Justice in Lebanon!!!!

 

القضاء بأمر السياسة: أي القاضيين يكذب… أيُّهما مُرتهن؟

حُكم سماحة ظالم إذا ما قورن بأحكام كُثر شاركوا في سفك الدم (هيثم الموسوي)

رضوان مرتضى

شُدِّد الحكم على المتّهم ميشال سماحة أمس. ضوعفت محكوميته ثلاث مرات. بدا القرار صادراً عمّن تهيّب ضغط الساسة والشارع. صدر حُكم مبرم فقُضي الأمر: القضاء في أمر السياسة. والقضاة موظّفون يتهيّبون الصوت المرفوع

رضوان مرتضى

حُكِم على الوزير السابق ميشال سماحة بالسجن ١٣ سنة. فسخت محكمة التمييز العسكرية الحُكم الأول بالسجن أربع سنوات ونصف سنة، وضاعفت مدته ثلاث مرّات، في حُكمٍ نهائي مُبرم لا يقبل النقض أو المراجعة، إلا عبر نافذة وحيدة وغير مضمونة.

ارتأت المحكمة إعادة سماحة إلى السجن، مع «ضمانة مطلقة» بعدم خروجه قبل ٧٨ شهراً (تُضاف إلى ٣٩ شهراً قضاها وفق الحُكم الأول. وبالتالي، يُصبح المجموع ١١٧ شهراً خلف القضبان). على جري العادة، رضخ «حُماة العدالة» لضغوط السياسة. وبات كلُّ من يُنظّر باستقلالية القضاء في لبنان، إمّا متعامياً أو كاذباً أو مجنوناً.

في القضية الراهنة، لا يختلف اثنان على أنّ سماحة ارتكب جرماً موصوفاً. ومن توافرت النية الجرمية لديه للقيام بعمل إرهابي لقتل أبرياء، ثم حال حائل، خارج عن إرادته، دون تنفيذه، هو قاتل مع وقف التنفيذ.

لكن يحق لنا أن نسأل: من نُصدّق؟ وأي القاضيين يكذب؟ أيُّهما مُرتهن؟ العميد خليل إبراهيم الذي حكم بسجن سماحة أربع سنوات ونصف سنة، أم القاضي طاني لطّوف الذي رفع الحكم إلى ١٣ سنة (بعد تغيير معظم أعضاء الهيئة)؟

هامش الخطأ مقبول بنسبة ١٠ أو ٢٠ في المئة، لكن هل يُعقل أن يكون الفارق ثلاثة أضعاف؟ هل ضُغِط على إبراهيم لتخفيف الحُكم أم أُلزِم لطوف بتشديده؟ هل شُفي غليل وزير العدل أشرف ريفي الحائر بين الاستقالة والعودة أم تلك قصةٌ أُخرى؟ وهل من صفقة؟ إذا خضع إبراهيم للضغوط، فذلك يعني أنّ كثيرين ممكن حكمهم مظلومون. وإذا خاض لطوف مع الخائضين، فذلك يعني أن مصير الأحكام السابقة مشكوكٌ فيه أيضاً. مهما قيل، لن يُصدّق أحد أنّ حكم سماحة قضائي بحت. ومقولة صيف وشتاء تحت سقفٍ واحد تنطبق هنا. فالمجرم سماحة الذي نقل متفجرات مع وجود نية جرمية لديه لاستخدامها ضد أبرياء، لا يختلف عن «الأمير الشرعي» في «كتائب عبد الله عزّام» جمال دفتردار الذي حُكم بالسجن سبع سنوات. ودفتردار هذا يشغل منصب المفتي في تنظيم نفّذ تفجيرات أوقعت عشرات الضحايا من اللبنانيين (تفجيرات الرويس والسفارة الإيرانية والمستشارية الإيرانية).

والمجرم سماحة لا يختلف عن «قادة المحاور» في باب التبّانة الذين سبّبوا إزهاق حياة المئات وتشريد المئات من أبناء طرابلس. لكن هؤلاء لم تتجاوز محكوميتهم أربع سنوات، لأنّ ولاتهم من أمراء السياسة هكذا أرادوا.

