Iraqi Kurdistan pays a deadly price for hosting the Mossad

JAN 26, 2024

Source

Israel’s notorious intelligence agency has spent decades infiltrating and sabotaging Arab states. But it has hit a wall in Iraq, a country that hosts the Axis of Resistance and is prepared to fight back hard.

Photo Credit: The Cradle

Just before midnight on 15 January, Erbil, the capital of Iraqi Kurdistan, was rocked by a targeted missile attack by Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC). Eleven Fateh 110 ballistic missiles homed in on the private residence of the affluent and connected Kurdish tycoon Peshraw Dizayee, aged 61, who was killed along with members of his family and a fellow business associate.

The IRGC said in a statement that it hit “one of the main headquarters of the Israeli Mossad in the Kurdistan region of Iraq,” noting that this action was in response to the occupation state’s assassination of leaders within the IRGC and its Axis of Resistance.

“We assure our nation that the Guards’ offensive operations will continue until avenging the last drops of martyrs’ blood,” the IRGC said.

This military strike has roots in the recent assassinations of several IRGC members in Syria, including a high-ranking commander, to which Tehran promised to retaliate. The IRGC also struck ISIS positions in Syria’s restive Idlib province. 

Covert oil connections 

Dizayee, a man of influence with deep connections to Iraqi-Kurdistan’s ruling Barzani clan and the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP), had an estimated wealth of $2.5 billion from founding the Falcon Group, which engaged in diverse sectors including security, oil, gas, construction, and agriculture. 

His pivotal role in facilitating oil exports from Kurdistan to Israel drew attention to his intricate, but illegal ties with Tel Aviv, in addition to the Kurdish security and intelligence apparatus.

Despite Iraqi laws explicitly forbidding any dealings with Israel, reports and experts suggest that a significant portion of Israel’s oil imports — approximately 70 percent, by some accounts — originates from Iraq’s Kurdistan region, at prices 50 percent lower than market values. 
Iraq exports about 3.6 million barrels of oil per day, including 390,000 barrels from oil fields in the Kurdistan region, through the 970-km northern pipeline that stretches from Kirkuk to the Turkish port of Ceyhan, before making its way to Israel.

In 2014, with ISIS taking control of Mosul and large swathes across Iraq, the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) began directly exporting crude oil to Turkiye and selling it on the international markets without going through Baghdad’s State Organization for Marketing of Oil (SOMO) company responsible for all Iraqi oil exports.

Iraqi lawmaker Uday Awad tells The Cradle that these direct oil sales were both illegal and secretive: 

“For years, the Kurdistan region tried to hide oil sales to Tel Aviv, but all shipments to Israeli ports are documented by SOMO which tracked every barrel sold to Israel.”

On 17 February, 2022, the Iraqi Federal Supreme Court ruled that the Kurdistan government’s approval of the oil and gas law in the region was unconstitutional, basing its decision on the KRG’s admission in 2015 — before the US Court of Appeals in a lawsuit filed by Iraq — of unloading oil shipments in Israeli ports.

Israeli influence and intrigue in Iraq

Dizayee’s expansive Falcon Group conglomerate has become a focal point in the Iraq-Israel nexus. Iranian media alleges a web of connections, including EIA, a company purportedly affiliated with the US Census Bureau, nestled within the US Department of Commerce. 

Of particular concern is Falcon Security Company, a subsidiary believed to employ around 600 individuals, primarily former military personnel from the US Army. Speculation swirls that this security arm maintains direct ties with the US Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), serving as a conduit for valuable information gathering on Iraq’s internal affairs.

Speaking on condition of anonymity to The Cradle, Iranian sources claim that Dizayee was a Mossad collaborator in Erbil, orchestrating covert operations and providing logistical support through his vast business empire. Private Iraqi sources corroborate this narrative, and say an intricate Israeli influence network has entrenched itself in Kurdistan, with the Mossad allegedly training groups antagonistic to Iran and the Axis of Resistance. 

Importantly, the focus of these groups reportedly encompasses security operations, including the targeted assassination of scientists engaged in Iran’s nuclear program.

Over the past decades, the Israeli Mossad has persistently worked to establish spy cells across Arab states — whether hostile or friendly — but has continually encountered resistance in Iraq. Notable instances include the case of Ezra Naji Zalka, an Iraqi Jew, whose spy network faced exposure by Iraqi intelligence, leading to their execution in 1969. 

The Mossad, however, received a boost in Iraq facilitated by the illegal 2003 US invasion of the country. The American occupation opened a new chapter for Israel’s espionage and sabotage activities, in which it targeted Iraq’s northern regions to create a strategic vantage point against neighboring countries, particularly Iran.

Mossad objectives extend beyond mere intelligence gathering: Its focus encompasses collecting information on military sites, security installations, and potential threats posed by countries resistant to Tel Aviv’s interests. 

Economic espionage became a key facet, with the Mossad seeking data on investment projects, tourism, agriculture, stock exchanges, and influential businessmen in targeted states.

The scope broadened further with the Mossad’s notoriously engagement in subversive activities, influencing societal values and norms. Accusations range from drug proliferation to the sponsorship of international prostitution networks and involvement in the slave trade. 

Resistance to Zionism and Israeli espionage 

Equipped with cutting-edge technology, the Israeli intel agency strives not only to identify the whereabouts of resistance leaders but also to manipulate public sentiment in its pursuit of broader geopolitical objectives.

Iraqi intelligence services have historically thwarted many of the Israeli penetration activities, particularly in the formation of spy cells in the center and south of the country. 

One such instance was the cell established by Ezra Naji Zalka, an Iraqi Jew who was able to recruit many spies to work for Israel. According to Iraqi government data, there were, at one time, 35 spies in the Zalkha network, including 13 Jews who were identified and captured by Iraqi intelligence. 

Zalkha’s main task at the beginning of his tenure with the Mossad was to collect information about poor Jews in popular neighborhoods, their living conditions, numbers, education, and attitudes on the issue of immigration. His cell later expanded its work to include military and security dimensions and began collecting information on Iraqi institutions.

According to memoirs published last year by Israeli-British historian and Iraqi Jew Avi Shlaim, between 1950 and 1951, the Mossad was linked to five bomb attacks on Jewish targets in an operation known as Ali Baba. The purpose was to instill fear amongst and hostility toward Iraqi Jews from the wider public. This would lead to over 120,000 Jews — at the time, 95 percent of the Jewish population in Iraq — being airlifted to Israel in a mission known as Operation Ezra and Nehemiah.

Mossad’s subversive tactics are thus a security threat to all West Asian states, with the recent flurry of normalization agreements effectively installing a Trojan horse for Zionism. 

The offer on the table is not for peace; it is a do-or-die threat: those states resistant to normalization face increased acts of terrorism, sabotage, or assassination — and, as a punishing last resort for those unwilling to fall in line, conventional air strikes by the US-backed Israeli military, or the US itself. 

The views expressed in this article do not necessarily reflect those of The Cradle.

Syrian Mercenaries Sent to Ukraine Are Fuel for Conflict

 September 19, 2023

By Mohammad Eid

Damascus, Syria – After Libya and Armenia, it was the Syrian mercenaries’ turn to be the fuel for international conflicts in Ukraine. Because the mercenaries careless about anything other than the money they receive in exchange for their field services, Washington has found its purpose in the political structures of the Syrian opposition, despite its various contradictions, from the “Syrian Democratic Forces” [SDF] and the Ankara agents who are fighting it. Everyone sends them to the Ukrainian Holocaust to implement their own goals; as for the mercenaries, as it is known about them, they fight for whoever pays the most.

Mercenaries to implement the agenda of Washington and Ankara

Military expert Brigadier General Ali Khaddour confirmed that terrorist groups loyal to Ankara in northern Syria have opened special offices to recruit militants and send them to Ukraine, in conjunction with Washington’s gathering of terrorists at the al-Tanf base in eastern Syria for the same purpose, in conjunction with the preparation of Kurdish fighters from the pro-Washington SDF, with the aim of heading towards Ukraine.

In an exclusive interview with al-Ahed News website, the military expert pointed out that the first step in recruiting Syrian mercenaries for fighting in Ukraine was the “Turkmen factions” affiliated with the Turkish army, which controls the countryside of Aleppo, Raqqa, al-Hasakah and northeastern Syria, where they opened offices through which fighters register their names and sign contracts obligating them to fight against the Russians in Ukraine in exchange for substantial sums of money.

Khaddour added that the Ankara-affiliated Turkmen factions, including Hamza Division [locally known as al-Hamzat], Sham Legion, Suleiman Shah Brigade, Ahrar al-Sharqiya, had opened offices under the supervision of their leaders in exchange for huge monthly salaries amounting to about 5000 euros per month which are provided by NATO as transportation allowances to Ukraine, noting that they were similar to the amounts paid by NATO payments to mercenaries in Czech Republic, Poland and some African and Asian countries. These offices are distributed in Afrin, Azaz, Jarabulus, al-Rai in the Aleppo countryside, Tel Abyad in Raqqa countryside and Ras al-Ayn in rural al-Hasakah.

Brig. Gen. Khaddour pointed out that the recruitment of Syrian mercenaries by Ankara’s Turkmen factions to fight in Ukraine came after meetings conducted by Turkish intelligence officers, accompanied by a number of Ukrainian intelligence officers and a number of faction commanders called the “Free Syrian Army” [FSA], where it was agreed to send the first batch of 500 fighters to fight in Ukraine, whereas the US Army sponsored the shipment of batches of terrorists affiliated with the “Maghawir al-Thawra” [Commandos of the Revolution] militia, along with former fighters and detainees belonging to the Wahhabi Daesh [Arabic acronym for “ISIS” /”ISIL”], most of whom held Russian, Chechen and Kazakh nationalities, to the al-Tanf base at the Syria-Jordan-Iraq border triangle in parallel with the dispatching SDF fighters in exchange for huge sums of money, something that has become certain despite the Kurdish leaders in the SDF rushing to deny it.

The intersection of Turkish-American interests

Member of the Syrian People’s Assembly, Muhannad al-Haj Ali, confirmed the information about Washington’s work with terrorist groups, particularly in the Syrian Jazira region and north of Aleppo and Idlib, with an aim of sending some fighters to Ukraine to be mercenaries under the command of Zelensky and his Nazi clique.

In a statement to al-Ahed News, Haj Ali pointed out that this issue is not new. It was preceded by successful attempts from Washington to gather a thousand fighters from the SDF terrorist organization and send them to Ukraine after they held several training courses in the al-Tanf region for huge salaries paid in euros by the NATO.

He added that the United States and Turkey had several goals behind this. Turkey had previously used these fighters, especially from Idlib and northern Aleppo, to fight in Libya and Armenia to support its allies there. It had also sent a portion of them to Afghanistan to be part of the Turkish forces that were deployed to Kabul Airport and so on. Hence, Turkey is trying to look for a way out of this surplus of terrorist on its border in northern Syria, after these terrorists have become a major problem for it; accordingly, it is recycling them again in a sense by sending them to new areas.

Haj Ali indicated that the US wants to get rid of some Kurdish leaders and fighters, given that Ukraine has suffered heavy losses since the beginning of the spring counterattack. Nonetheless, Russian figures indicate that 76,000 fighters were killed in the ranks of its [US] army, so it needs to compensate for this large number in the Ukrainian front. On the other hand, it wants to replace the Kurdish leaders with Arab leaders in the Jazira region in order to appease the Turks and prevent their polarization towards Russia, indicating that these attempts are continuing and, unfortunately, it is the Syrian human side that is investing in this aspect.

Kirkuk on fire: Ethnicity, oil, and sovereignty light the flames

SEP 13, 2023

What began as a localized political pact to help fix relations between Baghdad and Erbil has spiraled into renewed ethnic turmoil in Kirkuk and a resurgence of Kurdish independence aspirations.

Photo Credit: The Cradle

Ahmed al-Rubaie

An agreement reached between the governments of Baghdad and Erbil to relocate the Iraqi army from its headquarters in Kirkuk – a multi-ethnic city in Iraq’s north – ignited a wave of protests last month. 

Thousands of Arab nationalists and Turkmen residents staged sit-ins and established makeshift camps in front of the Iraqi Joint Operations Command building in late August. They were reacting to a directive issued by Iraqi Prime Minister Muhammad Shia al-Sudani to hand over control of the headquarters to the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP). 

The prime minister’s decision was part of a political arrangement struck by the Coordination Framework – Iraq’s largest Shia political bloc – prior to the formation of the current government. 

Kirkuk crisis

The agreement sought to transfer authority over Kirkuk’s headquarters to the Kurdish parties that had vacated the area in 2017, while the Iraqi army and the Popular Mobilization Units (PMU) would continue to maintain security responsibilities for the area.

Nonetheless, the move was met with great dissatisfaction among Kirkuk’s Arab and Turkmen communities, who were apprehensive about a resurgence of Kurdish influence in the oil-rich city. Demonstrators took to the streets, obstructing the Erbil-Kirkuk highway in protest, and conducting a sit-in around the Joint Operations Command headquarters.

Concurrently, the KDP organized a counter-protest on 2 September, mobilizing hundreds of its supporters. This counter-protest escalated into clashes with both the protesters and security forces in the vicinity of the headquarters. The unrest then rapidly spread to the predominantly Kurdish areas of the city, resulting in at least three fatalities and injuring around 16 individuals.

The sound of gunfire intensifies as Rudaw's Hardi Mohammed continues his coverage of the protests in Kirkuk pic.twitter.com/ArOfT2PfKy

— Rudaw English (@RudawEnglish) September 2, 2023

The following day, Sudani declared a curfew in the city and issued a statement calling upon “all political parties and social and popular activities to ward off strife and maintain security, stability, and order in Kirkuk Governorate.”

On the same day, the Federal Court in Iraq decided to temporarily suspend the implementation of the prime minister’s order to evacuate the joint operations headquarters. The court’s decision also provoked strong reactions, with KDP leader Masoud Barzani expressing concern about what he called “these unacceptable actions that will have bad repercussions.” 

“Shedding the blood of our children in Kirkuk will have a heavy price,” he added, while Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) Prime Minister Masrour Barzani described the court’s decision as a “farce.”

Reviving Article 140

On 28 November, 2022, Iraqi Minister of Justice Khaled Shwani, who also acts as the representative of Kurds in the central government, announced that Sudani had approved the reconstitution of the Supreme Committee to activate Article 140 of the Iraqi Constitution – an article intended to resolve the issue of who controls Kirkuk and the so-called disputed areas between the Kurdistan Region and its neighboring provinces, Nineveh, Diyala, and Salah al-Din.

The implementation of this article is a point of contention between the Kurds, who advocate for its enforcement, and the Arabs and Turkmen, who oppose it.

Article 140 outlines a three-stage process for determining the future of these disputed areas. It begins with the return of residents who were relocated to the city during Saddam Hussein’s rule back to their original areas, for which they will be financially compensated.

A population census of these areas is to be conducted then, followed by a popular referendum to determine whether the lands should fall under the authority of the government in Baghdad or Erbil.

A former official in the Article 140 Implementation Committee, who asked to remain anonymous, discloses to The Cradle that the compensation to be paid to the relocated Iraqis, per Article 140, amounts to an astronomical $3 billion. 

Jawad al-Ghazali, a member of the House of Representatives representing the State of Law bloc, tells The Cradle that Kurdish efforts to activate Article 140 are driven by a desire to gain control of Kirkuk because of its significant natural resource wealth. He warns that implementing the article “may lead to civil war.” 

Legal expert Ali al-Tamimi points out that the highly contentious article, approved while Iraq was under foreign occupation and rule, remains ambiguous more than 18 years later. For one, it does not specify whether the administrative units it encompasses refer to the governorates as a whole or specific administrative divisions within them.

While Kurdish political parties contend that the non-implementation of Article 140 is an underlying reason for all the strife and clashes in these areas, it is the adoption of this article that could actually tear Iraq apart.

The significance of Kirkuk

Kirkuk Governorate is located approximately 240 km from Baghdad, and its proximity to the Kurdistan Region’s provincial borders contributes to its diverse religious and ethnic composition. 

The governorate comprises four primary administrative units: Kirkuk District, the central city inhabited by a mix of Arabs, Turkmen, and Kurds; Hawija District, predominantly Sunni Arab; Daquq District, with a Turkmen and Kurdish majority; and Dibs District, which includes a majority of Sunni Muslim Arabs in its central and southern areas and a Kurdish majority in its northern regions.

The estimated population of Kirkuk stands at approximately 1,075,000 people. The city has experienced demographic changes over the years, particularly during Saddam Hussein’s era when its name was altered, and parts of it, such as Tuz Khurmatu, were incorporated into Salah al-Din Governorate.

Following the 2003 US-led invasion and occupation of Iraq, the two major Kurdish political parties – the KDP and the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) – gained significant control over the city. As Iraqi political analyst Hajim al-Hassani describes to The Cradle:

“The city is considered a mecca for the Kurdish parties, not because it is Kurdish as they claim, but because it contains great wealth, as it produces 350,000 barrels of oil per day, in addition to its fertile agricultural land.”

Baghdad retakes Kirkuk

On 12 June, 2014, the 12th Division of the Iraqi Army withdrew from its defensive positions in Kirkuk as ISIS terror troops gained control of the city. According to intelligence and press reports, a meeting took place between division commander Major General Muhammad Khalaf al-Fahdawi and Kurdish Peshmerga forces, during which they agreed that Fahdawi would relocate to the Kurdish city of Sulaymaniyah, handing over control of the division headquarters to the Peshmerga.

Subsequently, on 25 September, 2017, Erbil authorities conducted a referendum on secession in Kirkuk, a move that was fully rejected by Baghdad and various regional and international parties. The following month, the Iraqi government – with critical support from the PMU – launched a lightning-fast military campaign to reassert federal government authority over the governorate and other areas disputed with the Kurdistan Regional authorities.

This operation led to the withdrawal of Peshmerga forces from these areas, some of which they had controlled since 2014 and others following the illegal 2003 US invasion. During this rapid offensive, Iraqi army forces seized more than 33 headquarters of Kurdish parties in Kirkuk, including the primary headquarters of the KDP – still a sensitive issue in light of the recent clashes.

Wasfi al-Asi, the Head of the Arab Front in Kirkuk and a deputy in Iraq’s parliament tells The Cradle:

“It was a big day for the people of Kirkuk when the headquarters of the Kurdistan Democratic Party was recaptured. It was witness to an era of kidnapping and killing of Arab and Turkmen people of Kirkuk, and we will not allow that to happen again.”

Arshad al-Salhi, the leader of the Turkmen Front and also a member of parliament, argues that “not handing over the headquarters is a natural and sound decision, because the land on which it was built belongs to the state and not to the Kurdish parties.”

Many Iraqis make the argument that Kirkuk should be run by Iraqis – not an ethnic group that can threaten the territory’s sovereignty. They invoke the attempt by Kurdistan Region Leader Masoud Barzani to annex Kirkuk through the September 2017 referendum, aligning with the long-standing ambition of Kurdish leaders to establish an independent state.

The Israeli-Kurdish connection

Economic analyst Bassem al-Sharifi explains this viewpoint to The Cradle: 

“The Kurdistan government’s control over Kirkuk opens the way to its independence from Iraq, because its wealth is capable of providing sufficient financial resources to meet the region’s needs.”

Barzani’s dogged insistence on holding the referendum surprised many, but political analyst Haider al-Bakri says that motivation became more clear to Iraqis after Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu openly expressed support for Kurdish secession from Iraq.

