How Hezbollah Came to Dominate Information Warfare: Israeli Media

Hezbollah Secretary General Sayyed Hasan Nasrallah

Long time ago Hezbollah began significantly investing in propaganda, and laid the groundwork for the effective use of information warfare, which is the ability to gain an advantage over an adversary through the management of information, according to an article published by JPost.

JPost mentioned that Hezbollah operations have long been governed by the mantra,

“If you haven’t captured it on film you haven’t fought.” “The group grasped the importance of documenting its successes as early as 1994 when Hezbollah fighters and a cameraman infiltrated an Israeli military occupation compound in Lebanon and raised a flag inside the base, captured the event on film – and scored a major propaganda coup.”

“Hezbollah maintains a unit solely dedicated to psychological warfare that specializes in burnishing Hezbollah’s public image. Newspapers, social media outlets and television programming comprise Hezbollah’s information warfare portfolio. The group uses its information- related capabilities to advertise its many successes, including summer camps for children and a robust public works program.”

Hezbollah propaganda is well-honed, targeted and specific, and it emphasizes specific themes that include resistance ideology, martyrdom and establishing legitimacy through the provision of social services, according to JPost.

“The history of Hezbollah’s information warfare efforts is perhaps best told through the story of the evolution of its active media arm, Al-Manar, a satellite television station that broadcasts from Beirut and can be seen around the world. After the first broadcast of Al-Manar (The Beacon) in 1991, Hezbollah began regularly scheduled broadcasts three years later and serves a critical role as the main dissemination point for Hezbollah news and propaganda. Hezbollah’s extensive media operation also includes radio stations, print publications and a network of over 50 websites that operate in multiple languages.” “Al-Manar began trying to influence Israeli public opinion by broadcasting actual battlefield footage showing Israeli soldiers being killed and maimed.”

Equally as impressive as Hezbollah’s television and video production is its extensive use of new media and information technologies, including a major Internet presence, the Israeli paper added.

The Zionist paper pointed out that Hezbollah is constantly working to refine its technical capabilities, as evidenced by a move toward faster fiber-optic networks that can enhance the group’s data-streaming capacity and provide a stouter defense against Israeli electronic warfare capabilities.

“Hezbollah not only prevented Israeli units from jamming its networks south of the Litani River in the July 2006 war, it reportedly had equipment in place to jam Israeli radar and communications systems.”

“For operational security reasons, Hezbollah migrated to closed telephone circuits that operate independent of Lebanese government networks. During fighting in the Syrian town of Qusair in 2013, Hezbollah again showed its penchant for operations security by devising a complex system that allowed its fighters to talk freely on open radio communications without having to be too concerned about conversations being intercepted.”

Hezbollah has been a fact of life since the early 1980s and, given the group’s remarkable ability to operate in the information environment, will likely remain the most dominant and capable terrorist group in the Middle East for decades to come, JPost’s article concluded.

SourceIsraeli media

 

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‘Israeli’ Defeat … Not Just a Failure هزيمة إسرائيلية… لا مجرد فشل

Ali Haider

06-09-2017 | 08:21

Benjamin Netanyahu did not stop with simply articulating the importance of Daesh in the context of the general ‘Israeli’ strategy to confront the axis of resistance, including Hezbollah (Al-Akhbar, 22 August 2017).

 

Israeli soldier


In an interview with the ‘Israeli’ Channel 20, he reiterated ‘Israel’s’ position opposing the elimination of the terrorist group, describing its demise as “bad” for ‘Israel’. He went on to describe the dangers surrounding the shrinking territory under Daesh control and the group’s ultimate elimination, pointing out that “Iran pursues regular infiltration into the areas left” by the terrorist organization.

Netanyahu implicitly admitted that “Daesh” was playing the role of a dam, which prevents the growing threat to ‘Israel’, warning of “an Iranian plan that threatens ‘Israel’ and the countries of the region” during the post “Daesh” era.

Netanyahu’s insistence on being distinguished from the American administration regarding the elimination of the barbaric organization stems from the recognition of the political and military institutions in Tel Aviv of the narrow ‘Israeli’ options in the post-Daesh phase, and that any other alternative option is unlikely to rise to the level of services the terrorist organizations provided to ‘Israel’ on Syrian soil.

