Confrontations between Palestinian youth and Palestinian Authority’s ‘security forces’ in Nablus. (File Photo: via QNN)
The Palestinian Authority security forces on Tuesday suppressed a protest in Nablus to demand the release of political prisoners held by the PA, Quds Press news site reported.
Dozens of masked members of the PA security forces attacked the participants, including the families of political detainees, and fired gas canisters at them, suffocating a number.
The PA forces also assaulted journalists covering the event and prevented them from filming, confiscating their mobile devices.
Palestinian Authority Security Forces attacked a recent protest in Nablus calling for the release of Palestinian political prisoners.
The participants demanded the release of Musab Shtayyeh and other political detainees currently held by the Palestinian Authority, who are being pursued by the Israeli occupation.
Lawyers and human rights organizations confirmed earlier that 2022 witnessed a significant rise in the campaigns of prosecution, arrests, and summons orders issued by the Palestinian Authority security services against politicians, activists, freed prisoners, and university students.
File image. Maryam Banat, mother of Palestinian Authority (PA) outspoken critic Nizar Banat holds a poster with his picture while attending a rally protesting his death in the custody of PA security forces on 24 June 2021.(AP Photo/Nasser Nasser)
The legal team of the family of the late Palestinian activist Nizar Banat filed on 16 December a complaint against the Palestinian Authority (PA) at the International Criminal Court (ICC) in The Hague for alleged war crimes and torture.
Hakan Camuz, head of International Law at Stoke White, filed a complaint with the prosecutor’s office regarding the murder of Palestinian activist Nizar Banat, who was beaten to death by PA security forces on 24 June, 2021.
The aim of the complaint is to investigate the “brutal death” of the activist, whose autopsy revealed that he had received blows, some of them to the head and neck. From the beginning, his family insisted that he was abused during his arrest.
“Nizar Banat was illegally arrested and tortured by the Palestinian Authority on eight different occasions. During the months preceding his murder, Nizar and his family were subjected to more and more threats and attacks. His house was attacked with bullets and grenades a few weeks before his assassination,” the legal team said in an statement reported by The News International.
In his outspoken social media videos, Banat was well-known for accusing the PA of corruption and criticizing its security cooperation with the Israeli military in the occupied West Bank.
“The trial began in the military court in Ramallah in September 2021, which is a violation of international law, which indicates that cases of human rights violations should be tried in civilian courts,” the lawyers have denounced.
Meanwhile, the UN Committee Against Torture (CAT) determined that the PA is responsible for the torture and ill-treatment of civilians.
The CAT conducted several hearings during the investigation, discovering that the Palestinian National Security Forces frequently use lethal weapons when detaining or interrogating civilians.
CAT began its investigation on 12 July, concluding two weeks later with an official report. They urged the PA to conduct prompt and effective investigations into complaints involving public officials, and to prosecute and punish them with the appropriate penalties.
A poll conducted three months ago showed that only 26 percent of Palestinians are content with the management of Mahmoud Abbas as president of the PA, while 71 percent are not.
سلسلة من الجنرالات الأميركيين، من فئة النجوم الثلاث، استطاعوا أن يصلوا إلى المسؤولين المدنيين والعسكريين في واشنطن ورام الله و”تل أبيب”، فصار لهم دور كبير في ضبط العلاقة بين السلطة و”إسرائيل”، وفهم الواقع الميداني.
الأميركيون والضفة المحتلة (1 / 4): الاحتلال في وجه آخر
سمعنا كلنا تقريباً عن كيث دايتون، لكنه ليس إلّا واحداً من أصل ثمانية حملوا لقب “المنسق الأمني الأميركي لإسرائيل والسلطة الفلسطينية” منذ عام 2005. القصة أعمق كثيراً مما في ظاهر التسمية، إذ إن ثمة احتلالاً، في وجه آخر، في فلسطين، وخصوصاً الضفة والقدس المحتلتين. وجه يحثّنا دوماً على البحث عن القُطَب المخفية. فما هي اليد الأميركية في الضفة، ولماذا هناك خبراء عسكريون من “الناتو” رفقةَ “المنسق”، وماذا يفعلون؟
ورد خبرٌ، في الأول من حزيران/يونيو الماضي، يفيد بأن وزارة الدفاع الأميركية (البنتاغون) تعتزم تخفيض رتبة المنسق الأمني الأميركي لـ”إسرائيل” والسلطة الفلسطينية ، والمقيم بمدينة القدس المحتلة، من رتبة لواء بثلاث نجوم إلى عقيد ، وفق ما نقل موقع الأميركي، عن أربعة مسؤولين أميركيين حاليين وسابقين وآخرين إسرائيليين. تخفيض رتبة هذا المنسق (يتباين عن “المنسق” الإسرائيلي الموكّل من جهة الإدارة المدنية في جيش الاحتلال) واجه اعتراضاً من الخارجية الأميركية وسفيرها في “تل أبيب”، توم نيدز، فسعت الوزارة لمواجهة خطة البنتاغون وطلبت تدخل وكالة الاستخبارات المركزية .
بعد ذلك، انطلق اللوبي اليهودي في مهمته المعتادة: الضغط ثم الضغط، فشرع “معهد واشنطن لسياسة الشرق الأدنى” ومراكز بحثية أخرى في الحديث عن مخاطر هذه الخطوة، والدعوة إلى التراجع عنها. وجاء في موقع صحيفة “تايمز أوف إسرائيل” الإلكترونية (2/8/2022)، تقرير يقول إن هذه الخطوة تواجه اعتراضات مشتركة من الحزبين الجمهوري والديموقراطي، في الكونغرس والسلطة التنفيذية ومجتمع السياسة، بحيث يخشون جميعاً أن تؤدي إلى “تهديد استقرار الضفة وأمن إسرائيل”.
الغريب في الأمر نقطتان: الأولى تصدير مثل هذا النقاش إلى العلن، للمرة الأولى، في هذا المستوى. والثانية مستوى التحذير من نتائج هذه الخطوة، وخصوصاً أن المنسق، في رتبته أياً تكن، وفريق الموظفين، الذي هُدّد أيضاً بتقليصه بعد أن واجه تقليصات سابقة، يُظهر هذين الطرفين كأنهما من يُمسك زمام الأمور، ويحفظ أمن “إسرائيل”، لا جيشها الذي يناهز 170 ألف جندي، ووراءهم 465 ألفاً من الاحتياط، وقرابة ثلاثة ملايين “لائقين بالتجنيد”!
أمّا الذريعة الأميركية “الظاهرية”، فهي خطة رئيس هيئة الأركان المشتركة الأميركية، الجنرال مارك ميلي، والقاضية بتقليل عدد الجنرالات والأدميرالات، تنفيذاً لقانون “ميزانية تفويض الدفاع الوطني الأميركي لعام 2017” ، الذي أُقرَّ في عهد الرئيس السابق دونالد ترامب، بعد أن ارتأت إدارته أن تكون الحصة الكبيرة من هؤلاء من أفراد الخدمة العاملين في القواعد الخارجية والمناصب المتعددة في أنحاء العالم.
في ذلك الشهر، جرى التلميح، بالتزامن، إلى تخفيض رتبة الملحقين العسكريين الأميركيين في السعودية والإمارات، لكن شمول مثل هذه المناطق الحساسة، وخصوصاً فلسطين المحتلة، يشي بأن القرار الأميركي، ثم تصديره في الإعلام، أمر يتخطى الموازنات. فوراء ذلك أسباب وجيهة بدأت تظهر بوضوح في الأشهر الأخيرة، وملخّصها أن الإسرائيلي لا يستمع إلى التقييمات الأميركية، السياسية والعسكرية والأمنية، بشأن الضفة على وجه التحديد، وهو ما تكرر، وصولاً إلى التحذير الأميركي من اختيار شخصية يمينية متطرفة لوزارة الأمن، لكن هذا لا ينفي حضور عامل التركيز الأميركي على مواجهة الصعود الصيني والمشكلة الروسية في خلفيات هذا القرار.
ثمة جملة من التوصيات الأميركية يتقدّمها تخفيف سلوك “طنجرة الضغط”، الذي تحول من أمر عملياتي ميداني إلى واقع عامّ تعيشه الضفة بصورة عامة، وشماليّها على وجه الخصوص. والثانية مرتبطة بالأولى، وهي بشأن قواعد إطلاق جيش الاحتلال الإسرائيلي النار على الفلسطينيين. والثالثة – ليست الأخيرة – أن جزءاً كبيراً من الحل يقوم على تقوية السلطة الفلسطينية، على قاعدة “دع الفلسطينيين يحلّوا مشكلاتهم بأنفسهم”، وهي أصلاً المهمة الأساسية للمنسق الأميركي، الذي يشرف على متابعة قطاع الأمن، الأضخم عديداً وتمويلاً، في تركيبة السلطة.
أيضاً، شكّل اغتيال الصحافية شيرين أبو عاقلة إحراجاً للموقف الأميركي، بينما كان المنسق هو الوسيط الذي تسلّم الرصاصة التي قتلتها، بالنيابة عن “إسرائيل”. صحيح أن أبو عاقلة تحمل الجنسية الأميركية، وهذا ما قد يبرر سبب الدخول الأميركي على الخط، لكن كانت هذه القضية من المرات القليلة التي يبرز فيها مكتب التنسيق الأميركي – الدولي، فضلاً عن أن الأمر لن يقف عند حدود التحقيق فقط.
وكانت الخارجية الأميركية قالت، في تموز/يوليو، إن منسق الأمن الأميركي خلص إلى أن “إطلاق النار من مواقع الجيش الإسرائيلي كان مسؤولاً، على الأرجح، عن مقتلها”، لكن “لا يوجد سبب للاعتقاد أن هذا كان متعمَّداً”، قبل أن تنشر الصحافة الأميركية ما ينفي ذلك، وتتّجه العائلة إلى تقديم طلب إجراء تحقيق مستقل إلى مكتب التحقيقات الفيدرالي في مقتل مواطنة أميركية، ويحظى بتأييد أكثر من 20 من أعضاء مجلس الشيوخ الديمقراطيين.
مكان لا يملأه إلّا ثلاث نجوم!
يقول باحثون أميركيون وإسرائيليون إن سلسلة من الجنرالات الأميركيين، من فئة النجوم الثلاث، استطاعوا أن يصلوا بحكم أقدميتهم إلى المسؤولين المدنيين والعسكريين في واشنطن ورام الله و”تل أبيب”، فصار لهم دور كبير في ضبط العلاقة بين السلطة و”إسرائيل” من جهة، وفي فهم الواقع، ميدانياً ومجتمعياً، من جهة أخرى، وهذا ما قاد إلى نقطة الاعتراض الثانية على ذلك القرار: التوقيت “غير ملائم” البتة.
يتقابل ما سبق مع مشهد إقليمي يقول إن الجبهة الوحيدة المشتعلة في المنطقة حالياً هي الضفة، فاليمن والعراق ولبنان وسوريا باتت “جبهات خاملة”، أو “قليلة النشاط” (بغض النظر عما يجري الآن داخل إيران)، بينما تراوح غزة بين حالة “الكمون الموقّت” و”النشاط الفجائي”، وهو ما يعطي الضفة (بما يشمل القدس المحتلة) أولوية لدى أصحاب القرار كافةً. لذلك، ثمّة تعبير دائم عن القلق بشأنها، وخصوصاً أن حراكها يأتي بعد مرحلة خمول طويل، وضمن آليات مزدوجة في العمل تصعب السيطرة عليها: تنظيمية وشعبية (فردية).
لهذا، كان تحذير المراكز البحثية من أن أي خطوة شبيهة ستخاطر بـ”تدمير إنجازات كثيرة حققتها البعثة الأميركية (الدولية) في الأعوام الـ18 الماضية… فلا يجب التقليل من الرمزية السلبية لتقليل المهمة”. أصلاً، يرى الإسرائيلي أن السلطة “مقصّرة” في أداء مهمتها الأساسية: “حفظ الأمن”، بينما يسدّ مكتب المنسق هذه الفجوة. هنا تحديداً يذكر تقرير “تايمز أوف إسرائيل” (2/8/2022) مثالاً من عام 2017، حينما أعلنت رام الله تعليق التنسيق الأمني رسمياً، فكان USSC هو “القناة الوحيدة التي يمكن للجانبين التنسيق عبرها ومنع الوضع السيئ من الخروج عن نطاق السيطرة”. في توصيف آخر: باب خلفي للتنسيق.
يذهب الموقع نفسه إلى أبعدَ، عبر القول: “بصراحة، لن يتمتع عقيد أميركي (الرتبة الأدنى) بالمستوى المطلوب من الاحترام، ولن يكون قادراً على التعامل بفعّالية مع قائد عسكري إسرائيلي، مثل رئيس أركان الجيش، ناهيكم بالوزراء المعنيين، أو فلسطيني كالرئيس ورئيس الوزراء ووزير الداخلية وقادة الأمن، إذ لن يكون لدى الضابط الأدنى رتبة الجاذبية على العمل بفعالية في هذا المستوى، أو إظهار دعم واشنطن”، مع أن هناك وجهة نظر تقول إن الفلسطيني الرسميّ سوف يذهب إلى التنسيق، أيّاً يكن مستوى المنسق، ما دام أميركياً، كما أثبتت التجارب المتتابعة خلال الأعوام الماضية.
الحال نفسها تقريباً في واشنطن، حيث سيكون الجنرال ذو النجوم الثلاث، أكثر فعالية في تأمين الدعم، سياسياً ومالياً، وجذب انتباه المسؤولين، ولاسيما وزير الخارجية ومستشار الأمن القومي. وليس أخيراً، فإن هذا الرجل هو المسؤول الأعلى مرتبة بين ممثلي الدول التسع، التي تشكل بعثة USSC: الولايات المتحدة وبريطانيا وكندا وهولندا وإيطاليا واليونان وتركيا وبولندا وبلغاريا. فالمسؤولون القادمون من كندا وبريطانيا هم برتبة عميد (نجمة واحدة)، والبقية أدنى من ذلك، الأمر الذي يعني أن هذه الخطوة ستُقرأ على أن الأميركيين غسلوا أيديهم من القضية الفلسطينية، فتخفض الدول الأخرى رتب ضباطها، أو تذهب إلى سيناريو مغاير تماماً، فضلاً عن نتائجها على “إسرائيل” والسلطة والدول المطبّعة، القديمة والجديدة.