At that time, Iraqi religious authority Jawad al-Khalisi railed against Israel’s vocal and clandestine support of Kurdish independence from Iraq during a Friday sermon on 22 September, 2017: “The Zionists’ support for the secession project results from their awareness that their destiny is to disappear, and therefore they are working to establish a new Zionist entity.”

The decades-old relationship between Iraqi Kurds and Tel Aviv dates back to 1948, with visible connections in 1965 when Israeli diplomat David Kimhi met with Kurdish leaders and confirmed Israel’s readiness to provide military and financial support for the Kurds’ independence project. 

The Israel Kurd magazine, published in Erbil with its main headquarters in Israel, reported that Tel Aviv pledged to transfer 200,000 Kurdish Jews from Israel to Kurdistan – if the region declared independence from Iraq – to contribute to the development of the new state.

Neighboring hegemons Turkiye and Iran recognize Kirkuk’s importance to Israel. After all, Tel Aviv supports Kurdish separatist movements at local and regional levels – in part to encircle the two countries that have substantial Kurdish minorities. As such, both Ankara and Tehran have, in the past, engaged in separate and joint offenses against Kurdish separatist positions in Iraq, in violation of the state’s sovereignty. 

The Kirkuk question extends far beyond the borders of Iraq, carrying significant regional implications. Heavily mired in the aspirations of Kurdish leaders, it also entangles influential regional players such as Turkiye and Iran, along with the interests of political actors further afield. 

As the future of Kirkuk continues to hang in the balance, it serves as a potent symbol of the persistent challenges, one among many, confronting post-2003 Iraq. 

The views expressed in this article do not necessarily reflect those of The Cradle.

The shocking Kurdish role in Iraq’s Yazidi genocide

AUG 24, 2023

Photo Credit: The Cradle

While the massacre of Sinjar’s Yazidi community has often been blamed on Sunni Arab collusion with ISIS, evidence keeps mounting that Kurdish leaders played a big part in setting up the atrocity in order to advance their territorial ambitions in northern Iraq.

The Cradle’s Iraq Correspondent

After the brutal August 2014 ISIS attack on the Yazidi community in northern Iraq, a narrative quickly emerged blaming Sinjar’s Sunni Arabs for supporting the genocide.

Yet a deeper delve into this harrowing episode uncovers a much darker reality — one that implicates Iraqi Kurdish politician Masoud Barzani and the leadership of the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) in a sinister collaboration with ISIS. 

Yazidi massacre blame game

One of the massacres took place in the small village of Kocho on 15 August, which saw hundreds of women and children enslaved and their men executed. “All the Arabs around us were against us, with the terrorists of Daesh [an Arabic acronym for ISIS],” one male survivor was quoted as saying, pointing the finger at the Sunni Arabs of Sinjar. 

In August 2016, Yazidi member of the Iraqi parliament Vian Dakhil claimed that around 1,000 foreign ISIS fighters invaded Sinjar, “But tens of thousands flocked to support them. Those tens of thousands were our neighbors.”

However, several Sunni Arab men from Sinjar spoke with The Cradle to challenge this narrative. They claim they were not willing executioners of their Yazidi neighbors, with whom they had lived peacefully for generations. 

“Terrorism represents no tribe, no group, they represent themselves. If a family member becomes a terrorist or ISIS member, this does not mean his brother accepts it. But they could not resist it, or they would be killed by other ISIS members. Everybody surrendered under the gun.” 

As rural farmers and sheep herders, they had little power to stop the ISIS massacres. Some individual Sunni Arabs did join ISIS when the group invaded Sinjar, but this was a relatively small number and joining ISIS was largely opposed by the Arab community, they say. As one of the men explains:

“Terrorism represents no tribe, no group, they represent themselves. If a family member becomes a terrorist or ISIS member, this does not mean his brother accepts it. But they could not resist it, or they would be killed by other ISIS members. Everybody surrendered under the gun.” 

In fact, the grip of ISIS extended to the Sunni Arab populace in Sinjar and Mosul alike, leading to the execution of local law enforcement and security personnel as the terrorist group gained control over these regions.

One Sunni Arab informs The Cradle that ISIS executed 19 people from his village in 2014, including 11 members of his own family. 

A report by the UN Mission to Iraq (UNAMI) corroborates the claim that ISIS also targeted Sunni Arabs, and documents the mass executions of Sunni Arab civilians and soldiers as ISIS seized power in Mosul and Tikrit. Even those who purportedly “repented” and swore allegiance to ISIS often met a grim fate, facing execution regardless.

‘We know they could see us’

The Arab Sunni men speaking with The Cradle ask how they as civilians could have resisted ISIS in Sinjar when the Iraqi army, Kurdish Peshmerga, and US air force were all unable to prevent ISIS from taking Sinjar and massacring its Yazidi inhabitants.

The men claim that US F-16s warplanes were flying in the skies above Kocho as the massacre took place, but failed to intervene and carry out airstrikes, even though ISIS militants were driving in convoys of new Toyota pick-up trucks that were easily identifiable.

“We could see the ISIS members killing the Yazidis and the airplanes did nothing,” one man tells The Cradle.

This was confirmed by human rights researcher Naomi Kikoler, who interviewed survivors of the Kocho massacre. One survivor told her there were “jets in the air. We know they could see us. We thought they would save us. I could still hear them after being shot.”

‘Even if I am slaughtered’

Despite the dangers Sinjar’s Sunni Arabs also faced from ISIS, there are many instances where they helped their Yazidi neighbors escape after the Kocho massacre. One member of the local Sunni Arab community informs The Cradle:

“When ISIS killed the Yazidis in Sinjar, no one could go to help them. No one could do anything. We were just scared and sad about them. Some people escaped in the night and were injured and came and we helped them. Some had been shot. We gave them bandages, and water, and food, and we took them to the mountain to help them escape.”

“When ISIS killed the Yazidis in Sinjar, no one could go to help them. No one could do anything. We were just scared and sad about them. Some people escaped in the night and were injured and came and we helped them. Some had been shot. We gave them bandages, and water, and food, and we took them to the mountain to help them escape.”

A prominent Yazidi figure, Sheikh Nayef Jasso, recounted the efforts of his Arab Sunni friend, Abu Saady, who lived in an adjacent village. Sheikh Jasso explained in an interview with the Iraq 24 news channel how he had asked Abu Saady to help two survivors of the massacre escape to the mountains. According to Sheikh Jasso, Abu Saady responded by saying, “I will try. Even if I am slaughtered myself, I have to do it.”

However, the misperception that Sinjar’s Sunni Arabs were responsible for the ISIS genocide still goes largely unchallenged, although it is a view that is propagated not by the broader Yazidi community, but rather by the political maneuverings of the KDP led by Masoud Barzani. Furthermore, allegations have emerged that the KDP paid select Yazidis to amplify these claims in the media, casting the shadow of blame on Sunni Arabs.

For example, Yazidi MP Vian Dakhil who blamed Sunni Arabs from Sinjar for the genocide, is a KDP member. The influential Kurdish political party often seeks to coopt politicians from Iraqi minority communities, hoping to control them and ensure these communities act in favor of KDP interests.

Sunni Arabs as scapegoats

Shifting culpability onto Sinjar’s Sunni Arabs serves as a calculated diversion from the core culprits — namely, the KDP, whose Peshmerga forces had undertaken the solemn duty to safeguard the Yazidis in Sinjar. 

On 3 August, 2014, the Peshmerga betrayed this trust by abruptly abandoning their posts in the early hours of the morning, leaving the Yazidis defenseless against the ISIS onslaught. This was confirmed by journalist Christine Van Den Toorn writing for the Daily Beast.

Van Den Toorn writes that a local KDP official told her that “higher-ups in the party told representatives to keep people calm, and that if people in their areas of coverage left, their salaries would be cut.” 

Kurdish security officials also confiscated weapons from Christian communities in the Nineveh Plain, before abandoning these communities as ISIS invaded in using tactics similar to those in Sinjar. 

By convincing Yazidis to stay in Sinjar despite the looming ISIS threat, confiscating their weapons, and then abandoning them at the last moment without warning, Barzani’s KDP and Peshmerga ensured that ISIS would be able to massacre and enslave as many Yazidis as possible. 

The harsh reality was that without the intervention of fighters from rival Kurdish factions, the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK) and its Syrian offshoot, the People’s Protection Units (YPG), the atrocities carried out by ISIS would have been even larger. PKK and YPG militants coming from the Rabia border area with Syria created safe corridors for Yazidis to escape from Sinjar Mountain.

An explicit agreement

Several Yazidis who spoke with The Cradle said they knew the Peshmerga had betrayed them by suddenly withdrawing, but none said they understood why.

Several sources have alleged that Masoud Barzani made an agreement with ISIS, and this was the reason for the Peshmerga withdrawal.

According to French academic and Iraq expert Pierre-Jean Luizard, there was “an explicit agreement” between Barzani and ISIS, which “aims to share a number of territories.” ISIS was given the role of “routing the Iraqi army, in exchange for which the Peshmerga would not prevent ISIS from entering Mosul or capturing Tikrit.

Cemil Bayik, a senior PKK member also alleged that Barzani had sent senior KDP member Azad Barwari to meet with Sunni political figures and ISIS representatives in Amman, Jordan to make plans for ISIS to take Mosul.

As reported by The Cradle, prominent Sunni politician Atheel al-Nujaifi, then-governor of Nineveh province, “who was both collaborating with ISIS and acting as a Turkish proxy” played a key role in facilitating the fall of Mosul. 

Barzani’s arrangement with ISIS apparently included supplying weapons to the notorious terror group. According to reporting from Michael Rubin of the American Enterprise Institute (AEI), these weapons included Kornet anti-tank missiles, which ISIS used to destroy M1A1 Abrams tanks in battles against the Iraqi army.

Journalists and members of the KRG parliament later verified that senior Peshmerga commanders had traded weapons with ISIS, and that none of them were ever charged.

The ‘Kurdish Jerusalem’

Barzani’s desire to share territories with ISIS, despite the atrocities that unfolded, was fueled by a calculated strategy to expand his influence and achieve his long-standing goal of establishing an independent Kurdish state.

At its core, Barzani’s ambition sought to secure new territories, access untapped oil reserves, amass weapons, and garner international backing for the realization of a sovereign Kurdish state. The essential idea was for ISIS to take over mostly Sunni Arab territories in northern Iraq, forcing much of that population to flee, and then have US-backed Kurds “liberate” those lands and “Kurdify” them. 

Reuters quoted a KRG official saying: “Everyone is worried, but this is a big chance for us. ISIL gave us in two weeks what Maliki couldn’t give us in eight years.” 

As the chaos instigated by ISIS enveloped Mosul and the Iraqi army faltered, Barzani’s swift directive was to mobilize his Peshmerga forces to capture the oil-rich city of Kirkuk — a region of geopolitical importance that was also home to Arab and Turkoman populations. This territorial conquest held symbolic value akin to the “Kurdish Jerusalem.”

Denise Natali of the National Defense University observed that “the Kurds’ most evident gain from the ISIS takeover of Mosul is territorial, as the Kurds had extended their territory by about 40 percent.” Assyrian writer Max Joseph sums it up well: “This is conquest masquerading as liberation.”

Journalist and expert on Kurdish affairs Wladimir Van Wilgenburg similarly explained that after Mosul fell, “The Kurds control now most of the disputed territories … They now almost have their national desired borders.”

By controlling Kirkuk, Barzani gained not only new territory but massive new oil reserves which he immediately began exporting via a newly built pipeline to the Turkish port city of Ceyhan. 

As reported by Forbes, the majority of this oil was then sold to Israel, despite strong opposition from Iraqi Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki. The Jerusalem Post noted that by 2015, Kurdish oil was the source of 77 percent of Israel’s oil imports.

Gaining global sympathy 

However, the question arises: why was the subsequent Yazidi massacre necessary, considering Barzani’s acquisition of the territory and resources he sought through the fall of Mosul?

A Kurdish businessman with links to the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) explains to The Cradle that Barzani realized that exploiting the threat to religious minorities was the best way to generate sympathy for his own cause in the west.

Two weeks after Mosul fell to ISIS, Barzani had told the BBC: “Everything that’s happened recently shows that it’s the right of Kurdistan to achieve independence. From now on, we won’t hide that that’s our goal. Iraq is effectively partitioned now.” 

But Barzani’s goal of Kurdish independence had garnered little international support; US policy officially advocated maintaining the unity of Iraq and Kurdish independence was also opposed by key regional players Iran and Turkiye. Unsurprisingly, the only state willing to strongly support Barzani’s goal was Israel.

The politics of pity 

The atrocities against the Yazidis has generated unprecedented international sympathy. The plight of the Yazidis who remained trapped on Sinjar Mountain under threat from black clad ISIS militants dominated the media cycle in the western press for many months. 

Barzani effectively exploited the fear of ISIS and international sympathy for Yazidis by pressing the case that the Kurds needed direct help in liberating these areas, separated from the chaos plaguing the rest of Iraq. This allowed him to secure a reliable supply of weapons, independent of the central government in Baghdad.

The White House opened a direct weapons pipeline to Barzani’s Peshmerga on 11 August, as the massacre of Yazidis was still underway. The Washington Post reported that this had to be done off the books and through the CIA because the US military had no legal authorization to bypass Baghdad and send weapons directly to the Kurds.

As The Guardian reported the same day:

“The idea of arming the Kurds has been the subject of weeks of internal deliberation and official silence by president Barack Obama’s foreign policy advisers. It is a fateful step in Iraq’s current crisis, one that risks facilitating the long-term disintegration of Iraq.”

Annexation ambitions 

Over a year later, a disturbing revelation came to light as a coalition of forces including the PKK, Peshmerga, and the US-led coalition successfully reclaimed Sinjar city. Barzani’s ulterior motives for allowing the Yazidi massacre to unfold became startlingly evident as he moved to annex Sinjar, revealing his deeper motivations.

In a brazen statement, Barzani declared that Sinjar “belongs to Kurdistan in every way.” This proclamation was followed by an attempt to rewrite the narrative of the Yazidi genocide itself. 

Barzani sought to recast Sinjar as “a symbol of the oppression of the Kurdish people,” essentially erasing the fact that the tragedy was fundamentally one of immense suffering endured by the Yazidis, posing an existential threat to this Kurdish religious minority. 

He then went on to blame the Sunni Arab neighbors of the Yazidis in Sinjar for the crime he himself orchestrated:

“If the Arabs in the region have not committed crimes against the Yazidi brothers and have not helped ISIS, they are our brothers and we will protect them, but if their hands are red with the blood of Kurds and Yazidi brothers, they will have the same fate.” 

Fear of retribution

Speaking to The Cradle,several Yazidis expressed resentment over Barzani and the Peshmerga’s role in betraying them. 

However, they said the Yazidi community was afraid to speak about this openly and in the media, for fear of retribution. Even nine years later, few Yazidis from Sinjar have been able to return to their homes, and most instead live in tents in refugee camps dotting the Kurdistan region ruled by Barzani’s KDP.

Because most Yazidis continue to live under the very same political sphere that orchestrated their massacre and enslavement, they live in constant fear that another genocide may soon take place, even though ISIS has largely, but not entirely, been vanquished.

The views expressed in this article do not necessarily reflect those of The Cradle.

The Sultan 2.0 will heavily tilt east

May 31 2023

Photo Credit: The Cradle

It’s not that Erdogan has a scheme to head east at the west’s expense. It’s just that the world’s grandest infrastructure, development, and geopolitical projects are all in the east today.

By Pepe Escobar

The collective west was dying to bury him – yet another strategic mistake that did not take into account the mood of Turkish voters in deep Anatolia.

In the end, Recep Tayyip Erdogan did it – again. Against all his shortcomings, like an aging neo-Ottoman Sinatra, he did it “my way,” comfortably retaining Turkiye’s presidency after naysayers had all but buried him.

The first order of geopolitical priority is who will be named Minister of Foreign Affairs. The prime candidate is Ibrahim Kalin – the current all-powerful Erdogan press secretary cum top adviser.

Compared to incumbent Cavusoglu, Kalin, in theory, may be qualified as more pro-west. Yet it’s the Sultan who calls the shots. It will be fascinating to watch how Turkiye under Erdogan 2.0 will navigate the strengthening of ties with West Asia and the accelerating process of Eurasia integration.

The first immediate priority, from Erdogan’s point of view, is to get rid of the “terrorist corridor” in Syria. This means, in practice, reigning in the US-backed Kurdish YPG/PYD, who are effectively Syrian affiliates of the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) – which is also the issue at the heart of a possible normalization of relations with Damascus.

Now that Syria has been enthusiastically welcomed back to the Arab League after a 12-year freeze, a Moscow-brokered entente between the Turkish and Syrian presidents, already in progress, may represent the ultimate win-win for Erdogan: allowing control of Kurds in north Syria while facilitating the repatriation of roughly 4 million refugees (tens of thousands will stay, as a source of cheap labor).

The Sultan is at his prime when it comes to hedging his bets between east and west. He knows well how to profit from Turkiye’s status as a key NATO member – complete with one of its largest armies, veto power, and control of the entry to the uber-strategic Black Sea.

And all that while exercising real foreign policy independence, from West Asia to the Eastern Mediterranean.

So expect Erdogan 2.0 to remain an inextinguishable source of irritation for the neocons and neoliberals in charge of US foreign policy, along with their EU vassals, who will never refrain from trying to subdue Ankara to fight the Russia-China-Iran Eurasia integration entente. The Sultan, though, knows how to play this game beautifully.

How to manage Russia and China

Whatever happens next, Erdogan will not hop on board the sanctions-against-Russia sinking ship. The Kremlin bought Turkish bonds tied to the development of the Russian-built Akkuyu nuclear power plant, Turkiye’s first nuclear reactor. Moscow allowed Ankara to postpone nearly $4 billion in energy payments until 2024. Best of all, Ankara pays for Russian gas in rubles.

So an array of deals related to the supply of Russian energy trump possible secondary sanctions that might target the steady rise in Turkiye’s exports. Still, it’s a given the US will revert to its one and only “diplomatic” policy – sanctions. The 2018 sanctions did push Turkiye into recession after all.

But Erdogan can easily count on popular support across the Turkish realm. Early this year, a Gezici poll revealed that 72.8 percent of Turkish citizens privilege good relations with Russia while nearly 90 percent rate the US as a “hostile” nation. That’s what allows Interior Minister Soylu to remark, bluntly, “we will wipe out whoever is causing trouble, including American troops.”

China-Turkiye strategic cooperation falls under what Erdogan defines as “turning to the East” – and is mostly about China’s multi-continent infrastructure behemoth, the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). The Turk Silk Road branch of the BRI focuses on what Beijing defines as the “Middle Corridor,” a prime cost-effective/secure trade route that connects Asia to Europe.

The driver is the China Railway Express, which turned the Middle Corridor arguably into BRI’s backbone. For instance, electronics parts and an array of household items routinely arriving via cargo planes from Osaka, Japan are loaded onto freight trains going to Duisburg and Hamburg in Germany, via the China Railway Express departing from Shenzhen, Wuhan, and Changsha – and crossing from Xinjiang to Kazakhstan and beyond via the Alataw Pass. Shipments from Chongqing to Germany take a maximum of 13 days.

It’s no wonder that nearly 10 years ago, when he first unveiled his ambitious, multi-trillion dollar BRI in Astana, Kazakhstan, Chinese President Xi Jinping placed the China Railway Express as a core BRI component.