It is true that the failure of ‘Israeli’ intelligence assessments to foresee the future of the political and field developments on the Syrian, Lebanese and regional arenas, was catastrophic – similar to the failures of Western and regional intelligence apparatuses. But ‘Israel’s’ problem lies not only in the fact that it was late in discovering the gravity of the outcome on the current regional battlefield and political scene. The crux of the problem also lies in the constraints that deter the ‘Israeli’ political and security decision makers from the operational initiative, which leads to a change in the course of developments and causes a shift in the balance of power, especially in the Syrian arena.

It may be said that ‘Israel’ stood by in the first months of the Syrian crisis. Estimates in Tel Aviv and regional and international capitals were reassuring that the fall of President Bashar al-Assad and the establishment of a Syrian regime in Damascus hostile to Hezbollah and the axis of resistance were only months away.

However, the intervention of Hezbollah and its regional allies in support of the Syrian army – which was not factored in by ‘Israel’ – knocked out ‘Israeli’ hopes and gambits. What ‘Israel’ considered, at the time, a preoccupation for Hezbollah in Syria that would pave the way for its depletion and an attack on it in Lebanon, later turned into a threat following the success of the party, the Syrian army and the allies in turning the field equations.

The ‘Israeli’ strategic dilemma is not limited to the failure of its bets on the armed groups in the Syrian and Lebanese arenas – in particular Daesh – to achieve Tel Aviv’s objectives. But it seems that this failure had strategic consequences and implications related to the growing capabilities of the axis of resistance, spilling over into its conflict with ‘Israel’, and paving the way for a regional scene quite different from the one prior to the Syrian war. From here, ‘Israel’ dealt with – and is still dealing with – this war as an ‘Israeli’ war that others are fighting.

From here, Tel Aviv found itself very concerned with the outcome of this battle. Therefore, Netanyahu, in order to reverse the reality in Lebanon and Syria, initiated a proactive political move through Washington and Moscow. He sent a high-level intelligence delegation to the former and he headed another delegation to the latter. He repeatedly mentioned military options and warned of Iranian positioning and of the growing capabilities of Hezbollah and the resistance axis in the Syrian and Lebanese arenas.

The harsh and successive criticism by ‘Israeli’ officials and experts in Tel Aviv of the Obama administration came over the latter’s reluctance to intervene directly to change the balance of power in Syria – specifically after the Russian intervention. This revealed ‘Israel’s’ assessment that altering the reality on the battlefield only happens through a direct military intervention that it cannot bear. This was in the hands of the Americans. However, the Trump administration distanced itself from this option to avoid falling into the same dilemma in the region as the previous administrations did after the invasion of Iraq.

In recent weeks, there have been many reports and interventions by ‘Israeli’ experts regarding the characterization of the victory of the Syrian state and its allies and the threat that has been formed and which could be formed in the wake of victory. One of the reports on the ‘Israeli’ Channel 2 pointed out that “‘Israel’ could have entered Syria to create a situation where the rebels, not Daesh nor Al Qaeda, could control the entire southern region to the southern outskirts of the capital Damascus. ‘Israel’ did not want to do that because we are deterred, both in the security establishment and, of course, in the political establishment.” The report stressed that ‘Israel’ was defeated because it “suffers from the complex of the first Lebanon war.” In this way, the report acknowledges the awareness that the resistance had engraved in ‘Israeli’ consciousness during the period leading up to the liberation in 2000, which deterred it from exploiting the Syrian scene.

But what the report failed to mention is the military intervention by proxy armed groups. This was the view circulated by the Jewish reports, imitating Russia’s choice and scenarios of its military intervention in Syria. However, ‘Israel’ did not adopt this option and did not demand it, because it simply understands that it was a 2006 war scenario, multiplied by a few times, despite its awareness of the dangers that stem form the liberation of Lebanon’s eastern border, the liberation of Iraq, and the withdrawal of the insurgents on the way to their final defeat in Syria. The ‘Israeli’ channel 2 displayed a clear reference to the ‘Israeli’ performance: “It completely violates the legacy of the Zionist movement before the establishment of the state, where the Arabic division of the Zionist agency was involved in the internal policy of each Arab capital.”

