The Sultan 2.0 will heavily tilt east

May 31 2023

Photo Credit: The Cradle

It’s not that Erdogan has a scheme to head east at the west’s expense. It’s just that the world’s grandest infrastructure, development, and geopolitical projects are all in the east today.

By Pepe Escobar

The collective west was dying to bury him – yet another strategic mistake that did not take into account the mood of Turkish voters in deep Anatolia.

In the end, Recep Tayyip Erdogan did it – again. Against all his shortcomings, like an aging neo-Ottoman Sinatra, he did it “my way,” comfortably retaining Turkiye’s presidency after naysayers had all but buried him.

The first order of geopolitical priority is who will be named Minister of Foreign Affairs. The prime candidate is Ibrahim Kalin – the current all-powerful Erdogan press secretary cum top adviser.

Compared to incumbent Cavusoglu, Kalin, in theory, may be qualified as more pro-west. Yet it’s the Sultan who calls the shots. It will be fascinating to watch how Turkiye under Erdogan 2.0 will navigate the strengthening of ties with West Asia and the accelerating process of Eurasia integration.

The first immediate priority, from Erdogan’s point of view, is to get rid of the “terrorist corridor” in Syria. This means, in practice, reigning in the US-backed Kurdish YPG/PYD, who are effectively Syrian affiliates of the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) – which is also the issue at the heart of a possible normalization of relations with Damascus.

Now that Syria has been enthusiastically welcomed back to the Arab League after a 12-year freeze, a Moscow-brokered entente between the Turkish and Syrian presidents, already in progress, may represent the ultimate win-win for Erdogan: allowing control of Kurds in north Syria while facilitating the repatriation of roughly 4 million refugees (tens of thousands will stay, as a source of cheap labor).

The Sultan is at his prime when it comes to hedging his bets between east and west. He knows well how to profit from Turkiye’s status as a key NATO member – complete with one of its largest armies, veto power, and control of the entry to the uber-strategic Black Sea.

And all that while exercising real foreign policy independence, from West Asia to the Eastern Mediterranean.

So expect Erdogan 2.0 to remain an inextinguishable source of irritation for the neocons and neoliberals in charge of US foreign policy, along with their EU vassals, who will never refrain from trying to subdue Ankara to fight the Russia-China-Iran Eurasia integration entente. The Sultan, though, knows how to play this game beautifully.

How to manage Russia and China

Whatever happens next, Erdogan will not hop on board the sanctions-against-Russia sinking ship. The Kremlin bought Turkish bonds tied to the development of the Russian-built Akkuyu nuclear power plant, Turkiye’s first nuclear reactor. Moscow allowed Ankara to postpone nearly $4 billion in energy payments until 2024. Best of all, Ankara pays for Russian gas in rubles.

So an array of deals related to the supply of Russian energy trump possible secondary sanctions that might target the steady rise in Turkiye’s exports. Still, it’s a given the US will revert to its one and only “diplomatic” policy – sanctions. The 2018 sanctions did push Turkiye into recession after all.

But Erdogan can easily count on popular support across the Turkish realm. Early this year, a Gezici poll revealed that 72.8 percent of Turkish citizens privilege good relations with Russia while nearly 90 percent rate the US as a “hostile” nation. That’s what allows Interior Minister Soylu to remark, bluntly, “we will wipe out whoever is causing trouble, including American troops.”

China-Turkiye strategic cooperation falls under what Erdogan defines as “turning to the East” – and is mostly about China’s multi-continent infrastructure behemoth, the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). The Turk Silk Road branch of the BRI focuses on what Beijing defines as the “Middle Corridor,” a prime cost-effective/secure trade route that connects Asia to Europe.

The driver is the China Railway Express, which turned the Middle Corridor arguably into BRI’s backbone. For instance, electronics parts and an array of household items routinely arriving via cargo planes from Osaka, Japan are loaded onto freight trains going to Duisburg and Hamburg in Germany, via the China Railway Express departing from Shenzhen, Wuhan, and Changsha – and crossing from Xinjiang to Kazakhstan and beyond via the Alataw Pass. Shipments from Chongqing to Germany take a maximum of 13 days.

