The Syrian Russian Turksih Idlib Stand-Of – Erdogan’s Last Stand?

February 06, 2020

by Ghassan Kadi for The Saker Blog

Even though the Syrian Army, with the aid of its international friends and allies, especially Russia, has been able to score many victories and liberate most of Syria’s major cities from the control of terrorist groups, the fight is far from over.

Before the situation in the American-controlled North-East is addressed, the Western regions, including Idlib and its surrounds must be put back fully under the legitimate government control.

As a matter of fact, politically speaking, the situation now is perhaps more complex to deal with than nine years ago when the “War on Syria” took form. Almost exactly nine years ago, the enemies of Syria combined efforts to launch a joint attack. United only by their hatred for Syria, they had diverse agendas, but they combined efforts in order to capitalize on each other’s strengths. The Wahhabi version of Islamists, headed by Saudi Arabia, joined hands with the Muslim Brotherhood version headed by Turkey and financed by Qatar, and they all joined hands with NATO, Israel and Lebanese ultra-right militia among other vendetta groups, for the single purpose of deposing President Assad and replacing the legitimate secular Syrian Government with one that is sectarian and pliable to the will of the Western roadmap.

They failed.

They failed in achieving their combined objectives and some of the armies they created, such as Jaysh Al-Islam, headed by former Syrian Army officer Zahran Alloush, ceased to exist. Alloush was killed in a Syrian Army attack in December 2015, but the casualties also included conspirators who were sidelined and lost their careers; the most prominent of which is Prince Bandar Bin Sultan, who was perhaps the single biggest architect of the attack on Syria.

The tides began to turn in favour of Syria after the Syrian Army scored its huge victory in the Battle of Qusayr in mid-2013. This was a decisive battle that basically disabled the terrorists from linking the Damascus province with their northern supply lines. Without this victory, in retrospect, it would be arguable if Syria would have been able to earn much support from Russia; if any at all. Syria had to show a fighting spirit, resolve, determination and respect for her to reach such an echelon. After all, Russia does not only by tradition honour and respect those who stand up with dignity against all odds, but on the geopolitical scene, and after decades of being sidelined by the Western bloc, any Russian global move had to be fully and thoroughly assessed before any venture was to be undertaken.

It was crucial for Russia therefore, and for President Putin in particular, to ensure that the presence of Russian troops in Syria had very high chances of success.

The fragmentation of Syria’s enemies began to take form before Russian action in the skies and on the soil of Syria. The Saudi’s first and biggest disappointment was when the USA refused to level Damascus to the ground after Prince Bandar orchestrated the alleged Ghouta chemical attack in September 2013. That was Bandar’s last draw after the loss of Al-Qusayr and his attempts to blackmail Putin by threatening him to unleash Islamists in Chechnya.

From that point in time onwards, the Saudi role in the “War on Syria” dwindled and came to an end with the demise of Alloush. But as the tensions between Qatar and Saudi Arabia emerged in 2017, Qatar remained “represented” via its ally Turkey.

Erdogan was initially determined to victoriously pray at the Omayyad Mosque in Damascus early in the piece. But he is still determined to get a bite of the cherry, a consolation prize, despite all the setbacks that his former camp has endured.

After Turkey downed the Russian Su-24 in November 2015, the relationship between Turkey and Russia reached its nadir. But the pragmatist Erdogan soon apologized to Putin and eventually reached an agreement about how to deal with the deadlock situation in Idlib.

But Erdogan is not coming clean about his commitment to what became to be known as the Sochi Agreement.

Erdogan defiantly continues to wear the hat of a fully-fledged NATO member, a close friend and ally of Russia, the leader of the nation that is desirous to enter the EU, an Islamist who wants to rebuild the Ottoman Empire, and a nationalist who is willing and able to deal with Kurdish issue. What he does not see is that whilst those antics gain him popularity amongst sympathetic Muslim supporters, on the international scene, he is increasingly making a mockery out of himself.

His clear-to-see contradictions seem mind-boggling, but to the pragmatic Erdogan who is trying as hard as he can to be Sultan, his mind is fixated on Islamism and nationalism, and he is performing as if he has found himself a Fatwa that permits him to dance to the tunes of the devil to reach his ultimate objectives.

Among other things, to Putin, Erdogan portrays himself as Russia’s friend who is reconsidering his alliance with the US and even wants to buy Russian S-400 defence missile systems. To America, he remains as a NATO member and an American ally who wants to buy America’s latest state-of the-art F-35 fighter jets. On one hand, he makes verbal attacks against Israel, but continues to opt to have strong diplomatic ties with that state. He pledges support for the Palestinian cause but offers no evidence to put his words into action.

If Erdogan truly deserves any recognition and respect at all, it would have to be for his ability to meander his way through and survive amongst all the contradictions that he has deliberately and systemically implanted along his path.

He could be running out of options; at least in Syria, but this doesn’t stop him from making yet more contradictory statements within a few days of each other. By the end of January 2020 he threatened to take a new offensive in Syria over the Russian-backed Syrian Army offensive in Idlib.—report/ A few days later, he made a U-turn and declared that he will not allow the situation in Idlib to sour his relationship with Russia.—erdogan/?fbclid=IwAR1X6tQuRrWsX5iQ3kJCJaxFoR11cnfJpj–VlYhuUu9ZXLK6OQal0kiHaw But in between the two statements which are only four days apart, the Syrian Army has shelled Turkish positions and purportedly killed six Turkish soldiers and injured about a dozen. Whilst such an unprecedented incident should have sent Erdogan firing up as one would expect, according to Palestinian veteran journalist, Abdul Bari Atwan, this wasn’t to happen this time.

In a translation-worthy article, Russia and Syria have decided to take action in Idlib and they are no longer waiting for Erdogan to abide by his promises and agreements.

Atwan’s article’s title translates as: “What does the Syrian shelling of Turkish troops in Sarakob and the killing of six Turkish soldiers signify? And, what is the Russian message to Erdogan? And, did the Russians and the Turks tear up the Sochi Agreement? And, who will emerge as a winner in the bone-crushing battle in Idlib?”

According to Atwan’s analysis, the Syrian shelling of Turkish positions signaled the end of the line of joint Russian-Syrian patience with Erdogan’s lack of commitment to the Sochi Agreement. Atwan argues that opinion polls within Turkey indicate that Erdogan does not have the support of escalating in Syria and neither that of sending troops to Libya for that matter.

Did Atwan see the end of the line of Erdogan’s lies and contradictions this time? I personally hope he did. I must admit that in my previous analysis I have predicted several times that Erdogan had made his final and detrimental mistake . Somehow he always manages to slither out of the hole he was in and keep going.

Has he made his final and lethal mistake or is he going to relent and let Syria be?
Time will tell.

Hassan Al-Laqqis: The Man Who Flew Over Palestine

Hassan Al-Laqqis: The Man Who Flew Over Palestine

By Khadija Shokor

It has been five years since the martyrdom of Hajj Hassan al-Laqqis. One of the advantages of having him as a leader was that he was a dreamer, but he also sought “with all his heart” to make his dream come true. He did it. He is a happy martyr, in the immediate sense, having achieved his dream, himself. Along with a group of dreamers, they had to fly away.

The following text will shed light on some of this man’s accomplishments. He, like all the martyrs of the resistance, had (some) of his achievements revealed after his departure. It was his departure that revealed his identity. One of his close friends retells memories of his life. We, the living who have been blessed with the pride the resistance created, owe it to him to honor his memory.

12 men from the “Israeli” Mossad made up the group assigned to a mission in the southern suburbs of Beirut on December 4, 2013. The objective was the assassination of Hezbollah leader Hassan al-Laqqis, who had become an extraordinary threat to the enemy.

Two members of the group were tasked with the actual killing, while the remaining 10 were assigned the roles of implementation, transport and surveillance. The degree of danger that the man’s work posed to the enemy was illustrated by the great deal of risk it undertook by sending this type of group.

“I arrived home and they told me that Hajj Hassan had called me minutes earlier. When I was about to get back to him, his personal bodyguard called me to tell me that Hajj’s concierge informed him that someone had shot Hajj Hassan,” a friend of the martyr recalled with anguish.

Five years have passed but the scenes from that night are still enshrined in this friend’s mind.

“I arrived to find him leaning on the door of the car, smiling as blood flowed from his head. I approached and found the pistol in his other hand,” he said.

The 50-year-old man gets on memory lane and goes back to the beginning of his relationship with Hajj Hassan.

“He returned from Africa in 1978, and since then we have been friends,” he recalls.

This friend insists that excellence was Hajj Hassan’s quality from a young age.

“He was exceptional on all levels. He excelled in his studies. He was refined in his manners. He was constantly ambitious. I remember when we finished high school, Hassan learned that there was an institute offering computer courses in Gefinor.  He was quick to register although this field was not known at the time. Ever since he was little, he liked to know everything new in technology and development. So much so that he preferred to buy new technological magazines and equipment rather than the basics,” the friend explains.

Anyone you ask about Hajj Hassan’s qualities would tell you, and Sayyed Hassan Nasrallah confirmed as much in his speech that he was “a hard and diligent worker, well mannered, loving and creative. He was one of the brilliant and distinctive minds of this resistance.”

Sayyed Nasrallah knew Hajj Hassan very well, describing him as “a beloved brother, companion and a close friend since we were young men in the city of Baalbek.”

Baalbek was the city where Sayyed settled after returning from Iraq in late 1979 to complete his studies at a seminary founded by Sayyed Abbas al-Musawi. At the time, the relationship between the two young men was centered around the mosque. Later, when Sayyed became the cultural leader of the Amal movement in Baalbek, Hajj Hassan joined him. That was in 1980. He stayed close to him during that period. When Sayyed’s life was threatened because of his positions and speeches he delivered on the platforms in Baalbek, Hajj Hassan insisted on accompanying him to those events. He also insisted on staying with him during that time in case of any security risks that Sayyed faced. Since then, their friendship grew, developed and never ceased.

One of Hajj Hassan’s friends recalls how they and a group of young men accompanied Sayyed on the day of the “Israeli” invasion, trying to mobilize people against the enemy. They passed through the city of Baalbek and chanted: Death to America ??and Death to “Israel”.

Not only were they friends, they were also partners when the resistance movement was born. Even when Sayyed moved to Beirut, the two kept in touch both professionally and socially.

The Iranian Revolutionary Guard came to Lebanon. It organized military training courses for young people to resist the occupation. Hajj Hassan rushed to join the first of these courses. Later, he worked at the Revolutionary Guards’ Staff Office. He was in direct contact with most Iranian officials as a result of his work. And because he had a quick-wit by nature, he quickly became fluent in Farsi. He saw most of Sayyed’s meetings with the leaders of the Revolutionary Guard. This gave him extensive experience and broader relationships.

With the “Israeli” occupation being limited to the South and western Bekaa and the jihadist operations concentrated there, Hajj Hassan made several field visits in those areas. He participated in qualitative operations, most notably the storming of “Israeli” positions, such as the one against the “Tomat Niha” site in 1988.

His fight against the enemy allowed him to notice some of the obstacles and problems the Mujahideen faced on the battlefield. He sought solutions to overcome these issues. He began working on the Signal Weapon, exerting a lot of effort to develop it through the introduction of modifications. The effects of these modifications emerged in the communication system – both wireless and wired.  He also paid attention to the latest technological developments in security and military spheres.

He did not spare any opportunity to take advantage of everything new that can benefit the resistance. For this purpose he always sought to bring as much of the advanced technology as possible and make use of it for the resistance. He became the primary reference for technology to the entire resistance leadership. He was a diligent and hard worker. He participated in choosing the resistance’s missile arsenal and developed it. He expanded his research in this field until he became the first advisor to the military leadership every time it was presented with new weapons.

Later, the challenges grew, especially after the resistance grew stronger and the enemy’s precautionary methods intensified. He continued to propose ideas and solutions to face the challenges on land and the difficulties of land barriers, until he began to think about how to use the sky to face the difficulties on land.

“I used to make fun of him,” says Hajj Hassan’s friend. “Every time I entered, I would find him trying to assemble wooden pieces and install them on a small motor. I would ask him: Do you expect these pieces to take off? He would answer me with confidence:

it will not only take off, I will make it capture images. You don’t know. I might make it carry a weapon in the future.”

That idea was born in 1988. That was when the ambitious young man, who did not believe in the existence of “impossible”, decided to breach the sky.

He first started from his small room. He bought a lathe, collected simple motors, pasted them together with wooden pieces, and then tried to make them fly.

One, two, dozens of failed attempts. But finally he succeeded in making one of those designs fly. With his humble but persuasive manner, he managed to turn this idea into a conviction among the leaders and officials. This would later be known as the Air Force Unit of the Islamic Resistance.

It was not an easy journey. Every achievement cost Hajj Hassan and his team a lot of studying, planning, programming and working day and night. They were keen on readiness and development because they believed that the technological battle with the enemy would not end. This task cost a lot of time, effort and even souls. The names of the pioneers of that stage were not revealed except for those who were martyred, including Hajj Hassan, Hussein Ayoub and Jamil Skaf. The latter two excelled in this field, and both were martyred while they were taking part in developing it.

Sacrifice, for them, was not a hindrance. It was an incentive to continue. Therefore, Hajj Hassan continued to work on the development of drones. For this purpose he visited the aircraft factories in Iran. He attended many of the workshops there and met with many specialists in this field to benefit from their experience in developing domestic Iranian aircraft.

He never stopped looking for new developments worldwide in a bid to take advantage of any advances in his field.

Among the “Israelis” his work earned Hajj Hassan al-Laqqis the label of an officer in the existing war of minds against the resistance. This drove the “Israelis” to attempt to assassinate him in the early 1990s. A bomb was planted near his home in Baalbek, according to the martyr’s friend.

“He was returning to his house, and could not overtake a bulldozer driving in front of him. And then he turned right to overtake it. At that moment, a large explosion was heard on the other side,” the friend said.

The enemy was wrong to think that the assassination attempts would weaken al-Laqqis’ determination. After that incident, he returned to work in both the missile and aerial fields with greater focus, expanding the realm even further.

After the “Israeli” defeat in Lebanon in 2000, his work broadened. The drones or what was known as the air force unit had several factories. He managed them with a team he chose and trained carefully. Sayyed Nasrallah visited those factories periodically, being updated on their developments. The leaders of operations soon demanded the participation of these aircraft in their military operations due to their contribution in guaranteeing success.

Over the past years, the aircraft became the resistance’s powerful eye in the sky, both before and during the military operations. This was only some of what Hajj Hassan planned. The effects of this activity emerged clearly during the July 2006 war. At that time, the enemy returned to stalk this commander, who had worried them for many years. The “Israelis” took advantage of the outbreak of the war to try to assassinate him again. The “Israelis” confirmed this themselves.

“I was busy with my work,” said his close friend. “Hajj Imad Mughniyeh called me and told me that he had just seen Hajj Hassan on television during a live broadcast after a building had been destroyed in Shiyah. He asked me to go to him and tell him to leave the area.”

The friend continues, “when I arrived, I learned that he was trying to search the rubble for his 18-year-old son Ali, who was in the building. The martyr later told me that he went to the building to deliver a bag to his son. But shortly after he left, the “Israeli” aircraft struck the building and destroyed it.” His son was martyred.

“He was dauntless despite the loss,” his friend said. “He left the place and continued working hard and firm. We even noticed this firmness when we accompanied him to see his martyred son in the hospital three days after the aggression. He quickly bid him farewell and went back to his work with determination until the end of the war.”

The war ended, and al-Laqqis’ ghost kept haunting the “Israelis” who could not weaken his determination, not even by killing his son or destroying his home. He immediately returned, even before rebuilding his home, to pursue his work in airspace.

After the July 2006 war, work on drones was accelerated in light of the outcome of the war. Hajj took advantage of the scientific developments and the resistance’s existing capabilities to find new models and meet the emerging needs after the war.

The drones did not only operate within the resistance in Lebanon. In Syria, for example, they were credited with assisting most of the confrontations that took place. The al-Qusayr battle is one of the most prominent pieces of evidence.

The martyr’s friend tells us that the latter showed him a video how these drones were operating during the battle. They took pictures, which were directly transmitted to the command room. The command room in return contacted the field group and informed it about the details of the place and the positions of the militants. The drones reduced the loss of lives and helped in the success of the operation as a result of the accumulation of knowledge.

The martyr’s friend added,

“after the battle of al-Qusayr, the martyr informed me of a new plan, which aimed at arming the aircraft, enabling us to use it in filming and bombing. He reminded me of how he told me about this goal since the beginning.”

“Indeed, after a short period of time, he returned and played a video showing the success of a maneuver in which this plan was carried out,” the friend added.

Hajj Hassan was martyred, but his thoughts, approach and the fruits of his labor live on, with the same strength and determination. His team continued to make advances in his work and achievements. The effects of this work spread beyond Syria. Until today, Hajj Hassan has not really been known. Not by friend or foe. But some of his achievements will be revealed in the coming war, through the air force and the Islamic Resistance’s drones when the headlines read: “the resistance’s drones attack “Israel”.”

Source: Al-Akhbar Newspaper, Translated by website team

حسّان اللقيس: الرجل الذي حلّق… فوق فلسطين

خديجة شكر

السبت 8 كانون الأول 2018

خمس سنوات على استشهاد الحاج حسّان اللقيس. ميزة هذا القائد أنّه كان حالماً، لكن أيضاً، مع ميزة إضافيّة، أنّه كان يسعى «بكلّ روحه» لأن يُصبح حلمه حقيقة. لقد فعلها. هو شهيد سعيد، بالمعنى المباشر هنا، إذ حقّق حلمه، بنفسه، ومعه ثلّة مِن الحالمين أيضاً، فكان لهم أن يُحلّقوا… بعيداً. في النص الآتي بعض مِن آثار هذا الرجل، الذي، كسائر شهداء المقاومة، لم تُكشف (بعض) آثاره إلا بعد رحيله، بل لم يُعرَف إلا برحيله.

هنا بعض من ذكريات صديق مقرّب له، تحكي بعض سيرته، وذلك كبعض مِن حقّه علينا، نحن الأحياء، الذي نعمنا وننعم بعزّة صنعتها لنا تلك المقاومة.

12 رجلاً من «الموساد» الإسرائيلي، هم طاقم المجموعة التي أوكلت إليها المهمة، ليل 3 – 4 كانون الأول 2013، في الضاحية الجنوبية لبيروت. الهدف: اغتيال القيادي في حزب الله حسان اللقيس، الذي بات خطراً، فوق العادة، على العدو.

تولى اثنان من أفراد المجموعة مهمة القتل المباشر، بينما توزعت أدوار التنفيذ والنقل والمراقبة على العشرة الباقين. مستوى الخطر الذي بات يحيط بالعدو جراء عمل الرجل ودوره، يوضحه مستوى المجازفة التي أقدم عليها بإرساله لهذا النوع من المجموعات. يتذكر صديق للشهيد، بشيء من اللوعة: «وصلتُ إلى المنزل، فأخبروني أنّ الحاج حسان اتصل بي منذ دقائق. وحين كنت أهمّ بمعاودة الاتصال به، هاتفني مرافقه الشخصي ليخبرني أنّ ناطور البناية التي يسكنها الحاج اتصل به ليعلمه أنّ أحداً ما قد أطلق النار على الحاج حسان». خمس سنوات مرت، ولا يغيب عن خاطر هذا الصديق ذلك المشهد: «وصلت لأجده مستنداً إلى باب السيارة، مبتسماً وخيوط الدم تسيل من رأسه… اقتربت فوجدت المسدس في يده الأخرى».

هو صاحب فكرة الطائرات المسيّرة عن بُعد التي أسست لوحدة القوة الجويّة في حزب الله

تعود الذاكرة بالرجل الخمسيني إلى بداية علاقته بالحاج حسان: «عاد من أفريقيا، في العام 1978، ومنذ ذلك الوقت ونحن أصدقاء». يجزم هذا الصديق أن التميّز كان عنوان الحاج حسان منذ الصغر: «كان متميزاً على جميع الأصعدة، إنْ كان بتفوقه العلميّ، أو بدماثة أخلاقه، أو بطموحه الدائم التجدد. أذكر، حين أنهينا دراستنا الثانوية، يوم علم حسان بوجود معهد في الجيفينور لدراسة الكومبيوتر. سارع إلى التسجيل، مع أن هذا المجال لم يكن معروفاً حينها، إلا أنه كان يحب الاطلاع على كل ما هو جديد ضمن اختصاصات التكنولوجيا والتطور منذ صغره. لدرجة أنه كان يفضل شراء المجلات التكنولوجية والمعدات الجديدة، على حساب حاجاته الخاصة».

يُخبرك كل من تسأله عن صفات الحاج حسان تلك، ويؤكد هذا الكلام السيد حسن نصرالله حين وصفه في خطابه: «هو العامل المُجد والدؤوب… والمؤدّب الخلوق والمحب، وأيضاً المبدع، أحد العقول المميّزة واللامعة في هذه المقاومة».

