Expelling US troops: Iraq’s resistance efforts gain steam in Baghdad

MAR 1, 2024

As the Iraqi Resistance continues to pressure the US to halt support for Israel’s war on Gaza, Baghdad – and Moscow – align closer with their agenda to expel US troops from Iraq.

Photo Credit: The Cradle

The Cradle’s Iraq Correspondent

Surveillance devices on a local Baghdad thoroughfare captured on camera the assassination of an Iraqi Hezbollah Brigades leader, Abu Baqir al-Saadi, in a 7 February US missile attack. The images show a missile piercing the roof of his vehicle, then deviating to the right of Al-Baladiyat street, leaving a wake of flames in its incendiary path. 

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لاستهداف الشهيد #ابو_باقر_الساعدي

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— سيــــدة الحـرف 15K (@sayedat_alhrf1) February 22, 2024

Against the backdrop of the widening, US-backed and armed Israeli war on Gaza, the US airstrikes against Iraq and Syria were meant to deliver a strong message of deterrence to Iran’s allies in the Axis of Resistance, who are targeting US military interests in West Asia in response to the carnage in Gaza. 

But the strikes have instead served mainly to embarrass the Iraqi government and its domestic allies, prompting a reevaluation of the country’s relationship with Washington and reviving calls for an end to the US military presence in Iraq. 

Despite a steady stream of US threats and intimidation tactics employed to deter the Iraqi resistance since late last year, these factions have incrementally increased and expanded their engagement in the region-wide war, driven by their commitment to the Palestinian resistance and its liberation goals. The Iraqi groups have a specific goal: pressure Washington until it forces a Gaza truce – a strategic target that reflects the unity of purpose among the resistance factions in Iraq and the region.

Speaking to The Cradle, a senior leader of the Islamic Resistance in Iraq (IRI) sheds light on the significance of the Hamas-led Al-Aqsa flood operation launched on 7 October 2023. That event, he says, is viewed as a game-changer by Palestinian resistance factions, and has sent shockwaves through the corridors of power in Tel Aviv, Washington, and allied capitals. 

The operation is seen as a historical process challenging the status quo of the past seven decades and redefining the social, security, and military dynamics in the region, the source explains. 

‘Unity of Fronts’: putting theory into practice 

Barely two weeks after Al-Aqsa Flood and its aftermath, The Cradle’s Iraq correspondent posited “Will Yemen and Iraq join Palestine’s Al-Aqsa Flood?” At the time, it was noted that any potential involvement of Resistance Axis members other than Lebanon’s Hezbollah in the war “would likely materialize in the form of drone and missile attacks targeting specific objectives, as per the Resistance Axis’ strategic convergence in the Unity of Fronts.”

The “Red Sea crisis” that unfolded on the Ansarallah-led Yemeni front, in addition to scores of Iraqi resistance attacks against US bases in Iraq and Syria since October seem to confirm this hypothesis. 

In Iraq’s case, the greatest military burden was assumed by four of the resistance factions identified by Kataib Hezbollah Secretary General Abu Hussein al-Hamidawi: his own group Kataib Hezbollah, Harakat al-Nujaba, Kataib Sayyid al-Shuhada, and Ansarallah al-Aufiaa. As one IRI official tells The Cradle:

“The fronts are opened at the discretion of the leaders (of these groups) themselves, based on religious, ideological, and moral commitments stemming from the nature of the Iraqi character in the first place.” 

Over the past few months, the IRI has demonstrated its versatility by employing a variety of tactics and weaponry in around 188 separate military operations against US targets. These range from missile strikes on US bases in Iraq to drone attacks against US occupation forces in Syria, and even include the targeting of distant Israeli territories such as Ashdod, Haifa, and the occupied Golan Heights. 

An official source in the IRI confirms to The Cradle that “We bombed with ballistic missiles American bases, even those in Iraq, and this was not limited to distant targets in the depth, or in the occupied territory.” 

However, as tensions escalated, strains in the relationship between Baghdad and Washington became palpable. The Iraqi government found itself caught between the embarrassment of complicity and the challenge of maintaining control over security affairs. Even some of the resistance factions themselves felt the squeeze of external pressures, notably Kataib Hezbollah, who on 31 January announced a temporary suspension of operations against US forces and Israeli targets. 

The halt came in the immediate aftermath of the killing of three US soldiers in Tower 22 along the Jordanian-Syrian border, in an Iraqi resistance operation unprecedented in its depth which was viewed as a direct challenge to Washington’s perceived invincibility. As expected, the operation caused a spike in tensions, causing some ferocious shuttle diplomacy in the following days and provoking a strong, disproportionate US military response. 

Economic and strategic considerations

For factions like Kataib Hezbollah and Al-Nujaba, the decision to suspend operations was a calculated move to gauge Washington’s response. Yet, the US military’s targeted assassination of Kataib Hezbollah commander Abu Baqir al-Saadi caught them off guard, eliciting a sharp condemnation of the US attack from Baghdad. Saadi’s faction, it should be noted, is part of the Popular Mobilization Units that defeated ISIS, and is therefore under the umbrella of the Iraqi armed forces. 

This time, the Iraqi government had no choice but to side with the resistance, while the IRI issued a stern warning to the US in which it signaled a return to operations.

US Vice President Kamala Harris then extended an invitation to Iraqi Prime Minister Mohammed Shia al-Sudani to visit Washington. A postponed September 2023 White House visit to meet US President Joe Biden makes Sudani, notably, the only Iraqi prime minister yet to visit the US in an official capacity.

Following the Iraqi prime minister’s return from Munich earlier in February, US Ambassador to Iraq Elena Romansky met with him to coordinate the agenda for his upcoming visit to the US and ensure alignment on the topics to be discussed.

Romansky stated that “the leaders also discussed the importance of continuing the US-Iraq Higher Military Commission, which will enable the transition to an enduring bilateral security partnership between the United States and Iraq and is the natural next step to build on the very successful collaboration of the past 10 years between Iraq and the Defeat ISIS coalition.”

What cannot be ignored, however, is that these diplomatic initiatives followed a series of coercive measures by the US Treasury to diminish the value of the Iraqi dinar against the US dollar. While Iraq – both officially and among its various political factions – insists that leveraging the volume of Iraqi oil exports as a bargaining chip in the global market is an ineffective negotiating tool, there are those who anticipate seizing the opportunity of market scarcity to increase their share by two million barrels.

Sudani mission is a difficult one. He must hammer out a solution that fulfills his government’s commitment to remove foreign military forces forces from Iraqi soil without triggering negative US repercussions.

Baghdad backs the resistance  

According to leaks, the Iraqi prime minister reportedly reached an agreement with the IRI to suspend its military operations against US bases in order to facilitate his negotiations for the complete withdrawal of international coalition forces from Iraq.

Yet, any decision in this regard risks eliciting a negative response from Washington, which brandishes an ever-present arsenal of pressure tactics. This is particularly concerning given that Iraqi oil revenues are still required to pass through the US Federal Bank before being released to Baghdad.

Members of the Iraqi Council of Representatives are actively working to proceed with a law to remove foreign forces from Iraq, with majority representation from Shia-dominated central and southern Iraq. However, Sunni factions remain ambiguous in their stance toward the coordination framework blocs’ efforts to enact such legislation. In addition, Kurdish parties, notably the Kurdistan Democratic Party, vehemently oppose any consideration of US military withdrawal from Iraq.

In response to these dynamics, the Russian Foreign Ministry has expressed Moscow’s willingness to bolster Iraqi forces following the departure of unwanted foreign troops. The Russian offer has compounded the pressure on Washington, prompting a reassessment of the waning US strategic position in West Asia. 

Researchers close to Iraq’s Coordination Framework coalition, a collective of Iraqi political parties that played the key role in the formation of Sudani’s government, suggest that this development – coupled with the military pressure exerted by the resistance – has strengthened the official Iraqi stance and compelled the US to engage with and heed the demands of the Iraqi cabinet.

As the resistance factions step up their military operations in response to the US-backed Israeli assault of Gaza, it becomes clear that there is a growing synergy between the Iraqi government and the Iranian-supported elements of the armed forces. 

This alignment forms part of a broader regional resistance faction, with a strategic focus on not only the liberation of Palestine, but also the safeguarding of Iraq’s sovereignty in its entirety. 

The views expressed in this article do not necessarily reflect those of The Cradle.

The enemy within: Arab states that trade with Israel

JAN 31, 2024

West Asian exports to Israel have skyrocketed since 2020. These are the Arab and Muslim governments that put goods on Israeli shelves, despite their public stances supporting Gaza.

Photo Credit: The Cradle

Mohamad Hasan Sweidan

Israeli import data reveals that a number of Arab countries play a significant role in buoying the occupation state’s trade volume, despite attempts by other regional nations to weaken Israel’s economy. 

Since this decade’s onset, Israeli ports have been teeming with the arrival of goods from across the region. Each shipment not only boosts the occupation state’s economy, but also weaves a narrative that goes beyond trade statistics as these economic interactions carry a hidden stream of political significance.

Although not an Arab country, Turkiye was the first Muslim state to establish diplomatic relations with Tel Aviv, and today leads the pack of West Asian states boosting Israeli imports. In 2020 alone, the value of Turkish exports spiked to $5.7 billion, constituting 6.2 percent of total Israeli imports that year. 

Iron and steel ($1.06 billion), plastics ($464.67 million), electrical and electronic equipment ($346.83  million), vehicles ($331.48  million), machinery ($298.89 million), metals ($261.66 million),  and building materials ($188.39 million) form the cornerstone of Turkish exports to the Zionist entity. 

In second place is the UAE, which normalized ties with Tel Aviv as part of the US-brokered Abraham Accords in 2020, and was the first Arab state to sign a free-trade agreement (2022) with Israel as part of a plan to boost mutual trade to $10 billion annually. The Persian Gulf state’s exports were valued at $1.89 billion in 2022, accounting for 2.1 percent of all Israeli imports. 

Particularly intriguing is the 1543 percent surge in the value of Emirati exports to Israel since the normalization agreement. Noteworthy export categories include precious metals and stones ($525.32 million), iron and steel ($483.95 million), electrical and electronic equipment ($210.71 million), and oil ($94.55 million).

Business as usual 

Taking third place is Jordan, whose exports to Israel in 2022 reached $469.25 million, a massive 489 percent increase from 2018. Key export categories from the Hashemite Kingdom include plastics ($135.2 million), electrical and electronic equipment ($127.93 million), and iron and steel ($74.35 million).

As for Egypt, the first Arab state to make peace with and recognize Israel, its 2022 exports to the occupation state amounted to $179.31 million. Notable export categories include inorganic chemicals, precious metals compounds ($61.15 million), building materials ($14.26 million), foodstuffs ($12.78 million), and plastics ($11.32 million).

Surprisingly, in fifth place is Algeria, with Israel-bound exports reaching $21.38 million in 2022, the majority of which are inorganic chemicals, precious metals compounds, and isotopes. The revelation of trade relations between Algeria and Israel by the UN database raises questions about Algeria’s long-held stance against normalization, including its criminalization two years ago.

Morocco stands in sixth place, with exports to Israel amounting to $17.92 million in 2022, predominantly composed of foodstuffs. Rabat resumed diplomatic and trade relations with Israel as part of the 2020 accords. 

Finally, Bahrain’s exports to Israel in 2022 reached $10.58 million, reflecting an astounding 12,083 percent increase from 2020, the year of the normalization agreement between Manama and Tel Aviv. Key exports include aluminum ($8.78 million) and iron and steel ($2.62 million).

As such, the combined exports of West Asian countries to Israel surged by $4,359.530,000 between 2020 and 2022, marking an increase of almost 111 percent.

Israeli Energy Imports

Israel depends heavily on oil and natural gas for its power generation, with these sources constituting 80 percent of its total energy supply. It is a net exporter of natural gas, having sent 9.4 billion cubic meters abroad in 2022, with 6.5 billion cubic meters going to Egypt and 2.9 billion cubic meters to Jordan.

In contrast, Israel imports all its oil supply, and consumes approximately 220 thousand barrels per day. Of this, 62 percent comes from two Muslim-majority countries, namely Kazakhstan (93 thousand barrels) and Azerbaijan (45 thousand barrels). The remainder is sourced from West African countries, including Gabon, Nigeria, and Angola, in addition to Brazil, and an undisclosed amount is transported illegally from Iraqi Kurdistan.

To facilitate the import of most of Israel’s oil, the Turkish port of Ceyhan in southeastern Turkiye plays a crucial role. It serves as a loading point for oil tankers carrying crude from Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan through the Caspian Sea via the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline. Tankers also transport oil from Iraqi Kurdistan along the eastern Mediterranean Sea to the ports of Haifa and Ashkelon.

Oil tankers arrive in the occupied state via two main seaports: the aforementioned Ashkelon, equipped with 22 tanks holding 11 million barrels, and Eilat in the south, with 16 large oil tanks capable of holding about 1.4 million cubic meters of oil. The latter has seen an 85 percent fall in activity amid increased naval operations executed by Yemen’s Ansarallah-aligned forces in the Red Sea against vessels bound for Israel.

Approximately 180,000 barrels per day reach Ashkelon, from where internal pipelines transport the oil to the ports of Ashdod and Haifa. Both ports have oil refineries with capacities of 100,000 and 197,000 barrels per day, respectively. Additionally, a pipeline connects Ashkelon and Eilat, traversing the Negev desert with a capacity of 1.2 million barrels per day.

Despite the growing tensions and sharp rhetoric by some regional states toward Israel since its military assault on the Gaza Strip commenced, trade activity remains largely uninterrupted. Turkiye, despite calling Israel a “terrorist” state, contributes heavily to Israel’s economic well-being by helping Tel Aviv circumvent the Yemeni blockade, increasing its overall exports to Israel, and playing a pivotal role in oil transportation. 

Despite the war on Gaza, Turkish exports grew from 319.5 million dollars in November 2023 to 430.6 million dollars in December — higher even than the 408.3 million dollars exported in July, prior to the 7 October Al-Aqsa Flood operation.

Exports to Israel from the UAE, Jordan, Egypt, and Morocco are hardly surprising: these are the Arab states most vested in championing regional policies that serve the interests of the occupation state. The more surprising connection, however, is the trade relations — however minimal — between Algeria and Israel. 

To understand the true positions of states means to skip over the official rhetoric and examine the economic ties that politics often conceals.

The views expressed in this article do not necessarily reflect those of The Cradle.

Iraqi Kurdistan pays a deadly price for hosting the Mossad

JAN 26, 2024

Source

Israel’s notorious intelligence agency has spent decades infiltrating and sabotaging Arab states. But it has hit a wall in Iraq, a country that hosts the Axis of Resistance and is prepared to fight back hard.

Photo Credit: The Cradle

Just before midnight on 15 January, Erbil, the capital of Iraqi Kurdistan, was rocked by a targeted missile attack by Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC). Eleven Fateh 110 ballistic missiles homed in on the private residence of the affluent and connected Kurdish tycoon Peshraw Dizayee, aged 61, who was killed along with members of his family and a fellow business associate.

The IRGC said in a statement that it hit “one of the main headquarters of the Israeli Mossad in the Kurdistan region of Iraq,” noting that this action was in response to the occupation state’s assassination of leaders within the IRGC and its Axis of Resistance.

“We assure our nation that the Guards’ offensive operations will continue until avenging the last drops of martyrs’ blood,” the IRGC said.

This military strike has roots in the recent assassinations of several IRGC members in Syria, including a high-ranking commander, to which Tehran promised to retaliate. The IRGC also struck ISIS positions in Syria’s restive Idlib province. 

Covert oil connections 

Dizayee, a man of influence with deep connections to Iraqi-Kurdistan’s ruling Barzani clan and the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP), had an estimated wealth of $2.5 billion from founding the Falcon Group, which engaged in diverse sectors including security, oil, gas, construction, and agriculture. 

His pivotal role in facilitating oil exports from Kurdistan to Israel drew attention to his intricate, but illegal ties with Tel Aviv, in addition to the Kurdish security and intelligence apparatus.

Despite Iraqi laws explicitly forbidding any dealings with Israel, reports and experts suggest that a significant portion of Israel’s oil imports — approximately 70 percent, by some accounts — originates from Iraq’s Kurdistan region, at prices 50 percent lower than market values. 
Iraq exports about 3.6 million barrels of oil per day, including 390,000 barrels from oil fields in the Kurdistan region, through the 970-km northern pipeline that stretches from Kirkuk to the Turkish port of Ceyhan, before making its way to Israel.

In 2014, with ISIS taking control of Mosul and large swathes across Iraq, the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) began directly exporting crude oil to Turkiye and selling it on the international markets without going through Baghdad’s State Organization for Marketing of Oil (SOMO) company responsible for all Iraqi oil exports.