Direct freight trains from Xian to Istanbul are plying the route since December 2020, using the Baku-Tblisi-Kars (BTK) railway with less than two weeks travel time – and plans afoot to increase their frequency. Beijing is well aware of Turkiye’s asset as a transportation hub and crossroads for markets in the Balkans, the Caucasus, Central Asia, West Asia, and North Africa, not to mention a customs union with the EU that allows direct access to European markets.

Moreover, Baku’s victory in the 2020 Nagorno-Karabakh war came with a ceasefire deal bonus: the Zangezur corridor, which will eventually facilitate Turkiye’s direct access to neighbors from the  Caucasus to Central Asia.

A pan-Turkic offensive?

And here we enter a fascinating territory: the possible incoming interpolations between the Organization of Turkic States (OTS), the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), the BRICS+ – and all that also linked to a boost in Saudi and Emirati investments in the Turkish economy.

Sultan 2.0 wants to become a full member of both the Chinese-led SCO and multipolar BRICS+. This means a much closer entente with the Russia-China strategic partnership as well as with the Arab powerhouses, which are also hopping on the BRICS+ high-speed train.

Erdogan 2.0 is already focusing on two key players in Central Asia and South Asia: Uzbekistan and Pakistan. Both happen to be SCO members.

Ankara and Islamabad are very much in sync. They express the same judgment on the extremely delicate Kashmir question, and both backed Azerbaijan against Armenia.

But the key developments may lie in Central Asia. Ankara and Tashkent have a strategic defense agreement – including intel sharing and logistics cooperation.

The Organization of Turkic States (OTS), with a HQ in Istanbul, is the prime energizer of pan-Turkism or pan-Turanism. Turkiye, Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, and Kyrgyzstan are full members, with Afghanistan, Turkmenistan, Hungary, and Ukraine cultivated as observers. The Turk-Azeri relationship is billed as “one nation, two states” in pan-Turkic terms.

The basic idea is a still hazy “cooperation platform” between Central Asia and the Southern Caucasus. Yet some serious proposals have already been floated. The OTS summit in Samarkand late last year advanced the idea of a TURANCEZ free trade bloc, comprising Turkiye, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, Azerbaijan, and as observers, Hungary (representing the EU) and Northern Cyprus.

Meanwhile, hard business prevails. To fully profit from the status of the energy transit hub, Turkiye needs not only Russian gas but also gas from Turkmenistan feeding the Trans-Anatolian Natural Gas Pipeline (TANAP) as well as Kazakh oil coming via the Baku-Tblisi-Ceyhan (BTC) pipeline.

The Turkish Cooperation and Coordination Agency (TIKA) is heavy on economic cooperation, active in a series of projects in transportation, construction, mining, and oil and gas. Ankara has already invested a whopping $85 billion across Central Asia, with nearly 4,000 companies scattered across all the “stans.”

Of course, when compared to Russia and China, Turkiye is not a major player in Central Asia. Moreover, the bridge to Central Asia goes via Iran. So far, rivalry between Ankara and Tehran seems to be the norm, but everything may change, lightning fast, with the simultaneous development of the Russia-Iran-India-led International North South Transportation Corridor (INSTC), which will profit both – and the fact that the Iranians and Turks may soon become full BRICS+ members.

Sultan 2.0 is bound to boost investment in Central Asia as a new geoeconomic frontier. That in itself encapsulates the possibility of Turkiye soon joining the SCO.

We will then have a “turning to the East” in full effect, in parallel to closer ties with the Russia-China strategic partnership. Take note that Turkiye’s ties with Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, and Kyrgyzstan are also strategic partnerships.

Not bad for a neo-Ottoman who, until a few days ago, was dismissed as a has-been.

The views expressed in this article do not necessarily reflect those of The Cradle.

ما لا ينتبه له الكثيرون بين سورية وإيران مع زيارة رئيسي

 الإثنين 1 أيار 2023

ناصر قنديل

تمثّل زيارة الرئيس الإيراني السيد إبراهيم رئيسي أول زيارة لرئيس إيراني لسورية منذ الأزمة التي عصفت بسورية والحرب التي شنّت عليها قبل اثنتي عشرة سنة، وكانت آخر زيارة لرئيس إيراني الى دمشق قد قام بها الرئيس أحمدي نجاد، وخرجت منها الصورة الشهيرة التي تجمعه بالرئيس السوري بشار الأسد وقائد المقاومة الأمين العام لحزب الله السيد حسن نصرالله، والتي اعتبرها البعض أحد أسباب الحرب الأميركية الإسرائيلية على سورية، بصفتها أول إعلان عن تشكيل نواة لمحور المقاومة. ومع زيارة الرئيس رئيسي تنتشر تعليقات وتحليلات ومواقف تتحدّث عن فرضية ضغوط إيرانية على سورية للتنازل عن شروطها لعقد لقاء قمة يجمع الرئيس الأسد بالرئيس التركي رجب أردوغان.

ما لا ينتبه له الكثيرون أن الحديث يدور عن دولتين تلاقى نظام الحكم في كل منهما على بناء جسر استراتيجيّ لا يهتزّ منذ قرابة خمسة وأربعين عاماً، هي عمر انتصار الثورة الإسلامية في إيران وارتباط سورية معها بهذا التحالف الاستراتيجي، الذي وجدت فيه سورية تعويضاً عن خروج مصر مع اتفاقيات كامب ديفيد من الصراع مع كيان الاحتلال. وقد لا تكون في العام دولتان يحكمهما نظام مستقر بقيادة لون سياسي واحد يحافظ على إدارته للدولة خلال مثل هذه المدة الطويلة وترتبطان بعلاقة مشابهة، ونجحتا خلال هذه المدة الطويلة بتجاوز محطات شديدة الصعوبة واحتواء حروب وضغوط وحصار، فوقفتا معاً وراء المقاومة في لبنان حتى انتصارها عام 2000، وانتصرتا معها في حرب تموز 2006 ومثلها مع المقاومة في فلسطين حتى تحرير غزة عام 2005 وانتصرتا معها في حرب 2008، وتحملتا معاً أعباء دعم المقاومة في العراق لاستنزاف الاحتلال الأميركي وإجباره على الانسحاب عام 2011، وكانت التجربة الأهم والأعظم لهما في الانتصار على الحرب الكونية التي تعرّضت لها سورية، والنصر الأهم فيها كان على تنظيم داعش، في سورية والعراق، وصولاً الى إنتاج تحالف ثلاثي سوري إيراني روسي كان له الأثر الفاصل مع قوى المقاومة في فرض مسار من الانتصارات انطلاقاً من معارك حلب وصولاً الى الغوطة والجنوب والشمال في معارك دير الزور والبوكمال. وينطلق السوريون والإيرانيون من هذا الإرث العظيم لمناقشة كيفية مواصلة الطريق حتى تستعيد سورية عافيتها السياسية والاقتصادية، بصفتها، الركن الواقف على خط الأعاصير لهذا الحلف، فهي شرفة الحلف على المتوسط وهي جبهته على حدود فلسطين المحتلة، والتعافي السياسي هو بسط الدولة لكامل سيادتها على حدودها كما كانت عام 2011، والتعافي الاقتصادي هو استعادة الثورات النفطيّة التي تمكن الدولة من تشغيل اقتصادها انطلاقاً من إعادة الحياة لقطاع الكهرباء بكامل جهوزيته.

تدرك إيران بعمق أكثر من غيرها أن أي مطالبة لسورية بالتهاون في التوصيف والموقف من الاحتلال التركي، سوف يعني ثلاث نتائج مباشرة، الأولى هي توفير الغطاء لبقاء الاحتلال الأميركي، والثانية هي مزيد من التصلب لدى الجماعات الكردية المسلحة بخلفية الاستثمار على بقاء الاحتلال الأميركي، والثالثة هي فتح الطريق لإضعاف مشروع الدولة السورية، ما يعني فتح الطريق لاستعادة الجماعات الإرهابية التي يتقاسم الأميركيون والأتراك رعايتها بعض الروح التي فقدتها، وعودتها الى التوسّع خصوصاً في المناطق الرمادية كحال صحراء تدمر؛ بينما التمسك بدعم الموقف السوري بالمطالبة بموقف سياسي تركي واضح لجهة الالتزام بالانسحاب من الأراضي السورية، فسوف يعني إشعار الأميركيين بأن عليهم المسارعة بالانسحاب قبل أن يصبح احتلالهم مكشوفا بلا غطاء مع بدء جدولة الانسحاب التركي، وسوف يعني إشعار الجماعات الكردية ان الأميركي لن يبقى في سورية وأن لا ملاذ لها إلا العودة الى الدولة السورية والتفاوض معها على حلول سياسية. وهذا سوف يعني إشعار الجماعات الإرهابية بأنها باتت بلا غطاء وأن اي تحرك طائش سوف يُسرع بنهايتها، وهذا يعني تزعزع الكانتونات الانفصالية شمال شرق وشمال غرب سورية، وتلك هي وصفة التعافي التي تريدها إيران كما تريدها روسيا لسورية.

عشية زيارة الرئيس بشار الأسد الى موسكو قيل وكتب الكثير عن فرضية مشابهة لضغوط روسية على سورية للتخلي عن شروطها، لكن الحصيلة كانت أن اللقاء الذي جمع الرئيس الأسد بالرئيس الروسي فلاديمير بوتين لم يستهلك سوى دقائق معدودة لحسم هذا الأمر بتبني وجهة نظر الأسد، الذي أعاد تأكيدها عبر منابر الإعلام الروسي من موسكو.

– قمة رئيسي والأسد سوف تخرج سياسياً بما يعزّز موقع سورية واقتصادياً بما ينعش اقتصادها.

فيديوات متعلقة

مقالات متعلقة

• المقداد يشارك باجتماع اليوم في عمّان لنظرائه الأردني والعراقي والمصري والسعودي
• رئيسي في دمشق الأربعاء والقمة مع الأسد لتثبيت التحالف الاستراتيجي… واتفاقات اقتصادية / عون: دول أوروبية تمنع عودة النازحين… وباسيل: للاستفادة من التفاهمات لعودة لائقة/ حردان: النظام الطائفي ضد الطائف والدستور الذي يقسمون على احترامه دعا لإلغاء الطائفية/
• سرايا القدس تجبر قوة للاحتلال على الانسحاب من طولكرم
• التعددية المتفجّرة ظاهرة عالمية: كيف نواجه آثارها في لبنان؟
• طهران: وجّهنا ضربات للكيان الصهيوني داخل فلسطين وخارجها
• لبنان والعروض الإيرانية في قطاع الطاقة
• تقدّم إضافي لقوات «فاغنر» في باخموت

سوريا في قلب المشهد العربي… بشروطها!

الخميس 13 نيسان 2023

يأتي الانتقال العربي عموماً من حالة القطيعة مع سوريا إلى الانفتاح التدريجي (أ ف ب)

ابراهيم الأمين  

منتصف العام 2011، وصل موفد لزعيم عربي بارز إلى دمشق حاملاً رسالة إلى الرئيس بشار الأسد. كان فحواها يتركز على الوضع الداخلي إثر اندلاع موجة الاحتجاجات وانتقال المعارضين إلى حمل السلاح في وجه الدولة السورية. وطالبت الرسالة الأسد بإحداث تغيير سياسي في الحكم مقابل منع تمدد الموجات الاحتجاجية ووقف الدعم الخارجي لها. قرأ الأسد الرسالة، وأعادها إلى الموفد وقال له: سلم على من أرسلك، ولا جواب!

لم يكن الأسد في ذلك الوقت يتوقع أن يكون التآمر على سوريا بهذا الحجم، وعلى مدى ست سنوات، كانت المواجهة قاسية جداً، وجاء الدعم للأسد من حلفائه في لبنان والعراق وإيران، ما منع سقوط الدولة السورية، قبل أن يأتي الدعم الروسي ليفتح الباب أمام استعادة المناطق التي سيطر عليها المسلحون. وخلال تلك الفترة، كانت المفاوضات التي تقودها الأمم المتحدة، عبارة عن مضيعة للوقت، ولم تفد بشيء على الإطلاق، بل ربما كان لها دورها في تسعير الحرب في سوريا. مضت السنوات، وتصرف الجميع على أن مشروع إسقاط الدولة السورية ونظامها هو الذي سقط. والحصار الذي تعزز بعدما توقف إطلاق النار في مناطق واسعة من سوريا، ترافق مع تعزيز الاحتلال الأجنبي المباشر عقب فشل الوكلاء المحليين في إدارة الأمور. وهذا ما جعل الاحتلال الأميركي يثبت قواعد ويعزز واقع المجموعات الكردية الانفصالية، فيما اجتاح الأتراك مناطق الشمال الغربي من سوريا.

خلال السنوات القليلة الماضية، انطلقت موجة من الاتصالات بين عواصم عربية وإقليمية وغربية مع سوريا، مباشرة أو من خلال وسطاء، وتفعلت هذه الاتصالات بعد الزلزال المدمر الذي ضرب سوريا وتركيا. وهو أمر يؤكده مرجع كبير في دمشق بقوله: «يتواصلون معنا سراً، لكنهم يخافون الغضب الأميركي، نحن لا نحمّل أحداً أكثر مما يحتمل، لكن أحداً لا يمكن أن يفرض علينا شروطاً. ما واجهناه خلال عقد كامل، لا يقدر كل هؤلاء على تحمله، وقد صمدنا، ودورنا العربي نحن من صنعناه».
وسبق للرئيس السوري بشار الأسد أن صارح قادة عرباً وموفدين ووسطاء، في الفترة الأخيرة، بأن «سوريا لا تخوض معركة العودة إلى الجامعة العربية. وسوريا لا ترفض دعوتها إلى أي قمة أو اجتماع عربي، لكنها غير مستعدة لمقايضة هذا الأمر بأي شيء يمس ثوابتها». ونقل عن الرئيس السوري قوله «إن دمشق هي من يملك حق أن يسامح دولاً وجماعات كانت طرفاً كبيراً في الحرب وشريكة في سفك الدماء العربية. وسيكون من الخطأ أن يفكر أحد بأن سوريا مستعدة للحديث مع أي دولة حول وضعها الداخلي، وهي لا تقبل بأي وساطة بينها وبين أي سوري يريد العودة إلى بلده وفق شروطه. لا مجال لأي تفاوض حول المسألة السورية الداخلية».
خلال الشهرين الماضيين، دارت محركات الوسطاء بقوة كبيرة. حاولت دولة الإمارات العربية لعب دور خاص. لكنها كانت محكومة بالسقف الأميركي من جهة والسقف السعودي من جهة أخرى، بينما تولت سلطنة عمان التوسط بين دمشق ودول كبيرة، منها السعودية وحتى الولايات المتحدة. فيما كانت روسيا وإيران تديران وساطة مع تركيا. حتى العواصم العربية الفاعلة تحركت ولو من دون خطوات كبيرة. مثل مصر التي تريد تنسيق خطواتها مع السعودية، أو الجزائر التي لا تملك النفوذ الذي كان لها في وقت سابق.

وكشف مطلعون على جانب من هذه الاتصالات أن مسقط استضافت لقاءات هامة بين مسؤولين من سوريا ومن السعودية ومن الأميركيين أيضاً. وأن الاتصالات السعودية – السورية سرعان ما انتقلت إلى حيز التحاور المباشر الذي تمثل في لقاءات عقدت على مستوى أمني في الرياض، ومهدت لرفع مستوى التواصل إلى الحيز السياسي الذي سيترجم في زيارة وزير الخارجية السورية فيصل المقداد إلى جدة. فيما جرى الحديث عن زيارات أمنية سرية قام بها موفدون من دول خارجية إلى سوريا عبر لبنان، وتناولت المحادثات فيها مسائل كثيرة.

وبحسب المطلعين أنفسهم، فإن هذه الأطراف تعي أن رحلة عزل سوريا انتهت إلى فشل كبير. وبات هؤلاء في موقع من يريد تدفيع سوريا ثمناً لعودة التواصل، وكان هؤلاء يعتقدون بأن سوريا مستعجلة لأمرين: الأول، استئناف العلاقة الرسمية مع تركيا، والثاني عودة سوريا إلى مقعدها في الجامعة العربية. وقد صدم الأتراك بموقف الأسد الذي أبلغه إلى الرئيس الروسي فلاديمير بوتين، بأنه لا يمانع الاجتماع مع الرئيس رجب طيب أردوغان، لكن على تركيا القيام بخطوات قبل ذلك، تشمل إعلان جدول زمني لسحب قواتها من سوريا، والمبادرة إلى خطوات على الأرض تعكس هذه الجدية. وهو الأمر الذي لا يزال يؤخر المحادثات المباشرة بين سوريا وتركيا من أو مع مشاركة وسطاء. أما مع العرب، فإن الأسد قال لكل من التقاهم من المسؤولين العرب، بأنه ليس مستعجلاً للعودة إلى الجامعة العربية، وهو أصلاً لا يثق بقدرتها على القيام بشيء. لكنه مستعد لتنظيم العلاقات الثنائية مع الدول العربية من دون أي شرط.
صحيح أن القطريين يطلقون مواقف حادة ضد عودة سوريا. لكن ما لا يقال في العلن، أكده مرجع كبير لـ«الأخبار»، وهو أن القطريين توسطوا لدى الأمين العام لحزب الله السيد حسن نصرالله للبحث في تنظيم العلاقة مع القيادة السورية من جديد. إلا أن الأسد لم يكن متحمساً لهذا الأمر.

توسط القطريون لدى حزب الله لإعادة الاتصال بالأسد وقاد العمانيون اتصالات مع دول عربية وغربية أيضاً

أما السعودية فقد حاولت مقايضة سوريا في ملفات كثيرة تتعلق بالواقع العربي والعلاقات مع دول الإقليم. فبحث السعوديون كما سبق لآخرين أن فعلوا، أن يعرضوا على الأسد التخلي عن تحالفه مع إيران وقوى محور المقاومة مقابل انفتاح سياسي واقتصادي كبير على سوريا، إضافة إلى إثارة عناوين تتعلق بالإصلاحات السياسية الداخلية في سوريا، وصولاً إلى محاولة انتزاع مواقف سورية مطابقة لموقف الجامعة العربية من الحرب القائمة في اليمن، بما في ذلك محاولة إقناع الأسد بطرد السفير اليمني الحالي في دمشق وتسليم السفارة إلى ممثلي حكومة عدن التابعة لتحالف العدوان العربي – الأميركي على اليمن. لكن الأسد رفض هذا الأمر أيضاً. وحتى في ملف فلسطين، فقد راهن البعض على أن موقف الأسد السلبي من حركة الإخوان المسلمين ومن حركة حماس قد يساعدهم على موقف من المقاومة في فلسطين، لكن الأسد الذي لم يكن سهلاً عليه إعادة العلاقة مع حماس، كان قد حسم الأمر من خلال القول بأن موقفه من الحركة أو أي فصيل فلسطيني آخر، يرتبط بموقع هذا الفصيل في محور المقاومة ضد الاحتلال، ولذلك لم يأخذ ملف استئناف العلاقة مع حماس وقتاً طويلاً، بينما بقي موقفه من القضايا الأخرى على حاله.

ما حصل أخيراً، هو أن السعودية التي أدارت استراتيجية جديدة تستهدف «صفر مشاكل»، سارعت إلى عقد اتفاق مع إيران، يتيح لها الإسراع في وقف الحرب على اليمن، ويسهل على الرياض استئناف العلاقات مع سوريا بصورة مباشرة وعلى مستويات عالية، وصولاً إلى التوافق السعودي – المصري على ضرورة عودة سوريا إلى الجامعة العربية، وهو ما يريد ولي العهد السعودي محمد بن سلمان تحقيقه، بعد أن يحصل على غطاء ولو شكلي من الدول الحليفة له في مجلس التعاون الخليجي، ودول أخرى مثل مصر والأردن والعراق، حيث لا يزال موقف قطر هو الوحيد الرافض بينما يجري الحديث عن تردد كويتي يمكن لبن سلمان معالجته.