Thus, ‘Israel’s’ bets on “Daesh”, its brothers and those who preceded them have failed. It was defeated when it retreated from the operational initiative that compensated for this failure. It also failed to cut the road to Hezbollah’s increased capabilities and was defeated when it was deterred from exploiting its (Hezbollah’s) preoccupation with terrorist and takfiri groups to expand its range of attacks targeting the party’s capabilities in the Lebanese arena (the response to the Ghenta attack early 2014, as a model).

‘Israel’ failed in its intelligence assessments of the future of the Syrian and regional developments. It was defeated when it was unable to devise a parallel or alternative immediate option. It is an option present at the theoretical level, but its constraints are more present at the decision table. It also failed to convince the US administration to impose red lines to prevent the victory of the resistance axis. It was defeated when it did not take the initiative for this mission. Its bets to have Hezbollah preoccupied with the Takfiri threat on Lebanese territory failed along with efforts to consume Hezbollah with its rhetoric and the “policy of escalation” of an attack on Lebanon. But it was defeated before Hezbollah and the axis of resistance when Lebanon liberated its land, while at the same time maintaining a more effective deterrent equation than ever before.

Al-Akhbar Newspaper, Translated by website team

هزيمة إسرائيلية… لا مجرد فشل

علي حيدر

لم يكتف بنيامين نتنياهو بسلسلة المواقف التي أكد فيها أهمية دور «داعش» في سياق الاستراتيجية الإسرائيلية العامة لمواجهة محور المقاومة وحزب الله، («الأخبار»، ٢٢ آب ٢٠١٧). بل كرر قبل أيام، في مقابلة مع قناة «20» العبرية، موقف إسرائيل المعارض للقضاء على هذا التنظيم، واصفاً ذلك بأنه «أمر سيئ» لإسرائيل. وأسهب في وصف المخاطر المترتبة على تراجع سيطرة «داعش» والقضاء عليه، لافتاً إلى أن «إيران تنتهج التسلل المنتظم الى المناطق التي يتركها» التنظيم الإرهابي.

وأقر نتنياهو، ضمناً، بأن «داعش» كان يضطلع بدور السد الذي يحول دون تعاظم التهديد المحدق بإسرائيل، محذراً من «مخطط إيراني يهدد إسرائيل ودول المنطقة» في المرحلة التي تلي «داعش».
إصرار نتنياهو على التمايز عن الإدارة الأميركية في الموقف من القضاء على التنظيم المتوحش، ينطلق من إدراك المؤسستين السياسية والعسكرية في تل أبيب ضيق الخيارات الإسرائيلية في مرحلة ما بعد «داعش»، ومن أن أي خيار بديل آخر مفترض لن يرتقي الى مستوى الخدمات التي وفّرتها لإسرائيل التنظيمات الإرهابية على الأرض السورية.

صحيح أن فشل التقديرات الاستخبارية الإسرائيلية في استشراف مستقبل المسارات الميدانية والسياسية في الساحات السورية واللبنانية والإقليمية كان ذريعاً، شأنها شأن بقية الأجهزة الغربية والإقليمية. لكن مشكلة إسرائيل لا تكمن فقط في أنها اكتشفت متأخرة خطورة نتائج المشهد الميداني والسياسي الإقليمي الحالي، وما ينطوي عليه من مسارات مستقبلية، بل إن جوهر المشكلة يكمن تحديداً في القيود التي تردع صانع القرار السياسي والأمني الإسرائيلي عن المبادرة العملانية بما يؤدي الى تغير مسار التطورات، ويحدث انقلاباً في موازين القوى، وتحديداً في الساحة السورية.

قد يكون مفهوماً أن تقف إسرائيل موقف المتفرج في الأشهر الأولى من بدء الأحداث السورية، إذ إن التقديرات في تل أبيب والعواصم الإقليمية والدولية كانت مطمئنة الى أن سقوط الرئيس بشار الأسد وإحلال نظام سوري في دمشق معاد لحزب الله ومحور المقاومة لم يكونا سوى مسألة وقت لا يتعدى الأشهر.