Iraqi lawmaker Uday Awad tells The Cradle that these direct oil sales were both illegal and secretive: 

“For years, the Kurdistan region tried to hide oil sales to Tel Aviv, but all shipments to Israeli ports are documented by SOMO which tracked every barrel sold to Israel.”

On 17 February, 2022, the Iraqi Federal Supreme Court ruled that the Kurdistan government’s approval of the oil and gas law in the region was unconstitutional, basing its decision on the KRG’s admission in 2015 — before the US Court of Appeals in a lawsuit filed by Iraq — of unloading oil shipments in Israeli ports.

Israeli influence and intrigue in Iraq

Dizayee’s expansive Falcon Group conglomerate has become a focal point in the Iraq-Israel nexus. Iranian media alleges a web of connections, including EIA, a company purportedly affiliated with the US Census Bureau, nestled within the US Department of Commerce. 

Of particular concern is Falcon Security Company, a subsidiary believed to employ around 600 individuals, primarily former military personnel from the US Army. Speculation swirls that this security arm maintains direct ties with the US Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), serving as a conduit for valuable information gathering on Iraq’s internal affairs.

Speaking on condition of anonymity to The Cradle, Iranian sources claim that Dizayee was a Mossad collaborator in Erbil, orchestrating covert operations and providing logistical support through his vast business empire. Private Iraqi sources corroborate this narrative, and say an intricate Israeli influence network has entrenched itself in Kurdistan, with the Mossad allegedly training groups antagonistic to Iran and the Axis of Resistance. 

Importantly, the focus of these groups reportedly encompasses security operations, including the targeted assassination of scientists engaged in Iran’s nuclear program.

Over the past decades, the Israeli Mossad has persistently worked to establish spy cells across Arab states — whether hostile or friendly — but has continually encountered resistance in Iraq. Notable instances include the case of Ezra Naji Zalka, an Iraqi Jew, whose spy network faced exposure by Iraqi intelligence, leading to their execution in 1969. 

The Mossad, however, received a boost in Iraq facilitated by the illegal 2003 US invasion of the country. The American occupation opened a new chapter for Israel’s espionage and sabotage activities, in which it targeted Iraq’s northern regions to create a strategic vantage point against neighboring countries, particularly Iran.

Mossad objectives extend beyond mere intelligence gathering: Its focus encompasses collecting information on military sites, security installations, and potential threats posed by countries resistant to Tel Aviv’s interests. 

Economic espionage became a key facet, with the Mossad seeking data on investment projects, tourism, agriculture, stock exchanges, and influential businessmen in targeted states.

The scope broadened further with the Mossad’s notoriously engagement in subversive activities, influencing societal values and norms. Accusations range from drug proliferation to the sponsorship of international prostitution networks and involvement in the slave trade. 

Resistance to Zionism and Israeli espionage 

Equipped with cutting-edge technology, the Israeli intel agency strives not only to identify the whereabouts of resistance leaders but also to manipulate public sentiment in its pursuit of broader geopolitical objectives.

Iraqi intelligence services have historically thwarted many of the Israeli penetration activities, particularly in the formation of spy cells in the center and south of the country. 

One such instance was the cell established by Ezra Naji Zalka, an Iraqi Jew who was able to recruit many spies to work for Israel. According to Iraqi government data, there were, at one time, 35 spies in the Zalkha network, including 13 Jews who were identified and captured by Iraqi intelligence. 

Zalkha’s main task at the beginning of his tenure with the Mossad was to collect information about poor Jews in popular neighborhoods, their living conditions, numbers, education, and attitudes on the issue of immigration. His cell later expanded its work to include military and security dimensions and began collecting information on Iraqi institutions.

According to memoirs published last year by Israeli-British historian and Iraqi Jew Avi Shlaim, between 1950 and 1951, the Mossad was linked to five bomb attacks on Jewish targets in an operation known as Ali Baba. The purpose was to instill fear amongst and hostility toward Iraqi Jews from the wider public. This would lead to over 120,000 Jews — at the time, 95 percent of the Jewish population in Iraq — being airlifted to Israel in a mission known as Operation Ezra and Nehemiah.

Mossad’s subversive tactics are thus a security threat to all West Asian states, with the recent flurry of normalization agreements effectively installing a Trojan horse for Zionism. 

The offer on the table is not for peace; it is a do-or-die threat: those states resistant to normalization face increased acts of terrorism, sabotage, or assassination — and, as a punishing last resort for those unwilling to fall in line, conventional air strikes by the US-backed Israeli military, or the US itself. 

The views expressed in this article do not necessarily reflect those of The Cradle.

IRGC target Mossad headquarters in the Kurdistan region of Iraq

January 16, 2024

Source: Al Mayadeen + Agencies

Circulating scenes of missiles being launched from Iran towards northern Iraq on January 16, 2024. (Social Media/ X)

By Al Mayadeen English

The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps declares its targeting of “espionage headquarters and terrorist gatherings” in both Syria and Iraqi Kurdistan. This action is in response to the two terrorist attacks that occurred in Kerman earlier this month.

The Islamic Revolution Guard Corps in Iran announced it targeted “the headquarters of terrorist groups in the region with ballistic missiles.” According to the IRGC statement, the attack came in response to “the terrorist crimes recently committed by Iran’s enemies.”

The Revolutionary Guard specified that its target included “gatherings of terrorists linked to the terrorist operations carried out in Iran recently.”

In a subsequent statement, the Revolutionary Guard confirmed that it had targeted “one of the main headquarters of the Israeli Mossad in the Kurdistan region of Iraq.” This action was stated to be a response to the Israeli occupation entity’s assassination of leaders within the Revolutionary Guard and the Axis of Resistance.

It explained that the targeted Mossad headquarters is “the center for developing espionage operations and planning terrorist operations in the region, especially against Iran.”

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On the other hand, Al Mayadeen‘s correspondent in Syria reported the sounds of explosions that shook the city of Aleppo. Preliminary information suggested missile strikes targeting locations in the southeastern part of the city.

Simultaneously, Al Mayadeen’s correspondent in Iraq reported that “the sounds of at least seven explosions were heard in Erbil” within the Kurdistan region, highlighting the presence of sirens at the American consulate in the city.

🚨 BREAKING: Alarms sound at the US consulate in Erbil in northern Iraq, which has reportedly come under fire of a ballistic missile or heavy drone attack. At least eight explosions have been heard.

Source: RNN. pic.twitter.com/Nc0i6NTwcM

— Censored Voice. (@CensoredNws) January 15, 2024

Reuters, citing security sources, reported that “Erbil Airport in Iraqi Kurdistan region halts air traffic after explosions were heard in the city”

Moreover, two US officials told Reuters that the missile strikes in Iraq did not affect any US facilities and there were no US casualties.

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Iraq sends security delegation to Erbil to oversee deal with Iran

September 18, 202

Source: Agencies

Iraqi soldiers stand on a truck in a base in Sinjar, Iraq, May 3, 2022. (AP)

By Al Mayadeen English

Baghdad wants to supervise the implementation of the Iraq-Iran security deal, sending a security delegation to Erbil to oversee it.

Iraq’s National Security Advisor, Qassem al-Araji went to Erbil on Monday, chairing a senior security delegation to oversee the implementation of the security agreement between Iraq and Iran.

The trip came at the direction of Iraqi Prime Minister Mohammad Shia al-Sudani. 

At a joint press conference held in Tehran on Wednesday, Iranian Foreign Minister Hossein Amir-Abdollahian touched upon a number of topics with his Iraqi counterpart, Fuad Hussein, with whom he discussed the implementation of the security agreement between Tehran and Baghdad.

As per the agreement, Kurdish separatists in Iraq are to be disarmed and relocated by September 19.

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Indicating that he had engaged in significant discussions with FM Hussein regarding the security agreement earlier that Wednesday, the senior Iranian diplomat emphasized Iran’s unwavering commitment to safeguarding its national security.

Read more: Iran reminds Iraq of deadline to disarm separatist groups

Deadline not to be extended 

In an interview with Iran newspaper, Brigadier General Mohammad Reza Ashtiani revealed that the country would take appropriate action against terrorists in the Kurdistan region, as per an agreement with the Iraqi government.

The deadline previously agreed upon on September 19 would not be extended, the minister noted. He also emphasized that Iran would carry out last-minute assessments before making a decision.

A source divulged to Tasnim that the terror cells have acquiesced to the Iraqi Kurdistan region’s call to disarm and leave the border area. The source explained that “the opposition parties (terrorist secessionist groups) have agreed on relocation to the camps that have been already set up in the provinces of Erbil and Sulaymaniyah,” shutting down rumors that the parties had any intention of taking military action.

Read more: IRGC targets terrorist outposts in Iraqi Kurdistan

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Can Baghdad meet the deadline for its border security deal with Iran?

SEP 15, 2023

Photo Credit: The Cradle

As Iran’s ultimatum to Baghdad inches closer, the challenge of removing Kurdish separatist groups from their mutual border lies not in Baghdad’s will to cooperate, but in Iraqi Kurds’ secret collaboration with US/Israeli agents to keep them there.

Ahmed al-Rubaie

On 19 March, Iran signed a border security agreement with Iraq whereby the latter agreed to dismantle and relocate Kurdish separatists based in the Kurdistan region by a 19 September deadline. At the time, an image circulated of Iraqi Prime Minister Muhammad Shia al-Sudani standing behind a table where Iraqi National Security Advisor Qasim al-Araji and Iranian National Security Council Secretary Ali Shamkhani sat to ink the pact between the two countries. 

Tehran issued a brief statement, saying the agreement aimed to address security challenges along their common border. Simultaneously, a statement from Sudani’s office underscored “Iraq’s firm position of rejecting any violation of its sovereignty, and that Iraqi lands should not be a launching pad for attacking any of the neighboring countries.”

Fast forward five months to 28 August, when Iran’s Ministry Of Foreign Affairs disclosed that Tehran and Baghdad had “Signed an agreement under which Iraq committed to disarming separatist militants and terrorist groups present on its territory, closing their bases, and moving them to other places before September 19, 2023.” 

Zero hour approaches 

Iranian Foreign Ministry spokesman Nasser Kanaani did not specify the locations to which the militants would be transferred, but warned that if the terms of the agreement are not upheld, Iran will fulfill its responsibility of “preserving our nation’s security.”

On the same day, Iraqi government spokesman Bassem al-Awadi announced that the two countries “signed an agreement to prevent the infiltration of militants, disarm them, hand over wanted persons, and remove camps,” stressing that one of the principles of Baghdad’s foreign policy is “that Iraq should not be a party to harming its neighbors.”

An Iraqi official source, who declined to be named, reveals to The Cradle some details of the agreement, outlining the plan to transfer Iranian-Kurdish separatist groups within Iraq to privately supervised camps, which will be under “direct supervision of Iraqi forces, supported by Peshmerga forces, who will work to prevent any attacks across the Iraqi-Iranian border.”

Additional anonymous sources say that these camps would be established deep in the Iraqi Kurdistan Region (IKR), far from the Iraqi-Iranian border. The sources also reveal that a proposal to transfer Iranian-Kurdish factions to the west of the country faced opposition from Sunni politicians in the Anbar Governorate.

But former Secretary General of the Ministry of Peshmerga, Lieutenant General Jabbar Yawar, believes it unlikely that the Iraqi government will meet the deadline, less than a week away. He tells The Cradle: 

“Security problems on the border go back more than 40 years. Despite Iraq’s seriousness, the solutions require several stages to be implemented.” 

Dr. Ihsan al-Shammari, head of the Center for Political Thinking and former political advisor to ex-prime minister Haider al-Abadi, explains why the task of completely eliminating the Iranian-Kurdish militants or Iranian-designated terror groups like the Mojahedeen-e Khalq (MEK) is harder than it looks. 

For starters, these Iranian opposition and secessionist groups have hidden allies in Iraq.

“In the event that these organizations are forced to leave Iraq, the central government (Baghdad) will be faced with opposition from the US administration and the ruling Kurdish forces in the region, as these organizations have undeclared relations with the politicians of the Kurdistan Region.”

Furthermore, Shammari warns that “members of the Iranian factions inside Iraqi territory are considered refugees and cannot be expelled.” Any such step, he explains, will encourage Turkey “to put pressure on Iraq to end the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) file in the same way.”

That is not necessarily the case, legally speaking. Habib Abdel, a France-based expert in international law, says that members of these organizations “cannot be considered refugees under international laws.” 

“They did not acquire this status legally, and were embraced by Saddam Hussein’s regime for the purposes of using them against Iran.”

In any case, the Iraqi government announced on 12 September that it has begun relocating Kurdish factions away from the Iraqi border. This has been personally conveyed to Iranian President Ebrahim Raisi by Iraqi Foreign Minister Fuad Hussein, who arrived in Tehran the following day. 

Foreign militancy, long overlooked by Iraq 

The origins of this issue trace back to 1979, following the overthrow of the Shah of Iran and the rise of organizations opposing the newly established Islamic Republic. Many of these groups sought refuge in northern Iraq, including prominent factions like the Kurdish Democratic Party of Iran (KDPI), the Marxist leftist Kurdish Komala Party of Iranian Kurdistan, the Free Life Party (PJAK, the Iranian branch of PKK), and the nationalist Organization of the Iranian Kurdistan Struggle (Khabat). Most of these groups have, at some point, been armed and active on the Iraqi side of the border with Iran.

These organizations established their bases in areas north of Erbil and east of Sulaymaniyah, along the 1,460-kilometer Iraqi-Iranian border, which also includes approximately 550 kilometers of the border shared with the IKR. Over the last 40+ years, reports suggest that around 20,000 families of members affiliated with these Iranian armed organizations have settled along this border region.

Iraqi measures: mobilizing the military

On 23 November, 2022, the Ministerial National Security Council in Iraq convened, presided over by Prime Minister Sudani in his role as Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces, to address the security situation along the Iraqi border. 

The Council made several notable decisions: the redeployment of Iraqi border forces along the borders with Iran and Turkiye; providing logistical support to the border forces command; reinforcing border police stations under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Interior; and collaborating with the Kurdistan Regional Government and the Ministry of Peshmerga to safeguard Iraqi borders.

According to a security source, the part of the Iraqi-Iranian border located within the IKR is under the command of the First District of the Border Guard Forces, which consists of three brigades of 9,000 soldiers. In mid-July, the Iraqi Ministry of Interior announced the deployment of the 21st Brigade of Border Guard Forces on the Iraqi-Iranian border line in Sulaymaniyah Governorate. 

The Ministry’s Director of Media Relations Major General Saad Maan has said that “50 concrete towers and 40 thermal cameras have been erected” at the border, and Iraq will begin to construct 47 border posts on the Iraqi-Iranian zero line.

Iran’s gripe

In recent years, Iranian military forces have launched almost daily attacks with drones and surface-to-air missiles against “separatist terrorist groups that take the Iraqi Kurdistan region as their headquarters to destabilize security in Iran.” 

The attack targets are very specific, and almost always target the headquarters of Kurdish militant groups.

The Iranian government includes these operations within the framework of “using its principled right to self-defense in accordance with international law” against groups that “exploit Iraqi territory to plan and carry out sabotage and terrorist acts in Iran,” as stated by the Iranian Permanent Mission to the UN in New York. 

Iranian operations are often condemned by the IKR authorities, and sometimes by the central government in Baghdad. In September 2022, the US Military Command for the Middle East (CENTCOM) condemned in a statement “the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps’ unprovoked attack in Iraq’s Erbil Governorate this morning. Such indiscriminate attacks threaten innocent civilians and risk the hard-fought stability of the region.”

The spy wars 

Last year, Iranian reports revealed that about 1,200 members of Iranian Kurdish factions set out from 50 bases across the border with the IKR towards Iranian territory, following protests over the death of Iranian-Kurdish woman Mahsa Amini while she was in police custody last September.

Iranian political researcher Hassan Hani tells The Cradle that those militants “were trained by officers from the Mossad and the CIA, and infiltrated Iranian territory to incite riots and carry out sabotage operations.”

Tehran has consistently accused Iranian Kurdish factions in Iraqi Kurdistan of engaging in “terrorist” activities in collusion with Israel and of fomenting anti-government protests. In recent years, Iranian authorities have repeatedly alleged that Tel Aviv is behind various terrorist acts, including the assassination of Iranian scientists and attempts to sabotage the country’s nuclear facilities.

In June 2022, well before the September protests broke out, Iran’s Ministry of Intelligence revealed the arrest of a spy network “whose members communicated with Mossad officers through a neighboring country and entered Iran through the Iraqi Kurdistan region.” 

Two weeks ago, on 31 August, Tehran announced the foiling of what it described as “one of the biggest attempts at sabotage” against the country’s military missile, aviation, and space industries, and accused Israel of being behind it. 