السيد نصرالله الذي عرف الحاج حسان بحق، فقال عنه: «كان أخاً وحبيباً وأنيساً وقريباً وصديقاً منذ أن كنا شباباً صغاراً في مدينة بعلبك». بعلبك، تلك المدينة التي كانت مستقر السيد حين عاد من العراق، في أواخر العام 1979، ليكمل الدراسة في الحوزة التي أسسها السيد عباس الموسوي هناك. يومها كانت العلاقة بين الشابين «علاقة مسجد». لاحقاً، وحين أصبح السيد هو المسؤول الثقافي لحركة أمل في بعلبك، انضم إليه الحاج حسان. كان ذلك في العام 1980. بقي قريباً منه في تلك الفترة. يوم وصل تهديد للسيد بالقتل، جراء مواقفه وكلامه على منابر بعلبك، أصر الحاج حسان على مرافقته إلى المناسبات التي بقي يلقي فيها السيد تلك الكلمات. كما أصر على النوم عنده في تلك الفترة، تحسباً لأي عمل أمني كان يمكن أن يتعرّض له السيد. ومذاك توطدت أواصر هذه الصداقة التي استمرت وتطورت ولم تنقطع بعدها. يذكر أحد أصدقاء الحاج حسان كيف رافقا السيد مع مجموعة أخرى من الشباب يوم بدء الاجتياح الإسرائيلي، محاولين تعبئة الناس وتحريضهم ضد العدو، وذلك بالقيام بجولات في أنحاء مدينة بعلبك. كانوا يُردّدون: «الموت لأمريكا» و«الموت لإسرائيل». لم يكونا صديقين فحسب، بل كانا شريكين في الانطلاقات الأولى لحركة المقاومة، وحتى حين انتقل السيد إلى مدينة بيروت بقي الشابان على تواصلهما الودي والعملي.

استشهد ابن اللقيس عام 2006 في المبنى الذي قصفته الطائرات الإسرائيلية في الشيّاح

مع وصول الحرس الثوري الإيراني إلى لبنان، وتنظيمه دورات عسكرية للشباب بهدف مقاومة الاحتلال، سارع الحاج حسّان للانضمام إلى أولى تلك الدورات. لاحقاً، انتقل للعمل في مكتب قيادة الأركان التابع للحرس الثوري. كان على تماس مباشر مع معظم المسؤولين الإيرانيين نتيجة عمله، ولأنه بطبعه كان سريع البداهة، اكتسب اللغة الفارسية بطلاقة وبسرعة. كان يشهد، بحكم موقعه العملي، معظم لقاءات السيد مع قيادات الحرس، وذلك ما أكسبه خبرة واسعة وعلاقات أوسع.

مع انحسار الاحتلال الإسرائيلي في الجنوب والبقاع الغربي، وتركز العمليات الجهادية هناك، كان للحاج حسان عدة مشاركات ميدانية في تلك المناطق. شارك في عمليات نوعية، أبرزها اقتحام مواقع إسرائيلية، كاقتحام موقع «تومات نيحا» (عام 1988).

قتاله للعدوّ في ساحات الجهاد جعله يلحظ بعض العقبات والمشاكل، التي كانت تواجه المجاهدين في الميدان، فما كان منه إلا أن سعى لاجتراح الحلول لتخطيها. بدأ من سلاح الإشارة، الذي عمل جاهداً لتطويره من خلال استحداث تعديلات برزت آثارها في المنظومتين السلكية واللاسلكية (الاتصالات)، مروراً باهتمامه بكل ما استجد في عالم التكنولوجيا الأمنية منها والعسكرية، وذلك مِن خلال اطلاعه الدائم على التطور المتسارع حول العالم. لم يكن يوفر أي فرصة لاستغلال كل جديد يمكنه أن يفيد المقاومة. لهذا الهدف سعى دوماً لاستقدام ما أمكنه مِن التكنولوجيا المتطورة، ووضعها بتصرف الجسم المقاوم، حتى بات لاحقاً هو «المرجع التكنولوجي» الأول لدى جميع قيادات المقاومة. هو صاحب العمل الدؤوب، كمشارك، في انتخاب الترسانة الصاروخية وتطويرها لدى المقاومة. توسع في بحوثه على هذا الصعيد، حتى بات المستشار الأول لدى القيادة العسكرية في كل مرة يعرض عليها أسلحة جديدة.
لاحقاً، كبرت التحديات، خصوصاً بعد أن استعرت المقاومة واشتدت أساليب العدوّ الاحترازية. دأب على اقتراح الأفكار وإيجاد الحلول لمواجهة تحديات البرّ وصعوبات الموانع الأرضيّة، إلى أن بدأ بالتفكر في كيفية الاستفادة من السماء لمواجهة صعوبات الأرض. «كنت أسخر منه»، يقول صديق الحاج حسان، قبل أن يُتابع: «في كل مرة أدخل عليه وأجده يحاول تركيب القطع الخشبية وتثبيتها بموتور صغير، كنت أسأله: هل تتوقع أن هذه القطع ستستطيع الإقلاع؟ كان يجيبني ضاحكاً، إنما بكل ثقة: لن تقلع فقط، سوف أجعلها تُصوّر، وما يدريك قد أجعلها تحمل سلاحاً في ما بعد».

إذاً، تلك الفكرة انطلقت بالأساس في عام 1988. كان ذلك حينما قرر الشاب الطموح، الذي لم يكن يؤمن بوجود «المستحيل» أو «غير الممكن»… أن يقتحم السماء.
بدأ أولاً من غرفته الصغيرة، اشترى مخرطة، وكان يجمع «موتورات» بسيطة، يلصق بها قطعاً خشبية، ثم يُحاول أن يجعلها تطير.

محاولة، محاولتان، عشرات المحاولات الفاشلة، وينجح أخيراً في جعل إحدى تلك التصاميم تُحلّق. هنا، وبأسلوبه المتواضع المقنع المتين، استطاع أن يحوّل هذه الفكرة إلى قناعة عند القيادات والمسؤولين، قبل أن يُترجم ذلك إلى ما سيُعرف لاحقاً بـ«وحدة القوة الجويّة للمقاومة الإسلاميّة».

هذا المسار لم يكن سهلاً، فكل إنجاز فيه كان يكلّف الحاج حسان، ومعه فريق العمل الذي شكّله لاحقاً، الكثير من الدراسة والتخطيط والبرمجة والعمل في الليل والنهار. كانوا يحرصون على الجاهزية والاستعداد والتطوير، ذلك لأنهم آمنوا بأن المعركة التكنولوجية مع العدو لن تنتهي. كلّف هذا العمل الكثير من التضحية بالوقت والجهد، وصولاً إلى الأنفس. لم تُكشَف أسماء رواد تلك المرحلة، باستثناء الذين استشهدوا منهم، وهم، إلى جانب الحاج حسان، حسين أيوب وجميل سكاف. هذان كانا من الذين برعوا في ذاك المجال، وكانت شهادتهما وهما يشاركان في تطويره.

التضحية، عند هؤلاء، لم تكن عائقاً. كانت حافزاً للاستمرار، ولذا، تابع الحاج حسان العمل على تطوير الطائرات المُسيّرة عن بُعد. لهذا الهدف زار معامل الطائرات في إيران. حضر العديد من المناورات هناك، والتقى الكثير من الإيرانيين المختصين في هذا الشأن، كي يستفيد من خبراتهم لتطوير النُسخ التي كان توصل إليها. لم يتوقف يوماً عن البحث عن كل جديد، على المستوى العالمي، للاستفادة من أي تطور تكنولوجي يخصّ عمله.

هذا العمل دفع بالإسرائيليين إلى أن يعدّوا الحاج حسان اللقيس أحد ضباط حرب الأدمغة، القائمة، على أكثر من صعيد، بينهم وبين المقاومة. هذا ما جعل الإسرائيلي يحاول اغتياله في مطلع التسعينات. يومها، جرى زرع عبوة قرب منزله في بعلبك، بحسب صديق الشهيد، حيث «كان عائداً إلى منزله، واعترضت طريقه جرافة، فأراد تجاوزها، لكنه لم يستطع. ثم اتجه يميناً، بهدف تخطيها، وفي تلك اللحظة دوّى انفجار كبير عند الناحية الأخرى». أخطأ العدو حين اعتقد أن محاولات اغتيال اللقيس ستضعف عزيمته، إذ عاد بعد تلك الحادثة لمتابعة عمله على الصعيدين، الصاروخي والجوي، بقوة أكثر، مع توسعة الأطر أكثر.

بعد الاندحار الإسرائيلي عن لبنان، عام 2000، أصبح عمله أوسع وصار للطائرات المسيّرة عن بُعد، أو ما يعرف بوحدة القوة الجوية، عدة معامل يديرها مع الفريق الذي اختاره ودرّبه بعناية. كان السيد نصرالله يزور تلك المعامل في شكل دوري، فيطلع على تطوراتها، كما إن قادة العمليات باتوا يطالبون بإشراك تلك الطائرات في عملياتهم العسكرية، وذلك لما كانت تعود به من فائدة على مستوى نجاح العمليات.

على مدى كل تلك السنين، كانت الطائرات المُسيّرة عن بُعد هي العين الجوية النافذة للمقاومة، قبيل أعمالها العسكرية وخلالها، ولم يكن هذا إلا بعض ما كان يُخطط له الحاج حسان. ظهرت آثار هذا النشاط بوضوح خلال حرب تموز 2006. آنذاك عاد العدو ليتربص بهذا القائد، الذي أقلقه لسنوات طوال، فاستغل اندلاع الحرب ليحاول اغتياله مجدداً. لقد ورد ذلك على لسان الإسرائيليين. يقول صديقه المقرّب: «كنت منهمكاً في عملي. هاتفني الحاج عماد مغنية ليخبرني أنه رأى للتو الحاج حسان على التلفاز، خلال النقل المباشر إثر تدمير مبنى في منطقة الشياح، وطلب مني الذهاب إليه وإخباره ضرورة ابتعاده عن المكان». ويتابع الصديق: «علمت حين وصلت أنه كان يحاول البحث بين الأنقاض عن ولده علي (18 سنة)، الذي كان موجوداً في المبنى. قال لي الشهيد لاحقاً إنه كان حضر إلى المبنى لإيصال حقيبة لولده، لكن وبعيد مغادرته المكان أغار الطيران الإسرائيلي على المبنى فدمره». استشهد ابنه. يذكر محدّثنا: «كان جسوراً على رغم الفقد، غادر المكان وعاد يتابع عمله المطلوب بصلابة وقوة. لاحظنا هذه الصلابة حتى حين رافقناه لرؤية ولده الشهيد في المستشفى، بعد ثلاثة أيام من العدوان، فودّعه سريعاً عائداً إلى عمله بعزم حتى نهاية الحرب».

حاول الإسرائيليون اغتياله بزرع عبوة في مطلع التسعينات وأخرى أثناء الحرب عام 2006

انتهت الحرب، وبقي شبح اللقيس يلاحق الإسرائيلي الذي لم يستطع لا بقتله لولده، ولا بتدميره لمنازله أن يثبط ولو جزءاً من عزيمة هذا الرجل. فقد عاد فوراً، وحتى قبل إعادة بناء منزله، لمتابعة عمله في المجال الجوي. بعد حرب تموز 2006، أخذ العمل في الطائرات المسيّرة عن بُعد منحىً تصاعدياً في ضوء نتائج الحرب. فعمل الحاج مستفيداً من التطورات العلمية والقدرات الموجودة بيد المقاومة ليخلص إلى نماذج جديدة تلبي الحاجات المستجدة بعد الحرب.

لم يقتصر عمل الطائرات المسيّرة عن بُعد على المقاومة في لبنان، ففي سوريا مثلاً، كان لها الفضل في معظم المواجهات التي حصلت. وتعدّ معركة القصير من أبرز الشواهد على ذلك.
يخبرنا صديق الشهيد أن الأخير عرض عليه بعد معركة القصير فيلماً يظهر كيف كانت تلك الطائرات تعمل في أثناء المعركة، حيث كانت تصور، فتنتقل الصورة مباشرة إلى غرفة القيادة، والتي كانت بدورها تتواصل مع المجموعة الميدانية، فتطلعهم على تفاصيل المكان وتكشف لهم أماكن تواجد المسلحين. كان ذلك يخفف من زهق الأرواح ويساعد على نجاح العملية نتيجة تراكم المعرفة. يضيف صديق الشهيد: «بعد معركة القصير، أطلعني الشهيد على مخطط جديد، يهدف إلى تسليح الطائرة مما يمكننا أن نستعملها في التصوير ثم القصف. وذكرني كيف أنه أخبرني بهذا الهدف في البدايات». يتابع صديق الشهيد: «وفعلاً، بعد مدة بسيطة، عاد فعرض لي فيديو يظهر نجاح المناورة التي نفذ فيها هذا المخطط».

استشهد الحاج حسان، لكن فكره ونهجه وثمار عمله استمر حتى يومنا هذا، بالقوة والعزيمة ذاتهما، وتابع الفريق تطوير أعماله وإنجازاته. وامتدت آثار هذا العمل بعد سوريا. وحتى الآن، لم يُعرف الحاج حسّان على حقيقته لا من قبل العدوّ ولا الصديق، لكن ستكشف بعض آثاره في الحرب المقبلة، من خلال القوة الجويّة والمسيّرات التابعة للمقاومة الإسلامية، حين تتصدر وسائل الإعلام مقولة «طيران المقاومة يغير على… إسرائيل».

Sayyed Nasrallah: Hezbollah Will Strike Israeli Drones over Lebanon, Zionist Soldiers on Border Must Stand on a Leg and a Half and Await Us

August 25, 2019

Mohammad Salami


Hezbollah Secretary General Sayyed Hasan Nasrallah confirmed on Sunday that the Islamic Resistance will confront all the Israeli drones which violate the Lebanese airspace, and endeavor to down them, adding that the party will prevent ‘Israel’ from repeating in Lebanon the same aggression path it followed against the Hashd Shaabi sites in Iraq at any price.

“The time at which Israeli war jets used to strike targets in Lebanon while the usurping entity in Palestine kept safe has ended.” “If any Lebanese party opposes our decision, let it ask the Americans to rein in ‘Israel’.”

Delivering a speech during Hezbollah ceremony which marks the second anniversary of the Second Liberation, Sayyed Nasrallah stressed that party will do anything possible to prevent ‘Israel’ from pursuing this new aggression path, calling on the Zionists across the entity to keep worried and expect the Resistance attacks at any time.

Hezbollah Secretary General described the Israeli drone attack on Dahiyeh as very dangerous, clarifying that the Israeli drone has a military nature and devised by the Zionist army to carry out a suicide attack on a target in the southern suburb of Beirut.

“Hezbollah possesses the drone and may show it publicly in coordination with the state security apparatuses in Lebanon.”

The above mentioned drone was flying at a low attitude when a group of young men in the targeted area of Moawad stoned it, so it fell down, according to Sayyed Nasrallah who added that after one minute another drone carried out a suicide attack as it had been booby-trapped.

Sayyed Nasrallah stressed that although the attack did not claim martyrs, it indicates a very dangerous development which may be repeated on a daily basis if it keeps unanswered, highlighting that “this was the first Israeli attack on Lebanon since 2006 war”.

If we do not respond to the Zionist attack on Dahiyeh, ‘Israel’ will repeat the same model used to attack the Hashd Shaabi sites in Iraq.”

Sayyed Nasrallah stressed that Hezbollah will not the enemy to turn back the clock on the new formulas which have protected Lebanon, calling on all the Lebanese to support the national right in face of the Israeli aggression.

“If the Zionist enemy thinks that the financial pressure on Hezbollah will push it to surrender, we reiterate that we are ready to sell our houses in order to fight and defend our dignity, sovereignty and presence.”

Commenting on the Israeli air raids on Syria on Saturday night, Sayyed Nasrallah clarified that they targeted a Hezbollah site there and claimed two martyrs, stressing that they may never remain unanswered.

Sayyed Nasrallah recalled his threat that if the Israeli attacks on Syria claim any of Hezbollah members, the Resistance will respond in Lebanon, adding that Hezbollah will respond to the Zionist airstrikes overnight on Syria in Lebanon.

Sayyed Nasrallah addressed the Israeli troops on Lebanon’s border,

“Stand on a leg and a half and wait for our response which may take place at any time on the borders and beyond the borders.”

(“Stand on a leg and a half” means that the Zionist soldiers must keep trembling with fear and wait for Hezbollah response.)

The Israelis must know that their prime minister Benjamin Netanyahu aims at winning the parliamentary elections at the expense of their blood,  according to Sayyed Nasrallah who added that the Zionist leader lies to the settlers by alleging that the overnight air strikes targeted Iranian troops in Syria.

“Netnayahu is pulling the Lebanese, Syrian, Palestinian and Iraqi fire to the entity and pushing you into the abyss,” his eminence told the Zionist settlers.

Hezbollah leader had started his speech by hailing the “great” attendance of the resistance supporters at the ceremony titled “The Nation’s Safeguard”, stressing that it represents the first response to the Israeli attacks.

Sayyed Nasrallah congratulated the Bekaa locals and the rest of the Lebanese on the Second Liberation Day which marks defeating the terrorist groups on the northeastern border with Syria, felicitating also the Syrians on the Second Liberation Day because Syria benefited greatly from the victory.

Hezbollah Chief recalled the anniversary of kidnapping Imam Sayyed Mousa Al-Sadr and his two companions (August 31), stressing that resistance path has prospered thanks to his eminence.

Sayyed Nasrallah explained that the terrorist threat in the Lebaonon-Syria border area was existential and the victory of the militant groups of Nusra Front and ISIL has never been a secondary event.

The terrorist scheme which was launched in Syria in 2011 aimed at fragmenting the region on sectarian and racial basis after destroying it, according to Sayyed Nasrallah who added that axis of resistance frustrated all that plot.

“We have to recall the terrorists’ control of the Lebanon-Syria borders. We also have to recall the Lebanese political stances which supported the militant groups.”

Sayyed Nasrallah pointed out that the US administration asked the Lebanese authorities not only to refrain from launching a campaign to liberate the northeastern outskirts from the terrorist groups but also to prevent Hezbollah from doing that, adding that the Americans are even now refreshing ISIL terrorist group in Iraq, Afghanistan and other areas in the region.

“US helicopters save ISIL leaders in Afghanistan and plotting to incite a civil war in the country.”

Sayyed Nasrallah highlighted the Syrian army achievements, stressing that it will certainly regain control Idlib and Eastern Euphrates.

Sayyed Nasrallah maintained that the victory over Nusra Front and ISIL on Lebanon-Syria border pushed away the terrorist danger for an area of more than 50 square kilometers, adding that Hezbollah is still deploying troops on Lebanon-Syria border to repel any possible terrorist infiltration into the Lebanese territories.

Sayyed Nasrallah also called on the Lebanese government to take the needs of the Lebanese who live in Syria’s Qusair into the consideration of its socioeconomic projects, hailing their role in achieving the victory over the terrorist groups.

Domestically, Sayyed Nasrallah reiterated Hezbollah support to the socioeconomic demands of Al-Bekaa locals, blaming the sectarian considerations which frustrate the development projects and urging the Lebanese authorities to assume their responsibilities in this regard.

Sayyed Nasrallah stressed that Hezbollah will exert all the needed efforts to pass the law pertaining establishing Baalbeck-Hermel Development Council, adding that “we may resort to demonstrations and sit-ins if the other ways were blocked”.

His emeince also called on Bekaa locals to cooperate with the state authorities to restore peace in the area, urging them to reject all those who disrepute the families and their honorable history.

The ceremony, held in Al-Ain town in Bekaa, was started with a recital of a number of Holy Quranic verses before a group of of Hezbollah fighters recalled allegiance to the General Commander of the Islamic Resistance troops Sayyed Hasan Nasrallah.

Source: Al-Manar English Website

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On the Battlefield of the Second Liberation: Sayyed Nasrallah’s Meeting with Islamic Resistance Officers

By Maysaa Moukaddem

Beirut – Hezbollah’s Secretary General, His Eminence Sayyed Hassan Nasrallah, is no stranger to attracting the masses. Both friend and foe are mindful of him.

The masses know him through his speeches while some politicians know him closely through private meetings. What is unknown about the Secretary General is his battlefield personality and the way he deals with the military men during the battles.

He is always present on all battlefields, working both as a mentor and a leader and staying close to every soldier. His voice is always part of the conscience of the Mujahideen in the groves. They derive from him the impulse, spirit and much of the love that the battlefield requires.

A leader in the Islamic Resistance tells Al-Ahed News Website that “in 2013, when the leaders of the Islamic Resistance were planning to liberate Al-Qusayr, the Secretary General’s touches were also present. His Eminence determined the course of the attack on Al-Qusayr. After the leadership decided to attack Al-Qusayr, the debate was whether the resistance would attack from the north, i.e. from Tell Mando towards Arjoun and from Arjoun, the Mujahideen would bypass Dabaa Airbase and advance towards Al-Qusayr, or to start the attack from the south, i.e. from the place the resistance fighters reached the contact point with Al-Qusayr and start the offensive from Jisr Al-Mashtal towards Al-Qusayr.”

That’s where the leadership came in. The Secretary General resolved the decision. Sayyed Hassan Nasrallah gave the order that the attack be from the south and not from the north, from the contact points with al-Qusayr that the Mujahideen reached. That’s how it went.

Sayyed, who raises his finger threatening the “Israeli” entity with his military arsenal while the media and study centers analyze his speeches and read between the lines of his words, is a man who is careful with the blood of his sons and brothers (the resistance fighters) on the battlefield. He does not take this blood lightly. The Islamic Resistance leader tells Al-Ahed that most times, a lot of the battles could have been resolved a lot quicker. But Sayyed preferred the battles to take longer periods of time as long as the human losses were reduced and not many fighters were martyred.

Sayyed, who uses the power God gave him for the sake of truth, directs his wrath towards the enemy and his mercy towards the women, children and unarmed civilians. These are the ethics of true Islam, rooted in his heart. During the battles to liberate Lebanon’s Eastern Mountain Range, which ended with the Second Liberation in 2017, His Eminence introduced a series of limitations and restrictions.

