Reasons for the Russian special military operation in Ukraine

June 28, 2022

by Batko Milacic

On 24 February 2022, Russia started special military operation in the Ukraine. The main goals of the special operation was the denazification and demilitarization of Ukraine and the liberation of the Luhansk and Donetsk People’s Republics.

After the far-right coup sponsored by US in Kyiv back in 2014 which resulted in overthrew of the pro-Russian President Viktor Yanukovych there was a revolt of the Russian-speaking population in Ukraine. The pro-Russian population of Ukraine makes it clear that they do not accept the coup that took place in Kiev. This resulted in the separation of Crimea as well as a similar desire of the people in other parts of Ukraine.

However, the new government in Kiev, which is under the full control of Washington, immediately declares them terrorists and an ‘’anti-terrorist’’ operation was launched. The result of that ’’anti-terrorist’’ operation is 13,000 to 14,000 killed civilians, destroyed civilian infrastructure and many, many other crimes were committed by the new Ukrainian regime against its own people.

Also, Russia’s “special operation” was a “response to what NATO was doing in Ukraine to prepare this country for a very aggressive posture against the Russian Federation.

The Ukraine was given offensive arms, including the arms which can reach the Russian territory, military bases were being built including on the Sea of Azov and many dozens of military exercises, including many of them on Ukrainian territory were conducted under NATO auspices and most of these exercises were designed against the interests of the Russian Federation.

Since 2014 and the coup in Ukraine Russia has been initiating draft treaties, draft agreements with Ukraine and NATO, with countries of the Organization of Security and Cooperation in Europe and lately in December last year Russia proposed another initiative to the United States and to NATO to conclude treaties with both of them on security guarantees to all countries in the Euro-Atlantic space without joining any military alliance.

However, every time when Russia initiated these steps, they were basically rejected with more or less polite behavior. In 2009, Moscow proposed the European Security Treaty which NATO refused to consider and the treaty actually was about codifying something to which all OSCE countries subscribed at the top level.

Russia had suggested that the political commitments to give countries the right to choose its alliances and not to strengthen their security at the expense of the security of another country, meaning that “no single organization in Europe can pretend to be a dominant player in this geopolitical space.

NATO responded to Russia by saying that there would be no legally binding security guarantees outside NATO, which makes the OSCE, which was signed by several states across the continent, completely irrelevant.

NATO, despite its promises and promises of its leaders, was moving closer and closer to the Russian border. That was unacceptable for Russia.

All of the above, in addition to Kiev’s canceling everything Russian, including the language, education, media and day-to-day use of the Russian language was, in addition to violating basic human rights, an open provocation against Russia.

So when the Ukrainian regime intensified at the end of last year and early this year shelling of the Eastern territories of the country in Donbas, in the worst violations of the Minsk Agreements which were signed in February 2015 and endorsed by the Security Council resolution, when they were targeting civilians and civilian infrastructure, schools, hospitals, kindergartens, Russia.

More about the relations between Russia and Ukraine, the Kiev coup in 2014, American influence in Ukraine and the geopolitics of the current crisis can be seen in an excellent documentary ‘’Why the war between Russia and Ukraine began’’:

هل يطوي بوتين صفحة العالم الأميركي؟

الاربعاء 23 شباط 2022

المصدر: الميادين نت

قتيبة الصالح 

يمكن الحديث عن الموقف الروسي في هذه اللحظة، والذي ينطلق في إطار الأزمة الأوكرانية من 3 محدِّدات رئيسة.

قد يكون اعتراف موسكو باستقلال جمهوريتي دونيتسك ولوغانسك، والذي أعلنه الرئيس الروسي فلاديمير بوتين، هو التفصيل الأقل أهمية في خطابه المطوَّل والموجَّه إلى الشعب الروسي. أعاد بوتين، وفق سردية متماسكة، تعريف الأزمة، ملقياً الكرة مجدداً عبر الحدود، من دون أن ينسى الإشارة إلى فصل جديد في النظام العالمي.

تتجاهل واشنطن حقيقة، مفادها أن الاعتراضات الروسية على توسع الناتو سبقت وصول بوتين إلى الرئاسة أول مرة عام 2000.

ركزت أغلبية التعليقات، طوال الفترة السابقة، على أوكرانيا، في إطار الحشد العسكري الروسي وما يمثله من تهديد لكييف، بينما صوّرت الدعاية الأميركية الحدث على أنه وُلِد من العدم، وأن المشكلة الروسية هي في وجود أوكرانيا ديمقراطية عند حدودها. لذا، تريد موسكو فرض نفوذها على السياسة الخارجية لكييف.

يُذكّر ذلك مجدداً بالنهج الأميركي التقليدي؛ ذلك الذي يقوم على التعامل، وفق منطق فقدان الذاكرة التاريخي، بحيث تُفْصَل الأحداث عن سياقها وعن كل ما أدى إلى الوصول إليها. في هذا السياق، تتجاهل واشنطن حقيقة، مفادها أن الاعتراضات الروسية على توسع الناتو سبقت وصول بوتين إلى الرئاسة أول مرة عام 2000.

وكما أوضح بوتين، طوال 65 دقيقة، فإن جذور الأزمة تعود إلى التسويات غير المحسومة لمرحلة ما بعد الحرب الباردة؛ تلك الترتيبات التي تمت بينما كانت روسيا، كما يصفها أحد الكتّاب الأميركيين، جاثية على ركبتيها، تُباع بزّات ضبّاط جيشها مع الأوسمة فوق أرصفة موسكو بثمن بخس.

لم تكن الولايات المتحدة حينها في حاجة إلى المناورة. اختارت إدارة بيل كلينتون الاستمرار في تمدد الناتو شرقاً. لم تكن فكرة إيقاف ذلك واردة. فإلى جانب حسابات كلينتون الداخلية، كان ذلك ضرورياً لاستمرار القيادة الأميركية العالمية، إذ زوّدت فكرة الحماية الأميركية لأوروبا الولاياتِ المتحدةَ بنفوذ هائل في مراكز القوة الاقتصادية العالمية، في تلك اللحظة.

في موسكو المنهَكة، كان الأمر مثيراً للاستغراب. صُمّم الناتو أساساً من أجل المحافظة على أمن أوروبا الغربية، ومواجهة حلف وارسو بقيادة الاتحاد السوفياتي. ومع سقوط جدار برلين، لم يعد هناك من مبرّر لاستمرار التوسع.

كانت روسيا، على عكس اليوم، أضعفَ من أن يُسمع صوتها. وعلى وقع حاجتها إلى مليارات الدولارات من صندوق النقد الدولي، لم تمتلك موسكو كثيراً من الخيارات، فوقّعت اتفاقية العلاقات المتبادلة مع الناتو عام 1997.

بسهولة، تجاهلت واشنطن اعتراضات يلتسين على تمدُّد الناتو شرقاً، والذي مثّل تراجعاً أميركياً عن الضمانات الشفوية التي أُعطيت لغورباتشوف، وتجاهلت الولايات المتحدة أيضاً الأصوات الداخلية التي اعترضت على التوسع، داعيةً إلى استغلال الفرصة التاريخية في إنشاء نظام أوروبي جديد يشمل روسيا. ونتيجة ذلك، استمر منطق الحرب الباردة أميركياً. والحلف، الذي ضم 16عضواً في ذروة الحرب الباردة، أصبح يضم 30 دولة.

لكنّ هذا السياق الطويل اتَّخذ انعطافات مهمة في الأعوام الأخيرة. حدود الناتو باتت تغازل جورجيا وأوكرانيا. وبالرغم من انفتاح موسكو على الحوار مع كييف، فإن الرئيس الأوكراني، فولوديمير زيلينسكي، اتَّخذ خطوات تشي بخيار استراتيجي، يقترب على نحو لصيق من الغرب، ويعلن ما يشبه حالة العداء المتصاعدة مع روسيا، بحيث تتحول أوكرانيا، بصورة متدرجة، إلى جارٍ مستنزِف وخَطِر.

بناءً على كل ذلك، يمكن الحديث عن الموقف الروسي في هذه اللحظة، والذي ينطلق في إطار الأزمة الأوكرانية من 3 محدِّدات رئيسة:

أولا:ـ خطاب بوتين الافتتاحي، خلال اجتماع مجلس الأمن الروسي، في أيار/مايو 2021، والذي أشار فيه إلى أن أوكرانيا تتحول “ببطء، لكن بثبات، إلى نقيض معادٍ لروسيا”. 

ثانيا:ـ  كلمة بوتين خلال الاجتماع الموسَّع لمجلس وزارة الخارجية الروسية في الـ 18 من تشرين الثاني/ نوفمبر 2021، والذي أكد فيه أنه لا يؤمن بالضمانات الأمنية الأميركية، وأن واشنطن تنسحب ببساطة من المعاهدات مع تفسير، أو من دونه.

ثالثا:ـ المقال الشديد اللهجة للرئيس السابق دميتري ميدفيديف، في صحيفة “كومرسانت”، في تشرين الأول/ أكتوبر 2021، والذي وصف فيه القيادة الأوكرانية بأنها “تابعة”، وأن إجراء مزيد من المحادثات مع كييف لا طائل فيه.

وفقاً للمحدِّدات السابقة، يمكن تلخيص الموقف الروسي بالقول إن موسكو تعتبر الحد من المخاطر التي تشكّلها أوكرانيا بوابة لمراجعة النظام الأمني في أوروبا في فترة ما بعد الحرب الباردة. وفي هذا السياق، لم تعد روسيا تقبل المسار الذي تتخذه كييف في إطار تحولها التدريجي إلى دولة معادية، بالتوازي مع عدم الثقة الروسية بالالتزام الأميركي بشأن أي إطار دبلوماسي لحل الأزمة.

وانطلاقاً من هذا الموقف، وبالنظر إلى المعطيات التي قدّمها بوتين في خطابه الأخير، يمكن تقييم مآلات الأزمة الحالية، والتي تتراوح سيناريوهاتها بين أقصى التصعيد وأقصى التسوية، أو المراوحة بينهما.

استمرار التوتّر الحادّ

كثيرة هي الحسابات لدى جميع الأطراف: تُهدَّد روسيا بعقوبات قصوى، يقلِّل بوتين أهميتَها، وهو الذي استبق خطواته بتعزيز محور بكين – موسكو، بينما ترفض الولايات المتحدة الاستجابة للمطالب الروسية، في موازاة بحثها عن بدائل في كل الاتِّجاهات من أجل ضمان الحشد الأوروبي. 

تفرض هذه المراوحة احتمال امتداد الأزمة من دون تحرّك، لكن ذلك يبدو مستنزِفاً للجميع، بينما تراقب موسكو كمية الحركة عند الجانب الآخر من الحدود، والتي يمكن أن تصل إلى مرحلة يتسلّح فيها نهج كييف العدواني بأسلحة استراتيجية، ويرفع سقف التفاوض الغربي مع روسيا.

انفراج الأزمة (تسوية موقتة أَم بعيدة المدى)

بالنسبة إلى روسيا، لم تعد التهدئة هدفاً. يبحث بوتين عن حل نهائي للمشكلة الأوكرانية، وهو يدرك تماماً أن أي اتفاق لا يتضمن الضمانات المطلوبة يعني تأجيلاً للأزمة وإعادة تفجُّرها، وفق معطيات جديدة، يصبح معها الحل أكثر تكلفة.

في السياق، يدرك الرئيس الروسي أيضاً أنه لا يمكن ضمان التزام واشنطن الاتفاقيات البعيدة المدى، وأن أياً من الهيئات التشريعية في الولايات المتحدة أو أوروبا لن تمرر اتفاقية ملزمة قانونياً مع روسيا، ناهيك بالقناعة الروسية بانعدام الثقة بقيادات كييف، حتى المستقبليين منهم.

سيناريو التصعيد العسكري (واسع أَم محدود)

تريد موسكو إنهاء التهديد الذي يشكّله الناتو عبر كييف. ومن خلال أوكرانيا تعمل روسيا على إحداث انفصال زمني عن تسعينيات القرن العشرين، تدفن من خلاله نظام ما بعد الحرب الباردة، في كل تفاصيله. 

وبعد الاعتراف باستقلال دونيتسك ولوغانسك، أصبح الحديث عن الخيار العسكري احتمالاً معقولاً بالنسبة إلى كثيرين، على أن ذلك يبقى نسبياً لناحية اتساعه ومداه ونوعيته.

يطرح كثير من الخبراء خيارات متعددة بشأن ماهية التصعيد؛ بعبارة أدق: مستويات متعددة من القوة التي يمكن لموسكو أن توظّفها. ويربط هؤلاء هذه المستويات بمستوى الأهداف الروسية: “كلما كان الهدف أكثر طموحاً، زادت القوة اللازمة لتغيير حسابات كييف وحلف الناتو للتكاليف والفوائد”.

