Soleimani: The Resistance Flag-Bearer

By Staff

Martyr Lieutenant Qassem Soleimani has always supported the Resistance and attended to its needs. He is an ultimate partner to both, the liberation of Lebanon on May 25th, 2000 and the defeat of the Wahhabi Daesh [Arabic acronym for “ISIS” / “ISIL”] group form vast parts of the region.  

Soleimani: The Resistance Flag-Bearer

The Iranian missile strike: an initial evaluation

The Saker

January 08, 2020

First, as always, a recap.

Turns out that the Iranian strikes were apparently very accurate, check out these photos:

This is interesting, because while I had some US ex-Colonel on idiot-box saying that most Iranian missiles either missed or landed in the desert.  Rah! Rah! Rah!  The US has THE BEST military in the GALAXY!!  We kick these ragheads back to their medieval reality, bla-bla-bla.

The reality is that this has been a very effective “proof of concept demonstration”.  Think like this:  the Iranians have super-accurate coordinates for every single building in the Green Zone.  What impact would you think a determined – non symbolic – missile strike on key US buildings in the Green Zone would have?  How about US forces in Kuwait and/or Saudi Arabia.

Keep in mind that the kind of missiles Iran used is very much an older, less capable, generation.  For example, as far as I know, these missiles have no final guidance capability (you may want to double/triple check this one).  Other ones do (that I am sure of).

Furthermore, it is becoming apparent that Iran had no intention of hitting US personnel, at least not deliberately.  So when the Idiot-in-Chief tweets “so far, so good” he is quite correct, but for all the wrong reasons.

I think of this first strike as a very serious WARNING SHOT which serves two purposes.

First, to show that the “54 targets in Iran” threat is an empty one: Iranians don’t care (for certain) and Pentagon planners probably don’t want it either (most likely).  So besides hot air, the Idiot-in-Chief produced nothing.

Second, to show to those in the US who actually believe their own silly propaganda about the US having THE BEST military in the history of the Galaxy that in terms of missiles, Iran is doing just fine, thank you.

Now, in all fairness, I will ALWAYS welcome ANY gesture which can avoid a massive total war.  There is no doubt in my mind that these events are marking the beginning of the end for the Empire.  The only real question is at what costs to the rest of mankind?  So while he is a narcissistic idiot for sure, and while he wrapped the key part of his statement in all sorts of delusional and dumb chest-thumping and flag waving, I have to admit that Trump did the right thing once again.  Destroying 54 (or even a SINGLE one) Iranian target would have resulted in an Iranian strike on Israel (now we know for sure that it would be an accurate one too!) which would have triggered a massive regional war.  We STILL are not there and while many will call me naive or stupid, I am grateful for ANYTHING which can delay or cancel any major (or even minor) war.  And while I do think that Trump is a narcissistic idiot, I will ALWAYS recognize when he does something either right or even “less bad than what he could have done”.

I will also add this: I consider the US servicemen in Iraq (and the result of the world, for that matter) as guilty of voluntarily signing up to a military which has never and will never fight any just war.  But that is not a sin deserving to be killed in a massive ball of fire, sorry.  In combat, yes, US soldiers are a legitimate target, and legally speaking (from the point of view of the Geneva Conventions and the International Law of War), the targets Iran hit were 100% legitimate since international law does NOT ban collateral damage, it only bans INTENTIONAL collateral damage.  US military personnel are, by definition, legal, legitimate, targets, but on a human level I feel sorry for them and I don’t wish them to pay for the crimes of their commanders (for whom I have ZERO sympathy or compassion).

I am actually quite happy that nobody died in these strikes.

If there were numerous casualties (as some sources report), then I have no problem admitting that this strike was both legal and ethical, but I would feel sad for every killed person (US or Iraqi).

Do the Shia Muslims care about the lives of their enemies?  Yes! They actually do.  Proof?  Just see how Hezbollah treated those Lebanese people who were collaborators with the infamous Israel proxy called the “SLA” (South Lebanon Army) and you will see for yourself.  Have their been Shia executed atrocities in the past? Sure!  Starting in Iraq were various Shia militias committed plenty of horrible atrocities.  But that happens to ANY party to a vicious conflict, and ESPECIALLY a civil war (just look at the butchery the Russian or US civil wars were!).  But the fact is that Shia leaders often emphasize both mercy, compassion and justice (Hassan Nasrallah specifically said that Hezbollah would not target US civilians; contrast that with the Idiot-in-Chief).

So how do we “score” this one?  Who won and who lost”

This all depends on your criteria.

Here are mine: anything which makes it easier for the US to remain in the Middle-East is a victory for the Empire and anything which makes it harder for the US to remain in the Middle-East is a victory for the rest of the planet.

I think that this criteria makes it rather easy to score this latest strike, don’t you?

One more thing: two more rocket strikes seemed to have landed near the Green Zone.  From the (rather minimal) info I have, these were rockets from some kind of MRLS and they were fired by LOCAL Iraqi forces, NOT from Iran.  This is both interesting and telling.  Why?

Because you can expect a dramatic increase in these kind of “hit and run” mini attacks which can’t achieve a real tactical advantage, but which are devastating for morale and which hugely decrease the mobility and ability to operate of the targeted forces.  Again, I invite you to re-apply my criteria above to evaluate the usefulness (or lack thereof) of these strikes.

Singing off for a few hours.  Kind regards

The Saker

PS: one more thing: the Idiot-in-Chief said that “Iran is standing down”.  Just remember that an other no less Idiot-in-Chief announced in 2006 that “Israel had defeated Hezbollah”.  This is an old US trick called “declare victory and leave”.  They have declared victory.  Good.  Now let’s see how long it will take them to get out of Iraq and the Syria and, much further down the road, from the entire Middle-East.

Defying the Proxy Narrative: Hezbollah an Autonomous Regional Player

By Heba Mourad

Source

Hezbollah an Autonomous Regional Player 58ffa

The West’s reductive understanding of the West Asia, as well as its mainstream narrative, is rarely surprising. When it comes to Iran, Hezbollah and the resistance axis in the region, theorists, pundits and journalists tend to have a positivist approach to the topic. Western propaganda and media misinformation adds to this and furthers their fundamental misconception of the nature of the region and these major players. Hezbollah, as portrayed by Western powers, governments, and media, is a ‘proxy’ of Iran; with subordination and control defining the essence of this relationship.