The IRNA news agency quoted an official of the Ministry of Defense’s Information Protection Agency as saying: “The professional network, in cooperation with some hackers, planned to introduce defective parts into the production wheel of advanced missiles at the missile industries of the Ministry of Defense.” He accused the network of operating “under the direct direction of the Israeli Mossad.”

The Iranian nuclear program is the main target of Israel and the US, and the majority of the security violations that Iran has witnessed in recent years, such as the assassination of scientists and attempts to sabotage nuclear facilities, were in the context of concerted – often violent efforts – to prevent Iran from entering the elite club of nuclear-armed states.

Security vs. diplomacy 

Despite Iran’s continued efforts to contain the Iranian Kurdish armed factions situated along its border with Iraq, many of these groups have persisted and even thrived, in part due to both overt and covert support from Iraqi Kurdish parties, particularly the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) led by Masoud Barzani. 

As Iraqi political analyst Jassem al-Moussawi explains to The Cradle:

“The support of Iraqi Kurdish parties for Iranian organizations equates to American support for them as well. It’s widely understood that the authorities in the Kurdistan Region of Iraq do not operate independently of American policy and directives.” 

Moussawi points to a steady stream of information from local and international intelligence agencies, saying: 

Reports “conclusively confirm the involvement of the Israeli Mossad in the attacks against Iran, and that the majority of these attacks are carried out across the Iranian border with the Kurdistan Region, and the use of Iranian Kurdish movements as a Trojan horse, every time Iran witnesses popular protests.”

Given the host of hidden parties who seek to disrupt this critical border area, the implementation of the Iranian-Iraqi agreement is expected to face formidable challenges. The Iraqi government will encounter internal (Kurdish) and external (US/Israeli) obstacles as it strives to resolve the issue of Iranian Kurdish factions within its territory and maintain mutually-beneficial relations with Iran. 

The views expressed in this article do not necessarily reflect those of The Cradle.

Kirkuk on fire: Ethnicity, oil, and sovereignty light the flames

SEP 13, 2023

What began as a localized political pact to help fix relations between Baghdad and Erbil has spiraled into renewed ethnic turmoil in Kirkuk and a resurgence of Kurdish independence aspirations.

Photo Credit: The Cradle

Ahmed al-Rubaie

An agreement reached between the governments of Baghdad and Erbil to relocate the Iraqi army from its headquarters in Kirkuk – a multi-ethnic city in Iraq’s north – ignited a wave of protests last month. 

Thousands of Arab nationalists and Turkmen residents staged sit-ins and established makeshift camps in front of the Iraqi Joint Operations Command building in late August. They were reacting to a directive issued by Iraqi Prime Minister Muhammad Shia al-Sudani to hand over control of the headquarters to the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP). 

The prime minister’s decision was part of a political arrangement struck by the Coordination Framework – Iraq’s largest Shia political bloc – prior to the formation of the current government. 

Kirkuk crisis

The agreement sought to transfer authority over Kirkuk’s headquarters to the Kurdish parties that had vacated the area in 2017, while the Iraqi army and the Popular Mobilization Units (PMU) would continue to maintain security responsibilities for the area.

Nonetheless, the move was met with great dissatisfaction among Kirkuk’s Arab and Turkmen communities, who were apprehensive about a resurgence of Kurdish influence in the oil-rich city. Demonstrators took to the streets, obstructing the Erbil-Kirkuk highway in protest, and conducting a sit-in around the Joint Operations Command headquarters.

Concurrently, the KDP organized a counter-protest on 2 September, mobilizing hundreds of its supporters. This counter-protest escalated into clashes with both the protesters and security forces in the vicinity of the headquarters. The unrest then rapidly spread to the predominantly Kurdish areas of the city, resulting in at least three fatalities and injuring around 16 individuals.

The sound of gunfire intensifies as Rudaw's Hardi Mohammed continues his coverage of the protests in Kirkuk pic.twitter.com/ArOfT2PfKy

— Rudaw English (@RudawEnglish) September 2, 2023

The following day, Sudani declared a curfew in the city and issued a statement calling upon “all political parties and social and popular activities to ward off strife and maintain security, stability, and order in Kirkuk Governorate.”

On the same day, the Federal Court in Iraq decided to temporarily suspend the implementation of the prime minister’s order to evacuate the joint operations headquarters. The court’s decision also provoked strong reactions, with KDP leader Masoud Barzani expressing concern about what he called “these unacceptable actions that will have bad repercussions.” 

“Shedding the blood of our children in Kirkuk will have a heavy price,” he added, while Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) Prime Minister Masrour Barzani described the court’s decision as a “farce.”

Reviving Article 140

On 28 November, 2022, Iraqi Minister of Justice Khaled Shwani, who also acts as the representative of Kurds in the central government, announced that Sudani had approved the reconstitution of the Supreme Committee to activate Article 140 of the Iraqi Constitution – an article intended to resolve the issue of who controls Kirkuk and the so-called disputed areas between the Kurdistan Region and its neighboring provinces, Nineveh, Diyala, and Salah al-Din.

The implementation of this article is a point of contention between the Kurds, who advocate for its enforcement, and the Arabs and Turkmen, who oppose it.

Article 140 outlines a three-stage process for determining the future of these disputed areas. It begins with the return of residents who were relocated to the city during Saddam Hussein’s rule back to their original areas, for which they will be financially compensated.

A population census of these areas is to be conducted then, followed by a popular referendum to determine whether the lands should fall under the authority of the government in Baghdad or Erbil.

A former official in the Article 140 Implementation Committee, who asked to remain anonymous, discloses to The Cradle that the compensation to be paid to the relocated Iraqis, per Article 140, amounts to an astronomical $3 billion. 

Jawad al-Ghazali, a member of the House of Representatives representing the State of Law bloc, tells The Cradle that Kurdish efforts to activate Article 140 are driven by a desire to gain control of Kirkuk because of its significant natural resource wealth. He warns that implementing the article “may lead to civil war.” 

Legal expert Ali al-Tamimi points out that the highly contentious article, approved while Iraq was under foreign occupation and rule, remains ambiguous more than 18 years later. For one, it does not specify whether the administrative units it encompasses refer to the governorates as a whole or specific administrative divisions within them.

While Kurdish political parties contend that the non-implementation of Article 140 is an underlying reason for all the strife and clashes in these areas, it is the adoption of this article that could actually tear Iraq apart.

The significance of Kirkuk

Kirkuk Governorate is located approximately 240 km from Baghdad, and its proximity to the Kurdistan Region’s provincial borders contributes to its diverse religious and ethnic composition. 

The governorate comprises four primary administrative units: Kirkuk District, the central city inhabited by a mix of Arabs, Turkmen, and Kurds; Hawija District, predominantly Sunni Arab; Daquq District, with a Turkmen and Kurdish majority; and Dibs District, which includes a majority of Sunni Muslim Arabs in its central and southern areas and a Kurdish majority in its northern regions.

The estimated population of Kirkuk stands at approximately 1,075,000 people. The city has experienced demographic changes over the years, particularly during Saddam Hussein’s era when its name was altered, and parts of it, such as Tuz Khurmatu, were incorporated into Salah al-Din Governorate.

Following the 2003 US-led invasion and occupation of Iraq, the two major Kurdish political parties – the KDP and the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) – gained significant control over the city. As Iraqi political analyst Hajim al-Hassani describes to The Cradle:

“The city is considered a mecca for the Kurdish parties, not because it is Kurdish as they claim, but because it contains great wealth, as it produces 350,000 barrels of oil per day, in addition to its fertile agricultural land.”

Baghdad retakes Kirkuk

On 12 June, 2014, the 12th Division of the Iraqi Army withdrew from its defensive positions in Kirkuk as ISIS terror troops gained control of the city. According to intelligence and press reports, a meeting took place between division commander Major General Muhammad Khalaf al-Fahdawi and Kurdish Peshmerga forces, during which they agreed that Fahdawi would relocate to the Kurdish city of Sulaymaniyah, handing over control of the division headquarters to the Peshmerga.

Subsequently, on 25 September, 2017, Erbil authorities conducted a referendum on secession in Kirkuk, a move that was fully rejected by Baghdad and various regional and international parties. The following month, the Iraqi government – with critical support from the PMU – launched a lightning-fast military campaign to reassert federal government authority over the governorate and other areas disputed with the Kurdistan Regional authorities.

This operation led to the withdrawal of Peshmerga forces from these areas, some of which they had controlled since 2014 and others following the illegal 2003 US invasion. During this rapid offensive, Iraqi army forces seized more than 33 headquarters of Kurdish parties in Kirkuk, including the primary headquarters of the KDP – still a sensitive issue in light of the recent clashes.

Wasfi al-Asi, the Head of the Arab Front in Kirkuk and a deputy in Iraq’s parliament tells The Cradle:

“It was a big day for the people of Kirkuk when the headquarters of the Kurdistan Democratic Party was recaptured. It was witness to an era of kidnapping and killing of Arab and Turkmen people of Kirkuk, and we will not allow that to happen again.”

Arshad al-Salhi, the leader of the Turkmen Front and also a member of parliament, argues that “not handing over the headquarters is a natural and sound decision, because the land on which it was built belongs to the state and not to the Kurdish parties.”

Many Iraqis make the argument that Kirkuk should be run by Iraqis – not an ethnic group that can threaten the territory’s sovereignty. They invoke the attempt by Kurdistan Region Leader Masoud Barzani to annex Kirkuk through the September 2017 referendum, aligning with the long-standing ambition of Kurdish leaders to establish an independent state.

The Israeli-Kurdish connection

Economic analyst Bassem al-Sharifi explains this viewpoint to The Cradle: 

“The Kurdistan government’s control over Kirkuk opens the way to its independence from Iraq, because its wealth is capable of providing sufficient financial resources to meet the region’s needs.”

Barzani’s dogged insistence on holding the referendum surprised many, but political analyst Haider al-Bakri says that motivation became more clear to Iraqis after Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu openly expressed support for Kurdish secession from Iraq.

At that time, Iraqi religious authority Jawad al-Khalisi railed against Israel’s vocal and clandestine support of Kurdish independence from Iraq during a Friday sermon on 22 September, 2017: “The Zionists’ support for the secession project results from their awareness that their destiny is to disappear, and therefore they are working to establish a new Zionist entity.”

The decades-old relationship between Iraqi Kurds and Tel Aviv dates back to 1948, with visible connections in 1965 when Israeli diplomat David Kimhi met with Kurdish leaders and confirmed Israel’s readiness to provide military and financial support for the Kurds’ independence project. 

The Israel Kurd magazine, published in Erbil with its main headquarters in Israel, reported that Tel Aviv pledged to transfer 200,000 Kurdish Jews from Israel to Kurdistan – if the region declared independence from Iraq – to contribute to the development of the new state.

Neighboring hegemons Turkiye and Iran recognize Kirkuk’s importance to Israel. After all, Tel Aviv supports Kurdish separatist movements at local and regional levels – in part to encircle the two countries that have substantial Kurdish minorities. As such, both Ankara and Tehran have, in the past, engaged in separate and joint offenses against Kurdish separatist positions in Iraq, in violation of the state’s sovereignty. 

The Kirkuk question extends far beyond the borders of Iraq, carrying significant regional implications. Heavily mired in the aspirations of Kurdish leaders, it also entangles influential regional players such as Turkiye and Iran, along with the interests of political actors further afield. 

As the future of Kirkuk continues to hang in the balance, it serves as a potent symbol of the persistent challenges, one among many, confronting post-2003 Iraq. 

The views expressed in this article do not necessarily reflect those of The Cradle.

The shocking Kurdish role in Iraq’s Yazidi genocide

AUG 24, 2023

Photo Credit: The Cradle

While the massacre of Sinjar’s Yazidi community has often been blamed on Sunni Arab collusion with ISIS, evidence keeps mounting that Kurdish leaders played a big part in setting up the atrocity in order to advance their territorial ambitions in northern Iraq.

The Cradle’s Iraq Correspondent

After the brutal August 2014 ISIS attack on the Yazidi community in northern Iraq, a narrative quickly emerged blaming Sinjar’s Sunni Arabs for supporting the genocide.

Yet a deeper delve into this harrowing episode uncovers a much darker reality — one that implicates Iraqi Kurdish politician Masoud Barzani and the leadership of the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) in a sinister collaboration with ISIS. 

Yazidi massacre blame game

One of the massacres took place in the small village of Kocho on 15 August, which saw hundreds of women and children enslaved and their men executed. “All the Arabs around us were against us, with the terrorists of Daesh [an Arabic acronym for ISIS],” one male survivor was quoted as saying, pointing the finger at the Sunni Arabs of Sinjar. 

In August 2016, Yazidi member of the Iraqi parliament Vian Dakhil claimed that around 1,000 foreign ISIS fighters invaded Sinjar, “But tens of thousands flocked to support them. Those tens of thousands were our neighbors.”

However, several Sunni Arab men from Sinjar spoke with The Cradle to challenge this narrative. They claim they were not willing executioners of their Yazidi neighbors, with whom they had lived peacefully for generations. 

“Terrorism represents no tribe, no group, they represent themselves. If a family member becomes a terrorist or ISIS member, this does not mean his brother accepts it. But they could not resist it, or they would be killed by other ISIS members. Everybody surrendered under the gun.” 

As rural farmers and sheep herders, they had little power to stop the ISIS massacres. Some individual Sunni Arabs did join ISIS when the group invaded Sinjar, but this was a relatively small number and joining ISIS was largely opposed by the Arab community, they say. As one of the men explains:

“Terrorism represents no tribe, no group, they represent themselves. If a family member becomes a terrorist or ISIS member, this does not mean his brother accepts it. But they could not resist it, or they would be killed by other ISIS members. Everybody surrendered under the gun.” 

In fact, the grip of ISIS extended to the Sunni Arab populace in Sinjar and Mosul alike, leading to the execution of local law enforcement and security personnel as the terrorist group gained control over these regions.

One Sunni Arab informs The Cradle that ISIS executed 19 people from his village in 2014, including 11 members of his own family. 

A report by the UN Mission to Iraq (UNAMI) corroborates the claim that ISIS also targeted Sunni Arabs, and documents the mass executions of Sunni Arab civilians and soldiers as ISIS seized power in Mosul and Tikrit. Even those who purportedly “repented” and swore allegiance to ISIS often met a grim fate, facing execution regardless.

‘We know they could see us’

The Arab Sunni men speaking with The Cradle ask how they as civilians could have resisted ISIS in Sinjar when the Iraqi army, Kurdish Peshmerga, and US air force were all unable to prevent ISIS from taking Sinjar and massacring its Yazidi inhabitants.

The men claim that US F-16s warplanes were flying in the skies above Kocho as the massacre took place, but failed to intervene and carry out airstrikes, even though ISIS militants were driving in convoys of new Toyota pick-up trucks that were easily identifiable.

“We could see the ISIS members killing the Yazidis and the airplanes did nothing,” one man tells The Cradle.

This was confirmed by human rights researcher Naomi Kikoler, who interviewed survivors of the Kocho massacre. One survivor told her there were “jets in the air. We know they could see us. We thought they would save us. I could still hear them after being shot.”

‘Even if I am slaughtered’

Despite the dangers Sinjar’s Sunni Arabs also faced from ISIS, there are many instances where they helped their Yazidi neighbors escape after the Kocho massacre. One member of the local Sunni Arab community informs The Cradle:

“When ISIS killed the Yazidis in Sinjar, no one could go to help them. No one could do anything. We were just scared and sad about them. Some people escaped in the night and were injured and came and we helped them. Some had been shot. We gave them bandages, and water, and food, and we took them to the mountain to help them escape.”

“When ISIS killed the Yazidis in Sinjar, no one could go to help them. No one could do anything. We were just scared and sad about them. Some people escaped in the night and were injured and came and we helped them. Some had been shot. We gave them bandages, and water, and food, and we took them to the mountain to help them escape.”

A prominent Yazidi figure, Sheikh Nayef Jasso, recounted the efforts of his Arab Sunni friend, Abu Saady, who lived in an adjacent village. Sheikh Jasso explained in an interview with the Iraq 24 news channel how he had asked Abu Saady to help two survivors of the massacre escape to the mountains. According to Sheikh Jasso, Abu Saady responded by saying, “I will try. Even if I am slaughtered myself, I have to do it.”

However, the misperception that Sinjar’s Sunni Arabs were responsible for the ISIS genocide still goes largely unchallenged, although it is a view that is propagated not by the broader Yazidi community, but rather by the political maneuverings of the KDP led by Masoud Barzani. Furthermore, allegations have emerged that the KDP paid select Yazidis to amplify these claims in the media, casting the shadow of blame on Sunni Arabs.

For example, Yazidi MP Vian Dakhil who blamed Sunni Arabs from Sinjar for the genocide, is a KDP member. The influential Kurdish political party often seeks to coopt politicians from Iraqi minority communities, hoping to control them and ensure these communities act in favor of KDP interests.