لم تتأخّر نتيجة الحملة، فمن جرّاء هذا الضغط، أعلن البنتاغون، منتصف آب/أغسطس الماضي، أنه سيُبقي على رتبة المنسق الأميركي في المناطق الفلسطينية والإسرائيلية عقب “نقاش مستفيض” بين المشرعين الديمقراطيين والجمهوريين من مجلسي النواب والشيوخ، ترافق مع رسالة إلى وزير الدفاع الأميركي، لويد أوستن، وقع عليها 32 عضواً في “الشيوخ” من الحزبين في 6/2022. كذلك، فعلت وزارتا الخارجية والأمن الإسرائيليتان ومنظمة اللوبي اليهودي، “آيباك”، و”منتدى السياسة الإسرائيلية”، ومنظمة J Street الأميركية – اليهودية، التي تقول إنها مع “إسرائيل”، لكنها تؤيد إنهاء الاحتلال وقيام دولة فلسطينية.
بين هؤلاء، برز حديث مهم لعضو لجنة القوات المسلحة في مجلس الشيوخ، السيناتور ليندسي غراهام، قال فيه: “نعتقد بقوة أن هذا وقت محفوف بالمخاطر لإسرائيل… عندما يتعلق الأمر بتنسيق الأمن بين السلطة وإسرائيل، فنحن على استعداد لتقديم إعفاءات أو تعديلات على قانون مستقبلاً”، وخصوصاً أن هذا المكتب يُنسَب إليه أنه السبب الأساسي في “الانخفاض الحاد في العنف في الضفة منذ الانتفاضة الثانية (في الفترة) 2000-2005″، وفق غراهام. لكنّ ثمة توصيفاً آخر لما جرى، ألا وهو: “إنهاء الانتفاضة”، الأمر الذي يفتح الباب على الحديث بأريحية عن “احتلال” حقيقي يقرر، أو يوجه، مسار الأحداث، من السياسات العامة، وصولاً إلى فتح حواجز، أو (التوصية بـ) إقفالها.
هكذا، رُبط بين التراجع الأميركي وإجراءات الرئيس جو بايدن الأخرى، التي سبقت زيارته فلسطين المحتلة، في تموز/يوليو الماضي وأيضاً التي تخللتها، وأولها اختيار مسؤول أميركي من أصل فلسطيني ليكون نائب مساعد وزير الخارجية للشؤون الفلسطينية – الإسرائيلية، ومبعوثاً للحوار بصورة أساسية مع السلطة (هادي عمرو)، ثم إعادة المساعدات الأمنية والإنسانية (تمويل “الأونروا”)، وليس أخيراً ضغطه على الإسرائيليين من أجل فتح معبر “الكرامة”، 24 ساعة على مدار الأسبوع، والسماح بإدخال شبكات الجيل الرابع ثم الخامس (4G, 5G)، بينما بقيت إعادة الفتح لمكتب “منظمة التحرير الفلسطينية” في واشنطن مسألة معلّقة.
في المحصّلة، ومهما تجاهل الإعلام جزءاً كبيراً من التفاصيل والكواليس، فإن القضية الأساسية، أي مكتب المنسق الأميركي في شراكة “الناتو”، وأهميته ودوره، باتت ملفاً مفتوحاً للبحث والاستقصاء، بعد أن طفا على السطح بهذه الطريقة للمرة الأولى.
تأسيس الإدارة الأمنية
مع أن إنشاء السلطة الفلسطينية ربما تكون خطوة دفع إليها الأميركيون أكثر من الإسرائيليين، في مرحلة ما، أو أكثر من مرحلة، فإن الإطار الرسمي للتنسيق الأمني، ودخول واشنطن على هذا الخط بقوة، جاءا في الأيام الأخيرة للانتفاضة الثانية. لماذا في ذلك الوقت تحديداً؟ ظهر لدى الأميركيين أن هناك مشكلة في المعالجة الإسرائيلية للوضع الفلسطيني، ولاسيما بعد أن شنّ رئيس الوزراء الإسرائيلي آنذاك، أرئيل شارون، عملية عسكرية (“السور الواقي”، 2002) كانت أشبه بحرب، لكنها لم تكن متكافئة إطلاقاً.
هددت تلك العملية، التي كان من نتائجها تدمير مقارّ السلطة، وتفكيك عدد من أجهزة الأمن، وأيضاً قتل الرئيس الراحل ياسر عرفات، بتقويض مشروع السلطة من جذوره (قضايا الحل النهائي)، وهو ما كان يعني أن الضفة ستكون مقبلة، بعد حمّام الدم، على فوضى وعودة إلى عهد الحكم العسكري. صحيح أن الأميركيين أنزلوا محمود عباس بـ”الباراشوت” على مقر المقاطعة، لكن هذا لم يكن كافياً. من هنا، وتحديداً عام 2005، بدأت قصة مكتب منسق الأمن الأميركي لـ”إسرائيل” والأراضي الفلسطينية (USSC)، التابع لمكتب الشؤون الدولية لمكافحة المخدرات وإنفاذ القانون .
أولى الخطوات كانت تدريب بعض القوات التابعة للسلطة، بما في ذلك “الأمن الوطني” (كانت البداية بـ2200 عنصر) و”حرس الرئاسة” (400 عنصر)، لكن الأولوية هي تجهيز عشر كتائب من “الوطني” (5000 جندي) بحلول نهاية عام 2010: تسع كتائب لمحافظات الضفة كافةً، وواحدة للاحتياط، إذ لا توجد كتيبة لمحافظة القدس. لكن العدد تعزز في الإجمال بين عامَي 2008 و2010 في الأجهزة كافةً، بنحو 23 ألفاً على القوات التي كانت آنذاك. بالتوازي، كانت المساعدة الأمنية الأميركية للسلطة تتوسع وتلقى داعمين داخل الأوساط المؤثرة في واشنطن، والحديث هنا عن مرحلة مغايرة عن التسعينيات ومطلع الألفية الثانية. صحيح أن المساعدة الأميركية الأمنية انطلقت منذ اختتام اتفاق أوسلو (1993-1994)، لكنها لم تكن في هذا الحجم وهذا الشكل.
في تلك المرحلة، كانت المساعدة وفق شكلين: الأول علني ويأتي إلى “منظمة التحرير”، ليصل لاحقاً إلى جهاز أمني مدني، هو الشرطة والمقرر عام 1994 أن ينتشر “أولاً” في غزة وأريحا، لكن وقع هناك خلاف أوروبي – أميركي على التمويل ووجهاته. بعد مؤتمر المانحين للشرطة في أوسلو نهاية عام 1993، ساهمت كل من مصر والأردن، المنخرطَين في التسوية مع “إسرائيل”، في تدريب بضعة آلاف من الشرطة الفلسطينية في أراضيهما، بينما أعلنت الولايات المتحدة منح خمسة ملايين دولار للشرطة، مشجّعةً الدول الأخرى على التبرع.
مع ذلك، لم يكن قطاع الأمن في تلك الأعوام في رأس الأولويات بقدر عملية التفاوض، على رغم أن الولايات المتحدة كانت تُجري بعض التدريبات وترسل المعدات، أو تطلب إلى الأردن مثلاً أن يعطي بعض ما صار خارج الخدمة للسلطة. هنا يأتي الحديث عن الوجه الثاني للمساعدة: لقد بقي التواصل بين CIA وجهازي الاستخبارات و”الأمن الوقائي” الفلسطينيين قائماً بقوة، وهو على امتداد لخط تواصل قديم منذ السبعينيات مع “منظمة التحرير” وعرفات تحديداً.
فبعيداً عن الشرطة و”الأمن الوطني”، كانت هناك مساعدات بـ”أمر رئاسي” وضمن برامج سرية لتوفير عشرات الملايين من الدولارات لـ”زيادة الكفاءة المهنية لأجهزة الأمن الفلسطينية والمساعدة في مكافحة الإرهاب”، وشملت “تدريب الفلسطينيين على تقنيات التحقيق وتنظيم ملفاتهم (ابتُعثت دورات إلى الولايات المتحدة، وجرى هناك تجنيد عدد كبير من العملاء التقطهم الإسرائيليون لاحقاً)، ودعمهم باتصالات لاسلكية وأجهزة أشعة سينية وأجهزة كشف القنابل وأجهزة كمبيوتر ومركبات ومعدات أخرى”.
مع انطلاق الانتفاضة الثانية (عام 2000) وتطوراتها الدراماتيكية، ظهر أن “إسرائيل” دمّرت معظم البنية التحتية الأمنية للسلطة، بما في ذلك مباني الوزارات والأمن، علماً بأن المساعدة الأميركية السرية استمرت طوال الانتفاضة على رغم حجب المساعدات الأمنية الدولية العامة عن السلطة، بسبب اتهامها بمشاركة عناصرها في صد الاجتياحات أو تنفيذ عمليات. وقبيل نهاية الانتفاضة، وتحديداً في 24/3/2004، دعت النرويج إلى اجتماع طارئ للجهات المانحة للشرطة الفلسطينية، أي قبل يومين فقط من أجل مناقشة الانتشار الوشيك للشرطة في الخليل وغزة وأريحا، استناداً إلى تفاهمات بين السلطة و”إسرائيل”. ضم المؤتمر 73 مشاركاً من 21 دولة، بالإضافة إلى الأمم المتحدة والاتحاد الأوروبي والبنك الدولي، مع وجود أميركي رفيع المستوى.
بناء على ذلك، وفي نتيجة لمشروع “خريطة الطريق” الأميركي في عهد جورج دبليو بوش، كُلّفت وزيرة الخارجية آنذاك، كوندوليزا رايس، الإشرافَ على إنشاء فريق المنسق الأمني، بهدف مساعدة رئيس السلطة الجديد، محمود عباس، على إصلاح قطاع الأمن. سريعاً في 3/2005، هبط أول مبعوث لهذه المهمة، هو اللفتنانت جنرال في الجيش، كيب وارد (*) في تل أبيب، ليكون القناة الوحيدة للمساعدة الأمنية الدولية للسلطة.
بمساعدة خبراء دوليين، تم تشكيل فريق التخطيط الأمني الانتقالي الفلسطيني الدولي (TSPT) في 4/2005 بإشراف مشترك بين وارد ووزير الداخلية الفلسطيني آنذاك، اللواء ناصر يوسف، بحضور اللواء جمال أبو زايد، الذي كان مساعداً لوزير الداخلية. كان دور الأساسي هو التركيز على خطة فك الارتباط الإسرائيلية الأحادية الجانب من غزة، والعمل على تقييم قدرة السلطة على تولي الأمن في غزة والتنسيق مع “إسرائيل”.
أكثر ما كان محرجاً في الاجتماعات تسريب أحد تقارير التقييم في 7/2005، وفيه انتقادات للوزير يوسف، وحديث عن “الفساد وعدم الإصلاح في قطاع الأمن الفلسطيني”، ليسبب ذلك إحراجاً للسلطة، ويُنهي معه الجنرال الأميركي مهمته الأولى.
اللحظة الحاسمة
في انتظار العلاقة الأمنية الفلسطينية – الأميركية لحظةٌ حاسمة جعلت واشنطن تضع السلطة وبضع شخصيات، منها رئيس “الوقائي” في غزة آنذاك، محمد دحلان، في خانة “الفشلة”. فبعد انتهاء/إنهاء الانتفاضة الثانية، وإجراء الانتخابات البلدية والتشريعية وفوز “حماس” بالأغلبية، كان أفق المشكلات الأمنية يتراءى من بعيد. في هذا الوقت، صار اللفتنانت جنرال كيث دايتون هو المنسق الذي استمر عمله أطول من غيره من المنسقين بين عامي 2005 و2010، إذ عمل البقية عامين كأقصى حدّ، لينال بذلك الشهرة الكبرى.
في أعوام الخلاف بين “فتح” و”حماس”، وقبيل خسارة الأولى الحكم في قطاع غزة، عملت واشنطن على تحويل أموال المساعدة مباشرة إلى عباس والأجهزة الأمنية، لا عبر وزارة المالية. وكان نصيب الأسد لحرس الرئيس (قوات الـ17). وفق دايتون، كانت خطوة ضرورية على رغم خطورتها على بنية السلطة من أجل ضمان ألّا تذهب الأموال إلى عناصر أمن متأثرين بحماس. ووفق فلسفته، كان هذا المشروع مقابلاً “لمواصلة حماس تشكيل قواتها الأمنية بدعم كبير من إيران وسوريا”! لكن، بمجرد إعلان الحركة سيطرتها على غزة، ثم إعلان عباس حالة الطوارئ، فُتحت “أبواب الجنة” على أجهزة الأمن، وصار دايتون رجل المرحلة.
شنت السلطة حملتها الشرسة على كوادر “حماس” في الضفة، وتقرر إنشاء برنامج كبير بقيادة دايتون، صار هو الأساس في المساعدة الأمنية الأميركية بين عامي 2007 و2010. والأهداف الظاهرية، التي أعلنها البرنامج، وفق صفحته الرسمية، هي: “المساعدة على إنهاء العنف عبر أجهزة أمنية فلسطينية فعّالة، وتسهيل التنسيق والتعاون في الشؤون الأمنية المشتركة، وتطوير قوة أمنية قادرة وفعالة ومستدامة، والتوسط في إعادة انتشار القوات الفلسطينية في المناطق التي أخلتها قوات الدفاع الإسرائيلية، بما في ذلك مناطق ب”. لكنّ درّة الجوهرة في المشروع، وفق دايتون، كان تغيير العقيدة الأمنية بالتوازي مع تدريب القيادة العليا: “نُحضر ستة وثلاثين رجلاً من جميع الأجهزة الأمنية، يتعلمون معاً كيفية التفكير في مشاكل اليوم، وكيفية العمل المشترك مع احترام المعايير الدولية”.