It’s no wonder that nearly 10 years ago, when he first unveiled his ambitious, multi-trillion dollar BRI in Astana, Kazakhstan, Chinese President Xi Jinping placed the China Railway Express as a core BRI component.

Direct freight trains from Xian to Istanbul are plying the route since December 2020, using the Baku-Tblisi-Kars (BTK) railway with less than two weeks travel time – and plans afoot to increase their frequency. Beijing is well aware of Turkiye’s asset as a transportation hub and crossroads for markets in the Balkans, the Caucasus, Central Asia, West Asia, and North Africa, not to mention a customs union with the EU that allows direct access to European markets.

Moreover, Baku’s victory in the 2020 Nagorno-Karabakh war came with a ceasefire deal bonus: the Zangezur corridor, which will eventually facilitate Turkiye’s direct access to neighbors from the  Caucasus to Central Asia.

A pan-Turkic offensive?

And here we enter a fascinating territory: the possible incoming interpolations between the Organization of Turkic States (OTS), the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), the BRICS+ – and all that also linked to a boost in Saudi and Emirati investments in the Turkish economy.

Sultan 2.0 wants to become a full member of both the Chinese-led SCO and multipolar BRICS+. This means a much closer entente with the Russia-China strategic partnership as well as with the Arab powerhouses, which are also hopping on the BRICS+ high-speed train.

Erdogan 2.0 is already focusing on two key players in Central Asia and South Asia: Uzbekistan and Pakistan. Both happen to be SCO members.

Ankara and Islamabad are very much in sync. They express the same judgment on the extremely delicate Kashmir question, and both backed Azerbaijan against Armenia.

But the key developments may lie in Central Asia. Ankara and Tashkent have a strategic defense agreement – including intel sharing and logistics cooperation.

The Organization of Turkic States (OTS), with a HQ in Istanbul, is the prime energizer of pan-Turkism or pan-Turanism. Turkiye, Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, and Kyrgyzstan are full members, with Afghanistan, Turkmenistan, Hungary, and Ukraine cultivated as observers. The Turk-Azeri relationship is billed as “one nation, two states” in pan-Turkic terms.

The basic idea is a still hazy “cooperation platform” between Central Asia and the Southern Caucasus. Yet some serious proposals have already been floated. The OTS summit in Samarkand late last year advanced the idea of a TURANCEZ free trade bloc, comprising Turkiye, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, Azerbaijan, and as observers, Hungary (representing the EU) and Northern Cyprus.

Meanwhile, hard business prevails. To fully profit from the status of the energy transit hub, Turkiye needs not only Russian gas but also gas from Turkmenistan feeding the Trans-Anatolian Natural Gas Pipeline (TANAP) as well as Kazakh oil coming via the Baku-Tblisi-Ceyhan (BTC) pipeline.

The Turkish Cooperation and Coordination Agency (TIKA) is heavy on economic cooperation, active in a series of projects in transportation, construction, mining, and oil and gas. Ankara has already invested a whopping $85 billion across Central Asia, with nearly 4,000 companies scattered across all the “stans.”

Of course, when compared to Russia and China, Turkiye is not a major player in Central Asia. Moreover, the bridge to Central Asia goes via Iran. So far, rivalry between Ankara and Tehran seems to be the norm, but everything may change, lightning fast, with the simultaneous development of the Russia-Iran-India-led International North South Transportation Corridor (INSTC), which will profit both – and the fact that the Iranians and Turks may soon become full BRICS+ members.

Sultan 2.0 is bound to boost investment in Central Asia as a new geoeconomic frontier. That in itself encapsulates the possibility of Turkiye soon joining the SCO.

We will then have a “turning to the East” in full effect, in parallel to closer ties with the Russia-China strategic partnership. Take note that Turkiye’s ties with Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, and Kyrgyzstan are also strategic partnerships.

Not bad for a neo-Ottoman who, until a few days ago, was dismissed as a has-been.

The views expressed in this article do not necessarily reflect those of The Cradle.

‘Democracy won, Western media lost’: Erdogan makes victory speech

May 29, 2023

Source: Agencies

Turkish President and People’s Alliance’s presidential candidate Recep Tayyip Erdogan, center, gestures to supporters at the presidential palace, in Ankara, Turkey, May 28, 2023 (AP)

By Al Mayadeen English 

Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan addresses his supporters after winning the Turkish presidential election and underlines that democracy won in Turkey.