The Secretary General intervened in many of the battles’ broader context. In the battles to liberate the Eastern Range, Sayyed intervened tactically, according to a leader in the Islamic Resistance who spoke to Al-Ahed. At the time, Sayyed listened to details from officers in the Islamic Resistance: “How will we maneuver? How will the infantry intervene? How will the bypass take place? The types of maneuvers…”

During a meeting with the officers and leaders of the Islamic Resistance, His Eminence the Secretary General set a number of restrictions, one of which was that civilians should not be attacked “especially when it comes to the [refugee] camps. Even if they fired at us from the camps, we try not to respond.” The other restriction, according to one of the leaders of the resistance, was that “if the resistance fighters were forced to respond to the source of the fire from the direction of the civilians, gunfire should only come accurate and focused weapons, so that it precisely responds to the source of the fire without any error. Even this kind of response, needed special permission.”

“Sayyed remained with us during all the operations. He was following up on everything with us,” the leader of the Islamic Resistance confirms to Al-Ahed. He, then, clarifies that during the meeting with his officers, Sayyed “spoke using military terminology. He behaved as a military commander addressing the scene on the battlefield that was unfolding before him. He set limitations and restrictions and gave his orders to his officers. Back then, Sayyed gave us the time we needed and more.

“You are not pressed for time or on a deadline,” he told us.

The military leader of the Islamic Resistance then changes gears and begins talking about emotions. Since it is rare for a military man to talk about emotions, we leave it to the readers to judge the character of the meeting between the officers in the Islamic Resistance and His Eminence Sayyed Hassan Nasrallah prior to the battles of the Second Liberation.

“Of course, we were overjoyed that we kissed him and kissed his hand. This is normal … We felt a very high moral push… very great … Of course, as persons we were in an emotional state. For example, we loved to take the rings from him, but we were shy. We liked to take something from him, but we were shy. There were strong emotions…”

Have the Zionists Forgotten their Defeat in Joroud Arsal? The Joroud Victory In ’Israel’s’ Eyes: No One Can Stop Hezbollah

By Hussein Mortada

Have the Zionists forgotten their defeat in Joroud Arsal? The answer to this question is certainly not. Their wager in favor of the terrorists was so great that one of the most prominent “Israeli” military analysts wrote for the Haaretz newspaper in the summer of 2013 that

“Israel” no longer needs to fight in Lebanon. Hezbollah has drowned in the Syrian conflict and will not survive it.”

Everything was pointing to the inevitability of a major battle in the Joroud with a very important dimension. It was a disappointment for the Zionists. It was also the battle of the second victory in Joroud Arsal and Qalamoun.

It did not start in July 2017. It started with the beginning of the war against Syria in 2011. The plans of the countries leading the aggression and supporting the militants depended on the principle of seizing full control over the border areas. They would then use these areas as a springboard to invade resistance-held territory using terrorist ground forces with NATO-“Israeli”-Gulf support and planning.

Moving the battle into the home front to preoccupy the resistance and the Lebanese army was the beginning. The objective was to take control of and strike the resistance’s environment. Therefore, the battle of liberating Joroud is more significant than the July 2006 victory because it was an “Israeli” battle with an “Israeli” objective and “Israeli” tools even though the La Ilaha Illa Allah [No God except Allah] flag was raised. The resistance achieved more victories, including the Qusair victory, Talkalakh at the northern border, Syria’s Qalamoun, Joroug Arsal, Ras Baalbek and al-Qaa. The most dangerous objective of the terrorists and their backers was invading the central Bekaa up until the border with Lebanon’s Shebaa Farms. Of course, these areas along with occupied Palestine would have all been under the control of the terrorists and the countries backing them. Meanwhile, they would have secured a maritime access from Tripoli in Lebanon.

In short, this is the battle of the border. This is what the resistance thwarted in cooperation with the Syrian army. Meanwhile, the Lebanese army played an important role at the end of the battle.

According to what was planned, these terrorist groups were supposed to start with plan (B), which is besieging the resistance, paralyzing its movements and striking it in its environment. Here, we recall that part of this plan had been put in motion through the use of car bombs as well as identifying certain parties in Lebanon that conform to these plans and ideas. Here several obvious questions must be asked:

What if the Syrian army and the resistance had decided not to take action early on in order to thwart this project?

  • What if these groups were left alone along the border areas to blow up whatever they wanted and kill and kidnap whomever they wanted?

Based on this plan, which is even related to the nature of the battle with the Zionists, it was necessary to work on its failure and destruction, albeit in stages. Due to the nature of the battle that is also associated with some Syrian regions, the resistance adopted the policy of capturing and then dividing the regions and stages. Thus, the battle of Qusair coincided with Syria’s Qusair. The battle of Talkalakh at the northern border was associated with the Syrian Zara area, which was an important corridor used by militants to move between Lebanon and the Syrian depth. The battles went from Qalamaoun, to Yabroud, to al-Zabadani to the Joroud in order to besiege these groups in these areas.

All the preparations were completed to clear Lebanese areas of any terrorist – after these groups carried out several bombings and killed a number of Lebanese army soldiers. As in every victory, the Golden Triangle, the army, the people and the resistance, was present.

The resistance launched the Joroud operation to eliminate the last hope these groups had to move the battle inside Lebanon. It was a delicate and sensitive operation where politics overlapped with the military, geography and strategy. Therefore, the second liberation’s dimensions are equally important to the first victory over the Zionists in 2000.

The resistance and the Lebanese army, on the one hand, and the Syrian army and the resistance, on the other, caught the terrorists in Joroud in a pincer. Hence, full victory was achieved and the lands were returned to their owners. Security and stability prevailed across the whole of Lebanon despite its complex geography. Thus, Lebanon was on a date with a great victory.

Have the Zionists Forgotten their Defeat in Joroud Arsal?

Al-Ahed Website

Beirut – The shock was evident on the face of “Israel’s” former war minister, Avigdor Lieberman. After days of censoring media and military institutions when it came to Hezbollah’s 2007 military campaign to liberate Lebanon’s eastern Joroud, the man was unable to admit the impact of the defeat. Hezbollah had liberated the Joroud from the terror of “Israel’s” agents, the Nusra Front and Daesh.

From the heart of Tel Aviv, Lieberman called on the units of the military headquarters to prepare for various scenarios, warning that “the next conflict with Lebanon will also include Syria.”

Amid a flurry of confusion, the chief of the “Israeli” military and security establishment spoke about the unity of the fronts and directed threats at both Lebanon and Syria.

“If we talk about the Lebanese front, there is no such front anymore. There will be one front that includes Syria and Lebanon together: Hezbollah, the Assad regime and all those collaborating with the Assad regime,” he said.

All the analysis aside, Lebanon heard the message clearly. The cohesion between the Lebanese army and the resistance deprived the concerned parties in “Israel” of their sleep.

“The Lebanese army has become an integral part of Hezbollah’s strength and is under its leadership. The Lebanese army has lost its independence and has become an integral part of Hezbollah’s strength,” Lieberman stressed.

Going with the saying, ‘thanks to the recognition of the enemy’, Hezbollah succeeded in creating another cause for concern along the “Israeli” front.

The enemy’s observers were surprised by the speed with which the victory was achieved. According to Maariv, “the battles of the eastern Joroud in Lebanon are sending a clear message to three heads: “Israel”, the United States and Saudi Arabia. The message implied that the group is very capable of defending itself against all threats. Its combat skills are growing with time.”

For its part, the “Israeli” website Nzivnet published a special report explaining the exact course of the battles.

“Hezbollah is engaged in fierce battles in Joruod Arsal including artillery shelling and even close quarter combat. Hezbollah can be seen working as a trained army that operates heavy machinery such as armored personnel carriers, artillery, mortars shells and others. Meanwhile, the Radwan force – the force assigned to occupy the Galilee in the next war with “Israel” – carries out complex commando operation such as taking control of isolated places and caves,” the site reported.

“Hezbollah does not appear to be a guerrilla organization that “Israel” knew in the 90s and the beginning of the third millennium,” Nzivnet added.

The website underscores fears about “the flags of Hezbollah and Lebanon fluttering together atop a hill in the Wadi al-Khail region. This is the image of Hezbollah’s victory over terrorism. It is not in Aleppo or in Daraa. It is in Arsal, at home. Hezbollah has come back to fight at home. It is sending us signals too. And no one can stop it.”

“Israeli” worries spilled over from the battlefield into the political front. According to Haaretz, “Hezbollah took responsibility for the negotiations as if it were the Lebanese government. The party succeeded in securing the approval of the Lebanese army to adhere to the agreement it reached to deport fighters of the Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham.”

“This move by Hezbollah may not have any far-reaching strategic consequences from a military perspective, unlike the removal of al-Qaeda from the Lebanese border. But the organization will know how to capitalize on it when the time comes to discuss security in areas neighboring Lebanon,” Haaretz added.

Perhaps the entity’s fear is embodied in a few words said by the head of the “Israeli” military surveillance apparatus, Herzl Halevi, as he addressed the Joroud battles.

“Hezbollah is a stone’s throw away from the “Israeli” border.”

Iran’s battle strategy in Syria and its impact

BEIRUT, LEBANON (5:30 A.M.) – At the start of 2013, the Syrian War was looking unfavorable for the Syrian Arab Army (SAA), as a militant offensive in Aleppo cutoff the city from all government supply lines and the strategic East Ghouta region had all but fallen to Jaysh Al-Islam and the Free Syrian Army (FSA).

Making matters worse, the government had lost most of Syria’s northern border with Turkey and their western border with Lebanon. This would later prove to be a major issue for the military as foreign militants were pouring into the country from these regions.

Enter Hezbollah and Iran

The Spring of 2013 would prove to be an important period in the Syrian War. Both Hezbollah and Iran would enter the conflict on the side of the government and help the Syrian military regain the initiative in Homs, Aleppo, and Damascus.

Hezbollah’s deployment to Syria helped the government regain the Lebanese border by capturing the strategic crossing at Al-Qusayr, followed by Tal Kalakh and the majority of the Qalamoun Mountains.

The Lebanese group also provided reinforcements to several areas across the country in order to help stabilize these fronts.

While Hezbollah’s entry into the Syrian conflict is often viewed as the first time foreign fighters had entered the war, this is indeed false. Militants from several countries across the world had already entered Syria and began fighting alongside the rebel forces.

Several of these foreign fighters would later join jihadist groups like Jabhat Al-Nusra and the Islamic State (ISIS/ISIL/IS/Daesh).

However, unlike Hezbollah, Iran would play a pivotal role behind the scenes in 2013, offering their military advisers to help Damascus concoct a new battle plan.

The plan would focus on a four-corners strategy that would see the Syrian military maintain a presence in four corners of the country, giving the government an area of influence despite the absence of supply routes.

Four Corners Strategy

From 2013 to 2017, the Syrian government maintained a presence in several parts of the country. Since it was difficult to maintain control over the vast desert and mountainous regions, the strategy was to focus on the major cities and spreading out the militants so that the army could regain critical areas around the capital city.

It may appear a bit unorthodox, but the strategy ultimately helped the Syrian military maintain a presence in eastern Syria, where the U.S. and its allies attempted to expand across during the war with ISIS.

For example, the Syrian military kept a presence in the Al-Hasakah Governorate, despite the fact they were surrounded by the Kurdish-led People’s Protection Units (YPG)

While the Syrian military and the YPG were not fighting each other and their presence in Al-Hasakah was only threatened by ISIS, the army’s decision to stay inside Deir Ezzor city after losing their supply lines from Homs raised a few questions at the time.

Thousands of Syrian troops were besieged in Deir Ezzor and ordered to continue fighting ISIS from 2015 to 2017 when the siege was finally lifted. Prior to the arrival of the Russian Armed Forces in September of 2015, the Deir Ezzor front was under daily attacks by the Islamic State, leaving many to fear for the lives of the people and troops inside the city.

Had the army made the decision to retreat from Deir Ezzor city, ISIS could have sent their forces to other fronts and expanded their presence inside of Syria. Furthermore, it allowed the Syrian Army to maintain control of the city once the U.S.-led Coalition began expanding south of Al-Hasakah.

Finally, the entry of the Russian Armed Forces would play a decisive role in the conflict, as the Syrian Arab Army was able to finally launch multiple offensives to regain most of the country.

Present Day

Iran still desires a complete military victory in Syria, but with the continued Israeli attacks on their positions in the country and U.S. economic pressure through sanctions, the Islamic Republic has been forced to take a more defensive role in the region.

This defensive role has allowed Russia to champion the recent Syrian military operations, while they concentrate on other matters, including the proxy war in the eastern part of the country.

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How Syria Won The Revolution; The Jihadi Factor


February 06, 2019

By Ghassan and Intibah Kadi

How Syria Won The Revolution; The Jihadi Factor

The “War on Syria” has had many unintended twists and turns that were unforeseeable at the time it began. The plotters had no reason to believe they were going to lose, and the defenders had no option other than doing all they could and risk and sacrifice all that was dear and precious.

However, as frontlines are now being redrawn in Syria in preparation for the final showdown, a recapitulation of the events of the last eight years reveals that Syria did in fact end up having a revolution, but the group that embarked on the initial alleged revolution, the Free Syria Army (FSA) is nowhere to be seen.

This brings us back to the initial “Anti-Syrian Cocktail” that I wrote an article about back in early 2011; The ring leader was Prince Bandar Bin Sultan, son of then Crown Prince Sultan, and the man who hoped he would be the first grandson of founding King Abdul-Aziz to become king. In two subsequent articles, “The Anti-Syrian Politics” ( and “The Anti Syrian Vendetta”, the articles focused on how Bandar tried to raise the largest army he could conjure, and with virtually bottomless funds, he put together a very loosely-united cocktail of groups who had nothing in common other than their hatred towards Syria.

In more ways than one, pre-King Faisal Saudi Arabia kept to itself. Founder, King Abdul-Aziz who died in 1953, had the doctrinal substance that would have exported Wahhabism to neighbouring Muslim countries, but his main concern was to bolster his domain over his new kingdom and give it a strong foundation that would secure its longevity. His successor son Saud was infamous for his orgies and debauchery. He capitalized on the spoils of the new-found wealth and did not have any agenda other than indulging in earthly pleasures. It wasn’t until he was deposed and replaced by his brother Faisal in 1964 that Saudi Arabia had a king who was a fundamentalist and also desirous of spreading Wahhabism to the outside Muslim World.

And when the “War on Syria” began, and long before the identity of the would be willing fighter was well defined, I predicted in the same above-mentioned articles that a widely diverse coalition of enemies of Syria were banding together, using Muslim fundamentalism as a recruitment drive, and as the fundamentalist factor became clear for all to see, it eventually transpired that Qatar became a new kid on the block in providing bigtime funding to a number of terror organizations operating in Syria.

They were all not only united by their hatred for Syria, but also specifically to the Assad legacy; particularly due the fact that the Assads are Alawites, and in their eyes, infidels. Their main objective was to topple President Assad and ensure that Syria was ruled by an anti-Iranian Sunni fundamentalist government.

Bandar had no qualms at all about uniting the ununitable. To Bandar however, it was not about a war of ideologies, and he was no strict Muslim. To Bandar, the “War on Syria” was about power and curbing Iran’s influence in the region. That said, he found in the already-existing numerous Jihadi armies excellent tools and pawns to use. In doing so, he did not foresee the many fault lines emerging in his fragmented army, let alone seeing any reason to worry about such cracks because, in the beginning he seemed to be going from strength to strength, with a seemingly huge chance of success. When he presented his plan to his American masters, he received the thumbs up.

Like all other early indigenous writers who supported Syria from day one of the onslaught, we all took the optimistic view and kept reiterating that victory was certain, but only a question of time. We were mindful of the importance of keeping spirits up and boosting morale, and being optimistic about turns in events and alliances that were to Syria’s advantage. In retrospect however, up until the Syrian Arab Army’s (SAA) first substantial win of the battle of Qusayr in mid 2013, more than two years into the war, the Jihadis, combined, were winning the war and closing in on key government positions right across the Syrian terrain; including the main cities.

So how did events turn around and how did the “War on Syria” turn against the plotters?

To be able to predict what was to happen was unthinkable in hindsight. It is only now that we can sit and make sense by harking back at the events of the last few years.

It would be virtually impossible to work out which came first, the chicken or the egg, but there is no doubt at all that the resilience of Syrian people and the SAA played the most significant role. But that role could have been reversed had the plotters been better able to play their game to their advantage.

Fortunately the plotters didn’t, but had they played down the role of Jihad and tried to capitalize on political reform, they would have perhaps been better able to achieve their insidious objectives.

Before the war, Syria was fraught with corruption and there were many reasons to call for reform. Agitators aside, was why the initial demonstrations in Daraa were conducted under this banner. It was under this guise also that the infamous FSA was formed as a splinter group of the regular SAA. Virtually all of the FSA officers and soldiers were SAA defectors.

For a while, a fair while, and long before ISIS and Al-Nusra came to prominence, the FSA was the major fighting force against the regular army (SAA).

During those initial months, it was very difficult to convince sympathizers of the so-called Syrian opposition that this was not a civil war, that it was not about reform, and that it was simply a conspiracy against Syria, planned and orchestrated by her regional and international adversaries, using and employing Islamist Jihadists and their supporting nations. The reason behind this difficulty was because those fundamentalist fighters were nowhere to be seen.

This was why many activists, including some prominent pro-Palestine Western activists, were adamant in their support of the “revolution” and genuinely believed that it was a popular revolt seeking reform and political plurality among other things.

In hindsight now, looking back at it all, had the mastermind plotters seen the benefit in the reform/freedom guise, had they had the wisdom and foresight in weighing out their benefits of overtly importing and arming fundamentalist fighters as against focusing their efforts on duping the public and generating real and genuine dissent amongst Syrians to their government, they might have succeeded in creating a revolution that served their agendas.

After all, it would have been conceivable for the plotters to promote misinformation and make it look plausible and endorsable. There is another chicken and egg scenario here. Did the plotters import Jihadi fighters because they weren’t able to mobilize enough Syrians against their government, or did Syrians support their government because the plotters brought in foreign Jihadi fighters?

Whichever one came first here, the chicken or the egg, neither one of them had to cross the road for the people of Syria to ask questions in order to see that what they were witnessing was not a revolution as touted by world media; especially the Western media and their Arab cohorts such as Al-Jazeera and Al-Arabiya.

Perhaps the plotters’ biggest failure was in being unable to hide their intentions and disguise in a manner that reflected to Syrians that there was indeed a popular and genuine reform-based revolution in their country for them to join.


In other words, by allowing the so-called civil war/revolution to show its brutal and ugly fundamentalist sectarian face, the plotters turned many Syrian sympathizers and many other would-be supporters against them. And this was how secular free-minded Syrians flocked together in support of their legitimate secular government; whether they believed that reform was necessary or otherwise. This was the reason why genuine supporters of reform and patriots who are in positions of political opposition to the government all banded together to fight the real enemy. This of course bolstered not only the government’s position, but also that of the SAA and this played a significant role in creating a much more resolute and united Syria.

The plotters also failed in being able to produce a charismatic figure head for the “revolution”. All the while secular Syrians looked up to President Assad and the First Lady; two figure heads charming in every way, and with the power to unite by leading by example.

Of significance also was the fact that the disunited “Anti-Syrian Cocktail” was bound to fragment sooner or later; not only on strategic and doctrinal lines, but also on matters of power sharing, loyalty, and splitting of spoils. To this effect, clashes between different fundamentalist organizations became daily events.

Later on, as the turn of events presented to the plotters and their henchmen that victory was impossible, especially after Russia entered the ground and sky, their infighting morphed into that of survival and hope for better positions on either reconciliation tables or on disengagement talks, or both. Those Jihadi versus Jihadi battles in latter times continued to rage culminating recently in a total takeover by Al-Nusra of all other terror groups in Idlib.

Whilst I have always reiterated in previous articles that there was hardly any difference at all between the numerous fundamentalist Islamic Jihadi organizations, the Wahhabi faction that is loyal to Saudi Arabia has lost abysmally to the Qatari/Turkish led Muslim Brotherhood (MB) faction which is now in full control of the last bastion left for terrorists west of the Euphrates, and specifically in Idlib and surrounds.

With this, Erdogan feels that he still has a finger in the pie before final negotiations commence about the future of the terrorist enclave. Whether those delay tactics work or not for Erdogan, whether they preclude the need for a military resolution is yet to be seen. Any such resolution however will give Erdogan a form of a consolation prize, a humble victory that he badly seeks in Syria after all of his initial gambles went terribly wrong.

At this juncture, we must pause and ask what became of the movement that allegedly represented the passion of Syrians for secular and democratic reform. Where is the FSA now?

If the news about Al-Nusra’s total control of the Idlib region is accurate, we must then assume that the FSA is no longer in existence, because prior to the recent upheaval between Al-Nusra and other brigades in the region, the presence of the FSA was restricted to this area.

Ironically, the FSA has had a late resurgence not too long ago before Al-Nusra wiped out all rival militia, but Erdogan seems to have pulled the plug on the FSA, but for some reason, there is nothing I can find in the news from the region, or anywhere for this matter, to confirm this conclusion or debunk it.

What is clear is that the FSA, the only dissenting player that had in the very early beginnings a miniscule semblance of secular Syrian dissent, perhaps the only player that could have potentially turned into a popular revolution, has been disempowered and dismantled by the same demonic forces that created it and funded it.

Either way, whether Erdogan has done the dirty on the FSA or not, the FSA lost its position and clout when its role was overtaken by the many Islamist terrorist organizations. It tried hard to maintain its presence even though many of its rank-and-file rejoined the SAA, whilst others changed uniform and joined Al-Nusra, but the short of it is that the FSA has become a spent force.

