The story of Hezbollah anti-aircraft missile


July 13, 2019

TEHRAN –Secretary-General of Hezbollah Seyyed Hassan Nasrallah revealed two strategic surprises for the military and intelligence services of the West, especially the Zionists in the anniversary of 33-day Israeli war.

July 12 marked the 13th anniversary of the beginning of the 33-day Israeli regime’s war on Lebanon that resistance group, Hezbollah, managed to defeat the Zionist enemy by preventing it from achieving any of its targets. Secretary-General of Hezbollah Seyyed Hassan Nasrallah delivered a speech on the latest developments in Lebanon and the region. There are notable points in his speech which are extremely impressive in terms of achieving a military transformation in Hezbollah as follow:

-The resistance today is more powerful than before. Capabilities of Radwan Force and Al-Abbas Brigades will be shown more in future wars.

-It is not comparable to 13 years ago in the field of advanced weapons as well as missiles with pinpoint accuracy in both quality and quantity.

-Increasing intelligence superiority not only on the land but also in sea and air fields over the regime.

-The most strategic area of Israel; the ‘Israeli’ coast is under the resistance’s fire, including the 70-km long ‘Israeli’ coast starting from Netanya and ending by Ashdod which includes the most strategic Israeli sites (Ben Gurion airport, arms depots, petrochemical plants, Tel Aviv and Ashdod ports). Any possible war will result in vast destruction of occupied lands which are considered as heart of the regime.

-The ability to seize and recapture areas of occupied Palestine, including the important area of  Galilee.

-Possibility of having an anti-aircraft missile is the most important issues of Hezbollah which is the strategic surprise for the military and intelligence services of the Zionists.

The main mission of the Zionist intelligence and military services during the Syrian war was to prevent transfer of missiles or, more importantly, advanced missile technology to Hezbollah. The Zionist has targeted any places or caravan which were likely to transfer missiles to Hezbollah during these years. Therefore, the first question for world’s intelligence and military services is now how advanced anti-aircraft missiles have been transmitted to Hezbollah?!

In recent years, Israel has been struggling to compensate for its military defeats by air strikes of its advanced aircrafts. In this regards, Nasrallah believes that the air force will not determine the war’s conclusion. In other words, Hezbollah has now been able to probably undermine the latest strategic military superiority of the Zionist regime.

But perhaps one of the most sophisticated messages from Nasrallah’s speeches is the response to Netanyahu’s recent threat of using advanced military aircraft such as the F35 to attack some of Iran’s nuclear facilities. Over the past years, the Zionist regime has repeatedly emphasized that it is able to target Iran’s nuclear facilities by using its own aircraft without U.S. support, like attacking some of the nuclear facilities of Syria in the past. It means that Nasrallah has transmitted this strategic message to the threat of Netanyahu’s air strike to Iran that Hezbollah would down the Israel’s aircraft if necessary. Israel’s aircraft cannot target any parts of Iran as Iran’s air force has downed the U.S. advanced drone last weeks.


«Israeli» Army: A Hezbollah Fighter Is Equal to A Tank جيش العدو: مقاتل حزب الله يساوي دبابة

By Ali Haidar – Al-Akhbar Newspaper

13 years after the 2006 war, which sought to crush Hezbollah and establish a new Middle East, the Chief of Staff of the “Israeli” army Aviv Kochavi held a session for the general staff on January 16 of this year. During the session, he displayed graphics about the “serious transformation process” Hezbollah has undergone [along with Hamas in the Gaza Strip] from being a militia to a “terrorist army” [not in an organizational sense but at the level of capabilities].

Image result for aviv kochavi

The chief of staff stressed that the “qualitative gap” between this “army” and the “Israeli” army is shrinking, and that Hezbollah [along with the Palestinian resistance factions] continues to develop and exploit its relative superiority in camouflaging and [hiding] underground as well as building its offensive force. It is also improving the quantity of its missiles and their precision while employing relatively new means of combat such as drones.

The content of this report summarizes the nature of the outcomes of the 2006 war and reveals the scale of the transformation to the equations of conflict. Most notable among them is that it laid the groundwork for the crystallization of a regional resistance force whose features are more evident today. Kochavi’s choice of words confirms the “Israeli” security establishment’s official reading of the extent of the challenge posed by the party [Hezbollah] in the face of “Israeli” ambitions in Lebanon and the wider region.

Calling Hezbollah an army is no longer just the work of a professional journalist in Tel Aviv or an estimate of an expert [regardless of whether the party adopts it]. It was proclaimed by the current chief of staff of the army. This reveals the magnitude of the challenge Hezbollah poses in the consciousness of the military decision makers as well as the political establishment in “Israel”.

This official assessment includes two dimensions: first, it reveals the magnitude of “Israel’s” defeat in the 2006 war [because its outcome was not limited to its failure in achieving its objectives, but Hezbollah imposed its will and achieved many of its objectives related to the next phase].

Second, it reveals the “Israeli” security establishment’s recognition of the strategic threat that Hezbollah has become. All this explains the senior leadership’s hesitation to embark on a direct military confrontation with Hezbollah over the years that followed. In the words of [Eliyahu] Winograd, a few thousand fighters during the 2006 war became an army that threatened the strategic depth of the “Israeli” entity with the ability to defend and attack as well.

What aggravates the problem for “Israel” and what Kochavi acknowledges is that Hezbollah is reducing the qualitative gap between itself and the developing “Israeli” army, raising the level of danger among military commanders. As for the political decision-makers, it has weakened their confidence in their choices and readiness to pursue objectives in any perceived war by “Israel”.

This danger in the “Israeli” conscience also stems from the fact that Hezbollah was able to achieve all these victories even before it came to possess these kinds of advanced capabilities and despite the fact that “Israel” has been and still is the most developed army, capable of destruction at all levels.

A senior military officer explained the race between Hezbollah’s defensive preparedness and the “Israeli” army’s aggressive preparedness in one of his lectures a few years back. He said the good news in the development of the level of preparedness is that the “Israeli” army is able to achieve in four days what took 33 days in the 2006 war. But he added that the bad news is that Hezbollah is also able to hit in four days what it hit in 33 days.

What is brilliant in this course is that the enemy’s army realized that Hezbollah did not fall into the trap of becoming a regular army. The resistance movement, however, employed the strategic capabilities in accordance with the tactic of guerrilla warfare. Thus, producing an unprecedented formula, which allowed it to succeed in confronting an army possessing the latest military and technological capabilities. This took away the resolve of the “Israelis’” and gave Hezbollah the element of survival and ability to continue fighting.

Kochavi pointed out the aforementioned by stating that the party “continues to exploit its relative superiority in camouflaging… and [hiding] underground”. This is in reference to the superiority of this tactic by which Hezbollah can contain the effects of the enemy’s military superiority in terms of intensity, speed, destruction and accuracy.

The party’s ingenuity, which is ever-present in the minds of the enemy’s leaders and experts, covered all areas. However, the most prominent these days is the sharp debate at all levels about whether the “Israeli” army possesses the readiness to fight a ground battle. This debate among senior experts and related institutions reveals the extent of concern over the issue of Hezbollah’s development and readiness to face the “Israeli” ground forces.

As a result, “Israel” is witnessing a continuing debate about the ability of its ground forces to be decisive in case of an incursion into Lebanese territory. It is striking that those who oppose this option directly acknowledge that Hezbollah is capable of confronting “Israeli” armored vehicles by relying on its fighters.

