Peace with Syria: The final piece in Turkey’s foreign policy puzzle

August 15 2022

Ankara has managed to reset relations with several neighbors, yet normalization with Damascus has remained the most elusive, until recently. Why now? And what will it take?

Photo Credit: The Cradle

By Hasan Ünal

The 5 August meeting in Sochi between Turkey’s President Recep Tayyip Erdogan and Russian President Vladimir Putin has given rise to speculation in the west over Turkish-Russian rapprochement – and its possible negative impact on western efforts to curtail the imminent multipolar order.

Western NATO states have reason to be concerned about Ankara’s recent moves, given the momentum created on 19 July during Astana talks in Tehran – between Iranian President Ebrahim Raisi, Erdogan, and Putin – geared to resolve the Syrian crisis.

United against the States

What was striking about the meeting in the Iranian capital was its defiant tone, slamming US-led unipolarity (the so-called rules-based order), and accusing Washington of looting Syria’s resources and sponsoring terrorism, all while demanding that the US exits the region immediately.

Washington has long sought to undermine the Astana Process, launched in January 2017 by Russia, Iran and Turkey to demilitarize the Syrian conflict and establish ceasefires. To that end, it manipulated Turkey’s ill-defined Syria policy, expecting that Ankara and Moscow would collide head-on over “opposition-controlled” Idlib or elsewhere, thereby hindering possible rapprochement between the two Eurasian states.

However, it seems as if the Erdogan-Putin meeting has instead advanced beyond their earlier encounter on 29 September 2021, also held in Sochi, where it was then leaked that the two leaders had somewhat agreed on a broad geopolitical vision.

The two leaders focused on a wide range of areas of close cooperation – particularly on trade and economy – but also on prospective fields of mutual benefit such as defense industry ventures, as well as on regional issues like Syria, Crimea, and Cyprus.

Turkey’s shift on Syria

Although few details have been released following that closed-door meeting, it is interesting to note the discernable change in Ankara’s stance on Syria since then.

There is now serious talk of normalization with Damascus and a renewal of the Syrian-Turkish 1998 Adana Agreement, which will entail a joint effort to defeat US-sponsored Kurdish separatists in Syria, especially in the areas to the east of the Euphrates where the latter are striving to install a US-backed statelet.

As things stand, there is no reason why Erdogan and Putin could not iron out a deal to end the Syrian conflict, especially since Ankara – in an 18-month flurry of diplomatic outreach to regional foes – has largely given up on its Muslim Brotherhood-oriented foreign policy by mending ties with Egypt, Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and even Israel.

Today, Erdogan’s personal obstinacy over Syria remains the main hurdle obstructing an overall peace with Turkey’s war-stricken southern neighbor.

Why make peace?

The Turkish president certainly has a lot to gain from a well-orchestrated rapprochement with the Syrian government. For starters, Ankara and Damascus could agree on a protocol to repatriate millions of Turkish-based Syrian refugees back to their places of origin, and renew the Adana Agreement to create a common front against the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK) and its Syrian affiliates.

Conceivably, Erdogan could even ask Damascus to recognize the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus – a very dear issue for Ankara – in return for Turkey’s full support for the re-establishment of Syrian sovereignty over all its territories, including those areas currently under Turkish occupation.

With strong Russian guidance, is not entirely inconceivable that the two states could return to a comfortable neighborly states quo, with trade, investment, and reconstruction activities leading the way.

It would be a far cry from the 1998 to 2011 Syrian-Turkish ‘golden era,’ when Ankara studiously worked to bolster friendly relations with Damascus, to such an extent that joint-cabinet meetings were occasionally held between the administrations of Syrian President Bashar al-Assad and Erdogan, where the latter would refer to the former as “my brother.”

Today, the emerging multipolar order makes diplomatic and economic re-engagement all the more conducive, because as NATO’s Madrid Summit demonstrated, the west needs Turkey more than ever, and Ankara’s moves to normalize relations with Damascus is less likely to incur a significant cost than before the Ukraine crisis erupted.

Indeed, even before events in Europe unfolded, Turkey undertook several military operations against the PKK/ Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) in northern Syria, much to Washington’s dismay and outrage.

Ankara could proceed with these operations with less censure today, but it has not. Turkey appears to have realized – possibly under Russian advisement – that without normalization with Damascus, Turkish military moves on Kurdish separatists would yield significantly fewer results.

Problems closer to home

Moreover, Erdogan’s administration has been beset by the contentious domestic issue of the millions of Syrian refugees who remain inside Turkey. The days when the president and his close associates were preaching Islamic solidarity in defense of hosting Syrian refugees have long past.

The mood across Turkey has changed dramatically amid rising inflation, a collapse of the lira, and the general public’s disenchantment with the ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP). For the first time since Erdogan’s ascension to power in 2003, the masses sense that his once-unbeatable, Islamist-leaning populist party may be defeated in upcoming presidential polls slated for May-June next year.

True or not, there are public rumblings that the AKP – to escape an election loss – plans to bestow millions of Syrian refugees with Turkish citizenship, allowing them to vote in the pivotal polls.

The disoriented outlook of Turkey’s main opposition party has always played to Erdogan’s advantage in previous elections. The feeble-looking Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu, who took the helm of the Republican People’s Party (CHP) after a sex scandal involving its previous leader, has never managed to rally the public around him.

Importantly, Kılıçdaroğlu has typically trailed behind Erdogan in opinion polls because of his pro-American, pro-EU approach to almost everything – at a time when anti-US sentiment in the country polls at a startling 85 to 95 percent of the population.

Repatriating refugees

Furthermore, Kılıçdaroğlu and his party do not make any clear-cut pronouncements about a peace with Syria. If anything, the CHP was as critical of Assad as Erdogan’s AKP, and its spokespeople barely weighed in on the divisive Syrian refugee issue, even though economically-challenged Turkey currently hosts more refugees than any other country.

The entry of a new figure – Ümit Özdağ, a professor of Political Science and International Relations, who recently formed the Party of Victory (Zafer Partisi) – onto the Turkish national political scene, has introduced a radical change in the discourse about Syrian refugees and their repatriation.

Almost overnight, Özdağ has gained widespread support from voters across the political spectrum. His unexpected surge in the polls has clearly contributed to a reassessment by the government and ruling party on the Syrian issue.

Ankara needs Damascus

Today, almost all voices from the CHP to the AKP are floating arguments for some sort of repatriation, but as even the Turkish public understands, this cannot be done without normalization with Damascus.

Hence, Erdogan’s test-balloon musings to Turkish journalists on his flight back from Sochi, hinting that Putin had repeatedly recommended that Ankara coordinate with Damascus on any military operation in Syria to rout out the PKK/SDF.

Despite the positive national outlook on normalizing with Syria, Erdogan won’t have a smooth path ahead. Turkish foreign minister Mevlut Cavusoglu’s untimely remark a few days ago that Ankara should try to bring the Syrian opposition (a clear reference to the Turkish-backed Syrian National Army) and the Assad government together with a view to striking a deal, didn’t go down well at all with those oppositionists.

It almost led to an uprising in Syrian areas under Turkish control – particularly in Azaz, where militants burned down Turkish flags and vowed to fight to the bitter end against the “Assad regime” and even Turkey.

Same old foreign policy

The statement the Turkish Foreign Ministry issued following these events underlined the long hard slog to a Syrian peace settlement, and revealed the depth of the Erdogan government’s involvement with these militants.

As it has predictably done since 2011, the FM statement conveniently shifted blame back onto the Syrian government for foot-dragging toward overall peace and reconciliation.

But Ankara desperately needs to drop its tired old refrain: demanding that Damascus agrees to a new constitution, pushing for federalization of the state, and insisting on new Syrians elections, under a care-taker government, composed of opposition politicians, and preferably without Assad at its helm.

Having failed to oust Assad militarily, Turkey once imagined it could unseat him through this convoluted political and electoral formula. Erdogan’s logic was that the millions of Syrians under Ankara’s influence – both in Turkey, as well as in Turkish-controlled Syrian territories – in addition Syrian Kurds in areas under the PKK/PYD, especially to the east of the Euphrates, would vote Assad out.

Trading the ‘rebels’ for the Kurds

This ‘fantasy’ contrasts sharply with realities on the Syrian ground, and also totally undermines Turkey’s own national interests.

Years of these haphazard AKP policies, premised on the unrealistic scenario of a sudden collapse of Assad’s government, all while stealthily transforming the country into a jihadist paradise – in the name of democracy – has instead become Ankara’s biggest foreign policy quagmire, and has emboldened its separatist Kurdish foes as never before.

Furthermore, Erdogan’s disastrous Syria policy has isolated Turkey for almost a decade in the region, even among Sunni states, and threatened to set off a conflagration with Russia, a major source of energy and tourism for the Turkish economy.

In fairness, the Turkish leader appears to be making some sound political maneuvers of late, and reaching out to Damascus is the most important of these for the region’s stability. Whether Erdogan will crown his new grand foreign policy moves with a Syrian peace by normalizing relations with Damascus remains to be seen.

If he doesn’t take this bold step, particularly in advance of Turkey’s presidential elections, Erdogan runs the risk of joining the long list of politicians determined to oust Assad, who have themselves left or been ousted from office under the weight of the so-called “Assad Curse.”

The views expressed in this article do not necessarily reflect those of The Cradle.

Author

Tehran Summit to accelerate political solution in Syria, fight terror

19 Jul 2022

Tehran tripartite summit to discuss northern Syria

By Al Mayadeen English 

The presidents of Iran, Russia, and Turkey will hold their summit in the Iranian capital, Tehran, stressing the importance of finding solutions in northern Syria.

Iranian President Ebrahim Raisi, Russian Vladimir Putin, and Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan held a tripartite summit in the Iranian capital, Tehran, to discuss possible settlements in Syria.

The Iranian president opened the tripartite summit with a speech, stressing that “the sanctions imposed on Syria contradict the sovereignty of countries, and Iran condemns these policies against the Syrian people.”

Raisi pointed out that “Syria’s sovereignty, stability, and security are a red line, and the illegal US presence in the country is the reason for its instability,” saying that “the presence of the Syrian army on the borders is the guarantor of the country’s stability.”

Furthermore, Raisi noted the role of the Israeli occupation practices in destabilizing global security, saying that “the practices of the Zionist entity lead to destabilization of global security, which will have repercussions on the entity itself.”

Putin: Our goal is Syrian territorial integrity

In his speech, Russian President Vladimir Putin said that our goal is for Syria to be able to decide its future without outside interference.

Putin added that “The joint work of Russia, Iran, and Turkey to promote a comprehensive resolution of the crisis in the Syrian Arab Republic is very effective. Thanks to the help and support of our countries, the level of violence in Syria has noticeably decreased, peaceful life is being revived, and the economy and the social sphere are gradually being restored. And no less importantly, a real political and diplomatic settlement process has been launched on the basis of UN Security Council Resolution 2254.”

Putin stressed, “the need to ensure that the international community plays a more important role towards the Syrian people, without political interests,” adding that “we will have specific steps for the Syrian political dialogue on the basis of our agreements in a way that Syria can decide its future without outside interference.”

Erdogan: We need to accelerate political solution to the Syrian crisis

For his part, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan stressed “the need to combat all terrorist organizations,” saying that his country is determined to do so.” 

Erdogan added that “Turkey will continue to participate in meetings aimed at finding solutions to the crisis in Syria,” adding, “We must provide full support to accelerate the political and diplomatic solution to the Syrian crisis.”

On the tensions in the Syrian province of Idlib, Erdogan said during his speech that “Turkey understands the clear concern of the presence of some parties in Idlib.”

Regarding the Syrian refugees on Turkish territory, Erdogan expressed his confidence that “the Syrian people want a voluntary return to their lands,” pointing out that “it is unfair for the Turkish state only to bear the burdens of the displaced.”

Russian President Vladimir Putin and his Turkish counterpart, Recep Tayyip Erdogan, arrived in the Iranian capital to participate in the “Astana talks” in Tehran and discuss ways of a Syrian settlement, in addition to several common agendas.

Read more: Duma committee: Northern Syria Turkish operation hypothesis subsided

Related Stories

Source: Al Mayadeen Net

Syrian refugees in Turkey: From opportunity to Achilles heel

Even though Turkey’s massive refugee problem is a direct consequences of the AKP’s Syria policy, both the government and the opposition try to avoid its solution: ending the war in Syria.

June 23 2022

Photo Credit: The Cradle

By Erman Çete

In a recent TV interview, one of the most powerful political figures in Turkey, Interior Minister Suleyman Soylu, could barely restrain his anger.

Turning to Umit Ozdag, president of the newly-established Zafer (Victory) Party, Solyu lashed out: “This man is lower than an animal…an intelligence agent…the son of Soros.”

Ozdag is a former member of the Nationalist Action Party (MHP), a party now staunchly allied to President Recep Tayyip Erdogan.

A political science professor and a hardline Turkish nationalist, Ozdag reciprocated in kind, calling Soylu a “coward” for his lack of leadership at the Interior Ministry.

Ozdag’s Zafer Party has been at the forefront of harsh criticism against Erdogan’s refugee policy within the Turkish political scene. His popularity has been growing recently, with his anti-refugee and anti-AKP policies galvanizing Turkey’s dispirited urban youth.

The issue of refugees, now a critical one in the Turkish political landscape – alongside the country’s catastrophic economic decline – has become a focal point for upcoming elections.

The geopolitics of displacement

The AKP’s Syria policy is one of the main issues at stake. Their aggressive policies towards ‘former Ottoman regions’ have dramatically shifted traditional Turkish foreign policy away from Kemal Ataturk’s motto “peace at home, peace in the world.”

Turkish academic Ozgur Balkilic writes about the AKP’s geopolitical interpretation of the refugee question in a broader context.

He argues that Turkey’s various responses to the Syrian refugee crisis are the product of a geopolitical discourse based on Islamist ideology, highlighted by the AKP discourse on civilization, and the effort to build a completely different moral and political space for Turkey.

“The geographical vision of Kemalism produced an ideological framework in which Turkey tried to integrate with the west and stay as far away from the east as possible,” Balkilic told The Cradle.

By criticizing the ‘old Turkey’ as defensive, ineffective and obsessed with security, the AKP views Turkey’s new geopolitical orientation as “indispensable” in the new international system.

“The AKP reads the Syrian refugee crisis as a repercussion of the larger political and moral crises of the international system, in which it demarcates a leadership role for Turkey. State discourse on the Syrian refugee crisis can only be understood within this geopolitical scenario,” Balkilic says.

The AKP uses the legal framework in relation to refugees for its own agenda. While party to the 1951 Refugee Convention, Turkey maintains the geographical limitation only to people originating from Europe.

In reference to Syrian migrants and refugees, the AKP uses a religious definition of the word ‘guest’, not one clearly defined by official regulations.

Balkilic points out that authority-led public debates about Syrians are not shaped around the classic immigrant problems such as integration issues, legal and economic rights, and the labor market.

The language used by AKP officials is, instead, geopolitical. When Syrian immigrants are referred to as guests, they are viewed as part of the larger Islamic community, the Ummah, Balkilic stated.

This concept does not exist in the universal literature of migration, and Turkey has, as a result, been freed from its many obligations and responsibilities toward refugees and/or immigrants.

While Turkey uses a religious term to refer to Syrian refugees as guests of the nation, Turkey’s own role is expressed using another Islamic term –Ansar – which means hosting those in need.

The refugee issue as a weapon

Despite all this, the AKP’s policy towards Syria and the Syrian refugees has been forced to shift over time. First, its ‘regime change’ operation in Syria hit a brick wall. Second, the migration issue became a fault line in domestic politics.

After 2016, Turkey initiated various military operations in Syria: Operation Euphrates Shield, Operation Olive Branch, Operation Peace Spring, and Operation Spring Shield.

One of the announced goals of these operations was the settlement of Syrian refugees inside so-called ‘safe zones.’

Senior AKP executives have also often underlined the ‘cheap labor’ value of Syrian (and Afghan) refugees. Erhan Nalcaci, a Turkish professor and a columnist of the leftist daily Sol, believes the AKP sought to use refugees as “cheap labor and a large reserve army.”

“This was a unique opportunity to reduce wages, ignore social rights and make commodities produced in Turkey advantageous in international competition,” Nalcaci says, adding that the Turkish bourgeoisie has an “unspoken annexation agenda for northern Cyprus and the north-west of Syria.”

According to Nalcaci, Turkey considers these locations in Cyprus and Syria “areas of Turkish dominion.”

Nalcaci argues that placing Syrian refugees within this agenda “appears to be aimed at changing the ethnic structure of northern Syria from west to east and establishing a sharia management model, as well as Turkish hegemony over a region that is economically and politically dependent on Turkey.”

Some opposition politicians argue against hosting Afghan and Syrian refugees due to the possibility of AKP using them against their domestic political opponents.

Nalcaci agrees with this claim, saying “refugees provided a suitable basis for building a rented jihadist army if they needed it, just like in northern Syria.”

Turkey as a buffer zone for Europe

A further aspect is Turkey’s role in EU refugee policy. In 2016, the EU and Turkey reached an agreement on refugees. This was a re-admission agreement and had three important aspects.

Turkey would take any measure necessary to stop people travelling irregularly from Turkey to the Greek islands; anyone who arrived on the islands irregularly from Turkey could be returned to Greece; and for every Syrian returned from the islands, the EU would accept one Syrian refugee who had waited inside Turkey.

In return, Turkey would receive six billion euros from the EU.

Human right groups and the Turkish opposition have criticized this refugee agreement. In 2013, before the deal, Turkey had re-adjusted its Law on Foreigners and International Protection to the EU legislation.

According to Nalcaci, due to imperialist interventions and poor economic situations in their home countries, people have been forced to turn to the west as a better option for living conditions, and this mass migration is a threat to western imperialism.

Nalcaci claims that in the face of this migration, it is obvious that the EU used Turkey as a buffer country to attract qualified workforce and overlook refugees in Turkey, rather than in their own territory.

However, the AKP ambition to create a dependent area in northern Syria may backfire. On one hand, Nalcaci says, Syrian refugees are valued by the AKP as an expansionist tool in the region. On the other hand, he says, it is impossible for the imperialist mind to not anticipate that up to 10 million refugees in Turkey would create instability and open an area of ​​intervention.

An opposition smeared by the same brush

The views of the main Turkish opposition barely differ from those of the AKP government in relation to the Syrian problem. A north Cyprus-type ‘solution’ to the Syrian crisis is also on the CHP (Republican People’s Party) agenda.

The leader of the CHP, Kemal Kilicdaroglu, has often promised to send Syrian refugees back to Syria “with a flourish of trumpets.”

The newcomer party of Zafer is also committed to the expulsion of the refugees. The party’s so-called Fortress Anadolu project claims to deal with eight million refugees in Turkey. Within this framework, Ozdag announced that a commission from Zafer was to meet with Syrian President Bashar al-Assad.

Neither the CHP nor the Zafer party responded to our questions.

Nalcaci underlines the opposition’s stand on Syria and its refugees: “They do not include any substantive foreign policy changes in their program. Moreover, they have always supported AKP initiatives in the parliament, especially the resolutions to send soldiers.”

The most anti-refugee politician Umit Ozdag and his party Zafer have not raised any objection to sending Turkish troops to Syria. When it comes to ‘national security,’ the opposition sings the same tune as the AKP.

Although CHP voted against the last motion to send Turkish troops to Iraq and Syria, battling the ‘national security’ narrative is a difficult task.

“The practice of establishing a hegemonic zone on Syrian territory will continue unless there is a great upheaval that overturns the situation,” Nalcaci asserts.

It seems that things will have to change in order to remain the same.

The views expressed in this article do not necessarily reflect those of The Cradle.

Erdogan’s Plan to Israelize Northern Syria with a Million Settlers on Track

ARABI SOURI 

Israelize northern Syria is the real plot: reports from Turkey claim that the Turkish madman Erdogan is planning to ‘return’ up to a million Syrian refugees to their country with the help of city councils in Azaz, Jarabulus, and Tal Abyad.

One of the sites, the Saudi regime’s mouthpiece Al Arabiya reported: ‘Erdogan said on Tuesday that Ankara was aiming to encourage one million Syrian refugees to return to their country by building them housing and local infrastructure there.’

Saudi Bin Salman’s propaganda outlet claimed that Turkey is home to more than 3.6 million Syrian refugees,’ adding ‘Erdogan is facing rising public anger over the refugees’ presence and is wary of the issue dominating next year’s presidential and parliamentary elections.’

From my knowledge of this creep flip-flop hypocrite mafia-business partner, and war criminal Erdogan, I believe he’s ‘returning’ the families of his followers, not the Syrians uprooted from those areas infested by the Turkish army and a collection of terrorist groups spanning from the so-called National Army to ISIS (ISIL) all of which follow the same offshoot sect of Islam that Erdogan managed to radicalize the Sufi sect of Turkey into.

The Turkish madman Erdogan is replacing the people of northern Syria with terrorists and their families from other areas and from other countries from China to Latin America who joined the ranks of the ‘foreign legion’ he helped create.

That foreign legion includes his beloved and loyal anti-Islamic Muslim Brotherhood and Wahhabi terrorists including the Chinese Uighur, the Northern Africans, and others from the Central Asian stans of Turkic origins he collected.

We have repeatedly reported that the Turkish neo-Ottoman sultan wannabe wants to Israelize a buffer region in northern Syria to separate secular Syria from the radical Muslim Brotherhood Turkey he and his AKP clan are ruling (see hereherehere, and in other places on our site,) we devised the term ‘Israelize‘ to describe these evil plans.

On the other hand, the NATO-sponsored Kurdish SDF separatist terrorists have been actively working on a similar agenda to Israelize the parts of northern Syria they occupy with the help of the Biden oil thieves regiment of the US Army, also with the help of Israel and all of NATO combined, even Russia had supported them in the past and is yet to declare a new position toward their war crimes against the Syrian people in the provinces of Hasakah, Deir Ezzor, Raqqa, and Aleppo.

Make no mistake, the Saudis are hand-in-hand with the Turks, Qataris, US, Israelis, and the rest of NATO in the plot against Syria, any differences between them do not affect their joint efforts to destroy the Levantine country and slaughter its people, Syria, the last secular nation in the region and way beyond is an existential threat to entities like the temporary settlement dubbed Israel, the Al Saud fiefdom dubbed Saudi Arabia, the Arabia gas station dubbed Qatar (pronounced Gutter), and what Turkey has turned into under the rule of the UK empire-invented Muslim Brotherhood clan.

If Erdogan manages to carry out his agenda, he will be planting the seeds of a never-ending civil war his masters in Tel Aviv and Washington have long sought for the region. There will be no rest in the places where people were forcibly uprooted from their land and their land was gifted by those who do not own it to other people who do not deserve it; more than a century of the Palestinian cause hasn’t taught these fanatics that the real owners of the land will not give away their rights to their land to imported settlers even if all of the world’s superpowers and super-rich countries with all their evilness work toward achieving such war crime.

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Erdogan with Assad: There is no Reconciliation before the Arabs and “Israel” إردوغان و”إسرائيل”.. من المصالحة إلى التحالف العسكري؟

ARABI SOURI

Reconciliation with Damascus will mean for the Turkish President Erdogan to abandon his strategic calculations and projects.