Sunni Arabs as scapegoats

Shifting culpability onto Sinjar’s Sunni Arabs serves as a calculated diversion from the core culprits — namely, the KDP, whose Peshmerga forces had undertaken the solemn duty to safeguard the Yazidis in Sinjar. 

On 3 August, 2014, the Peshmerga betrayed this trust by abruptly abandoning their posts in the early hours of the morning, leaving the Yazidis defenseless against the ISIS onslaught. This was confirmed by journalist Christine Van Den Toorn writing for the Daily Beast.

Van Den Toorn writes that a local KDP official told her that “higher-ups in the party told representatives to keep people calm, and that if people in their areas of coverage left, their salaries would be cut.” 

Kurdish security officials also confiscated weapons from Christian communities in the Nineveh Plain, before abandoning these communities as ISIS invaded in using tactics similar to those in Sinjar. 

By convincing Yazidis to stay in Sinjar despite the looming ISIS threat, confiscating their weapons, and then abandoning them at the last moment without warning, Barzani’s KDP and Peshmerga ensured that ISIS would be able to massacre and enslave as many Yazidis as possible. 

The harsh reality was that without the intervention of fighters from rival Kurdish factions, the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK) and its Syrian offshoot, the People’s Protection Units (YPG), the atrocities carried out by ISIS would have been even larger. PKK and YPG militants coming from the Rabia border area with Syria created safe corridors for Yazidis to escape from Sinjar Mountain.

An explicit agreement

Several Yazidis who spoke with The Cradle said they knew the Peshmerga had betrayed them by suddenly withdrawing, but none said they understood why.

Several sources have alleged that Masoud Barzani made an agreement with ISIS, and this was the reason for the Peshmerga withdrawal.

According to French academic and Iraq expert Pierre-Jean Luizard, there was “an explicit agreement” between Barzani and ISIS, which “aims to share a number of territories.” ISIS was given the role of “routing the Iraqi army, in exchange for which the Peshmerga would not prevent ISIS from entering Mosul or capturing Tikrit.

Cemil Bayik, a senior PKK member also alleged that Barzani had sent senior KDP member Azad Barwari to meet with Sunni political figures and ISIS representatives in Amman, Jordan to make plans for ISIS to take Mosul.

As reported by The Cradle, prominent Sunni politician Atheel al-Nujaifi, then-governor of Nineveh province, “who was both collaborating with ISIS and acting as a Turkish proxy” played a key role in facilitating the fall of Mosul. 

Barzani’s arrangement with ISIS apparently included supplying weapons to the notorious terror group. According to reporting from Michael Rubin of the American Enterprise Institute (AEI), these weapons included Kornet anti-tank missiles, which ISIS used to destroy M1A1 Abrams tanks in battles against the Iraqi army.

Journalists and members of the KRG parliament later verified that senior Peshmerga commanders had traded weapons with ISIS, and that none of them were ever charged.

The ‘Kurdish Jerusalem’

Barzani’s desire to share territories with ISIS, despite the atrocities that unfolded, was fueled by a calculated strategy to expand his influence and achieve his long-standing goal of establishing an independent Kurdish state.

At its core, Barzani’s ambition sought to secure new territories, access untapped oil reserves, amass weapons, and garner international backing for the realization of a sovereign Kurdish state. The essential idea was for ISIS to take over mostly Sunni Arab territories in northern Iraq, forcing much of that population to flee, and then have US-backed Kurds “liberate” those lands and “Kurdify” them. 

Reuters quoted a KRG official saying: “Everyone is worried, but this is a big chance for us. ISIL gave us in two weeks what Maliki couldn’t give us in eight years.” 

As the chaos instigated by ISIS enveloped Mosul and the Iraqi army faltered, Barzani’s swift directive was to mobilize his Peshmerga forces to capture the oil-rich city of Kirkuk — a region of geopolitical importance that was also home to Arab and Turkoman populations. This territorial conquest held symbolic value akin to the “Kurdish Jerusalem.”

Denise Natali of the National Defense University observed that “the Kurds’ most evident gain from the ISIS takeover of Mosul is territorial, as the Kurds had extended their territory by about 40 percent.” Assyrian writer Max Joseph sums it up well: “This is conquest masquerading as liberation.”

Journalist and expert on Kurdish affairs Wladimir Van Wilgenburg similarly explained that after Mosul fell, “The Kurds control now most of the disputed territories … They now almost have their national desired borders.”

By controlling Kirkuk, Barzani gained not only new territory but massive new oil reserves which he immediately began exporting via a newly built pipeline to the Turkish port city of Ceyhan. 

As reported by Forbes, the majority of this oil was then sold to Israel, despite strong opposition from Iraqi Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki. The Jerusalem Post noted that by 2015, Kurdish oil was the source of 77 percent of Israel’s oil imports.

Gaining global sympathy 

However, the question arises: why was the subsequent Yazidi massacre necessary, considering Barzani’s acquisition of the territory and resources he sought through the fall of Mosul?

A Kurdish businessman with links to the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) explains to The Cradle that Barzani realized that exploiting the threat to religious minorities was the best way to generate sympathy for his own cause in the west.

Two weeks after Mosul fell to ISIS, Barzani had told the BBC: “Everything that’s happened recently shows that it’s the right of Kurdistan to achieve independence. From now on, we won’t hide that that’s our goal. Iraq is effectively partitioned now.” 

But Barzani’s goal of Kurdish independence had garnered little international support; US policy officially advocated maintaining the unity of Iraq and Kurdish independence was also opposed by key regional players Iran and Turkiye. Unsurprisingly, the only state willing to strongly support Barzani’s goal was Israel.

The politics of pity 

The atrocities against the Yazidis has generated unprecedented international sympathy. The plight of the Yazidis who remained trapped on Sinjar Mountain under threat from black clad ISIS militants dominated the media cycle in the western press for many months. 

Barzani effectively exploited the fear of ISIS and international sympathy for Yazidis by pressing the case that the Kurds needed direct help in liberating these areas, separated from the chaos plaguing the rest of Iraq. This allowed him to secure a reliable supply of weapons, independent of the central government in Baghdad.

The White House opened a direct weapons pipeline to Barzani’s Peshmerga on 11 August, as the massacre of Yazidis was still underway. The Washington Post reported that this had to be done off the books and through the CIA because the US military had no legal authorization to bypass Baghdad and send weapons directly to the Kurds.

As The Guardian reported the same day:

“The idea of arming the Kurds has been the subject of weeks of internal deliberation and official silence by president Barack Obama’s foreign policy advisers. It is a fateful step in Iraq’s current crisis, one that risks facilitating the long-term disintegration of Iraq.”

Annexation ambitions 

Over a year later, a disturbing revelation came to light as a coalition of forces including the PKK, Peshmerga, and the US-led coalition successfully reclaimed Sinjar city. Barzani’s ulterior motives for allowing the Yazidi massacre to unfold became startlingly evident as he moved to annex Sinjar, revealing his deeper motivations.

In a brazen statement, Barzani declared that Sinjar “belongs to Kurdistan in every way.” This proclamation was followed by an attempt to rewrite the narrative of the Yazidi genocide itself. 

Barzani sought to recast Sinjar as “a symbol of the oppression of the Kurdish people,” essentially erasing the fact that the tragedy was fundamentally one of immense suffering endured by the Yazidis, posing an existential threat to this Kurdish religious minority. 

He then went on to blame the Sunni Arab neighbors of the Yazidis in Sinjar for the crime he himself orchestrated:

“If the Arabs in the region have not committed crimes against the Yazidi brothers and have not helped ISIS, they are our brothers and we will protect them, but if their hands are red with the blood of Kurds and Yazidi brothers, they will have the same fate.” 

Fear of retribution

Speaking to The Cradle,several Yazidis expressed resentment over Barzani and the Peshmerga’s role in betraying them. 

However, they said the Yazidi community was afraid to speak about this openly and in the media, for fear of retribution. Even nine years later, few Yazidis from Sinjar have been able to return to their homes, and most instead live in tents in refugee camps dotting the Kurdistan region ruled by Barzani’s KDP.

Because most Yazidis continue to live under the very same political sphere that orchestrated their massacre and enslavement, they live in constant fear that another genocide may soon take place, even though ISIS has largely, but not entirely, been vanquished.

The views expressed in this article do not necessarily reflect those of The Cradle.

Iran Says Respect for Countries’ Territorial Integrity ‘Undeniable’

 July 17, 2023

Nasser Kanaani, Iranian Foreign Ministry Spokesman.

Iran has dismissed the idea of negotiating about its sovereignty over three Persian Gulf islands, saying respecting countries’ sovereignty and territorial integrity is an internationally-recognized principle.

“Respecting the sovereignty and territorial integrity of countries is a recognized and undeniable principle in the world and based on the United Nations Charter, and of course, it is a binding principle for all parties,” Foreign Ministry spokesman Nasser Kanaani said at a weekly press conference on Monday.

The remarks came days after the Persian Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) and Russia issued a joint statement that challenged Iran’s sovereignty over the three islands of Abu Musa, the Greater Tunb, and the Lesser Tunb.

Kanaani said Iran responds firmly to any act of breaching that principle and regards its sovereignty over the three islands as non-negotiable, adding that Tehran does not accept the interference of any party in this regard.

He pointed out that Iran has officially protested to the Russian government over the joint statement.

“Imprecise and non-constructive positions will not cause any problems in Iran’s national sovereignty over the three islands,” the spokesman added.

‘European prisoners tried based on Iranian laws’

In another part of his press conference, Kanaani discussed the issue of negotiations between Iran and Europe regarding the exchange of Iranian prisoners.

“We believe that the people who are imprisoned in Iran have committed crimes and violated Iran’s national laws, and [therefore], they were interrogated and tried based on Iran’s laws,” he said.

He also emphasized that pardoning a prisoner who has committed a crime is not a duty, but Iran has acted based on humanitarian principles in a significant number of such cases.

Dipping into Iran’s assets ‘clear example of banditry’

Regarding US efforts to block Iranian assets in various countries, the spokesperson of the Iranian Foreign Ministry said, “Iran will not tolerate any illegal action by the US to dip into the assets and properties of the Iranian nation.”

He said the move is a “clear example of banditry,” adding that Iran expects all countries to ignore such demands and adhere to their international responsibility.

US responsible for current situation of JCPOA

Kanaani referred to the indirect negotiations between Iran and the United States, saying that the Islamic Republic will not neglect diplomatic opportunities to maintain the Iranians’ rights and that Tehran has proved its eagerness to accept and make use of the capacity of amicable states that are keen on assisting the Islamic System in achieving a constructive accord.

He went on to say that the US is responsible for the current situation of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA); and of course, the US administration is the one who should be held accountable for ensuring a return of all signatories to the JCPOA.

Conclusion of the outstanding issues in the future is possible; however, it is up to the United States to make political decisions in this respect, Kanaani argued.

Hosting MKO example of supporting terrorism

Regarding Italy’s recent action to support Mujahedin-e-Khalq Organization (MKO) terrorist group, Kanaani said that Iran has taken official, serious, and urgent measures in this regard.

“Hosting MKO terrorists by any government cannot be defended or justified.”

He noted that hosting MKO members and leaders is a clear example of supporting terrorism and is in contrast with the international responsibility of governments to fight terrorism and the European countries’ human rights claims.

Iran has shown a serious reaction to this issue by summoning the Italian ambassador and expressing its position clearly, he stated.

We will continue the legal prosecution of the MKO members and leaders, he stressed.

Africa one of Iran’s priorities

Regarding President Ebrahim Raisi’s trip to three African countries, Kanaani said that the expansion of relations with Africa is among Iran’s priorities.

This was the first trip of an Iranian president to Africa after a decade, he added.

Iranian companies in the field of extraterritorial cultivation are interested in participating in African countries, he noted.

There are new plans to reinforce relations with Africa, he said, adding that Iran is on the verge of establishing a new relationship with Africa.

Iran calls for end of Russia-Ukraine conflict

The diplomat also emphasized that any measure that exacerbates the conflict in Ukraine is considered unconstructive and is against international peace and security, so Iran does not see any move by each side to fan the flame of war in Ukraine in favor of any party.

The Islamic Republic censures anti-Iran accusations because Tehran calls for the end of the war; thus, we underline the need for finding a political solution to the issue, Kanaani noted.

Those who play a role in the Russia-Ukraine conflict and are shipping prohibited arms to Ukraine should not make accusations against Iran.

Oman FM visit to Tehran

Touching on Oman’s foreign minister’s visit to Tehran on Monday, he said that Oman is a friendly state when it comes to regional and national issues and that Muscat plays a constructive role in international issues of mutual interest.

Kanaani went on to say that Sayyid Badr Albusaidi’s visit is definitely an opportunity for constructive dialogue between the two countries, and hopefully, we can share more information after today’s talks with the Omani official.

Five-way meeting on Lebanon

On a five-way meeting on the political circumstances in Lebanon and what has been reported by media outlets about inviting Iran to the meeting, Kanaani said, the Islamic Republic considers foreign interference in the Arab country’s internal affairs as unconstructive and an obstacle in the way of the Lebanese people’s role in determining their fate; however, we are of the opinion that foreign parties’ assistance toward political stability based on the Lebanese people’s desires can be positive.

He also concluded that Iran has not yet received any information on being invited to the five-way meeting on Lebanese elections in the Qatari capital Doha.

Iran, Pakistan on good path to boost ties

Kanaani described a recent visit of the commander of the Pakistani army to Iran as a continuation of constructive cooperation between the two countries, including in the field of military and defense based on their mutual interests, as well as the establishment of security at the common borders and implementation of past agreements.

“Thanks to the strong political will of Iran and Pakistan, our impression is that we are on the good path to strengthen the relations between the two countries,” he said.

Presence of separatists threat to security of Iran, Iraq

The spokesman pointed to a security agreement between Iran and Iraq and criticized the shortcomings on the part of the Baghdad government to implement it.

“As the Iraqi government recently announced, it has reached an agreement with the authorities of the northern region of that country to ensure the security of the borders with Iran,” he said, referring to the Kurdistan region.

He said Iran welcomes any action toward implementation of the security agreement and expects Iraq to fulfill its obligations.

“The security of the common borders is in the interest of both sides, and we continue to emphasize that the continued presence of terrorist and separatist groups on the borders of both sides is a threat to the security of Iran and Iraq,” he added.

Source: Agencies

Exclusive: Iraqi finance committee deputy calls for diversification away from US dollar

May 10 2023

The Cradle speaks to Iraqi parliamentarian Hussain Mouanes on the various economic, financial, and political challenges facing Sudani’s government.

Photo Credit: The Cradle

By Zaher Mousa

Parliamentarian Hussain Mouanes is a member of the Finance Committee in the publicly-elected Iraqi Council of Representatives. He has been politically active through many different stages of Iraq’s recent history, including the Baathist era, the US occupation, and the war against ISIS.

Before 2003, Mouanes was persecuted and imprisoned multiple times for his political activism by the government of former Iraqi President Saddam Hussein. He joined an Iraqi resistance movement after the illegal US invasion of Iraq and, after the rise of ISIS, initially joined the Iraqi Popular Mobilization Units (PMU) to organize against the terror group.

Despite his past political and military engagements, it is Mouanes’ recent experience as an elected politician, member of the Democratic Political Framework, and leader of the Rights Movement (Harakat Huquq), which has catapulted him into the national spotlight. His political cadres were previously members of Kataib Hezbollah, a faction known for its hostility toward the policies of the US, Israel, and the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC).

These details are significant in the context of the new Iraqi government – led by Prime Minister Muhammad Shia al-Sudani – the first in two decades that is not packed to the rafters with Iraq’s old political elite.

Today, other figures are emerging in this theater, including Mouanes, who has overnight become a prominent political figure in contemporary Iraqi politics – not least because he filed a high-profile lawsuit against former PM Mustafa al-Kadhimi for his negligence leading up to the January 2020 assassinations of Iranian General Qassem Soleimani and Iraqi PMU Deputy Leader Abu Mahdi al-Muhandis.

Iraq’s parliament just passed its first federal budget under the six-month old Sudani administration, which for the first time covers a three-year period instead of the traditional one year of previous budgets. This is part of a slew of economic and political changes promised by the prime minister, who appears to be tackling all of Iraq’s chronic problems at the same time.

In his interview, from his unique vantage point as a deputy in the parliament’s finance committee, Mouanes addresses those challenges, denounces his country’s enforced dependence on the US dollar, and candidly weighs in on both the good and bad policy directions being undertaken in Iraq today:

The Cradle: Does the federal budget presented in the parliament today actually address the necessary measures to reform Iraq’s economic system?