Image result for Major General Amir Eshel

In this regard, the former commander of the “Israeli” Air Force, Major General Amir Eshel, explained during the Herzliya conference a few days ago that the fighter is doing what the tank used to do in the past. He pointed out that even if a military squad penetrated deep into Lebanese territory, when it reaches the friction zone, Hezbollah fighters would emerge from the tunnels or behind them. This will lead to the crystallization of an equal field reality, which is very, very complicated!


جيش العدو: مقاتل حزب الله يساوي دبابة

علي حيدر

الجمعة 12 تموز 2019

جيش العدو: مقاتل حزب الله يساوي دبابة

بعد 13 عاماً على حرب عام 2006 التي هدفت إلى سحق حزب الله وإقامة شرق أوسط جديد، عقد رئيس أركان جيش العدو أفيف كوخافي، جلسة لهيئة أركان الجيش في 16/1/2019، عرض فيها «غرافيكس» تشير إلى «عملية تحوّل خطيرة» يمرّ بها حزب الله (ومعه حركة حماس في قطاع غزة)، من ميليشيا إلى «جيش إرهابي» (ليس بالمعنى التنظيمي، بل على مستوى القدرات). رئيس الأركان شدد على أن «الفجوة النوعية» بين هذا «الجيش» والجيش الإسرائيلي تتقلص، وأن حزب الله (ومعه فصائل المقاومة الفلسطينية) يواصل التطور واستغلال تفوقه النسبي في التخفي وتحت الأرض، ويبني قوة هجومية ويحسِّن كمية صواريخه ودقّتها، ويُدخل إلى الخدمة وسائل قتالية جديدة نسبياً مثل المحلّقات والطائرات المسيّرة وغيرها.

يختصر مضمون هذا التقرير حقيقة نتائج حرب عام 2006، ويكشف عن حجم التحول الذي أحدثته في معادلات الصراع، وأبرزها أنها أسست لبلورة قوة مقاومة إقليمية باتت معالمها أكثر جلاءً اليوم. وتؤكد مفردات كوخافي القراءة الرسمية للمؤسسة الأمنية الإسرائيلية لحجم التحدي الذي يمثله الحزب في مواجهة الأطماع الإسرائيلية في لبنان والمنطقة.

لم يعد وصف حزب الله بالجيش مجرد اجتهاد صحافي مختص في تل أبيب، أو تقدير لأحد الخبراء (بغضّ النظر عمّا إذا كان الحزب يتبناه)، بل صدر على لسان رئيس الأركان الحالي للجيش. وهو ما يكشف عن حجم التحدي الذي يمثله حزب الله في وعي صناع القرار الأمني، ومن ورائهم المؤسسة السياسية في إسرائيل. وينطوي هذا التقويم الرسمي على بعدين: الأول أنه يكشف عن حجم الهزيمة التي تلقتها إسرائيل في حرب 2006 (لأن نتيجتها لم تقتصر فقط على فشلها في تحقيق أهدافها، بل إن حزب الله فرض إرادته وحقق كثيراً من أهدافه ذات الصلة في المرحلة التي تلت وبالاستناد إلى ما حققه من انتصار في تلك الحرب).

والثاني، أنه يكشف عن إدراك المؤسسة الإسرائيلية الأمنية للتهديد الاستراتيجي الذي أصبح يشكله حزب الله. ويفسّر كل هذا التردد لدى القيادة العليا في اتخاذ قرار بخوض مواجهة عسكرية مباشرة معه طوال السنوات التي تلت. فمَن كان بضعة آلاف من المقاتلين خلال حرب 2006، بحسب تعبير فينوغراد، أصبح جيشاً يهدد العمق الاستراتيجي للكيان الإسرائيلي، ويملك القدرة على الدفاع والهجوم أيضاً.

ما يفاقم المشكلة بالنسبة إلى إسرائيل، أن حزب الله، باعتراف كوخافي، يقلص الفجوة النوعية في مقابل تطور الجيش الإسرائيلي، وهو ما رفع مستوى الخطورة في وعي القادة العسكريين. وبالنسبة إلى صناع القرار السياسي، أضعف ثقتهم بكون خياراتهم وجاهزيتهم قادرة على تحقيق المؤمَّل من أي حرب مفترضة قد تشنها إسرائيل.

تنبع هذه الخطورة أيضاً، في الوعي الإسرائيلي، من حقيقة أن حزب الله استطاع أن يحقق كل هذه الانتصارات في مواجهة إسرائيل، ومن قبل أن يملك هذا المستوى من القدرات المتطورة، رغم أن إسرائيل كانت ولا تزال الأكثر تطوراً وقدرة على التدمير في كافة المستويات. وأبرز من اختصر سباق الجاهزية الدفاعية لحزب الله، والجاهزية العدوانية للجيش الإسرائيلي، أحد كبار ضباط المؤسسة العسكرية، الذي أوضح في محاضرة له قبل سنوات، أن الخبر الجيد في تطور الجاهزية، هو أن الجيش الإسرائيلي بات قادراً في أربعة أيام على ضرب ما احتاج إلى 33 يوماً في حرب عام 2006. لكنه يُضيف أن الخبر السيئ هو أن حزب الله بات قادراً أيضاً على أن يضرب في أربعة أيام ما قام به في 33 يوماً.

حزب الله بات قادراً على أن يضرب في أربعة أيام ما ضربه في 33 يوماً

ذروة التألق في هذا المسار أن جيش العدو أدرك أن حزب الله لم يقع في فخ التحول إلى جيش نظامي، بل طوَّع القدرات الاستراتيجية وفق تكتيك حرب العصابات، فأنتج صيغة غير مسبوقة نجح في ضوئها بمواجهة جيش يمتلك أحدث القدرات العسكرية والتكنولوجية، فسلب الإسرائيلي القدرة على الحسم ومنح حزب الله عنصري البقاء واستمرار النيران. وهو ما أشار إليه كوخافي أيضاً بالقول إن الحزب «يواصل استغلال تفوقه النسبي في التخفي… وتحت الأرض»، في إشارة إلى ما يوفره هذا التكتيك من تفوق يستطيع من خلاله حزب الله احتواء مفاعيل التفوق الناري لجيش العدو، كثافة وسرعة وتدميراً ودقة.

مع أن إبداعات الحزب، التي حضرت لدى قادة العدو وخبرائه، شملت كافة المجالات، إلا أن أكثرها حضوراً في هذه الأيام، هو السجال الحاد على كافة المستويات حول ما إذا كان الجيش الإسرائيلي يتمتع بالجاهزية لخوض معركة برية في مواجهة. يكشف هذا السجال والمديات التي بلغها بين كبار الخبراء وداخل المؤسسات ذات الصلة، عن حضور حجم تطور جهوزية الحزب لمواجهة سلاح البر الإسرائيلي. نتيجة ذلك، تشهد إسرائيل سجالاً متواصلاً حول قدرة سلاح البر على الحسم في حال اقتحام الأراضي اللبنانية. واللافت أن من يعارضون هذا الخيار، يقرّون مباشرة بأن حزب الله قادر من خلال الاعتماد على مقاتليه على مواجهة سلاح المدرعات الإسرائيلي. وفي هذا المجال أوضح قائد سلاح الجو الإسرائيلي السابق اللواء أمير إيشل، خلال مؤتمر هرتسيليا قبل أيام، أن المقاتل بات يقوم بما كانت تقوم به الدبابة في السابق. ولفت إلى أنه حتى لو توغلت فرقة عسكرية إلى عمق الأراضي اللبنانية، فإنها عندما ستصل إلى منطقة الاحتكاك سيخرج إليها (مقاتلو حزب الله) من الأنفاق ومن خلفها وما شاكل، وهو ما سيؤدي إلى تبلور واقع ميداني متساوٍ، وهو أمر معقد جداً جداً!