The Turkish presidential election went smoothly without any problems, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan said Sunday during his victory speech, adding that the people gave him the responsibility of managing the country for another five years.

Erdogan also thanked the Turkish people from all walks of life, regardless of their allegiance to him or other parties, as well as all those who contributed to the success of the electoral process, especially the Turkish security forces.

“We won the Parliament in the first round, and in the second round, we took the presidency. Turkey and democracy both won,” the Turkish leader underlined. “No one lost in Turkey.”

The Republican People’s Party gave seats to certain parties despite the latter not having even 1% of the vote.

Western media lost

All the obstacles that once stood in Turkey’s face are a thing of the past now, Erdogan added, telling his supporters that Turkey was before a “new and strong” century, referring to the 100-year-anniversary of the founding of the Turkish republic.

The Justice and Development Party (AKP) gave strength to Turkey throughout the past because of the Turkish people,” Erdogan said, stressing that “democracy reigns victorious, and Western media, as well as those who sided with Western institutions, lost.”

“Turkey knows about the Western media and organizations’ plans: they want to obstruct the country’s progress. The Turkish people will not accept this,” he added.

The government will be moving in the direction of developing the country’s economy and dealing with inflation as well as the repercussions of the earthquake, the Turkish leader revealed. “We are the only ones capable of dealing with the country’s problems, not the resistance that has nothing to show but words.”

Turkey working on return of refugees

Upon paying off its debts, the Turkish government severed its ties with the International Monetary Fund, the Turkish president said.

“The opposition wanted to bring in debts from abroad, and if that were to happen, it will open the country up to foreign interventions. This is unacceptable,” Erdogan added.

The government previously worked on and will continue working on extracting Turkish oil and gas, he stressed, pledging to work on developing the country’s tech sector and will increase the number of hospitals and investments in the energy sector.

“We are working on returning the refugees. We have repatriated a million refugees as of late.

Speaking on Turkey’s ties with Russia, Erdogan promised to work on developing economic ties with Russia while also bolstering the tourism and service sector.

The Supreme Election Council chief said on Sunday that Erdogan won the presidential election with 52.14% of the vote.

“After processing 99.43% of the ballots from polling stations in Turkey and in foreign missions and border crossings, Erdogan received 52.14% of the vote, while [Kemal] Kilicdaroglu received 47.86%,” Ahmet Yener told a press conference.

In the wake of learning of his election victory, Erdogan, alongside his supporters, celebrated the victory at his home in Istanbul before the official election results not being declared yet.

Speaking from the porch of his home in Istanbul, the Turkish President hailed his supporters and the Turkish people.

Saying: “Bye, bye, bye, Kemal,” referring to his opponent, opposition leader Kemal Kilicdaroglu, Erdogan declared his victory before thousands of his supporters in Istanbul as he prepared to lead the country for an additional five years while the country’s major cities were celebrating the major victory.

Related Videos

Special Coverage | The scene in Turkey after Erdogan’s victory

Turkey elects Erdogan and consecrates him as leader

What did Kamal Java say about the most important changes in Turkish politics after Erdogan’s victory?

How will the outcome of the Turkish elections affect the file of the displaced Syrians?

Related Stories

• Erdogan Declares Victory in Turkey Presidential Election 
• Turkish FM expects Erdogan to gain over 56% in 2nd round
• Turkey Votes in Runoff Election Expected to Extend Erdogan Rule .
• Over half of Turkish parliament comprises of newly elected MPs
• Turkish elections authority officially announce round 2, due on May 28
• Crunch time in Turkey’s run-off vote

‘Bye, bye, bye Kemal’, Erdogan declares election victory

28 May 2023

Source: Al Mayadeen

President Recep Tayyip Erdogan delivers a speech to supporters outside his residence in Istanbul, Turkey, Sunday, May 28, 2023 (AP Photo/Francisco Seco)

By Al Mayadeen English 

Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan declares his election victory after garnering the majority of the vote in the country’s runoff election.

Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan won Sunday the Turkish presidential election in the runoff round, and he, alongside his supporters, celebrated the victory at his home in Istanbul despite the official election results not being declared yet.