Syria had many problems before the war and continues to grapple with some of them. Wars of such devastating magnitude almost invariably leave behind not only a trail of mess and destruction, but also a countless number of corrupt officials and profiteers. Every dog has its day, and the cleanup will soon begin.

But the irony is that with the “War on Syria”, the lines have been drawn and Syrians now know well who is with them and who is against them, domestically, regionally and internationally. They know what alliances they need to nurture and which others to seek. They know what political system they want and which they totally refute. They have chosen and fought for a government they were told decades ago that it came to power by a popular revolution back in March 1963, and later on reformed by Hafez Assad’s “corrective movement” of November 1970, but the choice Syrians made from 2011 onwards was their own, and they upheld it with tears and blood.

Syria has gone the full circle against her enemies and against archaic and brutal dogmas. It seems that Syria has truly ended up having a revolution after all, a real revolution, and that real revolution has won. There is a great opportunity now to rebuild the nation, to rebuild it on wholesome, principled, virtuous and sound foundations.

The ’Sayyed’ Who Never Left the Bekaa «السيد» الذي لم يغادر البقاع يوماً

Abbas Fneish

04-05-2018 | 08:10

In his last electoral speech addressing the people of the Bekaa [a few days ago], Hezbollah Secretary General Sayyed Hassan Nasrallah was eager to inject political momentum into the electoral battle, focusing on what awaits Lebanon and the region on May 6th. He thanked everyone who contributed to his detracting from the risk of appearing personally at the Bekaa to urge people to vote and participate. It is the Bekaa where Sayyed spent a great deal of his life.

Sayyed Nasrallah

The young man who studied in a Hawza [seminary] and who was running away from the regime of Saddam Hussein did not feel estranged in that city. He did not sense any difference between his family home in the Southern village of Bazuria, which he left at the age of fifteen, and his new residence in the Sheikh Habib neighborhood in the city of Baalbek. With his thick glasses, heavy beard and slim figure he snuck into people’s hearts here. Soon whispers of the “Sayyed Hassan”, the political leader of the Amal Movement in the Bekaa, will spread throughout the city of the sun. This was at the end of the 1970s.

Because he was the Imam of communal prayers in the Imam Ali Mosque in the neighborhood of Sheikh Habib, his knowledge of Bekaa and its people expanded. The close proximity of the mosque to the Imam al-Montathar Hawza, founded by his mentor Sayyed Abbas al-Musawi, as well as the latter’s care for him made Sayyed Hassan more connected to the people. He transformed from being a preacher introducing people to the revolutionary Islamic movement to being one of them. He shared their concerns, rooted in their habits, and roamed through their markets. There, he was blessed with his two children Jawad and Zainab.

With the “Israeli” invasion of Lebanon in 1982 and the arrival of elements of the Islamic Republic of Iran’s Revolutionary Guard Corps in coordination with Sayyed Abbas al-Musawi, the first features of what will later become known as Hezbollah was formed. In this context, Sayyed Hasan was able to attract people and mobilize them. He was the first to call [for resistance]. He would stand in the first row at times. At other times he would be standing on the “pick up” truck. He moved from town to town. He got to know them as they got to know him. He knew the tribes and families as they knew him. He moved from Hawsh al-Sayyed Ali to al-Karak and from Shmustra to Younine until his dialect became mixed with words from Baalbek because it was affected by his mingling with the people of that region.

From Beirut to the Bekaa

His goal was to encourage people to participate in military courses to learn how to bear arms to resist “Israel”. However, he did not forget his role as a preacher whether in Imam al-Montathar Hawza or among the people. During the month of Ramadan, the young Sayyed gave up all his work and headed towards the areas of the al-Jaafar clan in Faysan, Joura Qaddur, Ruwaymah and others. These were remote areas and very difficult to reach. Sayyed used to free himself to teach them the provisions of religion. The people around him sensed two aspects of his personality that will accompany him along his path: his astounding patience and his anticipation of the future. He used to say those would one day become the backbone of the rising resistance.

Hezbollah’s formations went public. Sayyed became responsible for the Bekaa region and, in parallel, the Friday Prayers Imam in the town of al-Nabi Sheeth. His work began to take an organizational direction. He followed-up, examined the details, especially the ones related to the military courses and those enrolling from the first day until graduation. He put himself at their disposal as a permanent instructor giving political and doctrinal lessons at the Janta camp. At the same time, he was not disconnected from Beirut or the South. He was a member of the party’s Shura Council before moving to Beirut in 1985 to become the head of Hezbollah’s Executive Council and then the top official in Southern Lebanon. Despite all this, he always remained present in the Bekaa. His home remained open, and he maintained a direct presence, especially at major events such as al-Quds International Day.

With the martyrdom of Sayyed Abbas al-Musawi and his assumption of the General Secretariat, the Islamic Resistance moved to another pattern. He remained present in the field in the Bekaa during graduations following the completion of military courses or in gathering the cadres and emphasizing the importance of the role of the region in resisting the occupation. The occupied Western Bekaa axis belonged to the Bekaa region. Therefore, he was deliberately present at every qualitative or sensitive operation and would delve into the most precise details.

The martyrs in the Bekaa and their families had the largest share of his interest. He took part in funeral processions. He was a speaker at the wakes. He was a celebrant of one of the sons and daughters [of the martyrs’ families]. If the circumstances demanded a postponement of the visit, the visit was never left uncompleted. Most houses in the Bekaa keep commemorative photos taken in person with “His Eminence Sayyed”.

From the liberation war to July 2006

In 1997, during the so-called “Revolution of the Hungry”, Sayyed’s recommendations to the people were to endure, assimilate and not to be drawn into any friction. When asked why, he used put the interest of the Bekaa, its people and its tribes before the organizational interest. People were always the key. They met Sayyed in the middle of the road. They invited him to their villages and homes to renew their allegiance. So, he went to Hermel, Shmustar, Tarayah, Bednayel, Shaath and other areas.

“His Eminence Sayyed’s” influence was above any consideration, blood and revenge. Any friction between any two clans was solved with a visit from a cadre of Hezbollah carrying the following message: “His Eminence, Sayyed, greets you”.

In that year, the martyrdom of Sayyed Hadi Nasrallah brought sadness to every house in the Bekaa. The Husayniyahs and the houses of mourning were opened to accept condolences for the young man who grew up among them. Some of them still remember him today as a child in the company of his father and his brother Jawad in a Mercedes.

The 2000 liberation resonated stronger in the Bekaa than in the South. As usual, Sayyed envisioned the next stage in preparation for a war with the enemy. He intensified his tours with the leader, Hajj Imad Mughniyeh, in the region to view the specialized courses. He opened some of them and graduated others. He was also informed in detail of the military readiness of the different units.

During the July 2006 war, the commander of the resistance was not disconnected from the Bekaa. During the war, he carefully followed-up on the function of the various apparatuses. After it, he followed-up on everything related to the martyrs and reconstruction.

Facing the Takfiris

The year 2011 formed a new and important post in the Bekaa. The movement of militants in Syria would soon become an escalating threat on the eastern border of Lebanon. During the beginning of 2012, the terrorist factions started violations on the other side of the border until the city of Qusayr fell into the hands of the militants. Attacks were unleashed around 30 thousand Lebanese residing in Syrian villages. The Secretary General of Hezbollah sent for the concerned parties and held a detailed meeting to assess the situation. He was as keen on the Bekaa and its people as he was with the national sovereignty of Lebanon, which was being threatened along its eastern frontier. The decision was purely defensive. It was based on the cooperation with the Lebanese people in the threatened villages to arm, train and organize them as needed to defend their land. But his main purpose was to form committees responsible for relations and reconciliations and to avoid friction. He requested that the door be open to humanitarian situations even if it concerned the militants. He asked that aid and medical assistance be presented and deliveries be permitted. He requested that civilians be separated from terrorists. He also recommended activating the presence of Hezbollah and its cadres among the people due to the sensitivity of the matter. He did not want to test their patience towards the violations of Takfiri terrorism. During that period, Sayyed’s follow-up was almost daily. He first asked about the people, families and clans. And then came work.

As the threat escalated in 2013 and the fire extended to more villages in Hermel and other areas, he took the decision to move from defense mode to deterrence mode and clear the villages of West Assi and rural Qusayr. As the battle of Qusayr approached, Sayyed was present in person. He met with the military leadership and Saraya [Lebanese Resistance Brigades] officials. He listened to a detailed explanation of the situation on the ground and gave his remarks. He explained to them the battle with all its dimensions and demonstrated its importance in the protection of the Bekaa, its people and its villages.

After Qusayr, as the Takfiri factions moved to the villages of Qalamoun and its outskirts, they resorted to suicide bombings in the villages and towns of Bekaa. He continued to follow-up with the situation closely “as if he was in the operation room in the Bekaa”, according to those with him, until the first battles of Qalamoun were concluded. Following these battles, the Nusra Front concentrated its terror on the outskirts of the Lebanese villages. It continued sending car bombs and launching rockets towards the villages of Bekaa and attacking Hezbollah positions. The most notable of which was Ein Saah in the outskirts of Britel, where eight fighters were martyred.

Sayyed in the Eastern Chains

A while later, the military leadership in the Bekaa convened to assess the situation and study the options. There was a knock on the door. The Secretary General in person was there in a black military uniform. Everyone was surprised by his presence. He asked them for a detailed explanation of the situation. He then gave his instructions that it was settled: “We must eliminate all terrorist threats on the eastern border.” The surprise was greatest when he asked to inspect the field. Sayyed toured all the points of contact as well as the main axes and observatories. At some positions, the fighters did not expect Sayyed’s visit. As a result, many wondered about the “big resemblance” between Sayyed and this “visiting leader”. At the Ras al-Harf hilltop, he got out of the car and walked towards the first barrier. Those accompanying him feared that the car would be hit by a guided missile. But he insisted on completing the tour. He asked that fortifications be enabled, ambushes be activated, crossings be blocked and the defense plans be secured. This tour, paradoxically, took place in the midst of intense “Israeli” air activity. When he arrived to an area overlooking Ein Saah, he was keen to know the details of “how the brothers were martyred”. At the last position, field officials told him about the rough terrain. Sayyed replied: “I’m comfortable. This is easy for our men.” His phrase reflected the reassurance of victory.

During that tour, Sayyed actually put the finishing touches on the upcoming battles on the outskirts. He did not stop following-up, especially during the snow season. He maintained daily contact during every storm and asked about the situation of the brothers, the supplies and the routes. In some of the communications, he would refer to the positions by their names to be more reassuring. Later, in the spring of 2015, the first stage of liberating the outskirts took place. It was followed by the second phase in the summer of 2017. In August 28, 2017, the Bekaa witnessed the second liberation celebration. Sayyed was unable to attend in person as he wished. He apologized sorrowfully. The same way he wished to attend the Loyalty to Land celebration in Baalbek the day before yesterday.

Source: Al-Akhbar Newspaper, Translated by website team


«السيد» الذي لم يغادر البقاع يوماً

في خطابه الانتخابي الأخير الموجّه إلى أبناء البقاع، أول من أمس، بدا الأمين العام لحزب الله السيد حسن نصرالله حريصاً على إعطاء زخم سياسي كبير للمعركة الانتخابية، ربطاً بما ينتظر لبنان والمنطقة من استحقاقات، غداة السادس من أيار المقبل، وهو شَكَر كل من ساهم في ثنيه عن مخاطرة نزوله شخصياً إلى البقاع لحثّ الناس على التصويت والمشاركة. البقاع الذي قضى «السيد» فيه ردحاً كبيراً من عمره.

لم يشعر الشاب الحوزوي الهارب من نظام صدام حسين بغربته في تلك المدينة. لم يلمس فارقاً بين منزل العائلة في البازورية الجنوبية التي خرج منها في سن الخامسة عشرة ومحل إقامته الجديد في حي الشيخ حبيب في مدينة بعلبك. بنظاراته السميكة ولحيته الكثّة وجسده النحيل سيتسلّل إلى القلوب هنا، وسرعان ما سيبدأ الهمس في مدينة الشمس باسم «السيد حسن»، المسؤول السياسي لحركة أمل في البقاع. كان ذلك في نهاية سبعينيات القرن الماضي.

إماماً للجماعة في مسجد الإمام علي في حي الشيخ حبيب، توسعت معرفته بالبقاع وأهله. التصاق المسجد بحوزة الامام المنتظر التي أسّسها أستاذه السيد عباس الموسوي، ورعاية الأخير له، جعلاه أكثر التصاقاً بالناس. انتقل من حوزوي واعظ يعرّف الناس بالإسلام الحركي الثوري، إلى واحد منهم، يتشارك همومهم، يتأصل في عاداتهم، ويجول في أسواقهم. وهناك، رُزق بولديه جواد وزينب.

مع الاجتياح الإسرائيلي للبنان عام 1982، وقدوم عناصر من الحرس الثوري من الجمهورية الاسلامية في إيران، بالتنسيق مع السيد عباس الموسوي، تشكّلت الملامح الأولى لما سيعرف لاحقاً باسم حزب الله. وفي هذا الاطار، تألّق «السيد حسن» في استقطاب الناس وتحشيدهم في كل المفاصل: أول الهاتفين، والواقف في الصف الأول أمام الجموع تارة أو على « البيك آب» تارة أخرى. تنقل في كل البلدات فعرفها وعرفته، وحفظ العشائر والعائلات وحفظته، من القصر وحوش السيد علي إلى الكرك، ومن شمسطار إلى يونين، حتى داخلت لهجته ألفاظاً بعلبكية تأثراً باختلاطه بناس تلك المنطقة.

من بيروت إلى البقاع

كان هدفه حثّ الناس على المشاركة في الدورات العسكرية للتعلم على حمل السلاح لمقاومة إسرائيل، من دون أن يغفل دوره التبليغي، سواء في حوزة الامام المنتظر أو بين الناس. في شهر رمضان، كان السيد الشاب يتخلّى عن كل مشاغله، وينطلق نحو مناطق عشيرة آل جعفر في فيسان وجورة قدور والرويمة وغيرها، وهي مناطق نائية كان الانتقال اليها شديد الصعوبة، مفرّغاً وقته لتعليمهم أحكام الدين. عكس ذلك لدى المحيطين به بعدين في شخصيته سيرافقانه طيلة مسيرته: صبره المذهل واستشرافه للمستقبل، حين كان يقول إن هؤلاء سيصبحون يوماً سند المقاومة الصاعدة.

خرجت تشكيلات حزب الله إلى العلن، وبات السيد مسؤولاً لمنطقة البقاع، وبالتزامن، إمام الجمعة في بلدة النبي شيت. بدأ عمله يأخذ منحى تنظيمياً: يتابع، يدقق في التفاصيل، لا سيما المتعلقة بالدورات العسكرية والملتحقين بها منذ أول يوم حتى التخرّج، ووضع نفسه في تصرّفهم كمدرّب دائم يعطي الدروس السياسية والعقائدية في معسكر جنتا. في الآن نفسه، لم ينقطع عن بيروت ولا عن الجنوب، إذ كان عضو شورى قرار في الحزب، قبل أن ينتقل عام 1985 إلى بيروت متولياً منصب المسؤول التنفيذي العام لحزب الله، وبعدها مسؤولاً لمنطقة الجنوب. مع ذلك، بقي حاضراً دائماً في البقاع، وبقي منزله هناك مفتوحاً، واستمر حضوره المباشر، لا سيما في المناسبات الكبرى، كيوم القدس العالمي.

مع استشهاد السيد عباس الموسوي وتوليه الأمانة العامة، انتقلت المقاومة الإسلامية الى نمط آخر واستحقاقات أخرى. بقي حاضراً «ميدانياً» في البقاع، في تخريج الدورات أو في جمع الكوادر والتشديد على محورية دور المنطقة في مقاومة الاحتلال، إذ كان محور البقاع الغربي المحتل تابعاً لمنطقة البقاع. لذلك، كان يتعمّد الحضور عند كل عملية نوعية أو حساسة، ويدخل في أدق جزئياتها.

وكان للشهداء في البقاع وعوائلهم الحصة الأكبر من اهتمامه، مشاركاً في تشييع أو خطيباً في أسبوع أو عاقداً قران أحد الأبناء أو البنات. وإذا ما حتّمت الظروف تأجيل الزيارة، فإنها لم تحل يوماً دون إتمامها، حتى إن معظم البيوت البقاعية تحتفظ بصور تذكارية شخصية مع «سماحة السيد».

من حرب التحرير إلى تموز 2006

عام 1997، إبّان ما سمّي «ثورة الجياع»، كانت توصياته تقضي بالتحمّل والاستيعاب وعدم الانجرار الى أيّ احتكاك. ولدى سؤاله عن السبب، كان يقدّم مصلحة البقاع وناسه وعشائره على المصلحة التنظيمية. الناس كانوا دائماً هم المفتاح. وهم لاقوا السيد في منتصف الطريق، فبادروا بدعوته الى قراهم وبيوتهم لتجديد الولاء، فجال في الهرمل وشمسطار وطاريا وبدنايل وشعث وغيرها.

كان أثر «سماحة السيد» فوق أي اعتبار، وفوق الدم والثأر. فبات أي احتكاك بين عشيرتين يُحل بزيارة من كادر في حزب الله حاملاً الرسالة الآتية: «بسلّم عليكن سماحة السيد».

في ذلك العام، أدخل استشهاد السيد هادي نصرالله الحزن إلى كل دار في البقاع. فتحت الحسينيات والبيوت للعزاء بالشاب الذي ترعرع بينهم، ولا يزال بعضهم الى اليوم يذكره صغيراً مع والده وأخيه جواد في سيارة المرسيدس «اللفّ».

تحرير عام 2000 كان صداه في البقاع أقوى من الجنوب. كعادته، استشرف السيد المرحلة المقبلة، استعداداً لحرب يراها واقعة مع العدو، فكثّف جولاته مع القائد الحاج عماد مغنية في المنطقة للاطلاع على الدورات التخصصية، مفتتحاً بعضها وراعياً تخريج بعضها الآخر، ومطّلعاً اطّلاعاً تفصيلياً على الجاهزية العسكرية للوحدات المختلفة.

في حرب تموز 2006، لم ينقطع قائد المقاومة عن البقاع، سواء خلال الحرب من خلال المتابعة الدقيقة لسير عمل الأجهزة المختلفة، أو بعدها بمتابعة كل ما يتعلق بالشهداء وإعادة الاعمار.

مواجهة التكفيريين

عام 2011 شكّل محطة مفصلية جديدة بقاعاً. الحراك في سوريا سرعان ما سيصبح تهديداً متصاعداً على الحدود الشرقية للبنان. مطلع 2012 بدأت تجاوزات الفصائل الارهابية على الجانب الآخر من الحدود، إلى أن سقطت مدينة القصير في أيدي المسلحين، وبدأت الاعتداءات على نحو 30 ألف لبناني يقيمون في قرى سوريّة. أرسل الأمين العام لحزب الله بطلب المعنيين، وعقد معهم اجتماعاً تفصيلياً لتقييم الوضع. كان حريصاً على البقاع وأهله بنفس درجة الحرص على السيادة الوطنية للبنان المهدد بحدوده الشرقية. كان القرار دفاعياً يقتصر على التعاون مع اللبنانيين في القرى المهددة لتسليحهم وتدريبهم وتشكيلهم بحسب الحاجة للدفاع عن أراضيهم، لكن الأصل لديه كان تشكيل لجان علاقات ومصالحات وتجنّب الاحتكاك، موصياً بفتح الباب امام الحالات الإنسانية حتى للمسلحين، وتقديم المساعدة والطبابة وتسهيل دخول الولادات، والفصل بين المدنيين والإرهابيين. وفي الموازاة، أوصى بتفعيل حضور حزب الله وكوادره بين الناس لحساسية الأمر، فهو لا يريد أن يضعهم في اختبار صبر جراء تجاوزات الإرهاب التكفيري. في تلك الفترة، كانت متابعة السيد شبه يومية، يسأل فيها أولاً عن الناس والعائلات والعشائر، وبعدها يأتي العمل.

مع تصاعد التهديد عام 2013، وتوسيع دائرة النار إلى قرى الهرمل وغيرها، اتخذ القرار بالانتقال من الدفاع الى الردع، وتنظيف قرى غرب العاصي وريف القصير. مع اقتراب معركة القصير، حضر السيد بشخصه. اجتمع بالقيادة العسكرية وبمسؤولي السرايا واستمع الى شرح مفصل عن الوضع الميداني وأبدى ملاحظاته، شارحاً لهم المعركة بأبعادها كافة، ومبيّناً أهميتها في حماية البقاع وأهله وقراه.

بعد القصير لجأت الفصائل التكفيرية، مع انتقالها الى قرى القلمون وجرودها والسلسلة الشرقية، الى التفجيرات الانتحارية في القرى والبلدات البقاعية. بقي متابعاً لصيقاً للوضع و«كأنه كان موجوداً في غرفة العمليات في البقاع»، بحسب المطلعين، حتى حسم معارك القلمون الأولى. إثر تلك المعارك، ركزت «جبهة النصرة» إرهابها على جرود القرى اللبنانية، واستمرت في إرسال السيارات المفخخة وإطلاق الصواريخ في اتجاه قرى البقاع ومهاجمة مواقع حزب الله، وأبرزها موقع عين ساعة في جرد بريتال حيث استشهد ثمانية مقاتلين.