The following is the English translation from Arabic of the latest article by Turkish career journalist Husni Mahali he published in the Lebanese Al-Mayadeen news site Al-Mayadeen Net:

The news published by Hurriyet newspaper, loyal to Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan, on April 3, has received wide attention in most Arab media outlets, as the newspaper stated, “The Turkish authorities are conducting their discussions with the aim of dialogue with the Syrian government, in order to restore relations between the two countries to its nature.”

The media and those who wrote in it did not pay attention to what was stated in the news, as it was said that “Turkey, in all its contacts with the Syrian administration, affirms 3 basic things, namely, sovereignty and territorial integrity of Syria, ensuring the lives of refugees returning to their country, and preventing the Turkish Kurdistan Workers’ Party from any activity in Syria.

Contrary to what President Erdogan asserts on every occasion, Ankara controls about 10% of the Syrian territory, which contradicts the notion of sovereignty and the unity of the Syrian territory. It also provides all kinds of support to tens of thousands of militants of the so-called “National Army” established in Turkey, which it pays the salaries of all its personnel.

On top of that, Ankara’s objection to the Syrian army’s liberation of Idlib and its vicinity, without heeding the accusations leveled against it regarding the relationship with the terrorist of “Al-Nusra Front”, which includes thousands of foreign militants, and which obtains all its needs from Turkey, near Idlib.

As for the return of Syrian refugees to their homes, many, including the leaders of Turkish political parties, wrote and spoke about Ankara obstructing the return of Syrian refugees to their country, and it tells them that the living and security situation in Syria is very bad, and it meets the needs of all Syrians residing in the areas controlled by the Turkish army west and east of the Euphrates, as Defense Minister Hulusi Akar previously said that “Turkey meets the needs of 9 million Syrians, 3.5 million of whom are in Turkey, and the rest are inside Syria.”

Ankara believes that this Turkish position “contributes to the increase in Erdogan’s popularity in Syria in general.” As for the Kurdistan Workers’ Party, which means the “SDF” and the Kurdish People’s Protection Units, the Syrian arm of the PKK, everyone remembers how Ankara had a close relationship with Salih Muslim, the leader of the Kurdistan Democratic Union Party, and sought to persuade him until the summer of 2015 “to rebel against the Syrian state in exchange for promises to meet his demands in the new Syria after the overthrow of the regime in Damascus.”

As everyone knows, Ankara, under the pretext of the aforementioned Kurdish militias, succeeded in persuading Washington and Moscow to allow it in October 2019 to penetrate east of the Euphrates and control a border strip of 110 km in length and 30 km in depth in some areas, which helped the Turkish forces to take control of strategic locations in the region, as is the case in the Afrin region after taking control of it in March 2018.

All of this explains Ankara’s failure to abide by its commitments in the Sochi and Moscow agreements on Idlib and the Turkish military presence in northern Syria in general, despite the possibilities of a heated confrontation with the Syrian and Russian armies in the region, as happened in February 2020.

It also explains President Erdogan’s constant talk about his rejection of any solution to the Syrian crisis, without recognizing the main Turkish role in this solution, which must meet the Turkish conditions in coordination and cooperation with the Syrian opposition, both political and armed, all of which are moving according to the Turkish agenda supported by Qatar, which is what President Erdogan exploits in his overall bargaining with all parties interested in the Syrian file regionally and internationally, especially with the continuation of their current positions, which can be summed up in not rushing to take any decisive decision to close this file.

President Erdogan sees this regional and international situation as a source of strength for him, as long as the Arab capitals are not encouraged to reconcile with President Assad, and he will not think of reconciling with him until after the leaders of the main Arab countries, led by Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Jordan, and Qatar, reconcile.

Reconciliation in President Erdogan’s concept is for these leaders and others to contact President Assad, exchange visits with him, and open their embassies in Damascus with Israeli consent, as they all did (Erdogan as well) with the putschist Abdel Fattah al-Burhan (of Sudan), and together they abandoned Imran Khan (of Pakistan) on American instructions!

In other words, President Erdogan will not take any initiative toward Damascus as long as he sees Assad as his “subordinate governor”, and sees himself as the “Ottoman Sultan”, this is what Assad said, which President Qais Saeed (of Tunisia) reminded last week when he responded to Erdogan’s statements, who described his decision to dissolve the parliament as a “coup,” so he said: “Tunisia is not a province, and we are not waiting for a firman (from the Ottoman Sultan).”

We do not ignore President Erdogan’s efforts to reconcile with Cairo, Riyadh, and Abu Dhabi, which he personally accused of plotting against Turkey, at a time when President Assad and the Syrian state did not undertake any hostile action against Turkey, which proved, through its recent actions, that it favors “Israel” with its terrorist regime over neighboring Syria, which through it, it entered the Arab region after the first visit of Prime Minister Abdullah Gul to Damascus at the beginning of 2003.

Although Gul, and even Davutoglu, who was said at the time to be the architect of Turkish foreign policy, became in the trench against Erdogan, it became clear that the prospects for Turkish reconciliation with President Assad will never be easy for the Turkish president.

Erdogan sees such reconciliation as a recognition of the defeat of his (Muslim Brotherhood) ideological project, even if he abandoned it during his bargains with “Tel Aviv” (Hamas and the Palestinians in general), Cairo (Egypt’s Brotherhood), Riyadh and Abu Dhabi.

In addition, reconciliation with Damascus will mean at the same time abandoning his calculations, projects, and strategic plans, especially after he established a network of complex military, intelligence, and political relations intertwined with very wide Syrian sectors and groups, and that abandoning it will not be easy for Ankara (what will it do with tens of thousands of militants?), which sees northern Syria as an extension of Turkish geography and a strategic depth for its national security, which Turkish officials have been repeating since the beginnings of the Syrian crisis, and its main player is Erdogan, it seems clear that he will not give up this role until his last breath, as long as no one asks him to do so, and President Assad will not surprise him by visiting Ankara!

Erdogan is waiting for the positions of the Arab capitals, and more importantly, “Tel Aviv”, because he thinks, rather he believes, that it will not initiate any reconciliation with Assad, of course, if he had not agreed with Herzog and Ibn Zayed on that, otherwise reconciliation with Syria must be a priority for Erdogan and the others, this is, of course, if they are not together at the disposal of “Tel Aviv”, the only beneficiary of the years of the bloody “Arab Spring”, during which they were all together in one trench against President al-Assad, and with the confessions of Hamad bin Jassem, who is still whining because “the prey escaped from them.” and catching it again needs more than a miracle!


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Denote

إردوغان و”إسرائيل”.. من المصالحة إلى التحالف العسكري؟

حسني محلي 

المصدر: الميادين نت

2022  الاثين 18 نيسان

ينتظر أن يزور خلوصي أكار “تل أبيب” خلال الأيام القليلة المقبلة، يليه زيارة رجب طيب إردوغان.

العلاقات التركية – الإسرائيلية يُتوقّع أن تشهد قفزة نوعية بعد الزيارة التي سيقوم بها إردوغان إلى تل أبيب.

بعيداً عن اهتمامات الإعلام التركي والعربي والدولي، تشهد العلاقات التركية مع الكيان الصهيوني تطورات مثيرة قد تجعل من تل أبيب حليفاً عسكرياً استراتيجياً لأنقرة التي يبدو واضحاً أنها تستعد لمثل هذه المرحلة الجديدة، داخلياً وخارجياً. فقد أعلن وزير الخارجية مولود جاويش أوغلو (14 نيسان/ أبريل) أنه سيزور تل أبيب قريباً جداً، ومعه وزير الدفاع خلوصي أكار، بدلاً من وزير الطاقة الذي كان عليه أن يبحث مع المسؤولين الإسرائيليين تفاصيل التنسيق والتعاون المشترك لنقل الغاز الإسرائيلي والقبرصي والمصري إلى تركيا، ومنها الى أوروبا، وهو الموضوع الذي قيل إنه يحظى بدعم أميركي، كما هي الحال بالنسبة إلى مشروع نقل غاز كردستان العراق إلى تركيا ومنها إلى أوروبا، بتنسيق تركي-إسرائيلي مشترك. ويفسّر ذلك الزيارات المتتالية التي قام بها رئيس إقليم كردستان العراق نيجيرفان برزاني ورئيس حكومة الإقليم مسرور برزاني إلى أنقرة خلال الشهرين الماضيين فقط، وتمّ خلالها أيضاً مناقشة الدور التركي في تأليف الحكومة العراقية الجديدة.  

وعودة إلى زيارة وزير الدفاع خلوصي أكار، والتي من المتوقع لها أن تكون خلال الأيام القليلة المقبلة، وستلحق بها زيارة الرئيس إردوغان إلى تل أبيب، فلا بد من التذكير بالاتفاقية التي سبق أن تمّ التوقيع عليها بين الطرفين في العام 1995-1996. وكان حينها الإسلامي نجم الدين أربكان رئيساً للحكومة، واتفق مع تل أبيب على تحديث طائرات أف-5 وأف-16 ومعها دبابات أم-60 التركية، مقابل المليارات من الدولارات. كما لا بد من التذكير بشراء تركيا (2005) لمجموعة من الطائرات المسيّرة الإسرائيلية، واستخدمتها ضد مسلحي حزب العمال الكردستاني جنوب شرق البلاد وفي شمال العراق. وجاءت موافقة أنقرة (أواسط 2011) على القاعدة الأميركية جنوب شرق البلاد قرب مدينة مالاطيا، في إطار المساعي التركية لتطوير علاقاتها مع تل أبيب. وكانت مهمة هذه القاعدة هي رصد التحركات العسكرية الإيرانية، وإبلاغ تل أبيب بأي صواريخ إيرانية قد تستهدفها حتى يتسنّى للقبة الحديدية التصدي لها قبل دخول الأجواء الإسرائيلية. 

الفتور والتوتر اللذين عانت منهما العلاقات التركية – الإسرائيلية خلال السنوات الأخيرة، لم يمنعا أنقرة من تطوير علاقاتها الاقتصادية والتجارية التي حققت أرقاماً قياسية لا تتناسب مع مقولات الرئيس إردوغان ضد “إسرائيل”. ولكنها تتفق مع الموقف التركي المتناقض، حيث لم تستخدم أنقرة حق الفيتو ضد انضمام “إسرائيل” إلى منظمة التعاون الاقتصادي والتنمية OECD (أيار/ مايو 2010) وانضمامها بصفة مراقب إلى الحلف الأطلسي (أيار/ مايو 2016). 

التناقضات التركية في العلاقة مع تل أبيب بما في ذلك إغلاق ملف سفينة مرمرة (كما هي الحال في إغلاق ملف خاشقجي) يشبّهها البعض بتناقضات السلطان عبد الحميد الذي قيل عنه إنه لم يتنازل عن فلسطين لليهود في الوقت الذي تثبت فيه الوثائق التاريخية عكس ذلك، حيث قدّم الكثير من التسهيلات لليهود للهجرة إلى فلسطين وشراء الأراضي وبناء المستوطنات فيها. 

مع التذكير أيضاً بتلاقي الأهداف التركية والإسرائيلية في سوريا، حيث دعمت أنقرة الفصائل المسلحة التي تقاتل ضد دمشق في الشمال، وكانت تل أبيب تفعل ذلك في الجنوب بدعم من الأردن ودول الخليج، كما هي الحال للوضع على الحدود مع تركيا، وباعتراف حمد بن جاسم. 

زيارة جاويش أوغلو وأكار التي تهدف إلى تحقيق التوازن في علاقات أنقرة مع تل أبيب ودول المنطقة الأخرى بعد المصالحة مع الرياض والقاهرة (سامح شكري سيزور تركيا قريباً) يريد لها الرئيس إردوغان أن تبعد تل أبيب عن نيقوسيا وأثينا، وسبق لهذه الدول الثلاث أن وقّعت على العديد من اتفاقيات التعاون العسكري والأمني والاستخباري، وكان ذلك تارة برضى ودعم مصريين وأخرى إماراتي وسعودي، في الوقت الذي ستسعى فيه أنقرة خلال الزيارة إلى إقناع تل أبيب بأن لا تعترض على بيع طائرات أف-35 الأميركية لتركيا، بعد اتفاق الطرفين التركي والأميركي حول قضية صواريخ أس-400 الروسية التي اشترتها أنقرة من موسكو قبل عامين، من دون أن تقوم بتفعيلها بعد ردّ الفعل الأميركي. 

العلاقات التركية – الإسرائيلية التي يُتوقّع لها أن تشهد قفزة نوعية بعد الزيارة التي سيقوم بها إردوغان إلى تل أبيب، يسعى الطرفان إلى دعمها في شتى المجالات، بما فيها تبادل الزيارات الاستخبارية والإعلامية والأكاديمية ورجال الأعمال، بل وحتى الوفود الدينية في إطار ما يُسمّى حوار الأديان والحضارات المدعوم أيضاً من الإمارات، الطرف الثالث في الحوار والتنسيق، ولاحقاً التحالف التركي – الإسرائيلي. 

ويفسّر ذلك وصف إردوغان لما قام به الشباب الفلسطيني بالعمل الإرهابي، ومن دون أن يقول ذلك بحق عمليات القتل والإجرام التي يقوم بها الجيش والأمن الإسرائيليّان يومياً ضدَّ الفلسطينيين داخل المسجد الأقصى. واعتبر ذلك إبراهيم كالين، المتحدث باسم إردوغان، “خطاً أحمر بالنسبة إلى تركيا”، ناسياً أن أنقرة قد نسيت وتناست كل خطوطها الحمر، عندما سلكت كل الطرق والوسائل من أجل مصالحة تل أبيب، بما في ذلك لقاء إردوغان مع حاخامات اليهود. والأغرب من كل ذلك، أن بعض الدول العربية التي تجرّأت وأصدرت بيانات “الاستنكار” لِما قامت به تل أبيب داخل المسجد الأقصى، رجّحت الحديث عن “استخدام مفرط للعنف بحق الفلسطينيين”، كما ورد ذلك في بيان الخارجية العراقية، وتتوقع لها تل أبيب أن تكون البلد العربي الجديد في مسلسل التطبيع، بعد تسلّم جماعة مقتدى الصدر وحلفائه السلطة في بغداد. وهو الاحتمال الذي يجعل من التنسيق والتعاون والتحالف المحتمل بين تل أبيب وأنقرة أكثر أهمية في حال فشل المساعي الإقليمية والدولية لإعادة ترتيب أمور المنطقة، قبل أو بعد الاتفاق النووي مع إيران، ولذلك علاقة بالتطورات المحتملة في الحرب الأوكرانية. فالدور الإسرائيلي في هذه الحرب لا يختلف كثيراً عن الدور التركي، ما دامت لأنقرة وتل أبيب علاقات وطيدة جداً بكييف في جميع المجالات، والأهم العسكرية والاستخبارية، وهو ما قد يتطلب حواراً وتنسيقاً تركيين -إسرائيليين ينعكسان بنتائجهما المستقبلية المحتملة على موازين القوى في المنطقة، وخاصة إذا فشلت المساعي الإقليمية والدولية في إبعاد إيران عن الحدود مع “إسرائيل” سواء كان ذلك في سوريا ولبنان أم عبر باب المندب الاستراتيجي بالنسبة إلى تل أبيب.

ويبدو أنها تستذكر مقولات مؤسّسها بن غوريون الذي قال: “إسرائيل بحاجة إلى ثلاث رئات تتنفس عبرها الأكسجين في محيطها العربي المعادي، وهي تركيا وإثيوبيا وإيران”.

وبخسارة الأخيرة ترى في كسب الأولى والثانية قضية وجودية، منذ أن اعترفتا بكيانها فور قيامه فوراً، واحتفظتا دائماً معه بعلاقات علنية وسرية، مهما كانت شعارات حكامها المتناقضة، كما هي الحال في علاقات أنقرة بحماس، وضَحّت بها بين ليلة وضحاها من أجل الحليف الجديد! 

إن الآراء المذكورة في هذه المقالة لا تعبّر بالضرورة عن رأي الميادين وإنما تعبّر عن رأي صاحبها حصراً

Can Europe overcome hatred, racism, embrace universalist spirit of refugee convention?

April 17 2022

Source: Al Mayadeen

Ruqiya Anwar 

The hardship of white Ukrainian refugees was humanized by the United States and Europe, while the West showed racism and double standards when it came to hosting refugees from the global south that were escaping western funded wars in the first place.

Bulgarian Prime Minister Kiril Petkov described Ukrainian refugees as Europeans concluding “These are intelligent individuals”

The Ukraine crisis has caused one of Europe’s greatest and fastest refugee migrations since World War II ended. A massive amount of people had fled to neighboring countries. According to the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), as many as four million people could evacuate the country in the next weeks. The European Union (EU) estimates that there will be seven million refugees by the end of the year. 

It has revealed significant disparities in the treatment of migrants and refugees from the Middle East and Africa, particularly Syrians who arrived in 2015. However, Europe’s radically divergent responses to these two crises serve a warning lesson for those seeking a more humane and generous Europe. The distinctions also explain why some of those fleeing Ukraine, particularly African, Asian, and Middle Eastern, are not receiving the same lavish treatment as Ukrainian citizens (Tayyaba, 2022).

However, we are aware that this is not how the international protection regime has worked in Europe, particularly in countries now hosting Ukrainian refugees. Racist and xenophobic language towards refugees and migrants, particularly those from Middle Eastern nations, pervades public discourse in Poland, Hungary, Slovakia, and Romania, and hostile actions such as border pushbacks and draconian detention measures have been taken in the past.

Notably, Hungary, since the 2015 refugee crisis, the country has refused to accept refugees from non-EU countries. Non-European refugees, according to Prime Minister Victor Orbán, are “Muslim invaders” and migrants are “a poison”, and Hungary should not welcome refugees from diverse cultures and religions to preserve its cultural and ethnic unity. 

More recently, in late 2021, the atrocious treatment of refugees and asylum seekers stranded on Belarus’s borders with Poland and Lithuania, most of whom were from Iraq and Afghanistan, provoked an outcry across Europe. Belarus has been accused of turning these people’s misfortune into a weapon by luring them to Belarus to travel to EU countries in retribution for EU sanctions.

Whereas hundreds of thousands of Ukrainian migrants pour into neighbouring nations, clutching their children in one arm and their valuables. And leaders from nations like Poland, Hungary, Slovakia, Bulgaria, Moldova, and Romania have greeted them.

While hospitality has been praised, it has also brought significant disparities in the treatment of migrants and refugees from the Middle East, particularly Syrians who arrived in 2015. Some of them claim that the language used by politicians currently welcoming refugees is upsetting and cruel.

According to Bulgarian Prime Minister Kiril Petkov, “These are not the refugees we’re familiar with. These are Europeans. These are intelligent individuals. They are well-educated individuals. This is not the type of refugee surge we’ve seen before, with people whose identities we didn’t know, people with murky pasts, and even terrorists”.

However, when over a million individuals walked into Europe in 2015, there was initially a lot of support for refugees fleeing crises in Syria, Iraq, and Afghanistan. There were also instances of animosity, such as when a Hungarian camerawoman was caught on camera kicking and potentially tripping migrants near the country’s Serbian border (CNC, 2022)

The wars in Afghanistan and Iraq and the Arab Uprisings of 2011 increased the number of refugees attempting to enter Europe. Even Turkey, which already hosts over 4 million migrants and asylum seekers, including 3.6 million Syrians, could not effectively accommodate them. However, the reception of these minority refugees in European countries has been overwhelmingly unfavourable.

Hundreds of Afghan, Syrian, Iraqi, and other asylum seekers were stranded in Poland-Belarus woodlands and marshes in 2021, without shelter, food, or water in subzero temperatures and facing constant assaults from Polish and Belarusian border authorities. At least a dozen people were killed, including children. Yet, the European Union refused to open the border.

Significantly, although walls are an inadequate means to handle the movement of refugees and migrants, wall-building has been on the rise in the region since the 1990s. Then, the European continent celebrated the fall of the Berlin Wall. According to a 2018 Transnational Institute analysis, the primary goal of these walls is to dissuade refugees and asylum seekers from the Global South.

Greece finished building a wall along its border with Turkey in 2021 to keep Afghan asylum seekers out. The Spanish government now intends to construct the world’s tallest wall in northern Morocco, where it claims the power to block migrant access into Spain, which is only 250 miles away.

Lithuania has been constructing an 11-foot-high steel fence with 2-inch-thick razor wire on its border with Belarus since 2021 to prevent migrants from the Middle East and North Africa from entering the country. EU states have agreed to accept Ukrainian refugees for up to three years without requiring them to seek asylum. Poland has stated that it will absorb 1 million Ukrainians. Lithuania, Hungary, Latvia, Romania, Moldova, Greece, Germany, and Spain are among the countries that have already opened their borders.

Unfortunately, these double standards have shown in the attitude of non-Ukrainians leaving Ukraine’s conflict. Students and refugees from the Middle East have been subjected to racist abuse, obstruction, and violence while attempting to exit Ukraine in increasing numbers. Many others said they were barred from boarding trains and buses in Ukrainian cities because Ukrainian nationals were given precedence; others said they have violently moved aside and halted by Ukrainian border guards when attempting to pass into neighbouring countries.

There were tales about non-white refugee communities that had gone unrecorded and unpublished. Despite their huge number and agonizing battles across countries and continents, millions of Syrian refugees remained anonymous and blankly depicted in the media. While standing in line at the border and seeking to get crucial services, a number of non-Ukrainians of colour, including Africans, Afghans, and Yemenis, have experienced prejudice.

The astonishing double standards were on full display in the aftermath of the Ukraine crisis and the early phases of the conflict that followed. The hardship of white Ukrainian refugees was humanized by the United States and Europe, as well as their different political spectrums. When the refugees were Arabs or Muslims, Black or Brown, however, it remained vehemently divided.

Moreover, the Polish authorities detained people and refused them to enter the country. The refugee crisis in Ukraine provides Europe with not only an important opportunity to demonstrate its generosity, humanitarian values, and commitment to the global refugee protection regime, and it also provides a critical opportunity for reflection, Can Europe’s people overcome widespread racism and hatred and embrace the universalist spirit of the 1951 Refugee Convention? All member states must apply the provisions of this Convention to refugees without discrimination as to race, religion, or country of origin.

The opinions mentioned in this article do not necessarily reflect the opinion of Al mayadeen, but rather express the opinion of its writer exclusively.

Leaked files expose Britain’s covert infiltration of Palestinian refugee camps

Under the guise of improving the plight of Lebanon’s Palestinian refugees, an initiative by the British Foreign Office has ulterior motives that impact Lebanese domestic politics.

April 13 2022

The British government has infiltrated Lebanon’s Palestinian refugee camps, ostensibly to use those demographics to political advantage. Otherwise, why not assist them through UNRWA?Photo Credit: The Cradle

By Kit Klarenberg

In February, Lebanese journalist Mohammed Shoaib was arrested on suspicion of collusion with Israel’s Mossad spy agency. The writer who worked for Al-Jaras, confessed that the notorious spy agency secretly paid him to author “dozens” of anti-Hezbollah articles, receiving a paltry $30 to $70 per article.

In particular, Shoaib was tasked with writing hit jobs on the “Iranian occupation” of Lebanon, and falsely linking Hezbollah with the August 2020 Beirut port blast, drug trafficking, and murder of political activists.

It is also alleged that Mossad specifically requested his work incite hostility towards Palestinian refugees in the country who number almost 300,000. In all, Lebanon hosts more than 1.7 million refugees and has the largest per capita population of refugees in the world.