باختصار، كان المطلوب إلى قوات “الأمن الوطني”، تحديداً، أن تكون “قوة خفيفة التسليح ومجهَّزة على غرار الشرطة لتدعمها في أوقات الحاجة الماسّة”، على أن تعمل في تشكيلات صغيرة، ووفق أسلوب عسكري، وتتحمّل مسؤولية مماثلة لفرق الأسلحة والتكتيكات الخاصة في قوات الشرطة الأميركية. في ذلك الزمن، خرج مصطلح دايتون الشهير: “الفلسطيني الجديد”، حين قال عام 2009: “أقول هذا بتواضع: ما صنعناه هو رجال جدد… عند عودة هؤلاء الرجال الفلسطينيين الجدد، أظهروا الحافز والانضباط والاحتراف، وقد أحدثوا فارقاً كبيراً”.
مع أن مكتب التنسيق يقرّ بأن السلطة تمتلك الآن “مجموعة مؤسسات أمنية فعالة ومهنية، على نحو متزايد، وقادرة على حماية الفلسطينيين في الضفة وخدمتهم”، لا يزال USSC “يركز على تنسيق الإصلاح المؤسسي، وتسهيل التعاون الأمني، ووضع الشروط الأمنية لاتفاقية السلام، وتسهيل التنسيق والتواصل بين الوحدات الأمنية الإسرائيلية والفلسطينية”، في مبرّرات لاستمرار عمله بعد أكثر من عقد من التدريب والتطوير. كذلك، يقول المكتب إن الاتصال الروتيني بكلا الجانبين “يضمن آلية تنسيق أمني دائمة لتسهيل التعاون الوثيق”، كما “توفّر الشبكة الحالية، من المتخصّصين الأمنيين في المنطقة، خيارات لتهدئة التوترات في أوقات الأزمات وإيجاد بدائل عن الصراع والعنف”، عبر طاقم متعدد الجنسيات من خبراء أمنيين عسكريين ومدنيين متخصصين بالعمليات والخطط واللوجستيات وسيادة القانون، يقدمون تقاريرهم إلى وزير الخارجية عبر مكتب الشرق الأدنى وآسيا، وإلى رئيس هيئة الأركان المشتركة.
هذا الفريق عدده نحو 75 (بدأ المكتب بـ45 موظفاً، ويقال إنه تقلّص أخيراً إلى 60)، بينهم 16 من العسكريين الأميركيين يعملون في مكتب أساسي في القدس المحتلة، و20 عسكرياً كندياً و15 بريطانياً في مكتب ثانٍ في رام الله. كما لدى موظفون في السفارة الأميركية في “تل أبيب”، إلى جانب 28 موظفاً مدنياً من شركة أميركية خاصة . في تلك الأعوام (2007-2010)، خصصت الولايات المتحدة نحو 392 مليون دولار للتدريب والتجهيز وبناء البنية التحتية ذات الصلة، على هذا النحو: في الإجمال أكثر من 160 مليوناً للتدريب، ونحو 89 مليوناً لتوفير معدات غير قاتلة، ونحو 99 لتجديد منشآت للسلطة أو بنائها، و22 أخرى لوزارة الداخلية، والتفاصيل يوضحها هذا الجدول:
الإنفاق الأميركي على الأمن الفلسطيني (2007 – 2011)
المعلومات السابقة وردت في تقرير صدر عن “مكتب محاسبة الحكومة” في 12/5/2010، بعنوان “السلطة الفلسطينية: المساعدة الأميركية هي تدريب قوات الأمن وتجهيزها، لكن البرنامج يحتاج إلى قياس التقدم ويواجه قيوداً لوجستية”، وهو واحد من تقارير رقابية أميركية متعددة، بشأن صرف أموال دافعي الضرائب ونتيجتها، خلصت أغلبيتها بعد أعوام إلى نتيجة لافتة تقول: “في حين أن هذه المبادرات سليمة من الناحية الفنية، فإنها أخفقت في تمكين وزارة الداخلية حقاً، فلقد حافظ قادة الأمن (الفلسطينيون) على علاقاتهم المباشرة برئيس الوزراء والرئيس، متجاوزين الوزارة”.
مفترق طريق
يظهر من السلوك الأميركي التركيز، في المراحل كلها، على التدريب وشراء المعدات، وفي المرحلة الأولى على الإنشاءات الأمنية، قبل أن تتوقف الأخيرة لسبب ستوضحه الحلقة الثانية من هذه السلسلة، بينما بقيت الأرقام الصغيرة لسائر البنود. كما كان ملاحَظاً أن عامي 2008 و2009 شهدا موازنتين، الأولى أساسية والثانية تكميلية. ثم في عام 2011 طُلب مبلغ كبير (150 مليون دولار)، لتغيب من بعد ذلك البيانات الرسمية عن الأعوام اللاحقة.
يمكن تفسير هذا الغياب في قراءتين: الأولى أن المساعدات توقفت، لأن مرحلة البناء تمّت، وما يجري بعد ذلك هو إكمال للمسار، ولا يحتاج إلى هذا المقدار من المال، وخصوصاً أن “تل أبيب” اعترضت على أجزاء كثيرة من المشروع، خوفاً من صناعة “أعداء المستقبل”. والثانية تحويل المشروع إلى “سري للغاية” والتركيز أكثر على التعاون مع الأجهزة ذات الفعالية في الداخل والمنطقة، كالاستخبارات و”الوقائي” والاستخبارات العسكرية.
لكن المؤكد أن عام 2018 كان الأسوأ في هذا البرنامج، إذ انخفضت العلاقات وأوقف ترامب برامج التدريب كلياً من دون أن يمنع التمويل الأمني الخاص، وذلك قبل أن يأتي بايدن ويحلحل بعض القضايا. كما يُلاحَظ أن التراجع في البرنامج وعمل مكتب المنسق بدأت ملامحه منذ غاب منظّره، دايتون، وجاء مَن بعده (*) بصفتهم إداريين متخصصين، في مدة محدودة لولاية كل منهم (عامين تقريباً)، على الرغم من أن تتبُّع سِيَرهم الذاتية يُظهر اهتمام الأميركيين بهذا المنصب تحديداً، وتعيين أصحاب الخبرة والأقدمية فيه.
لكن هذه الأموال تحتاج إلى إحاطات دورية وتبريرات تقدمها تقارير إلى الكونغرس، كان آخرها للسنة المالية 2023، وجاء فيه أن “طلب المساعدة الأمنية سيدعم السلطة من أجل بناء مؤسسات أمنية وعدالة جنائية مهنية وفعالة، تحافظ على الاستقرار في الضفة وتدعم القانون، وتساهم مباشرة في الأمن الإقليمي”، وفق تقرير لوزارة الخارجية مقدَّم إلى الكونغرس. وهذا جزء من توضيح أساسي يقدَّم سنوياً، ويشمل معايير المساعدة للسلطة الفلسطينية، ومنها المعايير الموضوعة للمساعدة الأمنية للضفة وغزة، ومدى امتثال الفلسطينيين لهذه المعايير، والخطوات التي تتخذها السلطة لوضع حد للتعذيب أو غيره من ضروب المعاملة المرفوضة للمحتجَزين.
أيضاً، يتعين على الخارجية أن تقدم تقريراً مرتين سنوياً إلى لجان الاعتمادات، بشأن “المساعدة التي تقدمها الولايات المتحدة من أجل تدريب قوات الأمن الفلسطينية، بما في ذلك وصف مفصَّل للتدريب (وما بعد التدريب) والمناهج الدراسية والمعدات المقدمة والمساعدات”، وحتى المساعدات من مانحين آخرين، مع “وصف للتعديلات، إن وجدت، على الاستراتيجية الأمنية للسلطة”.
مع ذلك، يقول مكتب التنسيق، وفق تقرير صدر عن خدمة أبحاث الكونغرس، إنه بعد أكثر من أربعة أعوام لأفراد “الأمن الوطني” ووحدات حرس الرئاسة (2008-2012)، تحول المكتب إلى “دور استشاري استراتيجي أقل كثافة”، إلى جانب الجهود المستمرة في تمويل الأجهزة الأمنية ومرافق العدالة الجنائية، وتزويدها بالمعدات غير الفتاكة (بما في ذلك المركبات ومعدات الاتصالات)، والتدريب على قضايا تشمل مكافحة الإرهاب، والشرطة المجتمعية، والسيطرة على الحشود، والاستجابة لحالات الطوارئ، والقيادة، وحقوق الإنسان، وأخيراً إصلاح العدالة الجنائية. لكنّ الإشادة كانت بـ”تحسين القانون في مدن الضفة، مثل جنين ونابلس، والتي كانت في السابق بؤراً للنشاط المسلّح والإجرامي، والذي تقوده، إلى حد كبير، فصائل أو عشائر تعمل من مخيمات اللاجئين، عبر رعاية حزم العفو والتعويضات لتوفير حوافز للمقاتلين وأفراد الأمن من الجيل الأكبر سناً، والذين لديهم سجلات طويلة في قتال الإسرائيليين من أجل وقف أنشطتهم أو التقاعد”.
لكن – يضيف التقرير في تحديثه الأخير في 27/10/2022 – إنه منذ عام 2014، استؤنف النشاط المسلح في تلك المناطق وتوسع بالتدريج، الأمر الذي شكّل تحديات لقوات الأمن الفلسطينية و”إسرائيل”. ثم، مع بداية العام الجاري “ازداد التشدد إلى درجة أنه صار مصدر قلق رئيساً للسياسة الأميركية في الساحتين الإسرائيلية والفلسطينية، بينما تعاملت القوات الإسرائيلية وقوات السلطة مع القضية بأساليب متباينة، وهو ما أدى إلى بعض التوترات. وفي هذا السياق، قد يصير دور المكتب تسهيل التنسيق بين إسرائيل والسلطة على نحو أكثر بروزاً، وقد يُعيد المسؤولون والمشرّعون الأميركيون تقييم المساعدات المقدَّمة إلى القطاع الأمني للسلطة”.
بعد هذا الاستعراض المفصَّل، لا بدّ من دراسة وافية لمجمل السلوك الأميركي في الضفة، بعيداً عن السياسة (المفاوضات) والأمن: الاقتصاد وصناعة النخب ودعم المؤسسات، لكن لا بد من التعمق أكثر في الفلسفة من “دعم الأمن أولاً ودائماً”، وما بذلته واشنطن، في هذا الصعيد، من جهود يهدّد الواقع الحالي في الضفة نتائجَها، بل ربما تتحوّل إلى حنظل طبقاً للتشاؤم الإسرائيلي من الاندفاع الأميركي نحو تقوية السلطة، في مقابل رغبة محمومة لدى “تل أبيب” في قضم الضفة وانهيار المنظومة الفلسطينية أو تحويلها إلى خادم أمني واقتصادي فحسب. وهذه التفاصيل هي ما ستبحثه الحلقة المقبلة.
كان أول منسق أمني أميركي لـ”إسرائيل” والسلطة الفلسطينية، وخدم بهذه الصفة من 3/2005 حتى 12/2005. تحولت مهمته الأساسية من الإشراف على الإصلاح الأمني للسلطة إلى التركيز على التحضير خطة فك الارتباط الإسرائيلية الأحادية الجانب من غزة وبعض مستوطنات الضفة الغربية، في 8/2005.
خدم خمسة أعوام في المنصب بين عامي 2005 و2010. جاء دايتون في 12/2005 قبل شهر واحد فقط من فوز حماس بأغلبية المقاعد في المجلس التشريعي في 1/2006، فتغيرت مهمته، بين عشية وضحاها، من “إصلاح قوات الأمن إلى منع حكومة تقودها حماس من السيطرة عليها”. بعد أن أنهى مهماته، تقاعد دايتون من الجيش الأميركي في 10/2010، وهو الآن مدير “مركز جورج سي مارشال الأوروبي للدراسات الأمنية” في جارمش بارتنكيرشن في ألمانيا.
من القوات الجوية للولايات المتحدة، وشغل منصب المنسق عامين، من 10/2010 إلى 10/2012. قبل هذا التعيين، عمل مديراً للاستراتيجيات والخطط والسياسات للمقر الرئيسي القيادة المركزية الأميركية، وسبق أن كان طياراً في عمليات “عاصفة الصحراء” وغيرها. منذ توليه منصب دايتون، ظلّ بعيداً عن الأضواء، وهو ما يُعزى إلى رغبته في تهدئة العلاقات مع السلطة التي كانت مستاءة من سلَفه. بعد أن أنهى مهمته، عيّنه الرئيس في “منصب مهم ومسؤولية” مغايرة.
شغل منصب المنسق من 1/2015 إلى 10/2017. قبل هذا التعيين، عمل نائباً لمدير هيئة الأركان المشتركة للجيش الأميركي. بعد إنهاء مهمته، تقاعد من القوات المسلحة، ويعمل في “مركز ويليام جيه بيري لدراسات الدفاع في نصف الكرة الغربي” منذ 2/2018.
عمل منسّقاً من 11/2017 إلى 10/2019. قبل هذا التعيين، كان رئيس أركان قيادة الولايات المتحدة في المحيطين الهندي والهادئ. في 11/2019، تولى قيادة العمليات الخاصة في “الناتو”.
