“No external factor enables a government or an army to stabilize, unless this government and this army enjoy a popular support that safeguard them.”
Egypt’s former Assistant Foreign Minister Hussein Al-Haridi in a recent interview
The pre-planned war in Syria has spanned twelve years and is still ongoing. It is well known that this warfare is not limited to battlegrounds but rather takes various economic, social, and political forms, in a bid to deplete President Bashar Al-Assad’s government. Surprisingly, all of these endeavors, however, were futile.
The Gloomy Tunnel
The arrest of two men in Daraa in March 2011 and the eventual outbreak of sporadic demonstrations in several regions, formed the full-fledged launch of a bloody scenario or even a global war that later appeared that it has been previously plotted. That was at a time when the entire region was experiencing “revolutions” dubbed as the “Arab Spring.”
It has been clear that all intents and schemes including the normalization of ties with the Zionist enemy- through subduing all resistance movements- as well as compensating for the defeat in Iraq, pass through Syria.
Soon after, Western powers, led by the United States, joined Arab countries in raising slogans such as “the freedom of the Syrian people” and “human rights in Syria.” Such moves were aimed at overthrowing the Syrian government’s legitimacy, neglecting thousands of Syrians who protested in support of President Al Assad.
In June 2012, world powers assembled in Geneva to declare “the necessity of a political transition.”
This declaration was only a pretext for escalating the demonstrations into a major military clash, resulting in the formation of organizations such as the “Free Syrian Army” (FSA) and the ” Jaysh al-Islam” (Army of Islam). These organizations comprised Syrians as well as a significant number of mercenaries from other Arab and Western countries, all with diverse backgrounds and agendas, who flocked to attack Damascus.
Since then, Syria has entered a dark tunnel: the country’s unity and sovereignty have been shattered, with almost all areas divided into pro and anti-regime factions. The emergence of Takfiri factions such as “Jabhat Al-Nusra” and “Ahrar Al-Sham” on the battlefield heightened the tensions.
Then in January 2014, the ISIL terrorist group took control of Raqqa and set out to govern vast areas of Syria and Iraq. Backed by regional and Western governments, these organizations have committed the most heinous terrorist acts against the Syrian people, as well as looting riches and systematically destroying the country’s infrastructure.
In addition to the military conflict, fierce media campaigns have intensified, relying on false flag chemical attacks in a bid to defame the Syrian government while disregarding the crimes committed by so-called “opposition factions.”
Syria Battles Bravely
Amid this reality, the Syrian state and its army stood firmly to protect the governing system and fortify Damascus, which had become a target for terrorists. The fall of the capital would have dealt President Assad a tremendous blow.
In September 2014, the US directly engaged in the struggle, organizing a coalition and assisting Kurdish factions under the pretext of eradicating “ISIL” in northern Syria. Later in 2015, and under the request of the Syrian government, Russia joined the war in a bid to aid Damascus in counter-terror operations.
This was a crucial turning point in the warfare, along with Iran’s and Hezbollah’s key roles in the battlefield and victories in more than one strategic battle, such as the clashes of Qusayr and Aleppo.
This video diplays scene of the couter-terror operations in Syria.
Such turning point reflected on Damascus’ recontrol of swathes of the Syrian territory, as well as keeping the threat of terror away from the capital and Aleppo. This was in addition to preventing Turkey, which aided the armed groups, from reaching its aim of dominating that region and eventually beating “ISIL” in the Syrian Badiya battles.
At the time when the military developments were unfolding in Syria, there was a political course emerging. Hence, when Russia, Iran, and the Syrian Army imposed a new status quo in the battlefield, the “Astana Talks” was established. The peace process came after the West and the UN yielded no substantive progress in the negotiations between the government and the so-called opposition, which remained split and withdrew the battlefield in favor of terrorist organizations.
Wary of Kurdish presence in Syria’s north, Turkey joined, afterwards, the Astana Talks as a guarantor state. This political process, which culminated in several rounds, concluded in a settlement, primarily brokered by the Russians and Turks in September 2018. The settlement involved Idlib and the northwest, which has been under terrorist control, resulting in a halt to fighting on those fronts.
Syria’s Outlook in 2020
On the eve of 2020, the Syrian state maintained control, as it had not done for the past nine years, except in the north, where the conflict created a kind of status quo represented by the limited presence of the US forces through several military bases. Undoubtedly, those bases were later utilized as a springboard for stealing oil and wheat. Also, there was a limited Turkish presence in the area under the pretext of countering the so-called Kurdish expansion.
On the other hand, the Israeli enemy found no means to voice concern over the failure of its allies and the victory of its foes. Thereupon, it occasionally breaches Syria’s airspace and launches strikes.
Despite this scenario in the country’s north, almost 12 years of war did not affect Syria’s Arabian identity, as the idea of its federalization had been buried.
This war has resulted in creating a powerful “Axis of Resistance” that extends from Iran through Iraq to Syria, then to Lebanon and Palestine. Consequently, Washington unleashed an economic warfare through the “Caesar” sanctions, depleting the Syrians who stood by their government.
In mid-2020, the Coronavirus pandemic spread all over the world, resulting in a stalemate in the Syria negotiations. Yet, the sanctions remained the most prominent feature in Syrians’ diaries.
Then in 2022, when the pandemic subsided, the war between Russia and the West in Ukraine commenced, casting a shadow across the entire world. The impasse was broken here by multiple communications reaching the gates of the presidential palace in Damascus, indicating what may be dubbed the “great turning point.” So, what happened, and what were the causes and effects?
لم يهتزّ ضمير الغرب (السّامي) جراء الزّلازل التي ضربت المناطق السّورية والتّركيّة مثلما اهتزّ لأميركا عندما اجتاحتها الأعاصير على مراحل وسنوات متعدّدة. لم تجرؤ الأمم العوراء المتحدة التي لم ترَ إلّا بعينٍ واحدةٍ ما أصاب تركيا من دمارٍ وسقوط ضحايا في حين كفّت عينها الأخرى عن مشاهدة ما حلّ بسورية من كوارثَ نتيجة الزّلازل نفسها. ولم تثر (النّخوة العربيّة) متسابقة بشهامتها لتضميد جراح قلعة العروبة وقلبها سورية. كما فعلوا حين تبارز (النشامى) سعياً لكسب رضا سيّدهم الأميركيّ ويحتلّون المراتب الأولى في تقديم المساعدات الإنسانيّة للولايات المتحدة الأميركيّة على أثر إعصار ماثيو أو كاترينا وفلورانس عام 2018 حيث صنّفت الدّول العربيّة بالأولى في تقديم المساعدات على مدار السّنوات التي ضربت الأعاصير أميركا. أمّا في سورية صمّت الآذان العربيّة وكفّت عيون من جادوا بأموالهم في (الرّبيع العربي) وسخوا بهباتهم من انتحاريين ومرتزقة لتدمير سورية.
أمّا إنسانيّة أوروبا الاستنسابيّة والمجتزأة فقد عصف بها الزّلزال الذي حطّم العقوبات الأميركيّة وحطم هامة قيصر الأميركي على أعتاب دمشق، ومعه فقد ذلك الغرب وفي مقدّمته أميركا وأوروبا إنسانيّته التي تتوهّج تضامناً مع تل أبيب في مواجهة الشّعب الفلسطيني الأعزل وتزداد شعلتها توهّجاً في تركيا ومع كلّ من يتحالف مع الكيان الصّهيوني أو يسخّر نفسه لخدمة المشاريع الأميركيّة في المنطقة. بالرّغم من ذلك لم يخلُ الأمر من وقوف الشّرفاء إلى جانب سورية التي وقفت تاريخيّاً ولا زالت بعزمٍ وحزمٍ إلى جانب قضايا العرب والمسلمين وفي مقدّمتها القضية الفلسطينيّة التي لا زالت حتى اليوم تدفع ثمن تبنّيها للقضية غير آبهة بكلّ العقوبات والحصارات الأميركيّة التي حطّمها الشّرفاء والأحرار من الأمة بدءاً من طهران التي كانت أوّل المبادرين لإرسال المساعدات وفرق الإنقاذ وفتح جسرٍ جوي بين طهران ودمشق مروراً بالعراق ولبنان الذي يواجه عقوباتٍ أميركيّةً لم تمنعه من اتخاذ قرارٍ رسميٍّ عبّر عنه رئيس حكومة تصريف الأعمال نجيب ميقاتي بإرساله فرقاً من الصليب الأحمر والجيش اللّبناني إلى سورية للمشاركة في عمليّات الإنقاذ إضافةً، إلى تكليف وزير الأشغال العامّة علي حمية بتشكيل وفد ضمّ وزراء الخارجية والمغتربين عبدالله بو حبيب، الأشغال العامّة والنقل علي حمية، الشّؤون الاجتماعيّة هكتور حجار، والزّراعة عباس الحاج حسن، الأمين العام للهيئة العليا للإغاثة اللواء محمد خير ومدير العناية الطّبية في وزارة الصّحة جوزف حلو لزيارة دمشق من أجل التباحث في المساعدات وعمليّات الإغاثة والمساعدات الإنسانيّة التي بادرت إليها بعض الجمعيّات الأهليّة والمؤسّسات الرّسمية في لبنان. إضافةً إلى تكليف وفدٍ آخر الذهاب إلى تركيا والمساعدة في عمليّات البحث وتقديم المساعدات.
رغم كبر المأساة في سورية وتركيا ثمّة ازدواجيّة في المعايير على المستوى الدّولي والإقليمي في التّعاطي بين البلدين اللذينِ جمعتهما كارثة الزلازل فالدّول العربية والغربيّة التي قدّمت الملايين من الدّولارات لتمويل المنظمات الإرهابيّة في سورية من داعش وغيرها هي ذاتها التي تؤيّد الحصار والعقوبات على سورية التي أفشلت مشروعها الإرهابي وخرجت منتصرة.
رغم كلّ ذلك فإنّ صعوبة الوضع الإنساني نتيجة حصار قيصر والزّلازل تضع كلّ الدول الملتزمة بقانون قيصر أمام موقفٍ تاريخيٍّ يدفعها لتأكيد إنسانيّتها من خلال المبادرة إلى إرسال المزيد من المساعدات لا سيّما الدّول الأوروبيّة وبعض الدّول العربية التي ألزمت نفسها بقرار العقوبات الأميركيّة على سورية لعدم إدراكها أنّ الإنسانيّة استثناء في الحروب لا تخضع لحصارٍ أو عقوباتٍ وأنّ المبادرة للعمل الإنسانيّ لا يحتاج إلى توقيع بروتوكولاتٍ أو اتفاقياتٍ فهو خارج عن إطار التبعية لأميركا وغيرها وإلّا فليعلم الجميع أنّه لا معنى لإنسانيّةٍ ممهورةٍ بختم البيت الأبيض ولا قيمة لها إنْ لم تغث ملهوفاً وتضمد جراحاً وترسم بسمةً على وجه منكوبٍ وبائسٍ. تلك هي إنسانيّة سورية التي فاضت على العرب والعالم ودونها تسقط كلّ معايير الإنسانيّة المزيفة التي ينشدها الغرب سمفونية يتراقص على أشلاء ضحايا كلّ الظالمين.
Key Arab heads of state convened this week for an emergency meeting that excluded the Saudis and Kuwaitis. The likely hot topics under discussion were Egypt’s economic collapse and Israel’s aggressive escalations.
On 18 January, the United Arab Emirates hastily arranged a consultative summit in Abu Dhabi, which included the leaders of four member states of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC).
Heads of state of the Sultanate of Oman, Qatar, Bahrain, and the UAE attended the urgent summit, along with Egyptian President Abdel Fattah Al-Sisi and Jordan’s King Abdullah II.
The absence of Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman (MbS), the de facto ruler of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, and either Kuwaiti Emir Nawaf al-Ahmad or his Crown Prince Mishaal al-Ahmad was noted with some surprise. No official statements or press leaks have yet emerged to explain the omission of the two GCC leaders or their high-level representatives from the urgent consultations.
This surprise summit came on the heels of a tripartite meeting in Cairo on 17 January, which included President Sisi, King Abdullah, and Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas.
Directly afterward, the Jordanian monarch flew to Abu Dhabi carrying a message for Emirati Emir Mohammed bin Zayed (MbZ) that prompted him to immediately convene a summit the next day.
What was so urgent to necessitate an emergency meeting of Arab leaders? Why did the top Saudi and Kuwait leaders give the summit a miss? There are several possibilities behind this swift convening of key Arab leaders in Abu Dhabi.
First, is the rapid deterioration of Egypt’s economy after the decline of the Egyptian pound to its lowest levels in history (32 pounds to the US dollar). Spiraling inflation rates, harsh conditions imposed by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) – most notably the floating of the national currency and a heavy reduction of private contracting and trade companies affiliated with the Egyptian army – have added sharply to the economy’s downward turn.
There are reports that the IMF has asked GCC countries to provide $40 billion in immediate aid to Egypt, otherwise the state’s collapse is imminent and inevitable.
Second, are the dangerous policies currently under consideration by the right-wing government of Israel’s new Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu. These include, most notably, threats to storm the Al-Aqsa Mosque in Jerusalem, the practical abolition of Jordan’s Hashemite Custodianship over Jerusalem, the illegal annexation of the West Bank, and the deportation of hundreds of thousands of its Palestinian residents to Jordan.
Third, former Qatari Prime Minister Sheikh Hamad bin Jassim, warned his neighbors a few days ago on Twitter of an imminent US-Israeli aggression against Iran that could fundamentally shake the security and stability of the Gulf.
The risk of economic collapse facing Egypt was perhaps the most important and urgent factor on the summit agenda. Financial assistance from the Gulf – once a reliable source of emergency aid – has completely stopped. Even if it continues, funds will no longer arrive in the form of non-refundable grants and unconditional deposits, as in years past.
That approach to funding has changed as Saudi Finance Minister Mohammed bin Jadaan made clear in his speech at the World Economic Forum in Davos, Switzerland on 18 January. In previous statements, Egypt’s President Sisi has confirmed his country’s financial woes by revealing that Gulf states have stopped their aid completely.
The absence of the Emir of Kuwait from the consultative summit may be understandable in this context – if, in fact, Egypt’s economy was the top of the summit’s agenda. The Kuwaiti National Assembly (parliament) has adopted a decision to prevent his government from providing a single dollar in aid to Egypt.