«السيد» في السلسلة الشرقية

بعدها بفترة، التأمت القيادة العسكرية في البقاع لتقييم الأوضاع ودراسة الخيارات. طُرق الباب. كان الأمين العام شخصياً يرتدي بزة عسكرية سوداء ولفحة التعبئة. فوجئ الجميع بحضوره. طلب منهم شرحاً مفصّلاً عن الأوضاع ، وأعطى توجيهاته بأن الأمر بات محسوماً: «لا بد من القضاء على كل التهديد الإرهابي على الحدود الشرقية». المفاجأة كانت أكبر عندما طلب القيام بجولة ميدانية تفقدية. جال السيد على كل نقاط التماس والمحاور والمراصد الأساسية. في بعض النقاط لم يتوقع المرابطون هناك زيارة السيد، لذلك كان كثيرون يسألون عن حجم «الشبه الكبير» بين السيد وهذا «القيادي الزائر»! في مرتفع رأس الحرف، ترجّل من السيارة وسار الى الساتر الأول. كان من معه يخشون تعرّض السيارة لرماية صاروخ موجّه، لكنه أصرّ على إكمال الجولة، وطلب تمكين التحصينات وتفعيل الكمائن وسدّ المعابر وإحكام الخطط الدفاعية. هذه الجولة، للمفارقة، حصلت في ذروة نشاط جوي إسرائيلي. عند وصوله إلى منطقة مشرفة على عين ساعة، حرص على معرفة تفاصيل «كيف استشهد الإخوان». في آخر نقطة، حدّثه المسؤولون الميدانيون عن التضاريس القاسية، فردّ السيد: «أنا مرتاح. هيدي هينة على شبابنا». عكست عبارته اطمئناناً للنصر.

في تلك الجولة، وضع السيد فعلياً آخر اللمسات على معارك الجرود القادمة، ولم يتوقف عن المتابعة، لا سيما في فصل الثلوج، فدأب على الاتصال اليومي عند كل عاصفة والسؤال عن وضع الإخوة والتموين والمسالك. في بعض الاتصالات كان يسمّي النقاط بأسمائها للاطمئنان أكثر. لاحقاً، في ربيع 2015، حصلت المرحلة الأولى من تحرير الجرود، لتتبعها المرحلة الثانية صيف عام 2017، في 28 آب 2017 كان البقاع على موعد مع احتفال التحرير الثاني. لم يتمكّن السيد من الحضور الشخصي، كما كان يرغب، فاعتذر بحسرة، تماماً كما كان يرغب، وبشدّة، في حضور احتفال يوم الوفاء للأرض، في بعلبك أول من أمس.

#Mission_Accomplished: Lebanon’s Second Liberation

Designed by: Nour Fakih 

31-08-2017 | 09:18

Lebanon's Second Liberation

The battle of al-Qusayr, 2013 – The underestimated victory: 40-minute OZ Analysis interview with Izat Charkatli

Trailer: Battle of al-Qusayr Interview

Available on AMN Live Stream Patreon for $2. Link here:

Interview between military and geopolitical analyst Izat Charkatli and Andrew Illingworth, founder of the OZ Analysis military analysis media project. The interview represents a complete summary of the successful al-Qusayr operation carried out by Syrian Arab Army and Hezbollah against Jabhat al-Nusra and the Free Syrian Army in the late-spring of 2013. The pro-government victory prevented the territorial breakup of western Syria by rebel forces and the physical isolation of Damascus city from the Syrian mainland.

The analysis provided by Izat Charkatli covers

(i.) the  strategic backdrop to the battle,

(ii.) the forces involved in the battle and their capabilities,

(iii.) the phases of the battle,

(iv.) the casualties suffered by both sides in the battle and

(v.) the strategic outcome of the battle. Detailed motion maps of the battle and original footage are provided within the video to illustrate the analysis.

Additional commentary is made on the rise of ISIS in Southwest Asia and the future political decisions the Damascus government will have make in order to consolidate its military victories and ensure the long-term reconciliation of Syria’s ethnic and sectarian issues.

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أعترف ان ماأنجزته تكنولوجيا الايديولوجيا في مخابر الموساد وال سي آي ايه كان باهرا في أن ينقل العقل العربي في خلال سنوات قليلة من عقل عدو الى عقل خادم للموساد ومشاريع الغرب ..

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واعترف أكثر أن حقن كل التراث في جرعة واحدة مكثفة قدرها خمس سنوات لاشك سيجعل عملية التخلص من سموم التراث غير المنقّى في العقل والقلب عملية تشبه التلوث باليورانيوم والمواد المشعة لاتزول آثارها الا بعد مئات السنين .. فالتراث الروحاني دوما عميق في أعماق التاريخ وهو مثل العناصر الكيماوية المشعة تبقى متوهجة شعاعيا ولاتنطفئ .. وتعيش آلاف السنين .. والتراث الديني يستحق أن يسمى يورانيوم التاريخ لقدرته على البقاء كعنصر مشع لايخمد ..

ونحن كجيل حل به هذا البلاء الذي استخرجته ورشات وحفارات السلفيين من بين رمال الصحراء لايجب أن نترك هذا اليورانيوم الذي تسرب ولوث المياه والتربة وستسقى منه الخلايا .. لايجب ان نتركه هائما على سطح الأرض فاما اما ندفنه من جديد في الأعماق أو نبطل مفعوله ..

 المعضلة ببساطة هي الثقافة المذهبية المعمدة بالدم والمجازر وعملية كي الروح التي ستلوث كل الثقافة القادمة لأنها لوثت مياه الثقافة الراهنة التي ستشرب منها الثقافة القادمة فكل الثقا فة العربية تلوثت بالمذهبية لان الدافع وراء الثورة السورية لم يكن الا ايديولوجيا المذاهب التي صنعتها تكنولوجيا الايديولوجيا الغربية .. فكيف اذا نختصر الزمن ولاننتظر مئات السنين حتى تنجلي هذه اللوثة المذهبية التي تشبه كارثة مفاعل تشيرنوبل الذي تسرب منه الاشعاع السام وتسبب بكارثة .. ونحن لدينا مفاعل (تشيرنوبل المذاهب) في العراق والشام حيث تلتقي العناصر المشعة التراثية المسيحية والاسلامية بشقيها السنية والشيعية .. لأن مرجل المذاهب والأديان ومفاعلها الكبير الذري وانشطارات الاسلام الكبرى ونهوض كل الديانات الأخرى السماوية وقعت في العراق وبلاد الشام وليس في المغرب أو ماليزية .. في هذه البلاد تكمن الطاقة الخلاقة الهائلة للعرب والمسلمين وتنتج الطاقة المشرقية في هذا المفاعل العملاق .. الذي تشقق في الزلزال الأخير وتسرب من الشقوق والتصدعات المذهبية الاشعاع القاتل اذي بدأ بتسميم الشرق .. ولايتوقف التسرب الا باغلاق الشقوق المذهبية

كيف نوقف التسرب الاشعاعي المذهبي؟؟ هل نوقفه بتدمير السعودية التي تضرب على هذا المفاعل كي ينفجر وينفجر معه الشرق كله؟؟ أم نوقفه بتدمير تركيا التي عبثت به وتسللت اليه وكانت تريد للمفاعل ان ينتج لها الطاقة العثمانية ..؟؟ والجواب سيكون: لايقتل المذهبية الا ان تقاتل المذاهب عدوا واحدا ..

الحقيقة أن أي حرب هنا أو هناك لن تحل المشكلة المذهبية الراهنة التي ستنتقل ان تركناها لتعيد انتاج كل أنواع التفاعلات المشعة المؤذية .. العرقية والدينية والعشائرية .. ولكن ربما هناك حل وحيد لهذه الحرب المذهبية .. ولايملك مفتاحه الا حزب الله .. ومفتاحه هو الجليل أو ديمونة .. ولاشيء سيعيد النصر الالهي الا عملية بقياس تحرير الجليل او قصف ديمونة الذي سيكون بمثابه كعب أخيل أو كعب اسرائيل .. فهل يقدر حزب الله أن يقدم على تحرير الجليل أو قصف ديمونا لهدم الربيع العربي وهدم الوهابية وهدم التسرب الاشعاعي المذهبي؟؟ .. واذا مااهتز الجليل أو ديمونا اهتزت القبائل العربية .. وأفاقت الشعوب التواقة للنصر .. وغاصت سقيفة بني ساعدة في الرمال ودخل “الجمل” الذي نسبت له معركة الجمل الى متحف الديناصورات .. ولكن هل هذا واقعي أم حلم طوباوي؟؟

وهنا دعونا نتحدث عن الواقعية التي تفترض أن اقتحام الجليل أو ضرب ديمونا خياران خطيران لان اسرائيل والعالم كله لن يسمح لحزب الله أن يفعل هذا دون رد عنيف .. ولايبدو هذا السيناريو واقعيا في ظل الظروف الراهنة .. ولا يجب تضخيم التصورات والامكانات للقيام بهذا المشروع الضخم وتكليف حزب الله به وهو لايملك حتى المبرر للبدء به .. لأن حزب الله في هذه الظروف لايمكن أن يقدم على المبادرة نحو اقتحام الجليل الا في حالة واحدة تمنحها له القيادة الاسرائيلية بيدها وهي أن تبادر اسرائيل بالهجوم على حزب الله .. فان حدث هذا فان حزب الله لايجب أن يفوّت فرصة ذهبية تأتي مرة في العمر كما حدث عام 2006 (عندما أعطت اسرائيل دون قصد الذريعة لحزب الله لامطارها بالصواريخ واذلالها) تنقله لتنفيذ الخيار “الضرورة” الذي قد تقدمه له اسرائيل نفسها هذه المرة أيضا ويمكنه عندها أن يحول الفخ الاسرائيلي لتدميره الى فرصة لاتفوّت لتدمير المفاعل المذهبي الطائفي التي تشغله اسرائيل في المنطقة وتلوثها بنفاياته التكفيرية الوهابية ..

ان من يحلل كلام السيد حسن نصر الله عن تحرير الجليل في احد الخطابات فانه يلاحظ أنه ربطه “بظرف ما قد تطلب فيه قيادة المقاومة من المجاهدين في حزب الله بالتحرك لتحرير الجليل” .. وهذا يعني أن الظرف المنتظر هو ظرف تقدم فيه المبررات الكاملة لتبرير التحرك أمام العالم وهذا سيكون في حال اطلاق اسرائيل عملية عسكرية عنيفة وشاملة ضد حزب الله او سورية أو ايران .. وتبدو اشارة السيد حسن نصرالله الى خيار ديمونا على أنها كلام رادع يحمل الانذار لاسرائيل التي يمكن ان تحرض ترامب على التحرش بايران أو مساندتها لتدمير حزب الله .. ويرى كثيرون ان كلام السيد نصرالله ليس لحماية ايران من تصريحات وخطط ترامب ونتنياهو العسكرية لأن ترامب قد يلغي الاتفاق النووي أو يعطله لكنه لن يهاجم ايران عسكريا على الأغلب .. الا أنه قد يساند عملية اسرائيلية ساحقة لتدمير حزب الله تتلو سقوط الاتفاق النووي .. لأن اسرائيل تدرك أن ايران من غير حزب الله يقل تأثيرها كثيرا على اسرائيل فتصبح مثل ليبيا أو الجزائر مؤيدة لفلسطين وعاجزة بحكم البعد والفاصل الجغرافي .. فاذا وقعت اسرائيل في غواية الثأر من حزب الله بعد اسقاط الاتفاق النووي فان هذا سيجعل ايران وحلفاءها غير ملزمين بأي ضبط للنفس وستطلق يد حزب الله في الجليل لتنفيذ الخيار الضرورة .. وسيكون التهديد الذي أعلن مؤخرا بضرب ديمونا سببا في ردع أي تدخل غربي أو ناتوي لحماية أو استرداد الجليل من حزب الله الذي أطلق معادلة ديمونا الرادعة ضد جنون وانتقام غربي من أجل اسرائيل في حال تحققت معادلة تحرير الجليل .. الضرورة تأتي من حقيقة أن حزب الله يجب أن يفكر في حرب تحرير الجليل عندما تتحول الحرب عليه الى فرصة له .. لا يستعيد بها الجليل فقط بل يستعيد موقع الحزب المقاوم الجليل ذي الشرف الرفيع الذي لايضاهيه أي شرف الذي عملت على تجريده منه ماكينات الاعلام الوهابي والاخواني .. شرف انجاز تحرير أول قطعة من فلسطين منذ احتلالها .. ودفن كل نفايات التلوث الوهابي والتكفير التي لوثت العقل العربي والمسلم ولوثت حتى الخلايا والدماء والمياه في الشرق ..

لاأعرف كيف تفكر الأقدار ولكنها ليست حمقاء بالتاكيد .. بل ان الحمقى هم الاسرائيليون الذين اعتقدوا في حساباتهم أن الربيع العربي سيطلق الربيع الاسرائيلي لأن الحرب السورية ستكون خاطفة واياما معدودات وينتهي كل شيء .. وتبدأ بعدها تصفية الحساب مع حزب الله ومع كل من قاوم يوما لاسدال الستار على نهج الممانعة التي بدأت بعبد الناصر ووصلت الى زمن السيد حسن نصرالله والرئيس بشار الأسد .. وكانت معركة القصير مفصلا وخبرا سيئا لاسرائيل لأنها أظهرت أن حكاية الأيام المعدودات لن تكون واقعية أبدا وأن اقتحام القصير أثبت تماسك محور المقاومة في أحلك الظروف .. ولكن لم يكن القادة الاسرائيليون يتصورون سيناريو أسوأ من سيناريو تحرير حلب بعد أن اعتقدوا أن حلب ربما تقصم ظهر النظام وان لم تسقطه .. لأن التوقعات المتفائلة والسعيدة كانت تتحدث عن معركة قاسية جدا وطويلة ستنهك الجيش السوري وحزب الله الذي قد يموت هناك بعيدا عن الجليل .. لأن خبرة العسكريين في اقتحام المدن سيئة ومريرة .. ولاتنتهي الا بصعوبة وطيف هزيمة بعد دفع ثمن باهظ .. ولكن الجيش السوري فعلها مع حلفائه ..

الاسرائيليون استفاقوا على حقيقة لم يضعوها بالاعتبار بعد معركة حلب وهي ان حزب الله سيتمكن من استعادة قسم كبير من قواته التي شاركت في تلك المعركة .. وقد تكون قريبا وجها لوجه مع الجليل تنتظر نهاية الحرب السورية .. ورغم الاختلاف البيئي والجغرافي بين جبهة حلب وجبهة الجليل الا ان الحقيقة التي لابد من الاقرار بها هي أن اقتحام الجليل اكثر سهولة بكثير من اقتحام حلب .. حيث ستوفر الأحراش والغطاء النباتي للمقاتلين تمويها ومظلات ممتازة عند الاختراق كما أن الاقتراب من المستعمرات سيحيد فاعلية سلاح الجو خاصة أن المساحة في شمال فلسطين ضيقة ومحدودة بالقياس الى معارك الحزب في سورية حيث الانتشار الواسع للجغرافيا المترامية التي تشتت قوى وكتائب الحزب الذي سيتكثف ويتركز بكامل قوته في جبهة ضيقة شمال فلسطين .. ناهيك عن أن التفوق في حرب المدن سيعطي حزب الله التفوق بلا منازع عند اقتحام هذه المستعمرات والمستوطنات الشمالية ..

ضرورة حرب الجليل تأتي من حقيقة ان حزب الله قد آذته الحرب المذهبية المفروضة عليه أكثر مما أوجعته حرب تموز وكل مواجهاته مع اسرائيل .. ويدرك الحزب أن اسرائيل كانت موفقة في اختيار المواجهة غير المباشرة معه عبر وكلاء المذهب الوهابي الذين سعّروا الصراع المذهبي واضطر حزب الله لكي يدافع عن نفسه وعن منظومته وسمعته وعن تاريخه الذي حاولت اسقاطه الحرب المذهبية .. ولكن لايمكن للحرب المذهبية أن تنتهي أو تتحرك بسرعة الا بحرب أخرى تلغيها .. مثل حرب تحرير أو مواجهة قومية تجعل الهم الطائفي أقل أهمية .. والحزب يرى أن من مصلحته تدمير الحرب المذهبية البشعة التي تشن عليه التي لن تتوقف من داخل لبنان ومن دول النفط التي تحقن الجمهور بالكراهية المذهبية بشكل متواصل .. فكما صار معروفا فان نصر تموز هو الذي جعل حزب الله متفوقا ومدرسة ملهمة للشعوب العربية التي اذهلها النصر الالهي ولم تفتش عن مذهب الحزب الذي انتصر لأنها نسبت الانتصار اليها واعتبرت الحزب جزءا من تركيبتها وثقافتها الاسلامية لأن مالدى الحزب من خلفية دينية لاهوتية له امتدادات وتماهيات مع الثقافة المنتشرة في العالم الاسلامي عموما .. كما أن نصر 56 المصري ضد العدوان الثلاثي الخارجي جعل الجماهير العربية ميالة لأن تنتسب الى النصر المصري لأنه واجه عدوا مشتركا للجميع وانتصر فانتمت الجماهير بعواطفها الى فكر المنتصر وهذا مانشر الدعوة القومية الناصرية بسرعة الى أن منيت بالهزيمة فانفض الناس عنها والتفوا حول أوهام كثيرة لاستبدالها ..

ان الأكاديميين العسكريين الاسرائيلييين لديهم قناعة ان حزب الله لن يجد طريقة اسرع لاستعادة مكانته الممانعة التي شوهتها المرحلة الاعلامية الحالية في الربيع العربي الا بنصر مبين وساحق ومذهل على اسرائيل يتوق اليه ويتحرق لانجازه اذا ماتلقف الفرصة .. نصر يضعه في مقدمة القوى العربية التي ستنال المجد وتكون انتصاراته سببا في تراجع المرحلة المذهبية لأن ايقاظ النصر على اسرائيل هو الوحيد الذي يرقأ الجراح ويسكت الأصوات التي تشوه الروافض المتهمين انهم يتآمرون مع الصهاينة والفرس على الاسلام وأهل السنة وفق المنطق الوهابي ويغسل اسم حزب الله مما ألصق به زورا من أنه لايريد تحرير فلسطين بل نشر المشروع الفارسي الشيعي بدليل انخراطه في الدفاع عن سورية التي سوقت عربيا واسلاميا على أنها دفاع عن طائفة ونظام حكم وهلال اخترعه ملك الأردن الذي ينتمي الى أم يهودية ..

الاسرائيليون يؤمنون بهذا الكابوس .. ومن يتابع المناورات الاسرائيلية يلاحظ أنها تتضمن عمليات اسعاف في المدن وعمليات اخلاء سريعة للمناطق المأهولة بسبب صواريخ أو تعرضها للاقتحام من قبل “ارهابيين” .. لكن هناك نشاطا محموما في الشمال لرفع السواتر والشراك وحقول الألغام .. يبدو أن المناورات القادمة ستكون من أجل اخلاء المدن المستهدفة بسرعة قصوى كي لايبقى مدنيون لتمكين سلاح الجو من ابادة القوات المهاجمة وتحطيم كل شيء على رؤوس المقاتلين ..

هل يمكن أن يحول الحزب أي هجوم اسرائيلي من ورطة الى فرصة؟؟ وهل هناك فرصة افضل من هذه؟؟ جيش تمرس على أقسى أنواع حرب المدن والاقتحام .. ومقاتلون منظمون وشرسون ومدربون تدريبا عاليا ولايفصل بينهم وبين الجليل الا سياج .. وحاجة ماسة لاطفاء حرب مذهبية تطهرهم من نفايات الاتهام والتزوير التي ألقيت عليهم .. انه السفر الى الجليل .. والمعراج الى النقاء الجهادي .. في رحلة بدأت من حلب الى ديمونا .. مرورا بالجليل ..

Special Report: Hezbollah’s Mechanized Battalion in Syria

November 21, 2016

Special Report: Hezbollah’s Mechanized Battalion in Syria

Shock! Hezbollah Now has a Full Mechanized Battalion in Syria

Marko Marjanovic

Marko Marjanovic

by Marko Marjanović (deputy editor and writer for Russia Insider. He has contributed to The Voluntaryist ReaderThe Libertarian Liquidationist and published the Crappy Town blog. Check out his new project, Checkpoint Asia.)

World’s most powerful non-state military is no longer an infantry force only

On November 11th Hezbollah held a military parade in al-Qusayr — a Syrian town that is just across the border from the largely Shia northern Bekaa Valley and that was the scene of Hezbollah’s first major battle in the Syria, and its first major success.

Hezbollah holding a parade as part of its annual Marty’s Day celebrations, just outside its primary military base in Syria isn’t terribly shocking.

And yet plenty were shocked when days later photos from the parade showing dozens of armored vehicles started hitting Twitter.

The images are quite stunning indeed showing that Hezbollah now operates enough tanks, APCs and self-propelled guns to equip a credible mechanized battalion.

This is far more than anybody who isn’t on the ground would have estimated. For example four months ago the Israeli daily Haaretz ran a piece on how much better armed Hezbollah is in 2016 than it was in 2006. The piece even repeats the highly dubious claim the Shia militia now has Pantsir-1S air defense system but was nonetheless confident that “the terror organization doesn’t own planes and tanks”.


The tanks in the pictures are mainly T-54s and T-62s, but also a few T-72s with reactive armor.

The APCs are almost exclusively the BMP-1 model, along a few US-made M113s armed with a Soviet-made double 14.5mm machinegun.

It was the M113s that got the parade into The Washington Post. The paper asked if these machines might not be from Lebanese army stocks. In fact they are almost certainly vehicles Hezbollah gained in the collapse of the Israeli-aligned South Lebanon Army in 2000.

Pictures also show at least three 2S1 Gvozdika 122mm self-propelled howitzers and two ZSU-57mm self-propelled anti-aircraft guns. There are is also a smattering of Soviet anti-aircraft guns, mainly mounted on flatbed trucks but also two or three installed on a GM-578 tracked vehicle chassis which originally carried the 2K12 Kub anti-air missiles.