ثمانية عشر عاماً مرّت على وفاة ياسر عرفات في مِثل هذا اليوم من عام 2004. ثمانية عشر عاماً ظلّ خلالها هذا الملفّ أشبه بلُغز مستعصٍ على التفكيك، وصندوق أسود عصيّاً على الولوج إليه. إلى الآن، لا نتائج واضحة معلَنة لعمل لجنة التحقيق التي كانت قد شُكّلت برئاسة توفيق الطيراوي عام 2010، لكنّ اشتداد صراع الخلافة بين «أولاد فتح» أدّى إلى انكشاف الكثير من المستور، وتسرُّب عدد كبير من الوثائق السرّية التي لم يَجرؤ أيّ منهم على إنكار صحّتها. وإذ يبدو جليّاً أن ثمّة مخطّطاً واضحاً، من وراء هذه التسريبات، لإزاحة الطيراوي من المشهد السياسي، وإخلاء الجوّ لحسين الشيخ وماجد فرج اللذَين يريدان الاستئثار بتِركة أبي مازن وحدَهما لا غير، فإن الوثائق تُظهر أن أبا عمار تعرّض لعملية اغتيال سياسي ومعنوي، كان محمود عباس و«شُلّته» شديدَي الضلوع فيها، سبقت تصفيته الجسدية، وهو ما يجلّيه قول الراحل في أيامه الأخيرة: «وُصلولي… خلّي الكرسي ينفعهم، شعبي والتاريخ لن يرحمهم». وإذا كان التاريخ «لن يرحم» بالفعل رأس السلطة الفلسطينية الحالي، الذي قضى على كلّ ما تبقّى من إرث ثوري، واستعدى مكوّنات المجتمع كافّة، واستحدث سُنّة الطرد من «أمّ الجماهير»، فهو، على العكس من ذلك، سيحفظ لأبي عمار، على رغم كلّ المآخذ على نهجه الحافل بالتناقضات، وعلى رغم «خديعة أوسلو» التي ثبت أنها لم تكن سوى غطاء لتوسّع المشروع الاستيطاني، أنه القائد العسكري الذي لم يُسقط «السلاح من يده»، وتلك لوحدها أعادتْه إلى وجدان الناس، مبرَّأً من كلّ «خطيئة وطنية»، وطنياً فلسطينياً كـ«يوم ولدتْه أمه»
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سرّبت السلطة أخباراً ادّعت فيها أنها تَوافقت مع قيادة «الأسود» على تسليم البنا نفسه (أ ف ب)
أثار إقدام القيادي في «عرين الأسود»، محمود البنا، على تسليم نفسه لأجهزة السلطة الفلسطينية جدلاً واضطراباً في الشارع الفلسطيني، اضطرّا المجموعة التي استُشهد للتوّ قائدها، وديع الحَوح، إلى إصدار بيان توضيحي تبرّأت فيه من خطوة البنا وأكدت أنها «بألف خير». وإذ لا تُنكر مصادر من داخل المجموعة تأثير تلك الخطوة على «الأسود»، فهي تؤكّد أن ثمّة «قيادة عميقة» للحالة الناشئة في نابلس، لم تصل إليها يد العدو أو السلطة، فيما تأتي محاولة فلسطينيَّين اثنَين تنفيذ عملية فدائية عند حاجز حوارة أمس، لتُثبت أن الرابط في ما بين «العرين» والفعل المقاوم في الضفة، أكبر، إلى الآن، من أن تتمكّن إسرائيل من اجتثاثه
تسير مجموعة «عرين الأسود» على حدّ السكّين. بعد استشهاد قائدها وديع الحَوح وأربعة من رفاقه، تلقّت المجموعة، التي تتّخذ من البلدة القديمة في نابلس معقلاً لها، ضربة معنوية، تَمثّلت في قيام أحد أكبر قادتها، محمود البنا، ومعه أربعة من المقاتلين، بتسليم أنفسهم ليل الأربعاء – الخميس، إلى الأجهزة الأمنية الفلسطينية، بذريعة تأمينهم من عملية اغتيال إسرائيلية متوقّعة. وقالت ليلى، شقيقة البنا، في منشور عبر صفحتها في «فيسبوك»، إن «عائلة محمود ووالدته وشقيقاته بذلوا جهوداً كبيرة لإقناعه بتسليم نفسه وترك السلاح، وخصوصاً أنه الأخ الوحيد المتبقّي لديهم، بعد مقتل شقيقه محمد في أحد سجون جهاز الاستخبارات في رام الله». وأضافت ليلى: «الحمد لله إنو رح يضلّلنا سند، نشكر ربنا إنو اقتنع، ونشكر كلّ واحد ساهم في إقناعه».
على أن خروج البنا من الصفّ القيادي لـ«العرين»، والذي عدّه مقرّبون من الجماعة «ضربة لا تقلّ ألماً عن استشهاد الحَوح»، عملت السلطة على استغلاله وتوظيفه منذ اللحظة الأولى. إذ سرّبت عبر منصّات ومواقع إلكترونية مقرّبة منها أخباراً ادّعت فيها أنها تَوافقت مع قيادة «الأسود» على تسليم البنا نفسه، لحمايته من التصفية. كما نشرت عدّة بيانات باسم مجموعات «كتائب شهداء الأقصى» في نابلس، حاولت فيها غسل يد الأجهزة الأمنية من الدور الذي تمارسه لتقويض الحالة التي تمثّلها «العرين»، حينما ذكرت أن «تسليم البنا ورفاقه أنفسهم، هو خطوة تكتيكية للمحافظة على استدامة العمل». كلّ تلك الفوضى استدعت توضيحاً من «الأسود»، التي نشرت، لاحقاً، بياناً أعلنت فيها أنها لم تخوّل أيّ طرف من الأطراف تسليم أيٍّ من مقاتليها، وأن «مَن يقوم بتسليم نفسه، هذا قراره وخياره ولا نناقشه به حتى»، داعيةً المواطنين إلى «التوقّف عن تداول الإشاعات، وعدم الإساءة إلى أيّ مقاتل سلّم نفسه». وأكدت أن «العرين بألف خير وفضل من الله، ونقول إن كان أبو صالح وعبود وإبراهيم والوديع والمبسلط وأدهم والدخيل قد مضوا، فإن المنتظرين الصادقين كثر».
لا يقلّل مصدر مقرّب من المجموعة من تأثير ما أقدم عليه القيادي محمود البنا
من جهته، قال البنا، في منشور عبر صفحته في «فيسبوك»، إنه سلّم نفسه لـ«إخواننا» في الأجهزة الأمنية، «بعد مشاورتي لإخواني في النضال أنا ورفاق دربي»، حتى «يحمونا من هذا المحتلّ الغاشم الذي حاول تنفيذ إبادة جماعية لنا في آخر عملية اغتيال»، مضيفاً: «نحن لم نُسلّم لننتهي، إنما للحق جولات». إلّا أن الصدمة التي أحدثتْها خطوة البنا ورفاقه، استدعت تصريحات من العديد من الشخصيات ذات الحضور الرمزي، في محاولة لرفع المعنويات وجبْر الكسر، ولا سيما أن الصحافة الإسرائيلية أطلقت موجة احتفاء بما سمّته «القضاء على ظاهرة العرين». إذ قال موقع «إنتلي نيوز» العبري: «عرين الأسود على وشْك الزوال من الوجود. هذه ضربة معنوية شديدة للجمهور الفلسطيني الذي علّق آماله على التنظيم»، فيما ردّت والدة الشهيد إبراهيم النابلسي على ذلك بالقول: «أُطمئِنكم أن العرين حيّ وقوي وثابت، وأُسوده أبطال كما تعرفونهم على الدوام، ولا يتراجعون للحظة، فقطار الحرية انطلق ولن يتوقّف». وفي ما بدا كمكافأة لمحافظ نابلس، بوصْفه «عرّاب الإنجاز»، أعلن الاحتلال، أوّل من أمس، فكّ الحصار بشكل جزئي عن المدينة. لا يقلّل مصدر مقرّب من «عرين الأسود» من تأثير ما أقدم عليه القيادي البنا، ولا سيما أن الأخير كان المرشّح الأبرز لملء الفراغ التي تركه الشهيد الحَوح، غير أنه ينبّه إلى أن «الصورة لم تتّضح بعد، هناك تفاصيل ليس من الجيّد الحديث فيها على الصعيد الأمني». ويؤكد عامر محمد (اسم مستعار)، وهو أحد مقاتلي «العرين»، بدوره، في حديثه إلى «الأخبار»، أنه على رغم الضربات التي تلقّتها المجموعة خلال الأيام الأخيرة، إلّا أن «ثمّة قيادة عميقة للحالة، لم تصل إليها يد الأجهزة الأمنية الفلسطينية، ولم تستطع إسرائيل ضربها»، مضيفاً إن «تلك القيادة هي مَن تتولّى حالياً تسيير شؤون الأسود». ويبيّن أن «قيادة الظلّ كانت تعمل مِن خارج دائرة الميدان، لذا فهي التي تنظّم اليوم عمل المقاتلين، وإذا كانت روح المقاومة لدينا حاضرة، وهناك قيادة تدير الموقف، فلن يضرّنا شيء».
وفي الاتّجاه نفسه، يرى الباحث السياسي مجد ضرغام أن «الضربات التي تلقّتها العرين ستؤثّر بلا شكّ على اندفاع هذه الجماعة وديناميكيتها»، غير أنها «ستُكسبها مزيداً من الهدوء، وضبط الخطاب الإعلامي، والتعاطي مع الأزمات (…)»، بحسبه. ويرى ضرغام، في حديث إلى «الأخبار»، أن «السلطة وإسرائيل لم تُحسنا فهم الحضور الوجداني للعرين ومقاتليها في الشارع، لذا، فإن خطواتهما الميدانية قاصرة عن القضاء على الظاهرة جذرياً»، لافتاً إلى أن «هناك جنديَّين في جهاز الدفاع المدني حاولا تنفيذ عملية عند حاجز حوارة القريب من نابلس يوم أمس، ما أدّى إلى استشهادهما. بالتأكيد، هما ليسا من العناصر المنضوية في تشكيل العرين، لكن الرابط بين قرارهما القيام بالفعل المقاوم، والعرين، هو الذي لا تستطيع إسرائيل ولا السلطة تقويضه».
Feature photo | Protesters burn effigies of pictures of Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, Abu Dhabi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Zayed and U.S. President Donald Trump, during a demonstration against the United Arab Emirates’ deal with Israel, in the West Bank city of Nablus, Aug. 14, 2020. Majdi Mohammed | AP
Ramzy Baroud US President Donald Trump’s so-called “Deal of the Century” was meant to represent a finality of sorts, an event reminiscent of Francis Fukuyama’s premature declaration of the “End of History” and the uncontested supremacy of western capitalism. In effect, it was a declaration that “we” – the US, Israel, and a few allies – have won, and “you”, isolated and marginalized Palestinians, lost.
In the same way, Fukuyama failed to consider the unceasing evolution of history, the US and Israeli governments also failed to understand that the Middle East, in fact, the world, is not governed by Israeli expectations and American diktats.
The above is a verifiable assertion. On October 17, the Australian government announced that it is revoking its 2018 recognition of Jerusalem as the capital of Israel. Expectedly, the new decision, officially made by Australian Foreign Minister Penny Wong, was strongly criticized by Israel, celebrated by Palestinians, and welcomed by Arab countries who praised the responsible diplomacy of Canberra.
Any serious analysis of the Australian move, however, must not be confined to Australia’s own political shifts but must be extended to include the dramatic changes underway in Palestine, the Middle East, and, indeed, the world.
For many years, but especially since the US invasion of Iraq as part of the politically-motivated “war on terror”, Washington perceived itself as the main, if not the only, power that is able to shape political outcomes in the Middle East. Yet, as its Iraq quagmire began destabilizing the entire region, with revolts, social upheavals, and wars breaking out, Washington began losing its grip.
It was then rightly understood that, while the US may succeed in waging wars, as it did in Iraq and Libya, it is unable to restore even a small degree of peace and stability. Though Trump seemed disinterested in engaging in major military conflicts, he converted that energy to facilitate the rise of Israel as a regional power, which is incorporated into the Middle East’s political and economic grids through a process of political “normalization”, which is wholly delinked from the struggle in Palestine or the freedom of the Palestinians.
The Americans were so confident in their power to orchestrate such a major political transformation to the extent that Jared Kushner – Trump’s Middle East adviser and son-in-law – was revealed to have attempted to cancel the very status of Palestinian refugees in Jordan, an attempt that was met with a decisive Jordanian rejection.
Kushner’s arrogance reached the point that, in January 2020, he declared that his father-in-law’s plan was such a “great deal” which, if rejected by Palestinians, “they’re going to screw up another opportunity like they’ve screwed up every other opportunity that they’ve ever had in their existence”.
All of this hubris was joined with many American concessions to Israel, whereby Washington virtually fulfilled all Israeli wishes. The relocation of the US embassy from Tel Aviv to occupied Jerusalem was merely the icing on the cake of a much larger political scheme that included the financial boycott of Palestinians, the cancellation of funds that benefited Palestinian refugees, the recognition of the illegally occupied Syrian Golan Heights as part of Israel and the support of Tel Aviv’s decision to annex much of the occupied West Bank.
The then Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and his allies had hoped that, as soon as Washington carried out such moves, many other countries would follow, and that, in no time, Palestinians would find themselves friendless, broke, and irrelevant.
This was hardly the case, and what started with a bang ended with a whimper. Though the Biden administration still refuses to commit to any new “peace process”, it has largely avoided engaging in Trump’s provocative politics. Not just that, the Palestinians are anything but isolated, and Arab countries remain united, at least officially, in the centrality of Palestine to their collective political priorities.
In April 2021, Washington restored funding to the Palestinians, including money allocated to the UN refugee agency, UNRWA. It did not do so for charitable reasons, of course, but because it wanted to ensure the allegiance of the Palestinian Authority, and to remain a relevant political party in the region. Even then, the PA President Mahmoud Abbas, still declared, during a meeting with Russian President Vladimir Putin in Kazakhstan on October 12, that “we [Palestinians] don’t trust America”.
Moreover, the annexation scheme, at least officially, did not go through. The rejection of any Israeli steps that could change the legal status of the occupied Palestinian territories proved unpopular with most UN members, including most of Israel’s western allies.
Australia remained the exception, but not for long. Unsurprisingly, Canberra’s reversal of its earlier decision regarding the status of Jerusalem earned it much criticism in Tel Aviv. Four years following its initial policy shift, Australia shifted yet once more, as it found it more beneficial to realign itself with the position of most world capitals than to that of Washington and Tel Aviv.
Trump’s “Deal of the Century” has failed simply because neither Washington nor Tel Aviv had enough political cards to shape a whole new reality in the Middle East. Most parties involved, Trump, Netanyahu, Scott Morrison in Australia, and a few others, were simply playing a political game linked to their own interests at home. Similarly, the currently embattled British Prime Minister Liz Truss is now jumping on the bandwagon of relocating the British embassy to Jerusalem so that she may win the approval of pro-Israel politicians. The move further demonstrates her lack of political experience and, regardless of what Westminster decides to do next, it will unlikely greatly affect the political reality in Palestine and the Middle East.
In the final analysis, it has become clear that the “Deal of the Century” was not an irreversible historical event, but an opportunistic and thoughtless political process that lacked a deep understanding of history and the political balances that continue to control the Middle East.