إلا أن تدخل حزب الله وحلفائه الإقليميين لدعم الجيش السوري، وهو أمر لم يكن محسوباً ومقدراً جيداً في إسرائيل، أطاح الآمال والرهانات الإسرائيلية. وما حسبته إسرائيل، في حينه، إشغالاً لحزب الله في سوريا يمهّد لاستنزافه والانقضاض عليه في لبنان، تحوّل لاحقاً الى تهديد، بعد نجاح الحزب والجيش السوري والحلفاء في قلب المعادلات الميدانية.

المعضلة الاستراتيجية الإسرائيلية لا تقتصر فقط على فشل الرهانات على الجماعات المسلحة في الساحتين السورية واللبنانية، وتحديداً «داعش»، في تحقيق ما كان يؤمل منها. بل بدا أن لهذا الفشل نتائج وتداعيات استراتيجية، تتصل بتعاظم قدرات محور المقاومة، وتطال مجمل معادلة الصراع مع إسرائيل، وتعبّد الطريق أمام مشهد إقليمي مغاير تماماً لما كان قائماً قبل الحرب السورية. من هنا، تعاملت إسرائيل ــــ ولا تزال ــــ مع هذه الحرب، باعتبارها حرباً إسرائيلية يخوضها الآخرون عنها.

من هنا، وجدت تل أبيب نفسها معنية جداً بنتائج هذه المعركة. لذلك بادر نتنياهو، لقطع الطريق على الواقع المتشكل في لبنان وسوريا، الى خطوة سياسية استباقية على خطّي واشنطن وموسكو. فأرسل وفداً استخبارياً رفيعاً الى الأولى، وترأس آخر الى الثانية. وكرر التلويح بخيارات عسكرية، والتحذير من التموضع الإيراني، ومن تعاظم قدرات حزب الله ومحور المقاومة، في الساحتين السورية واللبنانية.

الانتقادات القاسية والمتوالية التي يوجهها المسؤولون الرسميون الإسرائيليون والخبراء في تل أبيب لإدارة الرئيس السابق باراك أوباما، بسبب عزوفها عن التدخل المباشر بما يغير موازين القوى في الساحة السورية ــــ وتحديداً بعد التدخل الروسي ــــ لتحقيق قدر من التوازن، كشفت عن تقدير إسرائيل بأن قلب المعادلات الميدانية لا يتم إلا بتدخل عسكري مباشر لا تقوى هي عليه، بل هو في يد الجانب الأميركي، فيما تبعد إدارة ترامب نفسها عن هذا الخيار منعاً للوقوع في ما وقعت فيه الإدارات السابقة في المنطقة بعد غزو العراق.

في الأسابيع الماضية كثر صدور تقارير ومداخلات من الخبراء الإسرائيليين، حول توصيف واقع انتصار الدولة السورية وحلفائها، والتهديد المتشكل، وذاك الممكن أن يتشكل، في أعقاب الانتصار. ومن بينها تقرير في القناة الثانية العبرية أشار الى أنه «كان بإمكان إسرائيل الدخول الى سوريا لإيجاد وضع يسيطر فيه المتمردون، لا داعش والقاعدة، على كل المنطقة الجنوبية حتى الأطراف الجنوبية للعاصمة دمشق. إسرائيل لم ترغب بفعل ذلك لأننا مردوعون، سواء في المؤسسة الأمنية، وبالطبع في المؤسسة السياسية». وأكد التقرير أن إسرائيل منيت بالهزيمة لأنها «تعاني من عقدة حرب لبنان الأولى». وهو بذلك أقر بكيّ الوعي الذي حفرته المقاومة في المرحلة التي أعقبت تلك الحرب، وصولاً الى التحرير عام 2000، الأمر الذي ردعها عن استغلال المشهد السوري.