Mouanes: The Iraqi economic system has been built incorrectly. It has moved away from banks and financial institutions toward the bankers managing it. Iraq has been and continues to be a slave to the US dollar, even though every country’s economic strength depends on the strength of its currency.

Reforming and strengthening the economy starts with the federal budget. However, we face far greater challenges, such as reforming existing financial legislation like the Securities Commission Law, laws for private banks, and the Central Bank.

These laws must be in line with the global economic situation. The Financial Management Law should govern the budget, but instead, it is governed by the budget. The Parliamentary Finance Committee is seeking to establish a real political and economic system built on legislation, not on constant and continuous exceptions. For example, according to the Financial Management Law, the country’s deficit ceiling should be 3 percent, but the current budget allows it to swell to 18 percent.

The Cradle: Introducing a federal budget law covering three years – instead of one year – of government spending is a major change in the way the state deals with the economy, isn’t it?

Mouanes: Yes, but only if it includes actual programs, not a recurring annual budget under the pretext of escaping from political blackmail in a political system built on quotas. As a parliamentary financial committee, it is not clear to us what is meant by the three-year budget because the tables that we received cover only one year, and there is no evidence that it is a three-year budget except for some items related to oil prices.

Prime Minister Muhammad Shia al-Sudani and Minister of Planning Muhammad Tamim justified this by saying that limiting the budget schedules to one year is to ensure that projects do not stop. In this case, I agree with them. But the committee’s point of view is that the budget figures should be updated annually, which means a re-vote on the budget in Parliament.

The Cradle: There is much debate about the government’s attempt to appease protesters by employing them in the public sector. This has led to an increase in the number of public sector employees by about one million people within the first six months of the current Iraqi administration. Is this a correct policy?

Mouanes: No, it was not the right policy, and it stems from the despair of state-building. These measures reflect incorrect state-building practices and must be addressed. The government’s birth was abnormal, forced by the failures of previous administrations and the country’s widespread demonstrations.

However, the public sector cannot employ everyone. We need to explore alternative options, and our committee is working to include legislation in the budget that encourages people to seek jobs in the private sector.

Dependence on employment in the public sector burdens the state: take the operational budget, for instance, where 90 percent of its revenues are spent on salaries. This is not right and must stop. While, in the past, large public sector employment was necessary, continuing to rely on it when our needs have changed is a problem. It is necessary to look at the long-term interest of citizens and diversify their opportunities in various private sector jobs, because today, the public sector is simply unable to absorb anymore.

The Cradle: It is assumed that the measures taken by the current government are the result of a political agreement between the government coalition and the Rights Movement (Harakat Huquq), which you lead. Is there such an agreement?

Mouanes: The Rights Movement is not part of Iraq’s governing coalition or the Coordination Framework, nor is it part of the ministerial composition. Let it be clear that we will continue to criticize government performance, because we believe that improving the political process requires an active opposition bloc that challenges poor policies. The Rights Movement is keen to be the basis for such opposition.

The Cradle: Regarding the national interest in political agreements, should the agreement between Baghdad and the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) on oil sales be evaluated based on broader criteria than the decision of the current political forces?

Mouanes: The agreement has not yet been presented to parliament, and it is vague. We support a comprehensive solution to this issue in accordance with the Iraqi constitution. The Rights Movement will not allow the interests of the central, southern, and western governorates to be neglected for the sake of political favors, and I expect that the agreement will not last long if it does not comply with the constitution and existing laws.

The Cradle: Would you consider adopting a law to grant amnesty to those sentenced to prison and abolishing the Accountability and Justice Commission, which denies members of Saddam Hussein’s regime participation in political life and repatriates the displaced?

Mouanes: These demands must be discussed, and if an agreement is reached, we will deal with them in accordance with the constitution and laws. But the way in which the general amnesty is being promoted is incorrect.

Amnesty for those not involved in terrorism must be offered in a way that does not provoke Iraqis who are still suffering from the crimes that befell them. With regard to the Accountability and Justice Commission, it will be transformed into a judicial body after the termination of its work. But we believe that it is necessary to activate and expand the law banning the Baath Party to ensure that this party is not revived.

The Cradle: Is there any push to remove the current speaker of the Iraqi parliament, Mohammed al-Halbousi?

Mouanes: Halbousi’s dismissal requires political will. There is a popular demand within the Sunni political blocs for his dismissal. Among the Shia political blocs, too, there are those who believe that there are Sunni personalities who are excluded from the political arena and should be allowed to play their rightful roles. Let’s be frank, the discussion of Halbousi’s dismissal is related to competition between political blocs, not to public sentiment, and it is clear that there is no real political desire for that. So this is not an issue at this time.

The Cradle: What about the corruption allegations targeting Halbousi and his party in Anbar, such as the seizure of millions of meters of government land? You were involved in this operation, so what is your take on it?

Mouanes: This case is very important. It is more than the theft of money, rather, it represents the establishment of a political project. We are talking here about a crime greater than the “theft of the century” (a corruption scandal involving more than $3 billion).

There is another corruption file related to some areas of Fallujah that we will announce soon. This is not targeting a specific person as much as it is targeting corruption, and we will expose any corruption file, even if it is in our own areas. We are determined to prevent the waste of public money and honor our oath in parliament.

The Cradle: There seems to be a political dispute between PM Sudani and Speaker Halbousi. Do you think that there is a possibility that the latter could be dismissed?

Mouanes: Disagreement is normal, and there are efforts to end it, and it seems that things are going toward reconciliation. But let me make it clear that we are with Sudani in that the executive and legislative branches should not encroach on one another. We will stand in the face of any intrusion from any side.

The Cradle: We have heard about Iraq’s efforts to move away from the domination of the US dollar. How can this be achieved?

Mouanes: The current system of selling oil and transferring 100 percent of those revenues to the US Federal Bank – under the pretext of protecting Iraqi funds – is unsustainable. We need to develop real economic foundations to advance our country and break free from the dollar’s hegemony.

It is clear that Iraq is economically dominated by the US, and our government does not truly control or have access to its own money. This is evident in the new banking restrictions on Iraqi dollar bank accounts, any and all banking transactions in dollars, and America’s imposition of an electronic platform to register all Iraqi currency exchanges. 

Currently, most of Iraq’s foreign investment generation is limited to the lucrative energy sector, ignoring other vital sectors such as agriculture, industry, and tourism. It is time for Iraq to diversify its sources, basket, and storage of currency, especially given that the whole world is moving in this direction.

The Iraqi dinar must be strengthened and consolidated within Iraq as the primary currency used in transactions and ultimately be part of the basket of international currencies. As an oil-rich country that exports about four million barrels daily, we have a strong financial situation that can be leveraged to increase the value of the dinar in the market.

We believe that it is crucial to move away from the hegemony of the dollar, especially as it has become a tool to impose sanctions on countries. It is time for Iraq to rely on its local currency or at least diversify its sources of income.

The Cradle: Do you think Sudani’s efforts to replace ministers, governors, and hundreds of senior positions in the government will be successful?

Mouanes: One advantage of not being tied to any political agreement is that we have the freedom to make decisions without any alliance commitments. Sudani has set standards in his government program and identified shortcomings in the performance of some governors and ministers, and it is his responsibility to make changes.

It is normal for some political blocs to resist these changes as they try to maintain their entitlements. We have always advocated for ministers to be selected by the prime minister and not by their political blocs. Therefore, I believe that Sudani’s efforts to make changes are right, and we support him as long as we know the reasons behind the changes.

Sudani has assured us that he is not restricted by party or sectarian affiliations and that his changes will affect everyone who proves negligent. However, we reject any external international interference in Iraqi affairs or in the process of changing ministers. If such interference occurs, the prime minister should take a firm stance against it, as we entered the political process to lift tutelage and stop its imposition on the country.

The Cradle: Do you think the American delay in inviting Sudani to Washington indicates US suspicion toward him and his political program? Is this good or bad for Iraq?

Mouanes: The prime minister should assert his position in meetings as he represents the face of our country. We do not view the American people as enemies, but we are opposed to reckless US policies that impact Iraq’s interests adversely.

The government has the right to communicate with those it deems to be in the general interest of Iraq. However, the importance of Sudani’s visit to the US depends on its purpose. Is it just a ceremonial visit, or to discuss critical issues facing Iraq? And will Iraq benefit from the discussion of these issues with the Americans?

Given the ongoing US presence in Iraq, we do not see the importance of a Washington visit as much as a visit to Beijing, for example, as strengthening and diversifying relations with China would be more economically beneficial for us. Ultimately, the decision is up to the prime minister for the best interests of Iraq.

The views expressed in this article do not necessarily reflect those of The Cradle.

The clash of two cities: Erbil, Sulaymaniyah, and the future of Iraq’s Kurdistan

March 16 2023

The most successful Kurdish political experiment in West Asia is unravelling due to increasing divisions between the KDP and PUK, the two biggest political parties in Iraqi Kurdistan.

From right to left: Kurdistan Democratic Party leader (KDP) Masoud Barzani, Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) party leader Bafel TalabaniPhoto Credit: The Cradle

By Zaher Mousa

Iraq’s Kurds, as with other mainly Iranic populations across western and southern Asia, are busy preparing to celebrate Nowruz on March 21, the Persian new year which marks the beginning of Spring.

But this year’s festivities will be marred by a conflict raging between political and military forces in the city of Sulaymaniyah – stronghold of the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) – and between Sulaymaniyah and Erbil – stronghold of the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP ). To complicate matters further, Iraq’s central government in Baghdad has been drawn into this conflict with the semi-autonomous Kurdish region.

These fiery disputes have burned through the patience and loyalties of Iraqi Kurds, who have watched their political representatives lock horns over virtually everything: the relationship with Baghdad, oil production and revenues, the public sector salary crisis, the conflict between Turkey and Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) militants, and disunity within the region’s vital institutions in their respective strongholds. 

Kurdish internal ‘division and discontent’

Last February, an opinion poll conducted by Erbil-based research firm Sheekar Research, which is funded by the US National Endowment for Democracy, revealed that just over half of respondents (50.7 percent) believe they would be better off if the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) was dissolved and central authority from Baghdad was re-established.

The reasons cited by polls participants were the KRG’s deteriorating financial and service conditions, general administrative failure, and widespread corruption. In the PUK’s stronghold,, 64 percent of respondent supported dissolving the Kurdish administration, and 59 percent said they would not participate in demonstrations urged against the federal government in Baghdad.

The survey polled 1,000 people across Iraqi Kurdistan, and included a high proportion of the region’s government employees.

Respondents were also asked about how they view recent decisions by the federal supreme court against the KRG. Last February, the Baghdad court ruled that Iraqi Kurdistan’s oil and gas law was unconstitutional, which threw its contracts with international oil companies into legal jeopardy.

A plurality of survey respondents (46 percent) viewed the court’s decision as “illegal” and “issued against” Iraqi Kurdistan. Yet, most respondents either supported (10 percent) or expressed neutrality (42 percent) over the rulings, as they felt the court was primarily punishing the KDP and PUK.

The survey also asked who shoulders the responsibility for the KRG’s apparent weakness in Baghdad. A fifth of respondents (21 percent) blamed the KDP and the PUK, while a further 47 percent blamed all Kurdish political parties – including the ruling duopoly and opposition groups. One-third of respondents were unsure.

The poll, published by the semi-official Iraqi newspaper Al-Sabah and other Iraqi and Arab newspapers, led to an escalation of tension between Baghdad and the KRG. Iraqi government Spokesman Basim al-Awwadi called the Al-Sabah report an ‘opinion piece’ that did not represent Baghdad’s view.

However, the head of the Kurdish opposition New Generation Movement (NGM) bloc, Sarwa Abdel Wahed, confirmed in a television interview that the federal government had been subjected to significant pressure from Kurdistan to retract the poll and apologize for its publication.

Power struggle within the PUK

Since the late 1970s, Sulaymaniyah has been a political and military stronghold for the PUK, which had been founded by former Iraqi president (2005-2014) Jalal Talabani in 1975. After Jalal’s death in 2017, his wife Hero Ibrahim assumed party leadership for three years before that position became violently contested between his son Bafel Talabani (head of Kurdistan’s counter-terrorism affairs) and his nephew Lahur Jangi Talabani (heads one of Kurdistan’s two intelligence services).

In February 2020, the PUK’s leadership council elected both men as co-chairs of the party. The partnership did not last long. An assassination attempt against Bafel and two party leaders ended in accusations against Lahur for the poisonings.

In July 2021, Bafel ousted Lahur from the co-presidency, stripped him of his posts, dismissed officials loyal to him, and had Sulaymaniyah’s judiciary issue an arrest warrant for him and his two brothers.

But Lahur’s popularity among the region’s security and military institutions was something Bafel had not yet addressed, and security tensions broke out in the city. Violent clashes between the two parties erupted repeatedly, culminating, most notably, in the assassination of Officer Hawkar Al-Jaf in Erbil on July 10, 2022. Meanwhile, accusations against Lahur for planning assassination plots and establishing armed groups continued.

The most recent political agitation took place on 14 March, when KDP sources announced an assassination attempt against Wesi Barzani, the youngest son of its former president Massoud Barzani, the single most influential figure in the KRG. The KDP accused Bafel Talabani of the attack because Erbil backs his cousin Lahur in their conflict.

Since the outbreak of the PUK’s war of succession, the KDP in Erbil – its historical partner in governing the Kurdish region – has supported Lahur Talabani. This unvoiced loyalty was demonstrated by KRG Prime Minister Masrour Barzani – after the killing of Officer Al-Jaf – when he demanded pro-Bafel security service leaders be arrested in Sulaymaniyah. Furthermore, Erbil’s judicial authority has supported Lahur’s appeal against the procedures that led to his dismissal from the PUK’s co-chairmanship.

Bipartisan disputes

The succession dispute, however, is by no means the only major impediment in the relationship between Iraqi Kurdistan’s two most important cities and political parties. They also have acute differences over the KRG’s election law and the falsification of voter data, which has led to the postponement of the region’s parliamentary elections for over a year.

The two parties also differ on their relationship with the PKK in Qandil mountains and the Kurdish, US-backed Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) in northeastern Syria. The PUK supports the activities of the PKK, while a Turkish-KDP alliance to siphon off Iraqi oil has the Barzanis at odds with the PKK, designated by Ankara as a Kurdish terrorist group.

The dispute between the two parties further intensified over the selection of a candidate for Iraq’s presidency (which is reserved for a Kurd) after the country’s 2021 elections. The position has been filled by either Jalal Talabani, Fuad Masum, or Barham Salih since 2003 – all PUK politicos – in exchange for KDP candidates being assigned the presidency of the Kurdistan region.

On October 13, 2022, Iraq’s parliament elected Abdul Latif Rashid as president of the republic after a bitter struggle with the KDP’s Masoud Barzani, who tried to nominate his uncle Hoshyar Zebari, a former foreign minister (2004-2014) and the regional interior minister, Rebar Ahmed Barzani.

As a result of these differences, KRG Deputy Prime Minister Qubad Talabani – younger brother of Bafel – and his party’s ministers boycotted the meetings of the regional government. Baghdad is now trying to heal the rift between Sulaymaniyah and Erbil by increasing the Kurdistan region’s share of state revenues and finding a solution to the unlawful sale of Iraqi oil by the KRG.

In this context, Baghdad has referred a draft law to Iraq’s parliament to create the Halabja Governorate in Kurdistan. This will increase the number of governorates in the KRG to four (Erbil, Dohuk, and Sulaymaniyah), will lead to greater financial allocations for the Kurdistan region in the federal budget, and  strike a more equitable budget balance between the two parties.

Can Kurdistan ever be united?

Keeping the Kurdistan region united and cohesive is a major US objective in Iraq, and is repeatedly emphasized by Washington. Efforts are currently underway to find a solution to the dispute between Baghdad and Erbil over the KRG’s unlawful sale of Iraqi oil outside of central government authority. In both 2022 and 2023, the Federal Court issued decisions obligating the KRG to hand over oil revenues to Baghdad, and invalidating the unlawful oil and gas law in force in Iraqi Kurdistan.

The political agreement which was struck to form the government of Iraq’s current Prime Minister Muhammad Shia al-Sudani, includes the enactment of a federal law that regulates the process of extracting and selling oil and gas; the implementation of the constitution’s Article 140 (determining the administrative authority over disputed Iraqi areas); resolving the issue of internally displaced people (900 thousand are displaced in Iraqi Kurdistan); and the implementation of the 2020 “Sinjar AgreementSinjar Agreement” between Erbil and Baghdad to remove the PKK from the Sinjar district in the Nineveh Governorate.

The prime minister’s visit to Erbil this week was an effort to resolve outstanding issues and bridge gaps between competing Kurdish agendas. Sudani met with officials from the two rival parties and the opposition NGP to gain approval for the federal general budget for the years 2023, 2024, and 2025, before referring the bill to Parliament.

