Lebanon Confirms Its Rights To Confront ’Israel”… What Are Its Power Elements?

Source

Lebanon Confirms Its Rights To Confront ’Israel”… What Are Its Power Elements?

Charles Abi Nader

Apart from the political contending that preceded and accompanied the administrative-legal path of the Lebanese Maritime Borders Amendment Decree [6433], which also takes its constitutional and diplomatic path [as soon assumed] to the United Nations, it can be said that Lebanon – the government and the institutions – through its delicate and decisive decision to amend that decree, has imposed itself as a powerful player in the game of regional and international interests and conflicts.

The statement that Lebanon has imposed itself as a powerful player in the game of international interests and conflicts may be misplaced or inappropriate if we compare it to the crisis situation in Lebanon today, and what it is experiencing in terms of what looks like a financial, economic and social collapse, in addition to its fragmentation and political imbalance. But in reality, despite all the tragedies that have passed through Lebanon, its position has brought the highest level of challenge to many regional and international players.

First of all, the field of interest in which Lebanon has created itself by amending the decree defining its pure economic waters, is almost the entire eastern Mediterranean region, which is apparently very rich in gas and oil, between Syria and Turkey eastward and northward, between the occupied Palestine and Egypt southward and southwestward, and between Cyprus, Turkey and Greece westward. We are talking here about a maritime field, which is currently experiencing a delicate conflict and danger over the division and determination of the exclusive economic waters of the aforementioned countries, not far from the possibility that it will cause a military confrontation, such as between Greece and Turkey or between Cyprus and Turkey.

On the other hand, while ‘Israel’ is considered Lebanon’s fiercest opponent in this maritime border dispute, and due to its urgent need to exploit the huge wealth from the occupied Palestine’s coasts and to accelerate and advance its partnership with the Forum of Eastern Mediterranean States [Egypt, Cyprus and Greece], which is based on the initiation of the extraction and supply of gas and since it has completed the completion and preparation of the administrative, technical and legal structure for the initiation of the exploration in the Karish border field with Lebanon, which was affected by the aforementioned Lebanese amendment in more than half of its area, it will consider the Lebanese position regarding the amendment of its maritime rights in the south as a declaration of war against it, which would call for a non-simple reaction, not only as it threatened to stop indirect negotiations with Lebanon.

At a time where Lebanon is experiencing this almost complete collapse at all levels, and where most of the external parties involved in the conflict or the file contribute to deepening the collapse by exerting a lot of additional pressure on Lebanon to force it to surrender or submit to the maritime or other border file, and as these parties consider that the Lebanese position is supposed to be lenient and lax, in other words, disregarding what they see as their rights, so that they can make quick use of their needs before its inevitable collapse, Lebanon declares this strong position.

Therefore, the fundamental question remains: On what does Lebanon depend in this powerful position? And what are Lebanon’s power elements in the delicate game of defiance that it got itself involved in?

Of course, the consistent position of His Excellency the President of the Republic as a key official actor in guiding the negotiation process has been instrumental in amending the decree and establishing Lebanese maritime rights by fully supporting and embracing the perspective of the experts in the Lebanese Armed Forces and the specialists of the negotiating delegation in the demarcation process, which highlighted in a scientific-legal manner the correct maritime borders, that must be at first: A valid document for deposit with the United Nations and relevant institutions of the international community, and secondly: a platform for indirect negotiation with the enemy and for the demarcation and precise determination of the border based on it.

On the other hand, the legal and technical point of view presented and proved by the Lebanese Army in scientific details, from which its position was clear and decisive, regarding the necessity of completing indirect negotiations with the enemy on its basis, and in terms of the futility of its completion without it, proves without any doubt that the military, as a matter of national responsibility and duty, will be an essential party in fixing, protecting and supporting the amendment decision, with all possible military or security implications, dangers or repercussions.

Also, it is absolutely impossible to overlook the important role of the unified internal Lebanese position on the amendment, which was finally demonstrated by all concerned, official, partisan and political parties, and despite some initial reservations, which were in good faith in order not to lose the opportunity of demarcation and to benefit from the wealth as soon as possible, due to the urgent need for it today, this united position in terms of cohesion and non-division was essential in confirming the Lebanese decision to amend against all external parties.