Roughly half inhabit camps administered by the United Nations Relief and Works Agency (UNRWA), where they endure abysmal living conditions, overcrowding, poverty, unemployment, lack of access to justice, and other unspeakable hardships. The 11-year, foreign-backed crisis in neighboring Syria has also prompted Palestinian refugees there – and Syrian citizens – to seek sanctuary in Lebanon.

Given Israel’s track record of multifaceted crimes against the Palestinian people, that they are targeting an already vulnerable refugee population for propaganda purposes is hardly surprising. Nonetheless, Israel is not the only hostile foreign country resorting to these tactics.

Leaked files reviewed by The Cradle reveal the British Foreign Office has for many years secretly meddled in Lebanon’s refugee camps, courtesy of ARK, a shadowy intelligence cutout run by probable MI6 operative Alistair Harris. London’s agenda is rather different than Tel Aviv’s, however – it seeks to subtly stir up revolutionary fervor, and exploit them as unwitting foot soldiers in its ongoing clandestine war against Lebanon’s ruling elite.

‘Community Engagement’

The documents indicate ARK has been operating in all 12 camps since 2009, implementing British-funded “programming” of various kinds. This experience has granted the company “granular understanding” of their internal political, economic, ideological, religious and practical dynamics, and led to the establishment of a “diverse delivery team” and array of “local contacts” with “access throughout all camps and gatherings,” meaning community-level discussions and activities of residents can be spied upon and influenced.

This intimate, insidious insight is reinforced by “daily monitoring of neighborhood-level WhatsApp groups,” with “any new information, such as affiliation between a local group and a faction, or conflict between factions” documented by ARK’s in-house “stakeholder tracker.”

Typically, ARK has engaged in small-scale initiatives in the camps, including the restoration of streets and cemeteries, recycling initiatives, assisting in the launch of small businesses, providing income to disadvantaged and disabled residents, creating nurseries and daycare centers, and even launching a community hub, Sawa Coffeeshop. It serves to this day as “a popular place for youth to gather and promote civic engagement in their community and a shared Palestinian identity that bridges factional differences.”

In submissions to the Foreign Office dating to May 2019, ARK proposed ramping up these activities significantly. It pledged to create “Community Leadership Committees” in each camp, composed of hand-picked “stakeholders” – including NGOs, youth activists, women’s organizations, and representatives of neighborhood armed groups – to identify “quick impact projects” that could be implemented therein. These projects aim to “counter threats to social stability in the camps, create or improve livelihood opportunities, and provide better access to services.”

A social media platform created by ARK, Nastopia – which boasted 20,000 “highly invested” followers on Facebook at the time, a figure that has almost doubled since – was forecast to be fundamental to these efforts.

The page, run by a 24-strong team of ARK-trained “youth reporters”, would be used to recruit local participants, increase awareness and demand for “community engagement and improved conditions” among camp residents.  Other activities include the promotion of Foreign Office-financed projects and to publicize “success stories” generated by them, while “promoting Palestinian culture and a sense of belonging, and tackling social injustice.”

Nastopia was “already [an] effective voice for connecting Palestinian communities, particularly youth” by that point. ARK cited a recent “Camps Films Festival” organized by the platform, covered by Al-Jazeera, which showcased “films portraying life in the camps and what it means to be Palestinian,” and in the process provided “positive examples of a shared identity.”

All along, the Nastopia page was to be monitored with “community feedback” on the assorted initiatives gauged to identify areas in which these activities “could be adapted to maximize impact.” Specialist training provided to its staff meant the platform could also serve “as a forum for online and offline discussion about social injustices [and] virtual space to talk about topics considered taboo in the camps,” allowing ARK to burrow even deeper inside the heads of refugees.

‘Active Citizenship’

If the obvious surveillance and manipulation dimensions of ARK’s project weren’t troubling enough, it takes on an acutely sinister character when one considers a key objective of “highlighting successful initiatives” in the camps was to “[enhance] the audience’s confidence in their own ability to contribute to social change.”

A Foreign Office-commissioned Target Audience Analysis conducted by ARK in March 2019 sought to pinpoint a segment of Lebanon’s population that could be mobilized to “affect positive social change,” and methods by which tensions between sectarian communities could be reduced, in order to unify them in opposition to the country’s ruling elite. Reading between the lines, it gives every appearance of a blueprint for the overthrow of the Lebanese government.

An ideal audience was duly identified, representing 12 percent of the population, who disavowed violence but did not reject “other forms of contentious politics,” and could be “influenced” to engage in “behaviors leading to positive social change,” such as protests and community initiatives.

The only questions for ARK were: “What might be done to enable other Lebanese to have similar confidence in their potential to contribute to positive social change?” and “how might this segment of the population … be grown to include a larger fraction of the public?”

The answer, ARK proposed, was to both covertly and overtly promote the message that “change is possible and ordinary citizens have a role to play in achieving change,” by way of propaganda campaigns and civil society initiatives “[highlighting] where change has been achieved or where threats to Lebanon’s stability have been countered.” This would demonstrate to the country’s diverse population that “barriers” to reform can be overcome, by taking matters into their own hands.

Providing evidence of “responsive government at local levels” was crucial for reinforcing “principles of active citizenship” among Lebanon’s population – and the analysis specifically cited Syrians and Palestinians, who are mostly Sunni Muslims, as representing an “important part” of the country’s demography, to be motivated in this manner.

In other words, Foreign Office activities in the refugee camps form just one fragment of a wider, clandestine, multi-channel assault on public perceptions in Lebanon that Britain has been waging against its democratically-elected government.

A mobilized force

One can judge these efforts by their fruits. In October 2019, seven months after ARK’s Target Audience Analysis was supplied to the Foreign Office, large-scale protests engulfed the streets of Beirut, which have ebbed and flowed ever since, and generated enormous amounts of western media coverage along the way.

The extent to which ARK’s Foreign Office-funded meddling in Lebanon influenced this incendiary unrest may never be fully quantifiable, but it may be significant that in July that year, thousands of refugees across several camps began demonstrating in unison, demanding the government immediately reform employment laws barring them as “foreign workers” from numerous professions.

This turmoil was arguably the spark that ignited the entire “October Revolution” – and in one of its Foreign Office submissions, ARK refers to how it “takes pride” in ensuring refugees recruited to its illicit schemes receive “annual leave, sick leave, and health insurance,” despite this not being “legally necessary” due to local legislation “discriminating against Palestinians.”

Who benefits?

The influence of ARK on Lebanon’s impending general election in May, the country’s first since the riots began, is even more unambiguous. Several news outlets have hailed the unprecedentedly high profusion of young candidates vying for office – 80 in total, many of them women.

A clandestine Foreign Office project influenced by the aforementioned Target Audience Analysis sought to enlist Lebanese youth as “agents of change”, fostering among them a culture of active political participation, in order that they could better “hold political institutions and individuals accountable,” and increase “electoral participation” in favor of opposition parties.

Under its auspices, ARK convened “boot camps” in “priority areas” of Lebanon, cultivated “a national group capable of pushing for greater change” composed of young women, and created social media assets and youth-focused websites featuring political interviews, question-and-answer sessions, coverage of boot camp meetings, “calls to action,” and “humorous messaging campaigns.” Activity on these assets was scheduled to ramp up ahead of the 2022 elections.

Clearly, irrespective of the outcome of the Lebanon May elections, the ultimate victors won’t be the parties and candidates that secure office, or the average Lebanese citizens who elected them, but Britain – for whatever form the next government takes, one way or another, it will serve London’s financial, ideological, military, and political interests.

The views expressed in this article do not necessarily reflect those of The Cradle.

أزمة أوكرانيا تثبت: حياد لبنان أمر غير قابل للتطبيق

الجمعة 4 آذار 2022

العميد د. أمين محمد حطيط

منذ فترة من الزمن يروّج في لبنان مع اندلاع العدوان على سورية بحرب كونية قادتها الولايات المتحدة، ابتدع لبنان شعار النأي بالنفس حتى يتنصّل من موجباته التي يفرضها العديد من المعاهدات المعقودة بينه وبين الدولة السورية ويؤمّن لأميركا ما تبتغيه من حصار.

 شعار رفعته آنذاك الحكومة التي كان يرأسها نجيب ميقاتي رئيس الحكومة الحالي الذي يجاهر اليوم بانّ «السعودية هي قبلته السياسية كما هي قبلته الدينية»، رغم انه يُصرّ أو يتظاهر بأنه ملتزم بسياسة النأي بالنفس وهو كلام تنفيه الوقائع.

بيد أنّ الشعار المرفوع الذي يوحي بأنّ لبنان لن يكون مع طرف دون آخر في الحرب على سورية، هذا الشعار لم يطبّق في الميدان من قبل أحد فلا الحكومة عملت به ولا مكونات السياسة اللبنانية احترمته، حيث انّ الحكومة انصاعت لأوامر الغرب بالقيادة الأميركية في أكثر من ملف يعني سورية، بخاصة في مسألة النازحين السوريين كما وفي مسائل مالية وسياسية أخرى ولم يسجل من النأي بالنفس سوى بعض المواقف اليتيمة التي اتخذها مندوب لبنان في الجامعة العربية وما عدا ذلك فقد كان انحياز لبنان الرسمي الى خصوم الحكومة السورية واضحاً من غير التباس.

أما اللبنانيون فقد كان انقسامهم واضحاً أيضاً حيال المسألة، ففي حين ذهب فريق منهم للقتال الى جانب الدولة السورية قتالاً رأى فيه انه من طبيعة العمل الاستباقي للدفاع المشروع عن النفس، فقد التزم أطراف آخرون يعملون بأوامر وإملاءات أميركية موقع العداء للحكومة السورية ونصرة من يقاتلها من مجموعات داخلية مسلحة او إرهابية استقدمت من الخارج او حتى تشكيلات عسكرية احتلت أرضاً سورية، كما هو حال القوات الأميركية والتركية. مواقف متناقضة أظهرت انّ الانقسام عمودي حادّ بين اللبنانيين دون أن يكون هناك بين الطرفين مساحة مشتركة للتفاهم.

في ظلّ هذا الوضع الخلافي أطلق البطريرك الماروني الدعوة الى حياد لبنان وأيّده في دعوته معظم الأطراف الذين جاهروا بالعداء للدولة السورية والعداء للمقاومة التي وقفت الى جانب سورية في حربها الدفاعية ضدّ الإرهاب والاحتلال الأجنبي لأراضيها، وكان بديهياً أن تنظر المقاومة الى الدعوة هذه بعين الريبة والحذر خاصة أنها ترى في سلوك من أطلقها ومن أيّده كامل الانحياز الى الغرب بقيادة أميركية وكامل الانصياع للإملاءات الأميركية وكامل الانبطاح أمام دول الخليج المنصاعة أصلاً لأميركا والتي تنفذ عدواناً تدميرياً على اليمن.

في ظلّ هذا المشهد انفجر الوضع في أوكرانيا وبدأت روسيا بتنفيذ عملية عسكرية خاصة عبر حدودها، عملية حددت أهدافها بأنها ذات طبيعة دفاعيّة من أجل ضمان حياد أوكرانيا وعدم تحوّلها الى منصة للحلف الأطلسي الذي يجاهر بالعداء لروسيا وبأنها لا تنوي احتلالاً للدولة تلك بل جلّ ما تريده ضمان أمنها القومي الذي ينتهك بالخطط الأطلسية بقيادة أميركية. أما الغرب فقد نظر الى العملية العسكرية الروسية بأنها عدوان موصوف، وأنه سيواجهه بشتى الوسائل السياسية والإعلامية والاقتصادية وتقديم المساعدات العسكرية لحكومة كييف من غير التورّط بإرسال تشكيلات من جيوش الغرب خشية الانزلاق الى حرب عالمية أطرافها دول نووية.

لقد ظهر الصراع في أوكرانيا وحولها انه صراع بين روسيا التي تبرّر أعمالها العسكرية بحق الدفاع عن النفس بأسلوب استباقي وبين الغرب بقيادة أميركا التي جهدت لاستدراج روسيا الى هذا الموقع من أجل الإجهاز عليها وتفكيكها بتكرار ما قامت به ضدّ الاتحاد السوفياتي بعد احتلال أفغانستان. ورغم هذا الوضوح في طبيعة الصراع فإنّ لبنان سارع وفي الساعات الأولى لبدء العملية العسكرية الروسية، لإدانة روسيا والمطالبة بوقف عمليتها ثم صوّت في الجمعية العامة للأمم المتحدة لصالح مشروع قرار أميركي أوروبي اعتمد ضدّ روسيا، مؤكداً في مواقفه بأنه ليس على الحياد ولا يتقيّد بما ورد في البيان الوزاري للحكومة من شعار النأي بالنفس، فهل أصاب لبنان أم أخطأ في مواقفه؟ وهل الحياد ممكن والنأي بالنفس مستطاع؟

من البديهي أن يكون لبنان وهو من الدول المؤسسة للأمم المتحدة صاحب سياسة تدعو الى الأمن والسلام وحلّ النزاعات بالطرق السلميّة بعيداً عن الاحتكام الى القوة والسلاح مع ما يستتبعه من قتل وتدمير وتشريد وهو الدولة التي عانت ولا تزال تعاني من العدوان والاحتلال «الإسرائيلي» وعلى أرضها وحقوقها وسيادتها. ولكن على لبنان قبل ان يتخذ موقفاً من صراع دولي أن يتحقق ويمحّص انعكاسات موقفه وتداعياته عليه وعلى سياسة الحياد التي يدّعيها. ولكن هل يستطيع لبنان أن يصمد أمام الضغوط الأجنبية عامة والأميركية ـ الأوروبية ـ الخليجية خاصة؟

لقد أثبتت التجربة في لبنان أنّ القول شيء والفعل والممارسة شيء آخر، والأمر رهن بمن يتولى زمام الأمور في البلاد، فإذا تذكرنا أيام تلت طرد «إسرائيل» من جنوب لبنان في العام ٢٠٠٠ وكم صمد لبنان أمام الضغط الأميركي الرامي لحمله على التنازل امام «إسرائيل» عن حقوقه في أرضه، لوصلنا الي نتيجة مفادها انّ لبنان المتمسك بحقه وبجيشه وبمقاومته قادر على مواجهة الضغوط الأميركية، فقد حاولت مادلين أولبريت وزيرة الخارجية الأميركية وعبر مكالمات هاتفية لمدة أربع ساعات ان تثني لبنان عن مواقفه ولم تستطع وانتزع لبنان حقه في أرضه كما رآه.

بيد انّ نتائج الضغط الأميركي على لبنان في المسألة الأوكرانية جاءت بنتيجة معاكسة، حيث إنّ هاتف او زيارة من سفيرة أميركا الى المسؤولين أنتجت بيان إدانة لروسيا بسرعة قياسية سبق لبنان فيها كلّ الدول العربية ومعظم الدول الأوروبية، ثم كانت زيارة أخرى حملت لبنان على دعم الموقف الأميركيّ في مجلس الأمن ضدّ روسيا.

وهنا قد يروق للبنانيين الذين اتخذوا هذه المواقف من غير العودة الى مجلس الوزراء الذي هو حسب الدستور السلطة التنفيذية التي ترسم وتنفذ سياسات الدولة، قد يروق لهم القول بأنّ موقف لبنان منسجم مع مبادئه الرافضة للعدوان والاحتكام للقوة في حلّ النزاعات. ولكن أيضاً من مبادئ لبنان دعم الحق المشروع بالدفاع عن النفس، وهنا يجب ان نأخذ بالاعتبار الهواجس المشروعة لكلّ من الطرفين، الامر الذي لم يعمل به لبنان بنتيجة الضغط الأميركي.

هذه الوقائع تفضي بنا الى نتيجة واحدة وهي انّ الحياد المطلوب هو أمر غير مضمون في بلد كلبنان في ظلّ ضعف الدولة ووهنها ووجود ساسة لديهم مصالح يخشون عليها، فالحياد موقف لا يمكن ان يتخذه إلا قوي لا يخشى تهديداً ولا يستجيب لإملاء، أما الضعيف الخائف على مصلحة مالية او سواها، فإنه ينظر الي مصلحته ويتخذ الموقف الذي يحفظها دون التوقف عند تأثير ذلك على الدولة والوطن الذي يتولى مسؤولية فيه، وأخيراً نذكر بشروط الحياد التي هي الى جانب القوة الذاتية، هناك القبول الخارجيّ فهل يقبل الخارج بحياد لبنان ويدعه وشأنه أم يريد لبنان منصة ومسرحاً وقاعدة لعملياته وسياسته؟ الواقع يثبت انّ من يطلب حياد لبنان هو كمن يبحث عن النجوم في رابعة النهار. فتحوّلوا الى امتلاك القوة والبحث عمن يتولى الشأن العام ويقدّمه على أموره الخاصة.

*أستاذ جامعيّ ـ باحث استراتيجيّ

مصير الورقة الكويتيّة كمصير المبادرة الفرنسية

الخميس 3 شباط 2022

المصدر: الميادين نت

يبدو واضحاً أنّ ما وُصف بالمبادرة الخليجية ليس في واقع الأمر إلا وثيقة مكتوبة توثّق أحلام كلّ من “إسرائيل” أولاً، والسعودية ثانياً، والولايات المتحدة ثالثاً، وفرنسا رابعاً.

غسان سعود

إنها مبادرة تقوم على مطالبة الأقوى شعبياً وأمنياً وعسكرياً وانتخابياً بالاستسلام الكامل من دون أيّ مقابل.

في ذروة الاشتباك الإقليميّ والدوليّ عشية الجولات الحاسمة في المفاوضات الأمميّة بشأن البرنامج النوويّ، حمل وزير الخارجية الكويتي أحمد ناصر المحمد الصباح ما يُمكن وصفه بوثيقة الاستسلام للفريق السياسيّ اللبنانيّ الذي عجزوا عن هزمه بآلة الحرب الإسرائيلية في العام 2006، ثم بالمحكمة الدولية، ثم بشيطنته بجميع الوسائل الاحترافية، ثم بجيوش التكفيريين، ثم بالثورة الملونة، ثم بالتجويع والحصار، مع كلّ ما اقتضاه ذلك من إيقاف التنقيب عن الغاز، ومنع التحويلات المالية الكبيرة من الخارج، والتلاعب بسعر الصرف، مع منع المسّ بحاكم مصرف لبنان رياض سلامة، ومنع أيّ حلول إنسانية لأزمة اللاجئين السوريين. 

وفي مفارقة غريبة لا تختلف كثيراً عن جميع المقاربات السعودية لملفات المنطقة، قرَّرت المملكة أنَّها تستطيع، عبر ما يسمى “المبادرة الكويتية”، أن تأخذ بالسّلم كلّ ما عجزت هي و”إسرائيل” والجماعات التكفيرية وفرنسا والولايات المتحدة عن أخذه بالقوة والأمن والإعلام. 

أما الأغرب في هذه المفارقة، فهو أنَّها تطلب الاستسلام الكامل من دون أيّ مقابل، فلا يوجد تعهّد بحلّ أزمة المديونية مثلاً أو الإفراج عن الغاز اللبناني أو حلّ قضيتي اللاجئين والنازحين أو أيّ شيء آخر. على العكس تماماً، إنها مبادرة تقوم على مطالبة الأقوى شعبياً وأمنياً وعسكرياً وانتخابياً بالاستسلام الكامل من دون أيّ مقابل، لتقرر لاحقاً الدولة السعودية الكريمة ما تنوي فعله.

يأتي هذا كلّه بعد أسابيع قليلة من تقديم وزير الإعلام اللبناني جورج قرداحي استقالته مجاناً، ومن دون أيِّ مقابل متّفق عليه مسبقاً، ليتمّ تجاهل هذه الاستقالة من قبل الدول التي كانت تطالبه بها، والتي ما زالت تتمسّك بكلِّ ما اتخذته من إجراءات انتقامية قبلها وكأنَّها لم تحصل!

مبادرة من 12 بنداً أبرزها ضمان أمن “إسرائيل”

ما وُصف بالمبادرة الخليجية تألَّف من 12 نقطة. عند التدقيق بها، يتبيَّن أنّ هناك 7 بنود يمكن القول إنَّ لدول مجلس التعاون الخليجي الحق بمناقشتها مع لبنان، هي: 

البند الأوّل المتعلّق بالتزامه بكلّ استحقاقات مؤتمر “الطائف”. البند الثاني المتعلّق بالتزامه بكلّ قرارات الشرعية الدولية وقرارات جامعة الدول العربية. البند الرابع المتعلق بالنأي بالنفس قولاً وفعلاً. البند السادس المرتبط بوقف تدخل حزب الله في الشؤون الخليجية. البند السابع الخاصّ بوقف كلّ أنشطة الجماعات المناوئة لدول مجلس التعاون انطلاقاً من لبنان. البند التاسع الخاص بوضع آلية لضمان خلو الصادرات اللبنانية من أية ممنوعات. والبند الحادي عشر الخاص بوضع نظام تبادل معلومات أمنية بين دول مجلس التعاون والحكومة اللبنانية. 

في المقابل، هناك 5 بنود لا علاقة لأزمة لبنان مع دول الخليج بها، كما لا علاقة للبنان مع دول الخليج بها من قريب أو بعيد، فالبند الثالث مثلاً في المبادرة الخليجية يؤكّد “مدنية الدولة اللبنانية”، في مفارقةٍ تطالب فيها 6 دول غير مدنية الدولة اللبنانية باحترام “مدنيّة الدولة”، فيما يطالب البند الخامس بوضع موعد زمني محدد لتنفيذ قرارات مجلس الأمن، من دون أن تتضح علاقة “أمن إسرائيل” الذي تهدف هذه القرارات إلى حمايته بالأزمة بين لبنان ودول الخليج، إلا إذا كانت الأزمة ترتبط بأمن “إسرائيل” أساساً، وليس بتهريب الكبتاغون أو حرية الرأي والتعبير والانتماء والعقيدة في لبنان!

وفي البند الثامن، تطالب دول المبادرة التي لا تجري على أراضيها أية انتخابات حقيقية باحترام مواعيد الاستحقاقات الانتخابية اللبنانية، في وقت يتحدّث البند العاشر عن بسط سيطرة السلطات الرسمية اللبنانية على كلّ منافذ الدولة، من دون أن تتّضح هنا أيضاً علاقة هذا البند بالعلاقات اللبنانية – الخليجية، مع العلم أنَّ هذا البند تحديداً هو الشغل الشاغل للإسرائيليين الذين يضغطون بجميع الوسائل على الروس لأداء دور ما على طول الحدود اللبنانية – السورية لإيقاف تدفّق السلاح، بعدما باءت جميع المحاولات البريطانية والأميركية لتحقيق هذا الهدف بالفشل الذريع، رغم أبراج المراقبة والكاميرات وغيرهما.

أما البند الثاني عشر، فينصّ على العمل مع البنك الدولي لإيجاد حلول مالية للمودعين اللبنانيين، من دون أن تتّضح هنا أيضاً علاقة الأزمة اللبنانية – الخليجية بما يفترض بالحكومة اللبنانية أن تقرره، لجهة العمل مع البنك الدولي أو إيجاد أية مخارج اقتصادية أخرى.