Sudani aspires to strengthen his position as prime minister by satisfying all parties, including those in the KRG, whose political parties collectively represent 59 of Iraq’s 329 parliamentary seats. He has moved quickly. On 13 March, Sudani announced an agreement to end the dispute over the oil revenues – on the same day the KRG’s Ministry of Finance received 400 billion dinars (around $274 million) from Baghdad to pay government employee salaries.

While the agreement details are still “unclear,” political sources say its most prominent breakthrough appears to be the payment of KRG oil revenues into the Iraqi financial system, via a designated account in the Iraqi Trade Bank. This will – for now at least – allow Baghdad to see, but not touch, KRG energy revenues.

According to the sources, these measures come in response to conditions set by the US in advance of Sudani’s scheduled visit to Washington in the next few days.

The views expressed in this article do not necessarily reflect those of The Cradle.

Deputy FMs of Turkey, Syria, Iran, Russia to Meet Next Week

March 8, 2023

Iran FM Hussein Amir Abdollahian in a joint press conference with his Turkish counterpart Mevlut Cavusoglu

Source: Agencies

The Islamic Republic of Iran warns all states to act intelligently towards the behavior of the fake Israeli regime and not to allow Zionists to set their feet in the Caucasus region, Iran Foreign Minister underlined.

Hussein Amir-Abdollahian made the remarks in a joint press conference with his Turkish counterpart Mevlut Cavusoglu on Wednesday.

Amir-Abdollahian expressed his sympathy and solidarity with the Turkish people and government over the recent deadly earthquake.

From the first hours of the earthquake, the Leader of the Islamic Revolution and the President issued strict orders for solidarity and help to the Muslim people of Turkey, he said, adding that the Red Crescent of Iran, the Army, and the IRGC entered the earthquake-affected areas, and offered services and provide accommodation, and medical assistance.

“Today we had important talks about the importance of developing economic and trade relations,” Amir-Abdollahian said, adding that in the past years, Iran-Turkey trade volume has witnessed an increase due to the will of the leaders of the two countries.

“One of our main concerns is environmental and water issues, and we agree on the importance of continued access of Iran and the people of the western regions of the country to the Aras River,” he also noted.

“When it comes to regional transportation corridors, including the corridors between Iran and Turkey, we emphasize regional partnership instead of the regional competition,” he also said.

Iran, Turkey entitled to defend themselves against terrorists

Referring to the high-level security cooperation between Iran and Turkey regarding the issue of the fight against terrorism, Amir-Abdollahian said, adding, “We consider Turkey’s security as our security.”

Terrorists based in Iraq’s Kurdistan region and ISIL terrorists based in Afghanistan are among common concerns of Tehran and Ankara, he stressed.

Under international law, Iran and Turkey reserve the right to defend against any terrorist act or group, he noted.

Zionists serious threat to regional peace, stability

Amir-Abdollahian also reiterated Tehran’s position about Zionists’ presence in the Caucasus region, saying, “We consider the presence of Zionists in the region as a serious threat to the peace and stability of the region.”

The Islamic Republic of Iran warns all parties to act intelligently towards the behavior of the fake Israeli regime and prevent  Zionists from setting their feet on the region, he underlined.

Referring to the recent agreement reached between Ankara and Baghdad, he said that Iran welcomes participation in any quadrilateral meeting of Iran, Russia, Turkey, and Syria.

“We also reached a consensus on holding the tripartite meeting between Iran, Turkey, and the Republic of Azerbaijan,” he also added.

Deputy FMs of Turkey, Syria, Iran, Russia to meet next week

Cavusoglu, for his part, said that his Iranian counterpart Amir-Abdollahian wanted to join the talks between Turkey, Syria, and Russia, and Turkey happily agreed.

“Astana is the only surviving format (to address) Syria anyway. Now we are planning a meeting between the four foreign ministers,” Cavusoglu added.

“Russia offered to host a preliminary meeting for the preparations of this four-way meeting. This meeting will be held at the level of deputy ministers next week in Moscow,” he also said.

Elsewhere in his remarks, the Turkish diplomat thanked Iran and its people for their continuous support for the quake-hit people of Turkey.

After the earthquakes in Turkey, Iran acted quickly by sending tents, relief teams, and setting up field hospitals, he said.

Kurdish parties behind attack on Iranian MoD complex: Nour News

Feb 1, 2023

Source: Nour News

By Al Mayadeen English 

Iran’s Nour News reveals that elements from Iraqi Kurdistan collaborated with a foreign intelligence service in executing the Isfahan attack.

Picture from the drone attack on the complex of Iran’s Ministry of Defense in Isfahan. (Reuters)

In an exclusive report, Iran’s Nour News, which is affiliated with Iran’s Supreme National Security Council, said the small-scale UAV used in the attack on the Ministry of Defense workshop complex in Isfahan was assembled and used in an equipped workshop, with the assistance of trained forces, after being transferred to the country by Kurdish opposition groups.

According to the news outlet, parts of small-scale UAVs, as well as explosive materials, entered Iran with the support and guidance of Kurdish opposition groups based in Iraq’s Kurdistan region.

Read next: Iran summons Ukrainian envoy for expressing joy over Isfahan attack

Additionally, upon orders from a foreign security service, and after receiving parts of the UAVs and explosive materials, the group smuggled them from one of the inaccessible routes in the northwest of Iran, and delivered them to a liaison in one Iran’s border cities, according to the outlet. 

It adds that the parts and materials were assembled in an equipped workshop using trained forces, and were used for the sabotage attack against the workshop complex.

Read next: Iranian TV: Isfahan military complex suffered only minor damage

A few days earlier, the Iranian Defense Ministry announced that it successfully thwarted a drone attack on a defense industrial complex in the central Iranian province of Isfahan.

In a released statement, the Ministry said one of three Micro Aerial Vehicles (MAVs) attacking the defense equipment manufacturing complex in Isfahan was downed by a defense system stationed inside the facility.

According to the statement, two other MAVs exploded after being caught in traps set by the system, pointing out that the unsuccessful attack failed due to the preparedness of the defense system stationed in the region.

Videos circulating on social media showed the moment the complex’s defense system repelled the attack.

#BREAKING:

Explosion was heard in #Isfahan city, Isfahan Province of #Iran

It happened in an ammunition manufacturing center of the Iranian regime’s ministry of defense.#Iranian #iranunderattack #iranexplosions pic.twitter.com/kGU86swhCt

— Pak Afghan Affairs (@Pak_AfgAffairs) January 29, 2023

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Russian-Turkish Partnership in the Area of Another Turkish-Syrian Crisis

JANUARY 6, 2023

Posted by INTERNATIONALIST 360° 

Alexandr Svaranc
In today’s geopolitical dynamics, Russia and Turkey maintain a relevant regional presence in strategically important regions of the Near and Middle East, where the interests of the two powers can combine and diverge. However, the ruling elites have a high sense of maintaining a balance of power, respecting national interests, avoiding the prospect of radicalization of conflict situations and seeking decoupling to strengthen regional peace and mutually beneficial cooperation.

It should be recognized that the administrations of Presidents Vladimir Putin and Recep Tayyip Erdoğan have so far succeeded in finding relatively acceptable solutions to crisis situations through constructive dialogue, guiding the diplomacy of the two countries towards finding joint solutions on the same issue of Syria, overcoming the burden of historical stereotypes and building a new example of a worthy partnership.

In this context, Russia and Turkey have established a number of effective negotiating platforms (in particular the Astana, Sochi and Geneva summits in multilateral and bilateral formats). Russia understands the concerns of Turkish partners on key issues of Turkey’s national security (including ethnic separatism, external threats to territorial integrity and international terrorism). Russia, given its economic, resource, technological, intellectual and military-industrial strength, does not set out to suppress its important geographical neighbor. On the contrary, Moscow is developing a high level of strategic partnership in all the aforementioned areas, making a significant contribution to stabilizing Turkey’s financial and economic situation and strengthening its defense potential, and expects to expand trade with the ambitious goal of reaching USD 100 billion.

The stability and progress of each country depends not least on border security and the normalization of relations with its immediate neighbors. The political course of Turkey’s ruling Justice Party, led by its charismatic leader Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, proclaimed the “Zero Problems with the Neighbors” strategy in the early 2000s. For the Republic of Turkey, which will celebrate its 100th anniversary in 2023, the tradition of a post-imperial state remains high, where the complex history of the collapse of the Ottoman Empire following World War I was partly transformed into a painful relationship with many of its neighbors, who regained or lost their independence on the wreckage of the collapsed state.

Of course, the declaration of the said strategy without taking into account current realities cannot simultaneously succeed on all directions of Turkey’s borders and requires time and painstaking diplomatic work on bilateral and multilateral levels. At the same time, Turkey has had a number of positive achievements in shaping better relations with Russia, Georgia, Bulgaria and African countries. There is every reason to believe that Ankara is also interested in restoring full-fledged friendly relations with such a key country in the Arab East as Syria.

The peculiarities of the US regional policy in the Middle East have led to widespread destabilization in a number of Arab countries, to the negative phenomenon of the growth of radical Islamic movements with their institutionalization as Al Qaeda and ISIS (both terrorist groups banned in Russia), which eventually led to the chaos in a large part of the Levant. Accordingly, the destabilization of the political situation in the same Syria has provoked ethnic and religious strife, triggered a wave-like flow of a large army of refugees mainly to neighboring Turkey, and caused a significant social and economic crisis which took a heavy toll on the Turkish economy.

For Turkey, the politicization of the Kurdish issue within and near its national borders is an objective concern, forcing the authorities to pursue a tough course to prevent another territorial redistribution and, as a consequence, new social cataclysms in the Near and Middle East. Both Turkey and its reliable partners have to contend with these challenges.

The Russian peacekeeping operation in Syria since fall 2015 has set a new precedent for eliminating the US foreign monopoly in this region. With the arrival of the Russian Air Force, conditions have developed on Syrian territory for more effective interaction with key states in the Near and Middle East (in particular Turkey and Iran) to curb the threat of international terrorism emanating from ISIS (terrorist group banned in Russia) and to find political ways to resolve the accumulated differences in the Syrian-Turkish agenda, combining them with effective peacekeeping operations.

Turkey, which has problems with Kurdish separatism, is very sensitive to attempts to activate the Kurdish militant movement in Syria. This is why, after the Syrian Kurds declared political autonomy in 2014, Ankara recognized the Syrian Kurdish Democratic Union Party (PYD) as a terrorist organization and ally of the PKK, which is banned in Turkey, and the fighting wing of the PYD, the People’s Protection Units (YPG), as a military opponent. Partly due to the Russian presence in Syria, a number of Turkey’s limited military operations in the north have become a reality in order to avoid the creation of quasi Kurdish independent territorial entities capable of intensifying terrorist and separatist threats to Ankara. In particular:

– Operation Euphrates Shield in 2016-2017 (as a result, the cities of Jarablus and al-Bab were subjected to military mop-ups, 2,000 square kilometers of Syrian territory came under Turkish control with the formation of a security buffer zone there);

– Operation Olive Branch in 2018 to prevent the Kurdish-populated cantons of Jazira, Kobani and Afrin from uniting and the Kurds from reaching the Mediterranean Sea (Afrin ended up under full control of Turkish forces);

– Operation Peace Spring in October 2019, with Turkish military and pro-Turkish Free Syrian Army (FSA) units advancing deep into northern Syria, taking control of new population centers – Ras al-Ain and Tel Abyad, cutting the strategic M-4 highway. Thanks to effective negotiations between the Russian and Turkish leaders in Sochi on October 22, 2019, new zones of influence in north-eastern Syria were secured, with the status quo maintained in Turkish-occupied areas and the withdrawal of all Kurdish groups from the entire border with Turkey 30km inland, as well as the establishment of Russian-Turkish patrols in the area.

It should be noted that from operation to operation, Turkey has built up its military forces from special forces units to the use of armored vehicles, artillery and air force with a combination of infantry from the same FSA units, gaining new experience in combat operations in this theater.

In November 2022, with air strikes against Kurdish military bases (in Kobani, Aleppo, Raqqa, al-Hasakah), Turkey announced a new “Operation Claw-Sword” in northern Syria. The formal occasion was the terrorist act of November 13, 2022 in Istanbul’s Istiklal Square, which the Turkish intelligence services recognized to be organized by Kurdish insurgents (in particular the PKK and a Kurdish fighter executor from Syria). Ankara aims to implement a declared plan to establish a 30-kilometer security zone along the entire border with Syria.

Erdoğan has announced his intention to conduct a ground operation involving regular army forces alongside the air operation. He also criticized Russia to a certain extent. Turkey’s leader believes that Moscow has not fully met its obligations under the 2019 Sochi agreements to withdraw Kurds from the 30-kilometer zone. However, the creation of the same “Idlib Security Zone” with Russian participation was, infamously, prevented by the fact that the US refused to withdraw its forces from the zone with the support of local Kurdish forces.

Russia and Turkey have gone a long way towards an effective partnership in the Syrian crisis. Of course, every time Moscow and Ankara make progress in finding new solutions to stabilize the situation in northern Syria, the US, aware of the loss of its own hegemony in the region, finds another form of torpedoing the Russian-Turkish agreements. Accordingly, the Russian-Turkish effective partnership is perceived in Washington as a kind of attack on America’s monopoly and a breakdown of NATO unity, plagued by equally obvious internal contradictions.

Meanwhile, Russia-Turkey relations are progressing with strong results to show for it. Thus, according to Mehmet Samsar, Turkish Ambassador to Russia, the trade turnover between Russia and Turkey by the end of 2022 could be close to USD 50 billion, an increase of USD 15 billion over 2021. The scope of this partnership is expanding: from a gas pipeline to a nuclear power plant, from military and technical cooperation to joint actions for regional peace, from a grain deal to a gas hub. Turkey remains one of the few NATO countries that has not supported total sanctions against Russia in the context of the special military operation in Ukraine, pursues a traditionally pragmatic policy and maintains its role as a reliable partner and effective mediator in relations with its northern neighbor.

The author believes that, in the new year too, the Russian-Turkish situational alliance that has developed in recent years will maintain its momentum of growth, trust and optimization of new opportunities. The coming year 2023 will prove to be a time of intense and important political, economic, military and cultural events in the lives of the two countries. In particular, the next presidential election in Turkey, the launch of ambitious new economic projects (the gas hub, the unblocking of important regional communications, the prospect of a second nuclear power plant near Sinop on the Turkish Black Sea Coast), the establishment of stability in the safe corridor on the Turkish-Syrian border, the approach of peace in the Russian-Ukrainian conflict, etc. All this points to a broader agenda of Russia-Turkey relations, where the parties can complement each other and interact effectively.

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Iran’s 2022: Riots, Drones and Diplomats!

January 4, 2023

Source: Al Mayadeen English

By Karim Sharara 

Between the riots in Iran, the war in Ukraine, and the talks to revive the JCPOA, Iran has certainly had a busy year. Perhaps it would be good for us to look over the year from an eagle’s eye view so that we can get a feel of how 2023 might play out in Iran.

Between riots, drones, and diplomats, 2023 looks like it’s going to be one heck of a year, both for Iran, and the world.

This was certainly a busy year for the world. We left 2021 pondering on the prospects of a possible JCPOA revival (though to be fair, I did say it was highly unlikely it would happen at the time), looking forward to the winter Olympics, and thinking about what would unfold in the newest episodes of Boris Johnson and the party bunch.

But here we are now, amid a war in Ukraine, fully-backed and stoked by NATO, a continued escalation of tensions with China, a cost-of-living crisis in the West (alongside an energy crisis), full-on riots that quickly turned into armed attacks on security forces in Iran, and the death of Barbara Walters.

This has certainly been a whirlwind of a year, so perhaps looking into how things progressed, at least as far as Iran is concerned, could help us get a feel for how 2023 might unwind?

Perhaps the easiest place to start would be the beginning. Looking back into the early days of 2022, one main idea was being repeated in Iranian diplomatic circles on all levels for several months: We are very close to reaching a deal, but the move necessitates a serious, realistic decision by the US.

Really, you’d think the US would’ve been able to make a decision by now. But it isn’t about a sovereign decision so much as it was hoping for a repeat of 2015. Meaning a deal that it can go into and leave at will. 

One of the main reasons the Vienna Talks took so long really goes back to a simple principle. Iran had seen firsthand the consequences of US deception: The US signed the JCPOA, did not implement it, and suffered no consequences, then left it unilaterally and still suffered no consequences, and then sanctioned Iran through its maximum pressure campaign and still, suffered no consequences.

Meanwhile, the EU stood idly by, twiddling its fingers, also failing to abide by its side of the bargain, calling on Iran to implement the deal in full.

For a recap of last year: 2021 Roundup: A JCPOA revival in 2022?