غداً، سنسمع الكثير من التحليلات والتقديرات والمقاربات حول أبعاد الخطوة، وستنطلق ماكينة خصوم سوريا في لعبة إعلامية مكررة ومملة تتحدث عن التنازلات والمقايضات، لكن يكفي متابعة الوقائع على الأرض، ومسار الأمور في سوريا ومن حولها، حتى يدرك الجميع، أن ما يجري إنما هو محاولة عربية للعودة إلى سوريا وليس العكس.

من ملف : العرب إلى سوريا بشروطها

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The clash of two cities: Erbil, Sulaymaniyah, and the future of Iraq’s Kurdistan

March 16 2023

The most successful Kurdish political experiment in West Asia is unravelling due to increasing divisions between the KDP and PUK, the two biggest political parties in Iraqi Kurdistan.

From right to left: Kurdistan Democratic Party leader (KDP) Masoud Barzani, Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) party leader Bafel TalabaniPhoto Credit: The Cradle

By Zaher Mousa

Iraq’s Kurds, as with other mainly Iranic populations across western and southern Asia, are busy preparing to celebrate Nowruz on March 21, the Persian new year which marks the beginning of Spring.

But this year’s festivities will be marred by a conflict raging between political and military forces in the city of Sulaymaniyah – stronghold of the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) – and between Sulaymaniyah and Erbil – stronghold of the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP ). To complicate matters further, Iraq’s central government in Baghdad has been drawn into this conflict with the semi-autonomous Kurdish region.

These fiery disputes have burned through the patience and loyalties of Iraqi Kurds, who have watched their political representatives lock horns over virtually everything: the relationship with Baghdad, oil production and revenues, the public sector salary crisis, the conflict between Turkey and Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) militants, and disunity within the region’s vital institutions in their respective strongholds. 

Kurdish internal ‘division and discontent’

Last February, an opinion poll conducted by Erbil-based research firm Sheekar Research, which is funded by the US National Endowment for Democracy, revealed that just over half of respondents (50.7 percent) believe they would be better off if the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) was dissolved and central authority from Baghdad was re-established.

The reasons cited by polls participants were the KRG’s deteriorating financial and service conditions, general administrative failure, and widespread corruption. In the PUK’s stronghold,, 64 percent of respondent supported dissolving the Kurdish administration, and 59 percent said they would not participate in demonstrations urged against the federal government in Baghdad.

The survey polled 1,000 people across Iraqi Kurdistan, and included a high proportion of the region’s government employees.

Respondents were also asked about how they view recent decisions by the federal supreme court against the KRG. Last February, the Baghdad court ruled that Iraqi Kurdistan’s oil and gas law was unconstitutional, which threw its contracts with international oil companies into legal jeopardy.

A plurality of survey respondents (46 percent) viewed the court’s decision as “illegal” and “issued against” Iraqi Kurdistan. Yet, most respondents either supported (10 percent) or expressed neutrality (42 percent) over the rulings, as they felt the court was primarily punishing the KDP and PUK.

The survey also asked who shoulders the responsibility for the KRG’s apparent weakness in Baghdad. A fifth of respondents (21 percent) blamed the KDP and the PUK, while a further 47 percent blamed all Kurdish political parties – including the ruling duopoly and opposition groups. One-third of respondents were unsure.

The poll, published by the semi-official Iraqi newspaper Al-Sabah and other Iraqi and Arab newspapers, led to an escalation of tension between Baghdad and the KRG. Iraqi government Spokesman Basim al-Awwadi called the Al-Sabah report an ‘opinion piece’ that did not represent Baghdad’s view.

However, the head of the Kurdish opposition New Generation Movement (NGM) bloc, Sarwa Abdel Wahed, confirmed in a television interview that the federal government had been subjected to significant pressure from Kurdistan to retract the poll and apologize for its publication.

Power struggle within the PUK

Since the late 1970s, Sulaymaniyah has been a political and military stronghold for the PUK, which had been founded by former Iraqi president (2005-2014) Jalal Talabani in 1975. After Jalal’s death in 2017, his wife Hero Ibrahim assumed party leadership for three years before that position became violently contested between his son Bafel Talabani (head of Kurdistan’s counter-terrorism affairs) and his nephew Lahur Jangi Talabani (heads one of Kurdistan’s two intelligence services).

In February 2020, the PUK’s leadership council elected both men as co-chairs of the party. The partnership did not last long. An assassination attempt against Bafel and two party leaders ended in accusations against Lahur for the poisonings.

In July 2021, Bafel ousted Lahur from the co-presidency, stripped him of his posts, dismissed officials loyal to him, and had Sulaymaniyah’s judiciary issue an arrest warrant for him and his two brothers.

But Lahur’s popularity among the region’s security and military institutions was something Bafel had not yet addressed, and security tensions broke out in the city. Violent clashes between the two parties erupted repeatedly, culminating, most notably, in the assassination of Officer Hawkar Al-Jaf in Erbil on July 10, 2022. Meanwhile, accusations against Lahur for planning assassination plots and establishing armed groups continued.

The most recent political agitation took place on 14 March, when KDP sources announced an assassination attempt against Wesi Barzani, the youngest son of its former president Massoud Barzani, the single most influential figure in the KRG. The KDP accused Bafel Talabani of the attack because Erbil backs his cousin Lahur in their conflict.

Since the outbreak of the PUK’s war of succession, the KDP in Erbil – its historical partner in governing the Kurdish region – has supported Lahur Talabani. This unvoiced loyalty was demonstrated by KRG Prime Minister Masrour Barzani – after the killing of Officer Al-Jaf – when he demanded pro-Bafel security service leaders be arrested in Sulaymaniyah. Furthermore, Erbil’s judicial authority has supported Lahur’s appeal against the procedures that led to his dismissal from the PUK’s co-chairmanship.

Bipartisan disputes

The succession dispute, however, is by no means the only major impediment in the relationship between Iraqi Kurdistan’s two most important cities and political parties. They also have acute differences over the KRG’s election law and the falsification of voter data, which has led to the postponement of the region’s parliamentary elections for over a year.

The two parties also differ on their relationship with the PKK in Qandil mountains and the Kurdish, US-backed Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) in northeastern Syria. The PUK supports the activities of the PKK, while a Turkish-KDP alliance to siphon off Iraqi oil has the Barzanis at odds with the PKK, designated by Ankara as a Kurdish terrorist group.

The dispute between the two parties further intensified over the selection of a candidate for Iraq’s presidency (which is reserved for a Kurd) after the country’s 2021 elections. The position has been filled by either Jalal Talabani, Fuad Masum, or Barham Salih since 2003 – all PUK politicos – in exchange for KDP candidates being assigned the presidency of the Kurdistan region.

On October 13, 2022, Iraq’s parliament elected Abdul Latif Rashid as president of the republic after a bitter struggle with the KDP’s Masoud Barzani, who tried to nominate his uncle Hoshyar Zebari, a former foreign minister (2004-2014) and the regional interior minister, Rebar Ahmed Barzani.

As a result of these differences, KRG Deputy Prime Minister Qubad Talabani – younger brother of Bafel – and his party’s ministers boycotted the meetings of the regional government. Baghdad is now trying to heal the rift between Sulaymaniyah and Erbil by increasing the Kurdistan region’s share of state revenues and finding a solution to the unlawful sale of Iraqi oil by the KRG.

In this context, Baghdad has referred a draft law to Iraq’s parliament to create the Halabja Governorate in Kurdistan. This will increase the number of governorates in the KRG to four (Erbil, Dohuk, and Sulaymaniyah), will lead to greater financial allocations for the Kurdistan region in the federal budget, and  strike a more equitable budget balance between the two parties.

Can Kurdistan ever be united?

Keeping the Kurdistan region united and cohesive is a major US objective in Iraq, and is repeatedly emphasized by Washington. Efforts are currently underway to find a solution to the dispute between Baghdad and Erbil over the KRG’s unlawful sale of Iraqi oil outside of central government authority. In both 2022 and 2023, the Federal Court issued decisions obligating the KRG to hand over oil revenues to Baghdad, and invalidating the unlawful oil and gas law in force in Iraqi Kurdistan.

The political agreement which was struck to form the government of Iraq’s current Prime Minister Muhammad Shia al-Sudani, includes the enactment of a federal law that regulates the process of extracting and selling oil and gas; the implementation of the constitution’s Article 140 (determining the administrative authority over disputed Iraqi areas); resolving the issue of internally displaced people (900 thousand are displaced in Iraqi Kurdistan); and the implementation of the 2020 “Sinjar AgreementSinjar Agreement” between Erbil and Baghdad to remove the PKK from the Sinjar district in the Nineveh Governorate.

The prime minister’s visit to Erbil this week was an effort to resolve outstanding issues and bridge gaps between competing Kurdish agendas. Sudani met with officials from the two rival parties and the opposition NGP to gain approval for the federal general budget for the years 2023, 2024, and 2025, before referring the bill to Parliament.

Sudani aspires to strengthen his position as prime minister by satisfying all parties, including those in the KRG, whose political parties collectively represent 59 of Iraq’s 329 parliamentary seats. He has moved quickly. On 13 March, Sudani announced an agreement to end the dispute over the oil revenues – on the same day the KRG’s Ministry of Finance received 400 billion dinars (around $274 million) from Baghdad to pay government employee salaries.

While the agreement details are still “unclear,” political sources say its most prominent breakthrough appears to be the payment of KRG oil revenues into the Iraqi financial system, via a designated account in the Iraqi Trade Bank. This will – for now at least – allow Baghdad to see, but not touch, KRG energy revenues.

According to the sources, these measures come in response to conditions set by the US in advance of Sudani’s scheduled visit to Washington in the next few days.

The views expressed in this article do not necessarily reflect those of The Cradle.

Syrian sanctions relief: An ‘American trick’

March 14 2023

Photo Credit: The Cradle

The temporary lifting of Washington’s sanctions on earthquake-stricken and war-torn Syria is ‘misleading’ at best, and stands in the way of relief efforts.

By The Cradle’s Syria Correspondent

Four days after the devastating earthquake that struck southern Turkiye and northern Syria on 6 February, the US announced it would temporarily ease its Syrian sanctions in an effort to speed up aid deliveries to the country.

Specifically, the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) issued Syria General License (GL) 23, which allows a 180-day Syrian sanctions exemption for “all transactions related to earthquake relief efforts.” The EU followed suit later by also freezing some of its sanctions on Damascus.

But do these measures really represent a comprehensive freeze on sanctions against Syria? And are these partial suspensions proportional to the scale of the disaster that leveled the Syrian north?

A more detailed examination of these US “sanction exemptions” reveals that this humanitarian gesture was little more than a public relations stunt to placate growing Arab and Global South displeasure with Washington’s efforts to starve out Syria – sentiments that spiked quite notably after the earthquake.

The US sanctions suspension, for all practical purposes, is limited to the sending of emergency funds from “acceptable” sources. Washington, after all, still controls the process entirely – sanctions can be imposed on remittance senders at any time.

Furthermore, US sanction exemptions have not reduced the reluctance of foreign institutions and individuals to participate in Syria’s economy – even in sectors that are not explicitly targeted by the US and EU. The UN calls this unfortunate byproduct of western sanctions regimes “excessive compliance with sanctions,” because of the fear of running afoul of western financial regulators.

Suffocating sanctions

Damascus has been targeted by US sanctions since 1979 for siding with Tehran in the Iran-Iraq war (1980-1988). With the outbreak of the war in Syria in 2011, US President Barack Obama expanded previously imposed sanctions under the Syria Accountability Act (2004) as part of a western effort to create political, economic, and military pressures on the Syrian government.

These new sanctions covered practically all sectors, imposing financial restrictions on individuals, entities, facilities, institutions, ministries, the medical sector, and state banks. They were pervasive and punished all Syrians: banning passenger flights, restricting oil exports (the US, through its Kurdish proxy, the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), controls the oil fields in northeastern Syria), preventing the export or re-export of US goods to Syria, preventing the export of Syrian products overseas, freezing Syrian assets abroad, and severing diplomatic relations with Damascus.

This sanctions overload reached a climax with the ominous Caesar Act (2019) and Captagon Act (2022). The former granted Washington the power to impose sanctions against any individual or entity, regardless of their nationality, who engages with Syria in infrastructure and energy projects, provides financial, material, or technological support to the Syrian government, or provides the Syrian military forces with goods or services.

In 2022, the US Congress passed the Captagon Act, which targeted Syria’s pharmaceutical industry, one of the country’s most successful commercial sectors, which provides more than 90 percent of Syria’s medicine needs. This US domestic legislation grants itself the authority to monitor Syrian borders, and seeks to “legitimize” its military forces’ illegal presence in Syria.

License to chill

On 10 February, the administration of President Joe Biden issued Syria General License (GL) 23, which temporarily eases sanctions on Syria and allows for the additional flow of much needed humanitarian aid into the country. However, the statement issued alongside the decision indicates that this “exemption” has many limitations.

While removing sanctions entirely requires US congressional approval, suspending the ban on certain financial transactions with Syria for a short duration is the prerogative of the American president, and is often used as leverage to gain political concessions from US-sanctioned states.

An example of this is the 2015 nuclear negotiations with Tehran, when Obama issued licenses to freeze some US sanctions on Iran before his successor, Donald Trump, withdrew from the agreement in 2018 and reactivated the sanctions.

A press release issued by OFAC stated that GL 23 “provides the broad authorization necessary to support immediate disaster relief efforts in Syria.” It added that “U.S. and intermediary financial institutions should have what they need in GL23 to immediately process all earthquake relief transactions.”

The GL 23 “authorized all transactions related to earthquake relief efforts in Syria that would be otherwise prohibited by the Syrian Sanctions Regulations (SySR).” Importantly, it also states that “US financial institutions and US registered money transmitters may rely on the originator of a funds transfer with regard to compliance with this general license, provided that the financial institution does not know or have reason to know that the funds transfer is not in compliance with this general license.”

This language ensures that Washington retains the authority to investigate any transfers and punish money senders at any later date, on charges that the transfers are not related to relief efforts.

Another caveat, as per OFAC’s press release: “The Department of the Treasury will continue to monitor the situation in Syria and engage with key humanitarian and disaster assistance stakeholders, including NGOs, IOs, and key partners and allies.”

This essentially excludes dealings with Syrian government institutions, and prevents money transfers directly to state entities, including the Central Bank of Syria. Keep in mind that the distribution of all international humanitarian aid is directed via the Syrian government, as per the regulations and laws of the state.

This US “sanctions relief” caveat elicited a high-pitched response from the Syrian Foreign Ministry, in which it described Washington’s offering as “misleading, and aims to give a false humanitarian impression.”

Last May, the US lifted sanctions on foreign investments in areas outside of Syrian government control. The Treasury Department issued an authorization that now allows for “activities” in 12 different economic sectors in parts of northeast and northwest Syria without fear of US sanctions. This move was aimed at stimulating economic growth in areas controlled by US-backed Kurdish militias and Turkish-backed militants.

Hindering relief efforts

Washington’s sanctions have had direct consequences on international relief efforts following the earthquake. The United Nations and relief organizations were delayed in providing urgent life-or-death assistance to Syria, which the UN blamed on road and infrastructure obstacles and a “lack of fuel” – an implicit reference to the western sanctions that have deprived the country of its critical oil wealth.

Syria’s entire health sector has suffered directly from US sanctions because of power outages and the inability to purchase vital medical equipment needed to treat patients. According to estimates by the World Health Organization (WHO), around 20 medical facilities were damaged by the earthquake and need rehabilitation, but US sanctions prevent the restoration of these facilities, either through a direct ban or because foreign medical companies fear sanctions repercussions for dealing with the Syrian Ministry of Health.

Sanctions have doubled the suffering of Syrian earthquake survivors in terms of securing urgent relief materials and rehabilitating their damaged housing units. As such, UN Secretary-General Antonio Guterres has called for the lifting of sanctions that impede relief efforts.

“This is a moment in which everybody has to make very clear that no sanctions of any kind interfere with relief to the population of Syria in the present moment,” he said.

A Syrian relief source, who asked not to be named, informs The Cradle that the response of international organizations to the Syrian disaster still remains below standard due to poor funding and the difficulty of sending relief and medical materials because of the sanctions.

He explains that the impact of the US exemption license is almost negligible, as “the disaster will have a very long term impact. In normal circumstances, we need years of work, let alone the [additional burden of] sanctions.”

US ignores global calls to lift sanctions

In her preliminary report after a 12-day visit to Syria in November 2022, UN Special Rapporteur on Unilateral Coercive Measures and Human Rights Alina Dohan presented detailed information about the catastrophic effects of unilateral sanctions on Syrian citizens and the decline in their living standards.

Douhan called for the western sanctions imposed on Syria to be lifted immediately and stressed that they are illegal under international law.

The goal of US sanctions is to continue the wholesale destruction of a regional adversary that it wasn’t able to achieve during a decade-long, brutal war. Millions of Syrians were killed, injured, and displaced in a conflict funded and armed by external parties.

The February earthquakes just exacerbated the suffering that Syrians have endured for years, with official Syrian statistics claiming around half a million people affected, in addition to the damage of tens of thousands of housing units.

In a preliminary report, the World Bank estimates the direct damages of the earthquake in Syria at $5.1 billion. The destruction has affected four of Syria’s 14 governorates, which are home to approximately 10 million of the country’s population. These include Aleppo, Hama, and Latakia, which are under the control of the Syrian government, and Idlib, which is under the control of Al-Qaeda-affiliate Hayat Tahrir al-Sham. Aleppo, with a population of 4.2 million people, was the most affected ($2.3 billion), followed by Idlib ($1.9 billion) and Latakia ($549 million).

Despite exemptions for humanitarian aid, the impact of US sanctions on Syria has been significant, hindering the ability of humanitarian organizations to operate effectively in the country. The negative impact of these sanctions undermines any claims by Washington to support the Syrian people, especially in light of the ongoing humanitarian crisis.

The views expressed in this article do not necessarily reflect those of The Cradle.

U.S. Sanctions Agravate Earthquake Response in Syria

FEBRUARY 14, 2023

W. T. Whitney Jr.

Posted by INTERNATIONALIST 360° 

The son, right, and friends of Syrian refugee Naziha Al-Ahmad carry her body to be buried in a cemetery after she died during an earthquake, in Elbistan, southeastern, Turkey, Feb. 10, 2023. The U.N. says Turkey hosts about 3.6 million Syrians who fled their country’s 12-year civil war, along with close to 320,000 people escaping hardships from other countries. | Francisco Seco / AP

Suffering in Syria and Turkey caused by a strong earthquake on Feb. 6 has elicited an immense worldwide humanitarian response. The toll as of press time for this article was 36,000 people dead, with the number of recorded deaths steadily rising as rubble from collapsed buildings is removed. Unusually cold weather and snow add to the grief and difficulties in delivering aid material to survivors.

Compounding matters is the longstanding internal conflict in both countries aggravated by foreign interventions. The Turkish government contends with a Kurdish insurgency formerly active within its own borders and now based across the southern border in Iraq and Syria.