In the end, the decisive role remains for the resistance, with its deterrent capabilities and balance of force against the ‘Israeli’ enemy, which is the main foundation in stabilizing and protecting the delicate, sensitive and bold Lebanese position, in terms of modification in general, and in terms of its sensitivity to hit the center of the Karish field, which ‘Israel’ considers to be under its control [within the areas occupied in the Palestinian waters], which had completed all appropriate measures to initiate exploration and exploitation of its wealth, with possible implications and developments, that will produce a provision that the enemy will regard the official Lebanese amendment to the decree as war or targeting what it claims to be its rights. As the Resistance has always stated, it is behind the Lebanese government in supporting and protecting what the latter determines in terms of national rights, land or maritime borders or the borders of Lebanese sovereignty, thus it [the Resistance] will, with its qualitative capabilities, remain the most powerful and solid safety valve for the protection, maintenance and stabilization of these national rights.



Related Articles

Russia Tells Hezbollah: We Want You to Stay in Syria روسيا لحزب الله: نريدكم ان تبقوا في سوريا


Russia Tells Hezbollah: We Want You to Stay in Syria

Russia Tells Hezbollah: We Want You to Stay in Syria

Al-Ahed Translations

5 hours ago

By al-Akhbar Newspaper, Translated by Staff

Over the past years, media outlets hostile to the Syrian regime and its allies [individually and collectively] have published a lot of reports and “information” about actions and measures that Russia has begun to implement to get Hezbollah and Iran out of Syria, or at least reduce their presence there. These reports were based on an assessment that Russia does not want a partner in influence in the Levant, especially the Iranian influence. In the field, it was the opposite that governed the relationship between the parties, there was cooperation on more than one level, and sharing roles sometimes. And when something was not agreed upon, the issue was resolved by regulating the disagreement.

The visit of Hezbollah’s delegation, led by MP Mohammad Raad [a member of Hezbollah’s Shura Council and head of the Loyalty to the Resistance parliamentary bloc], to Moscow, in the middle of last month, was an occasion in which the Russian leadership clarified its position on the party’s presence in Syria. In Moscow, Hezbollah’s military performance is highly appreciated on the level of professionalism, discipline and the superior ability of its fighters to achieve their battle goals. At the same time, Moscow admires Hezbollah’s “pragmatism.” In the latter regard, it seems concerned with everything that contributes to the protection of the Syrian state, in particular the internal settlements with armed groups in many regions, especially in the south, and the major understandings with Turkey. In either way, the party was committed to everything that could be done to make these settlements and understandings successful.

In Moscow, the military and politicians consider Hezbollah’s presence in Syria more necessary than ever. Any gap left by Hezbollah and Iran in any Syrian province will be filled by the Americans, neither the Russians nor the Syrians. Moreover, some settlement groups, including those who are strengthened with the understanding with the Russians, see no deterrent to their extension except for Hezbollah and the Iranians.

In this spirit, Russian officials have been keen to convey a clear message to Hezbollah’s leadership: Your presence in Syria is as necessary in politics as in the military. We count on future cooperation in both fields.

The Russians do not consider Hezbollah as a Lebanese organization, but rather as a side who has presence in many States of the region. In the meetings with Russian officials, specifically Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov, his deputy Mikhail Bogdanov, and officials in the parliament, the situations in Yemen, Iraq, Syria, Palestine and others were discussed. The parties stressed the need to strengthen their communication and to adopt direct channels of communication between Hezbollah and Moscow, while studying the possibility of establishing a representative office for the party in the Russian capital.

The visit, that was based on a Russian invitation, appeared to be a message from Moscow to Washington that “the ongoing attempts to entrap us up with Iran or Hezbollah will not work. We will not only coordinate with Iran; we want to coordinate directly with Hezbollah.” The Russians have already informed all Western, Arab and regional States and powers that they communicate with about Lebanon that “Hezbollah is a major force, a real and significant case, that should be dealt with on this basis, and that no settlement can be achieved without consulting and agreeing with it.”

Another message Moscow wanted to deliver to Tel Aviv is that it is true that Russia seeks “an understanding with everyone” considering Syria, and there is an understanding between it and ‘Israel,’ but this understanding does not mean “we are helping ‘Israel’ in its strikes. On the contrary, we condemn these strikes, especially those passing through the Lebanese airspace. We remain committed to preventing ‘Israeli’ aircraft from penetrating Syrian airspace.” On one hand, Moscow confirms, based on its intelligence information, that the ‘Israeli’ strikes on arms convoys transported to Lebanon did not achieve their goals and did not prevent Hezbollah from achieving their goals. On the other hand, it does not object to the establishment of a deterrent equation that would prevent ‘Israel’ from attacking the Syrian territories. In the coming months, there is a trilogy that Moscow is seeking to secure the factors for its success in Damascus: the political process linked to the presidential election station, reconstruction, and the return of refugees.