This faulty interpretation is rejected by a British-Lebanese professor at the Lebanese University, Amal Saad; a writer and political analyst who explains the raison d’être of Hezbollah and it being a regional power rather than a “lackey” or “instrument” to the Islamic Republic of Iran.

In a recent scholarly article titled Challenging the sponsor-proxy model: the Iran–Hezbollah relationship, Saad attempts to demystify the Iran-Hezbollah relationship and challenges the prevalent western conceptualization of a sponsor-proxy relationship, pointing out that dubbing the relationship as such is highly simplistic. She points out that Hezbollah is far better explained by the ecological concept of symbiosis for instance, than any sponsor-proxy model. She adopts Bertil Dunér’s (1981) proxy theory, which offers the most coherent set of criteria for the proxy concept, and applies his concept of power, which he treats as a necessary and sufficient condition for sponsor-proxy relations.

Saad underscores that the relationship between the Lebanese resistance movement and Iran is complex and multidimensional. A set of elements, according to the writer, contributes to shaping the nature of the relationship such as historic and cultural ties, shared ideology and strategic culture. Using Dunér’s proxy theory vis-à-vis Realist criteria, and referring to extensive interviews with Hezbollah officials and experts she had conducted over the years, the analyst explains Hezbollah’s autonomy while demonstrating that the relationship between the two is better understood as an interdependent symbiosis between close allies.

Saad points out that the sponsor-proxy model is problematic since it is reductive and conceptually inadequate for examining a multidimensional partnership like that of Hezbollah and Iran. The first shortcoming is the simplistic and reductive nature of the model that cuts ideational factors such as identity, norms, values, and discourses to crude material considerations like military and economic power and interests. Another shortcoming of the model, in the words of Saad, is “that it serves far less as a value-free academic term than a politically charged cudgel used to delegitimize and criminalize one’s enemies, in much the same way the terrorism label is used.”

The general double standards in Western narratives depict Iran’s allies such as Hezbollah as proxies, while they refrain from doing so when describing the Pro-American March 14 “movement” in Lebanon, which has strong political backing from the US and is heavily financed by Saudi Arabia. The western corporate and state-owned media, as well as US government’s liberal use of the term proxy, is also absent when describing the US-Saudi relationship, or even the Israeli regime which is highly dependent on the US military and non-military aid.

Using rhetorical strategies, the establishment of media manufactures unfounded accusations. According to the professor, they strengthen the interchangeability between the terms “sponsoring terrorism and sponsoring proxies”, both used to refer to Iran’s relationship with its regional allies.

Also, focusing on historical and cultural ties, shared ideology and the resultant symbiotic or organic nature of such alliances, Saad interrogates the close relationship between Iran and Hezbollah and assesses their relationship against Realist criteria of proxy relations.

Saad offers an alternative theoretical model for understanding asymmetrical relationships between state and non-state actors which goes beyond the prevailing proxy orthodoxy.

History and Ties

The writer examines the history of cultural, religious and political ties between Iran and the Shia of Lebanon so as to highlight the organic and symbiotic nature of the relationship between Iran and Hezbollah. She offers a perspective on how deep-seated historical, cultural, social and familial ties have bound the Shia of Iran to the Shia of Lebanon throughout history in a bidirectional movement, pointing out that transnational links can be traced back to the early 16th century when Shi’ite scholars from Jabal Amil in Lebanon went to Iran.

One of the most famous scholars was Nur-al-Din Karaki Ameli, a Lebanese Shia scholar who played a pivotal role at the Safavid court in opening a new path in the relationship between secular rulers and Shi’ite clerics.

In her article, Saad mentions only one of the most recent such scholars, the Iran-born Lebanese scholar Musa Sadr, who played a pivotal role in the proximity between Muslims and Christians in Lebanon and established the AMAL movement for the deprived people. After his disappearance and during the Israeli regime’s occupation of much of Lebanon Hezbollah departed from this organization.

Saad underscores the redefinition of the Shia thought by the founder of the Islamic Revolution Imam Khomeini. It “was not merely an ascribed cultural identity but a political one shaped by a historical sense of injustice and rejection of oppression and humiliation, as epitomized by Imam Hussein whose martyrdom served as a revolutionary paradigm for Shi’ite believers.”

In this context, the concept of power was synonymous with resistance to oppression and subordination, and the restitution of justice, freedom, dignity, and honor – principles which were deeply internalized by the leadership cadres who today constitute Hezbollah.

The writer notes that the pattern of influence remained reciprocal and relations between the two were far more collaborative than dictative, with also prominent Iranian figures such as Mustafa Chamran coming to Lebanon to aid Sadr in his work.

Although Iran played a crucial role in the creation of Hezbollah, the movement is by no means its brainchild, as is often claimed by proponents of its ‘proxy’ status. A far more accurate representation of the Iranian role in the resistance movement’s formation, in Saad’s words, is that the Islamic Republic served as a source of revolutionary inspiration and support for it, rather than a source of life.

A Shared ideology

Saad points out that shared ideology changes the nature of a relationship from one characterized by dependency and subjection, to one bound by solidarity and comradeship. She notes that the religious dimension of the religio-political ideology revolves around Shia Islamic creed as well as the theory of the Wilayat-al-Faqih advanced by Imam Khomeini, while the political principles underpinning it relates to anti-Zionism, anti-imperialism, and resistance to both.

Although resisting Israel was Hezbollah’s raison d’être, Saad quotes Hezbollah Deputy Secretary General Sheikh Naim Qassem as saying the Wilayat al-Faqih was ‘the reason for Hezbollah’s establishment’. She explains that Hezbollah’s commitment to the Faqih does not represent a political commitment to a national head of state but an intellectual commitment to a sacred Islamic figure and his successors, whose commands are considered ‘fixed truths’. Imam Khomeini’s unique interpretation of Islam was conceived as ‘the religion of militant individuals who are committed to truth and justice. It is the religion of those who desire freedom and independence. It is the school of those who struggle against imperialism. It is this revolutionary interpretation of Islam which resonated among the Shia in Lebanon who found in it a valuable vehicle for political mobilization against the Israeli project in Lebanon and Palestine. This also means converging around an anti-Zionist, anti-imperialist identity, which seeks to resist US, Israeli and Saudi Arabian machinations in the region, while reclaiming sovereignty over their lands and expelling foreign occupation.