Burying the Nakba: How Israel systematically hides evidence of 1948 expulsion of Arabs

By Hagar Shezaf

Since early last decade, Defense Ministry teams have scoured local archives and removed troves of historic documents to conceal proof of the Nakba

July 05, 2019 “Information Clearing House” –   Four years ago, historian Tamar Novick was jolted by a document she found in the file of Yosef Vashitz, from the Arab Department of the left-wing Mapam Party, in the Yad Yaari archive at Givat Haviva. The document, which seemed to describe events that took place during the 1948 war, began:

“Safsaf [former Palestinian village near Safed] – 52 men were caught, tied them to one another, dug a pit and shot them. 10 were still twitching. Women came, begged for mercy. Found bodies of 6 elderly men. There were 61 bodies. 3 cases of rape, one east of from Safed, girl of 14, 4 men shot and killed. From one they cut off his fingers with a knife to take the ring.”

The writer goes on to describe additional massacres, looting and abuse perpetrated by Israeli forces in Israel’s War of Independence. “There’s no name on the document and it’s not clear who’s behind it,” Dr. Novick tells Haaretz. “It also breaks off in the middle. I found it very disturbing. I knew that finding a document like this made me responsible for clarifying what happened.”

The Upper Galilee village of Safsaf was captured by the Israel Defense Forces in Operation Hiram toward the end of 1948. Moshav Safsufa was established on its ruins. Allegations were made over the years that the Seventh Brigade committed war crimes in the village. Those charges are supported by the document Novick found, which was not previously known to scholars. It could also constitute additional evidence that the Israeli top brass knew about what was going on in real time.

Novick decided to consult with other historians about the document. Benny Morris, whose books are basic texts in the study of the Nakba – the “calamity,” as the Palestinians refer to the mass emigration of Arabs from the country during the 1948 war – told her that he, too, had come across similar documentation in the past. He was referring to notes made by Mapam Central Committee member Aharon Cohen on the basis of a briefing given in November 1948 by Israel Galili, the former chief of staff of the Haganah militia, which became the IDF. Cohen’s notes in this instance, which Morris published, stated: “Safsaf 52 men tied with a rope. Dropped into a pit and shot. 10 were killed. Women pleaded for mercy. [There were] 3 cases of rape. Caught and released. A girl of 14 was raped. Another 4 were killed. Rings of knives.”

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Morris’ footnote (in his seminal “The Birth of the Palestinian Refugee Problem, 1947-1949”) states that this document was also found in the Yad Yaari Archive. But when Novick returned to examine the document, she was surprised to discover that it was no longer there.

“At first I thought that maybe Morris hadn’t been accurate in his footnote, that perhaps he had made a mistake,” Novick recalls. “It took me time to consider the possibility that the document had simply disappeared.” When she asked those in charge where the document was, she was told that it had been placed behind lock and key at Yad Yaari – by order of the Ministry of Defense.

Since the start of the last decade, Defense Ministry teams have been scouring Israel’s archives and removing historic documents. But it’s not just papers relating to Israel’s nuclear project or to the country’s foreign relations that are being transferred to vaults: Hundreds of documents have been concealed as part of a systematic effort to hide evidence of the Nakba.

The phenomenon was first detected by the Akevot Institute for Israeli-Palestinian Conflict Research. According to a report drawn up by the institute, the operation is being spearheaded by Malmab, the Defense Ministry’s secretive security department (the name is a Hebrew acronym for “director of security of the defense establishment”), whose activities and budget are classified. The report asserts that Malmab removed historical documentation illegally and with no authority, and at least in some cases has sealed documents that had previously been cleared for publication by the military censor. Some of the documents that were placed in vaults had already been published.

An investigative report by Haaretz found that Malmab has concealed testimony from IDF generals about the killing of civilians and the demolition of villages, as well as documentation of the expulsion of Bedouin during the first decade of statehood. Conversations conducted by Haaretz with directors of public and private archives alike revealed that staff of the security department had treated the archives as their property, in some cases threatening the directors themselves.

Yehiel Horev, who headed Malmab for two decades, until 2007, acknowledged to Haaretz that he launched the project, which is still ongoing. He maintains that it makes sense to conceal the events of 1948, because uncovering them could generate unrest among the country’s Arab population. Asked what the point is of removing documents that have already been published, he explained that the objective is to undermine the credibility of studies about the history of the refugee problem. In Horev’s view, an allegation made by a researcher that’s backed up by an original document is not the same as an allegation that cannot be proved or refuted.

The document Novick was looking for might have reinforced Morris’ work. During the investigation, Haaretz was in fact able to find the Aharon Cohen memo, which sums up a meeting of Mapam’s Political Committee on the subject of massacres and expulsions in 1948. Participants in the meeting called for cooperation with a commission of inquiry that would investigate the events. One case the committee discussed concerned “grave actions” carried out in the village of Al-Dawayima, east of Kiryat Gat. One participant mentioned the then-disbanded Lehi underground militia in this connection. Acts of looting were also reported: “Lod and Ramle, Be’er Sheva, there isn’t [an Arab] store that hasn’t been broken into. 9th Brigade says 7, 7th Brigade says 8.”

“The party,” the document states near the end, “is against expulsion if there is no military necessity for it. There are different approaches concerning the evaluation of necessity. And further clarification is best. What happened in Galilee – those are Nazi acts! Every one of our members must report what he knows.”

The Israeli version

One of the most fascinating documents about the origin of the Palestinian refugee problem was written by an officer in Shai, the precursor to the Shin Bet security service. It discusses why the country was emptied of so many of its Arab inhabitants, dwelling on the circumstances of each village. Compiled in late June 1948, it was titled “The Emigration of the Arabs of Palestine.”

Read a translation of the document here

This document was the basis for an article that Benny Morris published in 1986. After the article appeared, the document was removed from the archive and rendered inaccessible to researchers. Years later, the Malmab team reexamined the document, and ordered that it remain classified. They could not have known that a few years later researchers from Akevot would find a copy of the text and run it past the military censors – who authorized its publication unconditionally. Now, after years of concealment, the gist of the document is being revealed here.

The 25-page document begins with an introduction that unabashedly approves of the evacuation of the Arab villages. According to the author, the month of April “excelled in an increase of emigration,” while May “was blessed with the evacuation of maximum places.” The report then addresses “the causes of the Arab emigration.” According to the Israeli narrative that was disseminated over the years, responsibility for the exodus from Israel rests with Arab politicians who encouraged the population to leave. However, according to the document, 70 percent of the Arabs left as a result of Jewish military operations.

The unnamed author of the text ranks the reasons for the Arabs’ departure in order of importance. The first reason: “Direct Jewish acts of hostility against Arab places of settlement.” The second reason was the impact of those actions on neighboring villages. Third in importance came “operations by the breakaways,” namely the Irgun and Lehi undergrounds. The fourth reason for the Arab exodus was orders issued by Arab institutions and “gangs” (as the document refers to all Arab fighting groups); fifth was “Jewish ‘whispering operations’ to induce the Arab inhabitants to flee”; and the sixth factor was “evacuation ultimatums.”