وفي النتيجة، يبدو واضحاً أنّ ما وُصف بالمبادرة الخليجية ليس في واقع الأمر إلا وثيقة مكتوبة توثّق أحلام كلّ من “إسرائيل” أولاً (الأمن والأمان والتوطين ونزع السلاح)، والسعودية ثانياً، والولايات المتحدة ثالثاً، وفرنسا رابعاً، لكنها لا تقدّمها للنقاش أو تضعها على طاولة التفاوض، كما يحصل في العادة بين القوى المتصارعة، في ظلِّ تأكيد المطلعين أنَّ مضمون “المبادرة” وطريقة تقديمها أشبه بإعلان حرب رسميّ، لكنَّ لياقة الدبلوماسية الكويتية كانت أشبه بمن يفرغ دلو مياه باردة فوق الرؤوس الحامية، حيث نزعت صواعق التفجير، في ظلِّ قناعة الكويت وسلطنة عُمان وقطر بأن التهديد والوعيد لا يمكن أن يكونا الحلّ مع لبنان، بعد فشل جميع المحاولات التصعيدية الأخرى، من دون أن يتّضح للوفد اللبنانيّ الذي زار الكويت أخيراً ما إذا كان الموقف الإماراتي يتناغم بالكامل مع السعودية، في ظلّ وجود مناخ عربيّ عام ضاغط في تأكيده عدم جدوى التصعيد ضد لبنان، تزامناً مع المصالحة الخليجية مع سوريا، حيث لا تزال العِبر من عبثية التصعيد طازجة.

موقف لبنان الرسمي: عصفوران بحجر واحد

بدورها، تعاملت رئاسة الجمهوريّة اللبنانية مع “الأفكار” التي حملها وزير خارجية الكويت بوصفها فرصةً لـ”مخاطبة” الدول العربية ومن يقف خلفها بشكل علنيّ وواضح وشفاف، بحيث يرى الرأي العام اللبناني والعربي كلّ ما يحصل بوضوح تام، وستزداد الأمور إيجابية في حال تشكيل لجان مشتركة للتنسيق الأمنيّ ومنع تهريب الممنوعات، في حال عودة التبادل التجاري بين لبنان والدول الخليجية وغيره. 

هذا هو العصفور الأول. أما العصفور الثاني، فهو ما تضمّنته رسالة رئيس الجمهورية إلى أمير دولة الكويت في أداء دور مباشر في إيجاد الحلول لكلِّ المشاكل العالقة، سواء بسبب عجز مجلس الأمن عن إقناع “إسرائيل” بتنفيذ القرارات الدولية بكلِّ ما تتضمنه من إعادة للاجئين وانسحاب من الأراضي المحتلة أو غيره، مع العلم أنَّ الرئيس عون كان من أكثر المرحّبين بمبادرة الرئيس الفرنسي فرنسوا ماكرون، الذي سرعان ما أبلغ من الولايات المتحدة والخليج بأنه لا يستطيع المضي قدماً في مبادرته، فانكفأ إلى الخلف. وكذلك، زار رئيس الجمهورية الدوحة التي وعدت بزيارة وزير خارجيتها لبيروت بحثاً عن “ورقة” ما، لكنه لم يجد طريقه إليها بعد. 

وفي ظلِّ تأكيد المطّلعين على أجواء النقاشات الدبلوماسية أنَّ ما تضمَّنته الورقة الكويتية يشمل عدداً مهماً من مشاكل الدولة اللبنانية العالقة في الأمم المتحدة، وفي مشاكل الإقليم، وفي تجاذبات الداخل اللبناني، منذ أكثر من 3 عقود، وإذا كانت هناك فرصة لوضعها جميعها على الطاولة لإيجاد حلول جذرية لها تعالج أساس المشاكل لا تداعياتها أو تفرّعاتها، فإن هذا سيكون أكثر بكثير مما تتطلَّع إليه رئاسة الجمهورية.

مصير الورقة الكويتية كمصير المبادرة الفرنسية

في النّتيجة، يمكن القول إنَّ فرنسا حضرت بوصفها قوّة عظمى لها تأثيرها في فيينا، ولها تأثيرها المعنوي في حزب الله، في ظل تمنّعها عن تحقيق التطلّعات الإسرائيلية بوضعه في قائمة المنظمات الإرهابية، ولها نفوذها التاريخيّ في لبنان. ومع ذلك، فقد كانت متواضعة جداً في ورقتها، رافضةً البحث بأيِّ شكل من الأشكال في نزع سلاح حزب الله، باعتباره أمراً مستحيلاً يمثل مجرد مضيعة للوقت.

أما السعودية التي تتخبّط في الرمال المتحركة اليمنية، من دون أن يكون لها تأثير معنوي أو غيره في حزب الله في أكثر اللحظات تأكّلاً لنفوذها في لبنان، فقد أتت لتضع ورقة لا تجرؤ الولايات المتحدة في ذروة وقاحتها على وضعها. ومع ذلك، إنَّ اللياقة الدبلوماسية الكويتية تقتضي لياقة دبلوماسية لبنانية مقابلة، ويفترض بالورقة أن تقابل بورقة ليحكم العقل على الورقتين، مع التأكيد أنَّ تعامل رئاسة الجمهورية مع الورقة الكويتية من جهة، وحفلة التحريض القواتية على الدولة اللبنانية ووجوب معاقبتها من جهة ثانية، سمحا للرأي العام بأن يرى بوضوح كيف تسعى رئاسة الجمهورية لنزع فتيل التفجير والانحناء للعاصفة، وكيف تريد القوّات اللبنانية، في المقابل، من الدول الخليجية الانتقام من لبنان واللبنانيين، وهو بحد ذاته إيجابية كبيرة للورقة الكويتية. 

لكن هذه هي حدود اللعبة، ولا شيء أكثر يُعوّل عليه. بذلت الدولة اللبنانية – وما زالت – كلّ الجهد اللازم لاحتواء التصعيد السعودي بنوباته الهستيرية المتراكمة، من دون أن يصل ذلك إلى حدّ الانكسار أو الاستسلام أو إعلاء الرايات البيضاء والتسليم بالأوامر السعودية. احتواء التصعيد، لكن ليس الخضوع لهذا التصعيد. هذا هو سقفها، وما لم يُعطَ 1% منه لفرنسا التي عرضت الأثمان لأجله، لن يُعطى مجاناً أو مقابل أثمان للسعودية.

إن الآراء المذكورة في هذه المقالة لا تعبّر بالضرورة عن رأي الميادين وإنما تعبّر عن رأي صاحبها حصراً

لبنان وسورية: الحدود والكهرباء والنازحون هل تستحق سورية كلمة شكر، ومن سيقولها؟

الثلاثاء 14 كانون أول 2021

 ناصر قنديل

تتزامن العناوين التي تفرض حضورها تحت عنوان العلاقات بين لبنان وسورية، وكلها عناوين من العيار الثقيل، لبلد مثل لبنان ينزف ويعاني ويلهث طلباً لود حكومات لا تقدم له إلا شروط الإذعان والاذلال من دون مقابل سوى وعود سرابية غامضة، بينما لبنان الرسمي الذي يدير ظهره لسورية، وهو يردد أنها بوابته البرية الحصرية إلى العالم، وأنها معبر تجارته، وسورية لا تقبل السيئة إلا بالحسنة، فبعدما كان المنتظر زيارة لوزير الداخلية اللبنانية إلى سورية تنتهي بالإعلان المتبادل عن فتح الحدود بين البلدين أمام المواطنين ضمن ضوابط كورونا، تبادر سورية من طرف واحد لفتح حدودها أمام اللبنانيين، واللبنانيون الراغبون بالتوجه إلى سورية بعشرات الآلاف إن لم يكن بمئات الآلاف، على رغم إنكار المسؤولين السياسيين والحكوميين لهذه الحقيقة، ففي ظل ارتفاع أسعار المواد الإستهلاكية والغذائية والدواء إلى عشرين ضعفاً عما كانت عليه، تشكل سورية بأسعارها المعقولة بالقياس لقدرات اللبنانيين متنفساً استثنائياً، حيث الأسعار هي نصف القمية كمعدل وسطي عن الأسعار الموازية في الأسواق اللبنانية بالنسبة إلى السلع الغذائية والاستهلاكية، وأقل من الربع بالنسبة إلى الدواء، وكما في مثل هذه الأزمات يقصد اللبنانيون سورية بزيارات عائلية يشترون خلالها حاجاتهم ويقضون يوماً سياحياً رخيصاً ويعودون بمؤونة الشهر.

بالتوازي تبذل سورية جهوداً استثنائية لإنجاز المطلوب لجعل استجرار الكهرباء الأردنية والغاز المصري إلى لبنان عبر سورية ممكناً بأسرع ما تستطيع، على الرغم من أن الوفد اللبناني الذي زار سورية طلباً للموافقة لم يفعل ذلك إلا بعد الحصول على موافقة مسبقة من السفيرة الأميركية، كما صرح بذلك الوزراء أنفسهم، وانقطع بعدها التواصل الرسمي إلا عبر اللجنة الرباعية اللبنانية- السورية- الأردنية- المصرية، ولم يجرؤ وزير الطاقة الجديد على زيارة سورية على رغم قيامه بزيارات موازية لكل من مصر والأردن، والزيارة بالحد الأدنى من باب تفقد مسار الإنشاءات والتحضيرات التقنية التي تجري في سورية ضرورية، إضافة إلى أهميتها السياسية، ويبقى أن الملف الأكثر أهمية الذي يمثله ملف النازحين السوريين وما يتسبب به من إستنزاف للاقتصاد اللبناني، فلبنان يراسل سورية بالواسطة تجنباً للتواصل المباشر، على رغم حجم الاستنزاف، وسورية تتحرك وحيدة مع الهيئات الدولية المعنية لإقناعها بضرورة تمويل عودة النازحين انطلاقاً من الذين يقيمون منهم في لبنان، ويصل إلى بيروت المبعوث الأممي غير بيدرسون الذي كان في دمشق، وطلب منه المسؤولون السوريون سماع رأي المسؤولين اللبنانيين حول الامكانية العملية للبدء بخطة لإعادة النازحين، ونقل التمويل المقدم لهم من صفة نازح إلى صفة عائد.

بالتزامن تشهد سورية كيف تستنفر الحكومة اللبنانية بوجه معارضين بحرانيين حقوقيين مهذبين سلميين، عقدوا مؤتمراً صحافياً حول الإنتهاكات التي تطال حقوق الإنسان في البحرين في بيروت، وتصدر المواقف المنددة وتدعى النيابة العامة للتحقيق، تحت شعار أن هذا المؤتمر إساءة لعلاقات لبنان العربية، بينما يقيم في لبنان عشرات بل مئات المعارضين السوريين ويتخذون منه مقراً لهم، وقد شهد لبنان مؤتمرات لتنظيم التدخلات العسكرية وإيواء المسلحين الإرهابيين، ووقف زعماء لبنانيون يصفونهم بالثوار، ولم يخرج صوت يندد ويعتبر ذلك إساءة تستحق المتابعة، وسورية تتجاوز كل ذلك ولا تلتفت إلى الوراء وتقول للمسؤولين اللبنانيين إن العرب الذين يهمكم أمرهم لأنهم يملكون الأموال، يتسابقون على زيارات دمشق، فقد زالت أسباب خشيتكم من الانفتاح على سورية، وواشنطن التي تخشون عقوباتها تمنحكم الإذن، فلماذا تترددون، على رغم أن المفروض أن لا تمر علاقة الأخوة لا بإذن الغريب، ولا ترتبط برضا الشقيق البعيد العلاقة بالشقيق القريب، والسؤال الذي ينتظر جواباً بعد كل ذلك، هل تستحق سورية كلمة شكراً؟ وهل من مسؤول لبناني يجرؤ على قولها شخصياً ومن دمشق من دون إذن أو استئذان؟

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NSFW- Fire in her stomach, the Turkish Lira is Sick, its Immune System Collapsed… When Turkey Sold her Honor نار في بطنها .. الليرة التركية المريضة بانهيار جهاز المناعة .. عندما باعت تركيا شرفها

NSFW- Fire in her stomach, the Turkish Lira is Sick, its Immune System Collapsed… When Turkey Sold her Honor

 ARABI SOURI 

Erdogan the pimp of the Turkish Lira the whore

The Turkish Lira continues its free fall, it is now at 9.60 Liras for one US dollar, a record fall from 1.5 Liras for one US dollar in 2010 before the Turkish madman waged his terrorist war on Syria, and there’s no sign of recovery even if the Turkish madman fires everybody in the Turkish Central Bank, the finance, and the economy ministries.

Naram Serjoon describes the current situation of the Turkish economy, and its Lira in this explicitly magnificent piece, as much as I tried to maintain the wordings in the translation, the Arabic version remains more profoundly poetic:

I know that just looking at this title will provoke many Syrians from the opposition and national loyalists, and before many read the article, they will say that our Syrian Lira is made of glass and it is not permissible to throw stones at the Turkish economy, and many will revolt and rage, perhaps the two sides will unite for the first time in denouncing the article because the Syrian economy has suffered a severe blow in the past year, and the West’s efforts have succeeded in weakening the Syrian Lira through a complex and coordinated operation that began with the confiscation of food and oil wealth in the Jazira region and completed the old siege cordon by adding the bombing of the port of Beirut and the ‘bombing’ of Lebanon’s banks, which were the Syrians’ treasuries for their money, for fear of the instability of the situation in the Syrian economy, which was a war economy, and all people flee from the war economy.

But the suffering of the Syrian Lira seems temporary, and the American bet was to effect the shock and terror in the Syrian economy to explode and cause the final destruction of stability and Syrian social life, in preparation for the explosion of a popular resentment that destroys everything that blood and bodies (sacrifices) have accomplished, there are many manifestations that indicate that the ways to fix the Syrian economy have begun to move, albeit slowly and that the US has begun to loosen its grip for many considerations, which we will discuss later. The Syrian Lira is like a free woman whose slavemaster wants to corrupt and impoverish her in order to sell her chastity and honor, but she refuses, preferring poverty and death than selling her honor to him and selling her cause and her daughter Palestine to him and his whims.

But why does the Turkish lira get sick?? She gets diarrhea and loses her weight, color, and fat and looks like she has cancer and there is no cure for it?? As if she was the one who fought a ten-year war and was besieged, looted, and her factories and oil were stolen?

Turkey is not Syria, and the big lie about the miraculous economy and the seventeenth economy in the world was the crutch of the Islamists who wanted to move us by force to an Ottoman country, not under the pretext that Islam is the solution but neo-Ottomanism is the solution, and the evidence is Erdogan’s miracle, the hero who saved Turkey’s economy and turned it into a strong economy.

Erdogan the pimp of the Turkish Lira the whore

And we have always been skeptical of this Turkish miracle and we offered scientific and economic explanations, namely that the sudden flow of Western money into the veins of the Turkish economy was at a price, and that the rising Turkish economy is standing on the crutches of Western banks, which if they withdraw their crutches, this giant will fall and roll and break its bones, Although the most important factor in the rise of Erdogan’s Turkey’s economy was the Syrian openness to Turkey in support of it when it became writhing and barking in favor of Palestine, and the Syrians rewarded it with the support of Erdogan’s economy, who requested Damascus’s support and presented his credentials when he visited Damascus with Amina (his wife) and was asking and اe was asking, and his requests were answered. The Syrian economy, culture, and media opened up to Turkey, and the economies of the Arab region followed suit. This flow of Turkish products and goods, which was similar to an invasion through northern Syria, caused the recovery of the Anatolian economy, where the Islamist bloc supporting Erdogan against the economy of Istanbul, and this increased the control of the new economy that arose in Anatolia by virtue of the Syrian support, which was intended to create a ground for the Five Seas Project, which would dispense Turkey and the Arabs from Europe, and create an oriental economy that would compete with the European economy.

This is the true story of Erdogan’s miracle, but as usual, lovers do not see the defects of the beloved. The lover does not see that his beloved, who was poor and became rich overnight, has sold something dear, such as her chastity, honor, and virginity, and this is what happened with Turkey, which sold its Islamic honor and oriental virginity and accepted to fight on behalf of the West with its body, voice, and money. She put NATO poison in the dishes of Muslims, she fought the Zionist war on the entire Islamic world, in which several Arab and Islamic republics were destroyed, and she presented this achievement on a silver platter to Israel without batting an eyelid from the horror of the catastrophe that her inciting and financing behavior had inflicted on hundreds of Arab cities, millions of Arabs, and the sanctities of Arabs.

Turkish Lira Continues its Sliding in Value Thanks to Erdogan’s Failed Policies

https://syrianews.cc/turkish-lira-continues-its-sliding-in-value-due-to-erdogan-failed-policies/embed/#?secret=8fYuCX2pFq

Turkey, which appeared to have a miracle, was in the hands of a pimp named Recep Tayyip Erdogan and the Justice and Development Party gang, who pushed her to sleep in the bed of the West and became the prostitute of the East. She wears the Islamic veil, but under the veil inhabits the vice, and like all hateful prostitutes, she wants every girl who refuses shame to be molested by force, like her.

What everyone should ask is what is the reason for this slack in the Turkish Lira now, even though Turkey does not live in a war, but rather lives from the wars surrounding it and eats from the shoulders of the Arab economies that surround it in Iraq, Libya, and Syria, all the money of the Syrian and Iraqi refugees migrated to Turkey and injected the Turkish economy with hundreds of billions of dollars. This poisonous leech named Turkey has sucked the blood of Syrians and Iraqis over the past two decades because it is the neighborhood and the sanctuary close to Europe, and despite this, the Turkish Lira suffers from dengue, fatigue, yellowing, and fever as if it had contracted malaria.

And Turkey injected it with Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and the Gulf states at the beginning of the war (on Syria) with tens of billions of dollars, as Hamad bin Jabr said (in the famous hadith of the prey), because the 137 billion dollars that were passed to support the ‘rebels’ and chaos in Syria, most of it passed through Turkey as the most important transit country for the militants who flocked by their tens of thousands and slept in its cities and hotels and used its airports and airlines and spent their huge salaries on its goods and in its cities and all the money transferred to them passed through the Turkish banks that were sated with banknotes, meaning that no less than a hundred billion dollars passed to Turkey at least, and with this, the Lira seems today is as if she is drinking castor oil, and remains in a state of permanent diarrhea,

Erdogan Sending Syrian Muslim Brotherhood Terrorists to Afghanistan

https://syrianews.cc/erdogan-sending-syrian-muslim-brotherhood-terrorists-to-afghanistan/embed/#?secret=SMELVnQsT7

Turkey openly stole Syrian oil through ISIS and the Kurds, stole crops and antiquities, and even became the largest center for the export of human organs from the Syrian victims. It stole thousands of Syrian factories and destroyed all competing Syrian industries in the east, giving way for the rise of the economy of Turkish industrialists, who became unrivaled after the destruction of Aleppo factories, which were the factory for the Middle East, however, the Turkish lira is weakening and emaciated, the bones of its face and the ribs of its chest protrude, and its stomach is swollen to resemble the children of the African famine.

And Turkey sold the Syrian refugees for billions of dollars, as it begged in their name from Europe and left them to live in the most despicable living conditions. And despite this, the Turkish citizen seems poorer than the Syrian refugee and became jealous of him.

Flip-Flop Erdogan Fails his Commitments in an International Treaty, Again

https://syrianews.cc/flip-flop-erdogan-fails-his-commitments-in-an-international-treaty-again/embed/#?secret=R1v3F7PQwG

The Syrian Lira seems more stubborn in the face of the dollar than the Turkish Lira which every day takes off some of her clothes in front of the dollar hoping that he will marry her or make love to her, but the dollar is not tempted by the Turkish lira, nor is he tempted by her tender flesh, and the euro is packing his bags and confiscating her clothes and leaving her naked.

The Turkish lira is very sick and panting, and the reason is not Corona, because the strong economies are still resilient, while the fake and forged economies are starting to get exposed because there is no real economy in Turkey, but an economy of thieves, the thieves of the Justice and Development Party, the Erdogan family, and the neo-Ottoman thieves that tried to build the Ottoman as it was built by its first pioneer sultans by robbing peoples and looting and enslaving them. When the idea succeeded, it became an empire of thieves, and the process of theft and enslavement lasted for 400 years.

The problem of the Turkish lira is Erdogan’s adventure towards the south, and it will not have a chance, and all the money that was injected into the Turkish stock exchange from Western banks has stopped, not because it wants to punish Erdogan for his Islamic honor, as some want to picture, rather, it was because the Western banks gave the Justice and Development Party everything it wanted in order to make the project of overthrowing the Syrian state succeed and attaching the East to the Turkish model, which is reconciliation between Islam and Zionism and an alliance between them under the leadership of the Muslim Brotherhood, but the project has eroded or collapsed and it has done everything in its power and is no longer able to provide more.

Western banks are not naive to inject a false economy with money, the game is over and there is no need to support this rogue economy, the Lira began to feel that all supporting injections had stopped and that the Gulf funds had stopped because there were no longer fighters migrating to Turkey to spending on them, and the movement of donations for the so-called Syrian revolution had stopped, remittances to fighters whom tens of thousands of them have been killed and tens of thousands are missing have stopped, and jihadist immigration to Turkey has largely stopped, especially after Erdogan excelled in blackmailing the Saudis and Emiratis in the Khashoggi case, which was a very stupid move by Erdogan that caused the depletion of Gulf transfers, although in the first months he received bribes of billions from the Saudis to cover the issue, which raised the Turkish Lira a few points, but, with his greed and rapacity, he insisted on completing the disclosure of the scandal at an Israeli and American request, because this would facilitate forcing the Saudis and Emiratis to publicly reveal relations and normalization (with Israel) after they were secret, because Israel wanted to enter the Gulf through the Emirates gate, penetrate the entire economy, spread the Mossad in the Arab communities, and start normalization with immigrants and recruit many of them as spies for the next stage, every Arab immigrant in the Gulf has become a Mossad spy project.

Whoever is waiting for the recovery of the Turkish Lira, we tell him, advising, it is funny dreams, do not be stubborn. The Turkish Lira is very sick, and Erdogan is trying to inject it with the elixir of life, reading the Qur’an and incantations and writing amulets for it, fleeing to wars with the Syrians and the Kurds, bombing the streets of Damascus and overnight buses to force us to accept negotiating with him. But nothing will help him, as she has destroyed her immune system, and she has a terminal disease, and this terminal disease is the one that will pass to the Justice and Development Party and will spread in the whole Turkish society, which is bidding farewell to the days of glory and prosperity when Erdogan was selling it promises and borrowing from the West to build the lie of the rich Turkish economy, albeit it were loans, aid, and privatization of the public sector.

And again, advice to everyone who puts his money in Turkey, flee with your skin and your money quickly, before you are surprised by a collapse as Beirut’s banks collapsed and the sultans’ decisions to seize your money, and perhaps you will find that the place from which you fled to the whole world is the safest place for your money, that is, invest in your country that at the height of the war did not stab you and did not declare its bankruptcy, and do not bet on Erdogan’s Lira. All indications and prophecies in Turkey’s ‘crystal ball’ say that it is a Lira that will enter intensive care because she ate from the money of the orphans, the widows, and the poor, it was like someone who eats fire in his stomach, that the fire is in the belly of the Turkish Lira, and we will contemplate it with pleasure, joy, and happiness as it burns before our eyes from its stomach, rather, we will put our coffee on that fire and heat the tea.. and drink Turkish coffee in this winter in front of this feverish body.