The revolution was therefore at one and the same time a revolt against the monarchy and a war of liberation against US imperialism Israeli penetration, and indigenous values, as embodied by its key catchphrase: ‘Independence, freedom, Islamic Republic’ (Esteqlāl, āzādī, jomhūrī-ye eslāmī).

Hence, Hezbollah’s resistance to Israeli occupation after its 1982 invasion, its defensive warfare in the July War of 2006, and its intervention against extremists in Syria and Iraq post-2012 are also the product of shared strategic and ideological objectives with its Iranian ally.

Saad concludes that Hezbollah’s relationship with Iran is therefore governed by ideational and ideological norms and identities that operate on an entirely different level of analysis than that of a controlling benefactor and its compliant surrogate.

Iran and Hezbollah do not merely share common interests but more importantly, a common strategic culture, and could even be considered as one strategic community, says Saad. Such a strategic culture is ‘the sum of ideas, conditioned emotional responses, and patterns of habitual behavior that members of a national strategic community share’, according to Jack Snyder.

Iran’s security interests are identical to Hezbollah’s. All these points together constitute the basis of Iran’s and Hezbollah’s national security doctrine which treats so-called Takfiri-Jihadis and Israel as existential threats.

Power

According to Dunér’s schema, receiving material support may or may not be conducive to a proxy relationship, depending on whether or not there is ‘pressure to intervene’. Hence, an actor who receives material support but is not pressured to intervene is not classified as a proxy but as a ‘partner’. According to Saad, the absence of an ‘exercise of power’ on the part of Iran, vis-à-vis Hezbollah, renders the latter a partner and not a proxy. She notes that Hezbollah’s autonomy is also confirmed by outside observers who are hardly sympathetic to the organization, like Abbas Samii who contends that: ‘it is not accurate to describe Hezbollah as an Iranian or Syrian proxy. Indeed, it would be more useful to consider Hezbollah as an autonomous actor in the Lebanese context.’

Hezbollah as a regional power

The author says that Hezbollah’s expanding regional role and advanced military capabilities make it an invaluable strategic ally for Iran and has created a sense of mutual dependency whereby Iran has increasingly come to depend on Hezbollah’s regional clout and power. By that, it could be said that interdependence rather than subordination and control, defines the essence of this relationship.

Hezbollah’s ability to take on a transnational, conventional military role, coupled with the expansion of its domestic military activities to include conventional roles such as homeland security and counter-insurgency has transformed Hezbollah’s irregular Resistance forces into a hybridized Resistance army, rendering it a post-resistance movement, Saad says.

According to her, Hezbollah’s deployment of both ‘hard’ military power and ‘soft’ normative power throughout the region represents a new paradigm in international relations; it is a non-state actor which performs some of the central functions of the state, effectively making it a state within the Lebanese context, while also fulfilling some of the strategic imperatives of a regional power.

The 2006 July war, according to Saad was a ‘large and serious failure’ for Israel, and a ‘semi-military organization of a few thousand men resisted, for a few weeks, the strongest army in the Middle East’, by that Hezbollah shattered the myth of Israel’s military invincibility.

Hezbollah has honed its offensive capabilities and improved its fighting skills across a range of military terrains during the conflicts in Syria and Iraq while fighting Takfiri terrorism. Also, defending the region from extra-regional threats is another criterion for considering Hezbollah as a regional power.

The author concludes that despite Hezbollah’s transformation from a regional player into a regional power in its own right, it continues to be mislabeled as a proxy of Iran’s, even when, ironically, the very same observers of this relationship recognize Hezbollah’s regional standing and power.

Hassan Al-Laqqis: The Man Who Flew Over Palestine

Hassan Al-Laqqis: The Man Who Flew Over Palestine

By Khadija Shokor

It has been five years since the martyrdom of Hajj Hassan al-Laqqis. One of the advantages of having him as a leader was that he was a dreamer, but he also sought “with all his heart” to make his dream come true. He did it. He is a happy martyr, in the immediate sense, having achieved his dream, himself. Along with a group of dreamers, they had to fly away.

The following text will shed light on some of this man’s accomplishments. He, like all the martyrs of the resistance, had (some) of his achievements revealed after his departure. It was his departure that revealed his identity. One of his close friends retells memories of his life. We, the living who have been blessed with the pride the resistance created, owe it to him to honor his memory.

12 men from the “Israeli” Mossad made up the group assigned to a mission in the southern suburbs of Beirut on December 4, 2013. The objective was the assassination of Hezbollah leader Hassan al-Laqqis, who had become an extraordinary threat to the enemy.

Two members of the group were tasked with the actual killing, while the remaining 10 were assigned the roles of implementation, transport and surveillance. The degree of danger that the man’s work posed to the enemy was illustrated by the great deal of risk it undertook by sending this type of group.

“I arrived home and they told me that Hajj Hassan had called me minutes earlier. When I was about to get back to him, his personal bodyguard called me to tell me that Hajj’s concierge informed him that someone had shot Hajj Hassan,” a friend of the martyr recalled with anguish.

Five years have passed but the scenes from that night are still enshrined in this friend’s mind.

“I arrived to find him leaning on the door of the car, smiling as blood flowed from his head. I approached and found the pistol in his other hand,” he said.

The 50-year-old man gets on memory lane and goes back to the beginning of his relationship with Hajj Hassan.

“He returned from Africa in 1978, and since then we have been friends,” he recalls.

This friend insists that excellence was Hajj Hassan’s quality from a young age.

“He was exceptional on all levels. He excelled in his studies. He was refined in his manners. He was constantly ambitious. I remember when we finished high school, Hassan learned that there was an institute offering computer courses in Gefinor.  He was quick to register although this field was not known at the time. Ever since he was little, he liked to know everything new in technology and development. So much so that he preferred to buy new technological magazines and equipment rather than the basics,” the friend explains.

Anyone you ask about Hajj Hassan’s qualities would tell you, and Sayyed Hassan Nasrallah confirmed as much in his speech that he was “a hard and diligent worker, well mannered, loving and creative. He was one of the brilliant and distinctive minds of this resistance.”

Sayyed Nasrallah knew Hajj Hassan very well, describing him as “a beloved brother, companion and a close friend since we were young men in the city of Baalbek.”