The Syrian government of President Bashar al-Assad, meanwhile, has confronted U.S.- and European-supported rebel forces fighting in northern Syria since 2011.

The humanitarian disaster from the earthquake is further aggravated by the warlike interference in Syria’s affairs that has gone on for years and is still underway, particularly the role of economic sanctions employed by nations led by the U.S. government. Of concern is U.S. imperialism’s seeming disregard of human suffering and deaths as it wields the weapon of economic war.

A civil war has raged in Syria for 11 years. The U.S. government, in conjunction with allies, supports elements of the anti-Assad resistance. They hold territory in northern Syria, where even U.S. troops are deployed.

The civil war has led to displaced populations of refugees, some living in government-controlled Syria, 3.6 million others living precariously in Turkey, and 4.1 million more living in conflict-ridden northern Syria; they were dependent on humanitarian aid prior to the earthquake. Kurdish rebels, anti-Assad rebels, and radical Islamists control their own portions of that area.

The earthquake has caused more death and destruction in Turkey than in Syria. Turkey registered 31,643 deaths as of Feb. 13 and Syria 4,574 deaths, of which 3,160 occurred in rebel-held areas.

The delivery of humanitarian aid material is always difficult in situations of natural disaster. The Turkish government reports offers of assistance from 71 countries. Search and rescue teams and shipments of materials have arrived there from dozens of them.

Conditions in Syria, however, are different. Western countries are contributing relatively little. Shipments of aid material have entered Syria from Iraq, Iran, Libya, Egypt, Algeria, United Arab Emirates, and India.

Rescue teams and aid shipments have been promised or have arrived from China, Iran, Russia, Cuba, and Algeria. Venezuela sent teams to both affected countries, and its teams were the first foreign rescuers to arrive in Northern Syria.

Physical barriers further complicate matters in Syria. Only the Bab al-Hawa crossing of the Turkish-Syrian border remains open; three others are closed due to Russian and Chinese pressure in the United Nations Security Council. Those countries regard U.S.-supported rebels active in the region as “terrorists.”

The Assad government is requiring that aid for areas under its control enter through Damascus. Air shipments to the capital, though, have been hobbled due to runway damage left over from an Israeli attack in January.

Economic sanctions against the Assad government, in force since 2011, pose the main difficulty for countries that would provide assistance to Syria. Governments worldwide have joined the United States, leader of the pack, in sanctioning Syria.

Speaking to the press on Feb. 6, State Department spokesperson Ned Price insisted, “We are determined to do what we can to address the humanitarian needs of the Syrian people.” He indicated that any U.S. aid would be delivered exclusively to NGOs, the implication being that economic sanctions remain in effect.

The head of the Syrian Arab Red Crescent called upon the United States and its allies to “lift their siege and sanctions on Syria so that rescue and relief work can proceed unimpeded.”

Speaking for China’s foreign ministry, Mao Ning likewise called for an end to sanctions, pointing out that U.S. “military strikes and harsh economic sanctions have caused huge civilian casualties,” while U.S. troops have assured the “plunder … [of] more than 80% of Syria’s oil production.”

A UN Special Rapporteur had already urged in November 2022 that sanctions against Syria be ended on grounds of “destruction and trauma suffered by the Syrian people since 2011.”

On Feb. 9, the U.S. government blinked. The Treasury Department provided authorization lasting for 180 days for “all transactions related to earthquake relief.” Other nations may follow suit.

The difficulty remains: An aggressive U.S. government is prone to trivializing claims that economic sanctions threaten human lives. The economic measures against Syria’s government revive the spectacle of sanctions aggravating humanitarian catastrophe from another cause. That was Cuba’s situation in having to deal with both U.S. sanctions and the COVID-19 pandemic.

The current situation in Syria calls for a critical look at the U.S. government’s frequent resort to economic sanctions as it wages what amounts to permanent war. Sanctions offer the advantage of impunity. An aggressor’s profile is lowered even as threats of ungovernability and human suffering mount.

As has long been known, those who suffer most from sanctions aimed at a national economy are a society’s poorest citizens. Sanctions violate human rights, particularly the right of citizens to lead economically sustainable lives and their right to benefit from social programming that is determined collectively, notably healthcare, education, and social security for elders.

Although legal experts have identified criminal aspects of U.S. sanctions, even crimes against humanity, the upshot has been impunity for the U.S. government, in part due to U.S. disregard for the International Criminal Court.

Frequent use of economic sanctions represents one aspect of non-stop war-making on the part of the U.S. government and of nations following the U.S. lead. Sanctions are in the same category as the use of one’s own military forces, the use of proxy warriors and other agents, and internal subversion leading to destabilization and/or coups.

Syria’s people have been on the receiving end of all that for years, and now, even with the devastation of the earthquake, they’re not getting much respite.

Western sanctions will mean that more Syrians die after the earthquakes

February 11, 2023

The economic stranglehold and selective approach to aid will lead to more death and displacement

The economic stranglehold and selective approach to aid will lead to more death and displacement

Feb 10, 2023, RT.com

-by Eva K Bartlett

Following the devastating earthquakes that rocked Türkiye, Syria and their neighboring countries on February 6, leaving more than 20,000 dead, Damascus is struggling to deal with this unprecedented humanitarian catastrophe as it remains under brutal Western sanctions that have brought the country to its knees. 

The West’s war on Syria that began in early 2011 failed to topple its elected president, but the subsequent years of increasingly cruel sanctions – all in the name of ‘helping the Syrian people’ – have succeeded in rendering life miserable and near impossible, with most unable to afford to properly feed their families, much less heat their homes.  

Now, in a time of crisis, the Syrian people cannot even receive donations or emergency support from abroad. One supporter set up a GoFundMe campaign, only to have it taken down due to the sanctions. Type the word “Ukraine” into the search field on PayPal or GoFundMe and you’ll see countless appeals for sending money to Ukraine. But for Syrians, Western platforms like these are off-limits, and have been for years.

Adding to the destruction left by war

On February 6, southern Türkiye and northern Syria were hit by a 7.8-magnitude earthquake, followed by dozens of aftershocks and then another earthquake. While the neighboring countries of Lebanon, Jordan, Palestine, Iraq and others were affected, the worst of the damage was in Türkiye and Syria.

As of February 9, the official death toll in Syria was 1,347, with more than 2,300 injured. Nearly 300,000 Syrians have been displaced due to the earthquakes. The scenes initially coming out of Türkiye and Syria were heartbreaking and catastrophic, with buildings collapsing in front of people, and piles of rubble with the dead and the maimed trapped below.

In Syria, the earthquakes added to already extensive damage from the war. Aleppo, the country’s second-largest city, was tragically prone to building collapses because of the terrorist occupation that had lasted until 2016. The militants had frequently tunneled under buildings, in many cases in order to lay explosives and destroy them, as they did with the Chamber of Industry in April 2014. With the Syrian population already struggling to just survive prior to the earthquakes, now Aleppo and the coastal regions of Syria affected by the earthquakes face even more death, injury and displacement.

Sanctions were already killing Syrians

Even without the earthquakes, Syrians struggled to get medication, hospitals struggled to get or maintain critical machinery and equipment, and the population as a whole suffocated as the country’s economy steadily worsened, all by design.

Western leaders are adamant that the only ones to blame for the Syrians’ suffering before the earthquake were President Bashar Assad and his government (or “regime,” as Washington calls any undesirable foreign government it hasn’t yet toppled), whose “dictatorship” caused the people to rise up and start a civil war (actually a US-led proxy war against Syria to overthrow said government). The sanctions, ostensibly aimed at the “regime,” are, by this logic, intended to helpand protect the general population. In reality, they are strangling Syrian civilians.

Here’s what life is like for many Syrians now, according to British journalist Vanessa Beeley: “The US and its proxy Kurdish separatist forces are occupying Syrian resources in the northeast which includes their oil, which means of course that the bulk of Syria is reliant upon Iranian oil to keep any kind of electricity running. At the moment, we have basically about two or three hours of electricity per day. There is no heating in the majority of homes across Syria.”

As Beeley notes, earthquake-displaced Syrians – unless they receive emergency aid – face freezing and wet conditions, “without any alternative shelter, without any electricity, without any heating.” And thanks to the sanctions, desperately needed humanitarian aid and fundraising is difficult. International cargo planes can’t land in Syria, and crowdfunding services and even credit cards are unavailable. The virtue-signaling Western nations – the main cause of suffering in Syria since 2011 – have not only persisted in keeping the sanctions in place; most of them haven’t offered any meaningful help since the earthquake, just hollow words.

So, lift the cruel, debilitating, sanctions on Syria, which in addition to having already created untold misery now prevent fundraising efforts.

The US regime could lift the brutal sanctions (but won't because they care so much for the Syrian people…🙄)

Hypocrite⬇️ https://t.co/AxtfXz1WVg

— Eva Karene Bartlett (@EvaKBartlett) February 7, 2023

The Chinese Foreign Ministry blamed the sanctions for amplifying the miserable situation, and likewise pointed out that the US’ illegal presence in Syria and theft of Syrian resources was also exacerbating the economic situation.

“Frequent [US] military strikes and harsh economic sanctions have caused huge civilian casualties and taken away the means to subsistence of the Syrians. As we speak, the US troops continue to occupy Syria’s principal oil-producing regions. They have plundered more than 80% of Syria’s oil production and smuggled and burned Syria’s grain stock. All this has made Syria’s humanitarian crisis even worse.” 

A friend in need is a neighbor on the sanctions list

All of the above has left Syrians to rely mostly on the country’s friends for help. Incidentally, many of those nations and groups are among the most vilified by the West.

Following the earthquake, Russia’s Ministry of Defense dispatched “over 300 personnel, and 60 military and special vehicles” for rescue and aid efforts in Syria. The Russian Emergencies Ministry sent more than 100 rescue workers to Türkiye and Syria, including an airmobile hospital with 40 medics.

Iran sent a plane with 45 tons of medical, food and sanitary aid to Syria, and has pledged to send more.

Even battered Libya, itself largely destroyed by another Western regime-change project, sent a plane with 40 tons of medical and humanitarian aid, as well as an ambulance, to Aleppo International Airport.

Hezbollah, the Lebanese resistance movement, sent convoys of humanitarian aid to Syria. Lebanon’s army said it would send members of its Engineering Regiment to Syria, to contribute to the search and rescue operations.

Not everyone who offered their help to Syria are on Western sanctions list, of course. Algeria sent 115 tons of aid of food and medical supplies, tents and blankets, as well as 86 specialized civil protection personnel. The United Arab Emirates will apparently send $50 million to Syria for relief efforts, and Indian, Emirati and Jordanian planes carrying humanitarian and medical aid for Syrian victims arrived in the capital on Wednesday. Even New Zealand pledged to contribute NZ$500,000 “for the Syrian Arab Red Crescent (SARC) to meet humanitarian needs.”

“Criminal @nytimes admits that West sanctions are preventing aid supply to #Syria, then changes to blame #Syria for #US inhumanity.”
[source: https://t.me/VanessaBeeley/12565 ]

Meanwhile, Western corporate media stuck to the narrative of blaming the Assad government, with a New York Times article on the issue apparently saying initially that Western sanctions had hampered relief efforts to Syria – before quickly changing the line to say the government “tightly controls what aid it allows into opposition-held areas.” This is in-keeping with the old trope that the Syrian government denies aid to civilians in areas occupied by terrorists, which in most Western media are dubbed “rebels” and “opposition fighters.” This is something I and other journalists on the ground have repeatedly debunked, visiting liberated areas and hearing time and again that locals had been starving because terrorists had been hoarding humanitarian aid, denying it to civilians or selling it at massively inflated prices.

NYT never misses an opportunity to push West's regime-change lexicon.
"Opposition" = literally AL-QAEDA 🙄

Instead of calling for an end to the criminal sanctions against the Syrian people, NYT exploits humanitarian tragedy to push West's agenda of toppling elected Syrian govt. pic.twitter.com/3RpsIiQ1VF

— Eva Karene Bartlett (@EvaKBartlett) February 8, 2023

Western aid is not for everyone

On Thursday, the World Health Organization (WHO) warned about a looming “secondary disaster” in Syria, pointing to “major disruptions” to basic life supplies, but failing to highlight the role of Western sanctions or the terrorist presence in northwestern Syria as the underlying causes. Reports on UN aid reaching northern Syria via Türkiye also downplayed the presence of Al-Qaeda terrorists in the areas mentioned, as well as Türkiye’s years-long support for Syrian anti-government forces. Such reports likewise neglected to mention the need for emergency relief in government-controlled areas of Syria, and the government’s efforts to bring that relief in.

Some 12 years into the West’s proxy war on Syria, the continued denial of the very basics of emergency humanitarian relief to Syrians outside “rebel-controlled” areas, shows how little the West’s claim to care for Syrians really matter. The lack of concern by the UN, WHO, and affiliated aid agencies for the Syrians of Aleppo, among other government-controlled areas, is not at all surprising, given these bodies over the years systematically downplayed terrorism against Syrian civilians.

As the humanitarian disaster continues, it is also worth remembering that, over the decades, Syria has taken in refugees from numerous countries. Yet, in spite of the current emergency situation and the very dire need to lift the West’s sanctions, it is unlikely the “benevolent” West will change its crippling anti-Syria policies to allow Syrians to merely survive.

Everyone donating to @molhamteam for Syrian victims of the devastating earthquake should know that the donations go ONLY to Idlib, and NOT to Aleppo,Hama,Latakia or elsewhere, & they are known to pocket donations.

Also, their hero is the infamous terrorist, Abdel Baset Sarout. https://t.co/EarawrS0uy pic.twitter.com/u3Hy0f89Lj

— Ibn Walid (@walid970721) February 6, 2023

RELATED LINKS:

–UN official challenges punitive unilateral sanctions suffocating Syrians

–Western leaders, screw your ‘Sanctions Target the Regime’ blather: Sanctions KILL PEOPLE

–US sanctions are part of a multi-front war on Syria, and its long-suffering civilians are the main target

Iran Must Not Fall

February 11, 2023

Source

By Davor Slobodanvich Vuycachich

Nasser Kan’ani, Iranian Foreign Ministry Spokesman, last month justifiably declared that the Western hybrid war, which has been continuously waged against Iran in military, economic, political and psychological campaigns, has suffered a complete failure. Precisely because of this, the USA is now rapidly preparing the military aggression of the unnatural coalition of Israel and regional Arab countries against Iran, which, along with Russia and China, is undoubtedly the biggest American enemy. The task of this military conglomerate would be to deal deadly blows to Iran that would lead to its disintegration and the establishment of a puppet regime on the remains of the country. There is no doubt that the USA could participate in the planned aggression. The recently held, largest in history, joint US-Israeli military exercises “Juniper Oak 23.2” clearly hint at such a possibility, although it is not impossible that the US’s European allies could also participate in this massive operation. Military analysts from the West estimate that a military intervention against Iran, a kind of repetition of what we have already seen in Iraq, Libya, and Syria, could begin this summer, but this publicly stated assessment is probably just an attempt at deliberate deception. There is evidence that the attack on Iran could happen much earlier.

The drone attacks on the Iranian city of Isfahan for which Israel is certainly responsible, either directly or through the use of Kurdish terrorists as its proxy military forces, was undoubtedly a deliberate provocation meant to force Iran into hasty and disproportionate retaliation. Such a reaction, no matter how justified it may be in fact, would be used by the US and Israel to portray Iran as an aggressor in front of the “international community”. The reporting of some Israeli media such as “The Times of Israel” in which they announced, or rather, wished for “Iranian retaliatory” attacks on Israeli civilian targets, clearly testifies to sinister intentions of Israel. Тhere is clearly an Israeli plan to provoke Iran as soon as possible. What we might soon expect are Israeli false flag operations that would be blamed on Iran. It is more likely that the territories of the Arab vassals of the US and Israel would be attacked, rather than Israel itself. In this way, Israel would also ensure the igniting of anti-Iranian hysteria among its Arab allies and at the same time ensure the earliest possible start of aggression against Iran, which is obviously very important to Israel. Namely, Iran should officially join the Shanghai Cooperation Organization in April, which will bring it great international support. Israel is therefore in a hurry to start aggression before this happens because it mistakenly believes that in that case, it could avoid the wrath of Moscow and Beijing. Another reason for Israel’s haste is that in a little more than a month, Iran should receive at least 24 Su-35 multi-role fighters from Russia, for which it already has well-trained Iranian pilots. Finally, the US and Israel know that time will work against them if they allow the intensive military cooperation between Iran and Russia to continue and deepen, and the big question is how much concrete intelligence they have about its details. Therefore, the aggression against Iran could begin immediately before or exactly on the Iranian New Year in Farsi known as Nowruz, which this year is celebrated on March 20. This is also the date that was mentioned in connection with the delivery of Russian jet fighters.

Israel has been talking for a long time about the necessity for the US to provide it with full support because of the alleged threat that Iran represents to the region, but it will rather be that the US stands behind this entire project, because none of America’s vassals has the ability to conduct foreign policy independently. Admittedly, Israel is probably the most independent of all American allies, but it is still obliged to coordinate all its major decisions with Washington. As for threats to the region, Israel is a state that was created and is maintained on the basis of a policy of ethnic cleansing and genocide and is the only regional power from the Middle East region that has undisguised imperialist ambitions and territorial claims towards its neighbors. The UN Human Rights Commission condemned Israel for violating almost all 149 articles of the Fourth Geneva Convention and this is the best illustration of Israel’s aggressive policy. Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, as an exponent of such a policy, rushed to visit Paris recently, where he asked France for support for the planned aggression against Iran. After Netanyahu’s visit, Radio France reported that Israel really wants to attack Iran as soon as possible and has already identified around 3,000 possible targets. Nevertheless, Israel is afraid of an independent showdown with Iran and is trying to provide itself with as much concrete military support as possible. As for the American Arab satellites, in the planned attack on Iran, Israel will probably be able to count on the support of Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Bahrain, Yemen, Sudan and Morocco. Azerbaijan is certainly being pressured to join the coalition, but the leadership in Baku probably sees how dangerous it could be if Russia were to get directly involved in the conflict on Iran’s side, which is more than possible.

Prior to Netanyahu’s visit to the Champs Elysées, the UK Government at the beginning of this year аlready called for the immediate creation of a Grand Military Coalition against Iran. The official pretext under which this shameless campaign against Iran is conducted is, first of all, its nuclear program. However, in these accusations against Iran, it is deliberately forgotten that two Iranian Ayatollahs, Khomeini and Khamenei, have publicly spoken out against the development of a nuclear arsenal in Iran. In September 2014, Mohsen Rafighdoost, minister of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps during the eight-year defensive war against Iraq, in an interview he gave to Gareth Porter, a journalist specializing in US national security policy, testified that he personally asked Khomeini to start developing nuclear and chemical weapons on two occasions, but was refused both times. The reason for Khomeini’s refusal was his claim that Islam forbids weapons of mass destruction. Ayatollah Khamenei, the Supreme Leader of Iran, issued a fatwa in the mid-1990s against the acquisition and development of nuclear weapons, which was officially disclosed only in August 2005 in Vienna, at a meeting of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). Israel, on the other hand, possesses nuclear and certainly, chemical and biological weapons and unlike Iran, represents a real threat. As for nuclear weapons, Israel has Jericho II (YA-3) missiles with a range of 1,7700 km and Jericho III (YA-4) with a range of up to 11,500 km. Israel can also use its F-15 and F-16 fighters for tactical and strategic nuclear strikes. Even the US Congress Office of Technology Assessment estimated that Israel possessed undeclared offensive chemical and biological weapons. With such an arsenal, Israel could be considered a global threat, and Russia and China are certainly very aware of that.