In sum this is a makeshift, improvised battalion. All of the equipment is venerable, some of it positively ancient. That said old doesn’t necessarily equal ineffective.

ZSU-57 with its 57mm autocannons for example is a hugely popular and sought-after fire support platform in Syria. This despite the fact it dates back to 1950 and had already been retired from service with the Syrian army. (The idea of using the anti-aircraft platform for direct fire support hadn’t been conceived of.)

Fact is going into battle supported by old armor and old large-caliber weapons is immeasurably better than going into battle by foot alone. Besides these weapons aren’t really outdated in the sense that the enemy doesn’t have better equipment either — if anything the rebels are faced with an acute shortage of armor and artillery. The vehicles may be knocked out by guided anti-tank missiles which the rebels have an ample supply of easily enough — but this is true even of the heaviest and most modern tanks, there is enough footage of Saudi M1 Abrams tanks lighting up like a candle after a hit from a Kornet in Yemen to attest to that.

As said a few of the vehicles Hezbollah brought with it from Lebanon, a few more are likely trophies. Their sheer number however means that majority must have been handed over to it by the Syrian army. This is certainly going to benefit the overall war effort of the pro-government side as only the best Syrian units can match the professionalism and skill of Hezbollah. It certainly makes sense to distribute the best of your military capital among the most elite formations on your side — particularly if they’re not tied down to a specific locality but willing to participate in decisive battles across the theater.

What may have prevented the Syrians transferring these machines earlier was Hezbollah’s lack of experience with them. As someone who did a two year stint in heavy industry and went from a hopeless rookie to a half-useable machinist I can attest to the fact that when it comes to operating and maintaining giant machinery enthusiasm and even courage are extremely poor substitutes for knowledge and experience.

The most significant consequence of Hezbollah’s new mechanized battalion may very well be the experience the group gains. 50-year old tanks are nothing you would want to match against Israeli armor and jets but they can be enormously significant for the group in a different way.

Once the war is over and the armor is no longer needed at the front a dozen tanks is enough to train up hundreds of crews. What is now Hezbollah’s mechanized battalion in Syria may very well go on to become its tank training school in Qusayr. Should the Shia militia then ever go on to acquire more modern armor it will already have people three-quarters ready to jump into them.

The fact the militia held onto a few relatively puny M113s for fifteen years that were of no use to it in the conflict it actually fought in that time may very well be a sign it takes a very long-term view and values armor pieces for a lot more than their most immediate utility.

Hezbollah showed in 2006 that it is probably the most professional non-state war fighting organization in the world. Having acquired armor it is now also one of the best-equipped.

It is ironic but since the 2003 start of the half-assed and hare-brained US project to make the Middle East safe for Israel Iran, Israel’s only near peer competitor in the region, has been provided a useful ally in Iraq, and Hezbollah, the only credible fighting force on its borders, has been gifted the opportunity to develop an armored branch.

A further irony is that Hezbollah may not have even intended to shock the world in this manner, but would have been happy to keep its armor under wraps for a while longer. Firstly, the war-torn al-Qusayr is largely abandoned so the armored display there certainly wasn’t put up for the benefit of Syrians but for militia’s own morale.

Furthermore, any photos Hezbollah normally releases are carefully redacted, for example the faces of its fighters are blacked out — this is not the case with many of the images from the parade, implying these are private photos taken by the rank and file to show off to friends and family that ended up on the Internet. A rare slip up in the group’s discipline then, but one that Syria watchers will be grateful for.


How did Hezbollah acquire US tanks which it paraded in big military display in Syria? – English Subs

by Middle East Observer


From Classic to Post-Resistance: On Hezbollah’s Transformation

Hezbollah’s Mahdi Scouts participate in a parade in Beirut’s southern suburbs as part of Quds Day on July 25, 2014. Al-Akhbar/Haitham Moussawi
Published Friday, February 13, 2015
Hezbollah’s intervention in Syria has been criticized by many in the Arab world as a sign that “they have abandoned resistance to fight fellow Muslims.” Their recent qualitative operation in Sheba’a against an Israeli military convoy, however, serves as a reminder that the movement has not shifted its focus away from Israel and is able to fight on several fronts simultaneously.
Hezbollah’s continued prioritization of its resistance activity, while entangled in multiple military theaters across the region, indicates that it has transcended its original, singular mission of resisting Israel. Confronting Israel is now one role among several others Hezbollah has assumed in the post-uprising regional political order, which has ushered in the rise of takfiri-jihadism. Outgrowing its resistance role, Hezbollah now assumes responsibility for guarding Lebanon’s borders, facilitating homeland security and counter-terrorism, as well as counter-insurgency operations in Syria and Iraq.
The Resistance is no longer confined to expelling Zionist occupiers and preventing Israeli aggression, but is now intent on preserving the political-territorial framework and strategic environment that it requires for its continued operational integrity. The destabilization of both spheres by takfiri-jihadists has compelled Hezbollah to transform itself into a post-resistance movement. The prefix “post” here does not denote the end of resistance, or what comes after it, but should be understood in much the same way that the concept of “post” in postcolonial can be interpreted as “the continuation of colonialism, albeit through different or new relationships concerning power.”
The resistance, by no means over, has now morphed into a transnational Resistance Army whose core identity and mission remain tied to its raison d’être of resisting Israel, but which is also committed to protecting the Resistance’s “backbone” as Nasrallah describes it. To that end, Hezbollah has sought to wrest Syrian, Lebanese and Iraqi territories from jihadist control.
In essence, Hezbollah is confronting a transnational insurgency that seeks to expand its proto-state, by transnationalizing its resistance in turn. Just as the movement conventionalized its guerilla warfare in 2006 with its new “hybrid” resistance paradigm, which fuses conventional and unconventional methods, it has now created a new model of counterinsurgency in which its own irregular, hybridized Resistance Army seeks to suppress the insurgent activity of another hybridized irregular force.

The destabilization of both spheres by takfiri-jihadists has compelled Hezbollah to transform itself into a post-resistance movement.

 Existential battle with ISIS
The war with ISIS and al-Nusra Front is viewed as an existential battle with an annihilative and uncompromising force that is hell-bent on eliminating all Shia, and by extension, the Resistance. While takfiri ideology is not politically delegitimized in the same way that Zionism is, nor is its right to exist as a religious doctrine questioned, takfiri militancy or jihadism is unequivocally equated with Israel. Hezbollah’s discourse likens the danger posed by ISIS and Nusra to Israel’s; in one speech, Nasrallah invoked Israeli oppression as an analogy for the potential loss of land, destruction of homes, capture of women, killing of children, and humiliation that the jihadists could inflict. In his “Resistance and Liberation Day” speech last year, Nasrallah even went beyond this analogy when he drew parallels between the mass migration of Jewish settlers to Palestine sponsored by colonial powers in the twentieth century and the mobilization and deployment of jihadists in the region, which he argued had been facilitated by modern day imperialists.
Jihadists are not just morally and politically equated with Israel, according to this interpretation, but strategically linked, as well. ISIS is portrayed as being the witting or “unwitting” servant of the US-Israeli scheme to divide the region and foment strife, while Nusra — whose military and intelligence cooperation with Israel has now been well documented by the UN and Western mainstream , as well as Zionist media — is considered the jihadists incarnation of Israel’s collaborationist South Lebanon Army (SLA). It is on this basis that Hezbollah does not view the US-led coalition’s strikes on ISIS targets in Syria and Iraq as anything more than a “declawing” operation designed to “contain” the organization, rather than defeat it.
Offensive warfare
While empirically supported arguments such as these have enabled Hezbollah to intellectualize its war against jihadism as an extension of its resistance campaign, the nature of its military intervention in Syria and Iraq has required it to reconceptualize and expand its concept of resistance warfare qua warfare. Resistance has now been stretched to encompass military strategies which have not traditionally been associated with classic guerrilla or resistance warfare — fighting groups that don’t qualify as occupation forces, defending allies outside its national borders, and adopting counter-insurgent warfare.
Advancing into enemy territory or territory contested by an adversary on the soil of an allied neighbor, is neither typical of armed resistance movements nor of a defensive military strategy, unless one views it as an act of “preemptive” self-defense as Nasrallah accurately described it. Fearing a jihadist onslaught into Lebanese territory, Hezbollah has subscribed to the old adage that “the best defense is a good offense” in Syria and to a more limited extent, Iraq.
In 2013, Hezbollah’s military role in Syria shifted dramatically from a small advisory mission to a direct combat role involving a large numbers of fighters. Starting with Qusayr, Hezbollah’s expanded military presence helped the Syrian government regain traction in areas which had been lost to rebel control. In fact, the ground assaults in Qusayr and Qalamoun were essentially led by Hezbollah forces, while the Syrian army provided artillery and air cover for its senior partner. Moreover, according to the Syrian Observatory of Human Rights (SOHR) Hezbollah is currently taking “the initiative to lead [Syrian] army and Iranian forces in the triangle of territory linking Daraa, Quneitra and the southwest of Damascus provinces.” In other areas such as parts of Damascus, Eastern Ghouta, and Kassab, Hezbollah forces engaged in direct combat alongside the Syrian armed forces, improving the latter’s combat performance. In Homs, Aleppo and the Golan, Hezbollah deployed special operations forces to assist, train, advise and organize Syrian regular forces and paramilitary NDF forces. Given the movement’s combat experience in unconventional warfare, and its training in urban warfare, Hezbollah’s special forces unit has served as a significant force multiplier for Syrian troops.

Hezbollah’s military intervention in Syria and Iraq has fundamentally recast its classic resistance role and placed it on a par with its long-time mentor, Iran’s special operations, Quds Force, itself an active partner in Syria and Iraq.

 Extraterritorial operations like these have usually been the province of major powers, rather than non-state actors who have customarily been the recipients of such assistance. As defined by the United States Army Special Operations Command, unconventional warfare usually “involves external parties aiding indigenous actors against governments. Such aid can involve training, organizing, recruiting, operational advising…” In other words, special operations forces affiliated with conventional, state armies have normally been deployed to assist unconventional forces rather than the other way around. Hezbollah’s military intervention in Syria and Iraq has fundamentally recast its classic resistance role and placed it on a par with its long-time mentor, Iran’s special operations, Quds Force, itself an active partner in Syria and Iraq.
The Resistance Axis
In the post-resistance phase, the politics of resistance has been supplanted by the politics of the Resistance Axis. The strategic alliance between Iran, Hezbollah, Syria and Iraq is now characterized by a unity of military forces and a unity of military theaters vis-à-vis ISIS and Israel.
In Syria, force integration among Hezbollah’s Resistance Army, the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC), Syrian armed forces and Iraqi militias has led to the emergence of a single military front. Just days before Israel’s assassination of Hezbollah fighters and an Iranian commander in the Golan governorate of Quneitra, Nasrallah threatened to respond to Israeli attacks on targets in Syria as though they “targeted the entire Resistance Axis.” Nasrallah later declared that “the fusion of Lebanese-Iranian blood on Syrian soil [in Quneitra], reflects the unity of cause and the unity of fate of the countries of the Resistance Axis.” Mohammed Ali Jaafari, commander of the IRGC, echoed this sentiment when he implied that Hezbollah’s retaliatory attack in Shebaa,represented a united response: “We are one with Hezbollah. Wherever the blood of our martyrs is spilled on the front line, our response will be one.”
Coupled with its defense of Syria and Iraq from jihadist forces, Hezbollah’s retaliation for Israel’s Golan strike with an attack in Sheba’a in occupied Lebanon, has meant that the territories of the Resistance Axis now constitute a single battlefront. Nasrallah introduced this new security doctrine when he announced that the resistance was “no longer concerned with any rules of engagement [with Israel]. We no longer recognize the separation of arenas or battlefields.”
This new regional security architecture has dire implications for Israel. In the next war, Israel not only has to contend with offensive military operations in the Galilee and “beyond the Galilee” as Nasrallah recently promised, but also with the potential involvement of other members of the Resistance Axis, particularly Iran. As the region-wide war with takfiri-jihadists has demonstrated, any Israeli aggression on Syria, Lebanon or Iran, will be viewed as a war against the Resistance Axis as a whole.
Amal Saad is a Lebanese academic and political analyst. She is the author of Hizbullah: Politics and Religion, published by Pluto Press.
The views expressed by the author do not necessarily reflect Al-Akhbar English‘s editorial policy. If you would like to submit a thoughtful response to one of our opinion pieces, send your contribution to our submissions editor.

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Lebanon: Hezbollah, allies prevent cross border attack by extremist groups

Militants remain active in the Qalamoun region of Syria on the Lebanese border. (Photo: Radwan Mortada)
Published Thursday, October 9, 2014Al_akhbar
After four intense clashes with al-Nusra Front and the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) and their allies, Hezbollah and the Syrian army succeeded in foiling multiple cross border attacks, causing a number of losses in the ranks of the militants and their supply of ammunition.
The violent clashes that erupted last Sunday in al-Qalamoun and Ersal have calmed down Wednesday night. After Hezbollah suffered a severe blow on the outskirts of Brital, news of the death of tens of militants from al-Nusra Front and its allies surfaced.
What really happened on the outskirts of Qalamoun in the last few days and up until Wednesday’s “bloodbath” against Nusra and its allies?
The militants opposing the Syrian government have all united under the same flag in Qalamoun. ISIS, Nusra and what is left of the so-called Free Syrian Army are all fighting side by side.
They attacked Hezbollah sites on the outskirts of Lebanon’s Brital and Nahle last Sunday, successfully infiltrating Lebanese territory and causing Hezbollah major losses before being forced to retreat due to Hezbollah’s strong resilience and quick retaliation.


In response, Nusra and ISIS militants adopted a new strategy. They attacked positions belonging to Hezbollah and the Syrian army on the outskirts of the Syrian villages of Assal al-Ward, Jebbeh and Flita. However, the attack on Syrian territory was more intense than that inside Lebanon. According to sources on the field, the number of militants was greater and they fired ammunition “abundantly.”
The third cross-border attack was last week when militants were able to control a strategic position that overlooks the village of Assal al-Ward and the road leading to the village of Jebbeh.
They released footage of them inside these sites, claiming they have full control of the village, even though, in reality, they were several kilometers away from Assal al-Ward.
The Syrian army and Hezbollah retaliated and regained control of the site. Because the militants could not keep hold of the site, they blew up all the ammunition before retreating.
According to Al-Akhbar’s sources, tens of militants were killed and injured. More than 10 bodies remain on the battleground up until the writing of this article. Pictures and videos from the clashes confirm the sources’ claims.
The sources also said the Syrian army struck a field hospital close to Martbieh crossing on the outskirts of Qalamoun, where militants took their injured, which further increased the militants’ casualty toll.
Moreover, Hezbollah fighters managed Tuesday night to take control of “Um Kharj” near the Lebanese border, a strategic site on the outskirts of Assal al-Ward, after violent clashes with Nusra militants.
Field sources said clashes, which lasted until late hours on Tuesday, left more than 10 Nusra militants dead and dozens injured.
Al-Akhbar sources said the hill of “Um Kharj” is of high importance as it is 2,600 meters above sea level and overlooks a wide area including al-Jibbe outskirts, al-Khasha’ and other hills in Qalamoun.
The “Um Kharj” site appears in a video Nusra released of their attack on “Ain Saa” on the outskirts of Brital.
Moreover, armed Syrian militants claimed yesterday the kidnapping of a 24-year-old Hezbollah fighter called A.A.. They released a photo, but not a video, that shows his hands tied. They refused to confirm if he was alive or dead. Sources toldAl-Akhbar that the fighter was injured and could not be contacted.
Will the scenario of the martyr Zulfikar Ezzedine, from Lebanon’s Tyre district, recur? Ezzedine died in Damascus countryside last year, after armed opposition militants caught him and published a video showing him taking his last breaths.
Hezbollah has been dealt several blows in the past few days. But according to a Hezbollah source “the price remains much less than what we (Hezbollah) and all the Lebanese people would have paid if the takfiris successfully infiltrated our borders and reached Lebanese villages and cities, and if ISIS and Nusra terrorists were still entirely in control of Qalamoun and Qusayr.”
According to analysts, barren areas between Qalamoun and Ersal under opposition control have given militants a stronger position.
They now seek to wage a war against Hezbollah and the Syrian army in the hopes of draining their power. However, analysts say that as winter approaches, they will fail just like they did on Assal al-Ward outskirts Wednesday.
This article is an edited translation from the Arabic Edition.


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Hezbollah in Syria: 15 Months of Security and Military Achievements – 1/3

Ibrahim Al Amin, Hassan Olleiq – Al-Akhbar

Hezbollah fighter in Rankous salutes a monument of Virgin Merry (s)The “Syrian Opposition” were in rush to get Hezbollah involved in their conflict with the regime since the first moments of their engagement. The rush was caused only – as subsequent events showed – by the firm belief among the opposition leaders in the West-Israeli-Gulf-Turkish axis, that the fall of the regime was only a matter of weeks, and that the fateful link between Hezbollah and the regime is fundamental. In addition, Hezbollah opponents in Lebanon were also in rush to materialize this link, for being convinced that they do not need to take Hezbollah into account as long as he will be toppled soon.

Hezbollah detected these data early, and was being able through different means, to get acquainted with how to handle opponents on the ground and in foreign communications. The party soon understood the strategic vision of those who quickly and effectively work to abduct and exploit the civil objections, towards a program that exceeds the demands of reform.
Hezbollah had a brief conclusion, although he postponed talking about it, or even to deal with it realistically, which facilitated his deep understanding of the conflict between the axis of resistance and the Israeli – regional – international axis. However, the red light was sparked by the state of hostility that emerged from the prominent powers in opposition. Yet, the party maintained a delicate and slow march in the Syrian minefield, observing at times and mediating between opponents and the regime many often.

Hezbollah is aware that the revitalization of Takfiri bases among the civilian and popular mediums – where opposition forces are strongly represented – has additional targets that serve the main goal itself against Hezbollah and the resistance. Sectarian vocabularies emerged in dealing with the Syrian and non-Syrian supporters of the regime. It was clear that the dragging everyone to doctrinal war has become a key demand of supporters of the militants in Syria, who considered that raising the slogan of «War of Sunnis» would increase fanaticism and create a offensive ground against Hezbollah in specific.

Trying to accuse Hezbollah of the murder and beating charges, pro-militants in Syria were looking for strategic trap for Hezbollah and his environment. From here, they moved towards targeting the Shiite sanctities, especially the shrine of Sayyeda Zeinab south of Damascus. Soon, Hezbollah sought the approval of the Syrian leadership to deploy groups of fighters to prevent the militants’ control over the shrine. This was the first public reference to Hezbollah intervention. For a long time , Hezbollah fighters didn’t carry out any offensive action, but many of them were killed while being stationed at points meant to protect the shrine.

Furthermore, Hezbollah was not unaware of the many people seeking to harm him immediately. He was astonished by the political shortcomings of the armed groups’ sponsors and by those who work with them in Lebanon as well. But what happened is that, in a place not far from Syria and where the real operating room is established, a known party decided to escalate the direct threat against Hezbollah. It decided to keep up with the global media campaign against Hezbollah because he stands by the regime of President Bashar al-Assad via a Lebanese internal campaign to make his weapons a source of danger to the Lebanese. But the practical step was required in a sensitive point of Hezbollah. In this context, the armed opposition and those who stand behind them committed the “strategic mistake” by opening the battle of “cleansing” in border villages with Hermel district.

The Qussayr region imposed itself on Hezbollah’s popular incubator and, consequently, on his leadership, where operations were a formal invitation and mandatory for Hezbollah to intervene militarily, and in a different way this time. At this moment, the Syrian opposition abandoned “linking the conflict” with Hezbollah and rushed towards direct military confrontation.