Another important lesson to be gleaned from all of this is that, as long as the Palestinian people continue to resist and fight for their freedom and as long as international solidarity continues to grow around them, the Palestinian cause will remain central to all Arabs and to all conscientious people around the world.
Ramzy Baroud is a journalist, author and the editor of The Palestine Chronicle. He is the author of six books. His latest book, co-edited with Ilan Pappé, is “Our Vision for Liberation: Engaged Palestinian Leaders and Intellectuals Speak out”. His other books include “My Father was a Freedom Fighter” and “The Last Earth”. Baroud is a non-resident senior research fellow at the centre for Islam and Global Affairs (CIGA). His website is ramzybaroud.net
The Palestinian factions signed the “Algerian Paper for Palestinian Reconciliation” on 13 October to strengthen the relationship among several Palestinian national parties in order to resist the confronting forces of the Israeli army.
The Algerian initiative was put forward as a result of the continuous aggression of Israeli forces against the Palestinians, specifically near Islamic and Christian sanctuaries in Jerusalem within the al-Aqsa area.
The document encourages unifying the Palestinian factions in light of these constant attacks and supports efforts aimed at restoring the rights of Palestinian nationals.
Throughout the year, far-right Jewish settlers stormed religious sites in the occupied West Bank, where a day prior, settlers began burning copies of the Quran in an attempt to provoke locals.
Israeli forces protected the settlers as they desecrated holy sites and several copies of the Quran, and prevented Palestinians from entering the squares surrounding the Ibrahimi Mosque.
On 11 October, Algerian President Abdelmadjid Tebboune hosted a meeting between delegates from the Palestinian Authority (PA) and the Palestinian resistance movement Hamas to facilitate reconciliation talks between the factions.
Hostilities between the parties have been apparent since 2007, following Hamas’s consolidation of power in the Gaza Strip. Previous negotiations have repeatedly failed due to their differences to find a solution to the Israel-Palestinian conflict.
The meeting between the parties lasts two days and will be led by members of Fatah, Hamas, and the Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ).
Despite peace talks between the factions, Fatah has been reluctant and has mostly rejected the Algerian Paper for Palestinian Reconciliation, whilst Hamas has been more accepting of the request.
Back in early September, Algeria officially invited Palestine to participate in the upcoming Arab summit that will take place on 1 November in Algiers.
The invitation was extended to the Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas, however, critics suspect Abbas is using the votes of Jerusalem residents to cling to power, given the growing discontent with his rule and the PA in general, due to their collaboration with the Israeli occupation.
Earlier in the year, an Israeli official revealed that PA forces carried out raids in the West Bank city of Jenin at the direct request of the Israeli military.
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The arrest of a prominent Palestinian activist, Musab Shtayyeh, and another Palestinian activist, by Palestinian Authority police on September 20 was not the first time that the notorious PA’s Preventive Security Service (PSS) has arrested a Palestinian who is wanted by Israel.
In this episode of ‘The Palestinian View’, Ramzy Baroud talks about the Palestinian Authority, its violence against the Palestinian people and the very future of the PA.
The recent arrests came as a shock to Nablus locals, who took to the streets in order to protest the decision of the PA to target the Palestinian resistance.
Violent clashes between Palestinian demonstrators and the Palestinian Authority (PA)’s security forces, this Monday, resulted in the death of a 53-year-old and represented a turning point in the relationship between the PA and the newly formed resistance factions inside the occupied West Bank.
On Monday evening the PA’s Preventative Security Service arrested two Palestinian resistance fighters wanted by “Israel”, Musab Shtayyeh and Ameed Tabila, in the city of Nablus. Musab Shtayyeh, the most prominent of the two, had evaded multiple Israeli arrest campaigns since June of last year. Shtayyeh also managed to escape an Israeli assassination attempt on July 24, which left three other Palestinian resistance fighters dead, after “Israel” had stormed the city of Nablus with hundreds of military personnel, including special forces units.
The arrests came as a shock to Nablus locals, who took to the streets in order to protest the decision of the PA to target the Palestinian resistance. In both Nablus and Jenin, the two locations where Palestinian armed groups have been the most active, armed fighters took to the streets to make announcements condemning the PA’s actions. Although the resistance forces in Nablus clearly stated that their guns were not aimed at anyone but the occupation, they stressed that their patience should not be tested.
It didn’t take long before young people took to the streets to burn tires in central Nablus and chanted in support of Shtayyeh and Tabila, to which the PA security forces responded with gunfire and tear gas. Palestinian resistance fighters also fired back towards the PA forces and it was later declared that a 53-year-old civilian had been shot and killed, the incident was blamed on the Palestinian Authority.
The images coming out of the West Bank have been striking; young men hurling stones at militarized vehicles, as Western-trained forces fire tear gas and bullets back, except this time the militarised force is not Israeli, it calls itself the Palestinian. To add insult to injury, it has emerged that the PA took the decision to carry out its arrest campaign based upon a request given by the Israeli occupation regime. Hussein al-Sheikh, the Secretary General of the PA’s executive committee, seems to be the source of the order given to carry out the arrests.
Right now, the PA has been put into its usual defensive mode, where it attempts to justify its actions and bids to convince Palestinians that its ‘Security coordination’ efforts are in the best interest of the Palestinian people, something that Palestinians see through. All of the explanations and excuses in the world will fail to cover up what took place this Monday. Just as was the case last year, when the PA’s security forces brutally beat the beloved activist, Nizar Banat, to death, after pulling him out of his home in front of his family. According to Amnesty International, it’s clear at this time that the PA failed to ensure accountability for the assassination of Nizar Banat and so it should come as no surprise that PA forces are sliding down a slippery slope into chaos.
Just as the United States and its NATO allies have failed to adjust their mindsets to the current era, so too has the leadership of the Palestinian Authority. We must recognise that we are now witnessing the era in which the expression of a new Palestinian generation is being felt; armed resistance factions are rising, an armed resistance populated – primarily – by young people between the ages of 18-25. When we break down what this means; it suggests that today’s resistance fighters in the West Bank were only small children when the Second Intifada was happening. The fighters in Jenin and Nablus today, fit into a trend that began emerging in the early to mid 80’s, when Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) cadres would organise themselves with modest means to fight the occupation.
The Palestinian resistance in the West Bank do not remember what it felt like to see the resistance crushed, during “Israel’s” brutal ‘operation defensive shield’ of 2002, they are not afraid and believe in victory. The biggest problem they now face however, began in 2002, following ‘operation defensive shield’; that is the CIA’s dismantling and reformation of the Palestinian Authority’s security forces. Nobody likes to talk about this, but it is true and cannot be disputed, at the behest of Israeli, EU and US interests, the PA’s security forces were transformed into a Western-Jordanian trained and equipped “anti-terrorism” task force, designed to do the heavy lifting for the Israeli occupation army.
Since the end of the Second Intifada, in 2007, we haven’t seen the energized armed struggle that we see today in the West Bank and so the PA’s forces have been capable of performing their duties, with little to no pushback. However, it has been way too long since the Oslo Agreements and the rhetoric of the Zionist entity has transitioned back to that which it maintained during the 1970’s, regarding Palestinian self governance. Palestinians don’t see any hope for change and the PA is not making any progress whatsoever towards achieving any form of Palestinian statehood. The Palestinian bourgeoisie of Ramallah are happy living in their imaginary fantasy world and the PA has now absorbed the Palestine Liberation Organisation (PLO). There has been no national elections since 2006 and the non-economy of the West Bank, which is completely controlled by the Zionist entity and Jordanian regime, is getting worse for the poorest in society.
The PA is now beginning to face its worst nightmare, the ultimatum that we all knew was coming at some point; they can turn their guns on the Zionist entity, or they can turn their guns on the Palestinian resistance and face the end of their power as we know it. There is no more standing in the middle, attempting to please the West by collaborating with the Israeli occupation forces on “security coordination” and playing the game of condemning Zionist atrocities, whilst begging on their knees for peace. The next chapter is going to be violent, now it is on those within that Fatah Party leadership to decide where the PA is heading and what side of the violence they are going to be on, because asking for peace talks is not going to solve today’s issues.
The opinions mentioned in this article do not necessarily reflect the opinion of Al mayadeen, but rather express the opinion of its writer exclusively.
Baroud comments on the Palestinian Authority’s quest to obtain full UN membership and whether such status is merely symbolic. (Photo: Palestine Chronicle)
In the latest Palestine Chronicle episode of the “Palestinian View’, Ramzy Baroud raises the question “Will the United Nations Finally Deliver Justice for Palestine?”
Baroud comments on the Palestinian Authority’s quest to obtain full UN membership and whether such status is merely symbolic.
To understand the historical context of this issue and to offer your own opinion, make sure to watch and share the Palestine Chronicle’s latest production.
‘The National Committee of Palestinian Tribes, Clans and Families in the Gaza Strip’ urged in a statement the Palestinian people to rise up against the latest measures by the Palestinian Authority (PA) to arrest a leading fighter in the West Bank city of Nablus.
On Tuesday, PA security forces arrested Musab Shtayyeh, a decision that led to widespread protests in Nablus and across the occupied Palestinian territories.
In their statement, representatives of major Palestinian clans and tribes demanded the immediate release of Shtayyeh, and an end to all ‘security coordination’ between the PA and the Israeli occupation.
The Palestine Chronicle attended the large assembly held in Gaza City on Tuesday.
(All Photos: Mahmoud Ajjour, The Palestine Chronicle)
The Palestinian resistance factions of the West Bank are no longer fractured and in disarray, and the results speak for themselves
The Israeli army’s recent incursions into the cities and refugee camps of the northern occupied-West Bank are not going as smoothly as before.
The occupation army’s incursions into the city of Jenin and Jenin refugee camp in early September required the mobilization of large forces, including special units and armored vehicles – in scale, unprecedented since 2014.
On the night of 6 September, a force of about 100 vehicles carried out a raid in Jenin, supported by air with drones, and on land, by hundreds of soldiers from Israel’s elite military units.
Their task? To demolish the house of Ra’ad Hazem, who carried out the Dizengoff attack in Tel Aviv on 7 April, 2022. More than anything, this excessive military build-up over a single home demolition illustrates that the Israeli military can no longer operate in the West Bank as they did before the May 2021 ‘Sayf Al Quds’ conflagration – and its subsequent developments.
After the 6 September operation – which resulted in the death of three Israelis and wounded 14 – the occupation army launched Operation ‘Break the Waves’ in response to the rapid expansion of Palestinian resistance factions and fervor in the West Bank.
The re-emergence of resistance in the West Bank
Break the Waves’ objective, according to then-Prime Minister Naftali Bennett, was to “attack without borders in order to stop the [resistance] operations” – four of which were carried out in cities in occupied territories – and to destroy the infrastructure of the resistance factions in Jenin and Nablus.
Five months after the Tel Aviv attack, the situation in the West Bank remains tense and is heading toward further escalation. In the interim, three new resistance battalions have been announced in Nablus, Tulkarm and Tubas.
Between 2007 and 2021, the resistance factions, particularly Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ), remained stuck in a vicious cycle. The enemy’s surgical strikes were hindering their proactive initiatives, and until 2020, their activities were limited to the formation of fighting cells that were able to carry out one or two attacks before being incapacitated.
Since Hamas took control of the Gaza Strip in 2007, Palestinian Authority (PA) security services have fully collaborated with the occupation authorities to pursue these resistance factions, for fear of having the Gaza model repeated in the West Bank.
The genesis lies in Jenin
The rejuvenation of resistance in the occupied West Bank can be attributed to the martyr Jamil al-Amouri. A prominent figure in the Jenin camp, Amouri was considered the most “wanted” by the occupation state for carrying out several shooting attacks against Israeli positions around Jenin, during the 2021 battle of Sayf al-Quds.
He effectively contributed to the formation of active military cells inside the camp, which later went on to form the nucleus of the Jenin Brigade.
In early June 2021, Amouri was assassinated, along with Lieutenant Adham Yasser Tawfiq Alawi from Nablus, and Captain Tayseer Mahmoud Othman Eissa from Jenin. The deaths of a PIJ commander along with two officers from the PA’s Military Intelligence effectively broke the ice between the PIJ on the one hand, and the Fatah movement and members of the security services in Jenin and Nablus, on the other.
This also led to a subtle change in the popular resistance factions’ perception of the PA security services, who for years have been accused of being agents of the occupation.
As political researcher Muhammad Dargham told The Cradle: “The martyrdom of Amouri with two officers from the security services removed the veil from the eyes of many supporters of the [Palestinian] Authority and the Fatah who woke up after thirteen years and found themselves guards of security coordination with Israel.”
PIJ and Fatah: setting aside differences
According to Dargham, the killing of Amouri, Alawi, and Eissa created harmony – at least in the Jenin camp – between the Al-Quds Brigades and the Al-Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigades – the respective armed wings of the PIJ and Fatah.
Three months after Amouri’s murder, five Palestinian prisoners belonging to the PIJ movement, along with the leader of the Al-Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigades, Zakaria Al-Zubaidi, managed to escape from Gilboa Prison, the most fortified of all Israeli prisons. Two of the six, Ayham Kamamji and Monadel Nafeat, managed to reach Jenin refugee camp.
By 19 September, 2021, all escapees were re-captured. However the date is also notable for the establishment of the Jenin Brigade – the first semi-organized resistance formation in the West Bank in 17 years. Importantly, while the Brigade was founded by PIJ operatives, it also consists of members of the armed wings of political rivals Hamas and Fatah.
Resistance spreads like wild fire
For many years, Israel ruled out the success of any semi-organized resistance action in the West Bank cities and refugee camps. This is due to the occupation’s adoption of a “maximum integration” policy that linked all aspects of the daily lives of Palestinians in the West Bank to Israel.
The occupation also adopted its “mowing the lawn” policy, which sought to target all resistances cells by arresting or killing its members.
These strategies were designed to send the message that any attempt to resist is doomed to failure, and the fate of those who undertake it will be life imprisonment or assassination.
However, what transpired in September 2021 was different from all Israeli estimates. The Jenin Brigade maintained its military continuity, and the attempts to storm the Jenin refugee camp became much more costly for the Israelis.