حُكم سماحة ظالم إذا ما قورن بأحكام كُثر شاركوا في سفك الدم البريء، وبأحوال المتورطين الذي تحميهم مظلّة السياسة. بدءاً من مدير المشتريات لدى «الست» بهية الحريري، الذي آوى أحمد الأسير مع مسلحين قتلوا جنود الجيش، وصولاً إلى المستشار الأمني للرئيس سعد الحريري، العقيد المتقاعد عميد حمود، الذي يعلم القاصي والداني دوره الرئيسي في معارك طرابلس وعلاقته بالأحداث الأمنية ومهنته كتاجر سلاح ومهرّب، لكن المحظي دوماً محمي. ماذا عن جمانة حميد التي ضُبطت بالجرم المشهود تنقل سيارة مفخخة، هل من العدل أن تخرج في صفقة تبادل؟

حُكم سماحة ظالم إذا ما قورن بتسهيل فرار رفعت عيد في جبل محسن. وبتسوية تُقرّ هنا لمصلحة قوى ١٤ آذار وأُخرى تُعقد لمصلحة قوى ٨ آذار. في بلد التسويات، إما أن يتساوى الجميع فُتشدد العقوبة إلى حدودها القصوى، أو يُعفى الجميع من العقوبة.

أن يُحكم سماحة بالسجن ١٣ سنة لنقله متفجرات وتخطيطه للقيام بتفجيرات، رغم علامات الاستفهام التي تُثار بشأن دور «المخبر» الذي يُشتبه بدوره في استدراج سماحة بتوجيه جهاز أمني معروف الهدف والغايات، فيما يُسجن فيصل أكبر، أحد عناصر مجموعة الـ13 المتهمة بالانتماء إلى تنظيم «القاعدة»، الذي أقر باغتيال الرئيس رفيق الحريري ثم تراجع، 10 سنوات. وماذا عن أبرز المطلوبين، هاني السنكري، الذي حُكِم بالسجن خمس سنوات، وهو خبير متفجرات وعنصرٌ بارز في «القاعدة»، والذي لم يكد يخرُج أخيراً، حتى طُلِب مجدداً. فضلاً عن الأحكام التي صدرت على أحد أبرز قيادات تنظيم «القاعدة» الذين مرّوا على لبنان، بحسب توصيف ضباط فرع المعلومات، السعودي محمد السويّد الذي حُكم عليه بالسجن سبع سنوات. والسعودي فهد المغامس الذي حُكم عليه بالسجن سبع سنوات، وكانت قضيته (بعد توقيفه عام 2007) حيازة متفجرات مع توافر النية بالتفجير والإعداد لعملية تفجير كبرى ضد المدنيين في زحلة يوم عيد السيدة والإعداد لقصف المدينة بالصواريخ، إضافة إلى اشتباكه مع عناصر القوى الأمنية وإطلاقه النار على أحدهم بقصد قتله، ومشاركته في عمليات إرهابية قبل توقيفه بأكثر من 3 سنوات.

هل سماحة أشدّ خطورة من أكبر والسنكري والمغامس والسويّد ودفتردار؟ وأين الطالب بدم المقتولين في التفجيرات الإرهابية؟
هل يختلف سماحة عن المنتمين إلى تنظيم «داعش»، الذي يستهدف لبنان بمدنييه وأمنييه وعسكرييه، ويحتل جزءاً من الأراضي اللبنانية، فتصدر بحقهم أحكام بالسجن لمدة لا تتجاوز ثلاث سنوات أحياناً؟

يُرمز إلى العدالة بامرأة معصوبة العينين تحمل ميزاناً للدلالة على النزاهة. والحكم العادل هو الذي يوافق حجم الجرم المرتكب، لا أكثر ولا أقل. متساوٍ مع الباقين. هكذا تقول الأسطورة. لكن في لبنان قصة أُخرى. يوماً بعد آخر يثبت أن القضاء لا يختلف عن باقي مؤسسات الدولة. في صروح العدالة، يُعشِّش فساد وتقع ارتكابات، ثم يعتصم الفاعل بحبل المحسوبية الذي يُخفّف العقوبة أو يُجنّبه إياها.

Jamil Al-Sayyed: On Miqati resignation and the war on Syria

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Looking Behind and Into the Assassination





Hassan had previously received warnings from Arab intelligence agencies that Israel was upset with him for cooperating with Hezbollah (Photo: Haytham alMoussawi)
Published Tuesday, October 23, 2012

Let us try to enter the mind of whoever decided on and carried out the assassination of Wissam al-Hassan.