Expect in Part 2:
– Long Border a Year Ago
– Resistance Begin to Move

Source: Newspapers
10-04-2014 – 17:17 Last updated 10-04-2014

حزب الله في سوريا :15 شهراً من الإنجازات الأمنية والعسكرية

في دير الشيروبيم البطريركي في صيدنايا بعد تحرير رنكوس أمس (الأخبار)
إبراهيم الأمين, حسن عليق
استعجلت «المعارضة السورية» الزجّ بحزب الله في حلبة صراعها مع النظام منذ اللحظات الأولى لاشتباكها معه. استعجالٌ كان سببه الوحيد ـــ وكما دلت الأحداث اللاحقة ـــ الاعتقاد الجازم لدى قادة المعارضة في المحور الغربي – الإسرائيلي -الخليجي – التركي، بأن سقوط النظام كان مسألة أسابيع فقط، ما جعل مطلب الربط المصيري بين الحزب والنظام أساسياً في معادلة هؤلاء. أضف إلى ذلك، استعجال خصوم حزب الله في لبنان هذا الربط، لقناعتهم، هم أيضاً، بأن لا داعي لمراعاة الحزب طالما أن إطاحته باتت قريبة.
حزب الله، استدل باكراً على هذه المعطيات. وأمكنه من خلال وسائل كثيرة، التعرف عن قرب إلى كيفية تعامل المعارضين على الأرض وفي الاتصالات الخارجية. وأمكن الحزب، سريعاً، فهم الرؤية الاستراتيجية لمن يعمل بقوة وسرعة على خطف واستغلال اعتراضات أهلية، نحو برنامج يتجاوز مطالب الإصلاح. وكانت لدى الحزب خلاصة سريعة، وإن تأخر في الحديث عنها، أو حتى التعامل معها واقعياً، وهي سهّلت فهمه العميق للصراع بين محور المقاومة والمحور الإسرائيلي الإقليمي والدولي. لكن، الضوء الأحمر، أشعلته حالة العداء التي ظهرت من القوى البارزة في المعارضة. ومع ذلك، حافظ الحزب على مسيره الدقيق والبطيء في حقل الألغام السوري، مراقباً حيناً ومتوسطاً بين معارضين وبين النظام أحياناً كثيرة.
كان حزب الله يدرك، ويعلم، أن تنشيط القواعد التكفيرية في أوساط مدنية وشعبية حضرت قوى المعارضة فيها بقوة، له أهداف إضافية. وهي تصب في مصلحة الهدف الرئيسي نفسه ضد الحزب وضد المقاومة. وبرزت المفردات المذهبية في التعامل مع الداعمين للنظام من سوريين وغير سوريين. وكان واضحاً، أن استدراج الجميع إلى حرب ذات طابع مذهبي، صار مطلباً رئيسياً عند داعمي المسلحين في سوريا، الذين اعتبروا أن رفع شعار «حرب أهل السنّة» من شأنه رفع العصبية، وخلق أرضية عدائية ضد حزب الله على وجه التحديد. ومع محاولات إلصاق تهم القتل والتفظيع بالحزب، كان هؤلاء يبحثون عن فخ استراتيجي يقع فيه الحزب وبيئته. ومن هذا الباب، دخل هؤلاء إلى هدف المسّ بمقدسات شيعية، ولا سيما مقام السيدة زينب الواقع جنوب دمشق. وسارع الحزب إلى طلب موافقة القيادة السورية على نشر مجموعات من مقاتليه، لمنع سقوط المقام تحت سيطرة المسلحين. وكانت هذه الإشارة العلنية الأولى لتدخل الحزب. وخلال وقت طويل، لم يمارس مقاتلو الحزب هناك، أي عمل هجومي، بل سقط منهم عناصر كثيرة، كانوا يتمركزون في نقاط هدفها حماية المقام.
لكن الأمر لم يقف عند هذا الحد. لم يكن الحزب غافلاً عن سعي الكثيرين إلى النيل منه مباشرة. هاله القصور السياسي عند من يرعى المجموعات المسلحة، ومن يعمل معهم في لبنان أيضاً. لكن الذي حصل، هو أنه في مكان ليس بعيد عن سوريا، وحيث تقوم غرفة العمليات الحقيقية، قررت جهة معروفة، رفع مستوى التهديد المباشر ضد حزب الله. فكان قرار مواكبة الحملة الإعلامية العالمية ضد الحزب لأنه يقف إلى جانب حكم الرئيس بشار الأسد، بحملة داخلية لبنانية تجعل من سلاحه مصدر الخطر على اللبنانيين. لكن الخطوة العملية، كانت مطلوبة في نقطة حساسة بالنسبة إلى الحزب. وفي هذا السياق، جاء «الخطأ الاستراتيجي» لهذه المعارضة المسلحة ومن يقف خلفها، بفتح معركة «تطهير» في القرى الحدودية مع قضاء الهرمل.
فرض استحقاق القصير نفسه على بيئة الحزب الشعبية، وتالياً على قيادته. كانت هذه العمليات، بمثابة دعوة رسمية وإلزامية للحزب، كي يتدخل عسكرياً، وبطريقة مختلفة هذه المرة. في هذه اللحظة، تخلت المعارضة السورية عن حالة «ربط النزاع» مع الحزب، واندفعت صوب المواجهة العسكرية المباشرة.
الحدود الطويلة قبل عام
توسع الانتشار الحمائي للحزب في محيط «السيدة زينب» ليمتد على مساحة الغوطتين الشرقية والغربية (مروان طحطح)
لنعد قليلاً إلى ما قبل عام من اليوم، فمن ينظر إلى خريطة الحدود اللبنانية ــ السورية، سيجد شريطاً يمتد من تلكلخ شمالاً إلى تخوم طريق دمشق ــ بيروت جنوباً، خاضع بشكل شبه تام لسيطرة المعارضة السورية. وهذا الشريط تقابله في لبنان المناطق الممتدة من وادي خالد إلى كفرزبد، مروراً بجرود قرى منطقة بعلبك وعرسال والهرمل.
كانت مدينة القصير واسطة عقد هذا الشريط، الذي أرادته المعارضة السورية منطلقاً لإعادة السيطرة على حمص، ولفصل الأخيرة عن دمشق، وقاعدة خلفية لإمداد الغوطتين بالسلاح والمقاتلين. ومنطقة القلمون هي الجزء الأكبر من هذا الشريط؛ فهي تمتد من جنوبي القصير، إلى التخوم الشمالية والغربية للعاصمة. هذا الشريط كان ببساطة، تهديداً استراتيجياً، لمستقبل النظام في سوريا، وللبنان.
فالسيطرة على هذه المنطقة كانت تهدد طريق إمداد المقاومة، ومناطق انتشار بيئتها في لبنان. وفضلاً عن ذلك، ثمة خطر لا يمكن وصفه إلا بالاستراتيجي على أصل وجود لبنان، يتمثّل بإقامة إمارة لتنظيم «القاعدة» وحلفائه على طول الطرف الآخر من الحدود. وهذه الإمارة كانت آخذة في التوسع. جاءت جرائم المجموعات المسلحة في قرى الريف المحاذي لمدينة الهرمل، ليضرب في صلب الحاضنة الشعبية للمقاومة، وخصوصاً عندما بدأت عملية تهجير سكان منطقة حوض العاصي، ابتداءً من نهاية أيلول 2012.
وفي القلمون، لم تتوقف المعارضة عن قضم المناطق والمواقع، مركزة على الحدود مع لبنان. واستغلت الفراغ الذي أحدثه اضطرار الجيش السوري إلى سحب وحدات من النخبة في هذه المناطق، لتعزيز انتشاره في محيط دمشق، وخاصة بعد تموز 2012، تاريخ بدء الحشود الكبرى لمسلحي المعارضة للهجوم على العاصمة.
المقاومة تباشر التحرك
في هذه المرحلة، اتخذت المقاومة قرارها الكبير، ببدء دراسة الميدان السوري المحاذي للبنان. باشرت فرق الاستطلاع عملها في مناطق حمص وريف دمشق، حيث كانت المعارضة تحشد. تعاظم خطر المسلحين في منطقة القصير، وصار الدفاع عن قرى حوض العاصي (السورية جغرافياً، والمختلطة بسكانها اللبنانيين والسوريين) أمراً حيوياً، بعدما بدأت المعارضة تهجير سكان هذه القرى، تمهيداً لفتح طريق مباشر بين مدينة القصير ومنطقة عكار اللبنانية.
تمكين أهالي هذه القرى من الدفاع عن أنفسهم، ومساعدتهم في حماية أراضيهم، لم تردع المسلحين الذين استمروا في محاولة التمدد جغرافياً، وفي كافة الاتجاهات. عملياً، أزالوا الحدود بين لبنان وسوريا. أقاموا لهم مواقع داخل الأراضي اللبنانية، في جرود عرسال، على سبيل المثال لا الحصر.
وقبالة بلدات جنتا والطفيل وحام معربون والنبي شيت اللبنانية، كانت فرق استطلاع المقاومة تسجّل ما هو أخطر. بعض كتائب المعارضة السورية المنتشرة في المنطقة، كانت تعمل وفق برنامج ميداني بهدف وحيد: رصد مواقع المقاومة ومعسكرات تدريبها والطرق التي تستخدمها على طرفي الحدود اللبنانية ــ السورية منذ سنوات.
على هذه الخلفية، وبهدف كسر الشريط الحدودي الذي أنشاته المعارضة، صدر قرار طرد المسلحين من القصير، المدينة وريفها. وبالقدر الذي سعت فيه المجموعات المسلحة لتحويل معركة القصير إلى معركة مفصلية واستراتيجية مع حزب الله، كانت مفاعيل الانتصار الحاسم الذي حققه الحزب هناك مفصلية واستراتيجية. يكفي للدلالة على ذلك حالة الهستيريا التي انتابت دول المحور المحرِّك للمعارضة من الخليج إلى الغرب مروراً بتركيا، كذلك أدى انتصار الحزب هناك، إلى ظهور حافزية هستيرية لدى المعارضة للإنتقام.
أما بالنسبة إلى الجيش السوري، فكانت شراكة الحزب معه في التخطيط العسكري نقطة التحول التي كان يحتاجها على صعيد الأداء الميداني. السبب المركزي يتصل بعقلية الحزب العسكرية. فهي أكثر مرونة وقدرة على التكيف مع أساليب حرب العصابات التي اعتمدها المسلحون في مواجهة الفكر العسكري الكلاسيكي للجيش. نقطة تحول بدأت تظهر مفاعليها أسرع من المتوقع.
من القصير إلى رنكوس
انتهت معركة القصير في الأيام الأولى من حزيران 2013. كانت الضربة قاسية للمعارضة المسلحة التي «همدت» لفترة، قبل أن تعاود تمددها. كان الجيش السوري وحزب الله قد حققا في هذا الوقت تقدماً في غوطتي دمشق الشرقية والغربية، وفي ريف حلب. استمرت المعارضة بمحاولة التوسع انطلاقاً من القلمون. تعمد المعارضون فتح معارك تأخذ صدى إعلامياً، كما في بلدة معلولا القلمونية، وفي صدد ومهين، التابعتين لريف حمص الجنوبي، والمحاذيتين للقلمون. خاض الجيش وحزب الله معارك ضارية أدّت إلى طرد المسحلين من صدد ومهين، ثم من قارة ودير عطية والنبك في القلمون. صار طريق دمشق حمص أكثر أمناً. رفعت المعارضة، إعلامياً، من مستوى التهويل بشأن القلمون. على الطرف الآخر، كان أصحاب القرار متريثين: «الطبيعة الوعرة لجبال القلمون تستوجب دراسة عميقة للميدان. وإذا فهم مسلحو يبرود ورنكوس وباقي البلدات القلمونية الدروس السابقة، ولم يشكلوا خطراً على لبنان، أو على دمشق، أو على طريق دمشق ـــ حمص، فلا داعي لخوص معركة سريعة في المنطقة». يبدو أن المعارضين لم يستخلصوا العبر الكافية من المعارك، فقرروا استخدام أماكن نفوذهم في القلمون لإرسال السيارات المفخخة إلى لبنان، وإطلاق الصواريخ نحو البقاع، إضافة إلى محاولتهم التمدد في القلمون نفسه، ودعم مقاتلي المعارضة في الغوطة الشرقية تحديداً. صدر القرار بالحسم العسكري في كامل منطقة القلمون، وبإقفال الحدود اللبنانية السورية. الإعداد الجيد للمعركة، وتكتيكات مقاتلي حزب الله الذين توزعوا على مجوعات صغيرة من الجيش السوري، والقدرة النارية الكبيرة، كلها عوامل أدّت إلى حسم سريع لأي معركة في القلمون، وفي ريف حمص (الحصن مثلاً)، وبأقل قدر من الخسائر البشرية في صفوف المهاجمين. من منطقة نعمات قبالة الهرمل، إلى معابر التهريب المتصلة بجرود عرسال، إلى الجراجير والسحل فمزارع ريما ثم يبرود ورأس العين، قبل فليطا ورأس المعرة، وصولاً إلى رنكوس. كان الانكسار النفسي أسرع من الهزيمة العسكرية. وبحسب قادة ميدانيين، لن يطول الأمر قبل إقفال الحدود اللبنانية ــ السورية بشكل كامل، ما يعني إفساح المجال أمام نقل قوات كبيرة من الجيش السوري، ومن المقاومة، من القلمون، للاستفادة منها في ساحات قتال أخرى.
توسع الدور والإنجازات
بعيداً عن القلمون، توسع الانتشار الحمائي لحزب الله في محيط «السيدة زينب» ليمتد على مساحة الغوطتين الشرقية والغربية ويبدل المعادلات الميدانية هناك من تطويقٍ للعاصمة من قبل المسلحين إلى تطويق المسلحين في جزر مقطعة جغرافياً داخل الغوطتين. إزالة التهديد عن العاصمة تزامن مع تبدّل ميداني مماثل لموازين القوى في حمص، «عاصمة الثورة»، فتحول زمام المبادرة إلى أيدي القوات السورية التي استعادت معظم أحياء المدينة وحاصرت المسلحين في ما بقي منها. وبعد حمص جاء دور حلب التي فكّ الحصار عنها وفتح الطريق الدولي إليها في السفيرة وخناصر، فتلكلخ والقصرين ومحيطهما في ريف حمص الغربي على الحدود العكارية مع لبنان، وصولاً إلى معركة القلمون الأخيرة.
في سياق التحولات التي شهدها الميدان السوري منذ معركة القصير إلى اليوم، يمكن التوقف عند مجموعة نقاط أبرزها:
ــ وقف التراجع الميداني للنظام وانتقال المبادرة عموماً من المسلحين إلى الجيش السوري وحلفائه من لجان دفاع وقوى أخرى، على رأسها حزب الله.
ــ تمكّن هذه المبادرة في وقت لاحق من انتزاع انتصارات ميدانية بارزة، وقلب معادلة التهديدات ما بين النظام والمعارضة.
ــ تسارع وتيرة الانتصارات في مرحلة متقدمة، كما حصل في منطقة القلمون التي تهاوت فيها جبهات المدن بفاصل أيام بين جبهة وأخرى، ما يشير إلى حصول تحول نوعي في التخطيط والأداء العسكريين للجيش وحلفائه من المنتظر أن يتراكم مع الوقت ليسرع وتيرة الانتصارات أكثر.
ــ إطباق السيطرة على الحدود اللبنانية السورية إطباقاً شبه كامل، لتصبح الحدود الدولية الأولى التي ضُبطت بقوة الميدان بين سوريا ودولة مجاورة.
ــ إيجاد «سور ردعي قوي» يحول دون أي تدخل دولي خارجي في الحرب السورية، وهو ما تبدّى في «أزمة الكيميائي» التي أريد لها أن تكون مدخلاً لتدخل كهذا، فتحولت إلى محطة لتكريس اليأس منه.
ــ إنهاء الرهان على إسقاط النظام، وتكريس حالة من القبول الضمني لدى معظم أعدائه بحتمية الحل السياسي الذي لا يعني سوى البحث في صيغٍ ثابتها الأساسي بقاء النظام.

Syrian Army Launches Large Scale Operations against Armed Mercenaries

Local Editor

Syrian armySyrian Army units on Thursday carried out large-scale military operations, targeting terrorists’ dens and assembly points in several areas around the country, SANA news agency reported.

Citing a military source, SANA said that units of the armed forces eliminated the last gatherings of the terrorist groups in Telal al-Abboudiyeh, Berghlan al-Gharbiyeh and al-Sharqiyeh in Qusseir countryside of Homs.

The source added that dozens of explosive devices which were planted by terrorists in the region were dismantled and terrorists were eliminated.

In Deir Ezzor of Aleppo, army units killed dozens of terrorists, some of whom are Saudis and Tunisians, and destroyed a tunnel they were using for transporting and transferring weapons and ammunition.

A source told SANA that an army unit clashed with al-Qaeda affiliated al-Nusra Front terrorist group in al-Erfi neighborhood, killing a big number of them, the majority of whom are Saudis and Tunisians.

Another unit liquidated eliminated an armed terrorist group including a sniper near Bemo Bank branch in al-Reshdia neighborhood in the city of Deir-Ezzor.

The source added that a 19-meter tunnel in al-Bousaraya street was destroyed with all terrorists and weapons inside.

A mortar launcher and a terrorists’ den were also destroyed in al-Moreiyeh village, where many terrorists were killed including the terrorist Abdul-karim al-Jassem al-Nahar.

Moreover, a military source told SANA that army units killed a number of terrorists in al-Ghazmati, al-Fardous, Karm Maisar, al-Shaar, al-Halek and Bani Zaid neighborhoods in Aleppo city.

The source added that an armed terrorist group was eliminated near the water station in Sulieman al-Halabi area. Other army units destroyed terrorists’ gatherings and hideouts with all the weapons and ammunition inside them in the villages of Maarat al-Artiq, Hilan, Haritan, al-Sheikh Lutfi, the industrial city, Rasem al-Abboud, al-Sheikh Najjar, Andan,Ebtin, Hadadin and surrounding Aleppo central prison.

In Idleb, army units eliminated a number of terrorists in the villages of Tal Salmo, Um Jern in Abu al-Dohour, KaferTala and the youth camp.

A 23mm anti-aircraft machinegun was destroyed, and a number of terrorists were killed and wounded surrounding al-Yarmouk School, the old customs, the shoes factory in Daraa al-Balad.
A unit of the armed forces eliminated an armed terrorist group in Maaloula town in Damascus Countryside.

Syria was hit by a violent unrest since mid-March 2011, where the Syrian government accuses foreign actors, mainly the Saudi Arabia and Turkey, of orchestrating the conflict by supporting the militant opposition groups with arms and money.

Source: Agencies
30-01-2014 – 18:08 Last updated 30-01-2014 – 18:08

Syrian Army Launches Attack from Qusseir, Controling Naaimat Hills near Lebanon

Local Editor

The Syrian army launched from the city of Qusseir an intensive campaign against the terrorist groups in al-Qaa area at Lebanese borders, regaining control over Naaimat Hills.

Syria Army
In details, the Syrian army attacked over 1000 the terrorists on Naaimat hill which is considered a stronghold for the militants as they used it to attempt infiltrating into Qusseir and to launch rockets and shells against the Lebanese areas.

The Syrian army killed scores of the terrorists and confiscated their munitions.

The Syrian Army foiled several infiltration attempts in the provinces of the Daraa and Souwayda, ambushing and killing scores of the militants who were trying to assist the besieged terrorists in eastern Gouta.

The Syrian army restored security to the international Damascus-Daraa highway by pushing back the militants from surrounding areas.

The Syrian army also foiled attempts by terrorist groups to infiltrate Talkalakh countryside from Lebanon and destroyed many terrorists’ hideouts in many areas in the province.

A source told SANA that the army eliminated all members of an armed terrorist group in the town of al-Zara and destroyed a vehicle loaded with weapons and ammunition, among the killed terrorists was leader of the group, Mustafa Rajab.

The source added that an army unit killed scores of terrorists who tried to infiltrate Talkalakh countryside from the area of Wadi Khaled in Lebanon and seizing a rocket launcher.

About 13 terrorists were killed and 9 vehicles were destroyed in many areas in al-Qseir southern countryside.

A military source told SANA that the army clashed with terrorists in the neighborhoods of Qadi Askar, Karm al-Maysar, al-Marjeh, Bustan al-Qasr, al-Rashideen, al-Jazmati and al-Hawouz in Aleppo city.

The source added that the army also targeted and destroyed terrorists’ hideouts in the areas of Jdaidah, Kweires, al-Sheikh Najjar, Darat Izza, al-Atareb, Maarat al-Arteeq, al-Widehi and Azzan and killed and injured scores of the terrorists.

In Raqqa, the Syrian army continued its special operations against the terrorists, despite the hard field conditions in the area.

The Syrian army killed a number of militants who besiege and attack Tabaqa’s airport.
Despite the terrorist siege, the Syrian army was able to supply its soldiers with the munitions and foodstuffs via the military airplanes.