Unlike Netanyahu and Israel’s political elite, Israeli military intelligence experts publicly state that they do not consider Iran a real threat to Israel. These weeks, mass protests against Netanyahu’s regime have been taking place across Israel, and the Israeli opposition has openly called his ultra-right government a far greater threat to Israel than Iran. Finally, we must also mention the assessment of Israel’s prestigious Institute for National Security Studies, according to which the greatest security threat to Israel is the deterioration of relations with the USA. Are internal political pressures, the struggle for power, and Netanyahu’s desire to please his American allies, in that case, the main reasons why the prime minister of Israel recklessly rushes into a very risky military conflict with Iran? Namely, the aggression against Iran could easily merge with the conflict in Ukraine and turn into a total world war. As the Chairman of the State Duma of the Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation, Vyacheslav Volodin, recently reminded, the entire foreign policy of the USA and its vassals is based solely on lies. Just as the pretext for the US-British invasion of Iraq was false accusations, the planned aggression against Iran has nothing to do with Iran’s nonexistent weapons of mass destruction.

There are other accusations against Iran, but they are equally meaningless and just an excuse for planned aggression. Iran does not interfere in the internal affairs of other countries in the region and is not a breeding ground and financier of terrorism. Admittedly, Iran as a country very often and with full rights condemns the persecution of Shias in the region, but no more than it condemns the persecution of Palestinians, for example, who are overwhelmingly Sunnis. Similarly, Iran condemned Azerbaijan’s aggressive policy towards Armenia, despite the fact that both Iran and Azerbaijan are predominantly Shia states while Armenia is an Oriental Orthodox Christian country. Iran simply leads a responsible and principled foreign policy. The frequent accusations of Iran’s alleged “sectarian” fanaticism are equally meaningless to genuine connoisseurs of the situation in the region. The USA, Israel, the UK, and other European former colonial powers, are the ones who are trying to spread hatred and fratricide among Muslims by financing and arming extremists in the region. Another strategy is to buy favors from existing regimes or, if that fails, to bring puppet regimes to power. It is a skill that Americans have brought to the level of art and perfection, and no other world power is more experienced and successful in this business than them. One of the strategies of the US and the collective West is to divide as much as possible the different schools and branches of Islam that they maliciously call “sects”, in order to then easily rule all the Muslim nations and their natural resources. Contrary to the attempts of the Western conglomerate to spread discord and hatred among Muslims, Ayatollah Khamenei in his speech on October 24, 2021 was very clear about Iran’s views on the necessity of unity, stating that “Islamic Unity is definitely a Koranic obligation”. Iran more than sincerely wants harmony among Muslims, which is not surprising at all, because it is one of its most vital security interests, as it is also the vital interest of all other Muslim nations in the region.

Iran has the second-largest natural gas reserves and the fourth-largest oil reserves in the world. Of course, as we all know very well, it is precisely in this fact that the real causes of the aggressive intentions of the USA, Israel, the UK, the EU and their Arab vassals, in relation to Iran, are hidden. However, on the other hand, for Iran, its natural wealth facilitates inclusion in the Eurasian economic space and leads to the intensification of all other Eurasian integrations. On the one hand, the export of Iranian energy products to Eurasian space really benefits China and not Russia, but on the other hand, Moscow and Tehran are rapidly developing an ever closer military and security cooperation. The frequent visits of Russian officials to Tehran, for example, Russian Security Council Secretary Nikolai Patrushev, are a good indicator of that process. There are many geopolitical moments that have brought Iran and Russia closer together. First of all, these are the two nations on which the West has imposed the most sanctions in the history of mankind. Second, and more importantly, both countries are in a deep and long-term political conflict with the US and its vassals. Finally, the Western conglomerate has been waging an intense hybrid and proxy war against both nations for a long time. The Russian-Iranian strategic alliance exists and has been developing for a long time, but it was only Russia’s military conflict with the de facto Nazi regime from Kiev that forced Moscow to recognize its reliable strategic ally in Iran. Admittedly, Iranian President Ebrahim Raeisi once said that the trade and economic relations between the two countries are not satisfactory, but obviously, there is a desire of both countries to improve them and that is starting to happen. As for China, Iran signed a somewhat secretive 25-year deal with its powerful Eurasian partner on March 27, 2021, but its concrete results are still not visible. It is true that China has a strong economic interest in cooperating with the Arab states of the Middle East region, some of which have very bad relations with Iran. However, Western analysts make a big mistake by focusing on the economic aspect of the cooperation of Eurasian nations. It is American hegemony and imperialism that forces Iran, Russia, China and other Eurasian powers to put economic interests on the back burner and give priority to issues related to the development of strategic security alliances.

Iran has formidable military potential that should not be underestimated. No matter how zealous the US and Israeli intelligence services are, Iran is a regional power that could give Israel and its allies extremely unexpected and very unpleasant and painful blows in places where they are least expected. Iran would not passively suffer the blows but would seek the opportunity to immediately transfer the conflict to the aggressor’s territory and this is something Iranian generals can surely achieve. Another very important moment is that Russia and China simply must not allow an Israeli-American coalition attack on Iran to happen in the first place because the risks are too great to ignore, and it is likely that after certain intelligence, the two superpowers will strongly, timely and jointly react to protect their vital interests in the region. Iran’s downfall is simply out of the question for Russia and China because it would imply a deep penetration of the US into the belly of Eurasia, which would result in a dramatic weakening and possible disintegration of the two superpowers. The question remains: what specific steps will the two Eurasian giants take to protect their common ally from aggression? The freedom-loving Iran, a multiple world champion in the fight against American hegemony, simply must not fall!

U.S. Declares War on Turkish Tourism Economy

February 7, 2023

Source

Steven Sahiounie is a Syrian American award-winning journalist based in Syria. He is specialized on the Middle East. He has also appeared on TV and radio in Canada, Russia, Iran, Syria, China, Lebanon, and the United States.

By Steven Sahiounie

On February 3, the Turkish interior minister, Suleyman Soylu, blasted the U.S. Ambassador to Turkey, Jeffry L. Flake, saying, “Take your dirty hands off of Turkey.”

The outrage was prompted after Washington and eight European countries issued travel warnings over possible terror attacks in Turkey. The U.S. and its western allies have attempted to connect a recent Quran burning in Sweden with travel danger inside Turkey. Muslim countries worldwide have denounced the burning as hate speech, not free speech, but this has no apparent connection to travel safety issues inside Turkey.

The U.S. travel warning is tantamount to a declaration of economic war on Turkey who is in an economic downturn of its tourism sector, which was 11 % of the GDP in 2019, representing $78.2 billion, and rose to $17.95 billion in the third quarter of 2022, of which 85.7 percent came from foreign visitors. In 2018, tourism directly accounted for 7.7% of total employment in Turkey.

“Every American ambassador wonders how they can hurt Turkey. This has been one of Turkey’s greatest misfortunes over the years. It gathers other ambassadors and tries to give them advice. They are doing the same thing in Europe, the American embassy is running Europe,” said Soylu.

Soylu has criticized the U.S. and blames Washington for the 2016 Turkish regime change attempt, and has accused the U.S. of ruling Europe. In foreign policies, the EU follows U.S. directives implicitly.

“I’m being very clear. I very well know how you would like to create strife in Turkey. Take your grinning face off from Turkey,” said Soylu.

Ankara warned its citizens abroad to be aware of possible anti-Islamic attacks in the U.S. and Europe following the burning of the Quran in Sweden. Turkey later summoned the nine ambassadors, including Flake, for talks over the warnings.

Soylu condemned the European consulate closures in Turkey as an attempt to meddle in campaigning for Turkey’s presidential and parliamentary elections, which are scheduled for May 14.

Soylu and Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan have suggested that the western states had issued the security warnings in order to pressure Turkey to tone down its criticism of the Quran burning and resolve the NATO dispute in which Erdogan has voiced opposition to Sweden joining the bloc.

After a right-wing Swedish Radical Christian burned the Quran in front of the Turkish embassy in Stockholm, Erdogan threatened that he would never consent to Swedish accession.

Sweden previously has refused to extradite the 120 terrorists Turkey has demanded, and the U.S. Senate has made it clear that if Turkey does not approve Swedish accession, arms sales to Turkey, specifically F-16s, will not be authorized.

Turkish elections

Turkish elections are scheduled for May 14, and will be the toughest reelection fight of Erdogan’s career, and he and his Justice and Development Party (AKP) may lose the election.

The six-party opposition coalition, composed of two larger and four smaller parties, has managed to present a unified front. The opposition to Erdogan support the restoration of Turkey’s parliamentary system and the curtailment of presidential powers.

Erdogan’s fear has grown so strong that he used the courts to ban a leading potential opposition candidate, Istanbul Mayor Ekrem Imamoglu, from running for the CHP. However, polls suggest that Ankara’s mayor, Mansur Yavas, could beat Erdogan.

The state has more overtly targeted some political parties, especially the pro-Kurdish, People’s Democracy Party (HDP). This left-leaning party was not invited into the opposition coalition, but HDP supporters will vote against Erdogan.

Biden supports opposition to Erdogan

U.S. President Joe Biden hosted an emergency meeting on Nov. 16 in Bali, Indonesia, with NATO and EU leaders to discuss a response to a missile blast in Poland, but Turkey was not invited. The meeting was held during the Group of 20 summit, and Turkey was present, but Biden snubbed them from the emergency meeting.

Turkey has been a full-fledged member of North Atlantic Treaty Organization since 1952, commands its second-largest military and has protected the southern flank of the alliance for 70 years.

Erdogan was again snubbed by Biden in December 2021 at the U.S. hosted virtual ‘Summit for Democracy’. In a New York Times interview published in 2020, the then candidate Biden called Erdogan an “autocrat.”

“What I think we should be doing is taking a very different approach to him now, making it clear that we support opposition leadership,” Biden said.

“He has to pay a price,” Biden said, adding that Washington should embolden Turkish opposition leaders “to be able to take on and defeat Erdogan. Not by a coup, not by a coup, but by the electoral process.”

Turkey recognized a clear attack by Biden using election meddling as a tool.

“The days of ordering Turkey around are over. But if you still think you can try, be our guest. You will pay the price.” Erdogan’s spokesman Ibrahim Kalin tweeted.

The main opposition CHP party quickly distanced themselves from Biden’s remarks of election meddling, calling for “respect for the sovereignty of Turkey”.

Turkey’s six-party opposition will select its candidate to run against Erdogan on February 13, CHP leader Kemal Kilicdaroglu said.

Obama and Erdogan

When President Obama conceived of his attack in Syria for regime change in 2011, using Radical Islamic terrorists as his foot soldiers, he called upon Erdogan to play a crucial role. Turkey hosted the CIA office which ran the Timber Sycamore program which trained and provided weapons for the Free Syrian Army. Erdogan also took in over 3 million Syria refugees fleeing the violence. Erdogan authorized his security forces to transport weapons to the terrorists in Syria.

Erdogan was a follower of the Muslim Brotherhood who provided the political ideology for the Free Syrian Army (FSA), who were terrorists attacking unarmed civilians, but were reported by the U.S. and western media as ‘rebels’.

However, the FSA disbanded due to lack of public support in Syria, and Al Qaeda stepped in the take its place, and finally ISIS emerged as the toughest terrorist group.

In 2017, President Trump cut off the CIA program in Turkey, and supporting of the Al Qaeda branch in Idlib, Hayat Tahrir al-Sham was left to Erdogan. The U.S.-NATO attack on Syria failed to produce regime change, but the country was partly destroyed in the process. Now, Erdogan proposes a reset in relations with Damascus, and is on track to establish business and diplomatic ties once more.

The U.S. State Department has issued warnings and threats to Erdogan if he follows through on his plan to have a neighborly relationship with Syria. Erdogan needs to make peace with Syria to return the 3.6 million Syrian refugees back home, and revive exports to Syria which will be a huge boost to the Turkish economy. If he accomplishes this soon, he has a good chance at winning reelection in May.

Kurds-PKK-YPG

A deadly terrorist bombing of a shopping district in Istanbul last November was carried out by a Syrian Kurd. The message was directed at Erdogan: don’t attack the YPG in north east Syria, or else. Those Kurds are supported by the U.S. military illegally occupying parts of Syria.

The U.S. partnered with the YPG to fight the ISIS, and both Erdogan and the opposition view that as a betrayal of a fellow NATO member, and U.S. ally. The YPG is directly linked with the PKK, an internationally designated terrorist organization and a threat to Turkey’s national security.

Erdogan has threatened a new military operation in Syria to disarm the YPG regardless of their U.S. partnership. The Syrian special enjoy under Trump, James Jeffrey, advised the Kurds to repair their relationship with Damascus, as the U.S. was not going to fight any war to defend them. The Kurd’s usefulness to the U.S. was over. Recently, the Turkish air force has been bombing them, with shells falling a few hundred feet from U.S. personnel stationed there.

Erdogan has asked Russian President Vladimir Putin for a green light to attack the Kurds in Syria, but was cautioned against it. However, the time might be ripe for a Turkish attack on the Kurds, which would disarm them and probably would lead to a withdrawal of the 200 American troops.

Turkey removed M4 outpost

On February 2, Turkish troops in Syria evacuated a military outpost near the M4 highway that connects the cities of Aleppo and Latakia. The former Al Qaeda branch in Syria, Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), occupy Idlib, the last terrorist controlled area in Syria.

Turkey had been defending the HTS from attacks from Syrian Arab Army, and the Russian military. However, Erdogan has decided to drop his support of the armed opposition as he repairs his relationship with Syria.

On January 31, Ankara informed the HTS leadership of its plan to conduct patrols on the HTS-controlled portion of the M4 (Aleppo-Latakia) road, which “may be followed by joint patrols with Russia, and eventually with Syria.”

Iran on the Erdogan – Assad Rapprochement Path, Meaning and Timing

 FEBRUARY 6, 2023

It seems clear that the entry of Iran into the line came at the request of Damascus, which thus wanted to balance the Iranian role with the information that constantly talks about common and intertwined personal and official interests between Presidents Putin and Erdogan.

The following is the English translation from Arabic of the latest article by Turkish career journalist Husni Mahali he published on 2nd Feb 2023 on Al-Mayadeen news site Al-Mayadeen Net:

Two days after President Erdogan’s statements, in which he said, “Let Turkey, Iran, and Syria meet to discuss possibilities for a final solution,” Russian Foreign Minister Lavrov said, in the press conference, with his Egyptian counterpart, Sameh Shoukry, in Moscow, “Today, an agreement has been reached aimed at Iran’s participation in the process of settling and normalizing relations between neighboring Turkey and Syria.

This means Cairo’s approval, perhaps on behalf of other Arab countries, of the Iranian role. This was recognized, the day before yesterday, by Ibrahim Kalin, Erdogan’s spokesman, when he said, “We will be happy with Iran’s contribution to the mediation efforts with Damascus because Tehran is an important player in the Syrian crisis from the beginning.”

Minister Lavrov’s words came after a series of contacts and visits by his Iranian counterpart, Hussein Abdollahian, to Beirut, Damascus, and Moscow, followed by the visit of the Foreign Minister of Qatar, Ankara’s ally, to Tehran, days after the Abu Dhabi summit, in which the leaders of a number of Arab countries, including Qatar and Egypt, participated. This explains Minister Lavrov’s taking advantage of Minister Shukri’s visit to Moscow to talk in his presence about Iran’s involvement in the mediation efforts between Erdogan and President Assad.

It seems clear that Iran’s entry into the line came at the request of Damascus, which thus wanted to balance the Iranian role with the information that constantly talks about common and intertwined personal and official interests between Presidents Putin and Erdogan, which was reason enough for Moscow not to put pressure on Ankara on the issue of Idlib and the Syrian north. in general, but succeeded in persuading Ankara to seek rapprochement with Damascus.

There is much talk in the Turkish media about Russian financial support for Erdogan, to help him win the upcoming elections, which are crucial for Erdogan, Turkey, and Russia as well.

It has become clear that Turkey, before and after these elections, will witness interesting developments related to Erdogan’s foreign calculations, which will have direct and indirect repercussions on the internal situation. The Syrian crisis comes at the forefront of these calculations, and the reason for this is the problem of the Syrians in Turkey, which will be an important electoral material that the opposition will use against Erdogan.

It has also become clear that he, that is, Erdogan will make the minimum concessions required of him to ensure his meeting with President Assad before these elections, and his chances are still few, according to all independent opinion polls, especially after the “Nation Alliance” announced its electoral project that includes 2,300 items aimed to fix everything Erdogan destroyed during his 20 years of rule.

Among these concessions was his acceptance of Iran’s entry into the line of rapprochement between him and President Assad at this time, when Tel Aviv, Washington, Western countries, and its other allies are conspiring against Iran, which was attacked by unknown drones that targeted a military complex in the city of Isfahan.

In parallel, tension appears between Baku and Tehran due to the armed attack on the Azerbaijani embassy in Iran and the killing of one of the embassy guards. This is what some nationalist circles in Turkey and Azerbaijan exploited to launch a hostile campaign against Tehran, which they have been doing for a long time due to Iranian support for Syria in the years of the so-called “Arab Spring”.

https://syrianews.cc/in-erdoganstan-opposition-leader-kilicdaroglu-prosecuted-for-insluting-the-sultan/embed/#?secret=x8tmRrjjFE#?secret=Q3L1pc6s4C

On Tuesday, the leader of the National Movement Party, Devlet Bahchali, who is an ally of President Erdogan, said, “Azerbaijan is a state and nation of Turkish origin, the same as South Azerbaijan,” meaning northwestern Iran. This Turkish nationalist provocation is accompanied by a similar provocation and escalation from the nationalist circles in Azerbaijan, which has established and developed in recent years intertwined military and intelligence relations with “Tel Aviv”, which has established a number of espionage bases near the Azerbaijani border with Iran, which is what it did in the Kurdistan region of Iraq, especially in areas under the rule of Masoud Barzani

At a time when the Jewish lobby controls most of the Azerbaijani media, which is waging a hostile and violent campaign against Iran, which coincided with the visit of Egyptian President Abdel Fattah El-Sisi to Azerbaijan, and a day later to Armenia, the two neighbors of Tehran.

Minister Lavrov’s talk about an “agreement” on Iran joining the Russian mediation between Assad and Erdogan seems clear that it came in support of the Astana process, but this time with Egyptian and Gulf approval, which may be reflected in support for the Egyptian-Turkish reconciliation path, that is, of course, if the Gulf capitals are sincere in their desire to return things to normal with Damascus.

It is not clear what practical positions the aforementioned capitals will take towards Iran entering the rapprochement line, which, if achieved, will undoubtedly be with the consent of the Gulf, which Erdogan hopes to support him financially, politically, and psychologically on the eve of the elections that will be on May 14.

Everyone knows that Erdogan was and still needs significant financial support from abroad, just as he needs media materials to help him gain more support, which will be achieved by meeting President Assad and announcing together their agreement to return Syrian refugees to their country. It is the issue that, if Erdogan succeeds in it, he will pull the rug out from under the feet of the opposition, which holds him responsible for the refugees and the entire Syrian crisis.

And while waiting for the American, Israeli, and European reaction to Iran’s entry into the mediation line between Erdogan and Assad, which is a victory for Iranian diplomacy at this particular time, everyone is waiting for President Erdogan to take practical and quick moves to resolve the issue of rapprochement before he is exposed to any external pressure, and the situation east of the Euphrates will be one of the most important elements of these pressures, since the rapprochement between Ankara and Damascus will aim, first or second, at joint action against the Kurdish “SDF” and “People’s Protection Units”.