After 99.08% of the votes were counted, Erdogan had 52,07% of the vote, with opposition leader Kemal Kilicdaroglu lagging behind at 47,93%.

Speaking from the porch of his home in Istanbul, the Turkish President hailed his supporters and the Turkish people.

“We will be ruling the country for the coming five years […] God willing, we will be deserving of your trust,” he said.

Saying: “Bye, bye, bye, Kemal,” referring to his opponent, Erdogan declared his victory before thousands of his supporters in Istanbul as he prepared to lead the country for an additional five years while the country’s major cities were celebrating the major victory.

People celebrate #Erdogan like a rockstar, with firework, dancing and Islamic phrases. Shortly after his Minister of the interior left smilingly the AKP Centre in #Istanbul Erdogan appeared on screen. He said that all of #Turkey won, and then shouted that LGBT won’t get into AKP. pic.twitter.com/P006w9jflA

— Marion Sendker (@_MarionSendker) May 28, 2023

“The people has given us the responsibility [to lead the country] for the next five years,” Erdogan said. “We have repeatedly said that those who serve the people will never be defeated.”

A short while ago, #Turkey’s incumbent President Recep Tayyip Erdogan declared victory in his country's run-off election, extending his rule into a third decade.
Before the final results arrived, Erdogan's supporters hit the streets to celebrate.#TurkeyElections… pic.twitter.com/P3DS4ysush

— Sharon Ogunleye (@Sharon_Ogunleye) May 28, 2023

According to the Turkish President, Kilicdaroglu, the leader of the Republican People’s Party, leased parliamentary seats to certain parties.

“The supporters of the Republican People’s Party will hold the party’s leader accountable for these results,” the leader underlined. 

“From now on, we will continue our struggle for Turkey […] the only true winner today is Turkey,” he added. 

The AKP leader, 69, overcame Turkey’s biggest economic crisis in generations and the most powerful opposition alliance to ever face his party, winning the election by a landslide.

Near complete results showed him leading Kilicdaroglu by four percentage points.

Turks returned to the polls on Sunday for the runoff round of the Turkish election to decide whether President Recep Tayyip Erdogan will extend his rule or will be unseated by his opponent Kemal Kilicdaroglu who promised to “restore a more democratic society” in Turkey.

Polls opened at 8 am local time, and the process ended at 5 pm local time, while results are expected to be announced a few hours after polls close.

On May 14, no presidential candidate ensured 50%+1 of the vote in the first round of the elections.

More than 191,000 ballot boxes are set up in 973 districts and 1,094 electoral boards across the country.

Ogan, who won 5.2% of the votes in the first round, asked his voters to support Erdogan in the second round.

Many are attributing Erdogan’s victory to the move done by his third-party opponent in the first round, though the president had already garnered the majority.

Read next: Round II: Erdogan, Kilicdaroglu heading for presidential runoff

Take two: Turkiye’s election circus gets even crazier

May 26 2023

Photo Credit: The Cradle

The second round of Turkish presidential elections has drawn global attention for its increasingly bizarre alliances, outrageous propaganda, and personality politics. Ironically, not much is expected to change in its aftermath.

By Ceyda Karan

The political landscape in Turkiye has become increasingly convoluted after the 14 May presidential and parliamentary elections left the Turkish presidency up for grabs – with a critical, second round of polls to be held on Sunday.

As the main candidates who failed to secure the presidency in the first round prepare for the 28 May election, Turkiye’s patchwork system of political alliances has become more intricate, marked by polarizing debates on issues such as secularism, nationalism, Syrian refugees, and the Kurdish issue. In the very year that Turkiye celebrates the Republic’s 100th anniversary, the country’s political atmosphere has grown more uncertain than ever.

The official results of the first round of the presidential election saw incumbent Recep Tayyip Erdogan, the candidate of the People’s Alliance, obtain 49.5 percent of the vote, while main opponent Kemal Kilicdaroglu, the candidate of the National Alliance, received 44.8 percent – both remaining under the 50+ percent threshold required for an outright win.

Muharrem Ince, who withdrew from the race at the last minute, secured 0.43 percent of the vote, and Sinan Ogan, the candidate of the secular nationalist ATA Alliance, received 5.17 percent.