Baalbek was the city where Sayyed settled after returning from Iraq in late 1979 to complete his studies at a seminary founded by Sayyed Abbas al-Musawi. At the time, the relationship between the two young men was centered around the mosque. Later, when Sayyed became the cultural leader of the Amal movement in Baalbek, Hajj Hassan joined him. That was in 1980. He stayed close to him during that period. When Sayyed’s life was threatened because of his positions and speeches he delivered on the platforms in Baalbek, Hajj Hassan insisted on accompanying him to those events. He also insisted on staying with him during that time in case of any security risks that Sayyed faced. Since then, their friendship grew, developed and never ceased.

One of Hajj Hassan’s friends recalls how they and a group of young men accompanied Sayyed on the day of the “Israeli” invasion, trying to mobilize people against the enemy. They passed through the city of Baalbek and chanted: Death to America ??and Death to “Israel”.

Not only were they friends, they were also partners when the resistance movement was born. Even when Sayyed moved to Beirut, the two kept in touch both professionally and socially.

The Iranian Revolutionary Guard came to Lebanon. It organized military training courses for young people to resist the occupation. Hajj Hassan rushed to join the first of these courses. Later, he worked at the Revolutionary Guards’ Staff Office. He was in direct contact with most Iranian officials as a result of his work. And because he had a quick-wit by nature, he quickly became fluent in Farsi. He saw most of Sayyed’s meetings with the leaders of the Revolutionary Guard. This gave him extensive experience and broader relationships.

With the “Israeli” occupation being limited to the South and western Bekaa and the jihadist operations concentrated there, Hajj Hassan made several field visits in those areas. He participated in qualitative operations, most notably the storming of “Israeli” positions, such as the one against the “Tomat Niha” site in 1988.

His fight against the enemy allowed him to notice some of the obstacles and problems the Mujahideen faced on the battlefield. He sought solutions to overcome these issues. He began working on the Signal Weapon, exerting a lot of effort to develop it through the introduction of modifications. The effects of these modifications emerged in the communication system – both wireless and wired.  He also paid attention to the latest technological developments in security and military spheres.

He did not spare any opportunity to take advantage of everything new that can benefit the resistance. For this purpose he always sought to bring as much of the advanced technology as possible and make use of it for the resistance. He became the primary reference for technology to the entire resistance leadership. He was a diligent and hard worker. He participated in choosing the resistance’s missile arsenal and developed it. He expanded his research in this field until he became the first advisor to the military leadership every time it was presented with new weapons.

Later, the challenges grew, especially after the resistance grew stronger and the enemy’s precautionary methods intensified. He continued to propose ideas and solutions to face the challenges on land and the difficulties of land barriers, until he began to think about how to use the sky to face the difficulties on land.

“I used to make fun of him,” says Hajj Hassan’s friend. “Every time I entered, I would find him trying to assemble wooden pieces and install them on a small motor. I would ask him: Do you expect these pieces to take off? He would answer me with confidence:

it will not only take off, I will make it capture images. You don’t know. I might make it carry a weapon in the future.”

That idea was born in 1988. That was when the ambitious young man, who did not believe in the existence of “impossible”, decided to breach the sky.

He first started from his small room. He bought a lathe, collected simple motors, pasted them together with wooden pieces, and then tried to make them fly.

One, two, dozens of failed attempts. But finally he succeeded in making one of those designs fly. With his humble but persuasive manner, he managed to turn this idea into a conviction among the leaders and officials. This would later be known as the Air Force Unit of the Islamic Resistance.

It was not an easy journey. Every achievement cost Hajj Hassan and his team a lot of studying, planning, programming and working day and night. They were keen on readiness and development because they believed that the technological battle with the enemy would not end. This task cost a lot of time, effort and even souls. The names of the pioneers of that stage were not revealed except for those who were martyred, including Hajj Hassan, Hussein Ayoub and Jamil Skaf. The latter two excelled in this field, and both were martyred while they were taking part in developing it.

Sacrifice, for them, was not a hindrance. It was an incentive to continue. Therefore, Hajj Hassan continued to work on the development of drones. For this purpose he visited the aircraft factories in Iran. He attended many of the workshops there and met with many specialists in this field to benefit from their experience in developing domestic Iranian aircraft.

He never stopped looking for new developments worldwide in a bid to take advantage of any advances in his field.

Among the “Israelis” his work earned Hajj Hassan al-Laqqis the label of an officer in the existing war of minds against the resistance. This drove the “Israelis” to attempt to assassinate him in the early 1990s. A bomb was planted near his home in Baalbek, according to the martyr’s friend.

“He was returning to his house, and could not overtake a bulldozer driving in front of him. And then he turned right to overtake it. At that moment, a large explosion was heard on the other side,” the friend said.

The enemy was wrong to think that the assassination attempts would weaken al-Laqqis’ determination. After that incident, he returned to work in both the missile and aerial fields with greater focus, expanding the realm even further.

After the “Israeli” defeat in Lebanon in 2000, his work broadened. The drones or what was known as the air force unit had several factories. He managed them with a team he chose and trained carefully. Sayyed Nasrallah visited those factories periodically, being updated on their developments. The leaders of operations soon demanded the participation of these aircraft in their military operations due to their contribution in guaranteeing success.

Over the past years, the aircraft became the resistance’s powerful eye in the sky, both before and during the military operations. This was only some of what Hajj Hassan planned. The effects of this activity emerged clearly during the July 2006 war. At that time, the enemy returned to stalk this commander, who had worried them for many years. The “Israelis” took advantage of the outbreak of the war to try to assassinate him again. The “Israelis” confirmed this themselves.

“I was busy with my work,” said his close friend. “Hajj Imad Mughniyeh called me and told me that he had just seen Hajj Hassan on television during a live broadcast after a building had been destroyed in Shiyah. He asked me to go to him and tell him to leave the area.”

The friend continues, “when I arrived, I learned that he was trying to search the rubble for his 18-year-old son Ali, who was in the building. The martyr later told me that he went to the building to deliver a bag to his son. But shortly after he left, the “Israeli” aircraft struck the building and destroyed it.” His son was martyred.

“He was dauntless despite the loss,” his friend said. “He left the place and continued working hard and firm. We even noticed this firmness when we accompanied him to see his martyred son in the hospital three days after the aggression. He quickly bid him farewell and went back to his work with determination until the end of the war.”