Source: Agencies
29-01-2014 – 14:48 Last updated 29-01-2014 – 21:3

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Posted on October 18, 2013 by
Bankrupt at Home and Abroad, Syria Shows Washington is a Spent Geopolitical Player
By Finian Cunningham

US policy on Syria could be described as «a comedy of errors» if the consequences for human suffering were not so brutal. Having largely created a quagmire of terrorism and lawlessness in Syria through covert insurgency operations over the past two and half years, the US government looks like a hapless Doctor Frankenstein who has lost control of the beast, or should we say beasts…
The creation from the laboratory of American regime change has many forms, from savage death squads on the ground to effete exile political groups ensconced in five-star Persian Gulf hotels.
But none of these creations seem to respond to the supposed master. The situation is evidently out of control and the US appears to the world like a mad, impotent fool.
First, Washington repeated calls this week on its manufactured Syrian opposition, the Syrian National Coalition, to attend the Geneva II political talks. But the SNC flatly rejected the admonition.
Then, a joint statement by the motley crew of foreign mercenary militias in Syria turned around again this week and issued a terse repudiation of the Syrian National Coalition or any other political group.
In a released video, the statement representing some 70 militant brigades said: “Having seen the failure of the political groups that claim to represent the opposition and the revolutionary groups… we leaders of the military groups in the southern provinces withdraw our recognition from any political group that claims to represent us».
This was the second slap in the face for the Western-lionized so-called National Coalition. Last month, some 13 insurgent organizations in the northern Syrian provinces also issued a blunt statement rejecting the coalition as having any legitimacy as a political representative.
Significantly, among those latter groups repudiating the SNC were the Al Qaeda-affiliated Jabhat Al Nusra and the Free Syrian Army. The Western governments claim to support the FSA, led by General Salim Idriss, because of its supposed «moderate» credentials and non-association with the extremist Takfiri networks, such as Al Nusra.
Awkwardly for the Western propagandists, the FSA does not seem to be reading the memos, and has publicly aligned itself with «the extremists». In other words, there is no separation of «moderates» and «extremists», or «good rebels» and «bad rebels».
That putative distinction is seen more than ever as merely a propaganda fiction that the Western governments have concocted in order to give themselves a political and moral cover for fomenting a criminal war of aggression in Syria – by hiding behind the pretense that they are supporting pro-democracy, freedom-loving good rebels. Shamefully, the Western mainstream so-called journalism industry has assisted in contriving this preposterous façade, instead of rigorously investigating and ripping it apart.
The reality is that the Western governments have unleashed a wave of terror on Syria since March 2011, under the guise of the Arab Spring, for the geopolitical objective of regime change. That wave of aggression to destabilize the government of President Bashar al-Assad is comprised of hundreds of mercenary groups of varying extremist tendencies, most of whom originate from as many as 30 countries, including Libya, Tunisia, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Afghanistan and Russia, as well as Western states such as Australia, Britain, France and Canada.
The illusory Western dichotomy of «moderates» and «extremists» was blown away during the massacres carried out in Syria’s Western Latakia Province during August. Even Human Rights Watch, which is normally dutiful to the pro-Western political agenda, reported hundreds of atrocities against civilians during the raids on villages in Latakia. These atrocities included the kidnapping of over 200 women and children, whose whereabouts remain unknown. There are credible reports that the victims may have been brutally slain for the purpose of fabricating the East Ghouta chemical gas attack on 21 August. During the Latakia offensive, the Free Syrian Army commander General Idriss was filmed on the ground proclaiming the success of the campaign under his leadership.
So, like the proverbial best-laid plans that come unstuck, the US and its Western and regional allies, flooded Syria with terrorism while lining up a government-in-waiting in the form of careerist exiles and political opportunists. The political puppets were to have moved in when the government in Damascus had been cleaved from the general population through the terrorism of the death squads. But it didn’t work out like that.
The American-led regime-change plan for Syria was fatally flawed because it did not reckon on the genuine popular mandate of the Assad government, the professionalism of the Syrian army, the robust regional alliance between Syria, Russia and Iran, and the resilience of Russia in particular to oppose Western political maneuvers through the UN Security Council. In addition, the US-led axis did not count on the immense opposition among the war-sickened Western public towards further insidious imperialist machinations in the Middle East.
From this incompetent chess play, Washington has ended up with an unholy incoherent mess from which it cannot extricate. Its mercenaries on the ground are losing and turning in on themselves through internecine turf wars. Al Nusra, the Islamic State of Iraq and Shams and the Free Syrian Army are more a threat to themselves than from the Syrian national army.
Meanwhile, whatever unity is forged between these groups it is based on outright rejection of the Western-backed political opposition.
As noted, the Western-engineered political opposition has come out against any dialogue at Geneva despite pleas this week from US Secretary of State John Kerry. These political pawns are probably reacting with umbrage out of a sense of being used as, well how can we say, pawns.
The Geneva talks aimed at forming a new consensus government in Syria were originally hatched back in June 2012, but have been continually delayed because the US and its Western regime-change allies, Britain and France, were coaxing their Syrian exile clients not to participate. Now the US wants these pawns to participate, only because Washington calculates that it has run out of options on the military field.
When Russia threw the US a political lifeline last month in the form of a deal on Syrian chemical weapons disarmament, to help Washington avert its disastrous warpath, part of the deal was for the speedy convening of Geneva talks, scheduled for next month in the Swiss capital.
A year ago, Washington and its allies were gung-ho about forcing regime change in Syria by fomenting a dirty war through an array of proxy mercenary groups. Never mind that many of these proxies are linked to the Al Qaeda franchise and are on the official US terror list.
The covert military agenda has turned out an abject failure, with the key turning point some four months ago being the defeat of the foreign militants in the mid-region town of Qusayr. With the covert military agenda losing traction, the East Ghouta false flag chemical attack was Washington’s last-chance gambit for launching an overt war on Syria to force its regime change plans.
However, Washington and its allies did not foresee the formidable opposition from within their own populations to any such military adventurism. The Western axis also did not foresee the trenchant international resistance to any such militarism. Russian President Vladimir Putin’s warning against American aggression resonated with many ordinary people around the world, including the American and European public.
Having painted itself into a corner, Washington was offered a political get-out by Russia when Russia’s Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov hammered out the Syrian chemical weapons decommissioning deal with Kerry in Geneva on 14 September.
That deal put the political process back on centre stage. Lavrov urged the US this week to «use whatever power it has» to exert its influence on the multifarious opposition to make good on the Geneva II talks.
The Russian top diplomat said: «The main obstacle on this path remains our [American] partners’ inability to make the Syrian opposition, which they are looking after, go to Geneva and sit at the negotiating table with the government».
Lavrov is too much of a statesman to use impolite language. But the essence of what he is saying is this: Washington has created a mess in Syria that it doesn’t have the power to fix.
Rather fittingly, in a world where the US government is seen as financially bankrupt, it is also being seen, glaringly, as a bankrupt geopolitical force.
Bankrupt at home and abroad, Syria underscores the inescapable fact that Washington is a spent geopolitical player.

Preemptive Battle in Qalamun Mounts, Arsal within Days

معركة كبرى في القلمون السورية أصبحت قاب قوسين أو أدنى ، والهدف: إبادة لواء بندر بن سلطان

Radwan Mortada – Al-Akhbar

Syrian Arab ArmyGunmen positioned in the Qalamun mountains and Arsal barren areas are beating the drums of war. They are exerting efforts in preparation for the next confrontation plan, and getting ready for a battle which they believe inevitable against the Syrian army and Hezbollah. Here, a military scheme is drawn to open a pre-emptive battle to restore Jose crossing in the next few days.

The spark of Qalamun and Arsal battle hasn’t been triggered yet. Insurgents are still playing with the ‘lost time’, awaiting for the crucial date between a moment and another. The two fighting camps on the Syrian ground – opposition militants on one side and the Syrian army with the support of Hezbollah fighters on the other – are preparing for an “inevitable war” that will break out in Qalamun Mountains (behind Lebanon’s eastern border) and in some parties of the Lebanese Arsal. Here, the battle is inevitable “strategically and tactically”, whether for the opposition militants or for the Syrian army, according to the sources of both, given that the region is a vital artery feeding the Syrian depth with gunmen and weapons.

That battle, which scheduled more than once, repeatedly postponed due of conditions that were preventing its start. But today, opposition field sources reveal for Al-Akhbar that a preemptive attack plan is to be carried out by armed groups to restore Jose crossing on the Lebanese-Syrian border (north of Arsal, east of Hermel, south of al-Qusayr city), which is subjected in its Syrian part to the control of Syrian army and Hezbollah; noting that the crossing was under the control of the opposition militants before being recovered with the expel of opposition militants from Qusayr.
During the months when the Syrian army (with the support of Hezbollah) was restoring control over al-Qusayr, opposition gunmen failed twice to restore the Jose.

Sources believe the start of military operation will be likely in the next few days, especially with the information stating that armed groups are planning to restore the crossing before the start of Winter, which always blocks most of the mountain outlets against them in the barren areas of Arsal due to the snow accumulation, which in turn cuts supply routes from Lebanon to the northern Damascus countryside, and then to all the areas surrounding Syrian capital.

After al-Qusayr road has been blocked, which was open last year, and amid the difficulty of smuggling across the northern Lebanese border (Akkar ) compared by Arsal barrens controlled by the insurgents, the militants have nothing else to achieve but seeking control over Jose crossing.
The irony is that they were preparing themselves last September for Winter and blocking Arsal road, seeking to control the Orontes Basin villages to open a direct route between al-Qusayr and Akkar. Yet, their attempt doomed to failure due to Hezbollah intervention.

Today, Syrian opposition gunmen want to repeat the same scheme in Jose crossing adjacent to the Lebanese Qaa projects. The information reveals that the attack decision has been taken regardless the losses; noting that it will be launched from several directions to encircle Jose town and its crossing with the support of more than one “martyrdom operation”‘ to pave the way for the attack before storming the area.

To this end also, most armed groups are engaged in preparing ambushes and improvised explosive devices in Qalamun and the Syrian Yabrood and Qara villages to block any possible attack of Hezbollah or the Syrian army.

Also, information states that these groups possess advanced missiles which they were struggling to store during the last period in anticipation of this confrontation.

Syrian Qalamun is an extension of the Lebanese Arsal barrens. Access to it means inevitable pass within barrens. It is surrounded by several Syrian opposition villages. Militants camps – living these days a boring routine – are deployed inside, where nothing disturbs them but a loud explosion of some sporadic shells falling from time to time.

The silence of these mountains – in most – hides the military operations rooms inhabited by hundreds of Syrian opposition militants. Inside the overlapping geographical spot between the Lebanese-Syrian border, these men maintain their state or their independent entity, which determining its identity believed confusing: Is it a combat camp or a military fortress or a buffer zone where gunmen and outlaws set and roam freely?

In these mountains and barrens, car bombs and IEDs have been prepared which claimed the lives of dozens of people. Along their routes, more than a “martyr” moved on, the last was the Jordanian Abu Musaab, hero of the “drawn swords at Maloula checkpoints” operation carried out by Al-Nusra Front fighters, who was riding a four-wheel drive vehicle, bombed with a large quantity of explosives prepared in the Qalamun mountains before blowing himself up at Maloula checkpoint, in the same moments while he was talking on phone to the emir of Qalamun Mountains in al-Qaeda organization. A number of fighters in the opposite side of Arsal boast the audio tape of Abu Masaab call with the emir.

The operation, which opposition groups say they are preparing for in Jose, will be within the framework of heavy military activity carried out by opposition gunmen in the areas of rural Damascus since the attack on Maloula, which saw more than a battle in different areas of eastern and western Ghota and Qalamun mountains.

Opposition groups seek, through these battles, to secure ‘safe areas’ under their control, in order to prevent the Syrian army from completing its battles in the two Ghotas, and to try liberating themselves. But until today, they were not successful in achieving that.

In the border area adjacent to Arsal, “Walid military camp” is well known. It is used by militants for training, comfort and transferring arms on both sides of the border. However, it is not the only camp. camps here are also numerous, just like militants who are of different persuasions and multiple affiliations. You can find Lebanese, Syrian, Palestinian, Saudi and Kuwaiti nationals.

As for the weapon holders, some of them are hard-liner Islamist militants who belong to Al-Nusra Front and the “Free of Qalamun Brigade”, along with random groups who differ in everything but agree on the hostility against the Syrian regime, notably “Baba Amr Martyrs Battalion” led by Sheikh Raed Aljori.

The final word here is for the Council of Military Leadership, which is dictated orders from a ‘shura’ council belonged to Al-Nusra Front, and whose groups are led in Qalamun by an “emir” holding the Kuwaiti citizenship.

It should be noted that most of the suspected names in the Beir al-Abed explosion on July 9, firing of rockets and killing army soldiers at a checkpoint in the Bekaa Valley, who are mentioned in the statement of Defense Minister Fayez Ghosn (on August 16, 2013), are fortifying in those mountains.
Translated by Al-Manar Website

Source: Newspapers
02-10-2013 – 18:02 Last updated 02-10-2013 – 18:02

معركة كبرى في القلمون السورية أصبحت قاب قوسين أو أدنى ، والهدف: إبادة لواء بندر بن سلطان

طبقا لمصدر خاص, ولمصادر أخرى مقربة من أحد أعضاء”الائتلاف” المنحدرين من منطقة الزبداني، التي من المتوقع أن تكون إحدى النقاط الأكثر سخونة قريبا، هناك حشود وحشود مضادة في المنطقة الممتدة من الزبداني في وادي بردى صعودا إلى الشمال الشرقي نحو سلسلة جبال القلمون الغربية المتاخمة للحدود اللبنانية، والتي تضم عددا من التجمعات السكانية مثل يبرود والنبك وعسال الورد ورنكوس، التي تقع في معظمها في مناطق جبلة وعرة. هذا فضلا عن إطلالتها على مواقع عسكرية حساسة تتبع دمشق وريفها.

وطبقا لمعلومات مؤكدة، فإن “أمير الجهاد في الهلال الخصيب”، بندر بن سلطان، أعطى أوامره مؤخرا لزهران علوش، الذي يرتبط باتصال مباشر معه، بحشد معظم مسلحي “لواء الإسلام” التابع له ، فضلا عن مسلحي “جيش الإسلام” الذي تشكل يوم أمس لهذا الغرض،إلى منطقة القلمون وريف دمشق الشمالي الغربي تمهيدا للقيام بـ”عملية مركبة” تستهدف قطع طريق دمشق ـ حمص من منطقة يبرود والنبك و الالتفاف على دمشق من الناحية الشمالية الغربية، بعدما فشلت جميع محاولات “اللواء” المذكور، الذي يتمركز أساسا في بلدة”دوما” و”غوطة دمشق”، ومعه “جبهة النصرة”،في إحداث اختراق للعاصمة، والتي كان آخرها في 21 من الشهر الماضي، أي “ليلة الكيماوي” الشهيرة. فيومها تحضّر الجيش السوري لأكبر عملية اجتياح من نوعها لأماكن تحشد “لواء الإسلام”( لواء بندر بن سلطان) وحلفائه من “جبهة النصرة” والمجموعات الأخرى الأقل شأنا.
إلا أن ما جرى فجر ذلك اليوم من استخدام للسلاح الكيميائي أحبط عمليته إلى حد كبير وأربكته.
ومن الواضح أن التطورات السياسية خلال الأسبوعين الأخيرين، لاسيما “التفاهم الروسي ـ الأميركي” وما تمخض عنه من نتائج، فضلا عن الضربات القاصمة التي تلقاها”لواء بندر” وحلفاؤه في منطقة “شبعا”، حيث تعرض لمذبحة حقيقية على أيدي الجيش السوري وحلفاءه، الذين خسروا سبعة فقط من مقاتليهم، دفع “أمير الجهاد” إلى تغيير تكتيكاته لملاقاة الاستحقاقات السياسية القريبة، وأهمها “مؤتمر جنيف2″ الذي يبدو أنه يجري الإعداد له بزخم غير مسبوق من وراء الكواليس. وكان واضحا أن انشقاق 13 تنظيما كبيرا من المسلحين، أبرزها “جبهة النصرة” و”حركة أحرار الشام” و”لواء الإسلام” نفسه، عن “الائتلاف”، وسحبها الاعتراف به، لم يكن إلا في إطار “خطة بندر” التي تهدف إلى تجميع “الأوراق الميدانية” في يده قبيل المؤتمر. وكان الانشقاق المذكور أتبع يوم أمس بانشقاق خمسين مجموعة إسلامية أصولية أخرى تمولها السعودية وباقي دول الخليج الفارسي ، عن”الجيش الحر” وتوحدها تحت اسم”جيش الإسلام”، جزءا من عملية تجميع”الأوراق الميدانية” المشار إليها. لكن تبقى مبايعة”زهران علوش” لـ”أبو محمد الجولاني” هي ذات المغزى الأهم في هذا السياق، وفق ما يؤكده مصدر بريطاني سبق أن كان عضوا في بعثة بلاده الديبلوماسية في دمشق.

وتقول مصادر مختلفة، ميدانية وديبلوماسية إقليمية وأوربية متابعة، من بينها الصحفي الفرنسي الموما إليه، إن كلا من”جبهة النصرة” و”لواء الإسلام”، فضلا عن عدد من المجموعات الأقل شأنا، حشدوا ما لا يقل عن 15 ألف مسلح في سلسلة جبال القلمون الغربية، لاسيما منها المتاخمة لمدن وبلدات “النبك ” و”يبرود” و”جيرود”، فضلا عن البلدات الواقعة في أعلى السلسلة الجبلية، لاسيما “عسال الورد” و”رنكوس” وسواهما.
وفي الوقت نفسه يعمل حزب الله، وفق المصادر نفسها، على إحكام سد جميع المنافذ والممرات على الحدود السورية ـ اللبنانية، وبشكل خاص في المنطقة الواقعة على امتداد أكثر من 40 كم، من جرود عرسال شمال بعلبك حتى قوسايا جنوبا ، من أجل منع فرار المسلحين من المنطقة حين تبدأ الحملة ضدهم. هذا فضلا عن أن “الجبهة الشعبية ـ القيادة العامة” قامت بعمل مشابه، وإن على نطاق أضيق، في منطقة “قوسايا” حيث تقع معسكراتها. ولا يغيب عن المعنيين أن المسلحين ، بما في ذلك “جبهة النصرة”، تقوم بتجميع مئات المسلحين داخل الأراضي اللبنانية نفسها، لاسيما في “المناطق الحاضنة” لهم، وبشكل خاص بلدة”عرسال” التي تبين من التحقيقات أن السيارات المفخخة التي انفجرت في الضاحية الجنوبية من بيروت جرى تفخيخها فيها، وأن من فخخوا تلك السيارات و أطلقوا الصواريخ على بيروت من زعران “الجيش الحر”، يقيمون في عرسال ، حيث يؤمن لهم”تيار المستقبل “الحريري ونوابه ، فضلا عن نواب “القوات اللبنانية”، الغطاء السياسي الذي يمنع الأجهزة الأمنية اللبنانية من اعتقالهم وإحالتهم إلى القضاء.

ورغم أن منطقة “القلمون” ذات طبيعة وعرة جدا يصعب فيها قتال الجيوش النظامية، إلا أن طبيعتها المكشوفة شبه الجرداء وندرة التجمعات السكانية فيها ومحدوديتها، يعطي ـ وفق خبراء عسكريين ـ ميزة تفاضلية للجيش السوري من حيث إمكانية استخدامه كثافة نارية كبيرة وأسلحة أكثر فتكا، بما في ذلك سلاح الجو، دون خشية التسبب بإيقاع خسائر في صفوف المدنيين كما يحصل في المناطق المدينية والريفية المأهولة. ويعتقد خبراء عسكريون تحدثت إليهم”الحقيقة” أن تمكن الجيش السوري وحلفائه من إنزال ضربة كبيرة في صفوف”النصرة” و”لواء بندر” و”جيش الإسلام” وحلفائهم في “القلمون” ، سيكون بمثابة قصم ظهر لـ”المعارضة المسلحة” في دمشق وريف دمشق، وصولا إلى مشارف مدينة حمص.

وبالعودة إلى واقعة تشكيل”جيش الإسلام”، ينبغي أن نشير إلى أن الاستخبارات السعودية ، وتحضيرا منها لمعركة “القلمون”، ومعها دمشق بطبيعة الحال، عمدت إلى توحيد خمسين مجموعة عسكرية، على رأسها”لواء الإسلام”، تحت اسم “جيش الإسلام”، من خلال مؤتمر لأمراء هذه المجموعات عقد أول أمس الأحد في “غوطة دمشق” الشرقية برعاية مندوب عن بندر بن سلطان. وقد انتهى المؤتمر بإعلان الأمراء جميعهم “مبايعتهم” لزهران علوش أميرا للجيش الجديد الذي سيأخذ على عاتقه افتتاح “معركة القلمون”!

“Labbouneh Raid Gives Reason to Hezbollah”

Scarlett Haddad, L’Orient-Le-Jour

Lebanon: army investigates the Zionist unit's invasion to the southern territoriesDespite the particularly critical situation, the secretary general of Hezbollah, who has two televised appearances this week -shows great calm.

According to his rare visitors – because Sayyed Hasan Nasrallah receives little these days in order to devote his time to the multiple political, media and military issues which he tackles in person – the head of Hezbollah believes that the party he leads is currently fighting on three fronts: on the internal scene, in Syria and against Israel.

These three fronts are of equal importance to him, although he prefers the stage where he confronts the Israeli enemy. The last incident that occurred in Labbouneh (which lies between Naqoura and Aita ash-Shaab) – the secrets of which have not yet been unfolded all – also confirmed elsewhere what “the Sayyed” has been saying in his speeches:
“Those who believe that by creating problems with resistance on the internal scene, they will succeed to divert it from its main objective to fight against Israel, are wrong.”

Through this incident, Hezbollah has shown that its willingness to remain on high alert is justified and that the “wing” which is devoted to fight Israel operates independently.

Moreover, according to some versions, the incursion of the Israeli patrol inside the Lebanese territories was a kind of test to exactly determine whether Hezbollah is actually in a state of permanent alert, or whether its participation in the war in Syria and the pressures it suffered domestically have forced the party to release its vigilance. This flagrant violation by Israel of the provisions of Resolution 1701 and of Lebanese sovereignty shows that Hezbollah has the right to keep its priorities.
Lebanon: Blood drops of a Zionist army element over the Lebanese southern territoriesAlways according to his visitors, Nasrallah is convinced that despite the immense international support Israel enjoys, it is afraid of the Resistance more than ever. Since the beginning of Hezbollah participation in Syria fighting, particularly in al-Qussayr, Israel thereby would have changed all its defense plans. The reason behind this change is simple.

So far, in all confrontations with Israel – which are numerous enough – Hezbollah was in defensive state and fought over its own territory in a favorable environment. But in Syria, especially in al-Qussayr, Hezbollah switched to the offensive state, showing new military capabilities that concern the Israelis.

These are immediately related to the hints  made by Nasrallah in his speech on Galileo to conclude that Hezbollah has plans to try to invade this portion of territory in case of a new confrontation. Thus, they have changed their defense plans on this basis, which represents a positive sign to Hezbollah.
Another positive sign is that Hamas is seeking to come closer to Hezbollah again. At a time when tension between Sunnis and Shiites is constantly rising in the region, this recreated the unity of Sunni and Shiite resistance movements.

Certainly, the Secretary General of Hezbollah does not underestimate the campaign launched against his party. Yet he believes that this is the price to pay.

To those who criticize the intervention in Syria, Hezbollah wonder what would have happened if it didn’t intervene: The Syrian opposition would have continued to bomb the Hermel and its surroundings, and Baalbeck and its surroundings, expanding each time the scope of its attacks a little, firstly to link Arsal to northern Lebanon providing a wide buffer zone for the Syrian opposition, and then to push the Shiite population to rebel and to embark a response against the Sunni opponents, plunging the country not only in an extended Syrian war, but also in the sectarian discord.

Scarlett Haddad is Lebanese journalist close to March 8 bloc.

Translated into English by Al-Manar Website

Source: Newspapers
13-08-2013 – 18:05 Last updated 13-08-2013 – 18:06
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