لكن ما لم يشر إليه التقرير هو التدخل العسكري عن بعد وترك الميدان للجماعات المسلحة. وهو رأي جرى تداوله في التقارير العبرية، في تقليد لخيار روسيا وسيناريوات تدخلها العسكري في سوريا. مع ذلك، لم تتبنّ إسرائيل هذا الخيار ولم تطالب به، لأنها تدرك، ببساطة، أنه سيناريو حرب عام 2006، مضروباً بأضعاف، رغم إدراكها المخاطر التي ستترتب عن تحرير الحدود الشرقية للبنان، وتحرير العراق، وتراجع المسلحين في الطريق الى الهزيمة النهائية في سوريا. وفي القناة الثانية العبرية إشارة واضحة الى الأداء الإسرائيلي: «يخالف كلياً إرث الحركة الصهيونية قبل قيام الدولة، حيث إن القسم العربي في الوكالة الصهيونية كان متورطاً في السياسة الداخلية لكل عاصمة عربية».
هكذا تكون إسرائيل قد فشلت في الرهان على «داعش» وإخوته ومن سبقهم. وهزمت عندما تراجعت عن المبادرة العملانية التي تعوض هذا الفشل. كما فشلت في قطع الطريق على تعاظم قدرات حزب الله، وهزمت عندما تم ردعها عن استغلال انشغاله في مواجهة الجماعات الإرهابية والتكفيرية لتوسيع نطاق اعتداءاتها التي تستهدف قدرات الحزب في الساحة اللبنانية. (الرد على اعتداء جنتا مطلع عام 2014، نموذجاً).

فشلت إسرائيل في تقديراتها الاستخبارية إزاء مستقبل التطورات السورية والإقليمية، وهزمت عندما لم تتمكن من بلورة خيار بديل فوري أو مواز. وهو خيار حاضر على المستوى النظري، إلا أن قيوده أكثر حضوراً على طاولة القرار. كذلك فشلت في إقناع الإدارة الأميركية بفرض خطوط حمر تمنع انتصار محور المقاومة، وهزمت عندما لم تبادر هي بنفسها لهذه المهمة. فشلت في الرهان على مفاعيل إشغال حزب الله بالتهديد التكفيري على الأراضي اللبنانية، وفشلت في إشغال حزب الله بمواجهة تهويلها و«سياسة التوثب» للاعتداء على لبنان، عن مواجهة التهديد التكفيري. لكنها هزمت أمام حزب الله، ومحور المقاومة، عندما حرر لبنان أرضه، وحافظ في الوقت نفسه على معادلة ردع، أكثر نجاعة وفعالية، من أي وقت مضى.

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Lessons Learned From Hezbollah

04-09-2017 | 15:14

During the 1999 election campaign Ehud Barak, who challenged and defeated Benjamin Netanyahu, promised to withdraw the “Israel” Occupation Force from the south Lebanon security zone. As prime minister and defense minister, he made good on that promise and unilaterally withdrew IOF forces to the international occupied Palestine-Lebanon border.

Southern Lebanon

Betrayed and left behind was “Israel’s” ally, the “South Lebanon Army” that had for years fought shoulder to shoulder with the IOF against Hezbollah, sustaining more than its share of casualties.

A great sigh of relief was heard throughout the land – it was hoped that this would put an end to the casualties the IOF was sustaining, while protecting “Israeli” settlers in the north. The theory presented to the public was that after the IOF withdrawal, Hezbollah would have no further motivation to attack “Israel”. In any case, “Israel” would now be in a position to carry out drastic retaliation in the event of a Hezbollah attack, and that this would suffice to deter Hezbollah. Lebanese earth would tremble, Barak warned, if that should happen. But it did happen again and again, and Lebanese earth did not tremble. Hezbollah did not become what we wished it would be. It grew many-fold in size and strength, and continued to be an implacable enemy of “Israel”.

What had been a limited danger from Katyusha rockets to the towns on the “Israeli” entity’s northern border, grew in the intervening 17 years to a major danger to the entire settlers population and much of the country’s infrastructure, which are threatened by a Hezbollah arsenal of more than 100,000 rockets and missiles aimed at all of “Israel”. It is the primary threat facing the entity at this time.