In Lebanon, the Russians insist on not to interfere as other countries do. They do not interfere in the formation of the government, they do not participate in the composition process, and they do not demand shares. It is true that they are interested in the reconstruction of the port, for example, just as they are interested in energy projects, whether those in which they are involved in [oil and gas exploration in the sea, fuel tanks at Beddawi] or those in which they aspire to participate in in the future, such as the reconstruction and operation of the Tripoli refinery. Here, the Russian interest in the sea gas seems remarkable, as estimates in some Moscow-based jurisdictions talk about a huge amount of gas in the Syrian and Lebanese seas. And if those estimates are correct, it is not unlikely that Russia will implement a gas pipeline project in the eastern Mediterranean competing with the “Eastern Mediterranean Gas Forum” project [involving Egypt, ‘Israel,’ Cyprus, Greece, Jordan, France and Italy], to transport gas to Europe via Turkey.

Considering Yemen, Moscow seems interested in finding a settlement that saves the Saudi prestige. While for Hezbollah, the key to the solution is to stop the aggression and lift the siege simultaneously, and Ansarullah are keen not to antagonize anyone, except those who take the initiative to start a fight.


روسيا لحزب الله: نريدكم ان تبقوا في سوريا

الأخبار

الثلاثاء 6 نيسان 2021

على مدى السنوات الماضية، نُشر في الإعلام المعادي للنظام السوري وحلفائه (فرادى ومجتمعين) الكثير من التقارير و«المعلومات» التي تتحدّث عن أعمال وإجراءات بدأت روسيا بتنفيذها، لإخراج حزب الله، وإيران، من سوريا، أو على الأقل، الحد من وجودهما. تلك التقارير مبنية على تقدير أن روسيا لا تريد شريكاً لها في النفوذ في الشام، وخاصة النفوذ الإيراني. في الميدان، كان العكس هو ما يحكم العلاقة بين الطرفين. تعاون على أكثر من صعيد، وتقاسم للأدوار أحياناً. وعندما لا يُتفق على أمر ما، كانت القضية تُحل بتنظيم الاختلاف.

الزيارة التي قام بها وفد من حزب الله، برئاسة النائب محمد رعد (عضو شورى القرار في الحزب ورئيس كتلته النيابية)، إلى موسكو، منتصف الشهر الماضي، كانت مناسبة أوضحت فيها القيادة الروسية موقفها من وجود الحزب في سوريا. في موسكو، تقدير عالٍ لأداء حزب الله العسكري: حرفية مقاتليه، وانضباطهم، وقدرتهم الفائقة على تحقيق أهدافهم في المعارك. وفي الوقت عينه، تبدي موسكو إعجابها بـ«براغماتية» حزب الله. في الشأن الأخير، تبدو معنية بكل ما يسهم في حماية الدولة السورية: التسويات الداخلية مع مجموعات مسلحة في كثير من المناطق، خصوصاً في الجنوب، والتفاهمات الكبرى مع تركيا. وفي الحالتين، كان الحزب ملتزماً بكل ما يمكن القيام به لإنجاح هذه التسويات والتفاهمات.
وفي موسكو، يرى العسكر والسياسيون أن وجود حزب الله في سوريا ضروري أكثر من أي وقت مضى. فأي فراغ يتركه الحزب وإيران في أي محافظة سورية، سيملأه الاميركيون، لا الروس ولا السوريون. كما أن بعض مجموعات التسويات، ومنها تلك التي تستقوي بالتفاهم مع الروس، لا ترى رادعاً يحول دون تمددها سوى الحزب والإيرانيين.
من هذا المنطلق، حرص المسؤولون الروس على إيصال الرسالة واضحة لقيادة حزب الله: وجودكم في سوريا ضروري، في السياسة، كما في العسكر. ونعوّل على التعاون معكم مستقبلاً في المجالين.
لا ينظر الروس إلى حزب الله بصفته تنظيماً لبنانياً، بل هو جهة لها حضورها في كثير من دول الإقليم. في اللقاءات مع المسؤولين الروس، وتحديداً وزير الخارجية سيرغي لافروف ونائبه ميخائيل بوغدانوف ومسؤولين في مجلس النواب، جرى التطرق إلى الأوضاع في اليمن والعراق وسوريا وفلسطين وغيرها. وشدّد الطرفان على ضرورة تعزيز سبل التواصل بينهما، واعتماد قنوات اتصال مباشرة بين الحزب وموسكو، مع درس احتمال إقامة مكتب تمثيل للحزب في العاصمة الروسية.