Gulf states have provided Egypt with $92 billion since the ‘Arab Uprisings’ began to tear through the region in January 2011.
Currently, Kuwait’s own internal governmental crisis, in addition to the deterioration of its relationship with Cairo over its deportation of Egyptian workers, can explain the emir’s absence. What is not understood so far, is why Saudi’s MbS was a no-show in Abu Dhabi.
While Emirati leader MbZ’s warm and friendly reception of his Qatari counterpart Tamim bin Hamad al-Thani raised hopes of easing bilateral tensions, news leaks suggested that Saudi-Emirati relations are in their own state of crisis – based on growing differences over the Yemeni war and other regional issues. Perhaps this crisis is what led to a thaw in Qatari-Emirati relations.
In addition, Egyptian-Saudi relations have collapsed to an state unprecedented for years. A report last month by US media outlet Axios revealed that Egyptian authorities have halted practical procedures in their transfer of the strategic Tiran and Sanafir islands to Saudi sovereignty. Egyptian official media has also launched a fierce attack on the Saudi-owned “MBC Egypt” channel and its presenter Amr Adib, accusing him of working for the Saudis amid fears the station will stop broadcasting from Egypt.
Besides the economic aspects, the differences, squabbles, and fluctuating relations between the countries of this axis, there are other issues of significant gravity that may have been addressed at the Abu Dhabi summit.
A key topic may have been the ambitions of Netanyahu’s unprecedentedly right-wing Israeli government – notably its prevention of Jordan’s ambassador from visiting Jerusalem’s Al-Aqsa Mosque, as a first step to abolish the Hashemite Custodianship over the ancient city.
While the failure to invite Palestinian President Abbas to the Abu Dhabi summit (there is an Emirati veto against it) may suggest otherwise, Jordan – currently under US and Israeli pressure to participate in the second Negev summit in Morocco – and its monarch may have pressed this issue in Abu Dhabi.
Gulf states that have normalized relations or opened communications with Israel would have been asked to use their influence to de-escalate these pressures. The ramifications of continued Israeli aggressions in Jerusalem and the West Bank are a direct threat to Jordan’s security and stability.
Interestingly, all the states represented at the Abu Dhabi summit – with the exception of the Sultanate of Oman and Qatar – have signed normalization agreements with Israel. The absent Saudis and Kuwaitis, have notably not yet joined that club.
Details of the Abu Dhabi emergency summit of heads of states have not yet emerged, but the days ahead could provide some answers. Will billions flow to Egypt to extract the country from its financial crisis? Or will the Arab House remain the same? We will have to wait to see.
The views expressed in this article do not necessarily reflect those of The Cradle.
NATO-sponsored Al Qaeda terrorists in Idlib took to the streets in angry protests against the latest rapprochement steps by the Turkish madman Erdogan toward Syria.
Euronews, a strong propaganda state-controlled arm of NATO and its financial arm, the European Union, shared a video clip showing a few dozen of all males protesting somewhere in the Al Qaeda stronghold in the Turkish-occupied and controlled Idlib province.
In the accompanying news, the EU propaganda outlet claimed that similar protests took place in a number of towns in the countryside of Idlib.
The protest shared by the EU propaganda arm Euronews showed protests spewing slogans with improper language reminiscent of the 2011 NATO-promoted protests in most remote villages and towns across Syria calling for NATO bombing of Syria to spread freedoms and democracy. These protests also witnessed the killings of dozens of Syrian policemen and civilians by 5th column instigators planted by foreign powers and funded by the US-led coalition which included Qatar and Saudi Arabia, the most retard political regimes in the whole world.
Without naming him, the al Qaeda fighters shown in the above video clip with their sons were expressing their anger toward their main sponsor, the Turkish madman Erdogan, after the recent steps taken by him to mend the ties with Syria and their fear he would drop his role in the regime change in Damascus which he played the central part in ever since he was assigned that task by George W. Bush years before the NATO-sponsored Arab Spring was initiated.
The Turkish madman Erdogan is in desperate need to speed up his rapprochement with Syrian President Bashar Assad before the upcoming elections in Turkey, all his policies during his very long reign in Turkey have brought draconian measures against freedoms in his own country, the jailing of tens of thousands of public workers and journalists under the pretext of supporting an opposition movement to him and the failed coup of 2016, in addition to the countless debacles in foreign interventions earning him zero friends in contrast to the policy of zero troubles with neighboring countries which he fooled his people with to vote for him.
Any meeting and agreement with President Assad would help Erdogan in his bid to be reelected, again, as it would give the Turkish people the impression of solving the refugee crises in their country, the crisis they blame for their deteriorating economy.
The main losers of such rapprochement with Damascus are the al Qaeda and ISIS terrorists in northern Syria, the Turkish madman Erdogan considers them, like his NATO colleagues, as moderate opposition; Syria and the normal world consider them as terrorists. The other losers of a Turkish rapprochement with Syria are the US-sponsored Kurdish SDF separatist terrorists. Both these terrorist entities share the same goals of creating cantons carving them out of Syria and placing a foothold of NATO and Israel where Syria’s main food basket farmlands and oil fields are.
It’s no surprise that al Qaeda terrorists would express their anger toward any rapprochement between Turkey and Syria, however insincere their main sponsor Erdogan is, they fear they will be abandoned like all cheap cards are in the bigger strategic political game.
Syria’s main condition for any rapprochement with Turkey is exactly that, Turkey must drop its support to Al Qaeda and ISIS terrorists in their numerous groups and return to the Adana Accords of 1998 which only Turkey under Erdogan has breached every article of it.
It’s also no surprise that the NATO propaganda arms would return to promoting those same terrorists who wreaked havoc across Syria and all the countries that were infested with the Arab Spring, and even the countries that sponsored the Arab Spring and had their terrorists return home and carry out terrorist attacks, mainly in western European countries.
There are somewhere between 60,000 and 120,000 terrorists of al Qaeda, ISIS, and their affiliates controlling a Syrian population of around 4 million Syrians across the regions under the Turkish occupation in northern Syria including Idlib province, parts of Aleppo, Raqqa, Deir Ezzor, and Hasakah provinces, a large number of those terrorists are foreign terrorists brought into Syria from across the world all the way from the Chinese Uighur and their families through Central Asia to western Europe, literally wherever the anti-Islamic Muslim Brotherhood and Wahhabism doctrines have influence, the first is the twisted version of Islam followed by the Turkish AKP ruling party with Erdogan as its supreme leader, a number of radical parties empowered across the Arab world, and the latter is the main twisted version of Islam followed by the Saudi and Qatari rulers.
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The Bahraini regime has just turned the page on the elections the tactic it wanted: elections without opponents or political associations in a bid to continue undermining rights and liberties and perpetuating the absolute powers of the King after he dismissed at least 100,000 citizens for the crime of belonging to – arbitrarily dissolved associations – or boycotting the last 2 electoral cycles, not to mention the suspicious division of the electoral districts and the main reliance on the participation of the politically-naturalised and the military personnel. So, the expected results were predetermined by claiming that the turnout was massive and unprecedented “reaching 73%” ignoring popular discontent and the unwillingness of the majority of citizens to participate. What happened confirms that Bahrain’s parliament is not going to witness legislative work in the upcoming days, but rather greater ties with the Israeli occupation throughout successive agreements in the sectors of the economy, finance, and medicine as well. To talk more about the elections and their consequences, I interviewed the Australian academic, Professor Tim Anderson.
1) What is your comment on the settings under which the Bahrain elections were organised? Do you think it was credible to organise such a democratic process in a country that suffers from authoritarianism at all levels?
Before even mentioning elections in Bahrain we should recognise that there is little democratic in the 2002 constitution or its application. The National Assembly – with 40 elected members in the Council of Representatives and 40 royally-appointed members in the Consultative Council – is effectively just an advisory body to the hereditary monarch, who controls all state power.
Although this Assembly makes laws, the King and his appointees can block them. On top of that, the King appoints all executive ministers. The two Prime Ministers since independence in 1971, and many senior ministers, have been his family members.
In this context, the current elections for Bahrain’s Assembly are being carried out without the participation of most opposition parties, many of whose leaders are in exile or in jail.
As even the Washington-aligned Human Rights Watch group admits, this is a façade of democracy with little substance. But that façade allows other apologists (in the USA, the UN, and Europe) to go along with the Bahraini regime’s claims that its King is:
“Deeply interested in the involvement and partnership of citizens in the decision-making process, out of a true belief in the importance of democracy .. [and a] vision for the democratization and parliamentary process in the country.”
When it seemed there was a democratic opening, during the so-called ‘Arab Spring’ of 2011, a movement “demanding a constitutional monarchy and an elected prime minister” was brutally suppressed, with the help of the Saudi military. Security forces killed dozens of protesters and arrested hundreds more, many of whom were tortured in custody. After that most opposition parties boycotted the 2014 elections and, after that, the regime outlawed the main Shia opposition group, Al-Wefaq, and the main secular opposition group, the National Democratic Action Society (Waad).
Opposition figures were jailed or forced into exile. For example, former parliamentarian Abdul-Hamid Dashti was sentenced in absentia to a lengthy prison term for simply insulting the Bahraini and Saudi regimes. Banned political parties had their members further disqualified for any role in public office, under 2018 laws. The Bahrain Institute for Rights and Democracy said in 2022 that there were “potentially 1,400 political prisoners in Bahrain, out of a total prison population of 3,200-3,800”. Since 2011 there has been increasing use of the death penalty, often based on evidence allegedly obtained under torture. All this makes internal democratic organisation very difficult.
2) In your opinion, why did the Bahraini regime relentlessly promote the elections? What are the benefits that it seeks – given that it does not respect the principle of the separation of powers?
The Bahraini tyrant seeks legitimacy and hosting the US 5th naval fleet helps him win powerful allies. As with Qatar (hosting a huge US air base) and Saudi Arabia, the US government has not launched any ‘Arab Spring’ colour revolutions against Bahrain. This means that, while occasional criticisms are raised, their usefulness to Washington helps soften their image.
For example Adam Ereli, former US Ambassador to Bahrain, argued recently that the ‘democracy’ of Bahraini regime “although falling short for some, arguably achieves the greatest good for the greatest number .. while admittedly imperfect, Bahrain’s stewardship of the democratic process nevertheless provides a much needed and publicly validated opportunity for its citizens to participate in the governing of their country.”
Other Arab countries with far greater democracy have been bombed by the US for their supposed political deficiencies. In other words, it matters little to Washington that there is no separation of powers and little democracy at all in Bahrain. Better that way, in fact; but for image marketing purposes the façade remains important. So the King presents democratic rhetoric, human rights reports, and near-meaningless elections, to mask the absolutist character of his comprador (foreign agent) regime.
3) How did you read the recommendations of Pope Francis to the King as well as the recommendations of the Universal Periodic Review of the Human Rights Council? And why, in your opinion, does the international community adopt double standards in Bahrain? Why does it acknowledge the existence of repression when it does nothing to ease the stifling restrictions imposed on Bahrainis?
A. In his recent visit to Bahrain Pope Francis did raise questions about the execution of prisoners, religious discrimination, and migrants’ rights. He was said to have asked privately for the release of some of the country’s political prisoners. Nevertheless, the interfaith meeting he attended was certainly a show aimed to cover discrimination against the 70% majority Shia Muslim population. The latter is politically active and both Washington and the Bahraini monarchy often link them to Iran, to blame Tehran for destabilising the regime.
The UN’s Human Rights Council (HRC) has not yet responded to the ‘fourth cycle’ report from Manama, which was lodged in early November. However, in its 2017 response to the ‘third cycle’ of reports, the HRC tried to push the regime to agree to inspection of its prisons (so as to assess the use of torture), to remove all reservations on the women’s rights treaty (CEDAW), to stop all executions and to ‘consider political reform’. There is not much sign of change, but Manama is certainly ‘going through the notions’ of responding in some detail to the latest ‘Universal Periodic Review’ (UPR).
Once again, the big power sponsors of the Bahraini regime shelter it from any harsh criticism. Indeed, historically, both in Latin America and in West Asia, Washington has supported many bloodthirsty, dictatorial regimes. The best current example is the Saudis, key sponsors of Al Qaeda and ISIS/Daesh terrorists. It should be plain that human rights and democracy have nothing to do with western foreign policy. Nevertheless, a certain amount of ‘human rights bureaucracy’ helps provide a semblance of normality.
4) Do you think that the Bahraini people have succeeded in overthrowing the intended goal of organising the so-called “coexistence forum” as well as “elections? How? And what is the message you send to them?
A. There is a fair amount of external democratic agitation, but the sponsors of the Manama regime have strong voices. For example, multiple sources repeat the claim that there was a quite high participation rate of 73% in the latest elections, for an initial 34 seats. They also stress the participation of women candidates, even when they note the absence of opposition parties. This was in many respects an attempt to counter the Al Wefaq party’s call for a boycott, while Amnesty International said the elections were taking place in a climate of repression. The country’s top cleric Ayatollah Sheikh Isa Qassim also backed the boycott call. It is not clear that those claims of 73% participation are at all reliable.
Meanwhile, at an international level, complaints are kept alive about Manama’s failure to face the issues of political prisoners, extrajudicial killings and systematic torture, and sectarian discrimination. The ‘impunity of the regime’ has become an important theme. As with the demands of the Palestinian people, the democratic reform demands on the Bahraini regime are capturing international attention. That is important; so too, in this writer’s opinion, is making common cause with the other democratic movements in the region. Bahrain is a small country and its democrats need regional allies.
5) How can these two events be linked to the rush in the steps of normalisation with the Zionist entity? What links the two regimes of Bahrain and the apartheid occupation? Are you afraid of a premeditated intention to turn Bahrain into another Palestine, as the Bahrain’s top spiritual Shiite authority, Ayatollah Sheikh Isa Qassem, has previously warned?
Manama’s ‘normalisation’ with the Israeli colony is a serious obstacle and one that springs from the undemocratic nature of the regime. Even the Israeli media has noted the public reaction against this within Bahrain. Al Wefaq leader Sheikh Hussein al-Daihi, said there is “no place for zionists in Bahrain”, maintaining that Bahraini people will always support Palestine.
Yet while Zionists and their collaborators says the new Jewish facilities make Manama “a beacon of religious tolerance”, many Bahrainis are alarmed at the regime’s integration of zionist cells into the country, a project which was tried before. They fear being crowded out by a wave of settlers, even perhaps becoming another Palestine.
The links between the Bahraini and Israeli regimes are obvious – they are both client states of the North Americans, providing support for its interventions, wars, and its regional hegemonic agenda. The huge US airbase and a complaint monarchy make Bahrain a dream regime for the USA, but also a ripe case for democratic revolution.
The opinions mentioned in this article do not necessarily reflect the opinion of Al mayadeen, but rather express the opinion of its writer exclusively.
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Former head of IRGC’s Al-Quds Force General Martyr Qassem Suleimani and Deputy Head of the Hashd Shaabi Committee Hajj Martyr Abu Mahdi Al-Muhandis
Ahmad Farhat, Translated and Edited by Mohammad Salami
Hezbollah Secretary General Sayyed Hasan Nasrallah warned during a speech on October 1, 2022, against the anti-Iran propaganda promoted in Iraq, underlining the Iranian support to the Iraqis in their fight against ISIL terrorist group.
The two civilizations of Iraq, Mesopotamia, and Iran, Persia, are said to be among the most ancient civilizations throughout history. Iraqis and Iranians have been sharing joys and griefs and confronting the foreign interventions, especially the British influence on Shah regime in Iran and the US invasion of Iraq in 2003.
Numerous are the Iraqi civilization’s, Mesopotamia, feats, including Hammurabi code of laws, and the geographical location of features exposed Iraq to the foreign greedy attacks in light of the oil excavations in the twenties of the twentieth century.
The ambitions of the enemies and the foreign sides have been endless and concentrated on partitioning Iraq and divide its population over sectarian segments in order to plunder the Iraqi resources.
The historical paradox lies in the fact that the states which supported Saddam Hussein’s war on the Islamic Republic were the same that backed the US invasion of Iraq in addition to Britain.
The same paradox extends and shows that the same states are stirring sedition between Iraq and Iran and instigating the Iraqis against improving the relations with the Islamic Republic, knowing that some of those Arab regimes participated in besieging the Iraqi people and imposing the oil-for-food program.
In this regard, the former Iraq foreign minister, Naji Al-Hudaithi, exposed many of the scandals of the oil-for-food program, indicating that $50 billion had been plundered to fund the UN agencies and compensate the foreign states which supported Saddam Hussein in his war on Iran.
The UN agencies and inspectors used to waste huge amounts of money to purchase new gadgets and devices even before the old ones break down, Al-Hudaithi said.
Those countries did not stop at that limit; Saudi, for instance, dispatched 5000 suicide bombers to carry out attacks in Iraq and facilitated the movements of the two terrorist groups of Al-Qaeda and ISIL.
The former Iraqi premier Haidar Abadi announced a related Saudi confession:
After the Iraqis managed in 2011 to expel the US occupation forces, the entire Middle East witnessed the advent of the so-called Arab Spring which turned to be a black winter in Iraq.
Head of the Badr Organization Hadi Al-Ameri and the former premier Nuri Al-Maliki reflect on the Iranian support to Iraq:
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The enemies wanted Iraq to confront solely the terrorist era; however, the fraternal relations with the Islamic Republic were stronger than the colonial schemes.
The Iranian military support to Iraq moved swiftly into the front of confrontation with the US occupation, and the former head of IRGC’s Al-Quds Force General Martyr Qassem Suleimani coordinated with the Deputy Head of the Hashd Shaabi Committee Hajj Martyr Abu Mahdi Al-Muhandis all the operations.
Many questions can be raised in this domain about Iraq’s destiny, ruling system, political creed, defense capabilities and economic situation it in case the terrorist groups or the US occupation have prevailed.
A thorough look at the scene affirms that the endeavor to demonize Iran betrays the history, present and the future of Iraq. Those attempts have been launched by some Arab and Western states, which supported the Saddam Hussein’s war on Iran and the US invasion of Iraq, via media outlets.
Nevertheless, the majority of the Iraqi people rejects this approach and underscores the fraternal relations between Iraq and Iran, knowing that this stance is always reiterated by the Iraqi officials.
Aerial footage shows the heavy participation in the popular event marking the first anniversary of the martyrdom of the two leaders, Suleimani and Al-Muhandis
The Islamic Republic blocked all the schemes to destroy the Iraqi state and displace its people, sending the military personnel and equipment to help the Iraqi army and popular forces to overcome the ISIL terrorists.
Martyrs Suleimani and Al-Muhandis participating in relieving Al-Basra and Khuzestan locals in Iraq
While, the martyr leaders Suleimani and Al-Muhandis and their brethren in the IRGC as well as Hashd Shaabi fighting the terrorist groups, certain Arab regimes were dispatching suicide bombers to commit massacres against the Iraqis.
Iran sacrificed its elite commanders and fighters, headed by General Suleimani who has been a great symbol for the Iranian and most of the Iraqis.
The two leaders Suleimani and Al-Muhandis embraced martyrdom together in the US drone attack on their convoy near Baghdad airport on January 3, 2020, underlining the US keenness on the Israeli interests and the Iraqi fuel.
The United States has continued to intervene in all the local Iraqi politics and plundering the Mesopotamian resources. Whereas, the Islamic Republic has been offering Iraq economic aids and investment projects.
The Islamic Republic of Iran has never requested any Iraqi services in return. Its intention has been always concentrated on defending the sanctities and supporting the vulnerable against oppression, which in consecrated in its Constitution.
Supreme Leader of the Islamic Revolution in Iran Imam Sayyed Ali Khamenei highlights the importance of the fight against ISIL terrorists in protecting Imam Hussein (P) Holy Shrine in Karbala City. Martyr Suleimani, moreover, indicates that the terrorists plotted to destroy the Holy Shrines in Iraq.
غزة | بعد وقت قصير من إعلان حركة «حماس» قرارها العودة إلى سوريا، يصل وفد من الحركة، خلال الأيام المقبلة، إلى العاصمة دمشق، ضمن مجموعة وفود فصائلية فلسطينية ستلتقي الرئيس السوري، بشار الأسد، في ما سيمثّل خطوة أولى على طريق إنهاء خلاف عميق بين الجانبَين، أشعله موقف الحركة من الأزمة السورية. وبحسب ما علمته «الأخبار» من مصادر «حمساوية»، فقد تمّ إبلاغ الحركة بنيّة الأسد استقبال الفصائل الفلسطينية، وأن «حماس» مَدعوَّة إلى هذا اللقاء، وهو ما ردّت عليه الأخيرة بالإيجاب، مؤكدة أن مسؤول ملفّ العلاقات العربية والإسلامية لديها، خليل الحية، ووفداً قيادياً منها، سيكونان ضمن الجمْع المتوجّه إلى دمشق. ولم يحدَّد بعد موعد الاجتماع السوري – الفصائلي، علماً أن الفصائل طلبت تأخيره إلى حين انتهاء لقاءات المصالحة في العاصمة الجزائرية، فيما كشفت مصادر مطّلعة، لـ«الأخبار»، أن ثمّة ترتيبات لعقْد لقاء ثُنائي منفرد، بعيداً عن الإعلام، بين ممثّلي «حماس» والأسد على هامش الاجتماع الموسّع. وأوضحت المصادر أن اللقاء المُشار إليه سيناقش الإشكاليات التي اعترت العلاقة سابقاً، وطُرق تسويتها، وكيفية «قطْع الطريق على المتربّصين» بمسار إنهاء القطيعة بين الطرفَين، كما سيتناول التحدّيات المقبلة التي تُواجه سوريا والقضية الفلسطينية، وإمكانية إقامة مكتب تمثيل للحركة في العاصمة السورية خلال الفترة المقبلة، على رغم أن خطوة كتلك تعترضها عقبات عديدة، بعضها سوري داخلي، وبعضها الآخر مرتبط بـ«حماس» نفسها، التي يرأسها في الخارج خالد مشعل، والأخير لا يزال على موقف معادٍ للقيادة السورية، فيما الأخيرة تُحافظ، بدورها، على نظرة شديدة السلبية إليه. وعلى رغم ما تَقدّم، من المتوقّع أن تَدْفع هذه الزيارة قُدُماً بخطوات «إعادة المياه إلى مجاريها»، وسط دعم من أطراف محور المقاومة لذلك المسار بشكل كامل، ورعاية إيرانية لصيقة، وإشراف مباشر من الأمين العام لـ«حزب الله»، السيد حسن نصر الله.
تم إبلاغ الحركة بنية الأسد استقبال الفصائل، وأن «حماس» مَدعوة إلى هذا اللقاء
على خطّ موازٍ، وقّعت الفصائل الفلسطينية، في العاصمة الجزائر، اتّفاق مصالحة يقضي بإجراء انتخابات تشريعية ورئاسية في غضون عام، لكن من دون تحديد الآليات التي يُفترض من خلالها تجاوُز العقبات السابقة التي حالت دون انعقادها، وعلى رأسها تلك التي فرضها الاحتلال في مدينة القدس. وفي هذا الإطار، أكدت مصادر «حمساوية»، لـ«الأخبار»، أن الحركة وافقت على الورقة الجزائرية ووقّعت عليها، على رغم كونها «فضفاضة على نحوٍ يتيح لأطرافها التملّص منها مستقبلاً»، متهمّةً حركة «فتح» بأنها هي التي دفعت في اتّجاه إخراج الورقة بهذه الصورة. وبيّنت المصادر أن الفصائل طالبت بأن تُجرى الانتخابات خلال 6 أشهر، إلّا أن «فتح» أصرّت على أن يكون ذلك بعد عام من التوقيع، من دون تحديد جدول زمني للخطوات اللازمة، ومن دون تقديم رؤية أيضاً لكيفية إتمام الاستحقاق في القدس. وبذا، لم تختلف المبادرة الجزائرية عن المبادرات العربية السابقة التي طُرحت على مدار 16 عاماً من الانقسام؛ إذ دائماً ما غاب عنها جدول زمني للتنفيذ، إضافة إلى خلوّها من أيّ ضمانات.
ودعت الوثيقة الجزائرية إلى «اعتماد لغة الحوار والتشاور لحلّ الخلافات على الساحة الفلسطينية»، تمهيداً لـ«انضمام الكلّ الوطني إلى منظّمة التحرير الفلسطينية». كما دعت إلى «تفعيل آلية الأمناء العامين للفصائل الفلسطينية لمتابعة إنهاء الانقسام وتحقيق الوحدة الوطنية والشراكة السياسية الوطنية». ونصّت، أيضاً، على «تكريس مبدأ الشراكة السياسية بين مختلف القوى الوطنية، بما في ذلك عن طريق الانتخابات، وبما يسمح بمشاركة واسعة في الاستحقاقات الوطنية القادمة في الوطن والشتات، وانتخاب المجلس الوطني الفلسطيني في الداخل والخارج حيث ما أمكن، بنظام التمثيل النسبي الكامل وفق الصيغة المتَّفق عليها والقوانين المعتمَدة، بمشاركة جميع القوى، خلال مدّة أقصاها عام واحد من تاريخ توقيع الإعلان»، فيما أبدت الجزائر استعدادها لاحتضان انعقاد المجلس الوطني الفلسطيني الجديد. كذلك، طالبت الوثيقة بـ«الإسراع في إجراء انتخابات عامّة رئاسية وتشريعية في قطاع غزة والضفة الغربية، بما فيها القدس عاصمة الدولة الفلسطينية، وفق القوانين المعتمَدة في مدّة أقصاها عام»، مُشدّدة على «ضرورة تطوير دور منظّمة التحرير وتفعيل مؤسّساتها بمشاركة جميع الفصائل»، فضلاً عن «توحيد المؤسّسات الوطنية وتجنيد الطاقات والموارد المتاحة الضرورية لتنفيذ مشاريع إعادة الإعمار ودعم البنية التحتية والاجتماعية للشعب الفلسطيني، بما يدعم صموده في مواجهة الاحتلال»، مُعلِنةً، أخيراً، «تولّي فريق عمل جزائري عربي الإشراف والمتابعة لتنفيذ بنود هذا الاتفاق، بالتعاون مع الجانب الفلسطيني».
According to a report by Al-Mayadeen TV, a high-ranking delegation from the Palestinian resistance movement Hamas is expected to visit Syria in October, embarking on their first official visit to reconcile ties.
The delegation will be led by the head of the Arab and Islamic Relations Portfolio and Hamas deputy chief in the Gaza Strip, Dr. Khalil al-Hayya.
No details have been provided by either side on the schedule of the visit nor whom the resistance faction will meet, especially regarding a possible meeting with Syrian President Bashar al-Assad.
Both sides assess that its not yet possible for head of the political bureau in Hamas, Ismail Haniyeh, to visit Syria as a result of his old public anti-Damascus remarks.
The reported visit is part of a recent push by the political leadership of Hamas to extend its hands to all Arab states and reestablish a bridge with all countries capable of opposing Israel.
On 15 September, Haniyeh, revealed in an interview to RT that the group is working on restoring ties with Saudi Arabia and Jordan.
Haniyeh highlighted that Hamas stands on equal terms with all of its Arab and international partners and “does not interfere in the internal affairs of any of these countries.”
His statement was seen by many as being directed towards Syria, in a bid to affirm that Hamas has abandoned its stand against Damascus, dating back to when it favored Turkish-backed opposition groups in 2011.
The reconciliation with Syria is of great importance to Hamas, due to its strategic role in the Axis of Resistance and support for the factions in Gaza, notably the Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ).
This recent push by Hamas to move away from the decision taken in 2012 to leave Syria was only possible after Turkish President Recep Tayyib Erdogan normalized ties with Israel earlier this year.
Additionally, Erdogan’s public comments about a possible meeting with Assad and the confirmation that Syrian and Turkish intelligence are coordinating have contributed to the current developments.
Nonetheless, the efforts made by the Secretary General of Hezbollah, Hassan Nasrallah, played a crucial role in the arming of ties between Hamas and Damascus.
Nasrallah’s effort focused on persuading Syria to accept Hamas again, and overcome the “pain” caused by the group’s decision to abandon the country when it needed allies the most.
In mid-September, Palestinian resistance movement Hamas issued a statement indicating that it had restored relations with Syria after ten years of estrangement, effectively ending its self-imposed exile from Damascus.
After the outbreak of the Syrian crisis in March 2011, at the height of the so-called Arab Spring, Hamas – in line with its parent organization, the Muslim Brotherhood (Ikhwan) – turned its back on its once-staunch Syrian ally and threw its support behind the mostly-Islamist “revolution.”
As governments collapsed in key Arab states, the Ikhwan felt the time was ripe for their organization to ascend to a leadership role from Gaza to Egypt, Libya, Tunisia and Syria.
Yet the decision by Hamas’ leadership to leave Damascus was met with strong opposition from influential circles within the movement, especially in its military arm, the Al-Qassam Brigades.
Despite Hamas’ official position toward Syria, internal opposition to the break in relations remained for years, most notably from Hamas co-founder Mahmoud Al-Zahar, and a number of Al-Qassam Brigades leaders such as Muhammad al-Deif, Marwan Issa, Ahmad al-Jabari and Yahya al-Sinwar.
Today, that balance has shifted notably. Sinwar is currently Hamas’ leader in the Gaza Strip, and his alliance is in strong ascendence within the movement.
From Amman to Damascus to Doha
But back in 2011, the person with the final say over the decision to abandon its Syrian ally was the then-head of Hamas’ Political Bureau, Khaled Meshaal.
Meshaal was the director of the Hamas office in Amman in 1999 when the Jordanian government decided to expel him. He travelled between the airports of a number of Arab capitals, which refused to receive him, under the pretext that there were agreements with a superpower requiring his extradition.
Only Damascus agreed to receive him. Despite the tension that historically prevailed in the Syrian state’s relationship with the Muslim Brotherhood, Meshaal was given freedom to work and built a personal relationship with Syrian President Bashar Al-Assad. In the years that followed, Hamas was granted facilities and resources that it did not enjoy in any other Arab capital.
Syria opened its doors to train hundreds of resistance fighters from the Al-Qassam Brigades and to manufacture quality weapons, such as missiles and reconnaissance drones.
One Syrian source told The Cradle that the privileges enjoyed by Hamas leaders and members in Syria were not available even to Syrian citizens. In addition to the high cost of Meshaal’s residence and security in Damascus, the state provided him and his associates with dozens of luxury homes in the capital’s most affluent neighborhoods.
Syria was also at the forefront of countries that facilitated the arrival of high-quality weapons into the besieged Gaza Strip. A source in the resistance tells The Cradle that the first Kornet missile to reach Gaza between 2009 and 2011 came from Syria with the approval of President Assad, and was received by then-Chief of Staff of Al-Qassam Brigades Ahmed al-Jabari.
Also crucial to the Palestinian resistance was the arrival of Iranian and Russian missiles that entered Gaza via Syrian arms depots.
Meshaal chooses Doha
It is important to recognize that while the decision to leave Damascus was not by any means unanimously agreed upon within Hamas, as political bureau chief, it was ultimately Meshaal’s call.
A Hamas source informed The Cradle that in September 2011, six months after the outbreak of the Syrian crisis, Meshaal received an invitation from the Qatari Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs at the time, Hamad bin Jassim al-Thani, to visit Doha. Recall that Qatar was one of the first states to fund and arm the Islamist opposition in the brutal Syrian war.
According to al-Thani’s estimates, the “Syrian revolution” was likely to end in the overthrow of the Assad government. He is reported to have advised Meshaal to abandon the sinking ship, so to speak, because if the rebellion is successful, “those who stayed with him [Assad] will drown, as happened with the late President Yasser Arafat, when Saddam Hussein was defeated in Gulf War,” the source described.
In an attempt to win over Hamas from Iran’s patronage, al-Thani offered to financially support the movement and to provide a geographical space for operations in the Qatari capital and in Turkish territory.
Meshaal is said to have informed his host that such a decision could not be taken unilaterally, and that he needed to refer to Hamas’ Political Bureau and Shura Council for buy-in.
Internal dissent
On his way back to Damascus, Meshaal made pit stops in a number of regional countries to inform Hamas’ leadership of the Qatari offer. Suffice it to say, the deal was rejected by the majority of members of the Political Bureau and the Al-Qassam Brigades.
The Hamas source says: “The second man in Al-Qassam, Ahmad Al-Jabari, rejected the treachery against the Syrian leadership, along with Mahmoud al-Zahar, Ali Baraka, Imad al-Alami, Mustafa al-Ladawi, and Osama Hamdan.
On the other hand, Meshaal had the support of Musa Abu Marzouk, Ahmed Yousef, Muhammad Ghazal, Ghazi Hamad and Ahmed Bahr, in addition to a number of the movement’s sheikhs such as Younis al-Astal, Saleh Al-Raqab, and Ahmed Nimr Hamdan, while the head of the Hamas government in Gaza at the time, Ismail Haniyeh, did not have a decisive position.
Meshaal’s opponents were of the opinion that as Hamas is a resistance movement, it would be ill-advised to sever ties with the region’s Axis of Resistance – Iran, Hezbollah and Syria – and that leaving this alliance left little options other than to join the “Axis of Normalization” [with Israel].
Meshaal then received a call from Kamal Naji, Secretary-General of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP), in which he was informed that the Syrians “are aware of all the details of your visit to Qatar, and of the discussion taking place in the Hamas leadership.”
According to the source, Naji advised Meshaal that Hamas “will not find a warm embrace like Syria, and that despite its historical disagreement with the Muslim Brotherhood, Damascus will not ask Hamas to take any declared position on the Syrian crisis.”
The source in Hamas told The Cradle: “The Qataris felt that Meshaal was unable to take such a fateful stance.” At this point, Sheikh Yusuf Al-Qaradawi (considered to be the spiritual guide of the Ikhwan) intervened to pressure both Haniyeh and Abu Marzouk, who had not yet made up their minds.
Fateful meetings
Meshaal was later invited to visit Turkey, where he met leaders of Syrian armed groups, accompanied by the Qatari Minister of Intelligence and officers from Turkish intelligence.
They convinced him that “a few steps separate the opposition from the Republican Palace in the Mezzeh neighborhood of Damascus, and that the days of the Assad regime are numbered.”
The meeting of Hamas’ political bureau in Sudan was the turning point. In that gathering, to the surprise of some participants, both Haniyeh and Abu Marzouk weighed in to side with Meshaal, and it was decided to “discreetly” withdraw from Damascus.
After the decision was taken, the Qataris worked to further enhance Meshaal’s position within Hamas, through an extraordinary visit by the Emir of Qatar, Hamad bin Khalifa al-Thani, to the Gaza Strip – the first for an Arab head of state. During this visit, al-Thani provided generous support with more than $450 million provided for reconstruction and the implementation of development projects.
Hamas’ fateful decision to abandon Damascus, however, was not met with the same enthusiasm by the movement’s military wing, who believed the move made little strategic sense.
Back to Damascus
In the following years, major regional changes contributed to the downfall of Khaled Meshaal and his removal from his position leading Hamas’ Political Bureau.
The Syrian state remained steadfast in the face of collective NATO-Gulf efforts to unseat Assad; Russian military intervention altered the battlefield balance of power; the Syrian political and armed opposition began to disintegrate and suffer heavy losses; the Ikhwan’s rule in Egypt and its control over Libya and Tunisia began to collapse; and a stand-off with Qatar caused Saudi Arabia and the UAE to alter their position on Syria.
With these stunning regional setbacks, it quickly became apparent that neither Qatari nor Turkish support offered any real strategic value for Hamas’ resistance model – nor could they hope to fill the void left by the reduction in Iranian and Syrian military support.
Moreover, Al-Qassam Brigades found itself facing severe financial difficulties, unable to secure the salaries of its members, let alone sustain any meaningful armed resistance against Israel’s continuous assaults and occupation.
At the time, Hamas’ revenues were derived mainly from taxes imposed on Gaza’s residents, while Qatari support, under US supervision, was limited to providing the expenses of the Hamas leadership in Qatar, and providing seasonal financial grants to government employees in Gaza.
Meshaal’s fall from power
Cumulatively, these events and the stagnation of the Palestinian resistance convinced Hamas’ leadership of the need to reshuffle its regional cards. The freed prisoner, Yahya al-Sinwar, was the initial spark to revamp a fresh new agenda, following his sweeping victory as the new Hamas leader in Gaza.
Sinwar, one of the historical leaders of Al-Qassam Brigades, decided to reset relations with Iran and Hezbollah, and work toward the movement’s eventual return to Damascus.
Meshaal, realizing that regional changes were no longer in his favor, tried to flatter the Syrian state more than once in media statements. But a firm decision had already been taken across the Axis of Resistance that Meshaal was no longer a welcome or trustworthy figure.
This was especially the case after it became clear to the Syrian security services that Meshaal was involved, along with dozens of Hamas members, in supporting armed groups, exposing secret sites of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) and Lebanese resistance Hezbollah, smuggling weapons to armed opposition in the strategically-located Yarmouk refugee camp and eastern Ghouta region, and providing them with expertise in digging secret tunnels.
Meshaal’s isolation became crystal clear at the end of December 2021, when Hezbollah refused to receive him during a Beirut visit, even though he was officially the external relations officer for Hamas.
According to the Hamas source, Meshaal tried to disrupt the consensus of the leadership of the Political Bureau and the Shura Council on restoring relations with Syria, when he “leaked, at the end of last June, the decision taken in the Political Bureau meeting to return to Damascus.”
Hamas, post-Meshaal
Meshaal’s leak caused media chaos, followed by attempts to pressure Hamas to reverse course. A statement issued by eight of the most important Muslim Brotherhood scholars, advised Hamas to reconsider its decision because of the “great evils it carries for the Ummah.”
Meshaal meanwhile, remained busy trying to restore relations with Jordan, in parallel with Iran, Lebanon and Syria. However, with the recent announcement by Hamas that it would return to Syria, “the efforts made by Meshaal and the Qataris behind him have gone unheeded,” says the movement’s source.
The normalization of relations between Hamas and Syria is significant, not only for the military dividend it could reap for the Palestinian resistance, but also because it can pave the way for Turkey and Qatar to re-establish their Syria ties, although Doha would do so very reluctantly.
With the decision to sideline the Meshaal camp within Hamas, it would seem that Hamas – and not Syria – has ultimately been the subject of regime change in this regional geopolitical battle for influence.
The views expressed in this article do not necessarily reflect those of The Cradle.
On 21 June, two unnamed Hamas sources told Reuters that the Palestinian resistance movement had decided to restore ties with Damascus following a decade-long rift after Hamas expressed support for the Syrian opposition.
The news caused a row, and it seems that this may have been the purpose behind its leak.
Shortly after the report, dozens of websites, satellite channels and media commentators in Turkey, Qatar, and the UK who are sympathetic to the Muslim Brotherhood – the political Islamist group to which Hamas belongs ideologically – distanced themselves from Hamas, which has neither confirmed nor denied the reports.
However, comments made by the head of the Political Bureau of Hamas, Ismail Haniyeh, has added credence to these claims.
In a speech before the National Islamic Conference in Beirut, on 25 June, Haniyeh said, “The time has come after ten years to make historic reconciliations in the Islamic nation.”
“What is happening in the region today is very dangerous as Israel is paving the way through military and security alliances to fight Iran, Hezbollah and Hamas,” he added.
So how accurate are the reports about “high-profile” secret meetings between Hamas and the Syrians? Is there a relationship between Haniyeh’s visit to Beirut and the timing of these revelations?
The heavy legacy of Khaled Meshaal
When Hamas left Syria over a decade ago, the office of Khaled Meshaal, who was the head of the movement’s Political Bureau at the time, justified the decision as stemming from “moral premises.”
They contended that the Hamas movement stands with the people in deciding who will rule them, saying “even if the ruler supports our right, we will not support his falsehood.” This reverberated within the movement, and the majority of its popular base supported “Syrian revolution” in the face of “the regime that is slaughtering its people.”
That was back in 2011, when the so-called Arab Spring helped sweep the Muslim Brotherhood (MB or Ikhwan) and its affiliates into power in Egypt and Tunisia, and paved the way for the MB-aligned Syrian armed opposition to take control of the outskirts of Damascus. .
But only four years later (2015), the picture was completely reversed: Egypt’s Mohammed Morsi was ousted in a Gulf-backed military coup; Tunisian President Kais Saied turned against the Brotherhood’s Ennahda party and removed it completely from the political scene. And Damascus gradually regained control over the vital parts of Syria.
In the wider region, the regime of Omar Al-Bashir fell in Sudan, and the Muslim Brotherhood’s influence in Libya, Yemen, Jordan and Kuwait was severely diminished.
New leadership, a new direction
It was inevitable that these significant region-wide changes would also transform Hamas’ leadership to reflect the new political scene. In 2017, Ismail Haniyeh was appointed head of the Political Bureau, while that same year, Yahya Al-Sinwar, who was released from Israeli prisons in 2011, became the leader of the movement in Gaza.
Seen as a hawk, Sinwar relies on the absolute support of the movement’s military arm, the Al-Qassam Brigades, and as such, introduced a new political approach to Hamas’ regional relations.
Although Sinwar’s first move was to reorganize relations with Cairo after a four-year estrangement, by far his most important change was to revive Hamas’ relations with the Axis of Resistance, making it the movement’s top foreign policy priority.
Within a few years, the Hamas leader in Gaza had re-established full relations with Iran and Hezbollah, but its return to Damascus still remains the biggest obstacle.
In order to thaw the ice with Syria, Iran mediated first, followed by Hezbollah, Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ), and more recently, the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP). This deadlock was not broken until after the Hamas operation “Sword of Jerusalem” in May 2021.
Testing the waters
In that same month, Syrian President Bashar Al-Assad responded to a greeting from Al Qassam Brigades, conveyed by the Secretary General of PIJ Ziad Al-Nakhaleh, with a corresponding greeting. After that, contacts began to increase between Syrian officials and Hamas leaders.
Syrian sources informed The Cradle that a year ago it was decided to “reduce security measures against a number of Hamas members in Syria, release a number of detainees, and reveal the fate of other missing persons.”
But that didn’t achieve normalcy between Syria and Hamas either. There are those within the latter, it appears, who continue to sabotage progress made with Damascus.
To understand the dynamics of this particular relationship – present and its future – it is necessary to review its stages throughout the years.
From Amman to Damascus
Hamas began paving the way for its relationship with Syria in the early 1990s through visits made by its official Musa Abu Marzouk. In 1992, Mustafa Al-Ledawi was appointed as the head of an unofficial office for the Hamas in Damascus.
The great leap occurred with the visit of the founder of Hamas, the late Sheikh Ahmed Yassin, to Damascus in 1998. This official visit, and the warm reception accorded Yassin, constituted a huge breakthrough in relations, after which the late President Hafez Al-Assad authorized Hamas’ official presence in Syria, providing it with political and security facilities and logistical and material support.
Despite previous bad blood between Damascus and the Syrian Muslim Brotherhood, notably in regard to the Hama massacre in 1982, there were several prudent reasons for the Syrian government and Hamas to collaborate.
One reason can be traced to the rivalry between Hafez Assad and the late Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) Chairman Yasser Arafat, who sided with the late Iraqi President Saddam Hussein in the Gulf War (1990–91) after Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait on 2 August, 1990.
On 21 November, 1999, a plane carrying Hamas’ then-political bureau chief Khaled Meshaal landed at Damascus airport, after being expelled from Jordan and refused a reception by many Arab capitals.
Since then, a number of political bureau members relocated to Damascus, and Hamas’ activities in Syria intensified. Between 2000 and 2010, the relationship further strengthened over several events, including the 2003 US invasion of Iraq, the 2005 withdrawal of the Syrian army from Lebanon, the 2006 July war between Israel and Hezbollah, and most importantly, the Israeli aggression against Gaza in 2008.
Syrian support
Hamas official Mahmoud Al-Zahar, who was interviewed by The Cradle in Gaza, talks about an important detail that the media did not mention at the time. When Hamas formed its first government in Gaza in 2007, in which Zahar was foreign minister, “Syria was the only Arab country that recognized the diplomatic red passport issued from Gaza.”
Zahar says: “The Syrian leadership gave us everything. On my first visit to Damascus, we were able to solve the problem of hundreds of Palestinian refugees stuck on the Syrian-Iraqi borders, and Syria adopted the Palestinian calling code (+970), and expressed its willingness to provide support to the elected Palestinian government. For that, it faced an Arab, international, and American war.”
Today, Zahar is the designated official tasked by Sinwar to revive the relationship with Damascus. This was confirmed by sources in Hamas, who said that he traveled to Mecca for the Hajj pilgrimage, and may head from there to Damascus.
These details are meaningful: it means Egypt is spared the censure of allowing Zahar to travel to Syria, and would avoid an awkward situation for Cairo in front of the US, Israelis and Gulf Arabs.
From Damascus to Doha and Ankara
The Syrian crisis that erupted in March 2011 put Hamas in a unique bind of its own making. Fellow Palestinian Islamists in PIJ, for example, did not take a radical position on the “revolution” from 2011 to 2017, and were content with maintaining their offices in Damascus, although its political and military leadership relocated to Beirut due to deteriorating security conditions.
On the other hand, Hamas issued its first statement regarding the Syrian crisis on 2 April, 2011, in which it affirmed its support for the Syrian people and leadership, and considered that “Syria’s internal affairs concern the brothers in Syria… We hope to overcome the current circumstances in order to achieve the aspirations of the Syrian people, and preserve Syria’s stability and its internal cohesion, and strengthening its role in the line of confrontation and opposition.”
This wishy-washy statement did not hide the hostile stance of the movement’s members and elites, who all adopted the anti-Syrian narrative. On 5 November, 2011, the Syrian security forces stormed the offices of Hamas, confiscated its assets, and shuttered them.
In early 2012, Meshaal traveled to Doha, Qatar, before holding a scheduled meeting with Bashar Al-Assad. Hamas declared that the meeting “will not be useful.”
Hamas and the opposition
On 8 December, 2012, the movement burned bridges with Damascus when Meshaal and Haniyeh raised the flag of the “Syrian revolution” during a celebration marking the movement’s launch in the Gaza Strip in front of tens of thousands of their supporters.
In a parade held during the celebration, a number of members of the Al-Qassam Brigades wore the opposition flag on their backs.
The Syrian government’s reaction was no less restrained. Assad accused Hamas of actively participating in the war against the Syrian state by supporting Al Qaeda’s Syrian affiliate Jabhat Al-Nusra, and by providing instructions to opposition factions on ways to dig tunnels and fortify them to withstand aerial bombardment.
Other opposition militant groups such as Bait Al-Maqdis, Faylaq Al-Rahman and Army of Huda announced that they were affiliated with Hamas.
Once an Ikhwani, always an Ikhwani
In 2016, Assad said in an interview with Syrian newspaper Al-Watan: “We supported Hamas not because they are Muslim Brotherhood, but rather we supported them on the grounds that they are resistance. In the end, it was proven that the Ikhwani (member of Muslim Brotherhood) is Ikhwani wherever he puts himself, and from the inside remains a terrorist and hypocrite.”
All this may seem a thing of the past, but it still affects the formation of a new relationship between the two parties, especially after the return of turncoat Meshaal and his team a year ago to important leadership positions in Hamas.
Although the majority of the movement’s leadership has changed, the old legacy of Meshaal still weighs heavily on everyone, especially in Damascus. There are many in Syria who still warn the “wound is open;” that Hamas has not yet closed it, but rather wants a “free return.”
Understanding Hamas’ structure
Before explaining Hamas’ recent decision to restore ties with Syria, it is necessary to know how the movement is run to ensure representation and accountability. Hamas has a Shura Council of 15 members, chosen in elections in which cadres of certain organizational ranks participate.
These cadres choose their representatives in the local advisory councils from different regions (West Bank, Gaza, Jerusalem, territories occupied in 1948, and prisons). As for members of Hamas’ base, they elect their representatives in the General Consultative Council, which in turn elects the Political Bureau.
Despite this ‘healthy democracy,’ the position on Syria produced two contradictory currents:
The first current is led by Meshaal, who was head of the Political Bureau until 2017. It includes Ahmed Youssef, a former adviser to Haniyeh, and Nayef Rajoub, one of the most prominent leaders of Hamas in the West Bank.
The second current has no specific leader, but Zahar was the public face before Sinwar joined him.
Between these two viewpoints, Ismail Haniyeh and Musa Abu Marzouk maintain a state of ‘pragmatism’ by taking a middle position between the Qatar-Turkey axis and the Axis of Resistance.
Although the decision to leave Syria was taken with the full approval of the members of the Shura Council and members of the Political Bureau, the entire burden of the decision was placed on Meshaal. The man, who was a personal friend of Assad and Secretary General of Hezbollah Hassan Nasrallah, became blacklisted by the Axis of Resistance.
Meshaal’s influence
All prior efforts to restore relations between Hamas and Syria were a “waste of time” as long as Meshaal was at the helm of the movement. This was not only the opinion of the Syrians, but of many Iranians as well.
In 2015, for example, when there were media reports about efforts to restore Hamas-Syrian relations, the Iranian Tabnak website (supervised by General Mohsen Rezaei, a leader in the Revolutionary Guards and currently one of the advisors to Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei) launched a scathing attack against Meshaal.
At that time, Meshaal had refused to visit Tehran if he was not received at the highest levels – that is – to meet specifically with Khamenei. The Tabnak website wrote: “Meshaal and the Hamas leaders lined up two years ago on the side of the international terrorists in Syria… They are now setting conditions for the restoration of relations between Hamas and Iran as if Iran did not have any conditions.”
Since that time, Meshaal and his team have remained staunchly reluctant to even talk about restoring relations with Damascus. In addition to their loyalty (to some extent) to Turkey and Qatar, they were aware that reviving relations would weaken their organizational position within Hamas, and contribute to increasing the influence of their rivals.
On the other hand, these rivals remained weak until 2017, as Meshaal managed to marginalize Mahmoud Al-Zahar who did not receive any influential positions.
Re-joining the Resistance Axis
The formation of the new Political Bureau meant there were now a large number of officials who were not involved in any public positions on the Syrian crisis – such as Sinwar, Saleh Al-Arouri, and Osama Hamdan, who maintained a balanced relationship with all parties.
Zahar told The Cradle that Sinwar was “convinced” of his theses about the shape of the “last battle with Israel.” He added: “I spoke with Abu Ibrahim (Sinwar) for a long time about restoring the bond with the components of the nation that have hostility to Israel, specifically Hezbollah, Syria and Iran, and this is the pillar of Hamas’ foreign policy in the future.”
Nevertheless, Zahar believes that Damascus “will refuse to deal with the movement’s leadership, which took the lead during the war.” But it is likely that the Syrians will accept to deal with him personally, which he will seek during his forthcoming visit.
What’s Next?
Well-informed sources in Hamas revealed to The Cradle that the movement’s Political Bureau met this month and made the decision to return to Syria, despite Meshaal’s objection.
The resolution has two aims: first, to build a resistance front in the “ring countries” surrounding Palestine; and second, to establish a maritime line of communication between Gaza and the port of Latakia, in Syria.
The sources also revealed that Jamil Mezher, who was recently elected deputy secretary general of the PFLP, conveyed a message from Sinwar to the Syrian leadership calling for the restoration of relations between the two parties.
After his visit to Damascus, Mezher met with Haniyeh in Beirut to discuss the results. Haniyeh also met Nasrallah, as well as Ziad Al-Nakhaleh in an expanded meeting of the leaderships of Hamas and the PIJ in the Lebanese capital. All these events took place in one week.
According to Hamas sources, Haniyeh informed Nasrallah that the movement has unanimously taken an official decision to restore relations with Damascus. The two sides also discussed the demarcation of the maritime border between Lebanon and Israel.
The sources confirm that “Hamas is ready to simultaneously target gas-stealing platforms from the Gaza sea, in the event that Hezbollah targets an exploration and extraction vessel in the Karish field.”
Hamas sources, as well as an informed Syrian source, however, deny holding any recent new meetings between the two parties. The Syrian source reveals that meetings sponsored by Islamic Jihad were held last year.
What does Syria stand to gain?
On the other hand, Damascus has its reasons for postponing the return of this relationship. Of course, internal reasons can be overlooked if Bashar Al-Assad himself makes the decision.
But it is the current regional situation and the re-formation of alliances that worries the Syrian leadership the most.
It is true that Assad the son, like his father, has learned the ropes in dealing with the MB, but now he has no need for a new headache caused by the return of Hamas. There is no great benefit from this return except in one case: the normalization of Syrian relations with Turkey, Qatar, or both.
On Syria’s terms
Only in this scenario, can bridges be re-built with Hamas. But the conditions for this are currently immature, as this normalization will be at the expense of Syria’s relationship with its ally Russia, whether in the issue of gas supplies to Europe or stopping the military operation that Ankara is threatening against Kurdish terrorists in northern Syria.
Syria, which has already improved its relations with the UAE, and is currently working to improve its relations with Saudi Arabia and Jordan, will not include a “losing card” in its stack of cards now.
It will also not compete with Egypt over a file – the relationship with Hamas – which Cairo considers its monopoly in the region.
Also, Damascus is not in the midst of a clash of any kind with the Palestinian Authority and the Fatah movement, which took advantage of the exit of Hamas to consolidate their position in the Syrian capital and improve their relationship with Assad.
However, when news broke about the possible resumption of Hamas-Syrian relations, this time Damascus did not launch an attack on the movement and did not comment negatively on the news of the rapprochement and the restoration of the relations – as it did previously.
There is no doubt that the battle of the “Sword of Jerusalem” and the presence of a new leadership in Hamas’ Political Bureau has thawed the ice significantly. But the answer to when full rapprochement will be achieved is a decision likely to be made between Assad and Nasrallah.
The views expressed in this article do not necessarily reflect those of The Cradle.
A decade after the unanimous decision by the leadership of Palestinian resistance movement Hamas to leave its base in Syria, a restoration of ties with Syrian President Bashar al-Assad now inches closer to reality.
According to a report by Reuters, Hamas is expected to resume ties with Damascus soon, setting aside the long breakup with Syria.
In the period between 18–19 June, a delegation from Hamas reportedly visited Syria and met with officials, in a bid to rebuild their relationship.
Back in 2011, the Arab world was facing unprecedented turmoil that shocked its foundation and dethroned many of its rulers, leaving no Arab state safe from political upheaval.
At the start of the war on Syria, Hamas leaders Ismail Haniyeh and Khaled Meshaal were forced to end the presence of Hamas in Syria in order to preserve its neutrality, in the face of growing popular support for the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt and Syria.
“What pained Abu Walid [Khaled Meshaal] most when leaving Syria were the warm relations with President Al-Assad and the favor Hamas found with the president, which it will never forget,” Hamas leader Moussa Abu Marzouk wrote.
However, it was not long before activists in Hamas were mourned as “martyrs” on social media, fighting against the Syrian Arab Army (SAA) in Idlib.
In December 2012, Hamas field commander Mohammed Ahmed Kenita was killed fighting the SAA.
According to a report by Palestine Now, Kenita arrived from Gaza four months prior and contributed in the graduation of three military combat courses for rebels from the Free Syrian Army (FSA).
But, despite the ever growing sectarian and political differences between the two, Hamas found no other choice but to approach Syria in light of plans by former president Donald Trump to recognize Jerusalem as the capital of Israel and the signing of the so-called Abraham Accords.
After Syria resumed ties with the UAE and Bahrain, the two states which harshly criticized Syria in the early days of the war, Hamas found the appropriate time to re-establish contact with Syria.
“Haniyeh and I talked about various issues in the region, including Syria, and that the relationship between Hamas and Syria must be re-established. There is a positive atmosphere, even if that takes time. I think that Hamas is moving towards resetting its relationship with Damascus,” said Secretary General of Hezbollah, Sayyed Hassan Nasrallah, in an interview in late 2021.
On 21 June, Ismail Haniyeh landed in Beirut to meet Lebanese officials and take part in the 31st Islamic National conference.
Haniyeh is also expected to meet with the leader of Islamic Jihad Ziad al-Nakhalah and with Hezbollah leader Sayyed Hassan Nasrallah.
US-sponsored terrorists of an ISIS-affiliated group operating out of the Al Tanf area have assassinated the head of the town council and the head of the Baath Party in the town of Al Nuaymah in the eastern countryside of Daraa.
Ali Awad Abboud, acting head of the town council, and Fouad Abboud, the head of the Baath party constituency in the town arrived dead at the National Hospital of Daraa, a source in the hospital informed the Syrian news agency Sana in a statement.
The hospital source said in the statement that both victims were killed by gunshots to their chests confirming the information circulating by local sources in the town who said ‘unknown gunmen shot the two officials in the town’ and they immediately fell dead.
This assassination indicates it was carried out by terrorists highly trained by an agency with such experiences, like the CIA or one of the US military agencies that carry out similar crimes around the world.
We’ve reported on the 23rd of December 2021, less than 5 months ago, the assassination of the mayor of the town of Al Nuaymah Alaa Al Abboud, he was killed by a bomb planted under his car, and some other members of his family were injured in the terrorist attack.
We also mentioned in the report on the previous assassination how the remnants of ISIS terrorists and members of the ISIS-affiliated terrorist group Maghawir Thawra operate out of the 50 kilometers no-fly zone established by the Biden forces illegally deployed in the Al Tanf area in the furthest southeastern Syrian desert, these forces have carried out military drills with the terrorists who also hold hundreds of Syrian families in the infamous Rukban concentration camp as human shields.
Syrian people, state and army officials, politicians, scientists, and tribal notables have all been targeted by the US-sponsored ‘Moderate Rebels’ or call use the latest trend by NATO the ‘Foreign Legion’ – Syria Branch, the US under the Noble Peace Laureate Obama have created these terrorist groups after failing to take over Syria by the color revolution dubbed Arab Spring, later beefed up by Trump, and now came back the diverse, most inclusive regime of Biden to continue investing in these terrorist groups to punish the Syrian people for not accepting the modern-day slavery decided upon them by the owners of the USA.
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يرى إردوغان أن هزيمة حزب “النهضة” في الانتخابات التشريعية، في حال إجرائها، ستكون ضربةً قاصمةً للنفوذ التركي في تونس.
تونس ليست إيالة عثمانية يا إردوغان
أثارت تصريحات الرئيس التركي رجب طيب إردوغان بخصوص حل البرلمان التونسي والدعوة إلى انتخابات جديدة حفيظة الرئيس التونسي قيس سعيد، ما جعله يرد بشكل عاجل عليه بأن تونس ليست إيالة عثمانية، في حين استدعت وزارة الشؤون الخارجية التونسية السفير التركي المعتمد لديها، وسلمته مذكّرة احتجاجٍ عبرت فيها عن رفضها التدخل في الشؤون الداخلية التونسية، واتصل وزير الخارجية التونسي بنظيره التركي من أجل الموضوع نفسه.
وقد ذكر بيان وزارة الشؤون الخارجية التونسية أن “تونس بقدر التزامها بثوابت سياستها الخارجية وحرصها على بناء علاقة وثيقة مع الدول الشقيقة والصديقة، قوامها التعاون والتضامن والتشاور والثقة المتبادلة، فإنها أيضاً تتمسك باستقلال قرارها الوطني، وترفض بشدة كل محاولة للتدخل في سيادتها وخيارات شعبها أو التشكيك في مسارها الديمقراطي الذي لا رجعة فيه”.
أولاً، ينبغي التأكيد أن من حق القيادة التونسية، سواء اتفق البعض أو اختلف معها، تقديم مذكرة احتجاج على تركيا، لأن مثل هذه التصريحات غير المسؤولة التي أطلقتها الحكومة التركية يعدّ تدخلاً سافراً في شؤون دولةٍ مستقلةٍ ذات سيادة، وبالتالي إنّ رد فعلها يبقى مسألة مفروغة منها، لأنها الجهة المخولة اتخاذ ما تراه مناسباً من القرارات التي تراها تصب في مصلحة البلاد، ولأن هذا الأمر لا يخص سوى الشعب التونسي وحده، الذي يملك حق اتخاذ المتعين من دون تدخلٍ أو تأثيرٍ من أية جهاتٍ خارجيةٍ في ما يخص مستقبله السياسي، وهو ما تكفله له المواثيق والأعراف الدولية.
منذ اندلاع ما سُمي بأحداث “الربيع العربي”، لم يتورع الرئيس إردوغان المهووس والمسكون بتحقيق حلم الخلافة العثمانية البائدة عن التدخل بشتى الوسائل في الشؤون الداخلية للدول الإسلامية والعربية، سواء في منطقة الشرق الأوسط أو شمال أفريقيا، كما لو أنها ما زالت تشكل جزءاً من الإمبراطورية العثمانية التي ترامت أطرافها بين أوروبا وشمال أفريقيا.
سعت تركيا منذ اندلاع الثورة التونسية في العام 2011، التي أطاحت حكم الرئيس التونسي الراحل زين العابدين بن علي، إلى دعمها بكل الوسائل المادية واللوجستية، لمعرفتها المسبقة بأن المنطقة الإسلامية والعربية مقبلة على تحولات دراماتيكية تمس المشهد السياسي وتصب في مصلحة تيار الإسلام السياسي الذي يشكل حزب العدالة والتنمية التركي أحد روافده.
وقد سهل وجود حزب “النهضة” التونسي في سدة الحكم، توسيع مجال النفوذ السياسي والاقتصادي لتركيا إدوغان -بسبب وحدة الأيديولوجيا التي تربط بين الحزبين- من خلال الاستثمارات التركية والمبادلات التجارية بين البلدين، التي لم تكن متكافئة بين الطرفين التونسي والتركي، إذ تميل كفتها لمصلحة الأخير، بسبب رفع الصادرات التركية نحو تونس، من دون رفع صادرات الأخيرة نحو تركيا.
وصول عجز الميزان التجاري إلى حوالى مليار دولار بين تونس وتركيا شكل عبئاً كبيراً على الاقتصاد التونسي الذي يعاني أزمات عدة، ما دفع السلطات التونسية مؤخراً إلى مراجعة كل الاتفاقيات التجارية المبرمة مع أنقرة.
كما أن البرلمان التونسي صوت قبل سنتين على مشروع قانون ينص على فرض رسوم جمركية على 90% من السلع والبضائع التركية، ما أثار غضب نواب حركة “النهضة” التي رفضت هذا الإجراء، وانسحبت فور بدء عملية التصويت عليه، إرضاء للحليف التركي.
ويبدو أن الدافع الحقيقي وراء تصريحات الرئيس التركي تجاه تونس هو توجسه من خسارة حزب “النهضة” التونسي الانتخابات التشريعية المقبلة، وبالتالي تقهقره في المشهد السياسي التونسي، بعد أن تداعت إحدى قلاع الإسلام السياسي المتمثلة بحزب العدالة والتنمية المغربي الذي يتزعمه الأمين العام الحالي عبد الإله بن كيران، الذي مني بخسارةٍ فادحةٍ في الانتخابات التشريعية التي نظمت في أيلول/سبتمبر من العام الماضي، في ضربة جديدة لأحلام إردوغان الذي كان يمنّي النفس بحكم حزام إخواني يمتد من سوريا، مروراً بمصر، إلى دول الاتحاد المغاربي، بدعم ومساندة من التنظيم الدولي للإخوان المسلمين.
وتأسيساً على ذلك، يرى إردوغان أن هزيمة حزب “النهضة” في الانتخابات التشريعية، في حال إجرائها، ستكون ضربةً قاصمةً للنفوذ التركي في تونس، وبالتالي تقويض بنيان ما بناه الرئيس التركي طيلة سنواتٍ بتحالفٍ مع صديقه زعيم حركة “النهضة” راشد الغنوشي، الذي يرعى المصالح التركية في تونس، لأن انحسار حضور الأخير يعني عملياً تراجع، إن لم يكن أفول، نجم التأثير السياسي والاقتصادي التركي في تونس، ونهاية أحلام إردوغان في بسط سيطرته على الدول التي كانت واقعة تحت الحكم العثماني.
زد على ذلك، أن الرئيس التركي، ورغم كل ما يشهده من أزمة داخلية بسبب سياساته، يفتعل أزمة خارجية لصرف أنظار الرأي العام التركي عن الداخل. هذا السلوك إن دل على شيء، إنما يدل على أن الرئيس إردوغان أضحى يعيش أسوأ حياته السياسية.
لا شك في أن القرارات التي اتخذها الرئيس التونسي قيس سعيد منذ 25 يونيو/تمور 2021، من قبيل تجميد عمل البرلمان لمدة 30 يوماً، وإقالة رئيس الحكومة هشام المشيشي حليف حزب “النهضة”، طبقاً للمادة 80 من الدستور التونسي، إضافةً إلى العديد من الإجراءات الأخرى المصاحبة لها، أطاحت طموحات إردوغان.
ختاماً، إن الرئيس التركي رجب طيب إردوغان لم يستوعب بعد حقيقة أن عهد وصاية الباب العالي وحكم الدايات والبايات والإيالات ولى إلى غير رجعة، وأن عقارب التاريخ لا يمكن إرجاعها إلى الوراء، لأن الشعب التونسي ليس قاصراً، وهو قادر على قيادة سفينة بلاده نحو بر الأمان، من دون تدخل جهات خارجية تملي عليه ما يجب أن يفعله. لذا، يمكن القول إن تونس ليست إيالة عثمانية يا إردوغان.
إن الآراء المذكورة في هذه المقالة لا تعبّر بالضرورة عن رأي الميادين وإنما تعبّر عن رأي صاحبها حصراً
حطّ عصفور محبط وحزين على رؤوس أصابعي، وطلب مني أن أدلّه على طريق الشام .
يمكنك، قلت له، أن تبدأ بميسلون، وأن تعرّج على الجامع الأموي، وأن تستريح على قبّة كنيسة الصليب، وأن تُغمض عينيك متماهياً مع أصوات المؤذنين، ورنين الأجراس .
بل يمكنك، يا صديقي، أن تنضمّ إلى قوافل الورد الزاحفة من قلب الإعصار، لترمّم ربيعاً أمعن الغرباء في تشويه وجهه الطلق.
سأل العصفور: ومن دليلي؟
قلت: سيكون دليلك جيشاً من شقائق النعمان الحاملة في ذاكرتها ملامح يوسف العظمة، وأسماء كلّ الشهداء الذين ماتوا لتحيا سورية، ورؤيا بولس الرسول الخارجِ من العباءة اليهودية إلى مسيحية منفتحة على عالم جديد .
*من روايتي “السيرة الذاتية لعصفور أضاع طريقه إلى الشام “.
With some reading, eventually, you will see how they utilize big tech algorithms, fake news, and US spies who are good at lying even to their own citizens.
The American Spring by American Spies: Fake News II
It’s amazing how fast the news cycles are in the USA. It seems as though telling the journalistic truth these days has become akin to the days of the prophets. How ironic it is that the great USA whose thumbprint is power is filled with people who are clueless and unaware of their inner spies… I described this strangeness in my first article. And for credibility sake and journalistic standards, I hold myself to the high standards of always telling the truth. If you practice this, it means that eventually the patterns, cycles, and people emerge from the unknown war machine with names, faces, and religions across the spectrums but all have one common goal: Money and Power.
Writing about the Democrats’ fake Russian Reset, I highlighted how Michael Sussman was exposed by the Americans in a government-authorized investigation. The Durham Report, which is currently in process, proved that Hillary Clinton paid for tech information while accusing Trump of espionage.
Durham’s filing says university researchers mined internet data to establish “an inference” and a “narrative” tying Trump to Russia and that they “were seeking to please certain ‘VIPs’.” Durham identified these VIPs as individuals at Sussmann’s law firm called Perkins Coie, where Sussman was a partner. The Clinton campaign was on that VIP list. Durham’s filing alleged that Trump’s residences and the White House were spied on by a tech executive aligned with the Democratic Party…”
What this implies is that, according to the West itself, there is a wide range of political schemes happening even to the American people, and those schemes look like the Arab Spring. How big a claim but only through a steady dose of truth-filled journalism can one begin to see. As a lawyer and independent journalist, with some reading and following these articles, eventually, you will see how they utilize big tech algorithms, fake news, and American spies who are good at lying even to their citizens.
WHY IT MATTERS TO US
It matters to us because a masterful strategic identity game is played in American politics, and like a torch in an Olympic game being handed over to a teammate, these American decision-makers hand over revolutions and wars. It is important to know about the American Spring and to understand their hostile powers, their military, and their intelligence capabilities, as well as what their latest scandal affords in the chess game of politics. Did Biden forfeit a massive war machine or did he hand it to the Taliban? These consistently destructive failures have devastating consequences and what we see with US mass media, now including social media, is in direct collusion with who they claim is a terrorist.
It means the media is flagrantly and sinister in their deflection. But In order to understand, one has to first understand this is a network of closely linked individuals who share a common goal: personal power at the expense of the whole.
In an American Spring, one would see nothing less than the complete destruction of American culture and influence. This has long happened since the days of Obama whose shady Presidency succumbed to a future promising president Hillary Clinton or President Donald J. Trump. Trump won in 2020 as a result of this decaying American influence. It sounds shocking and unbelievable, but essentially Hillary, Obama, and their allies have been positioning themselves to be the Lenin and Stalin of our time. They adopted the principles of their former enemies and have years of contradictions to prove it. How do principles change with such flexibility? They don’t. News cycles change, not values.
This American Spring is two-fold: the subversion of American culture and its replacement with socialist values, and soon we will be seeing a weaponization of Takfirists Islamic groups again to create instability, division, and ultimately regime changes.
The Americans are either too unaware of the dirty politics or their media are too proud to admit this. You heard the name Sussman from my writing and later confirmed by the Durham Report. However, Durham is a Special Counsel assigned to investigate the truth about the Russian Democrat-led disinformation campaign which means he is an exception and the US intelligence is no longer credible. Who are they and how do they sleep at night?
To prove my point that the intelligence apparatus of the US has failed, I digress with a NY Post article that calls a list of 51 names of intelligence officers and media pundits spies who lie: 51 ‘intelligence’ experts refuse to apologize for discrediting true Hunter Biden story. These experts chose to cover for Hunter Biden, who lost a computer which has been dubbed as the laptop from hell in which he sold “introductions to his father for 10 million dollars.” The same current news cycle and its major components are happening as we speak but in multiple areas of criminal political activity.
Let’s look at how this intelligence scandal of the 51 is no different from what we see around the world where the US invokes regime changes and how it relates to us specifically.
Front and Center Left, John Brennan
Remember that US officials are rotated and cycled through various government institutions distancing them from suspicion or conflicts of interest. Brennan in 2010 stated, “And during a 25-year career in government, I was privileged to serve in positions across the Middle East — as a political officer with the State Department and as a CIA station chief in Saudi Arabia. In Saudi Arabia, I saw how our Saudi partners fulfilled their duty as custodians of the two holy mosques of Mecca and Medina. I marveled at the majesty of the Hajj and the devotion of those who fulfilled their duty as Muslims by making that privilege — that pilgrimage.”