The “Israeli” entity received a reminder of the growing threat six years after the withdrawal, during the Second Lebanon War in 2006, in which 121 soldiers and 44 settlers died and over 2,000 soldiers and settlers were injured. The threat has grown dramatically since then, magnified by the presence of Hezbollah and Iranian forces in parts of Syria.

What went wrong? How did successive “Israeli” regimes allow a minor danger to northern “Israel” to grow into a major threat to the entire country?

It started with the withdrawal from the south Lebanon security zone. It was an abandonment of David Ben-Gurion’s credo that it was the task of IOF soldiers to protect the entity’s settler population and that in performing this task it would inevitably suffer casualties.

This change in policy was never announced, but gradually, almost imperceptibly, it became part of the entity’s attitude toward the dangers it was facing. It reflected a feeling that it was more painful to suffer casualties among the “Israeli” entity’s soldiers than among its settler population.

The withdrawal, far from convincing Hezbollah to refrain from further aggression against “Israel”, created the impression that Hezbollah had scored a victory over “Israel” and eventually led to Hezbollah taking control of Lebanon.

It was the result of a misreading of the rationale motivating Hezbollah, which was and continues to be a revolutionary organization pledged to bringing about the destruction of “Israel”. An organization whose leaders believe that they are following the orders of Allah will not be dissuaded from pursuing its goal.

And relying on deterrence, a concept which in any case is ill-defined and nebulous, has little meaning when applied to a terrorist organization. While “Israeli” decision makers over the years felt that they were deterring Hezbollah from attacking “Israel”, that the increasing arsenal of Hezbollah rockets and missiles was destined to rust away on the scrap heap, Hezbollah succeeded in reaching a point where it was successfully deterring the entity from taking action to destroy its growing arsenal of weapons.

Now the Hezbollah missile threat constitutes the most immediate and major threat facing the “Israeli” entity. There are no easy answers in dealing with this threat, but it is important to be aware of the mistakes the entity has made over the years in dealing with Hezbollah. This awareness of past mistakes is part of the answer to dealing with this threat.

Source: Haaretz, Edited by website team

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Hassan Nasrallah: Israel is in despair after the defeats of Daesh

Source

Speech by Hezbollah Secretary General Sayed Hassan Nasrallah on 28 August 2017 on the occasion of the Second Liberation, following the complete surrender of the terrorists of Daech and Al-Nosra in Lebanon

Transcript:

[…] We are truly facing a great victory (against Daesh in Lebanon). From there, consider that on May 25, 2000, we expelled the Zionist Occupying (Lebanon) and today we all (the Syrian and Lebanese armies and Islamic Resistance) have expelled the occupying terrorist takfiri. This is one of the fundamental similarities.

On the border, vast and sensitive areas (mountains, hills, strategic positions) were in the hands of the Zionists, and here also, vast expanses, mountains, heights, hills, strategic positions were in the hands of the takfiris. At the border, accross the international border, the Israelis were a permanent threat and that is always the case, and takfiris were a threat at every moment against all of Lebanon, especially against all the Bekaa, not only against Baalbeck-Hermel and border villages.

Lately, everyone knows that they planned there, in the Jurd of Ersal, Daesh was preparing suicide operations and attacks in Zahle and in the surrounding villages, but the intelligence services of the Lebanese army discovered them before the operations were conducted.

Today we face this reality. And maybe it would come to the mind of some to say “ô Sayed [Nasrallah], as regards Israel, it is something very different (from what happens today).” But no, it is a continuation. Day after day, it is shown that these Daesh and takfiri groups have been created by American power and fought to realize the Israeli project. They fought (in the interest of the) Israeli project. And what these takfiri terrorist groups have offered Israel, Israel could never get for decades.

And more dangerously… I do not want to classify these two dangers, because I believe that these terrorist groups are fighting within the American-Israeli project, whether they know it or not. Their leaders know for sure. The fools are the fighters who got fooled by false and superficial slogans. Israel is an occupation and hegemony project. Israel is an occupying project. The United States are a project of hegemony. Daesh and other takfiri groups are an extermination project. The extermination of all that is different (from them): Muslim, Christian, Sabean, Yazdi, everything. That is an extermination project. The extermination of man, of History, of civilization, of society, of all things. And then when our region is destroyed, its armies, its plans, its states, its institutions, its social structure, it will be offered (on a silver platter), primed, cooked to perfection, roasted and stuffed to America and Israel, so that they seize it and impose their conditions on everyone.