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نار في بطنها .. الليرة التركية المريضة بانهيار جهاز المناعة .. عندما باعت تركيا شرفها

 2021/10/23

نارام سرجون

أعرف ان مجرد النظر الى هذا العنوان سيستفز كثيرين من السوريين من المعارضين والموالين الوطنيين .. وقبل أن يقرأ كثيرون المقال سيقولون ان ليرتنا السورية من زجاج ولايجوز ان ترمي الاقتصاد التركي بالحجارة .. وسيثور كثيرون ويهيجون .. وربما يتوحد الطرفان لأول مرة في استهجان المقال لأن الاقتصاد السوري تعرض لضربة قوية في السنة الاخيرة ونجحت جهود الغرب في اضعاف الليرة السورية عبر عملية معقدة ومنسقة بدأت بمصادرة الثروة الغذائية والنفطية في الجزيرة واكملت طوق الحصار القديم باضافة تفجير ميناء بيروت وتفجير بنوك لبنان التي كانت خزانات السوريين وأموالهم خوفا من عدم استقرار الوضع في الاقتصاد السوري الذي كان اقتصاد حرب .. وكل الناس تفر من اقتصاد الحرب ..
ولكن معاناة الليرة السورية تبدو مؤقتة والرهان الامريكي كان احداث الصدمة والروع في الاقتصاد السوري ليتفجر ويتسبب في تدمير الاستقرار والحياة الاجتماعية السورية نهائيا تمهيدا لتفجير نقمة شعبية تدمر كل ماأنجزته الدماء والاجساد .. وهناك مظاهر كثيرة تشير الى ان طرق معالجة الاقتصاد السوري بدأت تتحرك ولو بشكل بطيء وان الامريكي بدأ يرخي قبضته لاعتبارات عديدة سنتطرق اليها لاحقا .. انها مثل المرأة الحرة التي يريد نخاس افسادها وافقارها كي تبيع عفتها وعرضها فترفض .. تفضل الفقر والموت على ان تبيع شرفها له .. وتبيع قضيتها وابنتها فلسطين له ولنزواته ..


ولكن لماذا تصاب الليرة التركية بالمرض؟؟ وتصاب بالاسهال وتفقد من وزنها ولونها وشحمها وتبدو وكأنها مصابة بالسرطان ولاعلاج لها؟؟ وكأنها هي التي خاضت حرب عشر سنوات وحوصرت ونهبت وسرقت معاملها ونفطها ؟؟
تركيا ليست سورية .. وكانت الكذبة الكبيرة عن الاقتصاد المعجزة والاقتصاد السابع عشر في العالم هي عكازة الاسلاميين الذين أرادوا تجويلنا بالقوة الى بلاد عثمانية ليس بذريعة ان الاسلام هو الحل .. فليس اي اسلام هو الحل بل العثمانية الجديدة هي الحل .. والدليل معجزة أردوغان .. البطل الذي أنقذ اقتصاد تركيا وحوله الى اقتصاد قوي ..


وكنا دوما نشكك بهذه المعجزة التركية ونقدم تفسيرات علمية واقتصادية وهي ان تدفق الاموال الغربية فجأة الى عروق الاقتصاد التركي كان مقابل ثمن .. وان الاقتصاد التركي الناهض يقف على عكازات البنوك الغربية التي ان سحبت عكازاتها فان هذا العملاق سيقع ويتدحرج وتتكسر عظامه .. رغم ان اهم عامل في نهوض اقتصاد تركيا اردوغان كان الانفتاح السوري على تركيا دعما لها عندما صارت تجعجع وتنبح لصالح فلسطين .. وكافأها السوريون بدعم اقتصاد أردوغان الذي طلب دعم دمشق وقدم اوراق اعتماده عندما زار دمشق مع أمينة .. وكان يطلب فيجاب .. وانفتح الاقتصاد والثقافة والاعلام السوري على تركيا ولحقته اقتصادات المنطقة العربية .. وكان هذا التدفق في السلع والبضائع التركية الذي كان يشبه الغزو عبر الشمال السوري سببا في انتعاش اقتصاد الاناضول حيث الكتلة الاسلامية الداعمة لاردوغان ضد اقتصاد استانبول .. وهذا زاد من سيطرة الاقتصاد الجديد الذي نشأ في الاناضول بحكم الدعم السوري الذي كان بغاية خلق أرضية لمشروع البحار الخمسة الذي سيغني تركيا والعرب عن اوروبة .. ويخلق اقتصادا مشرقيا ينافس اقتصاد اوروبة ..


هذه هي القصة الحقيقية لمعجزة أردوغان .. ولكن كالعادة فان المحبين لايرون عيوب المحبوب .. فالعاشق لايرى ان حبيبته التي كانت فقيرة وصارت تبدو كالاغنياء بين عشية وضحاها انما باعت شيئا عزيزا .. مثل عفتها وشرفها وبكارتها .. وهذا ماحدث مع تركيا التي باعت شرفها الاسلامي وبكارتها الشرقية وقبلت ان تحارب نيابة عن الغرب بجسدها وصوتها ومالها .. ودست السم الناتوي في أطباق المسلمين .. وخاضت الحرب الصهيونية على كل العالم الاسلامي ودمرت فيها عدة جمهوريات عربية اسلامية وقدمت هذا الانجاز على طبق من فضة لاسرائيل دون ان يرف لها جفن من هول الكارثة التي ألحقها سلوكها التحريضي والتمويلي بمئات المدن العربية وملايين العرب .. ومقدسات العرب ..
تركيا التي ظهرت صاحبة معجزة كانت في يد قواد اسمه رجب طيب اردوغان وعصابة حزب العدالة والتنمية .. دفعها دفعا للنوم في فراش الغرب وصارت عاهرة الشرق .. ترتدي الحجاب الاسلامي ولكن تحت الحجاب تسكن الرذيلة .. وصارت مثل كل العاهرات الحاقدات .. تريد كل صبية ترفض العار ان تهتك عرضها مثلها بالقوة ..
الذي يجب ان يسأله اي شخص عن سبب هذا الترهل في الليرة التركية الآن رغم ان تركيا لاتعيش حربا .. بل هي التي تعيش من الحروب المحيطة بها وتأكل من أكتاف الاقتصادات العربية التي تحيط بها في العراق وليبيا وسورية .. فكل اموال اللاجئين السوريين والعراقيين هاجرت الى تركيا وحقنت الاقتصاد التركي بمئات المليارات من الدولارات .. وامتصت هذه العلقة المسماة تركيا دم السوريين والعراقيين طوال العقدين الماضيين بحكم انها الجوار والملاذ القريب من اوروبة .. ومع هذا فالليرة التركية تصاب بالضنك والتعب والاصفرار والحمى وكأنها اصيبت بالملاريا ..
وتركيا حقنتها السعودية وقطر ودول الخليج في بدايات الحرب بعشرات مليارات الدولارات كما قال حمد بن جبر (في حديث الصيدة الشهير) لان 137 مليار التي مررت لدعم المتمردين والفوضى في سورية كانت معظمها تمر عبر تركيا كأهم دولة مرور للمسلحين الذين توافدوا بعشرات الالاف وناموا في مدنها وفنادقها واستعملوا مطاراتهم وشركات طيرانها وأنفقوا رواتبهم الضخمة في بضائعها و في مدنها وكانت كل الاموال المحولة اليهم تمر عبر البنوك التركية التي أتخمت بالبنكنوت .. اي ان مالايقل عن مئة مليار دولار مررت الى تركيا على الاقل .. ومع هذا تبدو الليرة التركية اليوم وكأنها تشرب زيت الخروع .. وتبقى في حالة اسهال دائم ..


وتركيا سرقت علنا النفط السوري عبر داعش والاكراد .. وسرقت المحاصيل والاثار وحنى انها صارت اكبر مركز لتصدير الاعضاء البشرية من الضحايا السوريين .. وسرقت آلاف المعامل السورية ودمرت كل الصناعات السورية المنافسة في الشرق .. لينهض اقتصاد الصناعيين الاتراك الذي صاروا بلا منافس بعد تدمير معامل حلب التي كانت تمثل مصنع الشرق الاوسط .. ومع هذا فان الليرة التركية تضعف وتصاب بالهزال وتبرز عظام وجهها وأضلاع صدرها ويتورم بطنها الى مايشبه اطفال المجاعة الافريقية ..
وتركيا باعت اللاجئين السوريين بمليارات الدولارات حيث تسولت باسمهم من اوروبة وتركتهم يعيشون في أحقر الظروف المعيشية .. ومع هذا فان المواطن التركي يبدو أفقر من اللاجئ السوري حتى صار يحقد عليه .. وتبدو الليرة السورية أكثر عنادا في مواجهة الدولار من الليرة التركية التي في كل يوم تخلع بعضا من ثيابها امام الدولار عله يتزوجها او يطارحها الغرام .. ولكن الدولار لاتغريه الليرة التركية ولايغريه لحمها الغض البض وهاهو اليورو يحزم حقائبه ويصادر ثيابها ويتركها عارية ..
الليرة التركية مريضة جدا وتلهث وليس السبب هو كورونا لأن الاقتصادات القوية لاتزال صامدة بينما الاقتصادات المزيفة والمزورة بدأت تنكشف لأنه لايوجد اقتصاد حقيقي في تركيا بل اقتصاد لصوص .. لصوص حزب العدالة والتنمية وعائلة اردوغان ولصوص العثمانية الجديدة التي حاولت بناء العثمانية كما بناها روادها الاوائل من السلاطين بسرقة الشعوب ونهبها واستعبادها .. وعندما نجحت الفكرة صارت امبراطورية للصوص دامت عملية السرقة والاستعباد 400 سنة ..


مشكلة الليرة التركية هي مغامرة اردوغان نحو الجنوب .. ولن تقوم لها قائمة .. وكل الاموال التي حقنت في البورصة التركية من البنوك الغربية توقفت .. ليس لأنها تريد ان تعاقب اردوغان على شرفه الاسلامي كما يريد البعض ان يصور .. بل لأن البنوك الغربية اعطت حزب العدالة والتنمية كل مايريد من أجل انجاح مشروع اسقاط الدولة السورية والحاق الشرق بالنموذج التركي الذي هو مصالحة بين الاسلام والصهيونية وتحالف بينهما تحت قيادة الاخوان المسلمين .. ولكن المشروع تآكل او تداعى وفعل كل مافي وسعه ولم يعد قادرا على ان يقدم المزيد .. والبنوك الغربية ليست بالساذجة كي تحقن اقتصادا كاذبا بالمال .. فاللعبة انتهت ولاداعي لدعم هذا الاقتصاد المارق .. وبدأت الليرة تحس ان كل الحقن الداعمة توقفت .. وأن اموال الخليج توقفت لأنه لم يعد هناك مقاتلون يهاجرون الى تركيا وينفق عليهم .. وتوقفت حركة التبرعات لما يسمى الثورة السورية .. وتوقفت التحويلات للمقاتلين الذين قتل عشرات الالاف منهم وفقد عشرات الالاف وتوقفت الهجرة الجهادية الى تركيا الى حد كبير خاصة بعد ان أبدع اردوغان في ابتزاز السعوديين والاماراتيين في قضية الخاشقجي التي كانت حركة غبية جدا من اردوغان تسببت في نضوب التحويلات الخليجية رغم انه تلقى في الأشهر الاولى رشوات بالمليارات من السعودديين للملمة القضية مما رفع الليرة التركية بضع نقاط .. ولكنه بجشعه وطمعه أصر على اكمال كشف الفضيحة بطلب اسرائيلي وامريكي لأن ذلك سيسهل ارغام السعوديين والاماراتيين على اظهار العلاقات والتطبيع علنا بعد ان كانت سرية لأن اسرائيل كانت تريد دخول الخليج من بوابة الامارات واختراق كل الاقتصاد ونشر الموساد في الجاليات العربية وبدء التطبيع مع المهاجرين وتجنيد كثيرين منهم كجواسيس للمرحلة القادمة .. فكل مهاجر عربي في الخليج صار مشروع جاسوس لدى الموساد ..
من ينتظر شفاء الليرة التركية فاننا نقول له ناصحين .. انها أحلام مضحكة فلا تعاند .. الليرة التركية مريضة جدا .. ويحاول اردوغان حقنها باكسير الحياة .. وقراءة القرآن والتعويذات ويكتب الحجابات لها والهروب الى حروب مع السوريين والاكراد وتفجير شوارع دمشق وباصات المبيت لارغامنا على قبول التفاوض معه .. ولكن لن ينفعه شيء .. فهي دمرت في جهازها المناعي .. وأصيبت بمرض عضال .. وهذا المرض العضال هو الذي سينتقل الى حزب العدالة والتنمية .. وسينتشر في المجتمع التركي كله الذي يودع ايام العز والرفاه يوم كان اردوغان يبيعه وعودا ويستدين من الغرب لبناء كذبة الاقتصاد الثري التركي .. رغم انه كان قروضا ومساعدات وخصخصة للقطاع العام ..


ومن جديد .. نصيحة لكل من يضع أمواله في تركيا .. اهرب بجلدك وأموالك بسرعة .. قبل ان تفاجأ بانهيار كما انهارت بنوك بيروت وبقرارات السلاطين بالاستيلاء على اموالك .. وربما ستجد ان المكان الذي هربت منه الى كل العالم هو أكثر الأماكن أمنا لأموالك .. أي استثمر في بلادك التي في ذروة الحرب لم تطعنك ولم تعلن افلاسها .. ولاتراهن على ليرة اردوغان .. كل المؤشرات والنبوءات التي في فنجان تركيا تقول انها ليرة ستدخل العناية المشددة .. لأنها أكلت من أموال اليتامى والأيامى والفقراء .. فكانت كمن يأكل في بطنه النار .. ان النار في بطن الليرة التركية .. وسنتأملها بتلذذ وحبور وسعادة وهي تحترق أمام عيوننا من بطنها .. بل سنضع قهوتنا على تلك النار ونسخن الشاي .. ونشرب ونحتسي في هذا الشتاء قهوة تركية امام هذا الجسد المحموم ..

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Al-Assad: Extremism Tied to EU’s Failed Policies in Middle East

22 Aug 2021

Source: Al Mayadeen

Syria’s President Bashar al-Assad discusses recent developments in Syria and the region with European Parliament Member, Thierry Mariani, and his accompanying delegation.

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Syrian President Bashar al-Assad attributes spread of extremism to the European Union’s ‘failed policies’ in the Middle East. 

Syrian President Bashar al-Assad stated that the Syrian people have found new ways to overcome the odds.

SANA news agency tweets: Al-Assad delivered his speech after being greeted by Thierry Mariani, a member of the European Parliament and a member of the French National Rally party, as well as a delegation accompanying him.

During the meeting, a discussion on the developments of the situation in Syria and the region took place. Al-Assad answered the delegation members’ questions about the situation and the difficult conditions experienced by Syrians as a result of the sanctions and the unjust siege imposed on them. He noted that despite all the troubles this sieges afflicts on all aspects of life, the Syrian people are resilient.

President al-Assad considered it necessary to have a dialogue at parliamentary, intellectual and cultural levels to analyze and understand the developments and changes taking place in the region and the world. He emphasized the importance of parliamentary and cultural delegations visiting Syria and the region to see things as they are, and to be able to link political statements to the current situation. Such dialogue is important because as Europe grapples with the refugee crisis, terrorism and extremism seem to be the result of its failed policies in the Middle East.

The discussion touched on the role of nationalism in the Arab region, identity, and the relationship between religion and politics, as well as the major challenges confronting nations as a result of extremism that has infiltrated many societies, including European ones. This spread of extremism comes as a result of the EU’s failure to develop appropriate policies to ensure immigrants’ integration into Europe while preserving their original identity.

Russia’s position at the seventy-sixth session of the UN General Assembly

August 05, 2021

Russia’s position at the seventy-sixth session of the UN General Assembly

https://www.mid.ru/en/foreign_policy/news/-/asset_publisher/cKNonkJE02Bw/content/id/4834791

1.      The goal of the 76-th session of the UN General Assembly (GA) is to reaffirm the central and coordinating role of the Organization in international affairs. Owing to its representativeness and universality, the UN is rightfully viewed as a unique platform for an equitable dialogue aimed at reaching compromise solutions with due regard to different opinions. Attempts to undermine the authority and legitimacy of the UN are, in our view, extremely dangerous, as they can lead to the dismantlement of the multipolar system of international relations.

2.      We have consistently advocated the strengthening of the genuine multilateral framework of international relations and world economy based on the norms of international law, including the UN Charter, with an emphasis on the unconditional respect for the sovereignty of States and non-interference in their internal affairs. We deem unacceptable the attempts of Western States to replace the universally recognized international legal principles with the so-called “rules-based world order” elaborated behind the scenes.

3.      We support the coordinated efforts of the international community to curb the spread of the new coronavirus infection as well as to mitigate its consequences in the political, health care, social and economic sectors. In this regard, we consider it unacceptable to politicize the issue of COVID-19 dissemination. We also stress the importance of showing unity and solidarity among all Member States and organizations of the United Nations system in the face of a common challenge. Russia stands for a gradual return to the face-to-face format of events at the UN as the epidemiological situation in the world improves.

4.      Preventing conflicts and addressing their consequences is our first priority. However, effective international assistance in this sphere, including from the UN, is only possible with the consent of the States concerned and in line with the UN Charter. This applies equally to good offices, preventive diplomacy and mediation, which should be conducted impartially and with respect for the sovereignty of States. It is crucial that there should be no universal “conflict indicators”: each situation calls for a delicate and unbiased approach as well as a thorough search for a tailored solution that would take into account the roots and history of the conflict.

5.        We believe that the goal of the UN Security Council reform is to increase the representation of developing States from Africa, Asia and Latin America in the Council without prejudice to its effectiveness and operational efficiency. Efforts to identify the best reform model, which would enjoy consensus or at least the support of the overwhelming majority of Member States, should continue in the current format of Intergovernmental Negotiations. The prerogatives of the UNSC permanent members shall not be subject to revision. The veto power is a unique tool that encourages the necessary compromises and allows the Council to reach well-considered and balanced decisions.

6.        We support realistic initiatives to revitalize the work of the UN General Assembly within the relevant Ad Hoc Working Group. We attach particular importance to fine-tuning the UNGA working methods, streamlining its overloaded agenda and strengthening multilingualism. Any innovation should be reasonable and correspond to the current needs. Any redistribution of the powers of other statutory bodies, especially the Security Council, in favour of the General Assembly is unacceptable.

7.      We support increased cooperation between the UN and regional and sub-regional organizations in line with the UN Charter, first and foremost, its Chapter VIII. The activities of regional associations, according to the UN Charter, should be in conformity with their objectives and principles. It is essential to further enhance partnership between the UN and such organizations as the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), the BRICS and the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU). The biennial resolutions on cooperation between the UN and the CIS, the CSTO and the SCO, uunanimously adopted at the previous 75th UNGA Session, prove the relevance of this task.

8.      The distortion of history and revision of the outcomes of World War II are unacceptable. We attach particular importance to the annual UNGA draft resolution on Combating Glorification of Nazism, neo-Nazism and Other Practices that Contribute to Fuelling Contemporary Forms of Racism, Racial Discrimination, Xenophobia and Related Intolerance. This document has traditionally enjoyed the support of the majority of UN Member States. We call on the delegations that abstained or voted against this initiative last year to reconsider their position.

9.      The destructive policies of certain extra-regional players in the Middle East and North Africa are clearly part of a global strategy to destroy the UN‑centric architecture established after World War II and replace it with a completely illegitimate “rules-based world order”.

We support the international legal parameters for resolving conflicts in this region agreed upon at the UN and implemented solely through political and diplomatic means. Our proposal to create a regional security architecture in the Persian Gulf and, in the longer term, throughout the whole Middle East remains on the table.

10.      One of the top priorities in the Middle East is the Syrian settlement. Achieving lasting and long-term stabilisation and security in the country is only possible through the full restoration of the country’s territorial integrity and sovereignty over its national territory. The continuation of the fight against international terrorist groups recognized as such by the UN Security Council remains critical.

On the political track, we support the promotion of a Syrian-led settlement process implemented by the Syrian people themselves with the UN assistance, as provided for in UNSC resolution 2254. We have consistently supported the relevant work of the Special Envoy of the UN Secretary-General for Syria, Geir Pedersen, but also stressed that his efforts should not go beyond the mandate defined by the Security Council.

There is growing concern about the significant deterioration of the humanitarian and socio-economic situation in the Syrian Arab Republic against the backdrop of tougher unilateral sanctions and the COVID-19 pandemic. We call on responsible members of the international community to refrain from politicising purely humanitarian issues and render assistance to all Syrians in coordination with Damascus, provide for sanctions exemptions for reconstruction projects and facilitate the return of refugees and IDPs.

11.       We are convinced that one of the foundations for establishing peace and security in the Middle East is the revival of the Middle East settlement process with the resolution of the Palestinian problem at its core.

We attach key importance to preventing an escalation of violence between Palestinians and Israelis and to providing extensive humanitarian assistance to those affected and in need in the West Bank and Gaza Strip. At the same time, we advocate for the restart of direct Israeli-Palestinian negotiations on all issues concerning the final status on the universally recognized international legal basis, including a two-State solution. We call on the parties to show restraint, to refrain from unilateral steps and provocative actions (forced evictions, expropriation of houses and land, settlement construction, arbitrary arrests and any forms of violence) as well as to respect the special status and integrity of the Holy Sites of Jerusalem.

We consider it imperative to step up efforts within the framework of the Middle East Quartet, including its interaction with regional actors. We support the arrangement of a Quartet meeting at the ministerial level.

12.    We believe that there is no alternative to a political settlement in Libya. We highlight the need to take into account the views of all Libyan sides, including while planning for international assistance aimed at putting an end to the conflict. We engage with all parties and call for an early cessation of hostilities and the restoration of sustainable and integrated state institutions, including security agencies.

We support the observance of the ceasefire and a political and diplomatic settlement in Libya. All influential political forces should be heard and involved in the political life of the country. We welcome the formation of the Government of National Unity aimed at making arrangements for the national elections scheduled for December 2021. We encourage Libyan actors to seek compromise and to establish strong and effective unified authorities. We support the activities of Special Envoy Ján Kubiš.

13.    We advocate for the cessation of hostilities in Yemen, which exacerbate the dire humanitarian situation in the country. We urge the States involved to engage in the dialogue with a view to reaching a comprehensive settlement which would be accepted by all stakeholders in Yemen.

14.    We support the Iraqi leadership’s efforts to stabilize security situation and implement long-term social and economic reforms. We emphasize the significance of the forthcoming parliamentary elections. It is important that they contribute to bridging the divide between various ethnic and religious groups and political forces. We welcome the dialogue between Baghdad and Erbil. We believe that Iraq should not be subject to external interference and become an arena for regional rivalries.

15.    We consistently pursue the policy aimed at facilitating the process of national reconciliation in Afghanistan. We provide assistance in building a country free from terrorism and drug-related crime. We are seriously concerned about the continuing influence of ISIS in the north and north east of the country as well as the threat of the spillover of terrorist activities into Central Asia and the use of a deteriorating domestic political environment to undermine the peace process. Together with our partners within the “Troika Plus” and with the participation of both Afghan negotiating teams we are working to advance national reconciliation in the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan. We attach particular importance to regional co-operation, primarily through the SCO and the CSTO. We note the continuing relevance of the Moscow format of consultations on Afghanistan. We support the work of the UN Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA).