Previously, any Israeli force that invaded the camp was met with stone-throwing and firecrackers. But over the course of a year and three months, the alliance of Al-Quds Brigades and Al-Aqsa Brigades raised the bar considerably, and stands as testament to the benefits of a united armed front for the resistance.
This was noticeable about a year after the launch of the Jenin Brigade. On 24 May, 2022, clashes erupted in the area of the Prophet Joseph’s tomb, near Balata and Askar refugee camps, east of Nablus. Israeli settlers used to enter this area without any confrontation except for stone throwing.
On that day, though, the confrontations developed into an armed clash that seemed organized and with purpose. A few days later, Al-Quds Brigades issued a statement announcing the launch of the Nablus Brigade.
One month earlier, three resistance fighters from the Al-Quds Brigades were killed in a clash with the Israeli army. One of the three, Saif Abu Libdeh, from the Ain Shams camp in Tulkarem, had worked for months to establish the infrastructure for a group that would be announced six weeks after his death, under the name Tulkarem Brigade. This was followed by the formation of another battalion – the Tubas Brigade in June.
The occupation state: feeling the heat
According to the Israeli army’s Chief of Staff Aviv Kohavi, the occupation forces have foiled “hundreds of operations” since the beginning of the Operation Break the Wave, and carried out more than 1,500 precautionary arrests.
Indeed, the first half of this year witnessed more than 3,700 Palestinian attacks in the West Bank, during which 21 settlers were killed and 316 wounded, including 2,692 attacks with stones, 577 with Molotov cocktails, 542 with burning tires, 33 with explosive devices, 30 with fireworks, 25 with paint bottles, 14 shootings, 1 case of hit and run, 4 cases of stabbing (with 7 foiled).
However, these numbers maybe underrepresented. For instance, in one week alone (28 August to 3 September 2022), 12 soldiers and settlers were injured, and about 90 points of confrontation were observed, including one stabbing attack, 22 shooting attacks, and 15 throwing explosive devices and Molotov cocktails.
Point of no return
There is consensus among the Israeli security establishment, think-tanks, and military analysts that the situation on the ground in the West Bank has reached a point of no return. The question that worries Israel is: Is it possible to eliminate the new resistance developments – or at least keep them confined to the northern West Bank and prevent their expansion to southern cities such as Hebron and Bethlehem, or central cities such as Jerusalem and Ramallah?
This Israeli concern is justified considering that the beginning of September bore serious consequences for the Israelis. On 4 September, three Palestinians from Jenin (a father and his two sons) shot at a bus carrying Kfir unit recruits in the Jordan Valley, injuring more than seven Israeli soldiers.
Until now, the results of the investigations have not been announced, but it seems that the attack was carefully planned in terms of timing, and choice of location, where there were fewer surveillance cameras at work.
A few days later, the Israeli army aborted an attempt by a Palestinian youth from Nablus from carrying out an operation in central Tel Aviv. The police suggested that the young man “infiltrated through a hole in the wall in the Tulkarem area,” where the army deployed three infantry battalions to thwart further attempts.
There is yet another event that suggests the resistance action in the West Bank is growing. At dawn, on Thursday 8 September, members of the Jenin Brigade detonated a locally manufactured explosive device targeting a military jeep during a raid of one of the neighboring camps.
It turned out that the device was controlled remotely, which represented a major technical development for the resistance factions, whose infrastructure was destroyed at the end of the Second Intifada.
Israelis are fanning the flames
The Israeli Institute for National Security Studies in Tel Aviv believes that the PIJ has succeeded in transforming the northern West Bank into a hotbed of resistance, as well as in smuggling weapons and money to Palestinian cities and camps.
These concerns coincide with expressed doubts over the efficacy of Israel’s “mowing the lawn” policy, which has fueled the “vicious cycle of blood,” according to Amos Harel, a military analyst writing for Haaretz newspaper.
In an article he wrote earlier this month, Harel asked whether the Israeli army is quelling the West Bank’s flames, or actually fanning them.
Avi Iskharov, an analyst in Yedioth Ahronoth newspaper, opined that Israel is facing a “new situation” that is not similar to the two previous intifadas of 1987 and 2000, pointing out that “there are pockets of Palestinian gunmen in Nablus and Jenin (in the northern West Bank), who clash almost every night with the army and shoot at Israeli targets.”
Sources close to the resistance brigades in the West Bank told The Cradle that “Israel’s concerns are exaggerated for use in the upcoming election campaign.”
“What we are seeing today is the result of years of [resistance] efforts. As the train has set off, returning to the starting point means acceptance of our mass killing, and this is out of the question,” says one Palestinian source.
Israel: The PA is not collaborating enough
The Israelis have sought to place the blame for their inability to eliminate the resistance brigades and to abort operations in the occupied territories squarely on the PA in Ramallah, who they feel are failing to fulfill their obligations.
Israel’s Kan channel quoted an Israeli official as saying that “the Palestinian security services should increase their activity in the cities of the West Bank to prevent further escalation.”
As for the Palestinians, the corruption-ridden PA is too weak to play a pivotal role in curbing the resistance which enjoys broad Palestinian popular support. Any further association made between the PA with the Israeli security campaigns will make it lose what is left of its flagging legitimacy.
The Hebrew Walla website quoted Minister of Civil Affairs Hussein al-Sheikh, the PA’s channel of communication with the Israelis, as saying: “It is Israel that has weakened the [Palestinian] Authority through daily incursions into the Palestinian areas.”
“The authority cannot accept a reality in which the army storms the occupied territories every night, then we are asked to work during the day against the militants,” added Sheikh.
A dawn of a new era in the West Bank
Meanwhile, the US has been keen to help prop up the PA and help it “restore stability,” by taking measures such as “increasing the number of work permits for Palestinians” in the occupied territories, “pumping economic aid to the Authority from various sources,” and facilitating the movement of Palestinians.
US Assistant Secretary of State for Middle Eastern Affairs Barbara Leaf, who recently visited Israel and met with senior security officials, warned that “the situation in the West Bank is worse than it appears and the future of the entire PA is under threat.”
In the early hours of 20 September, PA security forces in Nablus arrested Musab Shtayyeh, a Hamas commander wanted by Israel. Later that day, clashes broke out between the PA and hundreds of Palestinians who hit the streets in protest.
Resistance factions are demanding Shtayyeh’s immediate release and are threatening to bar the PA from Nablus until this is done.
In a video addressing the Palestinian Authority, the Palestinian resistance in Jenin cautioned: “we do not want to fight with you, but stay away from us. If you deal in kidnapping, we will also deal in kidnapping.”
The Authority’s unelected President Mahmoud Abbas is in a bind: he fears mutiny from within for collaborating with Israeli security, and fears punishment from Israel for not doing so.
By not adopting a conclusive direction, on a daily basis Abbas drains the PA of further legitimacy and authority, as demonstrated in Nablus today.
In terms of the prospects for Palestinian national liberation, this at least will be a welcome development, as the decline or demise of the western and Israeli-backed PA will open a wide door to revitalized armed resistance in the occupied West Bank.
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To judge US President Joe Biden’s recent visit to Israel and Palestine as a ‘failure’ in terms of activating the dormant ‘peace process’ is simply a misnomer. For this statement to be accurate, Washington would have had to indicate even a nominal desire to push for negotiations between the Israeli government and the Palestinian leadership.
Political and diplomatic platitudes aside, the current American administration has done the exact opposite as indicated in Biden’s words and actions. Alleging that the US commitment to a two-state solution “has not changed”, Biden dismissed his Administration’s interest in trying to achieve such a goal by declaring that the “ground is not ripe” for negotiations.
Considering that the Palestinian Authority of Mahmoud Abbas has repeatedly announced its readiness to return to negotiations, one can only assume that the process is being stalled due to Israel’s intransigence. Indeed, none of Israel’s top leaders or major parties champion negotiations, or the so-called peace process, as a strategic objective.
However, Israel is not the only party to blame. The Americans, too, have made it clear that they moved on from that political sham altogether, one which they have invented and sustained for decades. In fact, the final nail in the ‘negotiating solution’ coffin was hammered by the Donald Trump Administration, which has simply backed every Israeli claim, thus shunning all rightful Palestinian demands.
The Biden Administration has been habitually blamed by Palestinians, Arabs and progressive voices within the Democratic Party for failing to reverse Trump’s prejudiced moves in favor of Israel: for example, moving the US Embassy from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem, shutting down the US consulate in East Jerusalem, accepting the unfounded Israeli claims regarding its jurisdiction over illegal Jewish settlements built over occupied Palestinian land, and so on.
Even if one assumes that the Biden Administration is capable of reversing some or all of Trump’s unlawful actions, what good would that be in the greater scheme of things? Washington was, and remains, Israel’s greatest benefactor, funding its military occupation of Palestine with an annual gift of $4 billion, in addition to many other schemes, including a massive and growing budget allocated for Israel’s Iron Dome alone.
As horrific as Trump’s years were in terms of undermining a just resolution to the Israeli occupation of Palestine, Biden’s policies are but a continuation of an existing pro-Israel American legacy that surpasses that of Trump by decades.
As for Israel, the ‘peace process’ has served its purpose, which explains the infamous declaration by the CEO of the Jewish settlement council in the occupied West Bank, known as Yesha, in 2018, “I don’t want to brag that we’ve won. (…) Others would say it appears that we’re winning.”
However, Israel’s supposed ‘victory’ following three decades of a fraudulent ‘peace process’ cannot be credited to Trump alone. Biden and other top US officials have also been quite useful. While it is widely understood that US politicians support Israel out of sheer interest, for example, the need to appease the influential pro-Israel lobby in Washington DC, Biden’s, support for Israel stems from an ideological foundation. The US President was hardly bashful when he repeated, upon his arrival at Israel’s Ben Gurion airport on July 13, his famous statement, “You need not be a Jew to be Zionist.”
Consequently, it may appear puzzling to hear Palestinian officials call on the US – and Biden, specifically – to pressure Tel Aviv to end its 55-year occupation of East Jerusalem, the West Bank and Gaza.
Mohannad al-Aklouk, the Palestinian representative at the Arab League, for example, repeated the same cliched and unrealistic language of expecting the US to “exert practical pressure on Israel”, “set the stage for a fair political process based on international law”, and “meet its role as a fair sponsor of the peace process”. Strangely, Mr. al-Aklouk truly believes that Washington, with its dismal track record of pro-Israeli bias, can possibly be the savior of the Palestinians.
Another Palestinian official told The New Arab that PA President Abbas was “disappointed with the results of Biden’s visit,” as, apparently, the Palestinian leader “expected that the US President would make progress in the peace process”. The same source continued to say that Abbas’ Authority is holding meetings with representatives from “powerful countries” to replace the US as sponsors of the once US-sponsored negotiations.
Abbas’ political stance is confusing. The ‘peace process’ is, after all, an American invention. It was a unique, self-serving style of diplomacy that was formulated to ensure Israel’s priorities remain at center stage of US foreign policy in the Middle East. In the Palestinian case, the ‘peace process’ only served to entrench Israeli colonization of Palestine, while degrading, or completely sidelining, legitimate Palestinian demands. This ‘process’ was also constructed with the aim of marginalizing international law as a political and legal frame of reference to the Israeli occupation of Palestine.
Instead of questioning the entire ‘peace process’ apparatus and apologizing for the strategic plunders of pursuing American mirages at the expense of Palestinian rights, the Palestinian Authority is still desperately clutching on to the same old fantasy, even when the US, along with Israel, have abandoned their own political farce.
Even if, supposedly, China, Russia or India would agree to be the new sponsors of the ‘peace process’, there is no reason for Tel Aviv to engage in future negotiations, when it is able to achieve its colonial objectives with full American support. Moreover, none of these countries have, for now, much leverage over Israel, therefore are unable to sustain any kind of meaningful pressure on Tel Aviv to respect international law.
Yet, the PA is still holding on, simply because the ‘peace process’ proved greatly beneficial in terms of funds, power and prestige enjoyed by a small but powerful class of Palestinians that was largely formulated after the Oslo Accords in 1993.
It is time for Palestinians to stop investing their political capital in the Biden Administration or any other administration. What they need is not a new ‘powerful’ sponsor of the ‘peace process’ but a grassroots-based struggle for freedom and liberation starting at home, one that galvanizes the energies of the Palestinian people themselves. Alas, this new paradigm cannot be achieved when the priorities of the Palestinian leadership remain fixated on the handouts and political validation of Washington and its Western allies.
Palestinian leaders meet in Algeria. (Photo: via Algérie Information TW Page)
Palestinian Authority President Mahmoud Abbas met on Tuesday with the head of the Hamas political bureau, Ismail Haniyeh, Algerian media reported.
Algerian President Abdelmadjid Tebboune reportedly succeeded in bringing the two leaders together for the first time in years. The post included a video clip showing Abbas, Haniyeh and the Algerian president shaking hands, with other Palestinian officials present.
🎥 Algerian President Abdelmadjid Tebboune hosted a meeting between Hamas leader Ismail Haniyyeh and the PLO and Fatah leader Mahmoud Abbas, for the first time in years.
— Dwi_4Palestine🇮🇩🇵🇸❤🌹 (@dwi_PAL1109) July 6, 2022
The Algerian presidency deleted the post about 20 minutes after posting it, but then re-posted the same video with the entry:
“The President of the Republic, Abdel Majid Tebboune, brings together, in a historic meeting on the side-lines of the 60th independence celebrations in Algeria, the Palestinian brothers, the President of the State of Palestine, Mahmoud Abbas, and his accompanying delegation, and the delegation of Hamas, led by the head of its political bureau, Ismail Haniyeh, after many years of not meeting around the same table.”
Palestinian official news agency WAFA reported that Abbas “informed his brother President Tebboune of the latest political developments related to the Palestinian cause, and the practices of the occupation and its aggression against our people, which undermine the chances of peace and the two-state solution.”
WAFA added that the two presidents discussed “means of strengthening bilateral relations between the two countries and nations, in addition to many international and regional issues of common interest.”
Abbas also attended the large military parade held by Algeria, on the occasion of the 60th anniversary of its independence and the restoration of its sovereignty, which was performed by the Algerian army.
Hamas’ rifts with Turkey are not unprecedented, but this time Erdogan risks losing the Palestinian resistance card to Iran, Syria and Lebanon if he continues to overplay his hand.