The war ended, and al-Laqqis’ ghost kept haunting the “Israelis” who could not weaken his determination, not even by killing his son or destroying his home. He immediately returned, even before rebuilding his home, to pursue his work in airspace.

After the July 2006 war, work on drones was accelerated in light of the outcome of the war. Hajj took advantage of the scientific developments and the resistance’s existing capabilities to find new models and meet the emerging needs after the war.

The drones did not only operate within the resistance in Lebanon. In Syria, for example, they were credited with assisting most of the confrontations that took place. The al-Qusayr battle is one of the most prominent pieces of evidence.

The martyr’s friend tells us that the latter showed him a video how these drones were operating during the battle. They took pictures, which were directly transmitted to the command room. The command room in return contacted the field group and informed it about the details of the place and the positions of the militants. The drones reduced the loss of lives and helped in the success of the operation as a result of the accumulation of knowledge.

The martyr’s friend added,

“after the battle of al-Qusayr, the martyr informed me of a new plan, which aimed at arming the aircraft, enabling us to use it in filming and bombing. He reminded me of how he told me about this goal since the beginning.”

“Indeed, after a short period of time, he returned and played a video showing the success of a maneuver in which this plan was carried out,” the friend added.

Hajj Hassan was martyred, but his thoughts, approach and the fruits of his labor live on, with the same strength and determination. His team continued to make advances in his work and achievements. The effects of this work spread beyond Syria. Until today, Hajj Hassan has not really been known. Not by friend or foe. But some of his achievements will be revealed in the coming war, through the air force and the Islamic Resistance’s drones when the headlines read: “the resistance’s drones attack “Israel”.”

Source: Al-Akhbar Newspaper, Translated by website team

حسّان اللقيس: الرجل الذي حلّق… فوق فلسطين

خديجة شكر

السبت 8 كانون الأول 2018

خمس سنوات على استشهاد الحاج حسّان اللقيس. ميزة هذا القائد أنّه كان حالماً، لكن أيضاً، مع ميزة إضافيّة، أنّه كان يسعى «بكلّ روحه» لأن يُصبح حلمه حقيقة. لقد فعلها. هو شهيد سعيد، بالمعنى المباشر هنا، إذ حقّق حلمه، بنفسه، ومعه ثلّة مِن الحالمين أيضاً، فكان لهم أن يُحلّقوا… بعيداً. في النص الآتي بعض مِن آثار هذا الرجل، الذي، كسائر شهداء المقاومة، لم تُكشف (بعض) آثاره إلا بعد رحيله، بل لم يُعرَف إلا برحيله.

هنا بعض من ذكريات صديق مقرّب له، تحكي بعض سيرته، وذلك كبعض مِن حقّه علينا، نحن الأحياء، الذي نعمنا وننعم بعزّة صنعتها لنا تلك المقاومة.

12 رجلاً من «الموساد» الإسرائيلي، هم طاقم المجموعة التي أوكلت إليها المهمة، ليل 3 – 4 كانون الأول 2013، في الضاحية الجنوبية لبيروت. الهدف: اغتيال القيادي في حزب الله حسان اللقيس، الذي بات خطراً، فوق العادة، على العدو.

تولى اثنان من أفراد المجموعة مهمة القتل المباشر، بينما توزعت أدوار التنفيذ والنقل والمراقبة على العشرة الباقين. مستوى الخطر الذي بات يحيط بالعدو جراء عمل الرجل ودوره، يوضحه مستوى المجازفة التي أقدم عليها بإرساله لهذا النوع من المجموعات. يتذكر صديق للشهيد، بشيء من اللوعة: «وصلتُ إلى المنزل، فأخبروني أنّ الحاج حسان اتصل بي منذ دقائق. وحين كنت أهمّ بمعاودة الاتصال به، هاتفني مرافقه الشخصي ليخبرني أنّ ناطور البناية التي يسكنها الحاج اتصل به ليعلمه أنّ أحداً ما قد أطلق النار على الحاج حسان». خمس سنوات مرت، ولا يغيب عن خاطر هذا الصديق ذلك المشهد: «وصلت لأجده مستنداً إلى باب السيارة، مبتسماً وخيوط الدم تسيل من رأسه… اقتربت فوجدت المسدس في يده الأخرى».

هو صاحب فكرة الطائرات المسيّرة عن بُعد التي أسست لوحدة القوة الجويّة في حزب الله

تعود الذاكرة بالرجل الخمسيني إلى بداية علاقته بالحاج حسان: «عاد من أفريقيا، في العام 1978، ومنذ ذلك الوقت ونحن أصدقاء». يجزم هذا الصديق أن التميّز كان عنوان الحاج حسان منذ الصغر: «كان متميزاً على جميع الأصعدة، إنْ كان بتفوقه العلميّ، أو بدماثة أخلاقه، أو بطموحه الدائم التجدد. أذكر، حين أنهينا دراستنا الثانوية، يوم علم حسان بوجود معهد في الجيفينور لدراسة الكومبيوتر. سارع إلى التسجيل، مع أن هذا المجال لم يكن معروفاً حينها، إلا أنه كان يحب الاطلاع على كل ما هو جديد ضمن اختصاصات التكنولوجيا والتطور منذ صغره. لدرجة أنه كان يفضل شراء المجلات التكنولوجية والمعدات الجديدة، على حساب حاجاته الخاصة».

يُخبرك كل من تسأله عن صفات الحاج حسان تلك، ويؤكد هذا الكلام السيد حسن نصرالله حين وصفه في خطابه: «هو العامل المُجد والدؤوب… والمؤدّب الخلوق والمحب، وأيضاً المبدع، أحد العقول المميّزة واللامعة في هذه المقاومة».