بالحديث عن الأهداف، يمكن القول، ختاماً، إن اللحظة الأوكرانية تمثل فرصة في إعادة كتابة تاريخ ما بعد الحرب الباردة. تغادر روسيا الركام السوفياتي، ويعلن بوتين رسمياً نهاية “لحظة الأحادية القطبية”، والتي احتفل بها تشارلز كراوثامر في “الواشنطن بوست” عام 1990، معتبراً أن “الشرق استقال من اللعبة”.

وفقاً لفيونا هيل، مسؤولة الشؤون الروسية السابقة في الاستخبارات الأميركية، فإن ما يسعى إليه بوتين هو أن “تشعر الولايات المتحدة بمرارة الدواء الذي تجرَّعته روسيا خلال حقبة التسعينيات، فواشنطن ضعيفة بشدة في الجبهة الداخلية، وفي موقف متراجع في الخارج. إنه يعتقد أيضاً أن حلف الناتو ليس أكثر من امتداد للولايات المتحدة. لذا، عندما يتعلق الأمر بالحلف، تكون كل تحركات موسكو موجهة نحو واشنطن”.

إن الآراء المذكورة في هذه المقالة لا تعبّر بالضرورة عن رأي الميادين وإنما تعبّر عن رأي صاحبها حصراً

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US, NATO must respond on Russia’s security guarantees demands substantively — Putin

20 FEB, 2022

Russia referred its proposals on security guarantees to the United States and NATO in December 2021

MOSCOW, RUSSIA – FEBRUARY 19, 2022: Russia’s President Vladimir Putin is seen in a situation center at the Moscow Kremlin as he watches strategic deterrence force drills; ballistic and cruise missiles have been launched during the drills.

MOSCOW, February 20. /TASS/. The United States and NATO must give a concrete and substantive response to Russia’s proposals on security guarantees, Russian President Vladimir Putin said during a telephone conversation with his French counterpart. Emmanuel Macron, on Sunday.

Putin “once again stressed the necessity for the United States and NATO to take Russia’s demands on ensuring security guarantees seriously and to respond to them in a concrete and substantive manner,” the Kremlin said after their phone call.

Russia referred its proposals on security guarantees to the United States and NATO in December 2021. The proposed measures include guarantees that NATO will not advance eastward, including the accession of Ukraine and other countries into the alliance, as well as non-deployment of serious offensive weapons, including nuclear ones. Russia also demands the NATO military infrastructure be retreated to the 1997 borders.

In late January, Washington and Brussels handed over written responses to Russia’s proposals showing that the West has made no concessions to Russia on matters of principle importance for it. On Thursday, the Russian side made public its reaction to the United States’ response and will soon release a similar document on NATO’s response.

Russian options in the LDNR – my personal take

February 18, 2022

Okay, this will be a short bulletpoint reminder of how I see the Russian position and options in response to the Ukronazis attack.

First, a few key assumptions:

• Russia does not want to invade/liberate the Ukraine
• Russia would prefer not to get openly involved in the LDNR
• The best outcome for Russia would be for the LDNR to be able to hold without overt Russian support
• Throughout this entire battle, Russia will always prefer to do less than to do more.

Next, here is a summary of how I expect Russia to act in the next couple of days:

Event	Consequence	Russian option
Ukronazi shelling but not ground attack	Civilian casualties and infrastructure destruction	Let the LDNR handle it while reporting about this at home
Ukronazis attempt to move ground forces across the LOC	Risk to the LDNR defenses	Ideally, Russia would only use “indirect” means such as counter-battery fire, strikes on advancing Ukronazi forces, EW.
Ukronazis forces break through the LDNR defenses	Potential existential risk to the LDNR	Imposition of a no-fly zone, sustained artillery/rocket attacks on Ukie forces
Full scale Ukronazi attack	Existential threat to the LDNR	Russia moves her forces into the LDNR and stops it all.

Notice that in all the scenarios above, Russia does not initiate a fullscale attack on the Ukraine.

Why?

Because the decision to launch a fullscale attack on the Ukronazi state would be based not on events along the LOC (line of contact) but upon a much “bigger picture” of what the West might, or might not do, in the Ukraine and the rest of Europe.

In other words, the problem of the LDNR is separate from the much greater problem of the future security arrangement of Europe.

Also, another much needed reminder: when does it makes sense to negotiate with your enemies?

• Not when you “trust” them.
• Not when you hope to “convince” them.
• Not when you hope to “show a peaceful face” to the general public.

No, it makes sense to negotiate with your enemy when:

• You hope to achieve more by negotiations then by using military force.
• Time is on your side.
• When you need to buy more time (for whatever reasons).

The US and its EU colonies have been predicting a Russian intervention for months now.  That intervention has not happened (yet) and this is driving the leaders of the West into total despair.  This is good for Russia and that is how she wants to keep the situation for as long as possible.

I am personally convinced that the only way to solve both the specific LDNR option and to create a new security architecture in Europe will have to be achieved by Russian unilateral military operation: the folks in the West need yet another military defeat to come back to their senses (they need one about every century or so).  If the Russians also see that as inevitable, they still have two things they need to do first:

• To delay an open intervention as much as possible in order to subvert the western narrative
• To engage in what could be called the “psychological preparation of the theater of operations” which, in plain English, to create such a level of anger in the LDNR and also inside Russia that the public opinion will DEMAND an intervention.

There WILL be real negative economic and political repercussions for Russia when she intervenes.  Thus it is vital for Putin and the government to create such a political dynamic inside Russia that the Russian people will not only support an intervention, but DEMAND one.  Then, when the western “sanctions from hell” are imposed, the people will not blame Putin for the very real price Russia will have to pay to prevail.

Right now, you could say that the Russian bear has been awoken by all the noise, it has come out of its lair and is just looking.  Just that has the entire West in a state of total panic.

Good.

But when that bear will actually attack will not be decided by anyone but that bear.

The Ukies have declared on numerous occasions that they will not implement the Minsk Agreements.  That is very good.

Now their attack on the LDNR seems to show that the Ukies now want to provoke a Russian response.  This is also very good, as the level of public outrage on the RuNet and even on Russian TV has gone through the roof.  The Russian PSYOP preparation of the battlefield is progressing in the right direction.

As for the LDNR defenses, they seem to be holding, but the real, major, Ukie ground offensive has not begun yet!

That is the next thing we need to look for: a Ukie ground attack.  Specifically, we don’t need to worry primarily about the initiation of that coming Ukie attack, but what it yields in the first 4-6 hours or so.  Once the Ukies are fully committed, then they become a legitimate target for counter-strikes.

So this is The Big Question now: will the LDNR defenses hold?

==>>So this is the key thing to observe is this: is the LOC moving and, if yes, how far and how fast?<<==

My personal guess is that yes, they will, which will leave only two options to the Ukronazis:

• Give up
• Launch a massive, full-scale attack

The latter is much more likely than the former.

And, in the meantime, the pain dial for the West is slowly turning up pretty much on all fronts.

So for Russia it makes sense to let that process take as long as possible before deciding to interrupt it and overtly intervene.

I hear one argument: what about the innocent civilians murdered in the LDNR?

What about them?

Does anybody seriously think that a Russian intervention will result in less casualties than what is currently taking place?

The horrible truth is that loss of life will happen no matter how the situation evolves.  So the only real choice is not “save civilians or let them die” the choice is “make sure that every civilian death counts”.  Sound cynical?  It is, but that is the reality of real warfare (as opposed to the Hollywood & Tom Clancy nonsense folks in the West are brainwashed with since birth).

So, to all those who are constantly demanding that Russia intervene *now* and who don’t understand why Lavrov agreed to meet with Blinken, I will say this: do not project your own emotions and reactions unto Putin or, if you prefer, the “Russian bear”.  The Russians did not create the biggest country on earth and defeated all their enemies by being naive or by being unable to calculate when/how to react against a foreign aggression.

If you think that you know better, good for you, just don’t expect Putin to act the way you would in the same situation.

Lastly, there is something morally repugnant in the attitude of those who see warfare as anything but the weapon of last resort.  Christ said “blessed are the peacemakers” not “blessed are the warmakers”.  Yes, as I said, I believe that Russia will have to intervene, openly and directly.  But I also believe that Putin will wait as much as possible.  That is not only operationally wise, it is morally correct.

Andrei

ADDENDUM: I remember how the western media said that the city of Sarajevo was “intensively shelled” by the Serbs.  Utter nonsense!  These folks simply don’t understand modern warfare.  When a shell lands every few minutes or so this is NOT any “intense artillery fire”.  Now, when an area the size of one, or even several, football field instantly goes up in flames, that is a serious artillery strike.  What we see as of right now in the LDNR is what could be called “disturbing fire”.  When the Ukies used de-mining vehicles yesterday that could be part of a preparation for a ground assault.  This has NOT happened YET.  As for a ground assault, so far the Ukies have only sent in special forces and, apparently, they got detected, took casualties, and had to retreat.

All this is way below the threshold at which Russia will have to intervene.

Official Russian response to the American written response to Russian claims on security guarantees in Europe

February 17, 2022

Note: The website of the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs might be under DDoS as I cannot reach it.  The following is therefore a UNOFFICIAL machine translation of the Russian reply:

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The Russian Foreign Ministry has published a written response to the American written response to Russian claims on security guarantees in Europe.

On February 17, 2022, US Ambassador John Sullivan, invited to the Russian Foreign Ministry, was given the following reaction to the previously received American response on the Russian draft treaty between the Russian Federation and the United States of America on security guarantees.

TASS publishes the full text of the statement.

General characteristics

We state that the American side did not give a constructive response to the basic elements of the draft security guarantees agreement prepared by the Russian side with the United States. We are talking about the rejection of further expansion of NATO, the withdrawal of the “Bucharest formula” that “Ukraine and Georgia will become members of NATO”, and the refusal to create military bases on the territory of states that were previously part of the USSR and are not members of the alliance, including the use of their infrastructure for conducting any military activity, as well as the return of military capabilities, including shock, and NATO infrastructure to the state of 1997, when the Founding Act of Russia — NATO was signed. These provisions are of fundamental importance for the Russian Federation.

The package nature of Russian proposals has been ignored, from which “convenient” topics have been deliberately chosen, which, in turn, are “twisted” in the direction of creating advantages for the United States and its allies. This approach, as well as the accompanying rhetoric of American officials, reinforces reasonable doubts that Washington is really committed to correcting the situation in the field of Euro-security.

The growing military activity of the United States and NATO directly at the Russian borders is alarming, while our “red lines” and fundamental security interests, as well as Russia’s sovereign right to protect them, continue to be ignored. Ultimatum demands to withdraw troops from certain areas on Russian territory, accompanied by threats of tougher sanctions, are unacceptable and undermine the prospects of reaching real agreements.

In the absence of the readiness of the American side to agree on firm, legally binding guarantees of ensuring our security by the United States and its allies, Russia will be forced to respond, including through the implementation of military-technical measures.

In Ukraine

There is no “Russian invasion” of Ukraine, as the United States and its allies have been officially declaring since last autumn, and there are no plans, therefore, statements about “Russia’s responsibility for escalation” cannot be regarded otherwise than as an attempt to exert pressure and devalue Russia’s proposals for security guarantees.

The mention in this context of the Russian obligations under the Budapest Memorandum of 1994 has nothing to do with the internal Ukrainian conflict and does not apply to the circumstances resulting from the actions of internal factors there. The loss of territorial integrity by the Ukrainian state is the result of the processes that took place inside it.

The accusations of Russia contained in the American response that it “occupied Crimea” also do not stand up to any criticism. In 2014, a coup took place in Kiev, the initiators of which, with the support of the United States and their allies, set a course for the creation of a nationalist state that infringes on the rights of the Russian and Russian-speaking population, as well as other “non-titular” ethnic groups. It is not surprising that in such a situation, Crimeans voted for reunification with Russia. The decision of the people of Crimea and Sevastopol to return to the Russian Federation was made by free expression of will in the exercise of the right to self-determination enshrined in the UN Charter. Force or threat of force was not used. The question of Crimea’s ownership is closed.

If Ukraine is accepted into NATO, there will be a real threat that the regime in Kiev will try to “return” Crimea by force, dragging the United States and its allies, in accordance with Article 5 of the Washington Treaty, into a direct armed conflict with Russia with all the ensuing consequences.

The thesis repeated in the US response that Russia allegedly “ignited the conflict in the Donbas” is untenable. Its reasons are purely intra-Ukrainian in nature. The settlement is possible only through the implementation of the Minsk agreements and a set of measures, the priority and responsibility for the implementation of which are clearly spelled out and unanimously confirmed by UN Security Council resolution 2202, including the United States, France and the United Kingdom. In paragraph 2 of this resolution, Kiev, Donetsk and Lugansk are named as parties. None of these documents mention Russia’s responsibility for the conflict in the Donbas. Russia, together with the OSCE, plays the role of mediator in the main negotiating format – the contact group – and together with Berlin and Paris – in the “Normandy format”, which formulates recommendations to the parties to the conflict and monitors their implementation.