The recent Hamas-Turkey crisis illustrates how the Palestinian resistance movement is split from within. Although Hamas has institutionally decided on a strategic alliance with Iran, the revived Meshaal faction still curries favor with an unreliable Turkey. Photo Credit: The Cradle
Palestinian resistance movement Hamas is no longer able to hide its problem with Turkey. In 2011, Hamas took a hard line on Syria in favor of Turkey and Qatar. But eleven years later, the relationship is witnessing an impasse that Hamas can no longer hide, not only from its members, but also from the public. So what exactly is going on?
The Cradle interviewed a number of Hamas leaders, from the second and third leadership ranks, in Istanbul, Ankara, Beirut and Gaza, to get these details. They stipulated that their names not be mentioned for “organizational reasons,” or for reasons related to their place of residence.
More than a criticism
On the surface, Arab, Western and even Israeli media has tended to view the crisis as a new development, one that transpired after the recent Turkish-Israeli rapprochement – and Hamas’ criticism of it.
The revival of Ankara’s ties with Tel Aviv has been under discussion for a year or more, and culminated in early March with the visit of Israeli President Isaac Herzog to Ankara where he met with his Turkish counterpart, Recep Tayyip Erdogan.
Until then, Hamas was able to juggle its Turkish relations with some difficulty, and contented itself with a short statement criticizing the visit. But the Turkish condemnation of Palestinian guerrilla operations inside occupied Palestine in April placed Hamas in an impossible position, forcing the movement to issue a direct condemnation of the Turkish statements – and more.
Arab and Israeli media outlets then began to spread the news that Turkey was expelling Hamas military members or preventing a number from reentering its territory. Neither parties confirmed or denied those reports, which led to even more questions: Why is Turkey silent? Why didn’t Hamas launch a stinging attack against Ankara, as it did against Damascus 11 years ago? Had Syria expelled Hamas from its territory before 2011, would its war have happened – at least on this magnitude?
“Well-rehearsed game”
Sources we met in Istanbul say that what we are witnessing today is not an isolated incident, and has occurred more than once in the past years. In many cases, the Turkish authorities have requested certain Hamas members to temporarily leave the country, or to reduce their activities for a given period, after which things go back to normal. One source adds: “Everything is monitored in Turkey … what was happening was turning a blind eye to some activities at times, and tightening control at other times.”
These sources are close to Hamas’ external leader, Khaled Meshaal, who is the movement’s closest figure to Doha and Ankara, and its number one enemy in Damascus.
American “Muslim” Brotherhood
To indicate that things are normal between Hamas and Turkey, they point out that Sheikh Saleh al-Arouri, the official in charge of the group’s West Bank file, is still visiting Turkey.
Al-Arouri left Turkey in 2015 at an Israeli request, settled in Beirut, and has moved between Doha and Tehran and even Damascus at times. “But he still comes here (Turkey) from time to time to meet Abu al-Abed (Hamas’ Political Bureau Chief Ismail Haniyeh),” the sources reveal.
The truth is that Turkish authorities have now instructed Hamas that Al-Arouri must now coordinate his visits to Turkey in advance – ostensibly because he uses more than one passport, under different names.
So, this is all a well-rehearsed game. It is true that there is “Turkish tightening” of Hamas movements and activities, but “this took place in coordination with the movement, and upon an understanding on these details before Herzog’s visit. Therefore, there is no media clash between us and the Turks, and there are no statements and responses to them either,” the source continues.
In Gaza, however, there is another side to this story. Sources in the besieged territorial strip deny the existence of an ‘agreement’ between Hamas and Turkish officials. It confirms that the news about preventing the movement from carrying out any military or security activity from Turkish territory is accurate, especially if the action targets the West Bank, Jerusalem, and the 1948 areas.
The Gaza sources also confirm that some Hamas members have been prevented from entering Turkey, others were asked to stop their activities, and worst of all, the residencies of a number of them were not renewed without valid reasons provided, which means that they have to leave Turkey immediately. Although the number “does not exceed 100 with their families, but it is annoying, and it is considered to be in compliance with Israeli conditions.”
The Turks have taken further measures this time, ostensibly for “security purposes:” they have reduced the number of visas granted to Palestinian students and to tourism companies in Gaza. And from December 2021 onward, any Palestinian in Gaza or the West Bank who wishes to obtain a Turkish visa must come to a consulate in person to provide fingerprints and an instant photo, where previously it was sufficient to send their passport in.
But the most punishing measure by Ankara is the almost complete cessation of Turkish relief work in Gaza since the beginning of the Russian-Ukrainian war. The reason provided by Turkish authorities to its Hamas counterparts in Gaza was that Ankara is “shifting support to other regions.”
Bear in mind that Turkish relief activities that began in Gaza in the aftermath of Israel’s bombing devastation of the strip in 2009, have been significantly reduced since starting work in Ramallah four years ago (2017-2018).
Hamas vs Hamas
Hamas sources in Istanbul and Ankara say that their counterparts in Gaza “exaggerate” when describing the Turkish measures. They point to the fact that Hamas’ Gaza-based leader Ismail Haniyeh is a “semi-permanent resident” in Turkey as he is unable to hold all his meetings in Doha, and cannot visit Beirut whenever he wants. Therefore, he visits Ankara or Istanbul for a few weeks occasionally to hold these meetings. And since Haniyeh is the “head of the movement,” then “if there was a central Turkish decision to restrict Hamas, it would have been sufficient to prevent him from entering and stop hosting him, which never happened,” they argue.
“The movement’s leadership is holding a lot of meetings in Turkey so far, and it has not been prevented from doing so,” says one source. “According to our experience, everything that is requested now is temporary, regardless of how long it will last.”
“The Turks must give the Israelis what they are satisfied with, even if it is only in the media. But the reality is different. There are specific names under discussion, and it is not a broad and comprehensive process of expulsion or deportation,” he adds.
In late April, however, Israel Hayom newspaper reported that the Israelis handed the Turks a list of Hamas figures, including information about some of them being involved in military activities, in order to deport them.
Hamas sources in Turkey say that Ankara still allows entry to holders of the diplomatic (red) passport issued by the Hamas government in Gaza, while the majority of countries (such as Malaysia, Sudan, Syria and sometimes Lebanon) have responded to the West Bank-based Palestinian Authority’s request to stop doing so.
They also point to Meshaal’s new TV channel venture that will air from Istanbul, as an alternative to Al-Quds channel broadcast from Beirut which was closed down years ago due to “financial crisis.” Sources in Gaza instead say that that the aim of the closure was to “isolate Meshaal.”
The opening of Meshaal’s channel, which announced in October 2021 that it would begin hiring staff, comes on the back of recent Hamas political bureau elections, which resulted in the return of Meshaal and his team back into the game. Meshaal, who is also known as Abu Al-Waleed, is a supporter of strengthening the relationship with Turkey and Qatar at the expense of Hamas’ relationship with Iran, Syria and Hezbollah.
Effectively sidelined by Hamas for the past few years because of his monumental miscalculations during the Syrian war, in the past few months, Meshaal has been “very angry” because of Hezbollah’s refusal to meet during his Beirut visit in December. It is likely also why Meshaal’s name will never appear on an Israeli ‘ban list.’
The Hamas defense in Istanbul is therefore this: “Is it possible to open a new channel for the movement at a time when Turkey is expelling us?” Meshaal’s call not to clash with the Turks is based on his argument that Erdogan is facing difficulties now; that Hamas must understand this temporary situation until the Turkish presidential elections in 2023 pass peacefully; that an Erdogan loss will have repercussions on the movement that cannot be compared to any Turkish measures or restrictions now. This is the same theory of ’empowerment’ (tamkeen) to which the Muslim Brotherhood adheres.
Sources close to Meshaal argue that Turkey treats Israel on an equal footing, and it may respond to some Israeli requests as part of its political maneuvering, but that it will not meet all of these requests. This ‘political maneuvering’ is what prompted Erdogan to improve his relationship with the UAE – even though it contributed to the 2016 coup against him – and with Saudi Arabia – which killed a Saudi dissident with a chainsaw on Turkish soil. It is realpolitik, they argue. All for money, investments, gas – and to retain his presidency.
Secrets revealed for the first time
Hamas sources in Ankara and Istanbul revealed further private details to The Cradle, saying the recent Turkish measures did not include Hamas members who have obtained Turkish citizenship: “These have become Turkish citizens, and Israel cannot ask their state to expel them or prevent them from entering the country… We are talking here about dozens of active people.”
They also reveal that “Turkish intelligence protects Hamas members, not only from killing or kidnapping, but also from espionage.” In this context, the sources point to the arrest last October of a cell of 13 to 15 spies working for the Mossad. They were spying on a full range of Hamas and supporters’ activities in Turkey, especially the Palestinian and Syrian students who submitted projects related to drones or engineering that could serve the movement’s military arm. These students are still studying in Turkish universities today.
The Turkish measures also follow US and Israeli diktats that while Ankara and Doha must “contain Hamas,” they should also not lose control of them. One sources explains: “It is true that there are limits to Hamas’ work in Turkey and there is full control over its activities. But if everyone is expelled from here, this will mean throwing these people into the arms of Iran, Syria and Lebanon, because Qatar or any other country will not be able to bear their presence on its soil… and this is last thing the United States and even Israel would want.”
Indeed, despite some ‘collateral damage’ such as military, security and financial activities, it seems that there is a great benefit to the Israelis and the Americans from Hamas’ presence in Turkey, and it is unlikely that Israel will ever request the complete expulsion of the movement and prevention of all its activities.
During this investigation, The Cradle heard many complaints within Hamas about the behavior of some of its members who live in Turkey. Many of these, after obtaining citizenship or residency, engage in investment and real estate projects, and leave work in the movement, and some of them travel to Europe, Canada and even the United States.
Anger in Gaza
The arguments of the Meshaal camp in favor of ‘tolerating’ Turkey’s new measures do not convince Hamas sources in Gaza, who say that a “comprehensive review” of the relationship with Turkey is underway. This review does not intend to end or sabotage the movement’s relationship with Turkey, but instead to assess its “feasibility” and “benefits.”
‘Turkish normalization’ with Israel has caused great embarrassment within Hamas and its members, as well as among its supporters. Many are seriously demanding to know what Turkey has done over the past decades for Palestinian resistance. Even in the years when the relationship between Hamas and Ankara improved, they note that the relationship between Ankara and Tel Aviv was progressing more quickly, and in more areas.
This anger is what prompted the release of leaks and statements over the past two months criticizing Turkish behavior. But the Meshaal-dominated leadership abroad was able to prevent the ‘deterioration’ of the situation, and pledged to communicate with Turkish officials to clarify their position. So far, the issue has not been resolved. It seems that officials in Ankara are in no hurry to provide an answer.
It may be more important, however, to pay attention to what the leadership in Gaza is planning that may ultimately affect the future of the movement’s relationship with Turkey. Sources in Gaza say that the Hamas leadership has taken a decision to bring the relationship with Iran to the level of a “strategic relationship” and not just an alliance, and that this is a decision that has been adopted by the entire movement.
This is why since the end of the last war in May 2021, the speeches of Hamas’ leader in Gaza, Yahya Sinwar, have focused on the relationship with the “Jerusalem axis.” In his most recent speech on April 30, Sinwar spoke about Hamas’ coordination with the axis “to open the sea route to and from Gaza.”
This is the same route that the Turkish ship Mavi Marmara tried to take in 2010, before the attempt ended with an Israeli massacre. But Erdogan has quickly forgotten his threats over the incident, and was satisfied with an apology over the phone from former Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu – after Washington’s mediation – which asked Netanyahu to pay compensation to the Turkish victims. Israel at the time “expressed regret” but did not cough up an apology, and offered to pay what it described as “humanitarian funding” to compensate the families of the victims.
Because Hamas’ relationship with Iran has become strategic, and the Gaza leadership attaches great importance to it – to the point that it believes a “war of liberation” is close – it seems almost certain that its relationship with Turkey will continue to decline.
This does not mean that the Iranians have reservations about the relationship between Hamas and Ankara. But “the past and the present reveal the near and distant future,” as described by those we spoke with in Gaza.
They raise a serious issue that is being exposed for the first time. The leadership in Gaza has learned that the Turks are using members of Hamas to help organize programs for Turkish visits to Jerusalem and to persuade Turkish citizens to participate. This is being done under the heading of “supporting Al-Aqsa Mosque,” but it ultimately aims to improve the relationship with Israel, especially as the Turkish visitors will enter the occupied territories on an Israeli visa.
These visits have been very active since late 2021, and come with the encouragement of both the Turkish Presidency of Religious Affairs and the support of Erdogan, who has a number of associations concerned with this matter under his direct administration.
In April, a huge controversy erupted on social media platforms about the visit of the famous Turkish ‘Chef Burak’ Ozdemir to Al-Aqsa. Many believed the visit was “not innocent” in its timing, as it coincided with the Palestinian confrontation with Israeli forces over the holy mosque. However, Burak was better received by the Palestinians than the Gulf ‘visitors.’
Anxiety in Beirut
Those we contacted from Hamas in Beirut were less angry, but more anxious. They also refer to a “restriction in the granting of visas” through the Turkish embassy in Lebanon dating back to around six months ago. The embassy spun this as a natural reduction in Palestinian applications from Syria, after the Palestinian embassy in Damascus made it easier for Palestinians to obtain a passport issued in Ramallah – which could be used to visit Turkey to obtain residency or purchase real estate instead of via asylum documents.
Whatever the real reason for this restriction, it cannot be separated from the latest set of Turkish measures that were recently placed on Hamas. But the biggest concern in Beirut is about the future of the relationship. This concern is not a result of the difference in viewpoints within the movement, because in the end the decision will be issued collectively and institutionally.
The concern is over the fate of the relationship with Ankara, which appears to be adopting a different approach with the Muslim Brotherhood, after taking harsh measures against its members. The last of these measures was the expulsion of the Mkamelin channel and the suspension of its broadcasts from Turkish territory. Will a similar measure affect Hamas institutions soon?
For these reasons, their concerns appear realistic, especially given the acceleration of reconciliation between Ankara and Riyadh, Abu Dhabi and Tel Aviv, all of whom are avowed enemies of Hamas – with Doha potentially affected by Turkey’s new behaviors as well.