The author asserts that, “without a doubt, the hostile operations were the main cause of the movement of the population.” In addition, “Loudspeakers in the Arabic language proved their effectiveness on the occasions when they were utilized properly.” As for Irgun and Lehi operations, the report observes that “many in the villages of central Galilee started to flee following the abduction of the notables of Sheikh Muwannis [a village north of Tel Aviv]. The Arab learned that it is not enough to forge an agreement with the Haganah and that there are other Jews [i.e., the breakaway militias] to beware of.”

The author notes that ultimatums to leave were especially employed in central Galilee, less so in the Mount Gilboa region. “Naturally, the act of this ultimatum, like the effect of the ‘friendly advice,’ came after a certain preparing of the ground by means of hostile actions in the area.”

An appendix to the document describes the specific causes of the exodus from each of scores of Arab locales: Ein Zeitun – “our destruction of the village”; Qeitiya – “harassment, threat of action”; Almaniya – “our action, many killed”; Tira – “friendly Jewish advice”; Al’Amarir – “after robbery and murder carried out by the breakaways”; Sumsum – “our ultimatum”; Bir Salim – “attack on the orphanage”; and Zarnuga – “conquest and expulsion.”

Short fuse

In the early 2000s, the Yitzhak Rabin Center conducted a series of interviews with former public and military figures as part of a project to document their activity in the service of the state. The long arm of Malmab seized on these interviews, too. Haaretz, which obtained the original texts of several of the interviews, compared them to the versions that are now available to the public, after large swaths of them were declared classified.

These included, for example, sections of the testimony of Brig. Gen. (res.) Aryeh Shalev about the expulsion across the border of the residents of a village he called “Sabra.” Later in the interview, the following sentences were deleted: “There was a very serious problem in the valley. There were refugees who wanted to return to the valley, to the Triangle [a concentration of Arab towns and villages in eastern Israel]. We expelled them. I met with them to persuade them not to want that. I have papers about it.”

In another case, Malmab decided to conceal the following segment from an interview that historian Boaz Lev Tov conducted with Maj. Gen. (res.) Elad Peled:

Lev Tov: “We’re talking about a population – women and children?”

Peled: “All, all. Yes.”

Lev Tov: “Don’t you distinguish between them?”

Peled: “The problem is very simple. The war is between two populations. They come out of their home.”

Lev Tov: “If the home exists, they have somewhere to return to?”

Peled: “It’s not armies yet, it’s gangs. We’re also actually gangs. We come out of the house and return to the house. They come out of the house and return to the house. It’s either their house or our house.”

Lev Tov: “Qualms belong to the more recent generation?”

Peled: “Yes, today. When I sit in an armchair here and think about what happened, all kinds of thoughts come to mind.”

Lev Tov: “Wasn’t that the case then?”

Peled: “Look, let me tell you something even less nice and cruel, about the big raid in Sasa [Palestinian village in Upper Galilee]. The goal was actually to deter them, to tell them, ‘Dear friends, the Palmach [the Haganah “shock troops”] can reach every place, you are not immune.’ That was the heart of the Arab settlement. But what did we do? My platoon blew up 20 homes with everything that was there.”

Lev Tov: “While people were sleeping there?”

Peled: “I suppose so. What happened there, we came, we entered the village, planted a bomb next to every house, and afterward Homesh blew on a trumpet, because we didn’t have radios, and that was the signal [for our forces] to leave. We’re running in reverse, the sappers stay, they pull, it’s all primitive. They light the fuse or pull the detonator and all those houses are gone.”

Another passage that the Defense Ministry wanted to keep from the public came from Dr. Lev Tov’s conversation with Maj. Gen. Avraham Tamir:

Tamir: “I was under Chera [Maj. Gen. Tzvi Tzur, later IDF chief of staff], and I had excellent working relations with him. He gave me freedom of action – don’t ask – and I happened to be in charge of staff and operations work during two developments deriving from [Prime Minister David] Ben-Gurion’s policy. One development was when reports arrived about marches of refugees from Jordan toward the abandoned villages [in Israel]. And then Ben-Gurion lays down as policy that we have to demolish [the villages] so they won’t have anywhere to return to. That is, all the Arab villages, most of which were in [the area covered by] Central Command, most of them.”

Lev Tov: “The ones that were still standing?”

Tamir: “The ones that weren’t yet inhabited by Israelis. There were places where we had already settled Israelis, like Zakariyya and others. But most of them were still abandoned villages.”

Lev Tov: “That were standing?”

Tamir: “Standing. It was necessary for there to be no place for them to return to, so I mobilized all the engineering battalions of Central Command, and within 48 hours I knocked all those villages to the ground. Period. There’s no place to return to.”

Lev Tov: “Without hesitation, I imagine.”

Tamir: “Without hesitation. That was the policy. I mobilized, I carried it out and I did it.”

Crates in vaults

The vault of the Yad Yaari Research and Documentation Center is one floor below ground level. In the vault, which is actually a small, well-secured room, are stacks of crates containing classified documents. The archive houses the materials of the Hashomer Hatzair movement, the Kibbutz Ha’artzi kibbutz movement, Mapam, Meretz and other bodies, such as Peace Now.

The archive’s director is Dudu Amitai, who is also chairman of the Association of Israel Archivists. According to Amitai, Malmab personnel visited the archive regularly between 2009 and 2011. Staff of the archive relate that security department teams – two Defense Ministry retirees with no archival training – would show up two or three times a week. They searched for documents according to such keywords as “nuclear,” “security” and “censorship,” and also devoted considerable time to the War of Independence and the fate of the pre-1948 Arab villages.

“In the end, they submitted a summary to us, saying that they had located a few dozen sensitive documents,” Amitai says. “We don’t usually take apart files, so dozens of files, in their entirety, found their way into our vault and were removed from the public catalog.” A file might contain more than 100 documents.

One of the files that was sealed deals with the military government that controlled the lives of Israel’s Arab citizens from 1948 until 1966. For years, the documents were stored in the same vault, inaccessible to scholars. Recently, in the wake of a request by Prof. Gadi Algazi, a historian from Tel Aviv University, Amitai examined the file himself and ruled that there was no reason not to unseal it, Malmab’s opinion notwithstanding.

According to Algazi, there could be several reasons for Malmab’s decision to keep the file classified. One of them has to do with a secret annex it contains to a report by a committee that examined the operation of the military government. The report deals almost entirely with land-ownership battles between the state and Arab citizens, and barely touches on security matters.

Another possibility is a 1958 report by the ministerial committee that oversaw the military government. In one of the report’s secret appendixes, Col. Mishael Shaham, a senior officer in the military government, explains that one reason for not dismantling the martial law apparatus is the need to restrict Arab citizens’ access to the labor market and to prevent the reestablishment of destroyed villages.

A third possible explanation for hiding the file concerns previously unpublished historical testimony about the expulsion of Bedouin. On the eve of Israel’s establishment, nearly 100,000 Bedouin lived in the Negev. Three years later, their number was down to 13,000. In the years during and after the independence war, a number of expulsion operations were carried out in the country’s south. In one case, United Nations observers reported that Israel had expelled 400 Bedouin from the Azazma tribe and cited testimonies of tents being burned. The letter that appears in the classified file describes a similar expulsion carried out as late as 1956, as related by geologist Avraham Parnes:

“A month ago we toured Ramon [crater]. The Bedouin in the Mohila area came to us with their flocks and their families and asked us to break bread with them. I replied that we had a great deal of work to do and didn’t have time. In our visit this week, we headed toward Mohila again. Instead of the Bedouin and their flocks, there was deathly silence. Scores of camel carcasses were scattered in the area. We learned that three days earlier the IDF had ‘screwed’ the Bedouin, and their flocks were destroyed – the camels by shooting, the sheep with grenades. One of the Bedouin, who started to complain, was killed, the rest fled.”