السيد نصرالله الذي عرف الحاج حسان بحق، فقال عنه: «كان أخاً وحبيباً وأنيساً وقريباً وصديقاً منذ أن كنا شباباً صغاراً في مدينة بعلبك». بعلبك، تلك المدينة التي كانت مستقر السيد حين عاد من العراق، في أواخر العام 1979، ليكمل الدراسة في الحوزة التي أسسها السيد عباس الموسوي هناك. يومها كانت العلاقة بين الشابين «علاقة مسجد». لاحقاً، وحين أصبح السيد هو المسؤول الثقافي لحركة أمل في بعلبك، انضم إليه الحاج حسان. كان ذلك في العام 1980. بقي قريباً منه في تلك الفترة. يوم وصل تهديد للسيد بالقتل، جراء مواقفه وكلامه على منابر بعلبك، أصر الحاج حسان على مرافقته إلى المناسبات التي بقي يلقي فيها السيد تلك الكلمات. كما أصر على النوم عنده في تلك الفترة، تحسباً لأي عمل أمني كان يمكن أن يتعرّض له السيد. ومذاك توطدت أواصر هذه الصداقة التي استمرت وتطورت ولم تنقطع بعدها. يذكر أحد أصدقاء الحاج حسان كيف رافقا السيد مع مجموعة أخرى من الشباب يوم بدء الاجتياح الإسرائيلي، محاولين تعبئة الناس وتحريضهم ضد العدو، وذلك بالقيام بجولات في أنحاء مدينة بعلبك. كانوا يُردّدون: «الموت لأمريكا» و«الموت لإسرائيل». لم يكونا صديقين فحسب، بل كانا شريكين في الانطلاقات الأولى لحركة المقاومة، وحتى حين انتقل السيد إلى مدينة بيروت بقي الشابان على تواصلهما الودي والعملي.

استشهد ابن اللقيس عام 2006 في المبنى الذي قصفته الطائرات الإسرائيلية في الشيّاح

مع وصول الحرس الثوري الإيراني إلى لبنان، وتنظيمه دورات عسكرية للشباب بهدف مقاومة الاحتلال، سارع الحاج حسّان للانضمام إلى أولى تلك الدورات. لاحقاً، انتقل للعمل في مكتب قيادة الأركان التابع للحرس الثوري. كان على تماس مباشر مع معظم المسؤولين الإيرانيين نتيجة عمله، ولأنه بطبعه كان سريع البداهة، اكتسب اللغة الفارسية بطلاقة وبسرعة. كان يشهد، بحكم موقعه العملي، معظم لقاءات السيد مع قيادات الحرس، وذلك ما أكسبه خبرة واسعة وعلاقات أوسع.

مع انحسار الاحتلال الإسرائيلي في الجنوب والبقاع الغربي، وتركز العمليات الجهادية هناك، كان للحاج حسان عدة مشاركات ميدانية في تلك المناطق. شارك في عمليات نوعية، أبرزها اقتحام مواقع إسرائيلية، كاقتحام موقع «تومات نيحا» (عام 1988).

قتاله للعدوّ في ساحات الجهاد جعله يلحظ بعض العقبات والمشاكل، التي كانت تواجه المجاهدين في الميدان، فما كان منه إلا أن سعى لاجتراح الحلول لتخطيها. بدأ من سلاح الإشارة، الذي عمل جاهداً لتطويره من خلال استحداث تعديلات برزت آثارها في المنظومتين السلكية واللاسلكية (الاتصالات)، مروراً باهتمامه بكل ما استجد في عالم التكنولوجيا الأمنية منها والعسكرية، وذلك مِن خلال اطلاعه الدائم على التطور المتسارع حول العالم. لم يكن يوفر أي فرصة لاستغلال كل جديد يمكنه أن يفيد المقاومة. لهذا الهدف سعى دوماً لاستقدام ما أمكنه مِن التكنولوجيا المتطورة، ووضعها بتصرف الجسم المقاوم، حتى بات لاحقاً هو «المرجع التكنولوجي» الأول لدى جميع قيادات المقاومة. هو صاحب العمل الدؤوب، كمشارك، في انتخاب الترسانة الصاروخية وتطويرها لدى المقاومة. توسع في بحوثه على هذا الصعيد، حتى بات المستشار الأول لدى القيادة العسكرية في كل مرة يعرض عليها أسلحة جديدة.
لاحقاً، كبرت التحديات، خصوصاً بعد أن استعرت المقاومة واشتدت أساليب العدوّ الاحترازية. دأب على اقتراح الأفكار وإيجاد الحلول لمواجهة تحديات البرّ وصعوبات الموانع الأرضيّة، إلى أن بدأ بالتفكر في كيفية الاستفادة من السماء لمواجهة صعوبات الأرض. «كنت أسخر منه»، يقول صديق الحاج حسان، قبل أن يُتابع: «في كل مرة أدخل عليه وأجده يحاول تركيب القطع الخشبية وتثبيتها بموتور صغير، كنت أسأله: هل تتوقع أن هذه القطع ستستطيع الإقلاع؟ كان يجيبني ضاحكاً، إنما بكل ثقة: لن تقلع فقط، سوف أجعلها تُصوّر، وما يدريك قد أجعلها تحمل سلاحاً في ما بعد».

إذاً، تلك الفكرة انطلقت بالأساس في عام 1988. كان ذلك حينما قرر الشاب الطموح، الذي لم يكن يؤمن بوجود «المستحيل» أو «غير الممكن»… أن يقتحم السماء.
بدأ أولاً من غرفته الصغيرة، اشترى مخرطة، وكان يجمع «موتورات» بسيطة، يلصق بها قطعاً خشبية، ثم يُحاول أن يجعلها تطير.

محاولة، محاولتان، عشرات المحاولات الفاشلة، وينجح أخيراً في جعل إحدى تلك التصاميم تُحلّق. هنا، وبأسلوبه المتواضع المقنع المتين، استطاع أن يحوّل هذه الفكرة إلى قناعة عند القيادات والمسؤولين، قبل أن يُترجم ذلك إلى ما سيُعرف لاحقاً بـ«وحدة القوة الجويّة للمقاومة الإسلاميّة».

هذا المسار لم يكن سهلاً، فكل إنجاز فيه كان يكلّف الحاج حسان، ومعه فريق العمل الذي شكّله لاحقاً، الكثير من الدراسة والتخطيط والبرمجة والعمل في الليل والنهار. كانوا يحرصون على الجاهزية والاستعداد والتطوير، ذلك لأنهم آمنوا بأن المعركة التكنولوجية مع العدو لن تنتهي. كلّف هذا العمل الكثير من التضحية بالوقت والجهد، وصولاً إلى الأنفس. لم تُكشَف أسماء رواد تلك المرحلة، باستثناء الذين استشهدوا منهم، وهم، إلى جانب الحاج حسان، حسين أيوب وجميل سكاف. هذان كانا من الذين برعوا في ذاك المجال، وكانت شهادتهما وهما يشاركان في تطويره.