They (an individual, organization or state) must have considered Hassan to be an enemy who needed to be got rid of. This may have been to punish him for something he did, to prevent him from doing something, or to use the assassination to send a message with political and security overtones to the parties seen as standing behind Hassan. Accordingly, in addition to making the necessary logistical and technical preparations, the killers would have considered the likely repercussions of and reactions to such a move, both if it were to succeed and if it were to fail.

Given Lebanon’s experience over the past decade, any rational person would know that the assassination of someone of Hassan’s stature would have an explosive impact. But this rational person may have decided to proceed with the operation having taken the anticipated fallout fully into account. It is also clear from the nature of the operation that the perpetrator was highly professional. That leaves us with limited possibilities.

First, that Lebanese parties were involved, in collaboration with external parties, because they supposed the direct political fallout from an operation of this magnitude would benefit their political side. The assassination could be expected to bolster the political camp to which Hassan belongs. The political repercussions would, therefore, be highly negative for the perpetrators if they were opponents of March 14.

Second, that the perpetrators’ external political connections enabled them to conclude that the killing would not cause a major change in their domestic political scene, nor even in the regional and international scene as it relates to Lebanon. That implies that they had the capacity not only to execute a plan aimed at eliminating an enemy, but also to ensure that the fallout would remain limited.

Third, the bombing was the work of a party that is hostile to everything in Lebanon, such as Israel. Hassan had previously received warnings from Arab intelligence agencies that Israel was upset with him for cooperating with Hezbollah in uncovering Israeli espionage networks in Lebanon.

Fourth, that al-Qaeda opted to pre-empt an anticipated confrontation between it and Hassan. There have been many indications, including the outcome of his last meeting with the director of the CIA and his aides, that Hassan was a partner in the process of gathering intelligence on groups affiliated to al-Qaeda in Lebanon and the region. He and the Americans agreed to exchange information about the activities of these groups in Syria and Lebanon.

Can any of the possibilities currently being talked about be ruled out?

Yes, though that might displease a great many parties today. There are 1,001 reasons that make Syria an unlikely suspect.

People working in security deem it naive to think Hassan’s assassination was a response to his uncovering of the Michel Samaha case. There are many reasons for that, including the fact, revealed by the crisis in Syria, that the Syrian security establishment is in seriously and dangerously decrepit condition – as evidenced by its failure to take the most basic security measures to prevent repeated attacks on high-level regime figures.

How could such a precise and professional action be carried out by an entity that cannot protect its own centers from simple infiltration? Does everyone remember how the opposition managed to poison senior officers in the national security bureau, and then came back and carried out a multiple assassination by bringing explosives into the meeting room? How can a state which could not find or arrest its own prime minister after he defected and remained inside the country before leaving, suddenly display a high degree of proficiency in a security operation that would have required thorough and professional preparation?

How could someone who demonstrated the utmost stupidity in preparing Michel Samaha’s plan for confronting the regime’s opponents in Lebanon, become highly sophisticated a few weeks later and mount an operation like that which targeted Hassan? In the past, some used to cite the fact that the assassination attempts against Marwan Hamadeh, Elias al-Murr and May Chidiac were botched as evidence that Syria was behind them!

At present, a specialist team is conducting the investigation. The hard evidence available so far is confined to footage of the booby-trapped car being parked, also showing the time, and some distant and unclear images of the individuals who drove it to the location. Investigations are proceeding – and will be kept under wraps for some time – into questions such as:

  • How did the perpetrators know about Hassan’s arrival in Beirut the previous evening, and his decision to go to the apartment in Achrafieh which had been exposed some time previously?
  • Who were the people who were in a position to know that?
  • Are any them linked to the perpetrators, or were they under surveillance, enabling the perpetrators to reach Hassan?
  • What about the mechanism of the explosion, the nature of the device, and the bombers’ confidence that they could hit the target with such precision and ease?
  • What traces did they leave behind?
  • Can communications data help identify them?
  • What kind of movements were witnessed in the area recently, and how could the killers operate with apparent ease?

Meanwhile, as some engage in a vile game of exploiting blood, a family has had a massive calamity inflicted on it. One need only look again at the images of Wissan’s two sons at the funeral to appreciate the enormity of the personal tragedy, which alone lives on in memory.