The testimony continued, “Two weeks earlier, they’d been ordered to stay where they were for the time being, afterward they were ordered to leave, and to speed things up 500 head were slaughtered…. The expulsion was executed ‘efficiently.’” The letter goes on to quote what one of the soldiers said to Parnes, according to his testimony: “They won’t go unless we’ve screwed their flocks. A young girl of about 16 approached us. She had a beaded necklace of brass snakes. We tore the necklace and each of us took a bead for a souvenir.”

The letter was originally sent to MK Yaakov Uri, from Mapai (forerunner of Labor), who passed it on to Development Minister Mordechai Bentov (Mapam). “His letter shocked me,” Uri wrote Bentov. The latter circulated the letter among all the cabinet ministers, writing, “It is my opinion that the government cannot simply ignore the facts related in the letter.” Bentov added that, in light of the appalling contents of the letter, he asked security experts to check its credibility. They had confirmed that the contents “do in fact generally conform to the truth.”

Nuclear excuse

It was during the tenure of historian Tuvia Friling as Israel’s chief archivist, from 2001 to 2004, that Malmab carried out its first archival incursions. What began as an operation to prevent the leakage of nuclear secrets, he says, became, in time, a large-scale censorship project.

“I resigned after three years, and that was one of the reasons,” Prof. Friling says. “The classification placed on the document about the Arabs’ emigration in 1948 is precisely an example of what I was apprehensive about. The storage and archival system is not an arm of the state’s public relations. If there’s something you don’t like – well, that’s life. A healthy society also learns from its mistakes.”

Why did Friling allow the Defense Ministry to have access the archives? The reason, he says, was the intention to give the public access to archival material via the internet. In discussions about the implications of digitizing the material, concern was expressed that references in the documents to a “certain topic” would be made public by mistake. The topic, of course, is Israel’s nuclear project. Friling insists that the only authorization Malmab received was to search for documents on that subject.

But Malmab’s activity is only one example of a broader problem, Friling notes: “In 1998, the confidentiality of the [oldest documents in the] Shin Bet and Mossad archives expired. For years those two institutions disdained the chief archivist. When I took over, they requested that the confidentiality of all the material be extended [from 50] to 70 years, which is ridiculous – most of the material can be opened.”

In 2010, the confidentiality period was extended to 70 years; last February it was extended again, to 90 years, despite the opposition of the Supreme Council of Archives. “The state may impose confidentiality on some of its documentation,” Friling says. “The question is whether the issue of security doesn’t act as a kind of cover. In many cases, it’s already become a joke.”

In the view of Yad Yaari’s Dudu Amitai, the confidentiality imposed by the Defense Ministry must be challenged. In his period at the helm, he says, one of the documents placed in the vault was an order issued by an IDF general, during a truce in the War of Independence, for his troops to refrain from rape and looting. Amitai now intends to go over the documents that were deposited in the vault, especially 1948 documents, and open whatever is possible. “We’ll do it cautiously and responsibly, but recognizing that the State of Israel has to learn how to cope with the less pleasant aspects of its history.”

In contrast to Yad Yaari, where ministry personnel no longer visit, they are continuing to peruse documents at Yad Tabenkin, the research and documentation center of the United Kibbutz Movement. The director, Aharon Azati, reached an agreement with the Malmab teams under which documents will be transferred to the vault only if he is convinced that this is justified. But in Yad Tabenkin, too, Malmab has broadened its searches beyond the realm of nuclear project to encompass interviews conducted by archival staff with former members of the Palmach, and has even perused material about the history of the settlements in the occupied territories.

Malmab has, for example, shown interest in the Hebrew-language book “A Decade of Discretion: Settlement Policy in the Territories 1967-1977,” published by Yad Tabenkin in 1992, and written by Yehiel Admoni, director of the Jewish Agency’s Settlement Department during the decade he writes about. The book mentions a plan to settle Palestinian refugees in the Jordan Valley and to the uprooting of 1,540 Bedouin families from the Rafah area of the Gaza Strip in 1972, including an operation that included the sealing of wells by the IDF. Ironically, in the case of the Bedouin, Admoni quotes former Justice Minister Yaakov Shimshon Shapira as saying, “It is not necessary to stretch the security rationale too far. The whole Bedouin episode is not a glorious chapter of the State of Israel.”

According to Azati, “We are moving increasingly to a tightening of the ranks. Although this is an era of openness and transparency, there are apparently forces that are pulling in the opposite direction.”

Unauthorized secrecy

About a year ago, the legal adviser to the State Archives, attorney Naomi Aldouby, wrote an opinion titled “Files Closed Without Authorization in Public Archives.” According to her, the accessibility policy of public archives is the exclusive purview of the director of each institution.

Despite Aldouby’s opinion, however, in the vast majority of cases, archivists who encountered unreasonable decisions by Malmab did not raise objections – that is, until 2014, when Defense Ministry personnel arrived at the archive of the Harry S. Truman Research Institute at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem. To the visitors’ surprise, their request to examine the archive – which contains collections of former minister and diplomat Abba Eban and Maj. Gen. (res.) Shlomo Gazit – was turned down by its then director, Menahem Blondheim.

According to Blondheim, “I told them that the documents in question were decades old, and that I could not imagine that there was any security problem that would warrant restricting their access to researchers. In response, they said, ‘And let’s say there is testimony here that wells were poisoned in the War of Independence?’ I replied, ‘Fine, those people should be brought to trial.’”

Blondheim’s refusal led to a meeting with a more senior ministry official, only this time the attitude he encountered was different and explicit threats were made. Finally the two sides reached an accommodation.

Benny Morris is not surprised at Malmab’s activity. “I knew about it,” he says “Not officially, no one informed me, but I encountered it when I discovered that documents I had seen in the past are now sealed. There were documents from the IDF Archive that I used for an article about Deir Yassin, and which are now sealed. When I came to the archive, I was no longer allowed to see the original, so I pointed out in a footnote [in the article] that the State Archive had denied access to documents that I had published 15 years earlier.”

The Malmab case is only one example of the battle being waged for access to archives in Israel. According to the executive director of the Akevot Institute, Lior Yavne, “The IDF Archive, which is the largest archive in Israel, is sealed almost hermetically. About 1 percent of the material is open. The Shin Bet archive, which contains materials of immense importance [to scholars], is totally closed apart from a handful of documents.”

A report written by Yaacov Lozowick, the previous chief archivist at the State Archives, upon his retirement, refers to the defense establishment’s grip on the country’s archival materials. In it, he writes, “A democracy must not conceal information because it is liable to embarrass the state. In practice, the security establishment in Israel, and to a certain extent that of foreign relations as well, are interfering with the [public] discussion.”

Advocates of concealment put forward several arguments, Lozowick notes: “The uncovering of the facts could provide our enemies with a battering ram against us and weaken the determination of our friends; it’s liable to stir up the Arab population; it could enfeeble the state’s arguments in courts of law; and what is revealed could be interpreted as Israeli war crimes.” However, he says, “All these arguments must be rejected. This is an attempt to hide part of the historical truth in order to construct a more convenient version.”