16.    There is no alternative to the Package of Measures for the Implementation of the Minsk Agreements, enshrined in UNSC resolution 2202, as a framework for the internal settlement in Ukraine. Effective international assistance, including through the UN, should be aimed at implementing this decision and supporting the current settlement format, which includes the Contact Group in Minsk and the OSCE Special Monitoring Mission.

Sustainable political and diplomatic settlement of the internal crisis in Ukraine can only be achieved through a direct dialogue between Kiev and Donbass, while taking into account the legitimate demands of all the regions of Ukraine and its linguistic, ethnic and sectarian groups at the constitutional level. We will continue to actively assist in addressing the acute humanitarian situation in eastern Ukraine, which has persisted for many years and was brought about by the actions of the authorities in Kiev.

We insist on a full, thorough and independent international investigation of the MH17 plane crash over the Ukrainian territory based on irrefutable facts and in line with UNSC resolution 2166. Neither the technical investigation into the causes of the Malaysian Boeing crash conducted by the Dutch Safety Board nor the criminal investigation by the Joint Investigation Team meet these criteria.

We expect that all cases of violence against civilians and journalists that have occurred since the beginning of the internal crisis in Ukraine will be investigated fairly and impartially, and that all those responsible will be brought to justice.

17.       The territorial status of Crimea was definitively determined by the Crimean population itself during a referendum in March 2014. Any discussions on the situation in this Russian region that do not involve its residents bear no relation to reality. This issue as well as the situation around the Sea of Azov and the Kerch Strait, which lies within the scope of the Russian-Ukrainian bilateral relations, cannot be part of the UN-led discussion on the developments in Ukraine.

We condemn the efforts of the Ukrainian delegation to introduce the Crimean issue in the UNGA through a politicized resolution on the “militarization” of the peninsula as well as parts of the Black Sea and the Sea of Azov.           The resolution is built on groundless, unacceptable accusations against Russia and is intended to put the blame for all of Ukraine’s internal problems on the mythical “Russian aggression”. The document contains Kiev’s twisted interpretation of the provocation it carried out on 25 November 2018, when three Ukrainian vessels attempted to enter the Kerch Strait without first notifying the Russian side. The allegations on the alleged militarization of Crimea and parts of the Black Sea and the Sea of Azov contained in the aforementioned resolution also contradict the truth.

In case this odious draft resolution is again introduced in the UNGA, we call on all States to vote firmly against its adoption.

18.    The implementation of the trilateral statements of 9 November 2020 and 11 January 2021 is a priority for normalizing the situation in the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict area. We consider it useful to involve UN agencies and in particular the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) in humanitarian activities in the Russian peacekeeping operation area. The parameters for their possible work should be agreed upon in direct coordination with Baku and Yerevan.

19.    The problem of the Korean Peninsula should be resolved by political and diplomatic means. Building up sanctions pressure is counterproductive. The creation of a new security architecture in North-East Asia that would take into account the legitimate interests of all States in the region, including the DPRK itself, is key to achieving the settlement of this issue. Various Russian-Chinese initiatives, including the relevant “Roadmap’, the “Action Plan” and a UNSC political resolution are all important tools in this regard.

20.    The early restoration of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) aimed at settling the situation with the Iranian nuclear program is a priority task. We call on the US to return as soon as possible to full compliance with UNSC resolution 2231 and to implement the JCPOA, including through lifting the unilateral anti-Iranian sanctions imposed after the withdrawal of Washington from the “nuclear deal”.

21.    The solution to the Cyprus issue should be elaborated by the Cypriot communities themselves without any external pressure. Russia is guided by relevant UNSC resolutions which call for the formation of a bicommunal, bizonal federation with a single international legal personality, sovereignty and citizenship. The existing security guarantee system has become obsolete, is no longer able to alleviate the concerns of the parties involved and should be replaced with the guarantees from the UN Security Council.

22.    Russia fully supports the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the principle of equality of the three state-constituting peoples and the two entities with broad constitutional powers in full compliance with the 1995 Dayton Accords. In this context, we strongly disagree with the so-called appointment of a new High Representative for Bosnia and Herzegovina by the Steering Board of the Peace Implementation Council. Without the UNSC approval this decision has no executive force. Moreover, the abolition of the Office of the High Representative is long overdue.

23.    The settlement of the Kosovo issue should be based on international law, first and foremost on UNSC resolution 1244. Belgrade and Pristina should come to an agreement themselves, while the task of the international community is to help the parties find mutually acceptable solutions without external pressure. The EU, as a mediator in the dialogue in accordance with UNGA resolution 64/298 of 9 September 2010, should seek to ensure that the parties implement the agreed decisions, primarily, the establishment of the Community of Serb municipalities in Kosovo (the CSMK; the agreement reached in 2013 has still not been implemented). We support the work of the UN Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK).

24.    Internal disputes in Venezuela can only be resolved by the Venezuelans themselves, through a broad and direct dialogue and with full respect for the country’s Constitution. Effective international cooperation is possible only if it is aimed at supporting such a dialogue.

The illegal unilateral coercive measures imposed against Venezuela undermine the efforts of the Venezuelan authorities to effectively combat the pandemic, as well as impede the normalization of the humanitarian situation in the country and the improvement of the migration situation in the region. Humanitarian assistance should be provided without politicisation and in accordance with the UN guiding principles enshrined in UNGA resolution 46/182.

We will continue to oppose any attempts to question the mandates of Venezuela’s official delegations at various international organizations.

25.    We learned with deep sorrow the news of the assassination of the President of Haiti Jovenel Moïse. We have been closely following the investigation into this crime. We are seriously concerned about information regarding the involvement of foreign nationals, including from the US and Colombia, in this brutal murder. This indicates that once again external forces are trying to exploit the purely internal conflict to promote their destructive interests.

We are convinced that the only way to normalize the situation in the country is to reach broad internal political consensus in strict conformity with the universally recognized norms and principles of international law. It is important that all decisions should be taken through peaceful political means by the Haitians themselves, with international support but without destructive external interference in order to elaborate solutions acceptable to the opposing parties.

26.    The Final Peace Agreement is the international legal basis for the settlement in Colombia. This document made it possible for the UNSC and the UN Secretary-General to support the peace process. Unilateral attempts to alter the substance of its provisions are unacceptable. Comprehensive sustainable settlement in Colombia is impossible without involving the National Liberation Army (ELN) in the peace process.

27.    We call on all parties to the conflict in Myanmar to put an end to violence and launch a constructive dialogue in order to move towards national reconciliation. International community should avoid politicising the issue, refrain from interfering in the internal affairs of a sovereign State and abandon sanctions threats. We emphasize the ASEAN special role in the peace process. The current situation in Myanmar does not pose any threat to international peace and security, thus the only issue on the UNSC agenda in this context should be the situation in the Rakhine State.

28.    We support the aspiration of India and Pakistan to normalize relations in the context of the situation in the Kashmir region. We hope that a new escalation along the line of control will be prevented. Only direct negotiations between New Delhi and Islamabad can form the basis for a long-term settlement of this sensitive issue.

29.    We believe that conflict settlement in Africa should be based on a leading role of the countries of the African continent and supported by the international community. We call for the strengthening of cooperation between the UN and the African Union as well as the continent’s sub-regional organizations. As a permanent member of the UNSC, we will continue to facilitate a political resolution of the crises in the CAR, the DRC, South Sudan, Somalia, Mali and the Sahara-Sahel region as a whole.

We are firmly committed to actively supporting the efforts of the CAR authorities to improve governance and provide security on the basis of the 2019 peace agreement. At the same time, we will keep engaging constructively with all responsible stakeholders that support stabilisation in the country.

In cooperation with like-minded partners, it is important to assist Sudan in implementing the tasks of the transition period. We insist that the UN Integrated Transition Assistance Mission in Sudan (UNITAMS) should always take into account the views of the authorities in Khartoum.

We stand for in an early normalization of the situation in the Ethiopian region of Tigray. Restoring stability in Ethiopia is certain to have a positive effect on the entire Horn of Africa. We consider the decision of the Federal Government of Ethiopia to establish a ceasefire in the region a step in the right direction. We call on all those involved to support this initiative of the authorities in order to stop the bloodshed and improve the humanitarian and social and economic situation.

30.    The UNGA Special Committee on Decolonization (C-24) will remain relevant until a definitive solution to the issue of all 17 Non-Self-Governing Territories is reached. We will continue to actively participate in the work of this body.

31.    UN peacekeeping should fully comply with the basic principles of the UN work in this area (consent of the parties, impartiality and non-use of force, except for self-defence and defence of the mandate) as well as with the UN Charter. The primary task is to promote political settlement of conflicts and national reconciliation. The adaptation of UN peacekeeping operations to contemporary realities should be implemented in strict accordance with the decisions agreed upon in the intergovernmental format. This includes, inter alia, the issues of “peacekeeping intelligence” and the use of new technologies, which should serve the sole purpose of ensuring peacekeepers’ safety and protection of civilians. Vesting peacekeeping operations with additional powers, including with respect to the use of force, is only possible upon a UNSC decision that takes into account the specific situation in each country.

The UNGA Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations (C-34) should be responsible for defining the further development of UN peacekeeping activities.         Peacebuilding and peacekeeping are inextricably linked and based on the principle of national ownership in prioritising post-conflict reconstruction and development. International support should only be provided upon request of the host government and be aimed at enhancing the States’ own capacity.

32.    The UNSC sanctions, as one of the strongest instruments of ‘targeted action’ to tackle threats to international peace and security, should not be abused. As a measure of last resort in the area of conflict resolution, they cannot be applied without first taking into account the full range of their possible humanitarian, social and economic and human rights consequences. It is unacceptable to use them as a means of unfair competition and pressure on “undesirable regimes”. The functions of the existing institution of the Ombudsperson should be expanded to protect the interests of all the entities on the Security Council sanctions list. It is unacceptable to supplement Security Council sanctions with unilateral restrictions, especially those of an extraterritorial nature.

33.    We believe that all Member States should join efforts in the fight against terrorism, with the UN playing a central coordinating role. We firmly reject any double standards or hidden agendas in this area. We are convinced that the issue of terrorism should be addressed through the implementation of the relevant universal conventions and protocols, the UN Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy and relevant UNSC and UNGA resolutions.

Support for the counter-terrorism bodies of the United Nations system, first and foremost the United Nations Office of Counter-Terrorism (UNOCT), remains a priority. We advocate for the expansion of the UNOCT financing from the UN regular budget. We also intend to increase our voluntary contributions to the Office and call on other Member States to do the same. We believe that law enforcement and prevention-oriented initiatives should remain at the core of the UNOCT programme and project activities.

We consider it critical to make greater use of the tools of the specialized subsidiary UNSC bodies, primarily its Counter-Terrorism Committee (CTC), the sanctions committees on ISIL, Al-Qaida and the Taliban Movement. We are committed to a constructive dialogue with regard to the review of the mandate of the CTC Executive Directorate.

We call for ensuring full compliance with UNSC resolutions against the financing of terrorism, as well as with the standards of the Financial Action Task Force (FATF).

We intend to step up efforts to cut off weapons, financial and material support for terrorists, to stop the spread of terrorist propaganda, including through the use of modern information and communication technologies, and to eliminate links between terrorist groups and drug trafficking and other organized crime groups. It is necessary to strengthen cooperation between countries in countering foreign terrorist fighters (FTFs) and bringing them to justice more quickly.

We oppose the dilution of the international legal framework by non-consensual concepts, such as “countering violent extremism“, which allow for the interference in the internal affairs of States and the reorientation of international cooperation on counter-terrorism towards secondary gender and human rights issues. We believe it necessary to enhance efforts to combat various manifestations of extremism, including right-wing radicalism, while countering attempts to use this issue for political purposes and as an excuse to increase anti-Russian sanctions pressure.

34.    We strongly oppose the revision and weakening of the current international drug control system, including by legalising all recreational (non-medical) drug use, as well as imposing questionable drug treatment practices as a “universal standard” and promoting drug use as a socially acceptable norm.

We advocate the strengthening of the policy-making role of the UN Commission on Narcotic Drugs (CND) in the area of drug control. We intend to further continue to actively oppose efforts aimed at creating and institutionalising mechanisms that duplicate the CND work, and at imposing an alternative strategy for addressing the world drug problem bypassing the CND. We emphasize the need for States to strictly comply with the international anti-drug conventions. In view of the re-election to the CND for the period of 2022-2025, the Russian Federation will continue to promote a consistent line on the Commission’s platform as well as in negotiating the resolutions and decisions of the 76th UNGA Session.

We are concerned about the drastic deterioration of the drug situation in Afghanistan and its possible projection into increased smuggling of opiates into Russia and Central Asian countries. In the context of the withdrawal of NATO troops from the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, international and regional anti-drug efforts, such as the Paris Pact, the SCO, the CIS, and the CARICC, are of particular importance. We believe that consistent, effective anti-drug efforts by the Afghan leadership based on the principle of common and shared responsibility of States, are essential for achieving security in the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan.

35.    We support the key role of the United Nations in consolidating international efforts to combat transnational organised crime. We note the importance of an impartial Mechanism for the Review of the Implementation of the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organised Crime. We advocate strengthening the legal framework of international cooperation, including the development of new international legal instruments in a number of areas, including cybercrime, asset recovery, extradition and mutual legal assistance.

36.    We facilitate the development of the international anti-corruption cooperation, with the UN playing the central and coordinating role, based on the unique universal agreement, the UN Convention against Corruption (CAC). We support the effective functioning of the Mechanism for the Review of the Convention Implementation. We welcome the results of the first UNGA Special Session against Corruption which took place in June 2021. We consider it important that the political declaration of the UNGA Special Session confirmed the existence of gaps in international law governing the return from abroad of assets obtained as a result of corruption offences. We emphasise the need to develop an international legal instrument on asset recovery under the auspices of the UN to complement the UN Convention against Corruption.

37.    We support the key role of the UN in consolidating joint efforts to ensure international information security (IIS). They should result in the elaboration and adoption under the UN auspices of universal and comprehensive rules of responsible behaviour of States in information space aimed at preventing conflicts therein and promoting the use of information and communications technologies (ICTs) for peaceful purposes.

We welcome the adoption of the consensus reports of the UN Open-Ended Working Group (OEWG) and the UN Group of Governmental Experts on IIS. We note the unique spirit of the constructive dialogue at these platforms.

During the 76th UNGA Session, we intend to introduce in its First Committee an updated draft resolution on “Developments in the Field of Information and Telecommunications in the Context of International Security” welcoming the successful conclusion of the work of both groups as well as the launch of a new Russia-initiated OEWG on Security in the Use of ICTs and ICTs themselves 2021-2025 (in accordance with UNGA resolution 75/240).

We assume that the new Group will ensure the continuity and consistency of an inclusive and truly democratic negotiation process on IIS under the UN auspices within a single mechanism. We call on all States to take an active part in the work of the OEWG 2021-2025 and contribute to building a fair and equitable IIS system.

In line with the relevant UNGA resolutions adopted at the initiative of the Russian Federation, we advocate for an early drafting, under the auspices of the UN, of an international convention countering the use of information and communications technologies for criminal purposes. The consensus modalities set out while preparing for the negotiation process in the relevant UNGA Ad Hoc Committee enable us to count on constructive and comprehensive participation of the entire international community in developing a universal and effective instrument to counter digital crime.

We call on our partners to support our First Committee draft resolution as well as to unequivocally endorse full implementation of the mandates of the new OEWG and the Ad Hoc Committee.

38. We have consistently advocated strengthening the existing treaty regimes and developing, through consensus, new arms control, disarmament and non-proliferation (ACDNP) regimes. The UN and its multilateral disarmament mechanism should play a central role in this process. We are committed to ensuring the coherence and improving the performance of its three key elements – the First Committee of the UN General Assembly, the Conference on Disarmament and the UN Disarmament Commission – while unconditionally respecting the mandates of these forums.

We deem it necessary to counter any attempts to revise the existing disarmament architecture by means of unilateral coercive measures that bypass the UN Security Council.

The main focus of multilateral efforts and fundamentally new approaches to address the whole range of problems in the field of the ACDNP may be considered at a summit of the permanent members of the UN Security Council which Russia has proposed to hold.

39. We strictly comply with our obligations under the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) and advocate for its early entry into force. We call on the eight states on which the launch of the Treaty depends to sign and/or ratify it without delay. We believe that the key destructive factor here is the position of the United States which is the only state to have officially refused to ratify the Treaty. We expect Washington to reconsider its approach to the CTBT.

40. We support the noble cause of shaping a world free of nuclear weapons. We make a substantial practical contribution to achieving this goal. However, we are convinced there is a need for a balanced approach that takes into account all factors affecting strategic stability, including disruptive US steps aimed at undermining the existing ACDNP architecture. We do not support radical initiatives on introducing an early nuclear weapons ban (namely, the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons, TPNW).

41. We consider the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) to be the most important international legal instrument for ensuring international security and one of the pillars of the modern world order. Our common task is to prevent the final collapse of the system of international disarmament and arms control agreements that has been developed over decades and the regimes based upon them.

In this regard, we attach primary importance to the viability of the NPT. We call on all States Parties to make every effort at the 10th Review Conference postponed until 2022 because of the new coronavirus pandemic to strengthen the Treaty and to help achieve its goals rather than cause more controversy around it. The ultimate goal is to draft a document that would reaffirm the viability of the Treaty and the willingness of the States Parties to strictly abide by their commitments.

We fully support the work of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) as an international organisation that possesses the necessary authority and competence to monitor the observance of the non-proliferation obligations under the NPT through the application of Agency safeguards, which, in its turn, is an important condition for the States to exercise their right to use nuclear energy for peaceful purposes.

We believe that further development of the IAEA safeguards system serves to strengthen the non-proliferation regime, provided that it keeps intact the basic principles of verification – impartiality, technical feasibility, and transparency.

We are concerned about the recent tendency to politicise the IAEA safeguards system. As a result, claims are being made against States based on the ‘very likely/highly likely’ approach while deployment of nuclear weapons belonging to some countries in the territory of other formally non-nuclear States is being ignored.

The IAEA should not be turned into a nuclear disarmament verification tool, as this is neither a statutory purpose nor a function of the Agency. We believe that the participation of the IAEA Secretariat staff in the January 2022 Meeting of States Parties to the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW) in Vienna is inappropriate.

42. We regard the Conference on the Establishment of a Middle East Zone Free of Nuclear Weapons and Other Weapons of Mass Destruction held in New York on 18-22 November 2019 as a landmark event both in terms of ensuring stability and sustainability in the region and in the context of global efforts towards WMD non-proliferation. We intend to further support the idea of such conferences. We believe that efforts to elaborate a legally binding agreement on creating a WMD-free zone in the Middle East serve the interests of all states in the region.

We hope that the second Conference on the establishment of a WMD-free zone due to be held in New York in November 2020 but postponed because of the COVID-19 pandemic will take place this year, which would allow to kick start a somewhat stagnant process.

43. We are confident that there is still potential for political and diplomatic settlement of the situation arising from the termination of the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty (INF Treaty) based on Russia’s initiative to ensure predictability and restraint in the missile sphere.

We intend to maintain a unilateral moratorium on the deployment of land-based intermediate-range or shorter-range missiles in regions where no similar US-made weapons would appear. Despite the absence of a constructive response to this initiative on the part of NATO, we still consider a moratorium to be a promising idea that would make it possible to avoid new ‘missile crises’. We propose that the US and their NATO allies take on a similar commitment.

We reaffirm our commitment to the strict compliance with the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (the New START) and welcome its extension for five years without any preconditions – something that the Russian Federation has long and consistently called for. The extension of this Treaty set the stage for resuming a comprehensive dialogue with the United States on future arms control and the maintenance of strategic stability. At the Russian-US summit in Geneva on June 16, 2021 it was agreed to launch such a dialogue in the near future, as reflected in the Joint Statement by the Presidents at the meeting.

We believe that the goal of this engagement is to develop a new ‘security formula’ that takes into account all major factors of strategic stability, covers offensive and defensive nuclear and non-nuclear weapons capable of meeting strategic challenges, as well as the emergence of new technologies and new weapons.

44. We highly commend efforts of the UN Security Council and its ad-hoc 1540 Committee on the WMD non-proliferation. We are determined to engage in a substantive and constructive dialogue in the framework of the comprehensive review of the implementation of UNSC Resolution 1540. We expect that the procedure will result in the confirmation of the 1540 Committee’s current mandate.

45. Russia has initiated the development of important multilateral agreements in the ACDNP area, such as the Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space Treaty (PAROS) and the International Convention on the Suppression of Acts of Chemical and Biological Terrorism. We believe that a constructive dialogue on these issues will provide an opportunity to engage in substantive work (including negotiations) at the UN platform.

The imperative of preserving space for peaceful purposes and taking cooperative practical measures to this end is shared by the vast majority of States. We consider the globalisation of the no-first placement of weapons in outer space initiative to be an important but only interim step on the way towards the conclusion of an international treaty on the prevention of placement of weapons in outer space on the basis of a relevant Chinese-Russian draft treaty on the prevention of the placement of weapons in outer space and the threat or use of force against outer space objects.

At the 76th session of the General Assembly, we will traditionally submit to the First Committee draft resolutions on no first placement of weapons in outer space, transparency and confidence-building measures in space activities and further practical measures to prevent an arms race in outer space.

46. We consider it necessary to continue strengthening the central and coordinating role of the United Nations Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space (COPUOS). We are against the practice of addressing issues that fall within the competence of the Committee at other non-specialised international fora. We are concerned about the trend towards the consolidation of unilateral approaches in the policies of certain States aimed at establishing of a regime for the research, development and use of space resources, which carries serious risks for international cooperation, including with respect to outer space.

We continue to actively engage in the work of COPUOS to improve the security regime for space operations. We have succeeded in establishing the Working Group on the Long-term Sustainability of Outer Space Activities. The Group’s mandate is to implement the existing and develop new guidelines on long-term sustainability of outer space activities, which is of particular importance against the background of the rapidly changing environment in which space activities take place.

We are against moving the issues traditionally on the COPUOS agenda to parallel platforms, including the First Committee of the UN General Assembly, as part of the concept of the so-called ‘responsible behaviours in outer space’. Neglecting the Committee’s key role with regard to space debris and space traffic management may negatively affect the adoption of balanced consensus decisions in these areas.

We are in favour of the successful completion of efforts to develop the Space-2030 agenda and its implementation plan, with a view to presenting this document at the current session of the General Assembly.

47. We are in favour of strengthening the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention and the Chemical Weapons Convention, the 1925 Geneva Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare, as well as the Secretary-General’s Mechanism for Investigation of Alleged Use of Chemical and Biological Weapons.

In order to ensure the effective operation of this UN Secretary-General’s Mechanism, at the 76th session of the General Assembly we will submit a relevant draft resolution to the First Committee.

We come out against attempts by Western states to politicise the work of the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) in violation of the norms set in the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC). We regard as illegitimate their actions aimed at vesting the Technical Secretariat of the OPCW with the function of ‘identifying those responsible’ for the use of chemical weapons (attribution), including the creation of an illegitimate Investigation and Identification Team (IIT). We strongly disagree with its biased conclusions. We also have a whole range of complaints about the work of other OPCW inspection missions in the Syrian Arab Republic which violate the methods of investigation set out in the CWC. We urge the OPCW leadership to take action as soon as possible to rectify this deplorable situation.

We support impartial and highly professional investigations into chemical provocations by anti-government forces in Syria and all manifestations of ‘chemical terrorism’ in the Middle East in strict accordance with the high standards of the CWC.