Ibrahim al-Amine is editor-in-chief of Al-Akhbar.

This article is an edited translation from the Arabic Edition.

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Wissam al-Hassan and the Information Branch

Published Wednesday, August 29, 2012
The behavior of the Information Branch of the Internal Security Forces (ISF) in the Michel Samaha case is no different than in any other. This agency operates as part of a political venture. It successfully dealt a powerful head-punch to its opponents.It was a master-stroke, as they say. The professionals on the other side faulted Samaha and his accomplices in Syria, but they raised their hats to the Information Branch – even if some continue to claim it all had less to do with the efforts of Wissam al-Hassan and his outfit than the expertise of foreign intelligence agencies.

كن عميلاً عند سعد الحريري ووسام  واحصل على فيلا رائعة في كندا ... وانسى قطع طريق المطار والعذابThe debate about the judicial and security merits of what happened is unimportant. This was a controlled game, in which entrapment played a big part. That is apparent from the nature of the questions put to Samaha by the informer Milad al-Kfouri, according to the transcripts of his interrogation and conversations (leaked on the orders of ISF chief Ashraf Rifi, and perhaps by his office, as the latest information from the probe into the affair indicates). Yet regardless of the many questions that remain unanswered, Samaha committed a fatal blunder. He is the cause of what happened to him, and of the damage sustained by his political allies.
Whenever the Information Branch strikes, we are taken back to the debate about its establishment as a state security agency. Its existence was justified in terms of the country’s political composition.
It posthumously fulfilled Rafik al-Hariri’s dream of creating a paramilitary security force under his control in his capacity as the Sunni sect’s representative in the state.
Its critics from the same sect want it to remain effective, but in their service. Its other critics increasingly treat it as a hostile force and a tool for sabotage, and want to get rid of it.
Thus the political debate continues.

Which takes us back to the person of Wissam al-Hassan.

Hassan is no ordinary officer in the security forces. He represents the political faction that appointed him to the position. His special status is due to several reasons, including that he was one of Rafiq al-Hariri’s chief aides. He also has detailed information about most if not all the figures in and around the Future Movement camp, and the forces and figures that joined it after Hariri’s assassination.

He has been able to find out more about the latter, including intimate details.

He has also, for a variety of reasons, been able to strengthen his position as an interlocutor with regional and other foreign intelligence agencies. He can now claim to have links with most of the world’s security agencies, including those considered to belong to the axis that Hassan and his political camp oppose.

Hassan is not a new phenomenon in Lebanon. Like others from a political-security background, he has enough cover to be able to operate with considerable freedom. He also has official cover, which effectively spares him from being scrutinized. Even when a mistake is made, he finds the people to afford him the necessary protection.

Hassan’s relationship with former state prosecutor Said Mirza enabled him to do things the heads of the other security agencies could not. This was not due to any political or personal affinity between the two men, but in line with the political reality that governed their work. Accordingly, the Information Branch has recently had to make some changes to the way it functions. The new acting state prosecutor, Judge Samir Hammoud, does not differ radically in political terms, but has his own somewhat different personality. That obliges Hassan and his security team to bide their time while the picture unfolds. A new permanent state prosecutor is supposed to be appointed soon, but there are still differences within governing circles over the matter.

In general, Hassan behaves in accordance with this public position. His stature increasingly exceeds that of his job. He has a substantial media profile, and has acquired a network of collaborators within major institutions. He also has many years experience of managing assistance budgets in furtherance of the political role assigned to the Information Branch. Thus Hassan does not fear being purged unless the underlying power-structure that rules Lebanon undergoes a complete upheaval.

The problem, here, is not with Hassan continuing to operate in accordance with his convictions. It is that his adversaries from the opposing axis have been unable to present their own version of him. Until then, March 8 activists and leaders had best beware.

Ibrahim al-Amin is editor-in-chief of Al-Akhbar.

This article is an edited translation from the Arabic Edition.

UN’s Feltman: Security in Lebanon Exacerbated by Syria Developments

Local Editor

In a typical interference in affairs of Lebanon, UN under-secretary general Jeffrey Feltman warned that “security in Lebanon was deteriorating and affected by the situation in Syria.”