What Malmab says

Yehiel Horev was the keeper of the security establishment’s secrets for more than two decades. He headed the Defense Ministry’s security department from 1986 until 2007 and naturally kept out of the limelight. To his credit, he now agreed to talk forthrightly to Haaretz about the archives project.

“I don’t remember when it began,” Horev says, “but I do know that I started it. If I’m not mistaken, it started when people wanted to publish documents from the archives. We had to set up teams to examine all outgoing material.”

From conversations with archive directors, it’s clear that a good deal of the documents on which confidentiality was imposed relate to the War of Independence. Is concealing the events of 1948 part of the purpose of Malmab?

“What does ‘part of the purpose’ mean? The subject is examined based on an approach of whether it could harm Israel’s foreign relations and the defense establishment. Those are the criteria. I think it’s still relevant. There has not been peace since 1948. I may be wrong, but to the best of my knowledge the Arab-Israeli conflict has not been resolved. So yes, it could be that problematic subjects remain.”

Asked in what way such documents might be problematic, Horev speaks of the possibility of agitation among the country’s Arab citizens. From his point of view, every document must be perused and every case decided on its merits.

If the events of 1948 weren’t known, we could argue about whether this approach is the right one. That is not the case. Many testimonies and studies have appeared about the history of the refugee problem. What’s the point of hiding things?

“The question is whether it can do harm or not. It’s a very sensitive matter. Not everything has been published about the refugee issue, and there are all kinds of narratives. Some say there was no flight at all, only expulsion. Others say there was flight. It’s not black-and-white. There’s a difference between flight and those who say they were forcibly expelled. It’s a different picture. I can’t say now if it merits total confidentiality, but it’s a subject that definitely has to be discussed before a decision is made about what to publish.”

For years, the Defense Ministry has imposed confidentiality on a detailed document that describes the reasons for the departure of those who became refugees. Benny Morris has already written about the document, so what’s the logic of keeping it hidden?

“I don’t remember the document you’re referring to, but if he quoted from it and the document itself is not there [i.e., where Morris says it is], then his facts aren’t strong. If he says, ‘Yes, I have the document,’ I can’t argue with that. But if he says that it’s written there, that could be right and it could be wrong. If the document were already outside and were sealed in the archive, I would say that that’s folly. But if someone quoted from it – there’s a difference of day and night in terms of the validity of the evidence he cited.”

In this case, we’re talking about the most quoted scholar when it comes to the Palestinian refugees.

“The fact that you say ‘scholar’ makes no impression on me. I know people in academia who spout nonsense about subjects that I know from A to Z. When the state imposes confidentiality, the published work is weakened, because he doesn’t have the document.”

But isn’t concealing documents based on footnotes in books an attempt to lock the barn door after the horses have bolted?

“I gave you an example that this needn’t be the case. If someone writes that the horse is black, if the horse isn’t outside the barn, you can’t prove that it’s really black.”

There are legal opinions stating that Malmab’s activity in the archives is illegal and unauthorized.

“If I know that an archive contains classified material, I am empowered to tell the police to go there and confiscate the material. I can also utilize the courts. I don’t need the archivist’s authorization. If there is classified material, I have the authority to act. Look, there’s policy. Documents aren’t sealed for no reason. And despite it all, I won’t say to you that everything that’s sealed is 100 percent justified [in being sealed].”

The Defense Ministry refused to respond to specific questions regarding the findings of this investigative report and made do with the following response: “The director of security of the defense establishment operates by virtue of his responsibility to protect the state’s secrets and its security assets. The Malmab does not provide details about its mode of activity or its missions.”

Lee Rotbart assisted in providing visual research for this article.

This article was originally published by “Haaretz” –

Israeli military analysts admits: “Israel Can’t Win the Next War.”

June 03, 2019  /  Gilad Atzmon

Screen Shot 2019-06-03 at 09.11.05.png

by Gilad Atzmon

Ynet’s headline yesterday acknowledged what has been obvious to many Middle East commentators: Israel can’t win the next war. The most respected Israeli military correspondent Ron Ben Yishai’s headline reads as follows: “Why won’t we win the next war?” Though most of Ben Yishai’s Hebrew articles are reprinted in Ynet’s English edition, this article is yet to be translated and for obvious reasons. It is probably too upsetting for Diaspora Jews.

Ben Yishai’s rationale is clear and sound: Israel can’t deal with military casualties. Israeli security matters have been politicised. Field commanders are regularly subject to legal proceedings that lead to heavy penalties including suspensions. Consequently, many of them have lost their motivation. Israeli society is too sensitive to kidnappings and hijackings and finally, parents are too involved in IDF matters.

Ben Yishai concludes that Israel is too weak “whether it is a war against Hamas, Hezbollah, Syria or all of them, we will not win!”

Ben Yishai is honest enough to admit publicly that Israel’s enemies understand the psychological, spiritual, cultural and political fabric of Israeli society. They are aware of Israel’s weaknesses and the IDF’s paralysis and they act upon these. According to Ben Yishai, the Shiite axis, Hamas and the Salafi-Jihadists all understood that they “could not destroy Israel with one or two violent military moves, therefore they went on to wage a war of strategic attrition against us.” Any violent round or war whose results are inconclusive in favour of Israel, Ben Yishai says, are going to be seen as another nail in the Zionist’s coffin.

“They see the public hysteria over losses on our side. They notice the media frenzy that weakens the confidence of Israeli citizens, they see the national probing committees punishing Israeli commanders after each round of violence which leads to mistrust in the political class and its decision-making process.” Ben Yishai points out that Israel’s enemies seem to believe that when “Iran achieves a credible capability to threaten Israel with nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles,”  the Israeli society will collapse into itself. The Jews who seek a better life and are ‘spoiled enough’ to act upon it will be scattered over the world to look for a quieter and safer place under the sun.

None of these observations are new to me. Already in the 1980s, in the wake of the first Intifada, I heard Israeli generals admitting in the open that ‘for the Palestinians to win all they need is to survive.’ Palestinian analysts have been commenting for years that ‘Israel may have many lethal bombs but the Palestinians have one bomb, the demographic bomb.’ I have repeatedly argued in my writings that Israel hasn’t won a single war since 1967. Even when it won on the battlefield (like in 1973), it failed to achieve its military objectives. Bizarrely enough, Israel’s greatest military victory in 1967 inflicted on the country some political, strategic and demographic problems that have made the future survival of the Jewish State in its current form an unrealistic scenario. Like Ron Ben Yishai (yet way ahead of him), I have been arguing that Israel lives on borrowed time.

But Israel and the IDF are not alone. The American, British and French armies, alongside NATO in general, are also incapable of winning wars. The Soviet army was literally defeated in Afghanistan for the same reasons. Modern armies do not win wars, they are good in spreading collateral damage. It may even be possible that modern armies are not supposed to win wars. Their real task is to sustain the military-industrial complex by means of constant conflict.

A clash with Hamas, for instance, leads to a growing demand for the Israeli Iron Dome. Britain, America and France launch one criminal war after the other, they never win but they clearly sustain the production of killing machines.  Russia actually won a war recently together with Iran. This translated immediately into weapon-buying.

But it goes further. Western armies are set to follow military objectives that are defined by democratically elected governments. In the post-political era, the entire political class is disturbingly dysfunctional and totally unique in its inability to produce educated decisions, let alone set military objectives.