التضحية، عند هؤلاء، لم تكن عائقاً. كانت حافزاً للاستمرار، ولذا، تابع الحاج حسان العمل على تطوير الطائرات المُسيّرة عن بُعد. لهذا الهدف زار معامل الطائرات في إيران. حضر العديد من المناورات هناك، والتقى الكثير من الإيرانيين المختصين في هذا الشأن، كي يستفيد من خبراتهم لتطوير النُسخ التي كان توصل إليها. لم يتوقف يوماً عن البحث عن كل جديد، على المستوى العالمي، للاستفادة من أي تطور تكنولوجي يخصّ عمله.

هذا العمل دفع بالإسرائيليين إلى أن يعدّوا الحاج حسان اللقيس أحد ضباط حرب الأدمغة، القائمة، على أكثر من صعيد، بينهم وبين المقاومة. هذا ما جعل الإسرائيلي يحاول اغتياله في مطلع التسعينات. يومها، جرى زرع عبوة قرب منزله في بعلبك، بحسب صديق الشهيد، حيث «كان عائداً إلى منزله، واعترضت طريقه جرافة، فأراد تجاوزها، لكنه لم يستطع. ثم اتجه يميناً، بهدف تخطيها، وفي تلك اللحظة دوّى انفجار كبير عند الناحية الأخرى». أخطأ العدو حين اعتقد أن محاولات اغتيال اللقيس ستضعف عزيمته، إذ عاد بعد تلك الحادثة لمتابعة عمله على الصعيدين، الصاروخي والجوي، بقوة أكثر، مع توسعة الأطر أكثر.

بعد الاندحار الإسرائيلي عن لبنان، عام 2000، أصبح عمله أوسع وصار للطائرات المسيّرة عن بُعد، أو ما يعرف بوحدة القوة الجوية، عدة معامل يديرها مع الفريق الذي اختاره ودرّبه بعناية. كان السيد نصرالله يزور تلك المعامل في شكل دوري، فيطلع على تطوراتها، كما إن قادة العمليات باتوا يطالبون بإشراك تلك الطائرات في عملياتهم العسكرية، وذلك لما كانت تعود به من فائدة على مستوى نجاح العمليات.

على مدى كل تلك السنين، كانت الطائرات المُسيّرة عن بُعد هي العين الجوية النافذة للمقاومة، قبيل أعمالها العسكرية وخلالها، ولم يكن هذا إلا بعض ما كان يُخطط له الحاج حسان. ظهرت آثار هذا النشاط بوضوح خلال حرب تموز 2006. آنذاك عاد العدو ليتربص بهذا القائد، الذي أقلقه لسنوات طوال، فاستغل اندلاع الحرب ليحاول اغتياله مجدداً. لقد ورد ذلك على لسان الإسرائيليين. يقول صديقه المقرّب: «كنت منهمكاً في عملي. هاتفني الحاج عماد مغنية ليخبرني أنه رأى للتو الحاج حسان على التلفاز، خلال النقل المباشر إثر تدمير مبنى في منطقة الشياح، وطلب مني الذهاب إليه وإخباره ضرورة ابتعاده عن المكان». ويتابع الصديق: «علمت حين وصلت أنه كان يحاول البحث بين الأنقاض عن ولده علي (18 سنة)، الذي كان موجوداً في المبنى. قال لي الشهيد لاحقاً إنه كان حضر إلى المبنى لإيصال حقيبة لولده، لكن وبعيد مغادرته المكان أغار الطيران الإسرائيلي على المبنى فدمره». استشهد ابنه. يذكر محدّثنا: «كان جسوراً على رغم الفقد، غادر المكان وعاد يتابع عمله المطلوب بصلابة وقوة. لاحظنا هذه الصلابة حتى حين رافقناه لرؤية ولده الشهيد في المستشفى، بعد ثلاثة أيام من العدوان، فودّعه سريعاً عائداً إلى عمله بعزم حتى نهاية الحرب».

حاول الإسرائيليون اغتياله بزرع عبوة في مطلع التسعينات وأخرى أثناء الحرب عام 2006

انتهت الحرب، وبقي شبح اللقيس يلاحق الإسرائيلي الذي لم يستطع لا بقتله لولده، ولا بتدميره لمنازله أن يثبط ولو جزءاً من عزيمة هذا الرجل. فقد عاد فوراً، وحتى قبل إعادة بناء منزله، لمتابعة عمله في المجال الجوي. بعد حرب تموز 2006، أخذ العمل في الطائرات المسيّرة عن بُعد منحىً تصاعدياً في ضوء نتائج الحرب. فعمل الحاج مستفيداً من التطورات العلمية والقدرات الموجودة بيد المقاومة ليخلص إلى نماذج جديدة تلبي الحاجات المستجدة بعد الحرب.

لم يقتصر عمل الطائرات المسيّرة عن بُعد على المقاومة في لبنان، ففي سوريا مثلاً، كان لها الفضل في معظم المواجهات التي حصلت. وتعدّ معركة القصير من أبرز الشواهد على ذلك.
يخبرنا صديق الشهيد أن الأخير عرض عليه بعد معركة القصير فيلماً يظهر كيف كانت تلك الطائرات تعمل في أثناء المعركة، حيث كانت تصور، فتنتقل الصورة مباشرة إلى غرفة القيادة، والتي كانت بدورها تتواصل مع المجموعة الميدانية، فتطلعهم على تفاصيل المكان وتكشف لهم أماكن تواجد المسلحين. كان ذلك يخفف من زهق الأرواح ويساعد على نجاح العملية نتيجة تراكم المعرفة. يضيف صديق الشهيد: «بعد معركة القصير، أطلعني الشهيد على مخطط جديد، يهدف إلى تسليح الطائرة مما يمكننا أن نستعملها في التصوير ثم القصف. وذكرني كيف أنه أخبرني بهذا الهدف في البدايات». يتابع صديق الشهيد: «وفعلاً، بعد مدة بسيطة، عاد فعرض لي فيديو يظهر نجاح المناورة التي نفذ فيها هذا المخطط».