This tells us two things we need to know. As he claimed:
1) Brennan admits to being a ‘political officer’ with the State Dept while simultaneously the Jeddah Station chief. The second thing here to note is
2) Brennan has an affection and admitted pro-Islamic bias. As a political officer for the Dept of State, Brennan would be granted authority to issue visas from his CIA station.
In the West, Brennan has always been questionable by his opponents even so far as rumors claiming that Brennan converted to Islam. It’s similar to Lawrence of Arabia, but without the charm.
As a journalist, I know what it means for a laptop to be discredited by 51 lying spies and then proven to be true, which calls the spies’ integrity into question.
The American Spring continues under the strange leadership of Biden after a very long history of race-baiting and war-mongering. The laptop being denied isn’t the main story, rather it is what is on the laptop which is the true story, and here again, we see the same characters.
The same John Brennan who was located in Pakistan with Brezinsky, Obama’s university professor, and Carter’s CIA director, who would become a main face in the Arab Spring, is now again here before us.
History is in fact repeating itself because, despite their promises to avoid history’s mistakes, they continue to commit them.
Front and Center Right, James Clapper
Remember that US officials are rotated and cycled through various government institutions distancing them from suspicion or conflicts of interest. The New York Post is asking Clapper to renounce the accusation that was undergirded by fake news and American Spies as they call them.
President Bill Clinton created a task force to study the Khobar Towers bombing and assess all threats. The Assessment Task Force was led by General Downing, and a retired Air Force Lieutenant named General James Clapper served as the head of the intelligence assessment team. The task force was not asked to do a criminal investigation but only to report instances of malfeasance to the chain of command.
Downing reported that the chain of command “did not provide adequate guidance and support to the commander” who “was ill-served by the intelligence arrangement within his command…”
Not ironically, from 1999 to 2000, he was the Chief of Staff to then-CIA Director George Tenet.
Could the whole Russian Hoax have been to protect these people from being exposed for all their ‘malfeasance’ through their appointed careers? With Trump promising to end endless wars, this could be the only path forward. All Biden had to do was win what Hillary lost: Power & Control. Yet, as Obama warned his Democratic accomplices, “Don’t underestimate Joe’s ability to F*** things up.”
If it’s an American Spring, Trump would now have to be seen as heroic as the Left made Zelenski, no different than how the Egyptians see Sisi.
This American Spring very well may be interrupted if the Americans realize they do have spies amongst them and Biden’s seat of power squeaks with rust as it is upheld by them.
The Past
To understand the Middle East today, we must know some history. The intelligence scene is very much the fuel behind these conflicts, so consider another person of question. Louis Freeh
George H.W. Bush appointed him a judge for the US District Court for the Southern District of New York in 91. Two years later, he answered a call from President Bill Clinton, and he became the fifth director of the FBI in 93.
Freeh was the FBI Director during the Khobar Towers, the Unabomber, the Centennial Olympic bombing, Ruby Ridge, and Waco investigations. The Oklahoma City bombing happened under his watch.
He served from September 1993 to June 25, 2001, and was succeeded by Robert Mueller who reappears from the past to investigate Trump with the wasteful 3-year sham investigation which led to minimal prosecution compared to what was promised: Espionage.
As it relates to the Russian Hoax, Freeh is connected to the Russian-owned money laundering firm ‘Prevazon’. Prevazon hired Louis Freeh to help settle a major money-laundering case with the US government for roughly $5.9 million.
Prevazon is also represented by Natalia Veselnitskaya, the Russian lawyer who met with top Trump campaign officials in June 2016 at Trump Tower to lobby for repealing the 2012 Magnitsky Act. This would be the meeting that was planned and orchestrated against Trump.
Louis Freeh wasn’t used by the Democrats to ensnare Trump but is an intelligence officer with a past that Trump threatened to expose and end.
With official charges and Trump being acquitted over and over, the loser is the American people because although no charges were brought, this infamous Trump Tower meeting “with Russians” solidified the fake narrative of unproven espionage. Did Freeh have anything to be concerned about?
Leading us to another worthy note: Natalia Veselnitskaya was indicted for her connection to Kremlin- tied Prevazon, and American mainstream media still has no interest in correcting their false lies regarding the fake and obviously orchestrated Trump Tower meeting. Join me next week as we explore how these men have impacted the Middle East and our lives. And since the Western Media cannot expose it, I invite you to journey as we get to know who the American Spies are and how they have meticulously organized in a stealthy manner what will soon be known in the history books as the American Spring.
The opinions mentioned in this article do not necessarily reflect the opinion of Al mayadeen, but rather express the opinion of its writer exclusively.
Beirut – Last Friday, Syrian President Bashar al-Assad visited the United Arab Emirates [UAE] and met the Crown Prince of Abu Dhabi Sheikh Mohammed bin Zayed [MBZ] Al Nhayan and the ruler of Dubai Sheikh Mohammed bin Rashid Al Maktoum.
In terms of timing, Assad’s visit to an Arab country is the first since the crisis erupted in Syria11 years ago.
During the meeting, Sheikh Mohammed wished that “this visit would be the beginning of peace and stability for Syria and the entire region.”
Moreover, the two leaders discussed “issues of common concern”, such as Syria’s territorial integrity and the withdrawal of the foreign forces from the country.
The Assad-Al Maktoum meeting “dealt with the overall relations between the two countries and the prospects for expanding the circle of bilateral cooperation, especially at the economic, investment and commercial levels.”
MBZ, Abu Dhabi’s Crown Prince of and deputy commander-in-chief of the Emirati Armed Forces – summed up the Syrian President’s visit as “a good, peaceful and stable start for Syria and the entire region.”
Over the years, the UAE’s words had been put into action; starting with the reopening of its embassy in Damascus in December 2018, in the most significant Arab overture toward the Syrian government. However, relations remained cold.
Last fall, the Emirati Minister of Foreign Affairs flew to Damascus for a meeting with Assad, the first visit by the country’s top diplomat since 2011. The United States, a close ally of the UAE, criticized the visit at the time, arguing that the US would not support any thawing in relations with the Assad government.
The visit also implies a remarkable dimension, namely that it coincides with the anniversary of the outbreak of the Syrian crisis in mid-March 2011, in an implicit message at this time that Syria is paving the way to consider solutions to its crisis, and that Assad is quite aware that the visit to the UAE will be a milestone in the road to resolving it.
Syria was expelled before from the 22-member Arab League and boycotted by its neighbors after the conflict broke out 11 years ago.
According to the aforementioned, the visit signals a clear message that some countries in the Arab World are willing to re-engage with Syria as several countries are reviving ties with the Syrian government, including Jordan and Lebanon.
US stance regarding Asaad’s visit
When asked about Assad’s UAE visit, US State Department Spokesperson Ned Price said that Washington was “profoundly disappointed and troubled by this apparent attempt to legitimize Bashar al-Assad, who remains responsible and accountable for the death and suffering of countless Syrians, the displacement of more than half of the pre-war Syrian population, and the arbitrary detention and disappearance of over 150,000 Syrian men, women and children.”
Price downplayed the US-led wars over the past 20 years, which resulted in the death of millions of people and the devastation of several countries.
Long ago Syria has been called the heart of Arabism. At present, amid the new political developments taking place between Syria and the UAE, Damascus might become the main gate for all the Arab countries. This step was first of its kind in terms of diplomatic relations between countries of the Axis of Resistance and the so-called neutral countries, who are normalizing ties with the Zionist entity.
Bearing in mind the crisis it has been confronting since 2011, Syria must definitely be granted the Medal of Honor for standing in the forefront of countries refusing to normalize relations with the “Israeli” regime. And the coming days will prove Syria’s real position in the Arab World.
تفهم المقاومة تماماً أن الحرب ليست فعل مغامرة، وأن الهدف منها ليس تحقيق الشعبية، أو رضا وسائل الإعلام.
كعادته، قدّم إلينا سماحة السيد حسن نصر الله، في خطابه في ذكرى القادة الشهداء، جرعة كبيرة من الحماسة والتفاؤل بأن ساعة الانتصار على العدو تقترب. لم تكن تلك الجرعة عاطفية فحسب، لكنه دعّمها بمعلومات جديدة عن التطور النوعي في الترسانة العسكرية للمقاومة. اندرج هذا التطور تحت ثلاثة عناوين: امتلاك تقنية تحويل صواريخ المقاومة إلى صواريخ ذكية ودقيقة؛ امتلاك القدرة على تصنيع المُسيّرات؛ تفعيل وسائط الدفاع الجوي تجاه مسيّرات العدو.
يعرف العدو أن كشف المقاومة أيَّ تطور نوعي في تسليحها، يعني أنها تجاوزت ذلك التطور، وأن ما تملكه أكثر خطورة ونوعية.
كالعادة، تحظى خطابات سماحة السيد باهتمام الصديق والعدو. بعد الخطاب، انبرى الأعداء وعملاؤهم في حملات تشكيك واتهام، تحمّل المقاومة المسؤولية عن عدوانية العدو، وعن الأزمة المعيشية التي يربطونها بتخلي الدول العربية عن لبنان بسبب مواقف المقاومة تجاه العدو “الإسرائيلي”، وتجاه المجازر التي ترتكبها دول، مثل السعودية والإمارات وقطر، ضد المدنيين في اليمن وسوريا والعراق. لا يبالي هؤلاء بالتفريط بحقوق لبنان أولاً، وحقوق الأمة ثانياً، ما دامت دكاكينهم السياسية الفاسدة تحقق أرباحاً تذهب إلى البنوك الغربية.
تفهم المقاومة تماماً أن الحرب ليست فعل مغامرة، وأن الهدف منها ليس تحقيق الشعبية، أو رضا وسائل الإعلام. فالعدو مجهَّز بأحدث وسائل القتل وأخطرها، وهو لا يتورّع عن ارتكاب الجرائم ضد المدنيين والبنى التحتية. كما تدرك المقاومة أن أي معركة تخوضها مع العدو لا بدّ من أن تكون ضمن استراتيجية مدروسة، تضمن تحقيق أهداف مرحلية ترتقي بالفعل المقاوم. لذلك، اعتمدت المقاومة، منذ عام 1982، حتى اليوم، ثلاث مراحل للمواجهة مع العدو: مرحلة الدفاع عن المواقع والعمليات النوعية؛ ثم مرحلة صد العدوان وتكبيده أكبر خسائر ممكنة، ووصلت هذه المرحلة إلى ذروتها في حرب تموز/يوليو 2006؛ ومرحلة الردع القائمة على إدراك العدو أن أي عدوان على المقاومة يمكن أن يتحول إلى معركة كبرى قد تأتي نتائجها بما لا يقدر على تحمله.
ضمن هذا الفهم لم يكن من الممكن إطلاق صاروخ دقيق نحو العمق الفلسطيني، لأن ذلك يعني إعلان حرب. كان البديل إرسال المسيّرة “حسّان” في طلعة استطلاعية فوق فلسطين، في خطوة كانت ضرورية في سياق المواجهة مع العدو، إذ حملت المسيّرة “حسّان” مجموعة من الرسائل موجهة إلى من يهمه الأمر.
رسالة إلى العدو، الذي أصبح يعرف أن كشف المقاومة أيَّ تطور نوعي في تسليحها، يعني أنها تجاوزت ذلك التطور، وأن ما تملكه أكثر خطورة ونوعية. وبالتالي، دخلت الدوائر الاستخبارية والعسكرية الإسرائيلية في حالة من الارتباك، تجلّت بالطريقة المبالَغ فيها، والتي تعاملت بها مع المسيّرة “حسّان”، التي عدّها كثير من المعلقين والخبراء العسكريين نصراً مهماً للمقاومة في معركة الوعي.
من الأهداف المهمة التي حققتها “حسّان” أنها قوَّضت ما يدَّعيه العدو في قوله إن تكرار العدوان على سوريا هو من أجل قطع إمدادات المقاومة من الأسلحة النوعية، ووضعت هذه الاعتداءات في مكانها الصحيح، وهو أنها استغلال لظرف مؤاتٍ، إقليمياً ودولياً، من أجل تحقيق بعض الإنجازات الإعلامية، من دون القدرة على تحقيق أي إنجاز، أو التأثير في قدرات أيّ طرف من أطراف محور المقاومة.
الرسالة الثانية كانت إلى الشعب الفلسطيني، الذي ينخرط منذ عدة أشهر في انتفاضة مَنسيّة إعلامياً، في الشيخ جراح ونابلس ورام الله وجنين. هؤلاء المنتفضون، الذين كانوا يخوضون، في الوقت نفسه لطلعة المسيّرة “حسّان”، مواجهاتٍ قاسيةً في حي الشيخ جراح مع المستوطنين الصهاينة، وخاضوا في الليلة ذاتها اشتباكاً مسلَّحاً في منطقة جنين، كانوا في حاجة إلى دعم يقول لهم إنهم ليسوا وحيدين في المعركة، وإن المقاومة لا تكتفي بإصدار البيانات، لكنها تلجأ إلى الفعل الذي يقضّ مضاجع العدو.
منذ أن بدأت المواجهات في حيّ الشيخ جراح، وما تلاها في معركة “سيف القدس”، شهدت الأراضي الفلسطينية نقلة نوعية في العمل النضالي. تمثَّلت هذه النقلة بانضمام فلسطينيي المناطق المحتلة عام 1948 إلى الفعل المقاوم، ليس كمتضامنين، بل كشركاء في القضية الواحدة. لن ينسى العدو العَلَم الفلسطيني يرفرف في سماء اللد بعد طرد المستوطنين، ولا المواجهات في عكا. لقد أدى هذا التغيير النوعي إلى إعادة تشكيل مفهوم الجبهة الداخلية “الإسرائيلية” في أي حرب مقبلة، وبناء الاستراتيجية الجديدة على اعتبار أن اندلاع المواجهات في المدن الفلسطينية، ومدن الأراضي الفلسطينية المحتلة عام 1948، إحدى أهم الثُّغَر في حال نشوب معركة في الجبهة الشمالية (سوريا ولبنان).