To de-escalate the situation around Ukraine, it is fundamentally important to take the following steps. This is forcing Kiev to implement a set of measures, stopping the supply of weapons to Ukraine, withdrawing all Western advisers and instructors from there, the refusal of NATO countries from any joint exercises with the Armed Forces of Ukraine and the withdrawal of all foreign weapons previously supplied to Kiev outside Ukrainian territory.

In this regard, we draw attention to the fact that Russian President Vladimir Putin, at a press conference following talks in Moscow with French President Emmanuel Macron on February 7, 2022, stressed that we are open to dialogue and urge “to think about stable security conditions for everyone, equal for all participants in international life.”

Force configuration

We note that in their response to the Russian proposals, the United States insists that progress in improving the situation in the field of European security “can only be achieved in terms of de-escalation in relation to Russia’s threatening actions directed against Ukraine,” which, as we understand, implies the requirement to withdraw Russian troops from the borders of Ukraine. At the same time, the United States is ready to talk only about “mutual obligations … to refrain from deploying permanent-based forces with combat missions on the territory of Ukraine” and “consider discussing the problem of conventional armed forces.” Otherwise, the American side remains silent about our proposals contained in paragraphs 2 of Article 4 and paragraph 1 of Article 5 of the draft bilateral treaty and declares that “the current configuration of the US and NATO forces is limited, proportional and fully complies with the obligations under the NATO-Russia Founding Act.”

We proceed from the fact that the deployment of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation on its territory does not and cannot affect the fundamental interests of the United States. We would like to remind you that there are no our forces on the territory of Ukraine.

At the same time, the United States and its allies were advancing their military infrastructure to the east, deploying contingents in the territories of new members. They circumvented the limitations of the CFE Treaty and interpreted very loosely the provisions of the Russia—NATO Founding Act on the rejection of “additional permanent deployment of substantial combat forces.” The situation that has developed as a result of these actions is unacceptable. We insist on the withdrawal of all US armed forces and weapons stationed in CEE, SEE and the Baltic States. We are convinced that there are quite enough national potentials in these zones. We are ready to discuss this topic on the basis of art. 4 and 5 of the Russian draft agreement.

The principle of indivisibility of security

We did not see any evidence in the US response that the American side is fully committed to observing the immutable principle of indivisibility of security. The general statements about the consideration of this postulate by the American side are in direct contradiction with Washington’s unwillingness to abandon a counterproductive and destabilizing course to create advantages for itself and its allies at the expense of Russia’s security interests. This is precisely what is happening as a result of the unrestrained implementation by the North Atlantic Alliance, with the leading role of the United States, of the policy of unlimited geostrategic and military development of the post-Soviet space, including the territory of Ukraine, which is particularly sensitive for us. All this is happening directly on the Russian borders. Thus, our “red lines” and fundamental security interests are ignored, and Russia’s inalienable right to ensure them is rejected. For us, of course, this is unacceptable.

Additionally, we remind you that this principle is enshrined in the preamble of the Treaty between the Russian Federation and the United States of America on Measures for Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms of 2011, the extension of which for five years without any exceptions was agreed by the parties in February last year, as well as in a number of OSCE and Russia—NATO basic documents adopted at the highest level: in the preamble of the Helsinki Final Act of 1975, in the Charter of Paris for a New Europe of 1990, the Founding Act of Russia — NATO of 1997, the Istanbul Charter of European Security of the OSCE of 1999, the Rome Declaration of Russia-NATO of 2002 and the Astana Declaration of the OSCE Summit of 2010.

We note that the response received mentions Washington’s commitment to the concept of indivisibility of security. But in the text, it boils down to the right of states “to freely choose or change ways to ensure their security, including union treaties.” This freedom is not absolute and is only half of the well-known formula fixed in the Charter of European Security. Its second part requires, when exercising this right, not to “… strengthen one’s security at the expense of the security of other States.” We cannot consider the letter received from NATO dated February 10, 2022 as a response to the message sent by Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov on January 28, 2022 to US Secretary of State Anthony Blinken on this issue. We asked for an answer in a national capacity.

NATO’s “open door” policy

The US confirms its “firm support” for NATO’s “open door” policy. But it contradicts the basic commitments made within the framework of the CSCE/OSCE, first of all, the obligation “not to strengthen one’s own security at the expense of the security of others.” This policy is not consistent with the guidelines of the alliance itself, which, following a meeting of the NATO Ministry of Defense on June 6-7, 1991 in Copenhagen, pledged “not to extract unilateral advantages from the changed situation in Europe,” “not to threaten the legitimate interests” of other states, not to seek their “isolation” or “drawing new dividing lines on the continent.”

We call on the United States and NATO to return to fulfilling their international obligations in the field of maintaining peace and security. We expect concrete proposals from the alliance members on the content and forms of legal consolidation of the refusal to further expand NATO to the East.

Package nature of offers

We note the readiness of the United States to work in detail on individual measures for arms control and risk reduction. At the same time, it was recorded that Washington finally recognized the validity of a number of Russian proposals and initiatives in these areas that have been put forward in recent years.

At the same time, we once again draw the attention of the American side to the fact that Russia, in the documents we submitted on security guarantees, proposed to follow the path of a comprehensive long-term settlement of the unacceptable situation that continues to develop in the Euro-Atlantic area. First of all, we are talking about creating a stable foundation for the security architecture in the form of an agreement on NATO’s refusal from further actions that harm Russia’s security. This remains a constant imperative for us. In the absence of such a strong foundation, interrelated measures to control arms and reduce military risks, ensuring restraint and predictability of military activities in certain areas, even if they can be agreed upon, will not be sustainable in the future.

Thus, the Russian proposals are of a package nature and should be considered in a complex without highlighting its individual components.

In this regard, we would like to focus on the lack of a constructive reaction from Washington and Brussels to the most important elements of the Russian initiative that we have clearly identified. As for the issues of arms control, we consider them exclusively in the general context of a comprehensive, package approach to resolving the problem of security guarantees.

“Post-DSNV” (Treaty between the Russian Federation and the United States of America on Measures for Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms) and “safety equation”

The United States offers to “immediately” engage in the development of “measures for the development of the Strategic Stability Treaty” within the framework of the strategic stability dialogue. However, at the same time, the American side is trying to fix an approach that is not coordinated with us, which provides for focusing exclusively on nuclear weapons, and regardless of the ability of certain means to pose a direct threat to the national territory of the other side. Such a one-sided view of things contradicts the understandings reached at the Russian-American summit on June 16, 2021 in Geneva regarding the comprehensive nature of the strategic dialogue, designed to lay the foundation for future arms control and risk reduction measures.

Russia continues to advocate an integrated approach to strategic issues. We propose to work together to develop a new “security equation”.

The set of elements of our proposed concept, which remains fully relevant, was brought to the American side, including during meetings within the framework of the stratdialog and in the working document on its content submitted by us on December 17, 2021.

Deployment of nuclear weapons outside national territory

In its document, the United States did not react to such an element of the “package” of measures proposed by us as the withdrawal of nuclear weapons deployed outside its borders to the national territory and the refusal of their further deployment outside the national territory, and limited itself to mentioning the need to address the problem of non-strategic nuclear weapons on the platform of strategic dialogue, without taking into account the specifics of its deployment and other factors affecting the security of the parties.

We would like to clarify that in our proposals we are talking about solving the problem of the presence on the territory of some non-nuclear NATO states – in violation of the NPT – of US nuclear weapons that are capable of hitting targets on the territory of Russia. This would include the elimination of the infrastructure for the rapid deployment of such weapons in Europe, as well as the cessation of the NATO practice of training and exercises on the handling of these weapons, which involve non-nuclear NATO member states. It is impossible to discuss the topic of non-strategic nuclear weapons without eliminating this irritant.

Medium- and shorter-range ground-based missiles

We consider this issue as one of the priorities of the Russian-American dialogue on strategic stability. We believe that this category of weapons is a necessary component of a new “security equation” that should be jointly developed by Russia and the United States.

We continue to proceed from the relevance of Russian initiatives in the field of “post-INF”, which are based on the idea of counter-verifiable moratoriums on the deployment of ground-based INF in Europe.
In principle, we are open to substantive consideration of ways of its practical implementation. At the same time, we note the continuing uncertainty in Washington’s approaches to the main parameters of potential control measures over these weapons, first of all, to their coverage, which should apply to all means of the appropriate range in nuclear and non–nuclear equipment.

It was fixed that the United States takes the Russian approach as a basis, which provides for the mutual settlement of counter-concerns in the context of the previously existing INF Treaty. The variant proposed by the American side of the development of our idea of mutual verification measures in relation to the Aegis Ashore complexes in Romania and Poland, as well as some facilities in the European part of Russia, can be further taken into consideration.

As was emphasized in the statement of Russian President Vladimir Putin on October 26, 2020 and subsequently repeatedly brought to the American side, potential transparency measures regarding Russian facilities subject to approval could include monitoring the absence of the Russian 9M729 missile there. We remind you that this step is a manifestation of goodwill, given that the characteristics of the 9M729 missile in no way contradict the requirements of the former INF Treaty and that the United States has not provided any evidence that would confirm the accusations against Russia. At the same time, the American side ignored the voluntary event organized by us during the validity of this Agreement on January 23, 2019 to demonstrate the device and technical characteristics of the 9M729 rocket and its launcher.

Heavy bombers and surface warships

We note the attention of the American side to the Russian idea of additional risk reduction measures in relation to flights of heavy bombers near the national borders of the parties. We see a subject for discussion and the potential for mutually acceptable agreements.

We remind you of an equally important element of our “package” proposal concerning similar campaigns of combat surface ships, which also involve serious risks.

Military exercises and maneuvers

The United States did not respond to the proposals contained in paragraph 2 of Article 4 of the Russian draft treaty. The American side, apparently, proceeds from the fact that it is possible to reduce tensions in the military field by increasing transparency and additional measures to reduce the danger in line with Western proposals to modernize the Vienna Document.

We consider this approach unrealistic and one-sided, aimed at “shining a light” on the activities of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation. Confidence- and security-building measures within the framework of the Vienna Document of 2011 are adequate to the current situation. To start discussing the possibility of updating them, the necessary conditions must be created. And for this, the United States and its allies should abandon the policy of “containing” Russia and take concrete practical measures to de-escalate the military-political situation, including in line with paragraph 2 of Article 4 of our draft treaty.

As for the prevention of incidents on the high seas and the airspace above it, we welcome the readiness of the United States for appropriate consultations. However, this work cannot replace the settlement of the key problems posed by Russia.

February 17, 2022

source

More on the Topic

• Everyone is bracing for war, but it is already happening
• The insanity resumes full blast (next date of invasion: Feb 20th!) UPDATED!
• Sitrep: Donetsk, Lugansk, Situation at line of engagement
• If I did not know this is for real…
• Tomorrow will be a big day (even if nothing happens!)
• The great exodus continues while Russia wraps up her maneuvers

Vladimir Putin held talks with President of the French Republic Emmanuel Macron at the Kremlin.

February 08, 2022

President of Russia Vladimir Putin: Mr President, Emmanuel,

It is a pleasure to see you.

Last time we met was two years ago and, of course, there is a backlog of issues that we can and should discuss in a direct format.

Still, over these years, our contacts have never been interrupted, and we remain in touch at all times. Moreover, despite the pandemic, bilateral trade is up. During the pandemic, it fell by 15 percent, but over 11 months of 2021 it grew by over 70 percent to reach pre-pandemic levels and, I think, even slightly exceeded them.

Our colleagues are working quite successfully in the political sphere, including the foreign ministries and a 2+2 meeting between our respective defence ministers and foreign ministers.

Relations in the humanitarian sphere are on the rise as well. We have held events that cover region-to-region cooperation. More than 150 events have been held, and this helps create a supportive environment for promoting relations between our two countries.

Here is what I would like to point out specifically: of course, I understand that we share concerns about security developments in Europe, and I want to thank you for the fact that France invariably and strongly participates in the development of fundamental decisions in this area.

This has been the case with our relations in recent years. It is symbolic that we are meeting today because a fundamental document, the agreement on special relations between Russia and France, was signed 30 years ago today.

Notably, throughout these years, as I have mentioned, France has taken a very active part in addressing fundamental European security issues. Your predecessors did the same. France engaged in addressing the crisis that broke out after Georgia attacked South Ossetia, and in developing the Minsk agreements, and then organising the Normandy format. I appreciate the amount of effort invested by the current leadership of France and personally the President of France in resolving the crisis around the need to ensure equal security in Europe for an extended historical perspective, and in overcoming the challenges that are related to resolving the domestic crisis in southeastern Ukraine.

We discussed these matters over the telephone in great depth. I am aware that you have your own thoughts on this matter, and I am pleased to have the opportunity to meet with you in person to discuss these things.

Welcome, Emmanuel.

President of France Emmanuel Macron (retranslated): Thank you very much, Mr President, thank you very much, Vladimir.

Indeed, today is the 30^th anniversary of resuming diplomatic relations, and I would like to reiterate that bilateral relations have made it possible to focus on many issues.

We have many hopes in the cultural, academic and scientific spheres. We hope to continue the Trianon Dialogue together and advance the economic agenda.

The critical situation in Europe is our shared concern, and our continent – you pointed this out – is in a critical situation, so we all need to act with great responsibility.

Together we laid the foundation for an open, straight, and full-fledged dialogue in 2019. Since then, there have been several exchanges of views in St Petersburg, Bregançon and other venues, and I believe this dialogue remains as relevant as ever.

We need this dialogue, because it is the only thing that, I think, can ensure genuine stability and security for the European continent. In this context, we have had several telephone conversations in recent weeks, as you mentioned. Despite the crisis, I had a chance to exchange views with President Zelensky about Ukraine, as well as to coordinate views with many Europeans and Allies, including the British, Americans and Canadians.

I think today’s conversation can pave the way to de-escalation, which is where we should be heading. We are aware of the military-political situation and the Ukraine issue. You noted its importance, including the Normandy format, security issues in Belarus and the entire region, as well as important collective security issues, which we will cover later.

I am glad we have this opportunity to discuss these issues in depth, so that we can collectively begin to develop a practical response for Russia and the whole of Europe. A useful and practical response would be one that helps avoid war and build stability, transparency and trust for all.

Thank you very much for your warm welcome and for your time.

<…>

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News conference following Russian-French talks

President of Russia Vladimir Putin: Mr President, ladies and gentlemen,

It is a pleasure to welcome you to the Kremlin and to host the President of the French Republic, Mr Emmanuel Macron in Russia.

It appears symbolic that our meeting is taking place on February 7 (it looks like it will end on February 8, Moscow time), the day when a fundamental treaty between Russia and France was signed 30 years ago. That vital document provided a reliable foundation for the development of bilateral cooperation based on partnership and mutual respect for decades to come. Our talks with President Macron today were held in a business-like atmosphere and were substantive and meaningful.

It is clear to us that Mr President has come to Russia primarily to discuss the current issues of European and global security, for which our countries bear special responsibility as permanent members of the UN Security Council. In addition to this, France is holding the presidency of the Council of the European Union.

During the talks, we continued to exchange views on the proposals regarding long-term legally binding security guarantees, which Russia has made to the United States and NATO. I would like to remind everyone that these proposals include three key points: NATO’s non-expansion, non-deployment of offensive weapon systems near the Russian border, and the return of the bloc’s European capabilities and infrastructure to the 1997 level, when the NATO-Russia Founding Act was signed.

Regrettably, the replies from the USA and NATO, which we received on January 26, disregard these concerns of fundamental importance to us. Moreover, our Western partners once again said that all states have a right to freely choose their security arrangements and to enter into any military blocs and alliances. Well, we never questioned this principle. On the other hand, it is also obvious that these blocs and alliances have no obligation to admit any country that wishes to join them.

This open-door policy, which we have discussed with many of our partners, including with President Macron today, is very liberal. We believe that only the United States and possibly several other NATO members are benefitting from this interpretation of the fundamental principle of equal and indivisible security, which has been set down in many European documents and includes, as we all know, a pledge not to strengthen one’s security at the expense of the security of other states.

The reference to the open-door policy, which I have mentioned, is questionable as well. I would like to repeat (I have said this on numerous occasions, including in this very room during a recent news conference following Prime Minister of Hungary Viktor Orban’s visit) that according to Article 10 of the 1949 North Atlantic Treaty, the member states may, by unanimous agreement, invite any other European state in a position to contribute to European security to accede to that treaty. But this does not mean that the bloc is obligated to admit any country, as I have said as well. All right.

However, I would like to point out that they continue trying to placate Russia with deliberations that NATO is a peaceful and purely defensive alliance. People in many countries, namely Iraq, Libya and Afghanistan have learned the truth of this statement the hard way, and this is also true about the large-scale military operation against Belgrade waged without a UN Security Council sanction, which is definitely not an operation that could be waged by a peaceful organisation.

In addition, we cannot overlook the fact that the 2019 NATO Military Strategy openly describes Russia as the main security threat and an adversary. NATO has designated Russia an adversary. Moreover, while advancing its military infrastructure very close to our border, NATO and its member states believe that they have a right to teach us where and how we can deploy our armed forces. They consider it acceptable to demand that we do not hold planned drills and exercises and present the movement of our troops on our own – I repeat, our own – territory as a threat of a Russian invasion, in this case the invasion of Ukraine. They claim that the Baltic states and our other neighbours feel threatened as well. In any case, this presumption is being used to pursue an unfriendly policy towards Russia.

As for the NATO member-countries themselves, they continue to pump Ukraine with modern weapons to this accompaniment, allocating substantial financial resources to modernise the Ukrainian army, and sending military specialists and instructors to Ukraine.

Mr President and I have certainly spoken about this. As you can see, it took us a rather long time: the discussion went on for nearly six hours.

For our part, we have made a point of drawing Mr President’s attention to the reluctance of the current Kiev authorities to meet their commitments under the Minsk Package of Measures and the Normandy format agreements, including those reached at the summits in Paris and Berlin.

In my opinion, it is clear to everyone that the current authorities in Kiev have set a course for dismantling the Minsk accords. There are no shifts on such fundamental issues as constitutional reform, amnesty, local elections, and the legal aspects of a special status for Donbass. The well-known Steinmeier Formula – well-known to specialists, at any rate – when we have approved certain amendments to the Minsk accords and made definite concessions, is yet to be included in Ukrainian legislation. But even these items presented by the current President of the Federal Republic of Germany – at that time, he was the German foreign minister – are not being implemented. Kiev is still disregarding all opportunities for a peaceful restoration of the country’s territorial integrity via direct dialogue with Donetsk and Lugansk.

I have directed Mr President’s attention to the widespread and systematic violations of human rights in Ukraine. Dissenting media are closed in the country and political opponents are exposed to reprisals. Incidentally, when Mr Poroshenko was the President of Ukraine, I told him that Russia was ready to grant him political asylum, if he faced problems in the future. He was highly ironic in this regard at the time, but today I would like to reiterate my offer. Despite our serious differences regarding this matter, I mean the settlement in Donbass, as well as the fact that, to my mind, he has made a lot of mistakes in this area, his persecution as a state criminal is also, in my view, an exorbitant ‘bid for success’ on the part of today’s leaders. Russia is ready to grant asylum to Mr Poroshenko and persons like him.

What worries me most of all is that they are adopting legislation that discriminates against Russian speakers, who have been denied the right to be recognised as a core nation in what is, properly speaking, their homeland, and the right to speak their native language, which is quite odd because this is in no way reflected in the approaches adopted by the European countries.

We hope that Mr President intends – at any rate, he said so earlier today – to discuss what we have discussed today as regards European security and stability guarantees at his meeting with the Kiev leaders tomorrow.

We also touched upon other topical international and regional matters.

While reviewing the situation around Nagorno Karabakh, we noted the positive role of the Russian peacekeepers who are ensuring compliance with the ceasefire regime and helping the region return to peaceful life. We reaffirmed the great significance of efforts by the OSCE Minsk Group’s co-chairs in addressing topical humanitarian and socioeconomic matters in the region, among other things. The President of France informed us of the results of his recent videoconference meeting with President of the European Council Charles Michel, the President of Azerbaijan and the Prime Minister of Armenia.

We reviewed the situation around the Iranian nuclear programme and efforts to resume the full-fledged implementation of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, adopted in 2015 and approved by UN Security Council Resolution 2231. We agree that it is necessary to continue diplomatic efforts and to assist in the coordination of compromise solutions in the interests of preserving this highly important document. We agreed that our positions are very similar here or, as the diplomats say, they match.

Naturally, we did not overlook topical matters of bilateral relations, primarily those regarding economic interaction. Despite the complicated situation caused by the Covid-19 pandemic and volatility on the global markets, we underscored and noted that mutual trade grew by 71 percent in 11 months of 2021. French investment in Russia exceeds $23 billion. Over 600 French companies are operating successfully on the Russian market.

Overall, we agreed to continue our mutually beneficial cooperation in politics, trade and the economy, as well as in other spheres, including cultural and humanitarian ties.

To conclude, I would like to thank Mr President for his efforts and the efforts of France to resolve a highly acute matter linked with our relations with NATO in general, matters linked with maintaining security, creating a situation of stability and mutual trust on the European continent and, of course, resolving the crisis in southeastern Ukraine.

We have already met in Paris, and I know that, despite numerous problems facing any state leader, especially the leader of a major European state, Mr President deemed it necessary to come to Russia and to exchange opinions on how we should act in the future. I believe that, although it is still too early to talk about some of his ideas and proposals, it is possible to make them the foundation of our future joint steps.

Let us see what Mr President’s meeting will achieve in Kiev. We agreed that we will speak on the telephone after his trip to the capital of Ukraine and exchange opinions on this matter.

Thank you.

President of France Emmanuel Macron (retranslated): Thank you very much, Mr President. Thank you, Vladimir.

Thank you for this opportunity to come here at this complicated moment when the pandemic has not ended yet. Indeed, we are now marking the 30^th anniversary of establishing diplomatic relations, of this bilateral agreement you mentioned.

I will not discuss relations between our two countries in greater detail at present because we now realise that the situation is serious, and all of us should find a way, a peaceful path, a path towards stability in Europe. We still have the opportunity and the time to do this. The historical and strategic dialogue that we have developed over the past years can help accomplish this. We have decided to meet in precisely this context in Moscow today.

We held very substantial, to-the-point talks. We focused on current areas of tension and on options for de-escalation, to facilitate stability and security on our continent.

Mr President, you recalled history, NATO, the Ukrainian issue, and you mentioned the most diverse matters.

We can see that you have a very strong position, which does not always coincide with the European and Western position. It is necessary to underscore this. We have different views, and we need to understand and accept this. We discussed this in great detail. I believe in Europe and European unity, and this is a fundamental matter.

Indeed, NATO’s open-doors policy was heeded, and this is very important. These matters have existential significance for Sweden and Finland, for example, and it would be difficult to tell them all of a sudden that NATO is modifying its position.

However, we also heeded your statement that traumas had been inflicted over the past 30 years, and that it is necessary to build new mechanisms that would facilitate stability in the region. However, it is impossible to build these new provisions without revising fundamental principles or by limiting fundamental European rights that are currently not mentioned as part of the disagreements that we are discussing. I believe that this is a fundamental aspect.

Having said all this, we, nevertheless, tried to find points where our positions coincided, so as to make headway on them in the near future. Firstly, it is necessary to work very quickly to avoid any escalation. Tensions continue to rise today, and this exacerbates the risk of destabilisation. This is not in anyone’s interests.

Neither Russia, nor the Europeans need chaos and instability at a time when the nations and the continent have suffered so much from the pandemic. Everyone wants recovery and peace. This is why we need to come to an agreement on practical stabilisation and de-escalation measures.

We have discussed this together. This should be reaffirmed within the next few days or weeks. The result will depend on the talks and consultations with the United States, NATO and the Europeans, as well as on the outcome of my meeting with President Zelensky tomorrow.

I would like to point out that President Vladimir Putin has said that he is ready to act in accordance with this logic so that these initiatives are balanced, including when it comes to the issue of Ukraine’s sovereignty and territorial integrity.

In other words, the next few days will be decisive. The intense discussions, which we have already begun, will contribute to this.

What should be very clear from our conversation is that reliable de-escalation calls for making headway on fundamental matters. We had a lengthy discussion on these matters. We must jointly show the will to work on security guarantees and to build a new security and stability order in Europe. It must be based on the foundation we have created together as sovereign states.

This is the principle of existence for all states. I am referring to Russia, France and the other states that are also parties to these treaties. Therefore, this is the fundamental principle of European security. We have approved them by signing the Paris Charter and the subsequent OSCE declarations. It should be said that these rights have been questioned and violated. I am not talking about border violations but about the principle of territorial integrity and violations of international law, of human rights and basic freedoms.

Whatever the historical interpretations of various crises and incidents may be, to maintain the security of our continent as we have said many times, we must not repeat the past mistakes.

We talked for several hours today. But we also talked about this in the past, several years ago. I understand that opinions can differ and that there can be misunderstandings and even traumatic elements. I know that many EU countries did not have the same experience in the 20th century as France did. We must not forget this experience, which has not faded away over the past 30 years. However, we cannot accept the collective risk of another confrontation between spheres of influence in Europe, another period of instability and unrest. This is creating new grievances and new threats. Starting a conflict is easy but ending it and building a lasting peace is difficult.

Therefore, I do not believe that we must choose between new rules and the absence of rules. This is optimism based on will, as I see it. Russia is committed to sovereignty and rights, but I believe that we can create security and stability in Europe by reaffirming our achievements within the framework of the OSCE. At the same time, we must also find new solutions, which should probably be more innovative.

As for our ability to offer concrete security guarantees, we raised this issue directly during our conversation, respecting the interests of all our European brothers and ensuring their stability and security, as well as with due regard for the security guarantees proposed by Russia, our neighbour and friend.

I have told President Putin that I was concerned about the draft Constitution of Belarus, which is lacking two fundamental principles that were sealed in 1994. I am also concerned about the statement on nuclear weapons made by Alexander Lukashenko in December. I would like to say that President Putin has put my mind at rest regarding this.

I am indeed concerned about these matters, because they are increasing destabilisation. We should work together on practical security guarantees for the EU member states and for the regional countries, namely Ukraine, Georgia, Belarus and Russia. This is the goal we must pursue.

In the course of our conversation, we coordinated several proposals. I would like to note that there are points of contact between the positions of France, Russia, NATO and the United States. We will continue practical talks with all our partners to create these new guarantees of peace and security.

Russia has long asked for certain security guarantees, such as restrictions on military deployment and presence of conventional weapons, the transparency of missile defence and on intermediate- and shorter-range missiles. These Russian proposals correspond to the requirements of European states, the EU states. I am sure that a response can only be collective.

We are Europeans, but we are also allies of the United States. We have already demonstrated that we can work together, including within the framework of the five permanent members of the UN Security Council. Both of us have pointed out that this format can help us make headway on these matters, in particular, on the issues of peace and security, and can help us coordinate common decisions.

The third element on which we have managed to find converging positions, which President Putin has mentioned in his statement, as I have said, is the Ukrainian conflict. I am going to Kiev tomorrow to meet with President Zelensky. Of course, we are doing this jointly with German Chancellor Olaf Scholz, with whom we coordinated our positions several days ago. I will see him tomorrow. We continue working within the framework of the Normandy format to ensure full compliance with the Minsk agreements and to achieve a complete settlement of the conflict in Donbass.

Serious agreements regarding the ceasefire regime were reached during the recent advisers’ meeting of the Normandy format countries, and now we must move forward in terms of practical steps to ensure a clear and full implementation of these agreements. We have made progress on several technical issues during the talks.

I would like to welcome President Zelensky’s efforts, the specific obligations that he assumed in this format, in particular, to scrap the legislation that was not in line with the Minsk agreements, and President Putin mentioned this. So, this law was withdrawn at President Zelensky’s initiative. We were also given clarification about draft laws proposed in Russia, but we were reassured that this would not happen if they were not in line with the Minsk agreements.

So, this conflict is at the centre of the tension that we are experiencing today, and Russia and the European Union definitely need to resolve it in order to move forward in our relations.

We also mentioned a number of other matters, in particular, the conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan. Here, I have the pleasure to say that eight prisoners were released this morning. The French crisis response centre provided an aircraft to transport them. Last Friday, President Aliyev, Prime Minister Pashinyan and I had a videoconference meeting, where we discussed missing persons, refugees, and a number of other matters that also affect stability.

During the talks with President Putin, we both expressed coinciding views on a number of matters. I would like to welcome the role that members of your military played on the border during the difficult period in Armenia and Azerbaijan.

Both France and Russia also play an appropriate role within the scope of the existing Minsk Group agreements.

We also mentioned the Iranian crisis, and the recent US and EU initiatives. Our positions on this score are also similar. I would rather not talk about it at length, I just want to emphasise that today, at a time that has serious implications for our countries’ collective security and peace, we were able to discuss various aspects and understand the differences in interpretation, the divergence of views, but we also found a similarity of positions. This enables us to move forward. I think we both agree there can be no rational and long-term solution without a political and diplomatic settlement.

In the coming days and weeks, there will be opportunities for additional consultations and contacts with all our European partners, with our allies, as well as with Ukraine and other countries in the region.

We will have the opportunity in the next few days to once again speak by telephone and discuss Ukraine and our collective security. We would like to build a framework of trust that would allow us to move forward. We are determined to maintain stability and peace and to restart the mechanisms of trust in Europe. This is our collective responsibility.

I would like to say that France is reaffirming its commitment to move in this direction.

Thank you.

Question (retranslated): Good afternoon, President Macron, President Putin.

I have a question for both of you.

President Macron, you have seen disappointing results from Russia over the past five years. You have come to Moscow at a time when Russian mercenaries in Mali have put in question our presence there. Does your presence here have any meaning?

President Putin, a simple question for you: do you intend to invade Ukraine?

As for Mali, can you say that your government is not connected in any way with the mercenaries in Mali?

Vladimir Putin: First of all, regarding Mali. President Macron raised this issue many times, we discussed it with him, and President Macron is aware of our position on this matter. The Russian government, the Russian state have nothing to do with the companies that are working in Mali. As far as we know, the Malian leadership has no complaints about the commercial activities of these companies.

Following the logic that may be applied to NATO, the current member states and potential members, if Mali has opted to work with our companies, it has the right to do so. However, I would like to point out – I will talk about this with President Macron after this news conference – I would like to point out that the Russian state has nothing to do with this. It concerns the commercial interests of our companies, which coordinate their activities with the local authorities.

We will take a closer look at this, but we have nothing to do with it. This is the first point.

The second, regarding the situation in Ukraine and the issues we have discussed, the issues of concern to us. I spoke about this right here several days ago, during the news conference after talks with the Prime Minister of Hungary. I would like to say this once again. We are categorically opposed to NATO’s eastward expansion through the admission of new members because we see this as an overall threat of NATO’s continued expansion towards our border. It is not us moving towards NATO but NATO moving towards us. Therefore, saying that Russia is behaving aggressively is at odds with logic. Have we approached anyone’s border? No, it is NATO’s infrastructure that has come close to us. This is my first point.

The second, why is Ukraine’s potential admission into NATO dangerous? The problem does exist. For example, European countries, including France, believe that Crimea is part of Ukraine, but we think that it is part of the Russian Federation. And what happens if attempts are made to change this situation by military means? Bear in mind that Ukraine’s doctrines declare Russia an adversary and state the possibility of regaining Crimea, even using military force.

Just imagine what could happen if Ukraine were a NATO member. Article 5 has not been cancelled. On the contrary, Mr Biden, the President of the United States, has said recently that Article 5 is a sacred obligation and will be honoured. This is fraught with a military confrontation between Russia and NATO. I asked during the above-mentioned news conference, “What are we supposed to do? Fight against the NATO bloc?” But this question has a second part: “Do you want to fight against Russia?” Ask your readers, your audiences and the users of online resources, “Do you want France to fight against Russia?” Because this is how it will be.

Our concerns also have to do with common European security.

As for Donbass, Ukrainian leaders first say that they will implement the Minsk agreements and then they denounce them and say they will never do this because “this would destroy the Ukrainian state.” I have only just mentioned this. Well, will they, or won’t they? This is the question.

They speak of security guarantees from us. But who will guarantee our security? The Ukrainian authorities have already made two attempts to settle the problem of Donbass militarily. When they failed again, the Minsk agreements were coordinated and endorsed by a resolution of the UN Security Council.

So, will they comply with the agreements or not? Or will they make some other attempt? What should we think? After all, they have tried twice, and who can guarantee that they will not try a third time? These questions require a thorough consideration by all of us.

I am deeply grateful to Mr President for discussing these matters in Moscow today. I believe that these security matters concern not only Russia but also Europe and the world as a whole.

Look, our proposals include not only NATO’s expansion, which we oppose, but also a second point: the non-deployment of offensive systems near our borders. If everyone wants peace, tranquillity, well-being and confidence, what is bad about not deploying offensive weapons near our borders? Can anyone tell me what is bad about this?

If NATO is a peaceful organisation, what is bad about returning its infrastructure to the level of 1997, when the NATO-Russia Act was signed? This would create conditions for building up confidence and security. Is this bad?

We can let the open-door pledge be, even though the issue remains on the agenda. It is a key priority for us, and I have explained why. We talked about this for six hours.

Tomorrow, President Macron will fly to Kiev. We have agreed that he will at least put forth his action plan regarding this. I am deeply grateful to him for giving so much attention to this and that he is trying to find a solution to this matter of great importance to all of us.

Emmanuel Macron: To get back to your question, I think that it is first of all France’s responsibility to have the strongest possible relationship with Russia. We are two great European nations and great world powers. We are two permanent members of the UN Security Council.

Bilateral relations are of great importance for us, firstly, to have them develop, and to have common decisions on acute international issues. We are trying to do so on the Iranian issue and attempting to find a point of contact on Libya and other matters. We do have disagreements but we still find compromise. This is obvious to me.

Secondly, I think that President Putin and I agree that Russia is a European country. Those who can see Europe should be able to work with Russia and find ways to build the future in Europe and with Europeans. Is it easy? No, but Europe was also created through difficult initiatives that had immediate effects. So, yes, we do have difficulties but we must not give up.

Finally, this is France’s mission, it is its role. During these six months we are presiding in the European Union. Our role is to make the voice of the European Union heard and take into account a variety of complex circumstances in communication with such neighbours as Russia, which plays a decisive role in our security, and listen to all Europeans as well. I have been doing this over the past days. Being here I am trying to be the person who can make a contribution to finding this proper way.

I have a simple conviction. Do we increase our collective capability for making peace without our contacts with Russia? No, we do not. Who do we leave this role for? For others.

We do have disagreements. We realise that. Sometimes we fail to move forward and it is the result of such disagreements. However, we are trying to find compromises. I consider it to be my responsibility. Our task is to make sure that these compromises protect the interests of our partners and allies. This is why in the coming days and weeks we must start this difficult work, find new decisions in order to protect these guarantees while still protecting our basic principles and our neighbourly relations, because our geography will not change. This is why we carry on.

To be continued.

Lavrov’s Remarks Following Putin-Xi Talks In Beijing

February 04, 2022

The primary focus was the tensions that the West has been deliberately escalating around Russia and China, Sergey Lavrov said following talks between Vlsdimir Putin and Xi Jinping, which took place on Friday in Beijing. “The President of Russia described once again our position at the talks with the United States and NATO on the need to work out clear security guarantees in Europe. The PRC President reaffirmed support for Russia’s stand on this problem. He emphasised that it reflected the fair aspirations of

Joint Statement of the Russian Federation and the People’s Republic of China on the International Relations Entering a New Era and the Global Sustainable Development

February 04, 2022

Source

At the invitation of President of the People’s Republic of China Xi Jinping, President of the Russian Federation Vladimir V. Putin visited China on 4 February 2022. The Heads of State held talks in Beijing and took part in the opening ceremony of the XXIV Olympic Winter Games.

The Russian Federation and the People’s Republic of China, hereinafter referred to as the sides, state as follows.

Today, the world is going through momentous changes, and humanity is entering a new era of rapid development and profound transformation. It sees the development of such processes and phenomena as multipolarity, economic globalization, the advent of information society, cultural diversity, transformation of the global governance architecture and world order; there is increasing interrelation and interdependence between the States; a trend has emerged towards redistribution of power in the world; and the international community is showing a growing demand for the leadership aiming at peaceful and gradual development. At the same time, as the pandemic of the new coronavirus infection continues, the international and regional security situation is complicating and the number of global challenges and threats is growing from day to day. Some actors representing but the minority on the international scale continue to advocate unilateral approaches to addressing international issues and resort to force; they interfere in the internal affairs of other states, infringing their legitimate rights and interests, and incite contradictions, differences and confrontation, thus hampering the development and progress of mankind, against the opposition from the international community.

The sides call on all States to pursue well-being for all and, with these ends, to build dialogue and mutual trust, strengthen mutual understanding, champion such universal human values as peace, development, equality, justice, democracy and freedom, respect the rights of peoples to independently determine the development paths of their countries and the sovereignty and the security and development interests of States, to protect the United Nations-driven international architecture and the international law-based world order, seek genuine multipolarity with the United Nations and its Security Council playing a central and coordinating role, promote more democratic international relations, and ensure peace, stability and sustainable development across the world.

I

The sides share the understanding that democracy is a universal human value, rather than a privilege of a limited number of States, and that its promotion and protection is a common responsibility of the entire world community.

The sides believe that democracy is a means of citizens’ participation in the government of their country with the view to improving the well-being of population and implementing the principle of popular government. Democracy is exercised in all spheres of public life as part of a nation-wide process and reflects the interests of all the people, its will, guarantees its rights, meets its needs and protects its interests. There is no one-size-fits-all template to guide countries in establishing democracy. A nation can choose such forms and methods of implementing democracy that would best suit its particular state, based on its social and political system, its historical background, traditions and unique cultural characteristics. It is only up to the people of the country to decide whether their State is a democratic one.

The sides note that Russia and China as world powers with rich cultural and historical heritage have long-standing traditions of democracy, which rely on thousand-years of experience of development, broad popular support and consideration of the needs and interests of citizens. Russia and China guarantee their people the right to take part through various means and in various forms in the administration of the State and public life in accordance with the law. The people of both countries are certain of the way they have chosen and respect the democratic systems and traditions of other States.

The sides note that democratic principles are implemented at the global level, as well as in administration of State. Certain States’ attempts to impose their own ”democratic standards“ on other countries, to monopolize the right to assess the level of compliance with democratic criteria, to draw dividing lines based on the grounds of ideology, including by establishing exclusive blocs and alliances of convenience, prove to be nothing but flouting of democracy and go against the spirit and true values of democracy. Such attempts at hegemony pose serious threats to global and regional peace and stability and undermine the stability of the world order.

The sides believe that the advocacy of democracy and human rights must not be used to put pressure on other countries. They oppose the abuse of democratic values and interference in the internal affairs of sovereign states under the pretext of protecting democracy and human rights, and any attempts to incite divisions and confrontation in the world. The sides call on the international community to respect cultural and civilizational diversity and the rights of peoples of different countries to self-determination. They stand ready to work together with all the interested partners to promote genuine democracy.

The sides note that the Charter of the United Nations and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights set noble goals in the area of universal human rights, set forth fundamental principles, which all the States must comply with and observe in deeds. At the same time, as every nation has its own unique national features, history, culture, social system and level of social and economic development, universal nature of human rights should be seen through the prism of the real situation in every particular country, and human rights should be protected in accordance with the specific situation in each country and the needs of its population. Promotion and protection of human rights is a shared responsibility of the international community. The states should equally prioritize all categories of human rights and promote them in a systemic manner. The international human rights cooperation should be carried out as a dialogue between the equals involving all countries. All States must have equal access to the right to development. Interaction and cooperation on human rights matters should be based on the principle of equality of all countries and mutual respect for the sake of strengthening the international human rights architecture.

II

The sides believe that peace, development and cooperation lie at the core of the modern international system. Development is a key driver in ensuring the prosperity of the nations. The ongoing pandemic of the new coronavirus infection poses a serious challenge to the fulfilment of the UN 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development. It is vital to enhance partnership relations for the sake of global development and make sure that the new stage of global development is defined by balance, harmony and inclusiveness.

The sides are seeking to advance their work to link the development plans for the Eurasian Economic Union and the Belt and Road Initiative with a view to intensifying practical cooperation between the EAEU and China in various areas and promoting greater interconnectedness between the Asia Pacific and Eurasian regions. The sides reaffirm their focus on building the Greater Eurasian Partnership in parallel and in coordination with the Belt and Road construction to foster the development of regional associations as well as bilateral and multilateral integration processes for the benefit of the peoples on the Eurasian continent.

The sides agreed to continue consistently intensifying practical cooperation for the sustainable development of the Arctic.

The sides will strengthen cooperation within multilateral mechanisms, including the United Nations, and encourage the international community to prioritize development issues in the global macro-policy coordination. They call on the developed countries to implement in good faith their formal commitments on development assistance, provide more resources to developing countries, address the uneven development of States, work to offset such imbalances within States, and advance global and international development cooperation. The Russian side confirms its readiness to continue working on the China-proposed Global Development Initiative, including participation in the activities of the Group of Friends of the Global Development Initiative under the UN auspices. In order to accelerate the implementation of the UN 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development, the sides call on the international community to take practical steps in key areas of cooperation such as poverty reduction, food security, vaccines and epidemics control, financing for development, climate change, sustainable development, including green development, industrialization, digital economy, and infrastructure connectivity.

The sides call on the international community to create open, equal, fair and non-discriminatory conditions for scientific and technological development, to step up practical implementation of scientific and technological advances in order to identify new drivers of economic growth.

The sides call upon all countries to strengthen cooperation in sustainable transport, actively build contacts and share knowledge in the construction of transport facilities, including smart transport and sustainable transport, development and use of Arctic routes, as well as to develop other areas to support global post-epidemic recovery.

The sides are taking serious action and making an important contribution to the fight against climate change. Jointly celebrating the 30th anniversary of the adoption of the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change, they reaffirm their commitment to this Convention as well as to the goals, principles and provisions of the Paris Agreement, including the principle of common but differentiated responsibilities. The sides work together to ensure the full and effective implementation of the Paris Agreement, remain committed to fulfilling the obligations they have undertaken and expect that developed countries will actually ensure the annual provision of $100 billion of climate finance to developing states. The sides oppose setting up new barriers in international trade under the pretext of fighting climate change.

The sides strongly support the development of international cooperation and exchanges in the field of biological diversity, actively participating in the relevant global governance process, and intend to jointly promote the harmonious development of humankind and nature as well as green transformation to ensure sustainable global development.

The Heads of State positively assess the effective interaction between Russia and China in the bilateral and multilateral formats focusing on the fight against the COVID-19 pandemic, protection of life and health of the population of the two countries and the peoples of the world. They will further increase cooperation in the development and manufacture of vaccines against the new coronavirus infection, as well as medical drugs for its treatment, and enhance collaboration in public health and modern medicine. The sides plan to strengthen coordination on epidemiological measures to ensure strong protection of health, safety and order in contacts between citizens of the two countries. The sides have commended the work of the competent authorities and regions of the two countries on implementing quarantine measures in the border areas and ensuring the stable operation of the border crossing points, and intend to consider establishing a joint mechanism for epidemic control and prevention in the border areas to jointly plan anti-epidemic measures to be taken at the border checkpoints, share information, build infrastructure and improve the efficiency of customs clearance of goods.

The sides emphasize that ascertaining the origin of the new coronavirus infection is a matter of science. Research on this topic must be based on global knowledge, and that requires cooperation among scientists from all over the world. The sides oppose politicization of this issue. The Russian side welcomes the work carried out jointly by China and WHO to identify the source of the new coronavirus infection and supports the China – WHO joint report on the matter. The sides call on the global community to jointly promote a serious scientific approach to the study of the coronavirus origin.

The Russian side supports a successful hosting by the Chinese side of the Winter Olympic and Paralympic Games in Beijing in 2022.

The sides highly appreciate the level of bilateral cooperation in sports and the Olympic movement and express their readiness to contribute to its further progressive development.

III

The sides are gravely concerned about serious international security challenges and believe that the fates of all nations are interconnected. No State can or should ensure its own security separately from the security of the rest of the world and at the expense of the security of other States. The international community should actively engage in global governance to ensure universal, comprehensive, indivisible and lasting security.

The sides reaffirm their strong mutual support for the protection of their core interests, state sovereignty and territorial integrity, and oppose interference by external forces in their internal affairs.

The Russian side reaffirms its support for the One-China principle, confirms that Taiwan is an inalienable part of China, and opposes any forms of independence of Taiwan.

Russia and China stand against attempts by external forces to undermine security and stability in their common adjacent regions, intend to counter interference by outside forces in the internal affairs of sovereign countries under any pretext, oppose colour revolutions, and will increase cooperation in the aforementioned areas.

The sides condemn terrorism in all its manifestations, promote the idea of creating a single global anti-terrorism front, with the United Nations playing a central role, advocate stronger political coordination and constructive engagement in multilateral counterterrorism efforts. The sides oppose politicization of the issues of combating terrorism and their use as instruments of policy of double standards, condemn the practice of interference in the internal affairs of other States for geopolitical purposes through the use of terrorist and extremist groups as well as under the guise of combating international terrorism and extremism.

The sides believe that certain States, military and political alliances and coalitions seek to obtain, directly or indirectly, unilateral military advantages to the detriment of the security of others, including by employing unfair competition practices, intensify geopolitical rivalry, fuel antagonism and confrontation, and seriously undermine the international security order and global strategic stability. The sides oppose further enlargement of NATO and call on the North Atlantic Alliance to abandon its ideologized cold war approaches, to respect the sovereignty, security and interests of other countries, the diversity of their civilizational, cultural and historical backgrounds, and to exercise a fair and objective attitude towards the peaceful development of other States. The sides stand against the formation of closed bloc structures and opposing camps in the Asia-Pacific region and remain highly vigilant about the negative impact of the United States’ Indo-Pacific strategy on peace and stability in the region. Russia and China have made consistent efforts to build an equitable, open and inclusive security system in the Asia-Pacific Region (APR) that is not directed against third countries and that promotes peace, stability and prosperity.

The sides welcome the Joint Statement of the Leaders of the Five Nuclear-Weapons States on Preventing Nuclear War and Avoiding Arms Races and believe that all nuclear-weapons States should abandon the cold war mentality and zero-sum games, reduce the role of nuclear weapons in their national security policies, withdraw nuclear weapons deployed abroad, eliminate the unrestricted development of global anti-ballistic missile defense (ABM) system, and take effective steps to reduce the risks of nuclear wars and any armed conflicts between countries with military nuclear capabilities.

The sides reaffirm that the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is the cornerstone of the international disarmament and nuclear non-proliferation system, an important part of the post-war international security system, and plays an indispensable role in world peace and development. The international community should promote the balanced implementation of the three pillars of the Treaty and work together to protect the credibility, effectiveness and the universal nature of the instrument.

The sides are seriously concerned about the trilateral security partnership between Australia, the United States, and the United Kingdom (AUKUS), which provides for deeper cooperation between its members in areas involving strategic stability, in particular their decision to initiate cooperation in the field of nuclear-powered submarines. Russia and China believe that such actions are contrary to the objectives of security and sustainable development of the Asia-Pacific region, increase the danger of an arms race in the region, and pose serious risks of nuclear proliferation. The sides strongly condemn such moves and call on AUKUS participants to fulfil their nuclear and missile non-proliferation commitments in good faith and to work together to safeguard peace, stability, and development in the region.

Japan’s plans to release nuclear contaminated water from the destroyed Fukushima nuclear plant into the ocean and the potential environmental impact of such actions are of deep concern to the sides. The sides emphasize that the disposal of nuclear contaminated water should be handled with responsibility and carried out in a proper manner based on arrangements between the Japanese side and neighbouring States, other interested parties, and relevant international agencies while ensuring transparency, scientific reasoning, and in accordance with international law.

The sides believe that the U.S. withdrawal from the Treaty on the Elimination of Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range Missiles, the acceleration of research and the development of intermediate-range and shorter-range ground-based missiles and the desire to deploy them in the Asia-Pacific and European regions, as well as their transfer to the allies, entail an increase in tension and distrust, increase risks to international and regional security, lead to the weakening of international non-proliferation and arms control system, undermining global strategic stability. The sided call on the United States to respond positively to the Russian initiative and abandon its plans to deploy intermediate-range and shorter-range ground-based missiles in the Asia-Pacific region and Europe. The sides will continue to maintain contacts and strengthen coordination on this issue.

The Chinese side is sympathetic to and supports the proposals put forward by the Russian Federation to create long-term legally binding security guarantees in Europe.

The sides note that the denunciation by the United States of a number of important international arms control agreements has an extremely negative impact on international and regional security and stability. The sides express concern over the advancement of U.S. plans to develop global missile defence and deploy its elements in various regions of the world, combined with capacity building of high-precision non-nuclear weapons for disarming strikes and other strategic objectives. The sides stress the importance of the peaceful uses of outer space, strongly support the central role of the UN Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space in promoting international cooperation, maintaining and developing international space law and regulation in the field of space activities. Russia and China will continue to increase cooperation on such matters of mutual interest as the long-term sustainability of space activities and the development and use of space resources. The sides oppose attempts by some States to turn outer space into an arena of armed confrontation and reiterate their intention to make all necessary efforts to prevent the weaponization of space and an arms race in outer space. They will counteract activities aimed at achieving military superiority in space and using it for combat operations. The sides affirm the need for the early launch of negotiations to conclude a legally binding multilateral instrument based on the Russian-Chinese draft treaty on the prevention of placement of weapons in outer space and the use or threat of force against space objects that would provide fundamental and reliable guarantees against an arms race and the weaponization of outer space.

Russia and China emphasize that appropriate transparency and confidence-building measures, including an international initiative/political commitment not to be the first to place weapons in space, can also contribute to the goal of preventing an arms race in outer space, but such measures should complement and not substitute the effective legally binding regime governing space activities.

The sides reaffirm their belief that the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on their Destruction (BWC) is an essential pillar of international peace and security. Russia and China underscore their determination to preserve the credibility and effectiveness of the Convention.

The sides affirm the need to fully respect and further strengthen the BWC, including by institutionalizing it, strengthening its mechanisms, and adopting a legally binding Protocol to the Convention with an effective verification mechanism, as well as through regular consultation and cooperation in addressing any issues related to the implementation of the Convention.

The sides emphasize that domestic and foreign bioweapons activities by the United States and its allies raise serious concerns and questions for the international community regarding their compliance with the BWC. The sides share the view that such activities pose a serious threat to the national security of the Russian Federation and China and are detrimental to the security of the respective regions. The sides call on the U.S. and its allies to act in an open, transparent, and responsible manner by properly reporting on their military biological activities conducted overseas and on their national territory, and by supporting the resumption of negotiations on a legally binding BWC Protocol with an effective verification mechanism.

The sides, reaffirming their commitment to the goal of a world free of chemical weapons, call upon all parties to the Chemical Weapons Convention to work together to uphold its credibility and effectiveness. Russia and China are deeply concerned about the politicization of the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons and call on all of its members to strengthen solidarity and cooperation and protect the tradition of consensual decision-making. Russia and China insist that the United States, as the sole State Party to the Convention that has not yet completed the process of eliminating chemical weapons, accelerate the elimination of its stockpiles of chemical weapons. The sides emphasize the importance of balancing the non-proliferation obligations of states with the interests of legitimate international cooperation in the use of advanced technology and related materials and equipment for peaceful purposes. The sides note the resolution entitled ”Promoting international Cooperation on Peaceful Uses in the Context of International Security“ adopted at the 76th session of the UN General Assembly on the initiative of China and co‑sponsored by Russia, and look forward to its consistent implementation in accordance with the goals set forth therein.

The sides attach great importance to the issues of governance in the field of artificial intelligence. The sides are ready to strengthen dialogue and contacts on artificial intelligence.

The sides reiterate their readiness to deepen cooperation in the field of international information security and to contribute to building an open, secure, sustainable and accessible ICT environment. The sides emphasize that the principles of the non-use of force, respect for national sovereignty and fundamental human rights and freedoms, and non-interference in the internal affairs of other States, as enshrined in the UN Charter, are applicable to the information space. Russia and China reaffirm the key role of the UN in responding to threats to international information security and express their support for the Organization in developing new norms of conduct of states in this area.

The sides welcome the implementation of the global negotiation process on international information security within a single mechanism and support in this context the work of the UN Open-ended Working Group on security of and in the use of information and communication technologies (ICTs) 2021–2025 (OEWG) and express their willingness to speak with one voice within it. The sides consider it necessary to consolidate the efforts of the international community to develop new norms of responsible behaviour of States, including legal ones, as well as a universal international legal instrument regulating the activities of States in the field of ICT. The sides believe that the Global Initiative on Data Security, proposed by the Chinese side and supported, in principle, by the Russian side, provides a basis for the Working Group to discuss and elaborate responses to data security threats and other threats to international information security.

The sides reiterate their support of United Nations General Assembly resolutions 74/247 and 75/282, support the work of the relevant Ad Hoc Committee of Governmental Experts, facilitate the negotiations within the United Nations for the elaboration of an international convention on countering the use of ICTs for criminal purposes. The sides encourage constructive participation of all sides in the negotiations in order to agree as soon as possible on a credible, universal, and comprehensive convention and provide it to the United Nations General Assembly at its 78th session in strict compliance with resolution 75/282. For these purposes, Russia and China have presented a joint draft convention as a basis for negotiations.

The sides support the internationalization of Internet governance, advocate equal rights to its governance, believe that any attempts to limit their sovereign right to regulate national segments of the Internet and ensure their security are unacceptable, are interested in greater participation of the International Telecommunication Union in addressing these issues.

The sides intend to deepen bilateral cooperation in international information security on the basis of the relevant 2015 intergovernmental agreement. To this end, the sides have agreed to adopt in the near future a plan for cooperation between Russia and China in this area.

IV

The sides underline that Russia and China, as world powers and permanent members of the United Nations Security Council, intend to firmly adhere to moral principles and accept their responsibility, strongly advocate the international system with the central coordinating role of the United Nations in international affairs, defend the world order based on international law, including the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations, advance multipolarity and promote the democratization of international relations, together create an even more prospering, stable, and just world, jointly build international relations of a new type.

The Russian side notes the significance of the concept of constructing a ”community of common destiny for mankind“ proposed by the Chinese side to ensure greater solidarity of the international community and consolidation of efforts in responding to common challenges. The Chinese side notes the significance of the efforts taken by the Russian side to establish a just multipolar system of international relations.

The sides intend to strongly uphold the outcomes of the Second World War and the existing post-war world order, defend the authority of the United Nations and justice in international relations, resist attempts to deny, distort, and falsify the history of the Second World War.

In order to prevent the recurrence of the tragedy of the world war, the sides will strongly condemn actions aimed at denying the responsibility for atrocities of Nazi aggressors, militarist invaders, and their accomplices, besmirch and tarnish the honour of the victorious countries.

The sides call for the establishment of a new kind of relationships between world powers on the basis of mutual respect, peaceful coexistence and mutually beneficial cooperation. They reaffirm that the new inter-State relations between Russia and China are superior to political and military alliances of the Cold War era. Friendship between the two States has no limits, there are no ”forbidden“ areas of cooperation, strengthening of bilateral strategic cooperation is neither aimed against third countries nor affected by the changing international environment and circumstantial changes in third countries.

The sides reiterate the need for consolidation, not division of the international community, the need for cooperation, not confrontation. The sides oppose the return of international relations to the state of confrontation between major powers, when the weak fall prey to the strong. The sides intend to resist attempts to substitute universally recognized formats and mechanisms that are consistent with international law for rules elaborated in private by certain nations or blocs of nations, and are against addressing international problems indirectly and without consensus, oppose power politics, bullying, unilateral sanctions, and extraterritorial application of jurisdiction, as well as the abuse of export control policies, and support trade facilitation in line with the rules of the World Trade Organization (WTO).

The sides reaffirmed their intention to strengthen foreign policy coordination, pursue true multilateralism, strengthen cooperation on multilateral platforms, defend common interests, support the international and regional balance of power, and improve global governance.

The sides support and defend the multilateral trade system based on the central role of the World Trade Organization (WTO), take an active part in the WTO reform, opposing unilateral approaches and protectionism. The sides are ready to strengthen dialogue between partners and coordinate positions on trade and economic issues of common concern, contribute to ensuring the sustainable and stable operation of global and regional value chains, promote a more open, inclusive, transparent, non-discriminatory system of international trade and economic rules.

The sides support the G20 format as an important forum for discussing international economic cooperation issues and anti-crisis response measures, jointly promote the invigorated spirit of solidarity and cooperation within the G20, support the leading role of the association in such areas as the international fight against epidemics, world economic recovery, inclusive sustainable development, improving the global economic governance system in a fair and rational manner to collectively address global challenges.

The sides support the deepened strategic partnership within BRICS, promote the expanded cooperation in three main areas: politics and security, economy and finance, and humanitarian exchanges. In particular, Russia and China intend to encourage interaction in the fields of public health, digital economy, science, innovation and technology, including artificial intelligence technologies, as well as the increased coordination between BRICS countries on international platforms. The sides strive to further strengthen the BRICS Plus/Outreach format as an effective mechanism of dialogue with regional integration associations and organizations of developing countries and States with emerging markets.

The Russian side will fully support the Chinese side chairing the association in 2022, and assist in the fruitful holding of the XIV BRICS summit.

Russia and China aim to comprehensively strengthen the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) and further enhance its role in shaping a polycentric world order based on the universally recognized principles of international law, multilateralism, equal, joint, indivisible, comprehensive and sustainable security.

They consider it important to consistently implement the agreements on improved mechanisms to counter challenges and threats to the security of SCO member states and, in the context of addressing this task, advocate expanded functionality of the SCO Regional Anti-Terrorist Structure.

The sides will contribute to imparting a new quality and dynamics to the economic interaction between the SCO member States in the fields of trade, manufacturing, transport, energy, finance, investment, agriculture, customs, telecommunications, innovation and other areas of mutual interest, including through the use of advanced, resource-saving, energy efficient and ”green“ technologies.

The sides note the fruitful interaction within the SCO under the 2009 Agreement between the Governments of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization member States on cooperation in the field of international information security, as well as within the specialized Group of Experts. In this context, they welcome the adoption of the SCO Joint Action Plan on Ensuring International Information Security for 2022–2023 by the Council of Heads of State of SCO Member States on September 17, 2021 in Dushanbe.

Russia and China proceed from the ever-increasing importance of cultural and humanitarian cooperation for the progressive development of the SCO. In order to strengthen mutual understanding between the people of the SCO member States, they will continue to effectively foster interaction in such areas as cultural ties, education, science and technology, healthcare, environmental protection, tourism, people-to-people contacts, sports.

Russia and China will continue to work to strengthen the role of APEC as the leading platform for multilateral dialogue on economic issues in the Asia-Pacific region. The sides intend to step up coordinated action to successfully implement the ”Putrajaya guidelines for the development of APEC until 2040“ with a focus on creating a free, open, fair, non-discriminatory, transparent and predictable trade and investment environment in the region. Particular emphasis will be placed on the fight against the novel coronavirus infection pandemic and economic recovery, digitalization of a wide range of different spheres of life, economic growth in remote territories and the establishment of interaction between APEC and other regional multilateral associations with a similar agenda.

The sides intend to develop cooperation within the ”Russia-India-China“ format, as well as to strengthen interaction on such venues as the East Asia Summit, ASEAN Regional Forum on Security, Meeting of Defense Ministers of the ASEAN Member States and Dialogue Partners. Russia and China support ASEAN’s central role in developing cooperation in East Asia, continue to increase coordination on deepened cooperation with ASEAN, and jointly promote cooperation in the areas of public health, sustainable development, combating terrorism and countering transnational crime. The sides intend to continue to work in the interest of a strengthened role of ASEAN as a key element of the regional architecture.

The Year of the Tiger Starts with a Sino-Russian Bang

February 3, 2022

Pepe Escobar

Independent geopolitical analyst, writer and journalist

The Year of the Black Water Tiger will start, for all practical purposes, with a Beijing bang this Friday, as Presidents Xi Jinping and Vladimir Putin, after a live meeting before the initial ceremony of the Winter Olympics, will issue a joint statement on international relations.

That will represent a crucial move in the Eurasia vs. NATOstan chessboard, as the Anglo-American axis is increasingly bogged down in Desperation Row: after all, “Russian aggression” stubbornly refuses to materialize.

After an interminable wait arguably due to the lack of functionaries properly equipped to write an intelligible letter, the US/NATO combo finally concocted a predictable, jargon-drenched bureaucratese non-response “response” to the Russian demands of security guarantees.

The contents were leaked to a Spanish newspaper, a full member of NATOstan media. The leaker, according to Brussels sources, may be in Kiev by now. The Pentagon, in damage control mode, rushed to assert, “We didn’t do it”. The State Dept. said, “it’s authentic.”

Even before the leak of the non-response “response”, Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov was forced to send messages to all NATO foreign ministers, including US Secretary Blinken, asking how they understand the principle of indivisibility of security – if they actually do.

Lavrov was extremely specific: “I am referring to our demands that everyone faithfully implement the agreements on the indivisibility of security that were reached within the OSCE in 1999 in Istanbul and in 2010 in Astana. These agreements provide not only for the freedom to choose alliances, but also make this freedom conditional on the need to avoid any steps that will strengthen the security of any state at the expense of infringing on the security of others.”

Lavrov hit the heart of the matter when he stressed, “our Western colleagues are not simply trying to ignore this key principle of international law agreed in the Euro-Atlantic space, but to completely forget it.”

Lavrov also made it very clear “we will not allow this topic to be ‘wrapped up’. We will insist on a honest conversation and an explanation of why the West does not want to fulfill its obligations at all or exclusively, selectively, and in its favor.”

Crucially, China fully supports Russian demands for security guarantees in Europe, and fully agrees that the security of one state cannot be ensured by inflicting damage on another state.

This is as serious as it gets: the US/NATO combo are bent on smashing two crucial treaties that directly concern European security, and they think they can get away with it because there is less than zero discussion about the content and its implications across NATOstan media.

Western public opinion remains absolutely clueless. The only narrative, hammered 24/7, is “Russian aggression” – by the way duly emphasized in NATO’s non-response “response”.

Wanna check our military-technical gear?

For the umpteenth time Moscow made it very clear it’s not going to make any concessions on the security demands just because the Empire of Chaos keeps threatening – what else – extra harsh sanctions, the sole imperial “policy” short of outright bombing.

The new sanctions package, anyway, is ready to go for quite a while now, arguably capable of cutting Moscow off from the Western financial system and/or casino, and targeting, among others, Sberbank, VTB, Gazprombank and Alfa-Bank.

And that brings us to what’s Moscow going to do next – considering the predictable “extremely negative attitude” (Lavrov) from NATOstan. Deputy Foreign Minister Alexander Grushko had already hinted NATO knows perfectly well what’s coming, even before the non-response “response”:

“NATO knows perfectly well what kind of military-technical measures may follow from Russia. We make no secret of our possibilities and are acting very transparently.”

Still the American “partners” are not listening. The Russians remain unfazed. Grushko framed it in realpolitik terms: concrete measures will depend on the “military potentials” that could be used against Russia. That’s code for what sort of nuclear weapons will be deployed in Eastern Europe, and what sort of lethal equipment will keep being unloaded in Ukraine.

In fact Ukraine – or country 404, per Andrei Martyanov’s indelible definition – is just a lowly pawn in their (imperial) game. Adding to Kiev’s misery on all fronts, the head of the National Security and Defense Council of Ukraine, Alexei Danilov, all but gave away the (regional) game.

In an interview to AP, Danilov said that “the Minsk Agreements can create chaos”; he admitted that Kiev totally lost the war in 2014/15 and then signed the Minsk Agreements “under threat of Russian arms” (false: Kiev was soundly defeated by the Donbass militias); but most of all he admitted Kiev never had any intention of fulfilling the Minsk Agreements.

So Kiev, essentially, is breaking international law: the Minsk Agreements are guaranteed by the UN Security Council resolution 2022 (2015), adopted unanimously. Even the US, UK and France voted “Yes”. So breaking the law is not hard to do, as long as you’re enabled by “big powers”.