So now, the matter was simple, if the US needed to return to the deal, the Iranians needed to make sure that there would be no loopholes that Washington could use to leave the deal without consequences, and moreover, if that were to happen, then Iran also needed to make sure it could easily go back to where things were before the deal, in terms of the nuclear program.

As far as the US was concerned, there were two main issues driving it to drag its feet…The first was the fact that no loopholes meant that it would become more difficult to leave the deal, as it had been hoping for what Alastair Crooke called “A Pop-in, Pop-out JCPOA”, a doggie door if you will.

The second was due to political circumstances: Biden had been afraid of how the outcome of the Midterm elections might play out, and so was working the two sides by making headway in the talks (which explains the recurring statements that a deal was close to being reached) while also looking out for his administration’s and Democrats’ numbers in the Midterms, so it wouldn’t look like they were being weak on Iran, which the GOP could then exploit to boost its Midterm numbers.

One unforeseen event was the riots in Iran. Although they were stoked by the West – primarily the US, which is trying to push for regime change –if it hadn’t been for the riots, the US would have probably agreed to go back to the deal once the Midterms were done. 

But why would the US go back to the deal if it considers it so binding? The reasoning’s pretty straightforward, and also has to do with geopolitical shifts. The disruption of global energy supplies following Western sanctions on Russia has the West scrambling to look for alternatives to Russian gas and oil, and the EU is pushing for Iran to be brought back to the global energy market, while the US is still dragging its feet, ostensibly hoping at the moment for regime change through the Iran riots. 

Iran riots

Ah yes, the Iran riots, which the West rather impetuously calls protests. It’s funny how when some people take to the streets armed with weapons to use against security forces and civilians, they’re called peaceful protests by Western mainstream media who go out of their way to challenge any narrative that brings any evidence showing the violent intent of the rioters to light. 

Can it get any clearer than the interview that famed war hawk and mustache aficionado John Bolton had with BBC Persian’s Rana Rahimpour? 

Bolton, of all people, went out of his way to show that the rioters were being armed by weapons being smuggled from Iraqi Kurdistan, while the BBC Persian host, Rana Rahimpour, of all people, went out of her way to change subjects while also ‘correcting’ Bolton that there was no evidence to the rioters being armed, which led to Bolton replying that they indeed were, as videos on social media clearly showed (You can find the 8-minute video of the interview here, the part I’m referring starts at 5:16. However, it’s in Farsi, so you may want to get your Iranian friend to translate it for you over some Chelo Kebab and Doogh).

Former US National Security Advisor John Bolton said on UK state owned BBC Persian that the Iranian opposition is armed. The BBC Persian host tried to refute him & change the topic.

Meanwhile, the terrorists shoot at the armed forces & send footage to US state owned Persian TV! pic.twitter.com/TWa7Iy4euY— Seyed Mohammad Marandi (@s_m_marandi) November 9, 2022

By the way, this was the same Rana Rahimpour who just a few days earlier had an audio leaked from a conversation with her mother, saying that some media outlets (namely the Saudi-funded Iran International) were clearly working toward an end goal of weakening and dividing Iran.

Or how about the blatant way in which none other than famed media personality, broom-riding extraordinaire, and lover of gingerbread houses, the US-paid, VOA-employed, and friendly neighborhood spider woman Masih Alinejad was pushing for more riots in Iran, and constantly calling for even more sanctions against her own country, whose people were suffering because of the US-imposed sanctions.

The #CIA-backed instigator, #MasihAlinejad, is making a lot of money in exchange for inciting violence in #Iran and even using victims’ mothers to provoke more riots in the country. pic.twitter.com/k4svccmz96— Al Mayadeen English (@MayadeenEnglish) November 20, 2022

Perhaps it’s telling that the same countries that have sanctioned Iran for its ‘crackdown’ on ‘protestors’ had earlier resorted to more forceful measures in their crackdown on actual, unarmed protestors in their countries. It may be useful for us to remember Canada and its crackdown on anti-vaccine mandate protestors, which went as far as to freeze their bank accounts. How about Freedom Convoy protestors? Or how about the French police’s violence against protestors and racism against minorities? Or how about Australian police shooting anti-lockdown protestors?

It’s understandable from the Western point of view of course: You see Iranians are so ‘repressed by their government’ that they’re not allowed to leave their homes once they finish working, and by ‘protesting’ they’re actually running and getting their fair share of exercise; but Europeans get enough exercise as it is, so police aren’t actually using violence! They’re sparring with them because they’re so physically fit and need the challenge!

But seriously, let’s keep in mind that the West cannot expect the riots to end and for Iran to go back to how things were before pre-riots. Germany, France, the UK, Saudi Arabia, “Israel”, and the US all stoked the riots, overtly supporting them. Although Iran is very pragmatic, it also possesses a very good collective memory, and diplomatic relations and economic opportunities won’t mean that it will forego hostile actions taken against it.

Of course, that’s not to forget the impact that the war on Ukraine left on Western-Iranian relations, which further cemented Iran’s pivot to the Global South.

The war in Ukraine

Although at the start of the war in Ukraine, relations between Iran and the West went unaffected, they devolved as the war progressed on account of Western accusations that Iran had sent Russia drones for use against Ukraine. The problem for the West wasn’t that Iran denied supply of the drones for use during the war; as far as they were concerned, they were dead set on implicating Iran against Ukraine, regardless of the circumstances, rather it was that the drones were very effective in a battleground the West was using to test out its own arsenal.

Just to be clear, Iran’s stance on the war in Ukraine is still unchanged. It’s only natural that Tehran would want to further its ties with Moscow as part of its strategy to deepen its ties with the Global South and push for a new world order of multilateralism. That doesn’t mean that it ever supported the war in Ukraine, as in fact it said it was against the war, favoring a diplomatic resolution, but made it clear NATO was the party who instigated the war through its attempts to expand eastward.

To put things in perspective, Iran’s ties with Russia will only grow in the future, regardless of the war in Ukraine. The focus on Iran and the Global South creating international and regional institutions to counter US hegemony is only set to increase amid NATO’s policy to create new coalitions and alliances in Central Asia and the Asia Pacific. Moreover, the war in Ukraine served to stretch the US’ forces around the world even thinner, as it continues to make overtures against China in the Asia Pacific, while also announcing support for “Israel” and the normalization process in West Asia, in a bid to create an anti-Iran coalition. This is perhaps best evidenced during a recent June 24, 2022, policy speech made by former US Secretary of State Mike Pompeo at the Hudson Institute:

“Moving past our current geo-strategic focus, the United States must help in building of the three lighthouses for liberty. These beacons should be centered on nations that have great strife: Ukraine, ‘Israel’, and Taiwan. They can be the hubs of new security architecture that links alliances of free nations globally, reinforcing the strengths of each member state, in time, linking these three bastions with NATO, as well as the new and expanded security framework for the Indo-Pacific will form a global alliance for freedom. This will benefit America.”

Although it might be a bit difficult to hear someone who used the words ‘lie, cheat, and steal’ in the same context as a mugger would talk about “lighthouses for liberty”, this person — by a rather strange twist of fate and improbable circumstances, without a doubt due to a great disturbance in the force brought on by the birth of the antichrist — was a decision-maker in the former US administration, and apparently what he says has some measure of weight.

Maybe it is also telling, in this regard, that Pentagon upgraded its security ties with “Israel”, making it a full military partner, meaning that “Israel” has been transferred to CENTCOM, in a development that hasn’t happened in the US military establishment since 1948 (go figure, Pompeo might have been right!).

The Pentagon announcement made it clear that both were preparing for a potential war against Iran by both elevating “Israel’s” position and paving the way for a regional alliance against Iran.

“The easing of tensions between ‘Israel’ and its Arab neighbors subsequent to the ‘Abraham Accords’ has provided a strategic opportunity for the United States to align key partners against shared threats in the Middle East. ‘Israel’ is a leading strategic partner for the United States, and this will open up additional opportunities for cooperation with our US Central Command partners while maintaining strong cooperation between ‘Israel’ and our European allies,”.

Ok, so where does this leave us next year?

If we ever thought 2022 would be uneventful, then brace yourselves for next year! Russian, Iranian military cooperation is still in its early stages, as is a cooperation between Iran and Asian powers that would prefer a multilateral world order. It is without a doubt that we will see an increase in tensions around the globe, but West Asia hinges on the provocations of a very important actor: The Israeli occupation.

How the Israeli occupation’s incoming government, the most extremist to date, chooses to deal with Palestine and the Resistance Factions will leave a great impact on the region as a whole. 

Sure, we can opine on whether or not the JCPOA might be revived, because it’s still comatose, regardless of what the Americans say in the media; but the most significant variable, and certainly the hottest flashpoint as of the beginning of this new year in West Asia, is Palestine. If the Palestinian Resistance continues its victory streak and manages to pacify the Israeli occupation, then it is assured that “Tel Aviv” will seek to increase its regional power through alliances, while continuing to work for the next few years: Biding time until it overhauls its airforce, waiting for a change in the US administration that places “Israel” higher up on its list of priorities, and attempting to destabilize Iran’s domestic through intelligence, while at the same time attempting to drag the US into a regional war that it is wholeheartedly against.

As for the riots in Iran, they’re not completely over, yes they’ve fizzled out to a large extent, but it wouldn’t be farfetched to expect that Iran may have some changes in store on the domestic scene. That’s not to say the hijab law will be removed because of pressure from the riots, that is a resounding no, but what’s going to change is how the law is enforced.

Aside from the riots, a more interesting development for Iran was certainly the unfolding of Merkel’s confessions on the Minsk agreements. The whole point behind the color revolution that happened in Ukraine and the subsequent Minsk agreements was not appeasing Russia, inasmuch as it was about buying time for Ukraine and disarming Russia. This was the same trap that the Iranian team fell into during the 2015 JCPOA when it agreed to restrict its arms exports for years (five years for heavy arms, and eight for ballistic missiles). Though thankfully, Iran never stopped expanding its drone and ballistic missile program, although it would have been in a more advanced position now had it not agreed to that at the time.

This time, Iran will go into the talks with Merkel and the Minsk accords in mind, and an eye out for Western attempts to disarm it or pull the rug from under its feet.

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Our Agents in Erbil Told Us that Qassem Soleimani Is in the City…The Morale of Our Fighters Collapsed

January 4, 2023 

By Abir Kanso

Explosion Hits US Military Training Center in Erbil

December 18, 2022

Iraqi media reported an explosion in a training center and weapons depot used by American forces to train Peshmerga forces in Erbil.

Iraqi sources early Sunday morning reported that a huge explosion was heard in the Khabat district in Erbil province.

According to Sabereen News, the reason for the terrible explosion has not been determined yet.

Referring to the flight of the American military plane over the incident site, Sabreen News added that the explosion occurred in a training center and weapons warehouse used by the American forces to train Peshmerga forces in Erbil.

No more details have been released about the damage or possible casualties.

Source: Agencies

A US tool against Iran: Kurdish militancy on the Iran-Iraq border

US and Israeli-backed armed Kurdish separatists on the Iraqi border have participated in every incident of Iranian domestic strife, from 2009 to 2022.

December 15 2022

Photo Credit: The Cradle

By The Cradle’s Iraq Correspondent

After hours of traveling around the Iraqi border between the autonomous Kurdistan Region of Iraq (KRI) and Iran, you will come to a single conclusion: “This is a one-sided border.”

Since April 2003, after the illegal US invasion of Iraq, West Asia transformed into a vast playground for an array of foreign states and entities. Among them are Iranian Kurdish separatist parties and organizations stationed in northern Iraq.

Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) often targets the sites of these armed militias with airstrikes because of the separatist threat they pose. But why are these groups even based in Iraq, and do Baghdad and Erbil play any direct role in hosting militias that target Iranian territory?

These questions persist – unanswered – bar the ever-present Iranian military responses, as in September when the IRGC carried out targeted drone and missile strikes against separatist Kurdish militias for 13 consecutive days.

When the operation concluded on 7 October, the IRGC announced it had achieved its goals,” but warned that it “will resume its operations, if the threat to Iran’s national security returns again.”

Iranian Kurdish separatists

The most prominent of these Kurdish militias is the Kurdistan Free Life Party (Partiya Jiyana Azad a Kurdistanê – PJAK), whose activities against Iranian interested suddenly escalated after the US occupation of Iraq.

After 2004, PJAK appeared for the first time as an armed force, in the same areas controlled by the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) led by Abdullah Ocalan. The PKK are primarily based in the Qandil Heights in the far north-east of Iraq, which lies within the Zagros Mountain range that extends deep into Iranian territory.

The “East Kurdistan Forces” are the military arm of the anti-Iran Kurdish militia, and its fighters are estimated to be between 800 and 1,200, most of them from Syria, Iraq, Turkey, Iran and various Kurdish regions.

In a series of articles published in The New Yorker in 2006, journalist Seymour Hersh revealed that the US and Israel were training this party and supporting it financially and with intelligence in order to undermine Tehran.

Shortly after its invasion of Iraq, the administration of US President George W. Bush began a covert program to train and equip PJAK, with Israeli assistance. “The group has been conducting clandestine cross-border forays into Iran,” Hersh reported, as “part of an effort to explore alternative means of applying pressure on Iran.”

Taking advantage of social unrest

The recent and on-going unrest witnessed in a number of Iranian cities following the death of the young Iranian-Kurdish woman, Mahsa Amini, while in police custody on 16 September, provided an opportunity for PJAK and other Kurdish separatist parties to step up their subversive activities.

The Cradle’s Iraq correspondent was able to reach sites targeted by IRGC in the town of Koysanjak (60 km east of Erbil, the capital of the KRI) near the Iranian border, and to approach one of the largest camps of PJAK in one of the town’s valleys, surrounded by a mountain range.

It is almost impossible for journalists to reach these sites, so we had to travel disguised, alongside local villagers and with a Kurdish coordinator who arranged our visit. The militia fighters often shop in villages surrounding the camp.

However, “their goal is not to shop, but to carry out security and intelligence operations that the ruling Kurdistan Democratic Party in Erbil turns a blind eye to,” confirms a shepherd who moonlights as a tobacco and fuel smuggler on both sides of the border.

He estimates the number of fighters here to be just over 1,000, The mountains provide a comfortable and secure space to carry out their military activities, which include daily exercises and a live-fire military drill in the Autumn.

‘Dangerous dreamers’

Our source calls the PJAK fighters “dreamers” because their military arsenal dates back to the 1950s, and includes light weapons, explosive devices, mortars, and anti-vehicle mines. “The Americans will not give these people modern weapons,” adds the smuggler, who fought in the Iran-Iraq war in the 1980s, and has experience in traversing the rugged border terrain.

Nevertheless, he warns that these people are “dangerous,” with “Eastern Kurdistan Forces” now transitioning to security work and “management of operations” inside Iran. Their work is conducted in cooperation with special forces from the Peshmerga of the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) and the “coalition” forces (which are mainly US troops).

This cooperation is not new, and has accompanied every major incident of internal civil strife witnessed by Iran since at least 2009, including turmoil in 2016, 2017, 2019, 2020, and most recently, 2022.

In the past two years, PJAK’s activity has ceased to be purely military, and “we see its fighters accompanying guests. It is true that they disguise themselves, but we are not naive,” the Iraqi source says, adding, however, that the Kurdistan region “will not reap a profit from this game as usual.”

Iraqi Kurdish links to PJAK

Officially, the KDP and the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK), which are the two main political parties in the Kurdistan region, deny any connection with PJAK. However, Kurdish leaders acknowledge the existence of “coordination,” “transmission of messages,” and “exchange of information” with the militia group. The KDP has previously called on PJAK and PKK to lay down their arms.

Certainly, it would be difficult – if not impossible – for PJAK to manage activities of this magnitude on Iraqi territory, and to globally market themselves as “freedom fighters,” without the collusion and support of both Kurdish and Iraqi authorities.

A high-ranking Iranian diplomatic source with experience in Baghdad for more than ten years, confirms the existence of a tripartite committee that includes representatives from Tehran, Baghdad, and Erbil to exchange information about the “subversive activities” carried out by PJAK against Iran.

The committee does not, however, hold regular meetings, and the Iranians have become convinced that its trouble-shooting initiatives are not serious because of Baghdad’s ineptitude, and because of the involvement of foreign states in supporting the separatists.

This has prompted Tehran to adopt a policy of “force to deter what threatens its national security,” with one or two officials in the Iraqi state being informed half an hour before any Iranian military strike operations commence.

The diplomatic source, who has military experience, adds: “We constantly monitor everyone who visits PJAK sites, the movements of its fighters, all their steps, and the support they receive. We broadcast recordings of the moment of the bombing to assure the separatists and the intelligence services that support them that we know their locations very well.”