And that’s why today, who is shedding tears over the fate of Daesh in Syria, in Qalamoun and in Iraq? Netanyahu and Israeli officials! It is they who mourn (bitterly) and yell sorrowful lamentations! Currently, their problem with the Trump administration is that it committed itself to the eradication of Daesh as a priority, the same administration that recognizes that this is the Obama (and Clinton) administration who created Daesh. This is why no one should come and say that there is a big difference between the Liberation of South(-Lebanon in 2000 against Israel) and this battle (against Daesh) and that the liberation of South ranks first (in importance), and that (the Liberation of our borders) is in 10th place (for example) in any way! (Liberation of southern Lebanon against Israel) is first, (the Liberation of our borders against Daech) comes right away in second place! For it is a continuation of the battle against Israel.

Read Israeli (statements and press). (Unfortunately), the Lebanese and the Arabs do not read much. Read what they say, what they write, especially these days, with the ongoing eradication of Daesh in Iraq, Syria and Lebanon, so that you realize clearly that Daesh is a true Israeli project.

We are indeed facing the Second Liberation (of Lebanon). The date of the First Liberation is May 25, 2000. The date of the Second Liberation, for history, is today (28 August 2017). I do not mean the day (to be selected for an annual commemoration of this event). Today we wrote… Last time, today’s date, August 28, 2017, was empty (of any commemoration) in the calendar. But not for 2018. By the will of God, this day and this month are written by the Lebanese Army, the Syrian army and fighters of the Islamic Resistance in Lebanon. This was written today (in the annals of History): August 28, 2017 is the Day of the Second Liberation, which will be recorded as a glorious day in the history of Lebanon and the history of the region.

Now whether the Lebanese government (led by the pro-Saudi Saad Hariri and his March 14 coalition, facing the movement of March 8, with Hezbollah and its allies) recognizes it or not, that’s their problem, just like what happened on May 25, 2000. The situation was somewhat different at the time, that date was declared a national holiday, then was removed from the calendar at the time of a previous Prime Minister. But then, thanks to God, a head of government redid the occasion of May 25 a day of remembrance.

We now have an opportunity to commemorate: August 28, 2017. I speak only of the historical event that took place on August 28, I do not write the history (and national holidays) myself. But today there is no longer any daeshiste, takfiri, (member of) Al-Nusra Front or (any other terrorist) on the least grain of sand, any mountain or any Lebanese hill. It was on that date (this event occurred). After that, if the government wants to keep that date, or choose August 27, August 25, August 31 or September 3 (for the commemoration), I have no problem. I do not precede anyone, I speak only of the historical event.

On this basis, I wish to conclude with this call (to celebrate this event this Thursday 31st, the day of Arafat, on the eve of Eid-al-Adha): you remember that on May 25, 2000, it is all Lebanon who won, and Lebanon was happy with the victory (against Israel), with the exception of those who had placed their hopes in the Israeli occupation, and there were (a number) in the country, and those who had placed their hopes in the army of Antoine Lahd. So on that day, there was a majority (of Lebanese) happy, and (a minority) of people whose faces were darkened (with bitterness) because their plans had collapsed.

Today… But (in 2000), the happiest people, despite the fact that it was a national day, celebration and victory, were southerners, residents of southern Lebanon and Jabal Amel who were the happiest of all with this victory and this Liberation. The reason is simple: it is because the occupation took place on their mountains, their hills, their cities, it is their sons and daughters who were imprisoned, their peasants and farmer were fired at, and a daily threat was hanging over them. We remember the bombing against Sidon and Nabatiye and children and schoolchildren’s heads torn in the streets. It is quite normal that the people of the South, who are those who have suffered most and have the most sacrificed,were (more) happy on May 25, 2000.