This will be the biggest challenge for Erdogan and before Assad, especially if the Americans think about confronting Russian plans through Turkey, Syria, Iran, and perhaps Iraq as well. This may lead to a real and serious crisis in the relationship between Ankara and Washington, and it has enough reasons for such a crisis, as Turkey is a member of NATO which has many of its bases on its soil.

Ultimately, the bet remains on the success of Russian diplomacy in persuading Egypt, Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Qatar (Erdogan’s ally) of the necessity of urgency in achieving the Turkish-Syrian rapprochement, and by completing it, Erdogan’s reconciliations with Cairo, Abu Dhabi, and Riyadh will acquire practical importance from which everyone will benefit.

And without it being clear how Tel Aviv will respond to these Russian moves, which Washington will obstruct by various means, and its biggest weapon for that is the Syrian Kurds with their extensions in Turkey, Iraq, and Iran. They are Tel Aviv’s weapon also until the Gulf regimes convince Netanyahu and his allies in the terrorist government that the war is no longer in their interest and that the Palestinian youth generation, after the events in Jenin and the heroic Al Quds (Jerusalem) operation, is not the generation that will surrender to the conspirators against it internally, regionally and internationally, as long as there are those who stand and will stand by its side among the honorable people of the nation, and everyone knows them and they are the true source of terror for the Zionist entity and its allies in the region!

---

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Kurdish parties behind attack on Iranian MoD complex: Nour News

Feb 1, 2023

Source: Nour News

By Al Mayadeen English 

Iran’s Nour News reveals that elements from Iraqi Kurdistan collaborated with a foreign intelligence service in executing the Isfahan attack.

Picture from the drone attack on the complex of Iran’s Ministry of Defense in Isfahan. (Reuters)

In an exclusive report, Iran’s Nour News, which is affiliated with Iran’s Supreme National Security Council, said the small-scale UAV used in the attack on the Ministry of Defense workshop complex in Isfahan was assembled and used in an equipped workshop, with the assistance of trained forces, after being transferred to the country by Kurdish opposition groups.

According to the news outlet, parts of small-scale UAVs, as well as explosive materials, entered Iran with the support and guidance of Kurdish opposition groups based in Iraq’s Kurdistan region.

Read next: Iran summons Ukrainian envoy for expressing joy over Isfahan attack

Additionally, upon orders from a foreign security service, and after receiving parts of the UAVs and explosive materials, the group smuggled them from one of the inaccessible routes in the northwest of Iran, and delivered them to a liaison in one Iran’s border cities, according to the outlet. 

It adds that the parts and materials were assembled in an equipped workshop using trained forces, and were used for the sabotage attack against the workshop complex.

Read next: Iranian TV: Isfahan military complex suffered only minor damage

A few days earlier, the Iranian Defense Ministry announced that it successfully thwarted a drone attack on a defense industrial complex in the central Iranian province of Isfahan.

In a released statement, the Ministry said one of three Micro Aerial Vehicles (MAVs) attacking the defense equipment manufacturing complex in Isfahan was downed by a defense system stationed inside the facility.

According to the statement, two other MAVs exploded after being caught in traps set by the system, pointing out that the unsuccessful attack failed due to the preparedness of the defense system stationed in the region.

Videos circulating on social media showed the moment the complex’s defense system repelled the attack.

#BREAKING:

Explosion was heard in #Isfahan city, Isfahan Province of #Iran

It happened in an ammunition manufacturing center of the Iranian regime’s ministry of defense.#Iranian #iranunderattack #iranexplosions pic.twitter.com/kGU86swhCt

— Pak Afghan Affairs (@Pak_AfgAffairs) January 29, 2023

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واشنطن تحشد ضد التطبيع مع دمشق | أنقرة: مستعدون للانسحاب

الخميس 19 كانون الثاني 2023

علاء حلبي  

سربت أنقرة تصريحات تفيد بموافقتها على الانسحاب من سوريا جزئياً أو كلّياً وفق جدول زمني محددّ (أ ف ب)

على رغم العقبات الكثيرة التي تعترض طريق التطبيع السوري – التركي، تشير المعطيات المتوافرة كافة إلى أن أنقرة متمسّكة بهذا المسار، وهو ما أنبأ به مثلاً تسريبها حديثاً لأحد مسؤوليها عن استعدادها للانسحاب الكلّي أو الجزئي من الشمال السوري. ولعلّ ذلك التمسّك يفسّر جانباً من «الهَبّة» الأميركية، متعدّدة الأشكال والمستويات، لعرقلة عملية الانفتاح على دمشق، بدءاً من محاولة حشْد المعسكر الغربي بأكمله ضدّها، مروراً بالاشتغال على الربط الاقتصادي بين مناطق سيطرة «الإدارة الذاتية» وتلك الخاضعة لسلطة أنقرة، وليس انتهاءً بالعمل على تهشيم «الائتلاف» ومحاولة استنبات تشكيلات معارضة بديلة

مقالات مرتبطة

• موسكو تكثّف جهدها الميداني: لقاءات مع الأكراد… واستطلاعات على خطوط التماس الأخبار

قُبيل زيارة وزير الخارجية التركي، مولود تشاووش أوغلو، لواشنطن، ولقائه نظيره الأميركي، أنتوني بلينكن، عقد ممثّلو دول الاتحاد الأوروبي اجتماعاً في العاصمة البلجيكية بروكسل، بدعوة من المبعوثة الأوروبية لمنطقة الشرق الأوسط وشمال أفريقيا، هيلين لوكال، لمناقشة الأوضاع في سوريا، ليخلص الاجتماع إلى تأكيد استمرار موقف الاتحاد الأوروبي القائم، والمتمثّل في رفْض أيّ خطوات تطبيعية مع دمشق، ورفْض رفْع العقوبات عن الأخيرة، كما ورفْض إعادة الإعمار، الأمر الذي يتماشى مع حملة التصعيد التي تقودها واشنطن في الملفّ السوري هذه الأيّام. كذلك، سارعت الولايات المتحدة، التي لمست رفضاً قاطعاً من أنقرة لخطّتها القديمة – الجديدة للربط بين مناطق «الإدارة الذاتية» التي تقودها «قوات سوريا الديموقراطية» الكردية (قسد) والشمال السوري الذي تسيطر عليه تركيا، كبديل للانعطافة التركية نحو دمشق، إلى الإعلان عن اجتماع تشاوري في جنيف لممثّلي الدول التي تماثلها في مواقفها من الأزمة السورية، في إشارة إلى التحالف السياسي الذي تقوده ضدّ روسيا، حيث تربط واشنطن بين ملفَّي سوريا وأوكرانيا، وتَعتبر أيّ تقدّم في الملفّ السوري نجاحاً لموسكو، وفق مصادر سورية معارضة، تحدّثت إلى «الأخبار».

المصادر ذكرت أن جدول أعمال اللقاء لم يتبلور حتى الآن، غير أن المؤكد أنه سيستمرّ ليومَين: اليوم الأوّل (يُتوقّع أن يكون الإثنين القادم) يناقش فيه المجتمعون الخطوات الموحّدة التي يمكن اتّباعها لمنع أو تخفيف أيّ آثار للانعطافة التركية، وإعادة تقييم قانون العقوبات الأميركية على سوريا، ومدى إمكانية تنفيذ بنود منه ضدّ الدول التي انفتحت أو تسير نحو الانفتاح على دمشق، على أن يُعقد في اليوم التالي اجتماع مع الأمين العام للأمم المتحدة، أنطونيو غوتيريش.

استبَقت واشنطن زيارة أوغلو بجولة لمنسّق البيت الأبيض للشؤون الأمنية للشرق الأوسط وشمال أفريقيا شملت الأردن والعراق

واستبَقت واشنطن زيارة وزير الخارجية التركي بجولة قام بها منسّق البيت الأبيض للشؤون الأمنية للشرق الأوسط وشمال أفريقيا، بريت ماكغورك، شملت الأردن والعراق، حيث ناقش المسؤول الأميركي ملفّات عدّة من بينها الموضوع السوري. وبحسب مصادر كردية تحدّثت إلى «الأخبار»، فإن ماكغروك ناقش مع أربيل سُبل التنشيط الاقتصادي لمناطق «الإدارة الذاتية»، والاستفادة من استثناءات قانون عقوبات «قيصر»، والتي تشمل مناطق «الذاتية» وأخرى تسيطر عليها تركيا في الشمال السوري باستثناء إدلب وعفرين. في المقابل، أشار أوغلو، قبل انطلاقه إلى واشنطن، إلى أن الملفّ السوري سيحتلّ حيّزاً رئيساً من مباحثاته هناك، مضيفاً أن ملفّ طائرات «F16» سيكون حاضراً أيضاً، علماً أن الولايات المتحدة استثمرت هذا الملفّ مرّات عدّة للضغط على تركيا، بعد إخراجها إيّاها من مشروع تطوير طائرات «F35» إثر شراء الأخيرة منظومة «S400» الدفاعية الروسية.

وبالإضافة إلى الحراك السياسي والميداني (عبر إعادة نشْر القوّات الأميركية وتوسيع رقعة تمركزها، ومحاولة إحياء فصائل عربية تابعة لها في مناطق نفوذ «قسد»)، أعلنت الخارجية الأميركية ضخّ 15 مليون دولار لدعم ما سمّته «مكافحة التضليل، وتوسيع بثّ وسائل الإعلام المستقلّة، وتعزيز مبادئ حقوق الإنسان». ويتوافق ذلك مع التحرّكات الأميركية الأخيرة لخلق معارضة سورية بديلة لـ«الائتلاف» تنشط من نيويورك، تمهيداً لسحب البساط من تحت أنقرة، وإنهاء «الائتلاف» الذي يمثّل واجهة سياسية للمعارضة تتحكّم بها تركيا، علماً أن حملة كبيرة بدأت تَظهر بالفعل عبر وسائل الإعلام ومواقع التواصل الاجتماعي ضدّ هذا التشكيل. وفي المقابل، وفي تصريحات يبدو أنها تهدف إلى الضغط على واشنطن، سرّبت أنقرة إلى وسائل إعلام تركية تصريحات لمسؤول تركي كبير لم تُسمّه، أعلن خلالها موافقة بلاده على الانسحاب من سوريا جزئياً أو كلّياً وفق جدول زمني محدَّد، في ردّ مباشر على مطالب دمشق. كذلك ذكر المسؤول التركي أن بلاده متّفقة مع الجانب السوري على عدم وجود أيّ خطوط حمراء لا تمكن مناقشتها، الأمر الذي يعني إصراراً تركياً على الانفتاح على دمشق، خصوصاً بعد الزيارة التي أجراها وزير الخارجية الإيراني، حسين عبد اللهيان، لأنقرة قادماً من سوريا، وإعلانه دعم بلاده هذا الانفتاح، واستعدادها للانضمام إليه وتحويله إلى لقاءات رباعية تضمّ روسيا وإيران وتركيا وسوريا، وفق «مسار أستانا» الذي تحدّث عن إمكانية تعديله وتحديثه أيضاً. بدورها، أكدت موسكو مضيّها في تقريب وجهات النظر بين أنقرة ودمشق، حيث أعلن وزير الخارجية الروسي، سيرغي لافروف، استمرار العمل لإجراء لقاء على مستوى وزيرَي خارجية سوريا وتركيا، مرحّباً في الوقت ذاته بالمسار التركي للحلّ في سوريا.

ميدانياً، تابعت «هيئة تحرير الشام» (جبهة النصرة) هجماتها التصعيدية لتسخين جبهات القتال، عن طريق إرسال «إنغماسيين» إلى محاور «خفض التصعيد» في إدلب. وأفادت مصادر ميدانية بأن هجوماً جديداً شنّه عدد من «الجهاديين» على محور قرية معرة موخص في ريف إدلب الجنوبي، ردّ عليه الجيش السوري بقصف مكثّف على مواقع المسلحين، الأمر الذي أدّى إلى مقتل عدد منهم، عُرف منهم «أبو عبيدة النعماني» و«أبو جهاد الحلبي»، وهما من فصيل «أنصار التوحيد».

مقالات ذات صلة

• موسكو تكثّف جهدها الميداني: لقاءات مع الأكراد… واستطلاعات على خطوط التماس
• عبداللهيان في أنقرة: التقارب «الإيجابي» مع سوريا مفيد للمنطقة
• مساعٍ أميركية لتهشيم «الائتلاف»: «تحرير الشام» تبدأ تصعيداً مضبوطاً
• اللامركزية في مسارات الحلّ: أيّ تنمية يريدها السوريون؟

Turkey and Syria Meeting in Moscow May Result in Peace Plan

JANUARY 12, 2023

Posted by INTERNATIONALIST 360°

Steven Sahiounie

Tomorrow, the Foreign Ministers of Turkey and Syria will meet in Moscow.  This is the highest level meeting between the two countries who have been on opposite sides of the US-NATO war on Syria for regime change since 2011.

The outcome of that meeting, and the expected follow-up meeting between Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan and Syrian President Bashar al-Assad, may form the basis for the recovery of Syria, circumventing the UN resolution 2254, which has failed to produce results.

The US has lost the war, but has used armed militias to remain occupying parts of Syria, and to impose a stalemate which prevents a peaceful solution and recovery for Syria.  America is no longer the only superpower, and decisions made in the new Middle East no longer depend on orders from the US State Department.

Erdogan is up for re-election in June and faces heavy opposition. The economy is dismal, and people blame the Syrian refugees for lost jobs and social ills.  Erdogan and the opposition promise to send the refugees packing.

The Turkish export market to Syria in 2011 represented half of the entire global export market for Turkey.  That was lost when Damascus banned all Turkish imports because of their participation in the war on Syria. Erdogan could get the Syrian market restored by repairing the relationship.

In order to win re-election, Erdogan proposes a rapprochement with Assad.  The US has voiced its displeasure at any attempt of any country to repair relations with Syria.  However, Erdogan will not be swayed by US opinion or threats, in light of the fact that the US supports, trains and supplies weapons to the Kurdish militia (SDF and YPG) linked to an internationally banned terrorist organization (PKK), which have killed thousands in Turkey over three decades of terrorism. The Kurds know that Turkey is a much more important ally to the US, and the US will never fight Turkey to save the Kurds.  Former US envoy to Syria, James Jeffrey, told the Kurds they should repair their relationship with Damascus for protection. The US never supported a “homeland” for the Kurds.

Syria and Turkey are united in their goal to demilitarize the Kurdish northeast of Syria.  Syria and Turkey share a common enemy (the Kurds), and a common ally (Russia). This may be the basis of forming a new foreign policy between the two neighbors.

Syria

Syrian officials have met with Turkish officials and Arab Gulf officials.  Some Arab embassies in Damascus were re-opened, and Assad made a visit to the UAE.

The Assad administration in Damascus controls the vast majority of the Syrian territory.  The exceptions are: Idlib province in the northwest is under the occupation of Hayat Tahrir al-Sham, a Radical Islamic terrorist group which was the former Al Qaeda branch in Syria, and the Kurdish administration region in the northeast under the occupation of about 600 US troops and two local Kurdish militias (SDF and YPG) which follow a communist political ideology first promoted by the jailed PKK leader, Abdullah Ocalan.

Syria and Russia have been prevented from attacking and liberating Idlib from terrorist control. The US uses the three million civilians living under occupation as human shields to prevent attack. The US and its allies in the UN demand that the UN food and medical supplies be delivered to Idlib. The civilians are being fed and clothed, but the terrorists and their families are as well. The international community is supporting the welfare of the terrorists, who are there at the behest of the US, to prevent peace and recovery in Syria.  Despite the UN protocol which demands all UN members to fight Al Qaeda, or their affiliates, anywhere on earth, the US and Turkey have circumvented the protocol and use the terrorists as guards of the political stalemate which the US imposed on Syria.

The US

America has maintained an iron grip on Syria through the use of US sanctions and a brutal military occupation which has prevented the Syrian citizens from fuel for transportation and home heating, and to generate electricity.  Syrian houses, hospitals, schools and businesses have between 15 minutes to 1 hour of electricity in four intervals per day because of the US imposed sanctions, which have not affected the Syrian government, but have brought the Syrian people to desperation. Kidney dialysis machines require electricity constantly.  A gasoline powered generator can suffice when there are blackouts, but the US sanctions also prevent the importation of gasoline.  How can Syrians survive?

Despite Richard Haass writing in 1998 that US sanctions are ineffective and immoral against civilians, the US State Department hangs on to sanctions as a tool for regime change.

Iran

Iran and Syria have been united in their resistance to the occupation of Palestine Golan Heights and Shebaa Farms.  Iran stood firmly with Syria during the US-NATO attack on Syria because it is a key in the land route from Iran to Lebanon. Recently, there are some cracks appearing in the relationship between Damascus and Tehran.  Iranian President Ebrahim Raisi’s meeting in Damascus was postponed recently. Some experts feel Iran has been asking too much of Syria, and with new opportunities for improved relations with the Arab Gulf and Turkey, Syria may be taking time to evaluate its options.

Israel, Saudi Arabia, and other Arab countries want to see Iran out of Syria.  As long as Iran is in Syria the Israeli airstrikes will continue, which have been deadly and destructive.

There were 32 Israeli raids in 2022 that destroyed and struck 91 targets, including civilian infrastructure, buildings, weapons caches and vehicles. Eighty-eight military personnel were killed and 121 wounded in the attacks.

Saudi Arabia

Saudi Arabia is the United States’ largest foreign military sales customer, with more than $100 billion in active cases.  In the US there is a saying, “The customer is always right.”

Perhaps this may explain why the US takes no action against Saudi Arabia even when there have been deadly issues, or when Biden asked the Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman (MBS) to pump more oil, and he refused.

MBS is making huge reforms, which includes loosening restrictions on women, and creating new tourism and international sports opportunities.

MBS and Netanyahu are united in a common issue: to prevent Iran from obtaining a nuclear weapon, despite Iran insisting on wanting nuclear capabilities for peaceful purposes, such as energy production and medical research.  Netanyahu has stated one of his main priorities in office will be to normalize relations with Saudi Arabia.

The Arab League

The upcoming Arab League Summit will take place in Saudi Arabia, traditionally scheduled yearly in March.  Depending on the outcome of meetings between now and spring, Syria could possibly be reinstated and occupy their seat at the table.  Big changes have been taking place in the region involving the relations between Arab countries and the US, China and Russia. Saudi Arabia is in the driver’s seat and will use their hosting of the summit to project their ranking as the Middle East’s power broker.

Israel

Israeli Foreign Minister Eli Cohen has announced that the next Abraham Accords summit will be held in Morocco in March 2023.

The US had brokered in 2020 the Abraham Accords for the normalization of relations between Israel, Morocco, the UAE and Bahrain. Later, Sudan joined the accords.  Areas of shared interests are: defense, investment, agriculture, tourism, and energy.

The meetings and realignments between Syria and Turkey, mediated by Russia, may produce lasting changes in the Middle East, and bring enemies together as new friends.  The Israeli occupation of Palestine will continue to be the primary cause of instability and violence in the region.  It fuels religious extremism and terrorism. If Israel values the establishment of relations with their Arab neighbors, they must first look at their closest neighbors in Gaza and the West Bank.  The Middle East and the world wait for a peace summit to begin the process of peace for Israel and Palestine, and the host country will not likely be the US.