Baghdad turns a blind eye

Yet in Baghdad, official sources deny the existence of a tripartite committee, as well as any prior warning of Iranian airstrikes. In fact, a high-ranking Iraqi officer even informed The Cradle that there are headquarters and safe houses for Kurdish separatists and their leaders in both Erbil and Sulaymaniyah, with coordination between PJAK and the PKK.

There is also evidence that the separatist militias are active in illegal, cross-border activities that generate revenues for PJAK which, in turn, enable it to pay its fighters’ salaries. Baghdad is aware of all this, sources say, but turns a blind eye.

Safe-guarding Iran’s territorial integrity

The high-ranking officer claims, nevertheless, that Iraq’s new Prime Minister Muhammad Shia’ al-Sudani is serious about his initiative to establish a new Border Guards Force stationed between the region of Turkiye and Iran, and to prioritize supporting these forces with human resources, weapons, and modern equipment.

But the source has also expressed pessimism over this border venture, and expects the continuation of PJAK’s activities in the mountainous area they know so well.

He points out that Tehran “will not be convinced of the Iraqi field and military measures. The Iranians know our capabilities. The presence of the separatists at their borders will remain a source of security concern. And they told us that they will not stand hands folded in the face of this threat.”

“Practically,” he concludes, “Tehran is the one that controls the borders in the area of ​​the Jasusan mountain range.”

Needless to say, as a sovereign state Iran will adopt a proactive stance in confronting threats to its national security posed by foreign-backed, separatist groups – even though this may undermine the sovereignty of its weaker Iraqi neighbor.

While it is collectively in the interests of Iran, Iraq and indeed Turkiye and Syria to co-ordinate over this mutual ethno-nationalist, separatist, security threat, Baghdad has been too slow to rise to the challenge.

Instead, we may see this process begin first in the Northeast of Syria, where all four states are currently gathered in heightened concern over militarized Kurdish separatism, its foreign sponsors, and the imminent threat of a military confrontation. 

The views expressed in this article do not necessarily reflect those of The Cradle.

As US looting of Syrian oil continues, Damascus turns to protect crops

13 Dec 2022 22:05

Source: The Cradle

By Al Mayadeen English 

It is no news that the US frequently loots tankers of Syrian oil.

US looting Syrian oil

The Cradle reported on Tuesday, citing official Syrian sources, that the US smuggled a new shipment of Syrian oil from the Al-Hasakah Governorate on December 12.

According to the report, the convoy included 37 tanks carried by US military trucks and headed toward Iraq this morning via the illegal Al-Mahmudiyah border crossing in the far northeastern countryside of Syria.

Just a week ago, the US had looted 66 tankers of Syrian oil from the Jazira region and smuggled them into their occupation bases in Iraq. 

The report states that the lootings are in part fueled by an interruption of oil trafficking operations caused by Turkey’s offensive on the US-backed Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) – which are mainly situated in oil-rich regions – in the north.

They may have increased since Turkey began its offensive, but as already known, the lootings have been ongoing for years.

A week ago, reports indicated that Turkish airstrikes targeting the SDF’s main sources of income included two US-occupied oil fields.

https://twitter.com/AZgeopolitics/status/1595030508039450624?ref_src=twsrc%5Etfw%7Ctwcamp%5Etweetembed%7Ctwterm%5E1595030508039450624%7Ctwgr%5E347741ac649fb3fe7b0bb59e0a87ff13b8892ea8%7Ctwcon%5Es1_&ref_url=https%3A%2F%2Fenglish.almayadeen.net%2Fnews%2Fpolitics%2Fas-us-looting-of-syrian-oil-continues-damascus-turns-to-prot

According to an investigation by The Cradle, convoys pass weekly back and forth through illegal crossings. These convoys are often found to be guarded by US warplanes or helicopters.

Shepherds in the area reportedly confirmed these claims as they witness the looting and smuggling of oil to Al-Harir military site in Erbil, the capital of the Iraqi Kurdistan Region (IKR); a region that is likewise reputed for being a recruitment hub for western spy agencies.

The investigation further reveals that the oil is used to support the activities of the Kurdish Autonomous Administration of North and East Syria (AANES), as reported by The Cradle.

The sprees also serve the US in maintaining a strong foothold in the region between Baghdad and Damascus, according to columnist Firas Al-Shoufi who conducted the investigation.

The #US has built quite a reputation with its thievery skills: After #Iraq and #Afghanistan, it's #Syria's turn to fall victim to US hegemony that feeds on the wealth of other countries. pic.twitter.com/Au1I01GhLF

— Al Mayadeen English (@MayadeenEnglish) February 22, 2022

On another note, the Lebanese news outlet Al-Ahed News revealed earlier today that the Syrian government is working to protect vast wheat fields in the Al-Jazira region from being plundered or damaged by US troops.

According to the report, the US occupation has been offering adulterated grains to farmers claiming they are of better quality.

But farmers were quick to realize that the seeds had severely damaged their soil as they were found to contain a “high percentage of infection with nematodes.”

The Syrian government sought to respond to this situation by launching a program that sells wheat and barley seeds at affordable prices. 

In a tweet on December 12, the USAID agency blamed the climate for the damage, in an attempt to downplay the US occupation role in damaging Syria’s soil.

Last year, drought, conflict, and low-quality seeds led to a below-average wheat harvest in northeast Syria, creating a seed shortage for the past planting season and concerns about future harvests and food supplies. 🧺 pic.twitter.com/mv9CGBZ329

— USAID Middle East (@USAIDMiddleEast) December 12, 2022

What is the US doing in Syria?

Besides being an occupation that backs armed groups for its own operations and agenda in the region, the US occupation forces continue to steal Syrian oil by smuggling it from their bases in Syria to their bases in Iraq.

Convoys of tens of vehicles, including tankers loaded with stolen oil from oil fields occupied by US forces in Syria, are frequently seen crossing toward northern Iraq, in addition to trucks loaded with military equipment.

The US interference in the crisis-stricken Middle Eastern country continues to be exposed, from occupation to military agenda and the theft of oil.

Plundering Syria’s oil resources & depriving Syrians of resources

It is noteworthy that Syrian state media has accused over and over again the US and the so-called “Syrian Democratic Forces” (SDF) armed groups of occupying areas in the vicinity of oil-rich fields, smuggling resources to Iraq, and then siphoning them out.

The United States has been for years supporting SDF militias against Damascus, and the US-backed forces are currently occupying parts of the provinces of Al-Hasakah, Deir Ezzor, and Raqqa, where the largest Syrian oil and gas fields are located.

The actions carried out by the United States constitute state piracy with the aim of plundering Syria’s oil resources and depriving the Syrians of their own resources amid a harsh economic situation caused largely by the occupiers, the Americans themselves.

Read more: Syria: sanctions and oil looting cause fuel shortages, 4-day work week

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استراتيجية الأسْرَلة… هكذا وقع الأكراد في الشّرك

الخميس 8 كانون الأول 2022

وليد شرارة  

ترسّخت قناعة في دول المنطقة، بأن الغرب أصبح يعتمد «الورقة الكردية» كوسيلة لزعزعة استقرارها وتهديد وحدتها (أ ف ب)

«نحن حلفاء أميركا الأكثر إخلاصاً في سوريا. لا تنسونا». يعكس هذا العنوان، الذي اختاره مظلوم عبدي، قائد «قوات سوريا الديموقراطية»، لمقاله المنشور في «واشنطن بوست» بتاريخ 3 من الشهر الحالي، المنطق العميق الذي بات يحكم الخيارات الإستراتيجية لقيادات التنظيمات السياسية التي تدّعي تمثيل الأكراد في سوريا والعراق وإيران وتركيا. لا ريب في أن خيار التحوّل إلى قوة وكيلة للتحالف الأميركي – الغربي – الإسرائيلي، تشارك في حروبه المتصاعدة، الحامية أو الهجينة، ضدّ بلدان الإقليم، في مقابل دعمه لتوجّهاتها الانفصالية، لا يلقى إجماعاً البتّة في أوساط الرأي العام الكردي ونخبه السياسية والثقافية. قطاعات معتبرة منهم تعارض مثل هذا الخيار الانتحاري لأنه سيضع الأكراد في مواجهة بقية شعوب المنطقة، وليس الأنظمة السياسية فحسب، ولأنه يضرب عرض الحائط بوشائج الأخوة التاريخية والثقافية – الاجتماعية التي تجمع بينهم وبين هذه الشعوب. إضافة إلى ذلك، هناك الكثير من المعطيات عن وجود خلافات داخل بعض الأحزاب السياسية المشار إليها سابقاً – «حزب العمال الكردستاني» على سبيل المثال -، حول وجاهة خيار الاندراج في إستراتيجية الغرب ضدّ المنطقة، أي أداء وظيفة مطابقة لتلك التي أقيم لأجلها الكيان الصهيوني، انطلاقاً من اعتبارات واقعية في الأساس تذكّر بأن الوجود العسكري الغربي فيها محكوم بالزوال مهما طال أمده، على عكس دول وشعوب المنطقة الباقية على رغم الأزمات التي تعصف بها راهناً.

من المفترض أن يدفع إدراك حقائق التاريخ والجغرافيا، القوى السياسية الحريصة فعلاً على مصالح الشعب الكردي، إلى البحث عن تسويات وتوافقات مع بلدان المنطقة تضمن حقوق هذا الشعب، وتزيل جميع المظالم وأشكال التمييز التي تعرّض لها، من دون تهديد وحدة الكيانات الوطنية القائمة. فعلى الرغم من اختلاف طبيعة أنظمة الحكم في بلدان كسوريا والعراق وإيران وتركيا، ومن الخلافات وحتى الصراعات التي تدور أحياناً بين بعضها البعض، ترسّخت قناعة في أوساط قياداتها ورأيها العام، بأن الغرب أصبح يعتمد «الورقة الكردية» كوسيلة رئيسة من وسائل زعزعة استقرارها وتهديد وحدتها الترابية. لا يعني الكلام المتقدّم رفع المسؤولية عن الأنظمة المتعاقبة في الإقليم عمّا عاناه الأكراد من اضطهاد وتنكيل في حالات عديدة، لكن النقاش ينبغي أن يتمحور حول كيفية توفير الشروط اللازمة لحلول جذرية دائمة تسمح بتغيير الواقع القائم. أمّا الخيار الآخر، أي الاستزلام للغرب المنحدر، والذي تأخذ به التنظيمات الكردية المسلّحة في البلدان الـ4 المشار إليها، فإنه كفيل بتأجيج النزاع بينها وبين هذه البلدان، وحمْل الأخيرة على المزيد من التعاون في ما بينها، للتصدّي لسياسة التخريب والتدمير الغربية وتصفية أدواتها، مع ما قد يترتّب على ذلك من أثمان تدفعها الشعوب، بما فيها الشعب الكردي.

مَن يراهن على «الوفاء» الأميركي مقابل ما قدّمه من خدمات، سيندم ولو بعد حين

فكرة استغلال التناقضات الإثنية والطائفية في المنطقة لإضعاف دولها المركزية بعد الاستقلالات، إسرائيلية في الأساس، ومثّلت جزءاً لا يتجزّأ من «الاستراتيجية الطرفية» التي اتّبعها الكيان الصهيوني منذ خمسينيات وستينيات القرن الماضي، والمرتكزة على السعي للتحالف مع دول الجوار غير العربية، ومع من صنّفهم «أقليات» في داخل البلدان العربية. يشير الصحافي الأميركي، جوناثان رندال، في كتابه الهام «أمّة في شقاق»، إلى أن إسرائيل أقامت علاقات في بداية الستينيات مع الملا مصطفى البرزاني، رئيس «الحزب الديموقراطي الكردستاني»، وقدّمت له دعماً عسكرياً ومالياً كبيراً مع انفجار النزاع بين قواته وبين الجيش العراقي في تلك الفترة، وأن هذه العلاقات شهدت تطوّراً مستمرّاً فيما بعد. غير أن المنعطف الحقيقي في تاريخ توظيف القضية الكردية، كان الدعم النوعي والمتعدّد الأبعاد الذي وفّرته الولايات المتحدة للحركة الكردية في العراق عام 1991، بعد ما سُمّي بـ«حرب تحرير الكويت»، بدءاً بالحظر الجوّي الذي فرضته فوق كردستان، وأتاح تحوّل الأخير إلى إقليم خارج عن سيطرة الدولة العراقية. لقد أشرفت واشنطن على إنشاء شبه دولة كردية في شمال العراق تنامت قوّتها وقدراتها مع مرور الزمن، خاصة بعد الغزو الأميركي عام 2003، والذي كان مقدّمة لإعادة صياغة «الشرق الأوسط» على أسس طائفية وإثنية.

زمرة المحافظين الجدد الصهيونية، التي وقفت خلف هذا المشروع، حاولت تكرار ما جرى بعد اجتياح جيوش الغرب للإقليم إثر الحرب العالمية الأولى، عندما تمّ تقسيمه وزرع إسرائيل في قلبه. اعتبر هؤلاء أن الكيان الكردي الناشئ سيضطلع بمهام وظيفية شبيهة بتلك التي قام بها الكيان الإسرائيلي في سياق عملية التقسيم الجديدة التي خطّطوا لها. وفي الحقيقة، ومن منظور التنظيمات القومية الكردية المسلّحة في البلدان الأخرى كإيران وتركيا، وفي مرحلة متأخّرة سوريا، أضحى هذا الإقليم «قصّة نجاح»، ونموذجاً يُحتذى، وملجأً لبعضها، كالمجموعات الكردية الإيرانية أو التركية، تستخدمه كقاعدة خلفية لعملياتها في تركيا وإيران. التناقضات السياسية والأيديولوجية بين بعض تلك التنظيمات، كـ»حزب العمال الكردستاني» و»الحزب الديموقراطي»، والتي أدت إلى صدامات دموية أحياناً، لم تَحُل دون استبطان الأوّل، وغيره من المجموعات المسلّحة الكردية، لاعتقاد مفاده أن النجاح في تحقيق أهدافها منوط بمدى قدرتها على نسج تحالف مع الولايات المتحدة والغرب. ومن الجدير ذكره، هنا، أن حزب «بيجاك»، الفرع الإيراني لـ»حزب العمال» الناشط ضدّ تركيا، باشر عمله المسلّح ضدّ إيران عام 2004، أي سنة بعد غزو العراق، وأن العديد من قادته وعناصره، كإلهام أحمد مثلاً، انضمّوا فيما بعد إلى «قوات سوريا الديمقراطية»، وساهموا في الدفع نحو توثيق الصلات مع الأميركيين، ومع الإسرائيليين، كما اتّضح في فضيحة تهريب النفط السوري، بعد توقيع عقد لهذه الغاية بين أحمد ورجل الأعمال الإسرائيلي موتي كاهانا (راجع: نفط الشمال السوري بيد إسرائيل!، الأخبار، 15 تموز 2019).

لقد أدّى غزو العراق إلى انتشار مواقع عسكرية ومراكز تدريب للمجموعات المسلّحة الكردية الإيرانية في كردستان، تشنّ منها هجمات على إيران برعاية ومساندة أميركية وإسرائيلية. وقد اتّضح مع الأحداث التي تشهدها إيران أخيراً، حجم الدور الذي تضطلع به هذه المجموعات، وشبكاتها العاملة داخل أراضي الجمهورية الإسلامية. أما «قوّات سوريا الديمقراطية»، فهي استغلّت الحرب الدولية – الإقليمية ضدّ سوريا، ودورها كقوة رديفة للقوات الأميركية في الحرب على «داعش»، لتسيطر على مساحات واسعة من الشرق السوري، وأسهمت في استراتيجية واشنطن لحرمان الدولة السورية من مواردها. استلهمت جميع تلك المجموعات «التجربة الكردية العراقية»، وأهمّ دروسها هو الاندراج في الأجندة الأميركية والسعي إلى بلوغ الغايات الخاصة في إطارها. هي حرصت أيضاً على الإفادة من التناقضات بين دول الإقليم، والتقاطع أحياناً مع بعضها ضدّ بعضها الآخر، للاحتفاظ بمكاسبها وتوسيع هامش مناورتها. لكن المستجدّات المرتبطة بتداعيات الحرب في أوكرانيا على السياق الجيوسياسي الإقليمي، وما نراه من جهود روسية للتقريب بين دمشق وأنقرة، ومن اعتدال في نبرة المعارضة الروسية والإيرانية لتدخّل عسكري تركي ضدّ «قسد» في سوريا، ومن تزامن في توظيف «الورقة الكردية» في إيران وفي تركيا (تفجير إسطنبول)، جميعها عوامل قد تفضي إلى تقاطع أكبر بين دول الإقليم في مواجهة التنظيمات الانفصالية الكردية. مَن يراهن على «الوفاء» الأميركي مقابل ما قدّمه من خدمات، سيندم ولو بعد حين.

من ملف : كردستان الكبرى: الحلم الأسود