President Trump’s belligerent rants against Syria, Iran and North Korea are perfect examples of the above. Trump threatens to launch wars as often as he changes his socks, but he never provides his generals with an adequate set of objectives.  Obama,  Cameron and Sarkozy weren’t any better. They didn’t manage to set the objectives for Libya’s invasion or any other criminal Neocon conflict they launched.

Interestingly enough, I allow myself to suggest that one of the only state leaders who is fully aware of the inability of modern armies to win wars is Benjamin Netanyahu. The Israeli PM is aware of the fact that his army is weak and the Israelis are even weaker. Unlike his predecessors, Netanyahu actually tries to avoid large-scale conflicts with Gaza, Syria or Hezbollah as much as he can. Netanyahu is not a ‘lover of peace’ or a ‘humanist.’ He is happy to deploy snipers against civilians and ‘lets them’ shoot kids  who get too close to the border. Netanyahu sends drones to attack Iranian targets in Syria .  But he is very careful not to pull the region into a total war. Benjamin Netanyahu didn’t really need Ron Ben Yishai, he gathered many years ago that the IDF and Israeli society can’t win wars. He is buying time instead.

My battle for truth and freedom involves some expensive legal and security services. I hope that you will consider committing to a monthly donation in whatever amount you can give. Regular contributions will enable me to avoid being pushed against a wall and to stay on top of the endless harassment by Zionist operators attempting to silence me and others.



Leaked Docs Show NSA Fed «Israel» Intel for Targeted Assassinations

By Staff, Agencies

Frustrated by a legal ban on sharing intelligence with “Israeli” operatives conducting targeted assassinations against Hezbollah, the NSA crafted a loophole giving them total access even to US citizens’ data, leaked documents show.

The so-called “Israeli” SIGINT National Unit [ISNU], the NSA’s counterpart in Tel Aviv, convinced the Americans to circumvent the legal prohibition on providing surveillance data for targeted assassinations during the “Israeli” entity’s 2006 aggression on Lebanon, according to the newest revelation from the archives obtained by whistleblower Edward Snowden.

Using the familiar rationale of “terrorism” to excuse cooperation they knew was illegal, the NSA and ISNU found a workaround using the Office of the Director of National Intelligence that provided the “Israelis” with all the intelligence they needed, according to an October 2006 article in the NSA’s internal publication.

“To ISNU, this prohibition [on sharing data for targeted killings] was contrary not only to supporting ‘Israel’ in its fight against Hizballah [Hezbollah] but overall, to support the US Global War on Terrorism,” said an article in SIDToday.

Its author, whose name is redacted, details the “late-night, sometimes tense discussions” he had with ISNU officials who believed they deserved an exemption from the US prohibition on abetting targeted killings.

The documents don’t include details of what “arrangement” was eventually worked out with the ODNI, but the “Israeli” military used American data to lay waste to Lebanon’s civilian population, much like the tech-enhanced US troops in Afghanistan and Iraq, whose kill-counts swelled with civilian victims after they received access to NSA targeting data.

“‘Israel’ repeatedly, and in some cases egregiously, violated the laws of war,” Human Rights Watch reporter Nadim Houry told the Intercept, adding that the “Israelis” “engaged in indiscriminate aerial attacks” and cluster bombing against “civilian infrastructure that was not tied in any way to the armed conflict.”

This ‘strategy’ had a name – the “Dahiyeh doctrine” – and “Israeli” officials admitted it was deliberate, but despite this brutality, they were unable to win the war. A leaked presentation about the NSA-ISNU relationship notes that “public confidence in” the “Israeli” Occupation Forces [IOF] “erodes” and IOF “image damaged” after the seemingly-outmatched Hezbollah revolutionaries were able to keep the “Israelis” at bay. Nevertheless, the IDF was, according to the presentation, “Gearing up for Round II.”

Apparently unsatisfied with the legal loophole the Americans had created for them, the “Israelis” sought and received full access to the NSA’s massive surveillance data troves after the war. A 2009 memorandum of understanding officially gave ISNU unrestricted access to the NSA’s raw intelligence data – including the phone and internet records of American citizens and citizens of third-party countries. Only American officials’ data was excluded, on an honor-system basis [with ISNU instructed to “destroy upon recognition” any records originating with a government official]. Almost no strings were attached to this bonanza – the “Israelis” could even release the identities of Americans whose information had been scooped up in the dragnet, as long as they asked the NSA for permission first, and could pass the data on to anyone at all if the names were redacted.

While a leaked presentation calls ISNU “NSA’s most valued third party partner,” it also suggests there was “high anxiety” among the “Israelis” “heavily reliant” on NSA data for support. One slide reads “What Did ISNU Want? Everything!!!” and complaints about the ‘Israelis’’ “robust” spying on Americans crop up frequently in the Snowden archives. The NSA did not seem to mind, because the “Israelis” were very, very grateful for all the information.

“Throughout all of my discussions – no matter what the tone or subject – ISNU stressed their deep gratitude for the cooperation and support they received from the NSA,” the SIDToday article reads.


South Front


For the first time ever, the military wing of the Islamic Jihad Movement, the al-Quds Brigades, released a video showing its fighters targeting Israeli military vehicles around the Palestinian Gaza Strip with an armed drone.

The video, which was first broadcasted by the Lebanese al-Mayadeen TV in the noon of May 30, shows an armed drone targeting a Merkava IV main battle tank and an Achzarit armored personnel carrier (APC) of the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF). The attack occurred during the recent Gaza–Israel clashes.

“Your fortresses don’t stand before us,” a message in Arabic and Hebrew in the video reads.

The drone used in the attack appears to be a small-size quadcopter, similar to the famous DJI Phantom. The drone dropped small projectiles, similar to submunitions usually used in cluster rockets and bombs.

Al-Quds Brigades Reveal First Ever Video Showing Drone Attack On Israeli Tank, APC
Click to see full-size image

ISIS was the first to arm commercially bought drones and use them in combat. The battle of Mosul in Iraq witnessed an extensive use of such drones with the Iraqi military losing several vehicles to drone attacks.

While the terrorist group was the first to use armed drones, Hezbollah was the first to arm them with submunitions. In late 2016, the Lebanese armed group attacked several militants’ positions near the city of Aleppo with drones armed with Chinese-made MZD2 submunitions.

Al-Quds Brigades Reveal First Ever Video Showing Drone Attack On Israeli Tank, APCClick to see full-size image

The accuracy of the armed drone used by the al-Quds Brigades appears to be poor. However, the acquisition of such weapon remains a threat to the Israeli military, especially that it can be improved.

More on the topic:

«إسرائيل» تستشعر حرباً إقليمية فَتَقلقُ من حزب الله

مايو 25, 2019

د. وفيق إبراهيم

«إسرائيل» عينها على الخليج لكن هواجسها لبنانية لانها تعرف ان الرصاصة الاولى في الخليج لن تكون إلا صافرة البدء بعمليات وازنة تستهدف عدوانيتها براً وبحراً وربما تكتشف بالصدفة أن العربدة في الاجواء أصبحت خطيرة. وهذا عِلمُهُ عند اصحاب العلم العسكري.

لماذا أرسل جيش الكيان الإسرائيلي تهديداً بأنه قاب قوسين أو أدنى من استهداف حزب الله؟ وهل يكشف المهاجم عادة لخصمه عن خطته مسبقاً؟ أم أنه يريد ردعه؟

المعلومات التي وردت من الكيان الإسرائيلي في فلسطين المحتلة تزعم بأن جيشه على وشك مهاجمة حزب الله في لبنان وسورية، وقالت إنها وضعت خطة لقصف 300 هدف كافية لشلِ قدرة الحزب الهجومية.