---

Steven Sahiounie is a two-time award-winning journalist

Related News

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• Peace with Syria: The final piece in Turkey’s foreign policy puzzle

Assad demands withdrawal of Turkish forces for continuation of talks

Lavrentiev stressed the importance of these meeting in order to resolve tensions between Damascus and Ankara

January 12 2023

(Photo Credit : SANA)

ByNews Desk- 

On 12 January, Syrian President Bashar al-Assad met with the special envoy of his Russian counterpart Vladimir Putin to discuss Moscow’s proposal to establish bilateral talks between Damascus and Ankara; however, Assad remarked that any talks between the two states would require Ankara to end its presence in northern Syria.

The Syrian government indicated that the discussions during the meeting revolved around international and regional issues, with Assad noting that media and political battles are at their height in recent years, adding that these disputes require more stability regarding clarity on political positions, referencing Damascus’s position on Russia’s military operation in Ukraine.

Russia’s envoy, Alexander Lavrentiev, clarified that Moscow appreciates Damascus’s position throughout the Russia-Ukraine conflict, and despite Washington’s efforts in placing pressure on nations on good and neutral terms with Russia, it failed to isolate Moscow and Damascus.

Lavrentiev also reiterated that Moscow is seeking a tripartite meeting between Turkiye, Russia, and Syria, stressing the importance of following up with one another to resolve tensions between the neighboring countries.

Earlier this month, the US Department of State spokesman, Ned Price, expressed grave concern over Turkiye’s recent rapprochement with the Syrian government, adding that the US calls on its allies and international partners to refrain from normalizing ties with Damascus. 

The Turkish Minister of Defense, Hulusi Akar, has previously affirmed Turkiye’s respect for the sovereignty of Syria and announced their presence in the country is limited to fighting Turkish-designated terrorist groups, such as the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK).

Turkiye has been launching indiscriminate artillery attacks across northern Syria and Iraq over recent months, targeting positions held by the People Protection Units (YPG) and the PKK.

Despite Moscow’s stress on the importance of mending ties between Damascus and Ankara, Akar revealed last month that discussions are being held with Russia to use the airspace above northern Syria for a potential cross-border operation that targets Kurdish militant groups.

A Moscow Meeting Shatters Fantasies of a Syrian ‘Confederation’

January 11 2023

Photo Credit: The Cradle

A geopolitical writer and journalist who previously worked at leading Lebanese daily As-Safir.

Malek al-Khoury

Russian-brokered Syrian-Turkish rapprochement will bury prospects of a divided Syria, with the potential for opposition factions to be co-opted into the armed forces.

The newly-initiated Syrian-Turkish rapprochement talks are headed in Damascus’ favor and the “Turkish concessions” derided by opponents are just the start, insiders tell The Cradle.

Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan has already abandoned his dream of “praying in the Umayyad Mosque” in Damascus. But sources say this will be swiftly followed by further concessions that will throw a wrench into the ambitions of Syria’s opposition factions.

An undivided Syria

There will be no “federalism” or “confederation” – western codewords for the break up of the Syrian state – at these talks, but rather a “Turkish-Russian” acceptance of Damascus’ conditions.

For starters, Ankara plans to open the strategic M4 highway – which runs parallel to the Turkish border and connects all the vital Syrian cities and regions – as a prelude to opening the legal border crossings between Syria and Turkiye, which will re-establish trade routes between the two countries.

This move, based on an understanding between Damascus and Ankara, will essentially close the door on any opposition fantasies of breaking Syria into statelets, and will undermine the “Kurdish-American divisive ambition.”

It is not for nothing that Washington has sought to thwart communications between Ankara and Damascus. Under the guise of “fighting ISIS,” the US invested heavily in Syrian separatism, replacing the terror group with “Kurdish local forces” and reaped the rewards in barrels of stolen Syrian oil to help mitigate the global energy crisis.

Now Turkiye has closed the door to that ‘federalization’ plan.

A Russian-backed proposal

The Syrian-Turkish talks in Moscow on 28 December focused mainly on opening and establishing the necessary political, security, and diplomatic channels – a process initiated by their respective defense ministers.

While resolving the myriad thorny files between the two states is not as easy as the optimists would like, it is also nowhere as difficult as the fierce opponents of rapprochement try to suggest.

The Moscow discussions centered on mild, incremental solutions proposed by Russia. The Kremlin understands that the minefield between Ankara and Damascus needs to be dismantled with cold minds and hands, but insists that the starting point of talks is based on the political formulas of the Astana peace process that all parties have already accepted.

On the ground, Moscow is busy marketing satisfactory security settlements for all, though those on the battlefield appear to be the least flexible so far. The Russian plan is to “present security formulas to the military,” intended to be later translated into the integration of forces – whether Kurdish fighters or opposition militants – into the ranks of the Syrian Arab Army (SAA).

This will be achieved via committees led by both Syrian and Turkish intelligence services, a Russian source involved in coordinating the talks tells The Cradle.

Occupied areas of Syria, in 2023

Co-opting the Kurds

The Russian proposals, according to the source, rely on two past successful models for reconciliation on the battlefield. The first is the “Sheikh Maqsoud neighborhood model in northern Aleppo,” an area once controlled by Kurdish forces who began to coordinate with the SAA after the sweeping 2016 military operation that expelled opposition militants from the eastern neighborhoods of the city.

The Russian source says that the “Sheikh Maqsoud” model succeeded because of “security coordination,” revealing that “Syrian state security is deployed at the entrances to the neighborhood with checkpoints that coordinate with the Kurdish forces inside – in every way, big and small.” This security coordination includes “arresting criminally wanted persons, and facilitating administrative and service services” in coordination with Damascus.

The second reconciliation model used by Russian forces in Syria succeeded in bringing together the SAA and Sheikh Maqsoud Kurdish militias in a joint military maneuver conducted near the town of Manbij in the countryside of Aleppo last August.

While the Russian source confirms that the experience of “security coordination” between the SAA and the Kurdish forces was “successful,” he cautions that these models need “political arrangements” which can only be achieved by “an agreement in Astana on new provisions to the Syrian constitution, which give Kurds more flexibility in self-governance in their areas.”

Opposition amnesty

A parallel proposal revealed to The Cradle by a Turkish source, approaches ground solutions from a “confederation” angle, anathema to the Syrian authorities. According to him, “Damascus must be convinced of sharing power with the qualified factions of the (Turkish) National Army for that.”

While the Turkish proposal tried to move a step closer to Damascus’ aims, it seems that Russian mediation contributed to producing a new paradigm: This would be based on the tried-and-tested Syrian “military reconciliation” model used for years – namely, that opposition militants hand over their arms, denounce hostility to the state, and are integrated into the SAA.

Turkiye’s abandonment of its “demand to overthrow the regime” applies also to its affiliated military factions inside Syria, as the latter’s goals have dwindled to preserving some areas of influence in the north of the country. This is the current flavor of Turkiye’s reduced “confederation” ambitions: To maintain Turkish-backed factions within “local administrations” in northern areas where Turkiye has influence. This, in return for giving up on Ankara’s political ambition of “regime change” in Damascus and redrawing Syria’s northern map.

The solution here will require amending the Syrian constitution, a process that began several years ago to no avail.

From the Syrian perspective, officials are focused on eliminating all opposing separatist or terrorist elements who do not have the ability to adapt to a “unified” Syrian society.

Therefore, Damascus rejects military reconciliation proposals for any “sectarian” separatist or factional militias. Syrian officials reiterate that “the unity of the lands and the people” is the only gateway to a solution, away from the foreign interests that promote “terrorism or secession” – a reference to the Turkish and American role in Syria’s war.

Reconciliation on Damascus’ terms

There is no “confederation” in the dictionary of the Syrian state, and it is determined to stick hard to the principle of Syrian unity until the end. Damascus is intent on one goal: Reconciliations based on surrendering arms in the countryside of Latakia, Idlib, Aleppo, Raqqa, Hasakah, Qamishli, and al-Tanf, which are the areas that are still outside the control of the state.

According to the Turkish source, Syria refused to discuss anything “outside the framework of reconciliations and handing over weapons and regions,” which he says “makes it difficult for Ankara to undertake its mission,” especially in light of the fact that the Al Qaeda-affiliated Nusra Front controls large parts of these target areas.

A Syrian source tells The Cradle that the “Qamishli model” of military reconciliation is the closest one that applies to this case: Wherein “the SAA and national defense forces (the majority of which are pro-Damascus Kurds) coordinate fully.”

He makes clear that Damascus has already provided ample self-governance mechanisms for Kurds in the country’s north:

“The (Kurdish-run) Autonomous Administration in Syria already exists. It deals directly with Syria’s Ministry of Local Administration (in Damascus) and has multiple agencies that work through local representative councils to implement government plans in terms of security, tax collection, and services,” and of course it consists of the people of the region – Kurds.

The recent statement of top Erdogan advisor Yassin Aktay may throw a wrench in those works. His insistence that Turkiye should maintain control over the city of Aleppo – Syria’s second most populous, and its industrial heart – did not come out of nowhere.

Ankara considers that its repatriation of three million Syrian refugees should start from “local administrations run by the (Turkish-backed) Syrian National Army (a rebranded version of the opposition ‘Free Syrian Army),” says the Turkish source.

He is referring to Idlib, Aleppo, and their countrysides, and the areas in which Turkiye launched its “Olive Branch” and “Euphrates Shield” military operations. These locales in Syria’s north include the northern and eastern countryside of Aleppo, including Azaz, Jarabulus, al-Bab, Afrin, and its environs.

Turkiye may consider gradually handing over these strategic zones to its allied Syrian militias, he says.

“Call it confederation or not, these areas should be controlled by the Syrian National Army factions instead of the Al-Nusra Front – in order to ensure the safe return of the refugees.”

Steady progress

In short, the Russian mediation to bring Damascus and Ankara closer is moving slowly, but according to the Turkish source, “it is closer to reconciliation because the Syrian Ministry of Local Administration is beginning to take charge of regional affairs after holding new local council elections – in compliance with plans forged in the Astana process.”

Regarding Astana, the Turkish source says, “Let the Syrians treat the Kurdish and opposition areas as one, if the Kurds agree to dismantle their factions and join the Syrian army within a certain equation, the opposition factions will also accept.”

Regarding the complicated geopolitics of Syria’s east – currently occupied by US troops and their proxies – a high-ranking Syrian official who recently visited Saudi Arabia and Cairo, proposed “Arab intervention with the Syrian tribes to disengage tribe members in the Al-Tanf region from the US forces.” But according to the official, this would be subject to “the progress of relations between Damascus, Riyadh, Cairo, and possibly even Jordan.”

A few days ago, a video message was sent by Nusra Front leader Abu Muhammad al-Julani, in which he thundered: “Where are the armies of the Muslims?” It is a topical message from Al Qaeda’s Syria boss, who is angling to maintain his sectarian “area of ​​influence” in northwest Syria – strategic Idlib on the Turkish-Syrian border. Julani’s destructive narrative may be the last barrier to break for Damascus, Ankara, and Moscow to strike a deal on the ground.

A Moscow meeting shatters fantasies of a Syrian ‘confederation’

January 11 2023

Source

Photo Credit: The Cradle

Malek al-Khoury

The newly-initiated Syrian-Turkish rapprochement talks are headed in Damascus’ favor and the “Turkish concessions” derided by opponents are just the start, insiders tell The Cradle.

Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan has already abandoned his dream of “praying in the Umayyad Mosque” in Damascus. But sources say this will be swiftly followed by further concessions that will throw a wrench into the ambitions of Syria’s opposition factions.

An undivided Syria

There will be no “federalism” or “confederation” – western codewords for the break up of the Syrian state – at these talks, but rather a “Turkish-Russian” acceptance of Damascus’ conditions.

For starters, Ankara plans to open the strategic M4 highway – which runs parallel to the Turkish border and connects all the vital Syrian cities and regions – as a prelude to opening the legal border crossings between Syria and Turkiye, which will re-establish trade routes between the two countries.

This move, based on an understanding between Damascus and Ankara, will essentially close the door on any opposition fantasies of breaking Syria into statelets, and will undermine the “Kurdish-American divisive ambition.”

It is not for nothing that Washington has sought to thwart communications between Ankara and Damascus. Under the guise of “fighting ISIS,” the US invested heavily in Syrian separatism, replacing the terror group with “Kurdish local forces” and reaped the rewards in barrels of stolen Syrian oil to help mitigate the global energy crisis.

Now Turkiye has closed the door to that ‘federalization’ plan.

A Russian-backed proposal

The Syrian-Turkish talks in Moscow on 28 December focused mainly on opening and establishing the necessary political, security, and diplomatic channels – a process initiated by their respective defense ministers.

While resolving the myriad thorny files between the two states is not as easy as the optimists would like, it is also nowhere as difficult as the fierce opponents of rapprochement try to suggest.

The Moscow discussions centered on mild, incremental solutions proposed by Russia. The Kremlin understands that the minefield between Ankara and Damascus needs to be dismantled with cold minds and hands, but insists that the starting point of talks is based on the political formulas of the Astana peace process that all parties have already accepted.

On the ground, Moscow is busy marketing satisfactory security settlements for all, though those on the battlefield appear to be the least flexible so far. The Russian plan is to “present security formulas to the military,” intended to be later translated into the integration of forces – whether Kurdish fighters or opposition militants – into the ranks of the Syrian Arab Army (SAA).

This will be achieved via committees led by both Syrian and Turkish intelligence services, a Russian source involved in coordinating the talks tells The Cradle.

Occupied areas of Syria, in 2023

Co-opting the Kurds

The Russian proposals, according to the source, rely on two past successful models for reconciliation on the battlefield. The first is the “Sheikh Maqsoud neighborhood model in northern Aleppo,” an area once controlled by Kurdish forces who began to coordinate with the SAA after the sweeping 2016 military operation that expelled opposition militants from the eastern neighborhoods of the city.

The Russian source says that the “Sheikh Maqsoud” model succeeded because of “security coordination,” revealing that “Syrian state security is deployed at the entrances to the neighborhood with checkpoints that coordinate with the Kurdish forces inside – in every way, big and small.” This security coordination includes “arresting criminally wanted persons, and facilitating administrative and service services” in coordination with Damascus.

The second reconciliation model used by Russian forces in Syria succeeded in bringing together the SAA and Sheikh Maqsoud Kurdish militias in a joint military maneuver conducted near the town of Manbij in the countryside of Aleppo last August.

While the Russian source confirms that the experience of “security coordination” between the SAA and the Kurdish forces was “successful,” he cautions that these models need “political arrangements” which can only be achieved by “an agreement in Astana on new provisions to the Syrian constitution, which give Kurds more flexibility in self-governance in their areas.”

Opposition amnesty

A parallel proposal revealed to The Cradle by a Turkish source, approaches ground solutions from a “confederation” angle, anathema to the Syrian authorities. According to him, “Damascus must be convinced of sharing power with the qualified factions of the (Turkish) National Army for that.”

While the Turkish proposal tried to move a step closer to Damascus’ aims, it seems that Russian mediation contributed to producing a new paradigm: This would be based on the tried-and-tested Syrian “military reconciliation” model used for years – namely, that opposition militants hand over their arms, denounce hostility to the state, and are integrated into the SAA.

Turkiye’s abandonment of its “demand to overthrow the regime” applies also to its affiliated military factions inside Syria, as the latter’s goals have dwindled to preserving some areas of influence in the north of the country. This is the current flavor of Turkiye’s reduced “confederation” ambitions: To maintain Turkish-backed factions within “local administrations” in northern areas where Turkiye has influence. This, in return for giving up on Ankara’s political ambition of “regime change” in Damascus and redrawing Syria’s northern map.

The solution here will require amending the Syrian constitution, a process that began several years ago to no avail.

From the Syrian perspective, officials are focused on eliminating all opposing separatist or terrorist elements who do not have the ability to adapt to a “unified” Syrian society.

Therefore, Damascus rejects military reconciliation proposals for any “sectarian” separatist or factional militias. Syrian officials reiterate that “the unity of the lands and the people” is the only gateway to a solution, away from the foreign interests that promote “terrorism or secession” – a reference to the Turkish and American role in Syria’s war.

Reconciliation on Damascus’ terms

There is no “confederation” in the dictionary of the Syrian state, and it is determined to stick hard to the principle of Syrian unity until the end. Damascus is intent on one goal: Reconciliations based on surrendering arms in the countryside of Latakia, Idlib, Aleppo, Raqqa, Hasakah, Qamishli, and al-Tanf, which are the areas that are still outside the control of the state.

According to the Turkish source, Syria refused to discuss anything “outside the framework of reconciliations and handing over weapons and regions,” which he says “makes it difficult for Ankara to undertake its mission,” especially in light of the fact that the Al Qaeda-affiliated Nusra Front controls large parts of these target areas.

A Syrian source tells The Cradle that the “Qamishli model” of military reconciliation is the closest one that applies to this case: Wherein “the SAA and national defense forces (the majority of which are pro-Damascus Kurds) coordinate fully.”

He makes clear that Damascus has already provided ample self-governance mechanisms for Kurds in the country’s north:

“The (Kurdish-run) Autonomous Administration in Syria already exists. It deals directly with Syria’s Ministry of Local Administration (in Damascus) and has multiple agencies that work through local representative councils to implement government plans in terms of security, tax collection, and services,” and of course it consists of the people of the region – Kurds.

The recent statement of top Erdogan advisor Yassin Aktay may throw a wrench in those works. His insistence that Turkiye should maintain control over the city of Aleppo – Syria’s second most populous, and its industrial heart – did not come out of nowhere.

Ankara considers that its repatriation of three million Syrian refugees should start from “local administrations run by the (Turkish-backed) Syrian National Army (a rebranded version of the opposition ‘Free Syrian Army),” says the Turkish source.

He is referring to Idlib, Aleppo, and their countrysides, and the areas in which Turkiye launched its “Olive Branch” and “Euphrates Shield” military operations. These locales in Syria’s north include the northern and eastern countryside of Aleppo, including Azaz, Jarabulus, al-Bab, Afrin, and its environs.

Turkiye may consider gradually handing over these strategic zones to its allied Syrian militias, he says.

“Call it confederation or not, these areas should be controlled by the Syrian National Army factions instead of the Al-Nusra Front – in order to ensure the safe return of the refugees.”

Steady progress

In short, the Russian mediation to bring Damascus and Ankara closer is moving slowly, but according to the Turkish source, “it is closer to reconciliation because the Syrian Ministry of Local Administration is beginning to take charge of regional affairs after holding new local council elections – in compliance with plans forged in the Astana process.”

Regarding Astana, the Turkish source says, “Let the Syrians treat the Kurdish and opposition areas as one, if the Kurds agree to dismantle their factions and join the Syrian army within a certain equation, the opposition factions will also accept.”

Regarding the complicated geopolitics of Syria’s east – currently occupied by US troops and their proxies – a high-ranking Syrian official who recently visited Saudi Arabia and Cairo, proposed “Arab intervention with the Syrian tribes to disengage tribe members in the Al-Tanf region from the US forces.” But according to the official, this would be subject to “the progress of relations between Damascus, Riyadh, Cairo, and possibly even Jordan.”

A few days ago, a video message was sent by Nusra Front leader Abu Muhammad al-Julani, in which he thundered: “Where are the armies of the Muslims?” It is a topical message from Al Qaeda’s Syria boss, who is angling to maintain his sectarian “area of ​​influence” in northwest Syria – strategic Idlib on the Turkish-Syrian border. Julani’s destructive narrative may be the last barrier to break for Damascus, Ankara, and Moscow to strike a deal on the ground.