Addressing the UN Security Council, Feltman said the latest clashes in Tripoli’s neighborhoods of Jabal Mohsen and Bab al-Tabbaneh have highlighted the “need for international action.”” As the crisis in Syria continues to deteriorate, the situation in Lebanon has become more precarious and the need for continued international support to the government and the Lebanese Armed Forces increasingly important,” the UN under-secretary general for political affairs, told the UNSC during its monthly meeting on the Middle East.


“Tensions over domestic and security concerns remain high throughout the country and are easily exacerbated by developments in Syria,” Feltman said.
Talking about the arrest of former minister Michel Samaha, Fektman said it “deepened concerns about attempts to draw Lebanon into regional concerns.”
Feltman said that UN Chief Ban Ki-moon recently held talks with Prime Minister Najib Miqati on the crisis and “remains focused on protecting Lebanon’s stability and sovereignty.”

Feltman, along with other US officials including Senators Joe Lieberman and John Mccain visited Lebanon’s Tripoli and the North several times, especially as the unrest erupted in Syria.

The claim behind such a visit was “inspecting the Lebanon-Syria border allegedly as an effort to facilitate the entry of a UN monitoring team into Syria.

Source: News Agencies, edited by moqawama.org


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Lebanese Services to Syria’s Warring Sides

A police officer stands outside Samaha’s building on the day of the arrest. (Photo: Haitham Moussawi)
Published Monday, August 13, 2012
It would be difficult to adopt this argument: So what if Michel Samaha transported explosives to use against the Syrian opposition in Lebanon? We’re in a state of war, and what politicians from the March 14 coalition, especially the Future Movement, have been doing is far worse than transporting explosives. They have been participating in the detonation of Syria itself.
Yet Syria’s supporters in Lebanon, or rather the Syrian opposition’s adversaries, have been going further. They have been demanding the immediate storming of the jails to free Samaha from detention. And they have been berating the principal partners in the March 8 coalition, Hezbollah and the Free Patriotic Movement, as well as others, for being incapable of “protecting their own people.”

Underlying this is the fact that this section of the public does not trust the account of the Information Branch of the Internal Security Forces, nor the reputation it has acquired since investigations began into the assassination of Rafik Hariri. They fear that “abandoning” Samaha would mean unleashing the Information Branch in its capacity as the “official strike force” of Syria’s opponents in Lebanon, and giving it a free hand to raid the homes of, arrest or accuse any of Syria’s allies.

If this affair illustrates anything, it is that the political divide in Lebanon has become irreversible, and that reason no longer plays much part in it. The cleverness of the various Lebanese groups, all of whom are engaged in supporting one side or the other in the Syrian conflict, is confined to trying to catch each other out.
The Information Branch thus made sure to be able to show it had caught Samaha red-handed, not just in order to secure his conviction, but also to way-lay any political, media or other voices that might try to contradict its story. Indeed, senior figures in the Information Branch, as well as their political masters, expressed disappointment that Hezbollah, in particular, did not launch a campaign that would have enabled them to leak audio and visual recordings to the media related to Samaha’s case, including of his questioning in custody, which appears also to have been filmed.

The split over the issue is expressed in the top echelons as well as the grassroots. It has also provided those, like Walid Jumblatt, who want to move completely into the anti-Syrian camp, with the kind of card they need. What has now become the “Samaha File” enables him to take a further step toward abandoning the ship of the compromise government headed by Prime Minister Najib Mikati.

This takes the political usage of the “Samaha File” beyond the wars being waged openly by rival Lebanese security agencies. It has a bearing on the essence of March 14’s interest in getting rid of this government: not in order to form a different one – which would normally be termed a consensual or neutral government – but to leave the country to be governed by the status quo. What is done in the dark would then be done in broad daylight, and it will no longer matter who catches whom out.

Wissam al-Hassan (head of Information Branch of the Internal Security Forces) is feeling triumphant, and not because he scored a goal against his political enemies – although he still faces a torrent of unanswered questions on the issue. He hastened to get the mission accomplished because he has a genuine stake – not in a superficial sense, nor by way of accusation – in the “victory of the Syrian revolution.” He does not await praise from his bosses in Lebanon, but rather smiles and signs of approval from allied parties outside the country.
As for Michel Samaha, he fell victim to his eagerness to render a service to his Syrian allies, to a less-than-thorough analysis of the realities of the confrontation in Lebanon, and to his belief that such actions are called for. More seriously, Samaha failed to realize that he would fall victim to the powerlessness that dominates the confrontation between Syria’s enemies and allies in Lebanon.
This article is an edited translation from the Arabic Edition.