في موسكو، يرى العسكر والسياسيون أن وجود حزب الله في سوريا ضروري أكثر من أي وقت مضى


الزيارة التي تمّت بناءً على دعوة روسية، بدت في جانب منها رسالة من موسكو إلى واشنطن مفادها أن «المحاولات القائمة للإيقاع بيننا وبين إيران أو حزب الله لن تنفع. ونحن لن نكتفي بالتنسيق مع إيران، بل نريد أن ننسّق مباشرة مع حزب الله». وسبق للروس أن أبلغوا جميع الدول الغربية والعربية والإقليمية والقوى التي يتواصلون معها بشأن لبنان، أن «حزب الله قوة رئيسية، ويمثل حالة حقيقية وكبيرة، وينبغي التعامل معه على هذا الأساس، ولا يمكن إنجاز أي تسوية من دون التشاور معه والاتفاق معه».
رسالة أخرى أرادت موسكو إيصالها إلى تل أبيب. صحيح أن روسيا تسعى إلى «التفاهم مع الجميع» بشأن سوريا، وثمة تفاهم بينها وبين «إسرائيل»، لكن هذا التفاهم لا يعني «أننا نساعد إسرائيل في ضرباتها. على العكس من ذلك، نحن ندين هذه الضربات، خصوصاً تلك التي تأتي من الأجواء اللبنانية. وما زلنا ملتزمين بمنع الطائرات الإسرائيلية من اختراق الأجواء السورية». من جهة، تؤكد موسكو، بناءً على معلوماتها الاستخبارية، أن الضربات الإسرائيلية على قوافل الأسلحة التي تُنقل إلى لبنان لم تحقق أهدافها، ولم تمنع حزب الله من إنجاز ما يريد إنجازه. ومن جهة أخرى، لا تمانع قيام معادلة ردع تؤدي إلى منع «إسرائيل» من الاعتداء على الأراضي السورية. وفي الأشهر المقبلة، ثمة ثلاثية تسعى موسكو إلى تأمين عوامل نجاحها في دمشق: العملية السياسية ربطاً بمحطة الانتخابات الرئاسية، وإعادة الإعمار، وعودة النازحين.
في لبنان، يُصرّ الروس على عدم التدخّل بالصورة التي تقوم بها دول أخرى. لا يتدخلون في تأليف الحكومة، ولا يشاركون في عملية التأليف، ولا يطالبون بحصص. صحيح أنهم مهتمون بإعادة إعمار المرفأ، على سبيل المثال، تماماً كاهتمامهم بمشاريع الطاقة، سواء تلك التي يشاركون فيها (التنقيب عن النفط والغاز في البحر، وخزانات الوقود في البداوي)، أو تلك التي يطمحون إلى المشاركة فيها مستقبلاً، كإعادة بناء مصفاة التكرير في طرابلس وتشغيلها. وهنا، يبدو لافتاً الاهتمام الروسي بالغاز في البحر، إذ إن التقديرات في بعض الأوساط المختصة في موسكو تتحدّث عن كميات هائلة من الغاز في البحرين السوري واللبناني. وفي حال صحّت تلك التقديرات، فمن غير المستبعد أن تنفّذ روسيا مشروعاً لإقامة أنابيب للغاز في شرق المتوسط، ينافس مشروع «منتدى غاز شرق المتوسط» (تشارك فيه مصر و«إسرائيل» وقبرص واليونان والأردن وفرنسا وإيطاليا)، لنقل الغاز إلى أوروبا عبر تركيا.
يمنياً، تبدو موسكو مهتمة بإيجاد تسوية تحفظ ماء وجه السعودية. في نظر حزب الله، مفتاح الحل هو وقف العدوان ورفع الحصار في آن واحد، و«أنصار الله» حريصون على عدم معاداة أحد، إلا متى بادر إلى قتالهم.

%d bloggers like this: