Russian grain diplomacy: Winning hearts, minds, and markets

SEP 12, 2023

Photo Credit: The Cradle

The Ukraine conflict and the Black Sea grain deal have highlighted the ‘geopolitics of wheat’ and helped Russia gain leverage over Europe while expanding its influence in Africa and the Global South.

Mohamad Hasan Sweidan

In the complex fabric of international relations, the interaction between geopolitics and trade – particularly of vital commodities – often occupies a key position. Nowhere is this more evident today than in the grain trade agreement between Russia and Ukraine, known as the Black Sea Grain Initiative

Nestled within the fertile plains of Eastern Europe, Russia, and Ukraine stand as formidable players in the global cereal production arena, particularly in the domain of wheat cultivation. Their collaborative efforts significantly contribute to stabilizing global food prices and securing the food supply for numerous countries. 

But the historical, political, and regional intricacies inherent to these two states have often cast shadows over their global economic interdependence, a situation further exacerbated by the ongoing conflict in Ukraine.

Major players in the global grain market

On 22 July, 2022, a landmark agreement was brokered with the mediation of Turkiye and the UN, in which Russia and Ukraine would facilitate grain exports from both countries to global markets.

Central to this agreement was the establishment of a secure maritime route in the Black Sea – traversing the Bosphorus Strait in northwestern Turkiye – that would ensure the safe transit of grain shipments to and from Ukrainian ports.

Moreover, the accord envisioned the creation of a joint coordination center comprised of representatives from the three states who would be tasked with monitoring and inspecting ships to prevent the transportation of weapons.

Map of Black Sea Grain Initiative Shipping Route

The global significance of this agreement cannot be overstated, given the pivotal roles that Russia and Ukraine occupy as the world’s foremost cereal exporters. According to the World Food Program, Ukrainian cereals sustained the diets of approximately 400 million people globally in 2021. 

Yet due to the ongoing proxy conflict in Ukraine, the number of individuals experiencing acute hunger is projected to surge by 47 million, representing a 17 percent increase, with the majority of those affected residing in sub-Saharan Africa.

Russia and Ukraine collectively account for a substantial share of the global grain market, with Russia being the leading wheat exporter (20 percent of global exports) and Ukraine following closely behind as the fifth-largest (10 percent of global exports).

Additionally, the two neighbors jointly contribute 25 percent of the world’s barley exports and 15 percent of maize exports. In 2021, Russia recorded wheat exports valued at $8.92 billion, with major destinations including Egypt ($2.44 billion), Turkiye ($1.79 billion), Nigeria ($493 million), Azerbaijan ($339 million), and Saudi Arabia ($316 million).

During the same year, Ukraine’s wheat exports totaled $5.87 billion, with key destinations being Egypt ($851 million), Indonesia ($640 million), Pakistan ($594 million), Nigeria ($490 million) and Ethiopia ($440 million).

Russia’s wheat export surge amidst Ukrainian decline

However, the outbreak of war has severely impacted Ukrainian wheat exports, causing them to plummet from 21 million tons in the 2019-20 season to 16.8 million tons in 2022-2023, with a further decline to 10.5 million tons anticipated in the next year. 

The US Department of Agriculture (USDA) predicts that Ukraine’s wheat production will dwindle to 17.5 million tons, marking the lowest level since 2012-2013.

Despite western efforts to stifle Russia’s economy, Moscow has emerged as the primary beneficiary of this decline, effectively filling the void left by reduced Ukrainian exports. Russian wheat exports soared to a record-breaking 45.0 million tons in the 2022/2023 season, reflecting a remarkable 36 percent increase from the previous year and surpassing the previous record set in the 2017-2018 season by 3.5 million tons.

Thanks to competitive prices and abundant supplies, the USDA anticipates that Russia will account for over 20 percent of the global wheat trade in the 2022-2023 season, with Russian wheat stocks projected to reach their highest levels in nearly three decades.

Data from the Russian state statistics service Rosstat reveals that grain stocks until May 2023 were 61.5 percent higher than the previous year, while wheat stocks increased by 69.4 percent. Russian wheat exports are poised to set a new record at 47.5 million tons in the 2023-2024 season, surpassing exports from the EU (38.5 million tons), Canada (26.5 million tons), Australia (25 million tons), and Argentina (11 million tons).

Disparities within the Black Sea Grain Initiative

According to EU data, nearly 33 million tons of cereals and other foodstuffs were exported through the Black Sea Grain Initiative. UN data further reveals that these cereals and food were shipped to 45 countries spanning three continents, with 46 percent going to Asia, 40 percent to Western Europe, 12 percent to Africa, and 1 percent to Eastern Europe.

The primary exports include maize (51 percent), wheat (27 percent), sunflower flour (6 percent), sunflower oil (5 percent), barley (4 percent), rapeseed (3 percent), and others (4 percent). 

But to Moscow’s consternation – and contrary to its expectations – UN figures indicate that 90 percent of maize and 60 percent of wheat exported through the initiative found their way to high- and upper-middle-income countries, while only 10 percent of maize and 40 percent of wheat went to low- and middle-income countries.

These figures very clearly underscore the deal’s importance to Europeans. While initially aimed at meeting the food needs of poorer nations, it has instead overwhelmingly served the interests of western countries. Low-income states benefited from only 9 percent of total wheat exports and zero maize exports through this agreement.

This explains the west’s keen efforts to re-engage with the agreement after Russia’s July withdrawal from the deal, in which Moscow made clear that the west’s failure to fulfill its Russian grain export commitments scuttled the agreement’s renewal.

More grain for the Global South 

This situation is not unfamiliar to Europeans. The stark contrast between western rhetoric and actions has become increasingly evident, contributing significantly to the competition between the Global South and major powers.

While the EU vocally advocated for a grain agreement to “avert a worsening food crisis” in impoverished countries – but hoarded the grain for its own use – Russia exported 11.5 million tons of cereals to Africa in 2022 and nearly 10 million tons in the first half of 2023.

During the recent Russia-Africa summit, Russian President Vladimir Putin announced that Burkina Faso, Zimbabwe, Mali, Somalia, the Central African Republic, and Eritrea would each receive between 25,000 and 50,000 tons of grain, with Moscow also covering the shipping costs. 

Impact of Russia’s grain diplomacy 

Russian grain diplomacy has become a valuable card for Moscow to influence opinion in the African continent, which it has been able to further capitalize on after the shocking self-interest Europeans displayed during the last grain deal.

Russia’s conditions for rejoining the grain agreement have sparked a complex diplomatic situation with significant implications. Moscow’s demands include the reconnection of its state agricultural bank to the international bank messaging system SWIFT, a more equitable distribution of grain to poorer countries, especially in Africa, and the rollback of sanctions affecting export processes and logistics.

The UN proposed a compromise that would connect a ‘subsidiary’ of Russia’s State Agricultural Bank to SWIFT, but Moscow insisted that the connection must be a direct one. 

For Russia, the grain deal represents leverage over Europe, given the potential impact of rising food prices on European countries already grappling with a self-inflicted energy crisis. With Moscow’s withdrawal from the agreement, global grain prices surged, affecting wheat, rice, vegetable oil, and sunflower oil.

As a mediator in this ongoing conflict, Turkiye also has a vested interest in the deal’s restoration. Success in persuading Russia to return to the agreement would bolster Ankara’s diplomatic standing, particularly in its relations with the west.

Moreover, ‘food politics’ are not restricted to the Russia-west conflict: Poland, Hungary, Romania, Bulgaria, and Slovakia have imposed bans on the transportation of Ukrainian cereal products through their territories to protect their own farmers from cheap Ukrainian imports. While the bans are set to expire this month, these countries intend to extend them, further underscoring the need to resume the grain agreement.

Europe’s options appear limited, as the deal not only contributes to food security but also significantly impacts the west’s image in the Global South. Russia is keenly aware of this and actively works to publicize the destinations of Ukrainian grain while positioning itself as a guarantor of food security in numerous African countries, including Egypt.

Russian grain diplomacy has thus become a strategic tool for Moscow to project itself as a benefactor to Global South countries and to promote multipolarity that seeks less dependence on the west. With revenues and resources both in Russian hands, this is not a scenario in which Europe and the US can emerge unscathed.

The views expressed in this article do not necessarily reflect those of The Cradle.

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Testing the waters: Could Turkey’s Russian relations sink over Ukraine?

Neither friend nor foe, Turkey and Russia have backed opposing sides in several regional conflicts, yet managed to avoid direct confrontation. Now the Ukraine crisis poses a serious challenge.

March 22 2022

Caught between NATO and Russia over Ukraine, Turkey is forced to walk a thin line to avoid confrontation with either side.Photo Credit: The Cradle

By Yeghia Tashjian

The war in Ukraine has become the latest test for Turkey’s regional ambitions in confronting those of Russia, in what has clearly become a “cooperative rivalry.” This is where both sides, despite their opposite views on various regional conflicts ranging from Libya to Syria to the South Caucasus, have worked to manage these conflicts without directly challenging one another.

The current crisis has raised Turkey’s concerns of being in the firing line of Russia’s hegemonic ambitions. It is important to note that Turkey and Russia are not allies, but bitter ‘frenemies.’ Despite having robust commercial, energy, diplomatic and military ties, Turkey’s President Recep Tayyip Erdogan warned back in 2016 that NATO has to act and increase its presence in the Black Sea.

Over the past two decades, Russia has consolidated its presence in the Black Sea region by directly controlling Georgia’s Abkhazia and South Ossetia in 2008, and annexing Ukraine’s Crimea in 2014. The Black Sea Fleet is responsible for bringing supplies to Russian forces in Syria, mostly based in the port of Tartus and Khmeimim airbase, as well as for patrolling the eastern Mediterranean. Russia’s 2015 Maritime Doctrine clearly prioritizes the Black Sea as a pillar of its power projection.

Turkey’s waning power in the Black Sea

Russia’s 2014 annexation of Crimea tipped the balance of military power in the Black Sea in favor of Moscow. Not only has Russia significantly increased its Exclusive Economic Zone and its Black Sea coastline, it has also cancelled existing agreements with Ukraine, which limited the latter’s Black Sea fleet in Sevastopol.

Additionally, Russia has stationed new military ships and submarines and installed a dense network of advanced weapons systems across the Crimean peninsula. From Ankara’s perspective, Turkey feels surrounded by Russian military presence from the north (Crimea), east (Armenia), and south (Syria).

In response, Erdogan initiated the construction of the Istanbul Canal to put additional pressure on Russia using the 1936 Montreux Convention whereby Turkey can close the Black Sea Straits to all warships in times of war.

Indeed, following NATO’s intensified pressure, Ankara has started exercising its right under Article 19 of the Convention, and has warned all coastal and non-coastal states that it will not allow warships through the Bosporus and the Dardanelles. The convention also limits the period of stay for warships belonging to non-Black Sea states in the Black Sea.

However, this action also exposed Turkey’s limitations by raising the questions: How will Turkey react if Russian naval warships seek passage through the Straits? Will Turkey prevent them? The answer is clear.

As a Black Sea state, Russia has the privileged right to transit the Turkish Straits to return its warships to their bases. The treaty states that during armed conflict, belligerent warships “shall not” pass through the Straits unless the ships belong to a state that borders the Black Sea and are returning to their home ports.

Once Turkey determined that Russia was “at war,” it had no choice under the treaty but to stop Russian warships from passing through the Straits. The only exception for passage is for Russian warships from other areas returning to their bases in the Black Sea.

For example, a Russian fleet registered in the Black Sea but currently located in the Mediterranean Sea is allowed to pass through the Turkish Straits and return to its base. The condition also applies to Russian fleets currently in the Black Sea that belong to a base in the Mediterranean or Baltic Sea. Russia is free to take them out of the Black Sea. This option provides Russia with enough space to maneuver its naval power and downplay Article 19 of the Montreux Convention.

Turkey is aware that blocking access of Russian warships through its Straits will be viewed in Moscow as a “declaration of war.” This is the last thing Erdogan wants, knowing full well that the economic and political consequences will be harsher than those Turkey tasted after it downed the Russian jet over Syria in 2015.

Turkey’s balancing act between Russia and Ukraine

While Turkey will not directly provoke Russia, it has increased its military cooperation with Ukraine. This includes the supply of Bayraktar TB2 drones to the Kiev government. The Russians, for their part, have shown their preparedness for Turkish drones. Despite the fact that the Bayraktar TB2 drones are still operating and useful to the Ukrainian side, the Russian Ministry of Defense almost daily announces that its forces are downing many drones, including TB2.

This military relationship has also involved Ukraine supplying Turkey with military engines intended to boost Turkey’s growing arms industry; in particular, the Bayraktar’s successor drone and T292 heavy attack helicopters that are currently under production.

For Russia, this poses a threat, as in the future it may shift the military balance of power towards Turkey and Ukraine in the Black Sea. It is for this reason that Russian forces destroyed most of the Ukrainian heavy military infrastructure (including its naval and air force) and arms industry.

As such, Erdogan will aim to continue cooperation with Russia in the region; but he is equally likely to step up engagement with NATO to improve his global standing and reduce international criticism of his domestic conduct. Erdogan knows that standing against Russia and directly confronting Moscow is very risky as – excluding the ongoing war in Ukraine – he would start a war on three fronts in the region: in Libya, Syria, and Nagorno-Karabakh.

In order to extract itself from the ongoing difficulty of placating both sides, in recent days Turkey has engaged in proactive diplomacy and mediation between Kiev and Moscow. Ankara announced that the two adversaries have made progress on their negotiations to halt the war and are “close to an agreement.” However, Ukraine’s president responded by saying that any consequential agreement with Russia would be put to a referendum. This signaled that there is no agreement in sight and Ankara’s mediating efforts are fruitless.

Turkey will not gamble with Ukraine against Russia

Dr Maxim Suchkov, a Moscow-based expert in the Russian International Affairs Council (RIAC) expresses concern that Turkey may view the crisis as an opportunity to re-establish itself in the Black Sea and strengthen its relations with the west. Ankara enjoys good ties with both Moscow and Kiev and seeks to balance itself, supplying arms to Ukraine, on the one hand, but also refraining from sanctioning Russia.

Suchkov argues that Turkey may indeed be useful to the Russian endgame here, but “Moscow should also be careful since President Erdogan is known for his penchant to fish in muddy waters.” Hence, even if the outcome of the conflict does not favor Erdogan’s interests, Turkey may try to wrest something out of this crisis.

For this reason, President Erdogan cannot antagonize Russia and risk full-scale war as, domestically, the implications of this battle will be heavy on the Turkish government. Already, on 22 February, six Turkish opposition parties, not including the Kurdish HDP, called on a unified platform for the revival of the parliamentary system in the country with the aim of establishing an alliance to topple Erdogan in the coming parliamentary and presidential elections in June 2023.

According to recent public surveys, the opposition coalition is polling ahead, and indeed may oust Erdogan, given the financial chaos Turkey is experiencing. The current crisis will worsen the economic and political situation of Turkey.

One sector that is especially vulnerable is tourism, as between four to seven million Russian tourists and around two million Ukrainian tourists visit Turkey each year. Moreover, western sanctions on Russia will make money transactions difficult between both countries.

Crucially, Turkey imports almost 50 percent of its gas from Russia, and with the increase in global gas prices, Turks find themselves in a difficult quandary. For these reasons, Ankara is unlikely to undertake any risky gambles and will continue to strike a balanced posture in the crisis.

Turkey still has an important role to play

Turkey has general elections scheduled for June 2023, hence any change in the leadership in Turkey would affect the current track of Russian-Turkish relations. In a post-Erdogan Turkey, Ankara is likely to move closer to the western camp due to the pro-western (pro-US) leanings of the Turkish military, entrepreneurs, technocrats, diplomats, and civil servants – regardless of their liberal or nationalistic personal views.

This could form a long-term challenge for Russia-Turkey relations, given the successful “cooperative rivalry” both sides managed to arrange in Libya, Syria, and Nagorno-Karabakh. It is worth mentioning that on 2 March, Meral Akşener, leader of the Turkish opposition İYİ Party, raised the alarm on whether there were any guarantees that Turkey’s eastern provinces would be safe from a similar kind of Russian aggression. She also called Russia a “security threat” for Turkey. This is another indication that the Turkish opposition is not on the same wavelength as Erdogan’s multi-vector foreign policy.

Moscow has never viewed Ankara as an equal partner, but as a junior partner that could help configure a regional order which benefits Russian interests and decreases western influence. However, if Russia becomes stuck in a Ukrainian quagmire, it may need Ankara to arrange a temporary settlement.

Will the Syrian and Nagorno-Karabakh scenario be repeated – in which both sides sidelined western influence and Russia accepted a Turkish role in the region? If Ukraine is divided into two zones, would Russia accept a Turkish ‘peacekeeping force’ in the western part of Ukraine? Would the Americans give Turkey the green light to enter such a game? What would Ankara gain in return? Is such a military adventure within Turkey’s capabilities?

According to Dr Mitat Çelikpala, Professor of International Relations and the Dean of Faculty of Economics, Administrative and Social Sciences at Kadir Has University, such a scenario is beyond Turkey’s financial and military capacities – and Turkey cannot act unilaterally. Hence, for now, Turkey must continue its role of mediation between both sides to avoid any spillover effect near its borders.

The views expressed in this article do not necessarily reflect those of The Cradle.

تركيا تغلق المضائق: مجازفة معلَنة بالمصالح الروسية

الثلاثاء 1 آذار 2022

تتخوف تركيا كثيراً من تداعيات الحرب الأوكرانية على الاقتصاد التركي (أ ف ب )

محمد نور الدين 

لم يستغرق الأمر طويلاً حتى اعترفت تركيا بأن مصطلح «حالة الحرب» ينطبق على الوضع في روسيا وأوكرانيا. فبعدما قال وزير الخارجية التركي، مولود تشاووش أوغلو، إنّ بلاده كلّفت لجنة من خبراء القانون والدبلوماسية لبتّ مدى مطابقة «حالة الحرب» لما يجري على الجبهة الروسية ــــ الأوكرانية، أَعلن أمس أن هذين البلدين هما فعلاً في حالة حرب. ويكتسب هذا الاعتراف أهميته لجهة استعداد تركيا لتطبيق أحكام «اتفاقية مونترو»، التي بناءً عليها، أعلن تشاووش أوغلو، حظر مرور السفن العسكرية من مضيقي الدردنيل والبوسفور. وقال: «أبلغنا الدول المطلّة وغير المطلّة على البحر الأسود بألّا ترسل سفنها الحربية للمرور عبر مضائقنا».

هذه الاتفاقية، التي وُقّعت في 20 تموز 1936، تنظّم حركة الملاحة من البحر الأسود وإليه عبر مضيقَي البوسفور والدردنيل. وتقول المادة العشرون منها إنه في حالة وجود تركيا في حالة حرب مع أيّ دولة أخرى، يمكنها أن تغلق المضائق وفقاً لما تريد. لكن أنقرة ليست الآن في حالة حرب مع أيّ دولة. ولذا، اتّجهت الأنظار إلى المادة 19 التي تنصّ على أنه في حالة دخول أيّ دولة من دول البحر الأسود حرباً مع دولة أخرى، فبإمكان تركيا إغلاق المضائق أمام حركة السفن الحربية التابعة للدول المتحاربة في الاتجاهَين. إلا أنه يمكن للسفن الموجودة في البحر المتوسط، والمسجَّلة مثلاً في قاعدة في البحر الأسود، أن تطلب من أنقرة السماح لها بعبور المضائق للعودة إلى قاعدتها الأم، والعكس بالعكس.

سبقت أنقرة أيّ خطوة في هذا الاتجاه بالقول إنّ إغلاق المضائق لا يعني خطوة عدائية تجاه روسيا، بل هو تطبيق حرفي لـ»مونترو». كما أن تركيا تواجه تحديات أخرى تتعلّق بالاتفاقية ذاتها، حيث تَبرز مطالبات أو تلميحات من قِبل دول لا تنتمي إلى البحر الأسود، مثل الولايات المتحدة، بوجوب تعديل الاتفاقية، بحيث يُسمح لسفن هذه الدول بالعبور بحرية إلى البحر الأسود، وبالعدد والحجم الذي تريد، علماً بأن «مونترو» تمنع دخول أكثر من سفينتَين تابعتَين لدولة واحدة يزيد وزنهما على 45 ألف طن، وتفرض ألّا تزيد مدة بقائهما في البحر على 22 يوماً. وقد واجهت الولايات المتحدة صعوبات بسبب ذلك، أثناء المناورات التي قادتها في البحر الأسود لدول «حلف شمال الأطلسي» ومنها تركيا، ولمّحت ضمناً إلى الرغبة في تعديل الاتفاقية، الأمر الذي واجه معارضة شديدة داخل تركيا، لأن أيّ تعديل مهما كان صغيراً، يفتح باباً لن ينغلق على مطالبات بتعديلات واسعة من قِبل دول كثيرة.

الآن، تجد الحكومة التركية نفسها أمام تحدٍّ أساسي، يتمحور حول ما إذا كانت روسيا ستعتبر إغلاق المضائق خطوة عدائية ضدها. ويأتي هذا التحدّي بعدما تخطّت أنقرة تحدٍّ آخر، يتمثّل في واقع أنه لو لم تُقْدم على خطوة كهذه، كان ذلك سيعني أنها تنتهك أحكام الاتفاقية بنفسها، الأمر الذي سيفتح باب المطالبة بتعديلها، علماً بأن الأتراك يرون أن «مونترو» ركيزة أساسية لأمنهم القومي، ومكمّلة لـ»معاهدة لوزان» عام 1923، والتي رسمت أسس الكيان التركي. وتشكّك المعارضة التركية في نيات الحكومة، وتتهم الرئيس رجب طيب إردوغان بالسعي إلى هدم كلّ الإنجازات التي حقّقها أتاتورك، وعلى رأسها «لوزان» و»مونترو». وتدرك الحكومة التركية عواقب مثل هذه الخطوة، التي ستؤدّي إلى توتير علاقاتها مع روسيا، فيما تعتقد المعارضة أن ضرب تلك العلاقات يصبّ في مصلحتها، باعتبارها ركيزة من ركائز استمرار سلطة إردوغان. ولعلّ من تجلّيات ذلك، تقديم نائب إسطنبول عن «حزب الشعب الجمهوري المعارض»، محمود تانال، دعوى لدى المدعي العام للجمهورية في أنقرة، يتّهم فيها الرئيس الروسي فلاديمير بوتين، ووزراء الدفاع والخارجية ورئيس الأركان في روسيا، بـ»ارتكاب جرائم ضدّ الإنسانية وانتهاك القانون الدولي» في أوكرانيا.

تركيا مهدَّدة بفقدان العديد من الامتيازات والمكاسب الناتجة من علاقاتها المتشابكة


كما كان لافتاً مانشيت صحيفة «قرار» المعارِضة والمؤيّدة لأحمد داود أوغلو وعلي باباجان، وفيه: «عُد إلى بلادك يا فلاديمير»، فيما انطلقت حملة عامة ضدّ روسيا في وسائل الإعلام المؤيّدة للحكومة وتلك التابعة للمعارضة. لكن محمد علي غولر في صحيفة «جمهورييات»، يدعو الرأي العام إلى التذكّر بأن الأزمة الأوكرانية هي مجرّد نتيجة لسبب، هو رغبة «حلف شمال الأطلسي» في التوسّع شرقاً لخنق روسيا، بعدما أرادت الولايات المتحدة أن تنقل ثقلها إلى الشرق لخنق الصين. ويرى غولر أن روسيا «تعمل لمنع حرب عالمية من خلال غزو أوكرانيا»، بينما الولايات المتحدة تمثّل «ماكينة الحرب التي يجب القول لها توقّفي». ويقول غولر: «إن كلّ سنّ ينكسر من أسنان حلف شمال الأطلسي هو ضمانة لمستقبل وسلام الإنسانية جمعاء».

على أيّ حال، تعتقد تركيا أن إغلاق المضائق ربّما يمثّل فرصة لتوجيه رسالة «حسن نيّة» إلى القوى الغربية. كذلك، وعلى رغم المخاطر التي تكتنفها الحرب الأوكرانية على المصالح التركية، إلّا أن البعض يرى فيها «فرصة» لإعادة الاعتبار إلى أنقرة في أكثر من مجال. وعلى رأس هذه الفرص، يأتي رفض أوروبا تشغيل خطّ «نورد ستريم 2» الروسي، والذي قد يكون مناسبة لتركيا لتذكير أوروبا بأنها الممرّ الإجباري والأكثر جدوى لنقل غاز شرق المتوسط من إسرائيل ومصر إلى ميناء جيهان التركي، ومنه عبر الأنابيب المارّة في الأناضول، وصولاً إلى أدرنة فاليونان وأوروبا، ولا سيما بعدما سقط مشروع خطّ غاز شرق المتوسط من إسرائيل إلى قبرص الجنوبية، فاليونان وإيطاليا إلى أوروبا، والذي تبلغ كلفته حوالي 9 مليارات دولار، وإعلان الولايات المتحدة أخيراً أنها لن تساهم في هذا المشروع.

مع ذلك، تتخوف تركيا كثيراً من تداعيات الحرب الأوكرانية على الاقتصاد التركي. فعلى سبيل المثال، يبلغ حجم التجارة بين تركيا وروسيا حوالي 35 مليار دولار، منها 28 ملياراً واردات الأولى، والتي يذهب معظمها إلى شراء الطاقة، حيث تستورد أنقرة من موسكو 34 في المئة تقريباً من حاجتها إلى الغاز الطبيعي، وحوالي العشرة في المئة من حاجتها إلى النفط. أيضاً، تستورد تركيا من روسيا حوالي 65 في المئة من حاجتها إلى القمح، فيما يأتي السيّاح الروس إلى تركيا في المرتبة الأولى، وعددهم حوالي 5 ملايين سائح بمعدّل خمسة مليارات دولار. يُضاف إلى ما تَقدّم أن ثمّة استثمارات تركية في روسيا بقيمة 21 مليار دولار عبر 150 مشروعاً. كما أن الروس هم الذين يبنون المفاعل النووي في مرسين، ويزوّدون تركيا بصواريخ «أس 400» (كعب أخيل التوتر التركي ــــ الأميركي)، في حين يعدّ خطّ نفط «الدفق التركي» من روسيا عبر البحر الأسود إلى شرق إسطنبول شبه منتهٍ. وتتعاون تركيا وروسيا في عدد كبير من القضايا الإقليمية، مثل القوقاز وسوريا وليبيا وغيرها.

في المقابل، لتركيا علاقات متطوّرة اقتصادياً وعسكرياً مع أوكرانيا، حيث يبلغ حجم التجارة بينهما حوالي 7 مليارات دولار، والسيّاح ثلاثة ملايين أوكراني، والاستثمارات التركية في أوكرانيا 5 مليارات دولار. وتستورد أنقرة، أيضاً، 15 في المئة من حاجتها إلى القمح من كييف، فيما تُعتبر الأخيرة سوقاً مهمّة لطائرات «بيرقدار» التركية المسيّرة، والتي شكّلت أحد أهم أسباب انزعاج روسيا من تركيا، ورفضها التجاوب مع محاولة إردوغان التوسّط في الأزمة. بالنتيجة، تركيا مهدَّدة بفقدان العديد من الامتيازات والمكاسب الناتجة من هذه العلاقات المتشابكة، في حال تصاعد وتيرة الحرب أو خسارة أحد البلدين إذا ما انحازت إلى أحدهما.

على صعيد آخر، يرى محلّلون أن انفجار الحرب الأوكرانية يؤكد للأوروبيين أن مركز التهديد العالمي لا يزال على الأرض الأوروبية وليس قرب الصين، وهذا ما يعيد الاعتبار إلى الجغرافيا الأوروبية، والأهمية إلى دول أخرى مثل تركيا في الصراع ضد روسيا. كما أن الأزمة الأوكرانية سوف تشدّ من جديد العصب الأطلسي بشقَّيه الأميركي والأوروبي، بما فيه أنقرة، وقد تدفع بايدن نفسه إلى التخلّي عن محاولات التخلّص من إردوغان.

من ملف : روسيا: فلْتكن حرباً اقتصادية

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