Today, all of Lebanon won, and logically, the vast majority (of the population) is pleased, with the exception of those who have placed their hopes on the Al-Nusra Front, on Daesh and the regional states and world powers that stand behind them. It is understandable that they are angry, saddened and dismayed, and they offer their condolences, it is normal. And a few days ago, 2 or 3 weeks, they have insulted, reviled and slandered us, but let them act as they please. We understand their sadness and pain.

But with certainty, the vast majority of Lebanese are happy because without these (victorious) confrontations for several years to date, Daesh, the Al-Nusra Front and their like could have seized the Bekaa, the North and reached other places in Lebanon and we would have experienced a disaster. See what happened in the country and the societies around us (Syria, Iraq, Libya).

But it is also natural that the happiest people in the Second Liberation are our noble people of the Bekaa. They are the ones whose mountains, Jurds and fields, were attacked with car bombs and suicide bombers, against Hermel, Bekaa and Ras Baalbek, and the whole area was threatened upto all Zahle and the Bekaa, and now that this nightmare disappeared from their mountains, their hills, their Jurds, their homes and their lands, they sure are going to be the happiest of all. For they have suffered more than all, and in this battle, it is among them that there was the most sacrificed (martyrs).

It is true that our brothers, our families and the officers and soldiers of the Lebanese Army came from all regions of Lebanon and fought on this front, but there is no doubt that today in the Bekaa, there are no villages, especially in Baalbek-Hermel, in which are not found one, two or three martyrs, and one, two or three wounded. The Bekaa residents have also shaped this victory by the blood of their loved ones and their children, the apple of their eyes, the best elements among their young men. Not to mention the wounded who are still in the homes and in hospitals. Therefore it is normal that they are happy, congratulate themselves and take pride in this victory which is a national victory in general,but especially a victory for the Bekaa. […]

Translation: http://sayed7asan.blogspot.fr

بعد انقلاب السحر الداعشي القاعدي على الساحر لا بد من اعادة بناء الجدران والتصدي للمقاومات العربية العابرة لحدود سايكس بيكو

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‘Israel’ and Hezbollah Eye Their Next War

Local Editor

Looking back on the lessons of 2006, the problem for ‘Israel’ is that Hezbollah is even stronger and better prepared today than it was then, according to The Cipher Brief, a website specialized in intelligence, security and analytic affairs.

War

According to Tony Badran, Fellow at the Foundation for the Defense of Democracies, “Hezbollah was gaining military experience on the [Syrian] battlefield and via cooperation with Russia.”

Now the group’s 25,000 reservists receive more advanced training, the website added.

At the same time, the explosion in Hezbollah’s rocket arsenal since 2006 – now larger than the supply of most NATO countries – means that the group can launch salvoes of roughly 1,000 missiles per day, anywhere within ‘Israel’, during a future conflict.

Hezbollah’s anti-ship missile capabilities might also allow resistance movement to establish an effective naval blockade of ‘Israel.’

Finally, according to the website, most experts assume that Hezbollah maintains a vast network of tunnels under the border, allowing it to disgorge fighters into ‘Israeli’-occupied territory for raids behind the lines.

However, at the end of the day, a true war with Hezbollah will cost ‘Israel’ dearly. Even if the Iron Dome works as expected, many missiles will likely break through to military targets.

In turn, ‘Israel’ would need to launch a sustained ground invasion against well-trained and well-prepared Hezbollah.

David Schenker, Director of the Program on Arab Politics at the Washington Institute, notes that “while many people [in ‘Israel’] might support whacking Hezbollah, there is the basic fact that the last time this happened [in 2006], it took 34 days… this could drag on for some time and, like last time, it could not only cripple the economy throughout the north of ‘Israel,’ it could cripple the economy…”

In addition to the human toll of war, ‘Israeli’ leaders may not be willing to risk the political consequences of a major conflict. This is a problem for ‘Israel.’

Meanwhile, nowhere is this threat clearer than in Lebanon, where Hezbollah boasts thousands of soldiers, deep political influence, and an arsenal of up to 150,000 rockets, the website concluded.

Source: The Cipher Brief, Edited by website team

30-08-2017 | 14:35

Jamil Esayyed connecting the Dots (2005 -2017)

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