48. We note the negative impact on international security of yet another destructive step by the United States – the decision to withdraw from the Treaty on Open Skies (OST) under the pretext of alleged violations of the Treaty by Russia. Alongside the US withdrawal from the INF Treaty, as a consequence of which the Treaty ceased to have effect, this step is fully in line with Washington’s policy of destroying the whole range of arms control agreements and causes real damage to the European security system. The United States have upset the balance of rights and obligations of the States Parties to the OST, that is why Russia was forced to take measures to protect its national security interests and begin the procedure of withdrawal from the Treaty (to be completed by 18 December this year).

49. We continue to underline the unique role of the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea as a universal instrument creating a comprehensive legal regime for international cooperation of States in the World Ocean. We highly appreciate the work of such conventional mechanisms as the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf, the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea and the International Seabed Authority. We believe it is vital that they work strictly within their mandates under the Convention avoiding any broad interpretation of the competence granted to them or politicising their decisions.

50. The Russian Federation supports the work of the International Court of Justice (ICJ) as the main judicial body of the United Nations and is ready to assist the creation of conditions enabling its effective and unbiased functioning.

We closely follow the situation around the implementation of the provisions of the UNGA resolution of May 22, 2019 concerning the Chagos Archipelago, adopted in accordance with the relevant advisory opinion of the ICJ. We view the above-mentioned General Assembly decision in the context of the completion of the decolonisation processes.

Elections to the ICJ are planned for the autumn of 2023 at the Security Council and the 78th session of the UNGA. The Russian group in the Permanent Court of Arbitration (PCA) decided to nominate sitting judge K.Gevorgyan for re-election to the ICJ for the period 2024-2033. We are counting on the support of our candidate by the Member States of the Organisation in the forthcoming elections.

51. The Russian Federation facilitates the work of the International Law Commission (ILC) which contributes significantly to the codification and progressive development of international law. We believe that the UN should further build on its most valuable outputs.

In the autumn of 2021, during the 76th session of the UN General Assembly, elections to the ILC are scheduled to take place. The Russian Federation nominated the current member of the Commission, Director of the Legal Department of the MFA of Russia E.Zagaynov, for re-election to the Commission for the period 2023–2027. We hope that the UN Member States will support our candidate in the upcoming elections.

52. The credibility of the International Criminal Court (ICC) is steadily declining. It is becoming more politically biased and one-sided. We note the low quality of its work and the lack of any tangible contribution to conflict settlement.

53. We underline that the mandate of the Residual Mechanism is strictly limited, and it is necessary to complete its activity as soon as possible. We have to acknowledge yet again that the Mechanism inherited the worst practices from the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, which is demonstrated by its consistent anti-Serbian attitudes. We monitor respect for the rights of persons accused and convicted by the Residual Mechanism. We do not consider it expedient at this point to establish new judicial bodies of this kind.

54. We continue to assume the legal nullity of the International, Impartial and Independent Mechanism to Assist in the Investigation and Prosecution of Persons Responsible for the Most Serious Crimes under International Law Committed in the Syrian Arab Republic since March 2011 established by the UN General Assembly acting beyond its authority. We object to the funding of the Mechanism from the UN regular budget and to the Mechanism gaining access to the archives of the OPCW-UN Joint Mechanism.

55. We continue to regard the issue of “the rule of law” with an emphasis on its international dimension, i.e. the primacy of international law, particularly the UN Charter. We continue to oppose attempts to use it to interfere in the internal affairs of sovereign States under the pretext of strengthening the “rule of law” at the national level.

Given the confrontational incorporation of the permanent item “responsibility to protect” (R2P) in the UNGA agenda, we underline the loss of the consensual nature of this concept. We will continue to block attempts to legitimise it.

56. It is States that bear the primary responsibility for promoting and protecting human rights, while the UN executive structures are to play a supporting role. We believe that equal cooperation between States based on the rule of international law, respect for sovereignty and equality of States should be the main principle in the work of the United Nations to promote and protect human rights. It is inadmissible to duplicate the work of the main bodies of the United Nations through unjustified integration of the human rights agenda into all areas of the UN activities. We are against strengthening the link between the UN Human Rights Council (HRC) and the UN Security Council. We oppose attempts to reform the HRC in order to turn it into a quasi-judicial monitoring mechanism.

We consider it unacceptable to include politicised country-specific resolutions and topics outside the scope of their mandate in the agenda of United Nations human rights mechanisms. We condemn the use of human rights issues as a pretext for interfering in the internal affairs of States and undermining the principles of international law. It is in this light that we regard the resolution on the situation of human rights in Crimea, which, since 2016, has been regularly submitted to the Third Committee of the UN General Assembly by the Ukrainian delegation. This document has nothing to do with the actual situation in this region of the Russian Federation. We will vote against this resolution during the 76th session of the UNGA, and we call on our partners to do the same.

The work of the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) should become more transparent and accountable to the UN Member States in order to avoid politically motivated approaches to assessing human rights situations in different countries.

We will continue to promote intercivilisational, intercultural and interreligious dialogue and due respect for the diversity of cultures, civilisations, traditions and historical developments in the promotion and protection of human rights.

57. We strongly condemn all forms and manifestations of discrimination. The ban on discrimination enshrined in international human rights instruments is universal and applies to all persons without exception. We see no value added in defining new vulnerable groups (such as members of the LGBT community, human rights activists, bloggers) that allegedly require a special legal protection regime or new categories of rights. Such steps by a number of countries only lead to de-universalization of legal protection regimes and increased politicisation and confrontation within the UN human rights mechanisms.

58. Active practical work in the area of social development aimed at eradicating poverty, promoting social integration, ensuring full employment and decent work for all will facilitate effective implementation of the decisions adopted at the World Summit for Social Development and the 24th special session of the UN General Assembly.

We consider the UN Commission for Social Development to be the main UN coordinating body that develops framework for harmonised actions on general issues of social protection, ensuring equal opportunities for persons with disabilities, problems of ageing population, improving the situation of young people and strengthening the role of the traditional family. We resolutely oppose any initiatives that undermine its role, as well as the calls for its dissolution.

59. The United Nations Commission on the Status of Women (CSW) remains the main intergovernmental platform for discussion of a broad range of issues relating to improvement of the status of women and achieving gender equality in particular. We believe it is important to avoid politicization of these issues or their automatic inclusion into the UN documents focusing on other topics. Special attention in documents on improving the status of women should be devoted to social and economic rights, as well as social protection and support for women and their families.

We believe that gender equality issues should be taken into account in the work of the UN system in a balanced manner, without absolute prioritisation or selective use.

We commend the work of UN Women which should render assistance only within the framework of its mandate, upon request and with the consent of the States concerned. We will continue to interact actively with it within the framework of the Executive Board.

60. We reaffirm the need for strengthening international cooperation in the promotion and protection of the rights of the child on the basis of the Convention on the Rights of the Child and the outcome document of the 27th special session of the United Nations General Assembly entitled “A World Fit for Children”. We consider unacceptable attempts by a number of countries to deprive parents and legal guardians of their role in the upbringing of children and the development of their potential, including by granting young children autonomy in their decision-making. Programmes to support the family in its traditional sense, to ensure access to education and healthcare are important for the successful upbringing of children.

We devote close attention to the problem of children in armed conflict. We support the mandate of the Special Representative of the UN Secretary-General for Children and Armed Conflict and develop cooperation with her, including as part of the programme for repatriation of Russian children from Syria and Iraq.

61. We support discussion at the United Nations General Assembly of the problems of interreligious and intercultural interaction and the development of intercivilisational dialogue, especially within the framework of the Alliance of Civilisations (AoC). We regard the establishment of a culture of peace as an essential prerequisite for peaceful co-existence and global cooperation for the sake of peace and development.

We are actively preparing for holding the World Conference on Intercultural and Interreligious Dialogue (St Petersburg, May 2022).

62. We are ready for the cooperation on the UN agenda issues with all interested relevant non-governmental organizations. Their involvement in the work of the United Nations should take place within the framework of the established practice, which requires the obligatory consent of Member States. We encourage the adequate representation of the Russian non-governmental corps in the activities of the relevant segments, bodies and structures of the United Nations.

63. To overcome the consequences of migration crises affecting individual countries and regions of the world, global efforts are required under the central coordinating role of the United Nations.

We commend the work of the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) on ensuring more effective international protection for refugees and other categories of persons under its responsibility. We consider the work of the UNHCR particularly important in situations of major humanitarian crises.

Russia makes a significant contribution to international efforts to improve the situation of refugees, including by accepting forcibly displaced persons from Ukraine and also through programmes for the return of Syrian refugees to their homeland. Each year our country voluntarily contributes some $2 million to the UNHCR budget.

We reaffirm our commitment to the Global Compact on Refugees (GCR) and the Global Compact for Safe, Orderly and Regular Migration, which should form the basis of comprehensive long-term cooperation aimed at creating legal channels for migration and countering irregular flows.

Russia took an active part in the first meeting of the Global Refugee Forum. We expect that this platform will help to attract the attention of the international community to the problems of refugees and to consolidate efforts to implement the GCR.

We welcome the strengthening of the UN migration pillar under the coordinating role of the International Organisation for Migration (IOM). We support a comprehensive approach of the UNHCR and IOM to the prevention of the spread of COVID-19 among persons of concern. We are convinced that one of the effective measures to combat the pandemic should be large-scale vaccination of the population, including forcibly displaced persons.

We note the effectiveness of the UNHCR’s work with Syrian refugees and internally displaced persons (IDPs). We look forward to the world community pursuing a non-politicized approach in dealing with this issue and providing greater assistance in rebuilding infrastructure and ensuring conditions for their early return.

We appreciate and contribute, including financially, to the UNHCR’s efforts to address the catastrophic humanitarian consequences of the internal Ukrainian crisis. We support the UNHCR programmes aimed at eliminating statelessness, in particular in European countries.

We are interested in the UNHCR facilitating the return of IDPs and refugees to Nagorny Karabakh and the surrounding areas.

64. We consider the Georgian UNGA resolution on the status of internally displaced persons and refugees from Abkhazia and South Ossetia to be counter-productive and to entail the risk of aggravating the situation “on the ground” and further stalling the Geneva discussions, which remain the only negotiation platform enabling direct dialogue between the representatives of Abkhazia, South Ossetia and Georgia. We also note that at a time when the Abkhaz and South Ossetian representatives are deprived of the opportunity to convey their position to the General Assembly because of the systematic refusal of the United States authorities to grant them entry visas, discussions in New York on the topic of “refugees from Abkhazia and South Ossetia” without their direct participation are meaningless.

65. We consistently advocate for the strengthening of UNESCO‘s international standing. We believe that the adaptation of UNESCO’s working methods to the emerging challenges, including in the context of the new coronavirus pandemic, should be in line with the intergovernmental nature of the Organisation and be based on unconditional compliance with the provisions of the UNESCO Constitution, rules of procedure and directives of the decision-making bodies.

We oppose to the artificial integration of human rights issues in UNESCO’s activities in order to avoid duplication of functions of other UN specialised agencies. We aim to increase the effectiveness of the Organisation by depoliticising it and removing from its agenda issues of territorial integrity and sovereignty that do not belong to it.

Russia contributes significantly to UNESCO activities. In 2022, Kazan, the capital of Tatarstan, will host one of the largest and most significant UNESCO events – the 45th Anniversary Session of the World Heritage Committee, which will coincide with the 50th anniversary of the 1972 Convention concerning the Protection of the World Cultural and Natural Heritage.

66. We view cooperation in sports and the promotion of sport ideals worldwide as effective ways to foster respect and mutual understanding among nations.

We believe that politicisation of sports and discrimination of athletes, including Paralympians, in the form of collective punishment are unacceptable. We advocate the development of a universal system of international sports cooperation based on the principles of independence and autonomy of sports.

67.    In the context of international cooperation to address social and economic consequences of the COVID-19 pandemic, we support intensified efforts to implement the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development (the 2030 Agenda) as a holistic and balanced strategy to guide the work of the UN in the social, economic, environmental and related fields. We underline the integrated, non-politicised and indivisible nature of the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), with poverty eradication being the key objective.

We support stronger coordination between the UNGA and ECOSOC, including through the dialogue platform of the High-Level Political Forum on Sustainable Development (HLPF). The HLPF is designed to serve as a forum that brings together all stakeholders, including members of the business community (not only NGOs), to review the progress made in the implementation of the 2030 Agenda at the global level. Russia’s first Voluntary National Review on the implementation of the SDGs presented in 2020 has been a significant contribution to these efforts.

We promote a balanced approach in the energy sector with a focus on ensuring universal access to affordable, reliable, sustainable and modern energy sources in line with SDG 7. We recognise the urgent need to reduce greenhouse gas emissions, while believing that it should be fulfilled not only through the transition to renewable energy sources but also through the introduction of advanced low-carbon technologies in the use of all types of energy sources, including fossil fuels. In this context, we advocate increased use of natural gas as the most environmentally acceptable fossil fuel, as well as the recognition of nuclear power and hydropower as clean energy sources due to the absence of a carbon footprint. In this spirit, we intend to ensure Russia’s participation in the High-Level Dialogue on Energy in September 2021.

68.    We will continue to uphold the basic parameters for international humanitarian assistance outlined in UNGA resolution 46/182 and other decisions of the General Assembly and ECOSOC. We will oppose revision of fundamental principles, in particular the respect for the sovereignty of an affected state and the need to obtain its consent for assistance. We will continue to urge UN humanitarian agencies to act as “honest brokers” and base their work on carefully verified data about the humanitarian situation “on the ground”.

We are concerned about the worsening of humanitarian crises triggered by the effects of the COVID-19 pandemic. As humanitarian needs grow considerably, we believe it crucial to avoid politicising humanitarian assistance.

69.    We condemn individual countries’ practice of imposing unilateral coercive measures contrary to the United Nations Charter and international law. We therefore support the idea of joining efforts of sanctioned countries in line with the Russian President’s initiative to create sanctions-free “green corridors” to provide countries with access to medicines and essential goods.

70.    We call for accelerated implementation of the Addis-Ababa Action Agenda decisions on financing for development in order to mobilise and make effective use of resources to achieve the SDGs.

We support the principle of prioritising the interests of international development assistance recipients. We offer assistance to interested countries based on a de-politicised approach, promoting domestic innovation and expertise.

We recognise the importance of reaching international consensus on global taxation, in particular in the fight against tax evasion. We support the increased intergovernmental cooperation in curbing illicit financial flows and repatriation of income generated from illegal activities.

71.    We oppose attempts by individual countries to reduce socio-economic development solely to the achievement of environmental protection goals, namely climate change. We see such a one-sided position as an indication of unfair competition and trade protectionism, which are inconsistent with the World Trade Organisation (WTO) principles of a universal, open, non-discriminatory multilateral trading system.

72.    We welcome the further strengthening of the work of the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) and the United Nations Human Settlements Programme (UN-Habitat) to achieve sustainable development of the United Nations.

We support the consolidation of UNEP’s role as the key universal intergovernmental platform establishing the integrated global environmental agenda.

We advocate greater efficiency and stronger financial discipline within UN-Habitat as part of the Programme’s structural reform implemented in accordance with resolution 73/239 of the General Assembly.

We stress the need for strict adherence to the principle of equitable geographical representation in the staffing of UNEP and UN-Habitat and the inadmissibility of politicisation of these programmes’ mandates.

73.    We stand for the continued leadership of the Food and Agriculture Organisation of the United Nations (FAO), the UN World Food Programme (WFP) and the International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD) in coordinating international efforts to eliminate hunger, improve nutrition and promote sustainable agriculture. We will encourage these Rome-based organisations to engage in a closer inter-agency cooperation within the UN system in addressing these issues.

In practical terms, we are actively involved in preparations for the 2021 UN Food Systems Summit. We expect it to deliver a comprehensive analysis of optimal agri-food chain models to help eradicate hunger and improve food security, including the provision of healthy food for the population. We believe that commonly agreed and universally supported sectoral approaches and proposals should be reflected in the Summit outcome documents in a balanced way. We hope that the upcoming event will set the course for the transformation of global food systems, particularly in the context of overcoming the consequences of the new coronavirus pandemic, and give further impetus to the implementation of the 2030 Agenda.

We pay careful attention to preventing the risk of a food crisis, namely in view of the negative impact of the COVID-19 pandemic. We will continue to provide humanitarian food aid to countries most in need, first of all to those of the former Soviet Union, as well as in Africa and Latin America.

74.    We attach great importance to the work carried out by the UNGA to support the multilateral efforts in combating the COVID-19 pandemic and overcoming its impact. We advocate a universal, equitable, fair and unhindered access to medical technologies as well as safe, high-quality, effective and affordable vaccines and medicines for the new coronavirus infection.

We consider increasing global preparedness and response capacity for health emergencies to be a priority task. We are ready for a constructive dialogue with all partners in the framework of the relevant formats. Yet we believe that the World Health Organisation (WHO) should continue to be the main forum for discussing global health issues.

We consistently support WHO as the focal point for the international human health cooperation. We call for enhancing the efficiency of its work through increased transparency and accountability to Member States.

75.    We will further strengthen the multi-stakeholder partnership for disaster risk reduction under the Sendai Framework 2015–2030. Amid the ongoing pandemic, we believe that special attention should be paid to building States’ capacity to respond to emergencies, including in health care.

76.    We seek to keep down the growth of the UN regular programme budget for 2022, as well as estimates for peacekeeping operations and the International Residual Mechanism for Criminal Tribunals. We propose targeted and justified reductions in requested resources. Any requests for additional funding should first undergo careful internal scrutiny. At the same time, the Secretariat should step up its efforts to improve the efficiency of its working methods in order to minimise the associated costs of achieving UN’s objectives. We insist on stronger accountability, strict budgetary discipline and improved transparency in the Secretariat’s work.

77.    Ensuring parity among the six official UN languages in conference services and information and communication activities remains one of the priorities in our interaction with the Organisation’s Secretariat. The principle of multilingualism should be given primary consideration when implementing all media projects and information campaigns as well as allocating financial and human resources to the language services of the UN Secretariat.

Syria Sitrep: Joint Statement by the Representatives of Iran, Russia and Turkey

Syria Sitrep:  Joint Statement by the Representatives of Iran, Russia and Turkey

JULY 08, 2021

Joint Statement by the Representatives of Iran, Russia and Turkey on the 16th International Meeting on Syria in the Astana Format, Nur-Sultan, 7-8 July 2021
https://www.mid.ru/en/foreign_policy/news/-/asset_publisher/cKNonkJE02Bw/content/id/4809709

The representatives of the Islamic Republic of Iran, the Russian Federation and the Republic of Turkey as guarantors of the Astana format:

Reaffirmed their strong commitment to the sovereignty, independence, unity and territorial integrity of the Syrian Arab Republic as well as to the purposes and principles of the UN Charter and highlighted that these principles should be universally respected and complied with;

Expressed their determination to continue working together to combat terrorism in all forms and manifestations and stand against separatist agendas aimed at undermining the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Syria as well as threatening the national security of neighboring countries. Condemned the increasing terrorist activities in various parts of Syria which result in loss of innocent lives including the attacks targeting civilian facilities. Agreed to continue their cooperation in order to ultimately eliminate DAESH/ISIL, Al-Nusra Front and all other individuals, groups, undertakings and entities associated with Al-Qaeda or DAESH/ISIL, and other terrorist groups, as designated by the UN Security Council, while ensuring the protection of civilians and civilian infrastructure in accordance with international humanitarian law. Expressed serious concern with the increased presence and terrorist activity of “Hayat Tahrir al‑Sham” and other affiliated terrorist groups as designated by the UN Security Council that pose threat to civilians inside and outside the Idlib de-escalation area;

Reviewed in detail the situation in the Idlib de-escalation area and highlighted the necessity to maintain calm on the ground by fully implementing all agreements on Idlib;

Discussed the situation in the northeast of Syria and agreed that long-term security and stability in this region can only be achieved on the basis of preservation of the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the country. Rejected all attempts to create new realities on the ground, including illegitimate self-rule initiatives under the pretext of combating terrorism. Reaffirmed their determination to stand against separatist agendas in the east of the Euphrates aimed at undermining the unity of Syria as well as threatening the national security of neighboring countries. Expressed concern, in this regard, with the increasing hostilities against civilians. Reiterated their opposition to the illegal seizure and transfer of oil revenues that should belong to the Syrian Arab Republic;

Condemned continuing Israeli military attacks in Syria which violate the international law, international humanitarian law, the sovereignty of Syria and neighboring countries, endanger the stability and security in the region and called for cessation of them;

Expressed their conviction that there could be no military solution to the Syrian conflict and reaffirmed their commitment to advance viable and lasting Syrian-led and Syrian-owned, UN-facilitated political process in line with the UN Security Council Resolution 2254;

Emphasized the important role of the Constitutional Committee in Geneva, created as a result of the decisive contribution of the Astana guarantors and in furtherance of the decisions of the Syrian National Dialogue Congress in Sochi;

Expressed the need for the early holding of the 6th round of the Drafting Commission of the Syrian Constitutional Committee in Geneva. In this regard, reaffirmed their determination to support the Committee’s work through continuous interaction with the Syrian parties to the Constitutional Committee and the UN Secretary-General’s Special Envoy for Syria Geir O. Pedersen, as facilitator, in order to ensure its sustainable and effective functioning;

Expressed the conviction that the Committee in its work should respect the Terms of Reference and Core Rules of Procedure to enable the Committee to implement its mandate of preparing and drafting for popular approval a constitutional reform as well as achieving progress in its work and be governed by a sense of compromise and constructive engagement without foreign interference and externally imposed timelines aimed at reaching general agreement of its members;

Reiterated grave concern at the humanitarian situation in Syria and the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic, which presents a profound challenge to all Syria’s health system, socio-economic and humanitarian situations. Rejected all unilateral sanctions, which are in contravention of international law, international humanitarian law and the UN Charter, particularly in the face of the pandemic.

Emphasized the need to increase humanitarian assistance to all Syrians throughout the country without discrimination, politicization and preconditions. In order to support the improvement of the humanitarian situation in Syria and the progress in the process of the political settlement, called upon the international community, the United Nations and its humanitarian agencies, to enhance the assistance to Syria, inter alia by developing early recovery projects, including the restoration of basic infrastructure assets – water and power supply facilities, schools and hospitals as well as the humanitarian mine action in accordance with the international humanitarian law;

Highlighted the need to facilitate safe and voluntary return of refugees and internally displaced persons (IDPs) to their original places of residence in Syria, ensuring their right to return and right to be supported. In this regard, called upon the international community to provide the necessary assistance to Syrian refugees and IDPs and reaffirmed their readiness to continue interaction with all relevant parties, including the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and other specialized international agencies;

Welcomed the successful operation on mutual release of detainees on 2 July within the framework of the Working Group on the Release of Detainees / Abductees, Handover of Bodies and Identification of Missing Persons. The operation confirmed the willingness of Syrian parties to strengthen the mutual trust with the assistance of the Astana guarantors. It also reaffirmed the determination of the Astana guarantors to increase and expand their cooperation within the Working Group.

Took note with appreciation the participation of delegations of Jordan, Iraq and Lebanon as observers of the Astana format as well as representatives of the United Nations and the ICRC;

Expressed their sincere gratitude to the Kazakh authorities for hosting in Nur-Sultan the 16th International Meeting on Syria in the Astana format;

Decided to convene the 17th International Meeting on Syria in the Astana format in Nur-Sultan before the end of 2021 taking into consideration the pandemic situation. Also recalled the Joint Statement of 1 July 2020 to hold the next Tripartite Summit in the Islamic Republic of Iran as soon as conditions permit.

