embassy in Damascus in December 2018. In early 2020, the first public phone contact between then-Crown Prince of Abu Dhabi, Mohammed bin Zayed, and President Assad since the two nations severed diplomatic relations in 2012.

In November 2021, UAE Foreign Minister Abdullah bin Zayed had his first visit to Damascus in ten years. Then, in March 2022, Al-Assad paid his first Arab visit to Abu Dhabi since the start of the conflict, followed by Abdullah bin Zayed’s visit to Damascus in December 2022. The Emirati openness was visible in the amount of aid offered to Syria in various forms following the earthquake, amid blatant Western and American intransigence and adherence to sanctions despite the enormity of the humanitarian catastrophe.

The Syrian president also paid another visit to the UAE earlier this month in another sign of thawing ties.

https://twitter.com/joshuamills044/status/1505159664681508867?ref_src=twsrc%5Etfw%7Ctwcamp%5Etweetembed%7Ctwterm%5E1505159664681508867%7Ctwgr%5Eb0b88013bcc683601b76bb2c2f960df6c1b2f237%7Ctwcon%5Es1_&ref_url=https%3A%2F%2Fenglish.almanar.com.lb%2F1808875

According to sources, “there is an Emirati interest in obtaining economic opportunities in Syria throughout the post-war and reconstruction phase.” Furthermore, Abu Dhabi aspires to join the line of communication between Turkey and the Syrian regime, which would strengthen its regional presence.

Stubborn US

Turning to the camp of the obstinate states, the USA is the most prominent of them, with a military presence in bases such as Al-Malikiyah, Rumailan, Himo, Qasrak, Al-Hasakah’s sports city, Al-Shaddadi, and Al-Tanf. In addition to the tough sanctions that led to unambiguous consequences following the earthquake, Washington also plays a role, albeit in secret, in training terrorists such as ISIL militants and pillaging Syria’s wealth.

Meanwhile, these sanctions are regarded as one of the major impediments to normalization with the Syrian government by many nations, particularly the European Union. Herein, the Union’s Foreign Relations High Representative, Joseph Borrell, stated that the EU “will remain against normalization with the Syrian regime until it effectively engages in a political solution to the conflict as stipulated by the UN Security Council Resolution No. 2254.”

Syria the Victor’s role: Settlement Has Conditions

On his recent visit to Russia, President Al-Assad set the records straight. In exchange for all the “messages of friendliness,” and despite the economic and human misery exacerbated by the earthquake, the latter promised: there are prerequisites for the comeback.

Al-Assad informed Erdogan that restoring communication and ties is related to establishing a clear timeline for the withdrawal of Turkish soldiers from the Syrian territory. This resulted in the delay of an anticipated meeting between the two countries deputy foreign ministers with Russia and Iran to an undetermined date.

Syrian President Bashar Al-Assad (photo from archive).

In terms of the Arab world, despite his “positive” approach toward Saudi goodwill during his visit to Moscow, President Al-Assad has ruled out his country’s participation in the next Arab summit. “Syria’s membership in the Arab League is frozen, and to attend the summit, the suspension must be ended, and this requires an Arab summit,” he stated. “Returning to the Arab League is not an ambition in itself; the goal is the joint Arab action,” he added.

“As a result of its ambiguous regulations, the Arab League is frequently used to settle scores, therefore Syria cannot return while the AL is merely a label for division”, Al Assad added.

“Thousands of years may pass before the Arabs unite,” said Al-Assad in an interview on Russia TV. “So let us wait thousands of years,” he added, laughing.

Source: Al-Manar English Website