And on that invisible “Russian aggression”, well, even Danilov can’t see “the readiness of Russian forces near the border for an invasion, which will take three to seven days.”

Bring on the Dancing Horses

None of the above alters the fundamental fact that the USUK combo – plus the proverbial NATO chihuahuas Poland and the Baltics – are spinning around like mad trying to provoke a war. And the only way to do it is to Release the False Flags. It may be sometime in February, it may be during the Beijing Olympics, it may be before the onset of Spring. But they will come. And the Russians are ready.

The preamble has been staged straight from Monty Python Flying Circus – complete with Crash Test Dummy, a.k.a. POTUS yelling to comedian Zelensky that, in a trashy Mongol revival, “Kiev will be sacked” (to the sound of Bring On the Dancing Horses?); an outraged Zelensky telling POTUS to, c’mon man, back off; and the White House swearing that the US has gamed 18 scenarios for the “Russian invasion” (Lavrov: 17 were written by the intel alphabet soup, the 18^th by the State Dept.)

Cue to non-stop, frantic weaponizing of country 404 – everything from Javelins to MANPADs to overpriced Blackwater/Academi-tinged waves of “advisers”.

Switching away from farce, not to mention misguided scenarios starting from the faulty premise of an “invasion”, the only rational move Moscow may be contemplating is to de facto recognize the People’s Republics of Donetsk and Luhansk, and send in a contingent of peacekeepers.

That, of course, would enrage the neo-con infested War Inc. matrix to intergalactic paroxysm, as it would nullify all those elaborate psyops geared to instill the Fear of God on the unsuspecting victims of the Remixed Khanate of the Golden Horde, burning and looting all the way to…the Hungarian plains?

Then there’s the tricky question of how to de-Nazify Western Ukraine: that will be a strictly Ukrainian matter, with zero Russian involvement.

The ghost of Mackinder is in total freak out mode contemplating in impotence the imperial brilliance of deciding to fight a two-front war against the Russia-China strategic partnership. At least there’s Monty Python to the rescue: the Ministry of Silly Walks has been gloriously revived as the Ministry of Silly Strategies.

Pride of place goes to the phone call placed by Little Blinkie to Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi – which contains all the elements of a brilliant comic sketch. It stars with the combo behind that cipher, “Biden”, thinking that the Beijing leadership could influence Putin to not exercise “Russian aggression” against 404. On the sidelines, perhaps there could be some discussion about the “Indo-Pacific” racket.

The plot went downhill when once again Wang Yi – remember Alaska? – made shark fin’s soup out of Blinkie. The key take aways: China totally supports Russia; it’s the US that is destabilizing Europe; and were more sanctions to come, Europe will pay a terrible price, not Russia, which of course can count on a serious helping hand from China.

Now compare it with the phone call between Putin and Macron. It was, to start with, cordial. They discussed “brain-dead” (copyright Macron) NATO. They discussed the proverbial Anglo-Saxon shenanigans. They even discussed the possibility of forming a pan-European group – a sort of anti-AUKUS – with Russia included, curbing the influence of the Five Eyes and bent on avoiding by all means a war in European soil. For the moment, it’s all talk. But the game-changing seeds are all there.

Misguided scenarios insist that Putin skillfully exploited the imperial obsession with the rise and rise of China to re-establish Russia’s sphere of influence. Nonsense. The sphere was always there – and won’t move. The difference is Moscow finally got fed up with the heavy symbolism permeating the unresolved 404 mess: the intermingling of raw Russophobia in Washington and containment/encirclement NATO knocking at the door.

Metaphorically, this may turn out to be the Year of two – sanctioned – Black Water Tigers, one Chinese, one Siberian. They will be harassed non-stop by the headless eagle, blind to its own irreversible decay and always resorting to the serial Hail Mary passes of the only “policy” it knows.

The ultimate danger – especially for the European minions – is that the headless eagle will never let go of its former “indispensable” status without provoking another devastating war. In European soil. Still the tigers persist: in Beijing, before the Games commence, they will be taking yet another step to irreversibly bury the “rules-based international order”.

Russia’s 3 most important communications and responses in sequence

February 02, 2022

Posting these documents in a sequence of how they happened will assist in understanding one clear fact.  Russia has not stepped back one inch despite the flurry of so-called megaphone diplomacy tried at the UN in the last few days.  Neither has Russia changed her plans and strategy to bring the question of indivisible security to the forefront.

1. Text of the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Russia Mr. Sergey Lavrov`s written message on Indivisibility of Security addressed to the Heads of Foreign / External Affairs Ministers / Secretaries of the US, Canada and several European countries.
2. Press release on Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov’s telephone conversation with US Secretary of State Antony Blinken.
3. Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov’s answer to a media question following his telephone conversation with US Secretary of State Antony Blinken, Moscow, February 1, 2022

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1 February 2022 20:56

Text of the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Russia Mr. Sergey Lavrov`s written message on Indivisibility of Security addressed to the Heads of Foreign / External Affairs Ministers / Secretaries of the US, Canada and several European countries.

You are well aware that Russia is seriously concerned about increasing politico-military tensions in the immediate vicinity of its western borders. With a view to avoiding any further escalation, the Russian side presented on 15 December 2021 the drafts of two interconnected international legal documents – a Treaty between the Russian Federation and the United States of America on Security Guarantees and an Agreement on Measures to Ensure the Security of the Russian Federation and Member States of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.

The U.S. and NATO responses to our proposals received on 26 January 2022 demonstrate serious differences in the understanding of the principle of equal and indivisible security that is fundamental to the entire European security architecture. We believe it is necessary to immediately clarify this issue, as it will determine the prospects for future dialogue.

The Charter for European Security signed at the OSCE Summit in Istanbul in November 1999 formulated key rights and obligations of the OSCE participating States with respect to indivisibility of security. It underscored the right of each participating State to be free to choose or change its security arrangements including treaties of alliances, as they evolve, as well as the right of each State to neutrality. The same paragraph of the Charter directly conditions those rights on the obligation of each State not to strengthen its security at the expense of the security of other States. It says further that no State, group of States or Organization can have any pre-eminent responsibility for maintaining peace and stability in the OSCE area or can consider any part of the OSCE area as its sphere of influence.

At the OSCE Summit in Astana in December 2010, the leaders of our nations approved a declaration that reaffirmed this comprehensive package of interconnected obligations.

However, the Western countries continue to pick up out of it only those elements that suit them, and namely – the right of States to be free to choose alliances for ensuring exclusively their own security. The words ‘as they evolve’ are shamefacedly omitted, because this provision was also an integral part of the understanding of ‘indivisible security’, and specifically in the sense that military alliances must abandon their initial deterrence function and integrate into the all-European architecture based on collective approaches, rather than as narrow groups. The principle of indivisible security is selectively interpreted as a justification for the ongoing course toward irresponsible expansion of NATO.

It is revealing that Western representatives, while expressing their readiness to engage in dialogue on the European security architecture, deliberately avoid making reference to the Charter for European Security and the Astana Declaration in their comments. They mention only earlier OSCE documents, particularly often – the 1990 Charter of Paris for a New Europe that does not contain the increasingly ‘inconvenient’ obligation not to strengthen own security at the expense of the security of other States. Western capitals also attempt to ignore a key OSCE document – the 1994 Code of Conduct on Politico-Military Aspects of Security, which clearly says that the States will choose their security arrangements, including membership in alliances, ‘bearing in mind the legitimate security concerns of other States’.

It will not work that way. The very essence of the agreements on indivisible security is that either there is security for all or there is no security for anyone. The Istanbul Charter provides that each OSCE participating State has equal right to security, and not only NATO countries that interpret this right as an exceptional privilege of membership in the ‘exclusive’ North Atlantic club.

I will not comment on other NATO guidelines and actions that reflect the aspiration of the ‘defensive’ bloc to military supremacy and the use of force bypassing the prerogatives of the U.N. Security Council. Suffice it to say that such actions contravene the fundamental all-European obligations including the commitments under the aforementioned documents to maintain only such military capabilities that are commensurate with individual or collective security needs, taking into account the obligations under international law, as well as the legitimate security interests of other States.

Discussing the present situation in Europe, our colleagues from the United States, NATO and the European Union make constant appeals for ‘de-escalation’ and call on Russia to ‘choose a path of diplomacy’. We want to remind: we have been moving along that path for decades. The key milestones, such as the documents of the Istanbul and Astana summits, are exactly the direct result of diplomacy. The very fact that the West now tries to revise to its benefit these diplomatic achievements of the leaders of all OSCE countries raises serious concern. The situation demands a frank clarification of positions.

We want to receive a clear answer to the question how our partners understand their obligation not to strengthen their own security at the expense of the security of other States on the basis of the commitment to the principle of indivisible security. How specifically does your Government intend to fulfil this obligation in practical terms in the current circumstances? If you renege on this obligation, we ask you to clearly state that.

Without having full clarity on this key issue related to the interconnection of rights and obligations approved at the highest level, it is impossible to ensure the balance of interests embodied in the instruments of the Istanbul and Astana summits. Your response will help to better understand the extent of the ability of our partners to remain faithful to their commitments, as well as the prospects for common progress toward decreasing tensions and strengthening European security.

We look forward to your prompt reply. It should not take long as the point  is to clarify the understanding on the basis of which Your President/Prime Minister signed the corresponding obligations.

We also expect that the response to this letter will be given in the national capacity, as the aforementioned commitments were undertaken by each of our States individually and not within any bloc or in the name thereof.

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1 February 2022 20:13

Press release on Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov’s telephone conversation with US Secretary of State Antony Blinken

On February 1, Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov spoke by phone with US Secretary of State Antony Blinken at the latter’s initiative.

They continued their exchange of views on providing legally binding security guarantees to Russia in the context of the written response of the US and NATO to the initial drafts of the international legal agreements. Foreign Minister Lavrov emphasised the imperative character of our demands that all OSCE countries faithfully abide by the commitment not to enhance their security at the expense of the security of others, including NATO’s non-expansion and non-deployment of offensive weapons near Russian borders.

Opportunities to continue working on security guarantees were discussed in light of the current proposals under consideration.

During the discussion of Ukraine, Sergey Lavrov called on his counterpart to use US influence on the Ukrainian authorities to compel them to fully implement the Minsk Agreements instead of ratcheting up the aggressive rhetoric and loading up the Armed Forces of Ukraine with various types of weapons.

During the discussion of the bilateral agenda, Mr Lavrov spoke about Washington’s unacceptable policy of restricting the activities of Russian diplomatic missions in the United States. The officials agreed to step up the search for ways to remove these “irritants.”

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Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov’s answer to a media question following his telephone conversation with US Secretary of State Antony Blinken, Moscow, February 1, 2022

Question: Has Moscow responded to the Americans’ written materials that were sent following Russia’s proposals on security guarantees? What was the gist of your telephone conversation today with Antony Blinken? What contacts are planned for the future in this context?

Sergey Lavrov: Today, we heard from the US Department of State that they have allegedly received a response from Moscow to the document that the Americans sent in reply to our initial proposals on security guarantees in Europe.

This is a misunderstanding. We started studying the US response when we received it about a week ago. It was clear from the start that the Americans prefer to focus on discussing important albeit secondary issues. They asked if it was possible to agree on the non-deployment of offensive weapons on a reciprocal basis, including medium- and shorter-range missiles that had been covered once by the INF Treaty which the US destroyed. They mentioned transparency in holding exercises, measures for avoiding unforeseen incidents between combat aircraft and ships and other confidence-building measures.

As for the key issue that prompted us to send our initiatives to the United States and NATO, their response was negative. I am referring to our demands for honest implementation of the agreements on the indivisibility of security, which were reached in the OSCE framework in Istanbul in 1999 and in Astana in 2010. These agreements not only envisage the freedom to choose alliances but also make this freedom dependent on the need to avoid any steps that would enhance security at the expense of the security of others. We saw that the US and NATO response to our key question was extremely negative. They focus only on the freedom to choose alliances and completely ignore the condition that was approved at the highest level, notably, that it is unacceptable to encroach on the security of other states in the process.

We are also concerned over the position of other NATO countries, for instance, France. Its defence minister said not so long ago that they insist on the need to ensure security based on the documents that preceded the adoption of the Istanbul Charter and the Astana Declaration. The minister cited a document of the 1990 OSCE summit in Paris, which did not contain a demand not to enhance security at the expense of others. In other words, our Western colleagues are trying to consign to oblivion rather than simply ignore a key principle of international law accepted in the Euro-Atlantic space. To prevent this from happening, when we received Washington’s response to our initial proposals, I described in detail everything we are talking about now in a separate message and sent it to all foreign ministers of the OSCE states and some other countries to familiarise them with our position.

Today, I reaffirmed to Secretary of State Antony Blinken that we won’t allow this issue to be dragged out. We will insist on honest conversations and explanations of why the West does not want to honour its commitments at all, or only selectively when it benefits them. Mr Blinken agreed that this is a subject for another conversation. We will see how it goes. At present, we are completing the interdepartmental work on US proposals on other issues. We will report on them to our President.