استشهد الحاج حسان، لكن فكره ونهجه وثمار عمله استمر حتى يومنا هذا، بالقوة والعزيمة ذاتهما، وتابع الفريق تطوير أعماله وإنجازاته. وامتدت آثار هذا العمل بعد سوريا. وحتى الآن، لم يُعرف الحاج حسّان على حقيقته لا من قبل العدوّ ولا الصديق، لكن ستكشف بعض آثاره في الحرب المقبلة، من خلال القوة الجويّة والمسيّرات التابعة للمقاومة الإسلامية، حين تتصدر وسائل الإعلام مقولة «طيران المقاومة يغير على… إسرائيل».

«Israel» Admits It Can’t Deter Hezbollah

«Israel» Admits It Can’t Deter Hezbollah

By Staff, Ynet

“Israeli” military officials have admitted that the Lebanese resistance group Hezbollah has beefed up its presence along the border with the occupied Palestinian territories.

The “Israelis” admitted that although the “Israeli” Occupation Forces [IOF] have destroyed alleged Hezbollah cross-border tunnels, the Resistance group’s preparation for a war with the “Israeli” entity has not been undermined.

“We have a very serious enemy,” said Col. Roy Levy, the “Israeli” entity’s Northern Border Brigade commander, during a tour of the area Thursday. According to him, Hezbollah’s main focus is to entrench itself along the border area and “plan to attack us.”

Levy said he has seen no changes in the group’s behavior. “They have a lot of cameras, a lot of forces along the border, camouflaged,” he said.

The “Israeli” entity has waged a month-long aggression against Lebanon in 2006. The most recent breach to Lebanese sovereignty has been last August, when “Israel” sent an explosive spy drone to Beirut’s Dahiyeh [the southern suburb] in an attempt to target Hezbollah officials, as reported by local media outlets.

The entity has also acknowledged carrying out scores of airstrikes in neighboring Syria, alleging many of them believed to have been aimed at Iranian weapons shipments bound for Hezbollah.

The “Israeli” entity considers Hezbollah to be its most immediate threat, saying the group has amassed an arsenal of some 130,000 rockets and missiles capable of striking virtually anywhere in the entity. More recently, it has accused the group of trying to import or develop guided missiles.

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National Interest: In 2006, Lebanese Leaders Aspired That «Israel» Would Defeat Hezbollah

By Staff, Agencies

In an article posted by the American magazine the National Interest, a number of classified documents leaked by Wikileaks revealed that during the 2006 “Israeli” war on Lebanon, the “Lebanese defense ministry and government cooperated and coordinated with the US government to curb the power of Hezbollah”.

Image result for ‫الياس المر حرب تموز‬‎

It further added that, “leaders from across the country’s confessions virtually aspired that ‘Israel’ would defeat Hezbollah”.

Based on the article, Druze leader Walid Jumblatt stated in a document dated July 17, 2006, that

Image result for Walid Jumblatt with feltman

“although March 14 must call for a cease-fire in public, it is hoping that ‘Israel’ continues its military operations until it destroys Hizballah’s [Hezbollah] military capabilities . . . Then the LAF [Lebanese Armed Forces] can replace the ‘IDF’ [‘Israeli’ Occupation Forces] once a cease-fire is reached.”

It further added, a document dated August 7, 2006, revealed that Christian leaders meeting with then-Ambassador Jeffrey Feltman and Assistant Secretary Charles Welch argued that

“The Lebanese government will need to be in a position of strength to deal with Hizballah [Hezbollah] once the conflict is over . . . To this end, they would support a continuation of the ‘Israeli’ bombing campaign for a week or two if this were to diminish seriously Hizballah’s strength on the ground.”

Image result for ‫الياس المر حزب الله‬‎

الياس المر قدم النصح لاسرائيل لغزو لبنان وتدمير حزب الله

In the meantime, as revealed by a document dated August 8, 2006, then-Defense Minister Elias Murr, confident about a rapid LAF deployment, “stated clearly that the LAF was prepared to hit back at Hizballah if they attempted to fire at Israel or tried to draw Israeli fire by placing launchers near to LAF positions”, the National Interest article cited.

The article added that a document on the same day revealed that Murr

“claimed that LAF forces had stopped and seized a truck carrying Hezbollah missiles.”

These documents, according to the National Interest, show that the LAF did not cooperate with Hezbollah; rather it demonstrated the LAF’s indispensable and alternative force to stability and Hezbollah.

The article added,

“No sooner, the litmus test of the imperative need of the LAF took place in 2007 when a Salafi-jihadi organization Fath al-Islam took over the Palestinian refugee camp of Nahr al-Bared. Lacking equipment and ammunition, the LAF, despite its vigorous spirit, was virtually incapacitated”.

The National Interest gave credit to what it called “a swift American supply of weapons and ammunition” to the LAF which “prepared to storm the camp despite a warning from Hezbollah’s leader [His Eminence Sayyed] Hassan Nasrallah that the camp is a ‘red line’”. Following bloody pitched battles the LAF reclaimed the initiative against and defeated Fath al-Islam. The battle cost the LAF 166 soldiers and dozens wounded. This was the high price that the LAF had to pay.

The article concluded,

“Still, it was a price that elevated the LAF to a popular level beyond reproach or sectarian politicking. Since then, seeing the benefit of the LAF as a force against Al-Qaeda and its sister ‘jihadi’ organizations, Washington began to systematically equip the LAF with defensive weapons and train some of its officers”.

Image result for jeffrey feltman Elias Murr

Hezbollah MP: Soft War We’re Witnessing Now Equal to July War, We’ll Emerge Victorious

MP Mohammad Raad

December 4, 2019

Head of Hezbollah’s Loyalty to Resistance parliamentary bloc Mohammad Raad said Wednesday the soft war the resistance is witnessing nowadays is equal to July War, stressing that as in 2006, “we will emerge victorious.”

In a local ceremony in the southern town of Jibshit, MP Raad said the “economic situation in the country is bitter,” calling for cooperation in a bid to face the harsh conditions of the country.

“The situation requires more cooperation in a bid to heal the people’s sufferings. We shall work together as a united body,” MP Raad said, hoping that the crisis will not last long.

“Our destiny is to go ahead with our steadfastness. And I tell you that what we are witnessing now is a soft war that is equal to July War. And as we emerged victorious in 2006 we will do so in this war,” the Hezbollah MP stressed.

 

Source: Al-Manar English Website

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