أولئك القادمون من عكا وحيفا واللد والنقب، والمجتمعون حول البيوت المحاصَرة في حيّ الشيخ جراح، كانوا في حاجة إلى رسالة من المقاومة لتشد أزرهم، وتقول لهم إن الصمود والإرادة قادران على صنع المعجزات. وهذا ما قالته المسيّرة “حسان”.
على الرغم من أهمية الأثر المعنوي الذي تركه تحليق المسيّرة “حسّان”، وعودتها إلى قواعدها سالمة، فإن أغلبية المحللين العسكريين سلّطت الضوء على الاستنتاجات العسكرية المرتبطة بهذا التحليق. أهم هذه الاستنتاجات أن “القبّة الحديدية” ووسائط الدفاع الجوي، بما فيها الطائرات الحربية، ستكون عاجزة عن التصدي لهجمات مئات الطائرات المسيّرة، وآلاف القذائف والصواريخ التي يمكن أن تنهال على العدو في حال اندلاع الحرب. كما أن التكلفة المرتفعة لصواريخ “القبة الحديدية”، والتي تصل إلى 50 ألف دولار للصاروخ الواحد، ستجعل الحرب المقبلة كارثةً، اقتصادياً وعسكرياً.
منذ انطلاق “الربيع الصهيوني”، تراجع موقع القضية الفلسطينية في سلّم الأولويات العربية. وجاءت موجة التطبيع العربي الأخيرة لتضع مزيداً من الضغوط على الشعب الفلسطيني. جاءت الدقائق الأربعون التي حلقت خلالها المسيّرة “حسّان” لتُعيد الاعتبار إلى الفعل المقاوم في سياق القضية الفلسطينية، والصراع العربي – الإسرائيلي، ولتقول إن المواجهة النهائية مع العدو ستكون في أرض فلسطين، وإن محور المقاومة يضع يده في أيدي المقاومين داخل فلسطين، وفي العالم العربي، ليكون النصر حليفهم.
إن الآراء المذكورة في هذه المقالة لا تعبّر بالضرورة عن رأي الميادين وإنما تعبّر عن رأي صاحبها حصراً
Posted on January 28, 2022 by worldpeacewithjustice
January 28 2022
The illegal Turkish military presence in Iraq is a blatant violation of that country’s territorial integrity. While Ankara claims it is a national security priority, it actually uses this military cover to influence and manage Iraqi and regional affairs
Almost 100 years after the Treaty of Ankara (1926), Iraq-Turkey relations remain fraught. Despite various disputes over water rights, territorial violations, unlawful oil trades, and alliances, the overriding reason for tensions remains the problem of Kurdistan.
Today, media headlines across Turkey continue to reflect the nation’s antagonism with the armed groups of the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK) inside Iraq, a neighboring state in which the Turkish Armed Forces (TSK) launch military operations with impunity.
But despite the repeated protests of the Iraqi government over these violations of its sovereignty, Turkish presence and operations in northern Iraq continue unabated.
In May last year, Turkish Defense Minister Hulusi Akar visited the Turkish military base Biliç Hill Base in northern Iraq to supervise Turkish troops deployed for an ongoing operation against the PKK.
Furious about the visit, Baghdad summoned the Turkish diplomatic envoy in Baghdad to express displeasure at Akar’s presence inside Iraq without providing prior notice.
Official numbers concerning the presence of TSK in northern Iraq are unclear. According to an Anadolu Agency article back in 2017, TSK had a battalion in the Bamarni Airport, near Duhok, as well as commando units in Kani Masi and Begova in northern Iraq.
In accordance with Ankara’s goal of unilaterally creating a 40km-deep security belt in northern Iraq, TSK has established new bases in the Iraqi regions of Hakurk and Metina.
One source claims that the number of Turkish troops in Iraq has risen to over 10,000, but a news outlet aligned with Turkey’s ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP) says there are only 2,000 troops, with approximately 500 of them mechanized units in Bamarni, and 400 of them from Bolu Commando Brigade in Kani Masi.
It also claims that there are 130 Special Forces as liaison officers in Erbil, Zaho, Dohuk, Batufa, Sulaymaniyah, and Amadiya. In the town of Simele, Turkish intelligence units are reinforced with new recruits, while military tanks, recently updated by Israel, are deployed in Bashiqa base.
In a rare move, Turkey’s Directorate of Communications published a map in 2020 which showed the positions of Turkish troops in northern Iraq. The map has since been removed.
According to the map, from Zakho to Hakurk in the west–east axis and from Avashin to Erbil in the north–south axis, Turkey has 38 military posts or bases in northern Iraq.
Source: Turkey’s Directorate of Communications, 2020
Bargaining chips in northern Iraq and wars on terror
It is quite significant that pro-Justice and Development Party (AKP) news outlets portray Iraqi resistance against the US presence – many of them pro-Iran – as an indirect threat to Turkey.
Moreover, it appears that the US has given Turkish military operations a green light inside Iraqi territory, but attempted to create a schism between the PKK and its Syrian militia affiliate, the People’s Defence Units (YPG), with which Washington has common cause – to Turkey’s detriment.
Ankara, which enjoys cordial diplomatic and robust economic relations with Iran, can be just as opportunistic. According to the US’s former Syria special representative James Jeffrey, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan had personally told him twice that he too “considers Iran a threat.”
Such expressions reflect a constant principle within Turkish foreign policy: If you have problems with the west, turn to the east to create bargaining chips.
In this regard, Turkish hard power instruments in Iraq and Syria work against the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK), developing elements of pressure against Damascus and Tehran, and creating new opportunities to negotiate with Washington.
A new era for Turkey
During the 1980s, Turkey stepped into a new era marked by two intertwined developments.
The first development occurred when the Stabilization Decisions of 24 January 1980 changed the country’s existing economic model. The external debt of Turkey during the 1970s had triggered a ‘balance of payment’ crisis. The Turkish bourgeoisie desperately needed both foreign exchange and to transform import-substitution industrialization into an export-oriented economic policy.
Second, the dissolution of the USSR and the end of the Cold War created a sense of opportunity for Turkey. Neo-Ottomanism entered the Turkish political scene when the newly established Central Asian and Caucasian republics were seen as ‘Turkic hinterland’ for the post-Soviet order.
Today, among left-wing circles inside Turkey, it is still widely believed that the 12 September 1980 coup d’état was initiated to apply these economic policies.
As a result, the Turkish state re-evaluated its foreign policy in two broad ways: via the economic prism – diversifying export destinations to bolster and transform the economy; and via identity politics, transforming Turkey from a ‘secular’ state and society into a country in which Turkish and Islamic identities were promoted forcefully by the putschist government of the 1980s.
Turgut Ozal, the first post-coup prime minister, and later the eighth President of the Republic of Turkey, implemented these policies to ‘re-orient’ the new Turkey.
Mixed occasionally with both pan-Turkist and pan-Islamist ideologies, neo-Ottomanism became increasingly attractive for Turkey in furthering its economic and political visions.
It is no surprise then, that Erdogan views Ozal as his role model for Turkey. Both figures bind export–growth economic policies with proactive foreign policy adventures.
Along with other neighbors of Turkey, northern Iraq was now being viewed as strategically significant in this new political context. Iraq was the bridge through which Turkey could reach the Persian Gulf. Turkish state and foreign policy were thus restructured along this line in the early 1990s.
The First Gulf War, according to Ozal, was an opportunity for Turkey’s new foreign policy realignments. The president went on to join the US-led anti-Saddam Hussein coalition and began publicly championing the theme of a ‘Greater Turkey’ as the protector of Turkomen and Kurds in northern Iraq.
Although the Turkish army and foreign ministry resisted Ozal’s efforts, Ankara allowed the Poised Hammer force – an aviation unit consisting of American, Australian, British, Dutch and French troops – to deploy in Silopi, Şırnak and operate on Turkish soil.
In the meantime, Turkey continued its armed operations against the “terrorist threat of the PKK,” alongside efforts to legitimize its presence in northern Iraq, which are assessed by the Iraqi government as illegal.
There were two large operations in northern Iraq in the 1990s. In 1995, the Turkish Armed Forces (TSK) launched Operation Steel, during which over 35,000 Turkish troops crossed the border.
The second operation, in 1997, was Operation Hammer, and it had two goals: to destroy PKK camps and to strengthen the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) against the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) in the Kurdish civil war.
The anti-PUK strategy overlapped with the PUK’s so-called ‘pro-Iranian’ stance. This was another reason for Turkey to support the KDP against the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK), and occasionally against the PUK, and it has been the repertoire of the Turkish state ever since.
Alongside irredentist claims over Iraq, Turkey began to exploit the post-Soviet world around it, exporting cheap and relatively high-tech Turkish goods to new destinations assessed as crucial areas.
The tide turned in 2008. The Justice and Development Party (AKP), with its neo-Ottoman figures like former Prime Minster Ahmet Davutoglu, reversed the Turkish course in Iraq. Ankara started to handpick Sunnis to take under its wings, and to develop solid relations with the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG).
Energy cooperation, particularly oil and natural gas investments, were primary motivations for both these governments. In 2004, Turkey’s exports to Iraq were less than two billion dollars, but by 2013, it had risen over 10 billion dollars, and the destination was the KRG, in particular.
Turkish construction companies earned lucrative contacts in the KRG. Erbil Airport was built by Cengiz İnsaat, which is owned by one of Erdogan’s closest allies, Mehmet Cengiz.
In 2014, despite the protests of Baghdad, the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) started to sell its oil through Turkish ports.
The new Turkey makes a retreat
After 2016, however, Turkish policy towards northern Iraq underwent a re-assessment.
One of the reasons was due to domestic political shifts. The pro-Kurdish People’s Democratic Party (HDP) acquired strong support in the June 2015 general elections, and AKP lost its majority for the first time in 13 years, bringing an abrupt end to the AKP’s so-called ‘Kurdish opening.’
There were strong clashes between pro-Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK) forces and Turkish Armed Forces (TSK) in southern parts of Turkey, which paved the way for a return to the old counter-insurgency TSK tactics in regard to the Kurdish question.
Then, on 15 July 2016, a failed coup d’état triggered a further restructuring of the Turkish state.
Another reason for the change in Turkish policy towards Iraq was that foreign policy failures and disappointments had taken their toll on Ankara.
The Arab Spring and the Muslim Brotherhood’s brief regional ascendence were snuffed out in Egypt and Tunisia, sending shockwaves throughout the Turkish government, and ending the rise of the Turkish model of a modern Muslim state throughout West Asia.
The Syrian government, with its allies Hezbollah, Iran, and Russia, held its ground and the US-backed regime change operation in Syria fell apart.
The so-called ‘Friends of Syria’ group splintered into Qatar-Turkey vs. Saudi Arabia-UAE, and started to fight each other.
The outward flows of Syrian refugees heightened tensions within Turkish society, and fueled both anti-AKP and anti-refugee sentiment.
Importantly, the YPG occupation of northern Syria, and its partnership with the US ‘anti-ISIS’ coalition supported by the PKK, created a ‘national threat’ for the Turkish government.
Turkey then set about modifying its policy on Syria. The result was a retreat from the aim of toppling Syrian President Bashar al-Assad to the more humble goal of “eliminating the terror corridor alongside [Turkey’s] southern border.”
The paranoia of ‘Iranian influence’
As a result of its hard power policies over the years, Turkey has been denied access via Syria and Iraq to the lucrative markets of the Persian Gulf’s Arab states. These policies include Turkey’s too-cozy relationship with Iraq’s KRG, as well as its economic and sometimes military competition with Iran in Iraq.
Soaring inflation in Turkey also decreased the competitiveness of Turkish goods in regional markets, and the Iraqi government’s protective policies have slowed down Iraq–Turkey trade volume. At the same time, Iranian trade with Iraq began to increase.
Strategic calculations have also played their part. Turkey’s eagerness to wipe out Kurdish militias from northern Iraq’s Sinjar region has caused tensions with both Baghdad and Tehran.
When TSK launched a military operation against the PKK in Gara, northern Iraq, in February 2021, Iraq’s Popular Mobilization Units (PMU, or Hashd al-Shabi) deployed forces in the Sinjar area against Turkish troops.
Turkish Armed Forces (TSK) have also been training anti-PKK Iraqi politician Osama al-Nujaifi’s Hashd al-Watani forces in a Turkish base in Bashiqa, near Mosul. In Sinjar, a tacit alliance between the PMU and PKK-affiliated Sinjar Resistance Units (YBS) confronted the TSK-backed Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP).
For Turkey, this confrontation represents an unholy alliance between Iran and the PKK. When Iran’s ambassador to Iraq, Iraj Masjedi, criticized Turkish operations in northern Iraq, then Turkish envoy Fatih Yıldız hit back, saying Masjedi should be “the last person to lecture Turkey.”
Ambitious goals, ambiguous future
Today, officially and firstly, TSK claims that its troops and bases are in northern Iraq for ‘fighting against terrorism’ and maintaining national security.
Secondly, as in the case of Bashiqa, Turkey lays claim to Iraqi Sunnis and legitimizes its assets by exploiting the sectarian fragmentation of Iraqi politics.
Thirdly, as long as the US remains in Iraq and maintains its ‘countering Iran’ policy in West Asia, Turkey will present its policy towards the KRG as a counterbalancing act against the so-called ‘Iranian influence.’
It appears that the KRG, and Sinjar in particular, will be the current focal point for the quarrel between Iran and Turkey. As a distant aim, in the event of the fragmentation of Iraq, Turkey would likely explore the annexation of northern Iraq, where it believes it has historic claims.
With respect to the Iraqi government, options against Turkey’s breaches of sovereignty and territorial integrity are limited. Ankara will remain as a big trading partner for Baghdad, with a staggering trade deficit to the detriment of the latter.
Turkey’s deep reach inside the KRG and warm relations with the ruling Barzani family will allow it to use northern Iraq as a bargaining chip with Baghdad in the post-US era – both unilaterally, and for the benefit of its NATO alliance.
Lastly, the recent thaw between Turkey, some Gulf states, and Israel may force Baghdad to accept the Turkish fait accompli in northern Iraq.
In short, Turkish troops in northern Iraq are useful for three things: Influencing the Kurdish question and directly tackling its PKK problem; boosting Turkish regional ambitions; and establishing a bargaining chip with its western allies.The views expressed in this article do not necessarily reflect those of The Cradle.
UPROOTED PALESTINIANS: SALAM ALQUDS ALAYKUM 