Talking Syria’s Presidential Elections, With Laith Marouf & Myself (in Damascus)

 

Eva Bartlett

Brief conversation I had last night with geopolitical analyst Laith Marouf about yesterday’s Syrian presidential elections. I visited eastern Ghouta towns yesterday and saw jubilation among Syrians on the streets, including in Douma, singing and dancing.

No matter what the lame corporate media is saying about the elections, Syrians wanted them and are still celebrating today. Hell, in 2014, a week after the elections, I saw a party raging in Homs, what the pro-“revolution” crowd used to call the “capitol of the revolution”.

Laith:

“Syrians in the US went to the embassy at the UN and voted. That was a direct challenged to American hegemony, since the Americans closed the Syrian embassy in DC. But there is still a Syrian embassy at the UN, and that they can’t touch, the Americans. So many people showed up at the UN headquarters, waiving flags, and so on. The other two countries that host the majority of Syrian refugees or immigrant populations, Germany and Turkey, again the blocked the Syrian votes from happening.

At the same time, countries that were responsible for the war in Syria, like the UAE, opened the embassy, allowed Syrians to vote.

Last week in Lebanon, tens of thousands of Syrian residents of Lebanon went to Syrian embassy in Beirut. The fact on the ground is that Syrian people are out in the millions voting in these elections.”

الكاردينال الراعي في مواجهة صراعات داخليّة خطيرة

See the source image
 د.وفيق إبراهيم

يتمرّد الكاردينال المارونيّ بطرس الراعي كالعادة على حيادية رجال الدين مصراً على الانخراط في مواقف تضع الكنيسة المارونية في قلب النزاعات الأساسية التي تجعله مؤيداً للسياسات الفرنسية الأميركيّة، وصنيعة سياسية داخلية فيه هيمنة مارونية شبيهة بمرحلة 1920.

كذلك فإنه لا ينسى قط عداءه للأحزاب القومية (السورية والعربية) ومثيلاتها، ورفضه أي تقارب مع سورية وإيران وحزب الله.

هذه مواقف يتمسك بها الراعي معتقداً ان الزمن السياسي في لبنان لم يتغيّر، وبذلك يمكن له الإمساك بحزب القوات اللبنانية التابع لسمير جعجع والكتائب ومرتكزاً على السياسات الفرنسيّة والأميركيّة.

See the source image

إلا أنّ أخطر ما زال يتمسك به هو إصراره على طرد النازحين السوريين من لبنان مقابل تقارب مع محاولات إسرائيلية لديها القدرة على التسلل الى الداخل اللبناني عبر أمثال القوات اللبنانية وأحزاب مشابهة لها، وكذلك عبر الصراع السنيّ الشيعيّ الذي يرتدي أشكال صراعات دينية بين دور إفتاء أو قتال سوري – إيراني من جهة وإسرائيلي من جهة ثانية تحمله الأدوار الأميركية العالمية الى مختلف الشرق الاوسط.

الكاردينال الراعي موجود اذاً في قلب النزاعات الفرنسية – الأميركية والدور الروسيّ، متقرّباً من بناءات سعودية – خليجية تحاول تأسيس حلف كبير يربط الخليج بالأردن و»إسرائيل» ومصر مقابل الحلف الناهض السوري الإيراني مع حزب الله وهو بناء قوي جداً له اساساته المتمكنة في محور بلاد الشام ومنتصباً في وجه «إسرائيل» وحلفائها.

فهل يستطيع الكاردينال دفع لبنانه الخاص نحو صيغة جديدة لـ 1920؟

يحاول الراعي إعادة ضبط الحزبية المسيحية وتوجيهها نحو صدام مع الأحزاب الوطنية.

أليس هذا ما فعله بمحاولة اختلاق صدام بين القوات وبين القوميين الاجتماعيين؟ وفعل مثله عبر تأييد الصدامات بين مواطنين مسيحيين مدنيين وحزبيين مع مواطنين سوريين كانوا ينتقلون في شوارع المناطق المسيحية لانتخاب رئيس لبلادهم عبر المناطق الجبلية. وكاد أن يتسبّب بصراعات مفتوحة بين القوات الجعجعية والمواطنين السوريين الى ان انتهى بكيل شتائم للسوريين المدنيين داعياً الى طردهم نحو سورية.

كما يحاول الكاردينال إعادة الدفع بصيغة سياسية تشبه صيغة 1920 وهو العليم بعمق أن هذا أصبح من المستحيلات.

لكنه يحاول وبعنف الاستعانة بالطرفين الأميركي – الفرنسي نحو إعادة إحياء الصيغ الفاشلة بالتعاون مع الطرف السعودي – الخليجي، وذلك عبر تشكيل تحالف جديد يستند الى البطريركية المارونيّة والسعوديّة وذلك بانتفاء زعامة سنية جديدة تقف الى جانب القوات وتلعب دور المتصدّي بعنف للأدوار السورية – الإيرانية.

See the source image

لذلك بدا الكاردينال شديد العنف في هجومه على الحزب السوري القومي الاجتماعي الذي وجد فيه صاحب دور يجمع بين إمكانية أداء دور إقليمي وحركة داخلية نشطة، ما استفزه لأنّ هذا الحزب يجمع بين اللبنانية الشديدة الحركة والإطلالة على الدور السوري والفلسطيني وهذا ما يستفزّ الراعي ومعه القوات اللبنانية، ونفراً كبيراً من الأحزاب الطائفية التي ترفض ايّ تقارب مع الجوار السوري – الإيراني وتعاكس أيذ دور لحزب الله.

هذا ما يؤكد أن الكاردينال لا يزال معتقداً أنّ الزمن السياسي اللبناني لم يتغيّر، وذلك على الرغم من كلّ الانتصارات التي أنجزها حزب الله في لبنان وسورية بالتحالف مع الحزب القوميّ وبقية الأحزاب القوميّة ولم يعرف الراعي اليوم أنّ التركيبة السياسية اللبنانية لم تعُد صالحة لإدارة سياسة لبنان في زمن سقطت فيه صيغة 1920 وأصبحت أية صيغة جديدة تحتاج الى أدوار حزبية لقوى لبنانية تكاد تمسك بالأسس اللبنانية الأصلية.

لبنان الجديد اذاً يحتاج الى دور كبير للكنيسة المارونية تؤدي فيه مركز عصبية سياسية ليس لجعجع أي دور كبير فيها، بقدر ما تحتاج لدور كنسيّ بوسعه الاستعانة بالفاتيكان مع نظام تحالفات ماروني مع الطوائف اللبنانية الأخرى وذلك على اساس نظام تعادلي يدفع نحو لبنان جديد وقويّ بوسعه استدراج القوى الأوروبية وسورية وإيران وروسيا وأميركا نحو دعم اقتصاد لبناني قوي يقود لبنان نحو الازدهار والتطور.

جعجع… قاطع الطرق

فراس الشوفي

الجمعة 21 أيار 2021

جعجع... قاطع الطرق
(هيثم الموسوي)

يمتهن سمير جعجع قطع الطرقات، ولذلك هو قاطع طرق. قطع في الماضي الطريق على السلم الأهلي، واليوم يحاول قطع الطريق على التغيّرات الإقليمية وانعكاساتها في لبنان، كما قطع قبل عام ونصف العام الطريق على اللبنانيين وبالأمس على السوريين بهراوات من الحقد، وحجارة من الجهل، اعتدى عددٌ من أنصار حزب القوات اللبنانية في منطقتي نهر الكلب وجل الديب، على سياراتٍ وحافلات تقلّ ناخبين سوريين أثناء توجّههم للمشاركة في الانتخابات الرئاسية السورية، في مقرّ السفارة في اليرزة.

BBC

وبالتوازي، كانت مجموعات أخرى، تضمّ خليطاً من «متعصّبين» في بلدتي سعدنايل وتعلبايا، وعلى خط الساحل الجنوبي في خلدة والناعمة من بقايا مجموعات أحمد الأسير، تعترض أيضاً طريق السوريين، في عملٍ هجين من العنف والجهل، أنتج ما لا يقل عن عشرين جريحاً تعرّضوا للضرب بآلات حادة.

هذا المشهد، لم يأت من فراغ، إنّما من قرار تخريبي اتخذه رئيس حزب القوات اللبنانية سمير جعجع قبل يومين، وعبّر عنه أول من أمس بسلسلة تغريدات دعا فيها إلى طرد الناخبين الذين يقترعون لصالح الرئيس بشّار الأسد في الانتخابات، معطياً الضوء الأخضر لمجموعات الشغب للاعتداء على الأبرياء لمجرّد أنّهم يمارسون حقّهم في التعبير عن موقفهم السياسي. كلام جعجع، سرعان ما لاقاه بيانٌ تحريضي آخر من النائب السابق خالد الضاهر، صاحب بطولات التحريض على القوميين الاجتماعيين في حلبا، والتي أنتجت مجزرةً بحقّ 11 شهيداً عام 2008. الضاهر لم يتكف بالتحريض، إنّما لفّق موقفاً عن لسان مفوضية شؤون اللاجئين التابعة للأمم المتّحدة، إذ ذكر في بيانه أن المفوضيّة تطالب بقائمة أسماء الناخبين لتزيلهم من لوائح النازحين الخاصة بها، في محاولة لثنيهم عن الاقتراع. في المقابل، أكّدت الناطقة باسم المفوضية ليزا أبو خالد لـ«الأخبار» أن كلام الضاهر عارٍ من الصّحة، وأن «التصويت لن يؤدّي إلى فقدان صفة اللاجئ».

لا يمكن قراءة حركة جعجع، إلّا من ضمن سياق الخيبات السياسيّة التي تعرّض لها مشروعه في الآونة الأخيرة، محليّاً وإقليمياً ودولياً. ومن التأثير النفسي لمشهد الناخبين السوريين وما يعنيه الأمر من إعلان استفتاء على الشرعيّة الشعبية والدولية للرئيس بشّار الأسد، التي ظهرت من خلال فتح السفارات السورية مقراتها في العديد من دول العالم للناخبين، لا سيّما في دول الخليج وعلى رأسها الإمارات.

لطالما استند جعجع منذ خروجه من السجن في 2003، إلى تطرّف الموقف الخليجي، لكي يبني موقفه الهجومي على سوريا والمقاومة وإيران، مستفيداً من الرغبة الأميركية في التصعيد بالداخل اللبناني. ثم لاحقاً، تسلّح جعجع بالنازحين لابتزاز الدولة السورية بمواطنيها، وسعى، مع آخرين، إلى تخريب كل جهود عودتهم بالمواقف المتطرّفة كجزء من حملة الاستغلال الدولية بالسوريين في آتون الحرب. وهو أيضاً اشترك في دعم المجموعات الإرهابية، على الأقل إعلامياً، فيما يملك أكثر من طرف لبناني، معطيات عن علاقات ربطت أمنيين (سابقين؟) في القوات بمقاتلين من «جبهة النصرة»، لتمرير الأسلحة وتأمين أماكن آمنة لهم في عددٍ من المناطق الجبلية.

ليس تشبيهاً قاسياً مقارنة موقف «إسرائيل» من المتغيّرات الدولية والإقليمية وموقف جعجع

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صحيح أن جعجع يمثّل ما تبقّى من تيار شوفيني لبناني – مسيحي متطرّف في الشكل ضد «الغريب»، لكنّه في المضمون يختار «الغريب» على هواه. فإذا كان الغريب معادياً لسوريا والمقاومة، فهو محلّ ترحيب، أمّا إن كان القريب مؤيّداً للمقاومة، فهو غريبٌ وخصمٌ وجب مهاجمته والتحريض عليه. تماماً، كما كانت علاقة جعجع بياسر عرفات نهاية الثمانينات: عداء للمقاومة الفلسطينية، ثم علاقات مفتوحة وتلقّي الأموال من حركة فتح عندما اشتعل الخلاف بين أبو عمار ودمشق.

ومن لا يذكر دعوات جعجع لـ«حكم الإخوان»، ودفاعه عن «غزوة الأشرفية» وكلام مي شدياق عن أن «عودة النازحين السوريين لن تتمّ ولو على دمائنا»؟

بكل الأحوال، إن الأجواء الدولية والإقليمية، تجعل جعجع في موقفٍ متوتّر. فالاندفاعة العربية نحو سوريا بعد انتصارها على الإرهاب وثبات الدولة وتوسّع الغول التركي، يصيب جعجع بخسارةٍ كبيرة. كما أن الحوار الإيراني – السعودي المستمر بمعزلٍ عن مفاوضات الملفّ النووي الإيراني، والغضب السعودي على الرئيس سعد الحريري، تعني أيضاً سقوطاً لخطاب جعجع التحريضي ضد إيران وحزب الله، وتعني مستقبلاً تهدئةً في لبنان أو تسويةً بالحدّ الأدنى، لا مكان لجعجع فيها، لا سيّما في ظلّ خطوط الاتصال الجديدة بين الرئيس ميشال عون والمملكة العربية السعودية، بعد أن راهن جعجع على سقوط العهد في الشارع.

أما على أرض فلسطين المحتلة، فإن التحوّلات التي واكبت انتفاضة الفلسطينيين على كامل التراب الفلسطيني، والقلق الوجودي الذي تعيشه «إسرائيل» الآن، يعني أن كل الخطط التي بنيت على مرحلة ما بعد إعلان يهودية الدولة، قد تعرضّت لانتكاسة كبرى، فسقطت صفقة القرن بالضربة القاضية.

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ليس تشبيهاً قاسياً، إن جرت مقارنة موقف «إسرائيل» من سلسلة المتغيّرات الدولية والإقليمية، وموقف جعجع، بحيث تبدو إسرائيل أكبر الخاسرين في الإقليم، ويبدو جعجع أكبر الخاسرين في لبنان.

من هنا، يمكن تفكيك سلوك جعجع أمس، وفي الأيام والأسابيع المقبلة، والنزعة التخريبية عنده. فلا شيء يمكن أن يوقف التحوّلات سوى فتنةً كبرى في لبنان، لا يبدو أن أحداً مستعداً لها غير جعجع، تماماً كما كان موقفه في العام 1994، عندما حاول قطع الطريق على مشهد استقرار ما بعد الحرب. ربّما برّأ المجلس العدلي جعجع من جريمة تفجير كنيسة سيّدة النجاة، التي اعترف العميل اللحدي جريس الخوري بوضع المتفجّرة فيها، لكنّه أدان رئيس القوّات بـ«تأليف عصابة أشرار».

اليوم أيضاً، جعجع ألّف عصابة أشرار هدفها قطع الطرقات، قطع الطرقات على الناس وقطع الطرقت على التهدئة وقطع الطرقات لمنع التحوّلات الإقليمية من أن تنعكس على لبنان. وهي مارست أيضاً قطع الطرقات على مدى العامين الأخيرين مستغلةً حالة الغضب الشعبي. قد تردّ القوات اليوم بنفي علاقتها بما حصل بالأمس، إلّا أنها فعلت الأمر عينه طوال العامين الماضين بالتبرؤ من قطع الطرقات، حتى خرج قبل أيام الوزير ملحم رياشي وأكّد المؤكّد. فهل ننتظر رياشي بعد عام أو عامين ليكشف عن دور القوات في الاعتداء على السوريين الآمنين أمس؟


الانتخابات السورية في الخارج: علامات تحوّل وأصوات نشاز

19/05/2021

 ناصر قنديل

على إيقاع المشهد الفلسطيني المتفجر تجري اليوم الانتخابات الرئاسية السورية خارج سورية، وحيث لم يعُد ممكناً لأحد إنكار الصلة بين الحرب التي شنت على سورية وجيشها ورئيسها، وبين موقف سورية وجيشها ورئيسها من القضية الفلسطينية والصراع مع كيان الاحتلال وخيار المقاومة، بعدما شكلت سورية العقدة المركزية التي تقف عائقاً أمام ما خطط وتم إعداد المسرح لتظهيره لتصفية القضية الفلسطينية ومحاصرة خيار المقاومة، وتعميم التطبيع، كذلك لم يعُد ممكناً الفصل بين النهوض الجديد لخيار الانتفاضة والمقاومة في فلسطين، وبين الروح المعنوية التي بثتها انتصارات محور المقاومة وتنامي قوته، وقد شكلت انتصارات سورية العنصر الحاسم في هذا التحوّل المعنوي في صورة محور المقاومة بعيون الفلسطينيين، وكان الصاروخ السوري الذي بلغ ديمونا واحتفل به الفلسطينيون آخر علامات هذا الحضور.

السوريون خارج سورية وقد تعدّدت أسباب نزوحهم عن بلدهم يعيشون زمن التحوّلات أيضاً، وقد برزت بداياتها قبل سنوات، وكان لبنان مسرحاً لتظهير مبكر لها مع انتخابات الرئاسة السورية عام 2014 ومشهد الطوفان البشري أمام مقر السفارة السورية، وما قاله فيه الكثيرون على مستوى صناع القرار العالمي كمؤشر على وجهة الرأي العام السوري، وتسبّب بهيستيريا المتورّطين بالحرب على سورية من رموز بقايا النظريات الفاشية العنصرية المتصهينة، والذين يكرّرون عصابهم مجدداً، لكن التحوّل في الرأي العام السوري هذه المرّة سيكون أوضح وأشمل، وليس المشهد الفلسطيني العامل الوحيد في منح الزخم لهذا التحول، بصفته التعبير الجديد عن صعود محور المقاومة الذي تشكل سورية قلعته، بل لأن ما تشهده عواصم عربية وغربية تموضعت على ضفاف العداء لسورية، يقول للسوريين إن العالم يتغيّر.

عندما تجري الانتخابات الرئاسية في السفارات السورية، في فيينا واستكهولم وابو ظبي والقاهرة وعمان وموسكو ومينسك وبكين ونيودلهي وبيونس آيرس ومسقط ويرفان وإسلام أباد وطهران وبيروت وتنضمّ باريس الى المشهد الإنتخابي، فهذا ليس أمراً عادياً، لأن أكثر من نصف السفارات السورية التي ستشهد الانتخابات، كانت ممنوعة من استضافة الناخبين في الاستحقاق الرئاسي السابق، والأهم أنها في عواصم لدول لعبت دوراً فاعلاً في الحرب على سورية، ويشكل موقفها بالسماح باستضافة السفارات للعملية الانتخابية تعبيراً قاطعاً عن حجم التحول الجاري في المشهد العربي والدولي من حول سورية، وفي الحصيلة يشكل اعترافاً ضمنياً بشرعيّة العملية الانتخابيّة وما ينتج عنها، وإلا لماذا منعت العملية سابقاً وسُمح بها اليوم؟ وهذا يعني أن التشكيك بشرعية الانتخابات ونتائجها سيتراجع عن المشهد السياسي، ولو بقي بالنسبة للبعض من باب رفع العتب، أو توزيع الأدوار.

من الطبيعي أن يترك هذا التحول العربي والدولي أثراً على تزخيم التحول الجاري في الرأي العام السوري خارج سورية، لجهة إعلان نهاية مرحلة الابتزاز السياسي لسورية بملف النزوح، الذي كان أصل الاستثمار فيه بخلفية توظيف النازحين ككتل ناخبة، بربط عودتهم بالحل السياسي الشامل ومشاركة المعارضة في الانتخابات، وبسقوط هذا العامل واقعياً تسقط مبررات الاحتفاظ بموقف دولي سلبي من عودة النازحين، كان يترجم بربط أي مساعدة مالية للنازحين ببقائهم في بلدان النزوح، بينما طالبت سورية دائماً بالسماح بتوفير هذه المساعدة للعائدين منهم، وهو ما طالب به لبنان مراراً، وكانت ترفضه مع الأصوات الخارجية أصوات نشاز في الداخل اللبناني، هي الأصوات ذاتها التي تهدّد النازحين بترحيلهم إذا شاركوا بالانتخابات، كتعبير عن الغيظ الناتج عن الرهانات الخاسرة التي اعتادها أصحاب هذه الأصوات النشاز، بدلاً من أن تنطلق حساب المصلحة الوطنية، وترى في كثافة المشاركة الانتخابية مؤشراً على رغبة النازحين بالعودة، فتضمّ صوتها للمطالبة بتحويل المساعدات التي يتلقونها في لبنان كنازحين، ليحصلوا عليها في سورية كعائدين، لكن البعض يرتكب الحماقات ليفضح حقيقة موقفه الذي يريد تخيير السوريين بين استضافة مشروطة بالعداء لبلدهم والتوطين من بعده، أو التهجير القسري، بينما الطبيعي أن يقول للعالم، انظروا إليهم ها هم راغبون بالعودة ويثقون بدولتهم فلم لا تعطونهم المساعدات في بلدهم فيرتاحون من ظلم النزوح ويرتاح لبنان من عبء الاستضافة

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FSA Terrorist Aakef Zaki Killed by Unknown Gunmen in Daraa Countryside

 ARABI SOURI

NATO terrorist Aakef Zaki killed in Daraa

FSA terrorist and top wanted by the Syrian authorities in Daraa the so-called Aakef Zaki was killed in East Karak town in the eastern Daraa countryside south of Syria.

The NATO terrorist and former commander of the so-called ‘Martyrs of Eastern Karak’, one of the armed groups of the Al Qaeda FSA terrorist organization was shot dead in front of his house yesterday 7th of December, by unknown gunmen.

Aakef refused to join the large-scale reconciliation efforts in the southern Syrian province, the reconciliation led by the Russian Reconciliation Center in Syria returned thousands of people to their normal lives, some of the radical commanders refused to join the reconciliation and continued their attacks against the Syrian authorities, civilians, and notables in the region, taking advantage of the protection provided by Trump forces in the Tanf area southeast of Syria.

The killed terrorist was responsible for a number of attacks, kidnaps, field executions, and lootings in the southern Syrian provinces of Daraa and Sweida. On the 8th of last month, November, an armed terrorist group carried out an attack against a Syrian Army checkpoint to the west of the Eastern Karak town.

There were at least 34 terrorist attacks in the southern region post the reconciliation, they included the assassination of 24 persons, wounding of 8 others, two failed assassination attempts, including 18 of his former colleagues of the FSA fighters who joined the reconciliation. The terrorists shot dead 22 of the targeted victims while committed field execution of two others who were shot after being kidnapped.

Trump maintains a large number of his forces in Syria, mainly in the northeastern region bordering Iraq, and the southeastern region of Tanf in the depth of the Syrian desert bordering Iraq and Jordan. The Trump forces in the Tanf area protect members of the ISIS-affiliated group Maghawir Thawra which also runs the infamous Rukban concentration camp where thousands of Syrian refugees are held against their will in horrific conditions. Trump forces illegally positioned in Tanf also facilitated some of Israel’s bombings inside Syria and Iraq.

ISIS terrorists who committed the heinous massacre in the remote desert villages of Sweida province in the early morning hours of July 25th, 2018 fled to the same protected area by the Trump forces in Tanf. The Sweida massacre resulted in slaughtering 215 residents in their houses, injuring 180 others, and kidnapped 27 women and children.

The killing of Aakef Zaki will not help in uncovering much of the information needed by the Syrian authorities about the massacres and crimes committed in the southern region, it would have been much better if he was arrested to expose his accomplices and tell their whereabouts.

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