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Three Reasons Why Syria’s Man in Lebanon Was Arrested

Former Lebanese Information Minister Michel Samaha. (photo by REUTERS/ Khaled al-Hariri)

By:Elias Muhanna posted on Thursday, Aug 9, 2012

What to make of today’s arrest of former Lebanese minister Michel Samaha?
The silver-tongued politician, well-known for his close ties to the Syrian government and its allies in Lebanon, was arrested Thursday morning at his home in a Beirut neighborhood. A group of police officers reportedly stormed the apartment at dawn, while the couple was still in their pajamas, “armed as though they were going to go liberate something,” said Samaha’s wife, Gladys.
Within a few hours, a Lebanese TV station was reporting that Samaha had confessed under interrogation that he had participated in a plan to transfer “explosives from Syria to Lebanon in order to carry out bombings in North Lebanon, particularly in the area of Akkar, with Syria’s knowledge.”
As of the time this post went to press, no official word had come out regarding the reasons for Samaha’s detainment or his alleged confession.
In the meantime, though, here are three reasons to pay close attention to this story:
1. This doesn’t happen in Lebanon.

Yes, we all remember the days when high-ranking security officials were dragged into custody by the Lebanese armed forces because of their alleged involvement in the assassination of Rafiq al-Hariri.

But that was then and this is now. The likelihood that a figure with Samaha’s profile (and connections) could be unceremoniously tossed in the back of paddy wagon without a shred of evidence is very slim. Leaks suggest that the Internal Security Forces (ISF), had gathered substantial evidence of Samaha’s involvement in the alleged plot including telecoms, video and audio surveillance, and witness testimony. If the evidence is thin, there are going to be major consequences.
On the other hand, there is something implausible about the story. Even if one were to assume that the alleged plot existed and that Samaha had knowledge of it, it seems highly unlikely that he would have been involved on an operational level.
2. The fragility of the Lebanese government.


The current Lebanese government, headed by Prime Minister Najib Mikati, is already looking very fragile as it is. Divisions in recent weeks between its main primary bloc leaders over such issues as Lebanon’s energy policy have softened the ground for a potential walk-out. This was before the cabinet approved a controversial new electoral law based on proportional representation that seems doomed to die in Parliament.

With the arrest of Samaha, Prime Minister Mikati has significantly gone out on a limb. If Hezbollah decides to demand Samaha’s release on pain of the government’s collapse, Mikati will have few cards to play. On the one hand, he will find it politically impossible to go against the ISF, given that Samaha is being accused of involvement in a plot to sow strife in Sunni areas. Mikati, who has long been painted by the Future Movement (Lebanon’s main Sunni party, currently sitting in opposition) as a fig leaf for Syria and Iran’s allies, is eager to maintain his bonafides as a leader in the Sunni community. Being seen as kowtowing to Hezbollah would be political suicide for Mikati less than a year before the next parliamentary elections.
On the other hand, if Hezbollah keeps mum about Samaha’s arrest, Mikati will come off looking like a crime-busting superhero.
3. A sectarian rumble looming in Lebanon’s security services?
Samaha was arrested by the ISF, the leadership of which is said to be under the sway of the Future Movement. Within minutes of the incident, Samaha’s friends and associates were calling it a brazen political move.
Jamil al-Sayyid, the former director of the General Security Service who endured a years-long detainment for suspected, but never proven, links to the Hariri assassination, railed today against Samaha’s arrest.

He pointed out, among other things, that the arrest last May of an Islamist named Shadi al-Mawlawi threw the Sunni community into a fit, mainly because the arrest was carried out by the General Security Service, which is seen as being close to Hezbollah.

How can someone like Samaha be dealt with so crudely, al-Sayyid demanded, when a nobody like Shadi al-Mawlawi could be promptly released with an apology?
There seems to be a hidden war taking place between Lebanon’s military-intelligence branches. So far, there have been few public casualties of that war, but if the stakes keep rising as they did today, that may change rapidly.
Elias Muhanna is an assistant professor at Brown University and the author of QifaNabki.com, a blog on Levantine political affairs. Follow him on Twitter @QifaNabki

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