The answer to this question can perhaps be found back in 2018. This year reveals a lot about events transpiring today.
The 2018 crisis
This was not a good year in the relationship between Hamas and Turkey. Turkish measures against the movement were similar to its actions today: refusal to arrange high-level meetings between the Hamas leadership and Turkish officials, freezing the renewal of residency permits for its members, and poor treatment of the wounded Palestinians from Gaza, among other measures.
That year, Turkey had expressed “disappointment” with the Syrian war, and with Hamas, which had decided in 2017 to improve its relationship with Egypt, start wooing Syria, and strengthen its relationship with Hezbollah and Iran.
The Hamas-Turkish crisis was then based in Ramallah. The President of the Palestinian Authority (PA) Mahmoud Abbas did all he could to sabotage the relationship between the two parties and he succeeded in that well.
At that time, Abbas met Erdogan, and provided him with information about an alleged ‘alliance’ between Hamas and the dismissed leader of Fatah, Muhammad Dahlan, who receives Emirati support, and who is accused of participating in plotting the coup against the Turkish president.
Hamas was unable to alleviate Erdogan’s wrath in this instance, and the latter ordered the transfer of the management of relief works from Gaza to Ramallah, and restricted Turkish aid to the PA in the West Bank. While the relationship gradually improved over time as tensions decreased, ties between Hamas and Ankara did not return to their previous levels.
Erdogan’s supportive statements about Palestine ebb and flow, and he stands accused of exploiting the Palestinian cause in order to gain popularity when facing internal crises. The Palestinian cause is still very popular on the Turkish street, and the president’s outreach to Israel has not been well-received.
Today, since Ankara’s relationships with Ramallah, Amman and Tel Aviv are thriving, and may improve soon enough with Cairo too, why does Turkey even care about the Hamas card and Palestinian resistance? It is a troubling question for the movement that its leaders often ask among themselves.
It seems that the coming months, not years, will hold an answer to that. While Erdogan’s actions are unpopular in Turkey, they serve his geopolitical agenda for now. On the other hand, with an uncertain 2023 election result looming, he will need his ‘Palestinian card’ to appeal to constituents – many of whom have now also turned critical of the US, which Erdogan is ever eager to please. It is an almost impossible balancing game for the Turkish presidency.
In the meantime, any Turkish actions against Hamas will not be surprising, but the movement has been put on notice, and its reactions may surprise Turkey right back.
The views expressed in this article do not necessarily reflect those of The Cradle.
There is a reason why Israel is insistent on linking the series of attacks carried out by Palestinians recently to a specific location, namely the Jenin refugee camp in the northern West Bank. By doing so, the embattled Naftali Bennett’s government can simply order another deadly military operation in Jenin to reassure its citizens that the situation is under control.
Indeed, on April 9, the Israeli army has stormed the Jenin refugee camp, killing a Palestinian and wounding ten others. However, Israel’s problem is much bigger than Jenin.
If we examine the events starting with the March 22 stabbing attack in the southern city of Beersheba (Bir Al Saba’) – which resulted in the death of four – and ending with the killing of three Israelis in Tel Aviv – including two army officers – we will reach an obvious conclusion: these attacks must have been, to some extent, coordinated.
Spontaneous Palestinian retaliation to the violence of the Israeli occupation rarely follows this pattern in terms of timing or style. All the attacks, with the exception of Beersheba, were carried out using firearms. The shooters, as indicated by the amateur videos of some of the events and statements by Israeli eyewitnesses, were well-trained and were acting with great composure.
An example was the March 27 Hadera event, carried out by two cousins, Ayman and Ibrahim Ighbariah, from the Arab town of Umm al-Fahm, inside Israel. Israeli media reported of the unmistakable skills of the attackers, armed with weapons that, according to the Israeli news agency, Tazpit Press Service, cost more than $30,000.
Unlike Palestinian attacks carried out during the Second Palestinian Intifada (2000-05) in response to Israeli violence in the occupied territories, the latest attacks are generally more pinpointed, seek police and military personnel and clearly aimed at shaking Israel’s false sense of security and undermining the country’s intelligence services. In the Bnei Brak attack, on March 29, for example, an Israeli woman who was at the scene told reporters that “the militant asked us to move away from the place because he did not want to target women or children.”
While Israeli intelligence reports have recently warned of a “wave of terrorism” ahead of the holy month of Ramadan, they clearly had little conception of what type of violence, or where and how Palestinians would strike.
Following the Beersheba attack, Israeli officials referred to Daesh’s responsibility, a convenient claim considering that Daesh had also claimed responsibility. This theory was quickly marginalized, as it became obvious that the other Palestinian attackers had other political affiliations or, as in the Bnei Brak case, no known affiliation at all.
The confusion and misinformation continued for days. Shortly after the Tel Aviv attack, Israeli media, citing official sources, spoke of two attackers, alleging that one was trapped in a nearby building. This was untrue as there was only one attacker and he was killed, though hours later in a different city.
A number of Palestinian workers were quickly rounded up in Tel Aviv on suspicion of being the attackers simply because they looked Arab, evidence of the chaotic Israeli approach. Indeed, following each event, total mayhem ensued, with large mobs of armed Israelis taking to the streets looking for anyone with Arab features to apprehend or to beat senseless.
Israeli officials contributed to the frenzy, with far-right politicians, such as the extremist Itamar Ben Gvir, leading hordes of other extremists in rampages in occupied Jerusalem.
Instead of urging calm and displaying confidence, the country’s own Prime Minister called, on March 30, on ordinary Israelis to arm themselves. “Whoever has a gun license, this is the time to carry it,” he said in a video statement.However, ifIsrael’s solution to any form of Palestinian resistance was more guns, Palestinians would have been pacified long ago.
To placate angry Israelis, the Israeli military raided the city and refugee camp of Jenin on many occasions, each time leaving several dead and wounded Palestinians behind, including many civilians. They include the child Imad Hashash, 15, killed on August 24 while filming the invasion on his mobile phone. The exact same scenario played out on April 9.
However, it was an exercise in futility, as it was Israeli violence in Jenin throughout the years that led to the armed resistance that continues to emanate from the camp. Palestinians, whether in Jenin or elsewhere, fight back because they are denied basic human rights, have no political horizon, live in extreme poverty, have no true leadership and feel abandoned by the so-called international community.
The Palestinian Authority of Mahmoud Abbas seems to be entirely removed from the masses. Statements by Abbas reflect his detachment from the reality of Israeli violence, military occupation and apartheid throughout Palestine. True to form, Abbas quickly condemned the Tel Aviv attack, as he did the previous ones, making the same reference every time regarding the need to maintain “stability” and to prevent “further deterioration of the situation”, according to the official Wafa news agency.
What stability is Abbas referring to, when Palestinian suffering has been compounded by growing settler violence, illegal settlement expansion, land theft, and, thanks to recent international events, food insecurity as well?
Israeli officials and media are, once again, conveniently placing the blame largely on Jenin, a tiny stretch of an overpopulated area. By doing so, Israel wants to give the impression that the new phenomenon of Palestinian retaliatory attacks is confined to a single place, one that is adjacent to the Israeli border and can be easily ‘dealt with’.
An Israeli military operation in the camp may serve Bennett’s political agenda, convey a sense of strength, and win back some in his disenchanted political constituency. But it is all a temporary fix. Attacking Jenin now will make no difference in the long run. After all, the camp rose from the ashes of its near-total destruction by the Israeli military in April 2002.
The renewed Palestinian attacks speak of a much wider geography: Naqab, Umm Al Fahm, the West Bank. The seeds of this territorial connectivity are linked to the Israeli war of last May and the subsequent Palestinian rebellion, which erupted in every part of Palestine, including Palestinian communities inside Israel.
Israel’s problem is its insistence on providing short-term military solutions to a long-term problem, itself resulting from these very ‘military solutions’. If Israel continues to subjugate the Palestinian people under the current system of military occupation and deepening apartheid, Palestinians will surely continue to respond until their oppressive reality is changed. No amount of Israeli violence can alter this truth.
– Ramzy Baroud is a journalist and the Editor of The Palestine Chronicle. He is the author of six books. His latest book, co-edited with Ilan Pappé, is “Our Vision for Liberation: Engaged Palestinian Leaders and Intellectuals Speak out”. Dr. Baroud is a Non-resident Senior Research Fellow at the Center for Islam and Global Affairs (CIGA). His website iswww.ramzybaroud.net
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Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov hoped for the restoration of Syria’s membership in the Arab League, saying Arab nations would be able to reunify their positions and resolve their differences if Damascus is readmitted to the organization.
Lavrov made the remarks during a press conference with the foreign ministers of Algeria, Egypt, Jordan, Iraq, and Sudan — members of the Arab Contact Group on Ukraine — in the Russian capital city of Moscow on Monday.
“We expressed our hope for Syria’s return to the Arab League. The issue will be resolved as soon as possible as it will help Arabs unify their positions in the region and the whole world,” Lavrov said.
The Arab League suspended Syria’s membership in November 2011, citing an alleged crackdown by Damascus on opposition protests. Syria has denounced the move as “illegal and a violation of the organization’s charter.”
The Arab republic was one of the six founding members of the Arab League in 1945. In recent months, an increasing number of countries and political parties have called for the reversal of its suspension from the Arab League.
Early this year, the secretary general of the central committee of the Palestinian Fatah political party denounced the suspension as “disgraceful” for the entire Arab world, especially as the war-ravaged country is a founding member of the regional organization.
Speaking at a press conference in the Syrian capital of Damascus on January 10, Jibril Rajoub added that Syria must return to the Arab League.
He said that his visit to Damascus at the head of a high-ranking Palestinian delegation is a turning point in light of the ‘Israeli’ regime’s stepped-up aggression and attempts to liquidate the Palestinian cause.
Rajoub noted that Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas plans to visit Syria in the near future, extending his gratitude to the Syrian people and leadership for their hospitality towards Palestinians living there and for their firm stances vis-à-vis the Palestinian cause despite all the difficulties they have gone through over the past years.
During an interview with Lebanese TV channel Al Mayadeen, Palestinian author, journalist and editor of The Palestine Chronicle, Dr. Ramzy Baroud, presented his new book “Our Vision for Liberation: Engaged Palestinian Leaders and Intellectuals Speak Out,” co-edited with renowned historian, Professor Ilan Pappé, and published by Clarity Press.
“The term Liberation, along with other terms, such as Al-Muqawama, Resistance, has been viewed with disfavor since the Oslo so-called peace process and the political charade and, naturally, the political discourse that accompanied that charade,” Baroud said.
Below are a few excerpts from the interview, conducted by Zainab al-Saffar, host of the Al-Mayadeen’s well-regarded program Min al-Dakhil – From the Inside:
Why ‘Liberation’
“Palestinians and their supporters were divided into camps, the ‘extremists’ and the ‘moderates’, and certain words have been removed almost entirely (…), and this is very dangerous, because the Palestinian people are leading a national liberation struggle.”
“Nothing has changed, Palestine is still an occupied country, Palestinians are still an oppressed nation, are still fighting and resisting for their freedom. So why did we remove the language that is intentionally meant to describe the events in Palestine?”“We have decided to use, or rather re-use, the word ‘Liberation’ as a new marker. If we are to think of a prosperous future for Palestinian freedom, justice and so forth, it has to be based on the right terminology and that is Liberation”.
Ordinary People Matter
“The language has changed but also the characters have changed. The Palestinian people who have always served as the core players in this so-called conflict, in what we call our national liberation struggle, have been removed entirely from the story. They are only allowed to emerge once in a while as victims, numbers or statistics.”
“Our ability to study the events in our region rarely follows the trajectory of ordinary people. We constantly seek the answers trying to analyze leaders, governments and ruling elites but we rarely look at ordinary people.”
“This is why I decided to focus my Ph.D. studies on people’s history at the University of Exeter, and this is my connection with Professor Ilan Pappé. We asked a simple question: What propels Palestinians to fight after 75 years of Zionist colonization of Palestine? Is it characters – Mahmoud Abbas, Mohammed Dahlan, Yasser Arafat? Is it a faction? No, the reason that they carry on is the people themselves.”
Who Represents Palestine
“If an individual on his own comes up with his own, individual vision for liberation, we always have this conflict, the conflict of representation. Who represents the Palesitnian people? And who has the right to speak about the Palestinian people? It hasn’t been resolved. We already know that resistance is something that cannot be compromised. This book attempts to offer an introduction to what a Palestinian political program could look like”.
“How were these intellectuals selected? And this is where there is a keyword in the title. It is the word ‘engaged’ that makes all the difference. The term, similar to the term ‘organic intellectual’ comes from Antonio Gramsci, the anti-fascist Italian intellectual who died essentially in prison. We wanted to apply this to the Palestinian situation.”
A painting dedicated to late Palestinian leader Yasser Arafat. (Photo: Mahmoud Ajjour, The Palestine Chronicle)
Former Qatari Prime Minister Hamad bin Jassim bin Jaber Al Thani claimed in a recent interview with Kuwait’s Al-Qabas that Palestinian iconic leader Yasser Arafat was killed by someone close to him.
Al Thani was asked whether he believed in claims that Arafat had been murdered. “They are not claims,” he said, “This is the truth”. He added that Arafat was “definitely” killed by “someone close to him”.
Al Thani, who served as Qatar’s Foreign Minister and later as Prime Minister, said that several months before his death, Arafat took part in a meeting in Doha, which included a number of Palestinian Authority and Israeli officials. The meeting, hosted by Al Thani himself, was aimed at helping Arafat leave as he was placed under an Israeli siege in his Ramallah, West Bank, headquarters.
However, according to Al Thani, soon after the meeting, both parties notified Qatar that talks were not necessary anymore. A few months later, the news of Arafat’s illness was communicated.
Ex-Qatar PM: #Arafat was killed by someone close to him
Yasser Arafat, who was the Chairman of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) and subsequently the President of the Palestinian Authority (PA), died unexpectedly in November 2004, at the age of 75. The cause of death remains unknown, despite various claims that he was poisoned by Israel.
UPROOTED PALESTINIANS: SALAM ALQUDS ALAYKUM 