هنا يذهب الاستنتاج الاول بسرعة الى أن «إسرائيل» بصدد محاربة حزب الله بالغارات الجوية والقصف الصاروخي، ما يستبعد فكرة الاجتياحات البرية والتي لا تزال الوسيلة الوحيدة للسيطرة الكاملة على الخصم. والدليل هنا ان الروس في سورية نفذوا أكثر من مئة وعشرين ألف غارة جوية على مواقع الارهاب الذي كان مسيطراً على أكثر من مئة ألف كيلومتر مربع.

لا شك في أنه ترنّح متلقياً ضربات بنيوية في الافراد والمواقع لكن الجيش السوري متحالفاً مع حزب الله ومنظمات شعبية أخرى تمكّنوا من تحرير الأرض والإمساك بها وإعادة تأهيلها لإعادة استيعاب المدنيين ومنع الارهابيين من العودة اليها.

وهذا يعني ضرورة التكامل في الحرب بين وظائف الغارات و»حتمية الحسم البري».

فكيف تكتفي «إسرائيل» بالتلويح بالقصف الجوي؟

وتستبعد البري والبحري؟ هذا علمه أيضاً عند النكسات البرية التي لحقت بها أثناء اجتياحها للبنان في 2006، وعلمه أيضاً في سفينتها الحربية التي تلقت قبالة سواحل لبنان صاروخاً جهادياً أصابها في «أمّ بطنها»، فكادت تغرقُ لولا تمكنِ الإسرائيليين من إعادة سحبها الى فلسطين المحتلة، وهذه الحادثة تؤرّخ لاختفاء الأساطيل البحرية الإسرائيلية من المدى البحري للبنان والتوقف الكامل عن عربدتها في مياهه الإقليمية.

للتعمّق يتبيّن انّ «إسرائيل» تربط بين محور متشكل من حلف كبير يبدأ من لبنان وسورية وغزة والعراق الى اليمن وإيران وهي لا تخطئ أبداً في هذا الربط.

كما تعتبر أنّ انطلاق الحرب في الخليج مؤشرٌ لاندلاعها باستهداف «إسرائيل» في بلاد الشام ومن غزة الى لبنان.

الأمر الذي يفرض عليها توجيه رسائل تهديدية في اتجاهات شتى، فتكلف مصر وقطر بضبط قطاع غزة بالإمساك به عن طريق التجويع حيناً والإمداد الغذائي حيناً آخر والقصف الإسرائيلي الشديد مرة ثالثة.

وتعتبر أنّ الحشد الشعبي في العراق مؤسسة جهادية لديها وظيفتان، ضرب الإرهاب داخل العراق بالتحالف مع الجيش العراقي وسورية، أما الوظيفة الثانية فهي مكرّسة للاحتلال الأميركي للعراق،

لجهة أنصار الله فهم اختصاص تلك الهمجية السعودية الإماراتية التي تجتاح اليمن وتقتل أهله منذ سنين خمس.

حتى وصل الحوثيون الى درجة تهديد السعودية في داخلها والتأثير على استمرارية المعادلة التاريخية التي تقوم منذ العام 1945 على مبادلة التغطية الأميركية للخليج بالنفط والاقتصاد والأهمية الدينية.

لذلك يبقى حزب الله في دائرة الحرب المباشرة مع «إسرائيل»، لكنه لم يعد كما كان عليه لبنان في مرحلة تعامله مع «إسرائيل» 1948 1999 يتلقى الاعتداءات والاحتلالات ولا يردّ، فمعارك الحزب معها في 2000 و2006 أفهمتها انّ المعادلة تغيّرت، السنّ بالسنّ والهجمة بمثلها وربما أكثر شراسة منها.

إنّ هذه المعادلة تنحو بدورها نحو التراجع فدور حزب الله في سورية واقتداء عشرات حركات المقاومة والدول بنموذج جهاديته وتأثيره الثقافي عليها، هي العوامل التي تضعه نصب عيني الاهتمام الأميركي، فمكاتب الدراسات الغربية تعتبر أنّ العالم العربي يصبح أداة كاملة لهم لولا الحلف بين حزب الله والدولة السورية والحشد الشعبي وأنصار الله، فهؤلاء لا يزالون على عقيدة تحرير مناطقهم من النفوذ الأميركي لمنع الاستسلام لـ »إسرائيل» وتحقيق صفقة القرن بوظائفها الثلاث: إلغاء القضية الفلسطينية، تدمير البنيان العربي المقاوم والتحضير لحلف عربي إسرائيلي يعتبر إيران عدوة الدول ويعمل لتنفيس الظاهرة الاقتصادية الصينية قبل تحوّلها جزءاً كبيراً من القوى الأساسية في العالم معاقباً روسيا بالحدّ من حركتها في الشرق الاوسط والبلقان وأميركا الجنوبية.

المطلوب اذاً ضبطٌ إسرائيلي لحزب الله في مرحلة تنفيذ صفقة القرن، فكان هذا التهديد الإسرائيلي فهل له فائدة؟

إذا كان يريد إثارة الذعر في حزب الله فهو لم ينجح بذلك، لأنّ الحزب معتاد على قتال «إسرائيل» وأصبح متخصّصاً بحركتها العسكرية وأزمتها السياسية وهو يعلم أيضاً انّ «إسرائيل» تعرف انّ الامتداد العسكري لحزب الله أصبح على مساحات وازنة من لبنان وسورية ويتخذ من ظاهر الأرض وباطنها مكامن ليومٍ مع «إسرائيل» لن يكون أقلّ من يوم الحشر.

لماذا اذاً هذا التهديد الإسرائيلي؟

إنه أولاً للزوم الداخل الإسرائيلي المرتعب من تداعيات محتملة لحرب الخليج في مناطقه، خصوصاً وانه راقب بأم العين كيف استطاع قطاع غزة الصغير مقاومة ماكينة القصف الإسرائيلية جواً وبراً بما يؤذيها مدركاً عاصمته تل أبيب بالصواريخ، فكيف يكون الحال مع إمكانات عسكرية واحتراف قتالي يمثله حزب الله؟

هذه إذاً رسالة تطمين للداخل الإسرائيلي ومحاولة لتمرير قمة البحرين بإظهار القوة الإسرائيلية.

للتوضيح فـ »إسرائيل» تعرف أنّ ضرب 300 هدف في لبنان لا يؤدّي الى إلحاق ضرر بنيوي بترسانة حزب الله، هذه الترسانة التي أكد الحزب أنها موجهة نحو كامل الأهداف الحيوية عسكرياً واقتصادياً في فلسطين المحتلة.

هناك دور جديد أساسي لقائد الجيش اللبناني الذي وجّه تحية الى المقاومة في عيدها مؤكداً دور الجيش في تحرير الأراضي اللبنانية المحتلة، وهذا حدث تاريخي هام أن تقف الدولة الى جانب حزب الله في مجابهة القصف الإسرائيلي، هذا إذا كان القصف جدياً وليس مجرد صوت يترك صدى من دون أثر.

«إسرائيل» الى أين؟ الإجابة ليست عندها او لدى الأميركيين بل في فوهات صواريخ المقاومة وسورية، والجيش اللبناني الوطني الرافض للسياسات الانبطاحية بالنأي بالنفس عن الوطن.


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