The sequel no one asked for

The second round between Erdogan and Kilicdaroglu has essentially transformed the election into a referendum on the former’s 21-year rule. The public’s sentiment and perception have therefore become crucial in this contest.

Despite the parliamentary election’s official results being due on 19 May, the Supreme Election Board (YSK) has not yet released them, leading to some frantic domestic speculation on the reasons for this. Some observers have raised concerns about the possibility of fraudulent voters, as the number of voters is reportedly double the population growth rate. In normal circumstances, parliament should convene on the third day after the official results are published, and elected MPs should be sworn in.

However, Erdogan is purportedly stalling the swearing-in procedure because members of his alliance, the radical Islamist Kurdish movement HUDA PAR, refuse to utter the phrase “Turkish nation” during the ceremonial oath. This leaves Erdogan keen to defer the ceremony – and this drama – until after the 28 May presidential election.

In the lead up to Sunday’s polls, the main topics dominating Turkiye’s political discourse are distrust in the fairness of the election, Turkish citizenships granted to Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) nationals in exchange for top-dollar real estate purchases, and the wildly disparate numbers of refugees currently residing in the country (the government says less than 4 million; the opposition claims 13 million).

These highly polarizing issues have triggered a number of realignments within the two main alliances contesting the presidency.

This time it’s personal

Since the country’s 2017 referendum, in which parliamentary democracy was replaced by a Turkish-style presidential system that recognizes unsealed ballots as valid, electoral irregularities have become a recurring concern. And so the opposition is understandably apprehensive about potential “vote theft” and the security of ballots.  

Furthermore, the unusually high voter turnout rate of over 80 percent in Turkiye’s devastated earthquake-affected areas that claimed the lives of tens of thousands and caused mass migration, has raised questions.

In the southeastern region, which has a significant Kurdish population, Erdogan’s far-right, ultra-nationalist, Nationalist Movement Party (MHP) coalition partner, made significant gains in the polls, sparking allegations of ballot manipulation. Similarly, suspicions arose due to the unchanging 5 percent vote share garnered by the third candidate and kingmaker, Sinan Ogan, throughout the vote count.

However, after an initial week of furious debates, these concerns have now been fully overshadowed by the impending second round of voting.

In fact, the parliamentary elections, where Erdogan’s Justice and Development Party (AKP) won 35.6 percent of the vote and the main opposition Republican People’s Party (CHP) secured 25.3 percent – and the subsequent uncertainty regarding the exact representation of the two parties and their allies – have been largely forgotten.

The presidential contest has taken center stage as the sole, focal political point of interest. And last-minute shifts and tweaks in the madcap alliances that make up the two leading coalitions are all the Turkish media talk about.

Switching slogans and alliances

Kilicdaroglu’s Millet (or Nation) Alliance, which leads the narrative for change (essentially, ousting Erdogan), has adopted patriotic slogans such as “Those who love their homeland should come to the ballot box” and “Let the gates of hell be closed.” Although he emphasized “unity” and objected to Erdogan’s polarizing politics in the first round of polls, Kilicdaroglu has adopted a more confrontational discourse in this second phase. Interestingly, he adopted the “hell” slogan from Sinan Ogan, a candidate who was eliminated in the first vote and who has since endorsed Erdogan ahead of the runoff vote.

Before 14 May, Ogan stated, “Maybe we won’t open the gates of heaven, but we will close the gates of hell.” The “hell” he referred to was the Erdogan government. While harshly criticizing Erdogan for his handling of Syrian refugees, Ogan also declared that Turkish nationalists – like himself – would never align themselves with the Islamist HUDA PAR. He even suggested that the Peoples’ Democratic Party (HDP), representing Kurdish politics, would negotiate a deal with Erdogan in the second round.

But, ironically, it was Ogan who ended up striking a deal with Erdogan, announcing his support for the president on the grounds of maintaining “stability” in Turkiye. This, despite the fact that Ogan’s main condition regarding the repatriation of refugees appears not to have been met: Although a popular election issue, Erdogan has ruled out repatriating Syrian asylum seekers.

Winning over the nationalists

It remains uncertain how much of Ogan’s nationalist voter base will take to Erdogan. The ATA Alliance, to which he owes his candidacy, has become heavily divided in advance of the second polls. The foundation of the alliance consists of the far-right Zafer Party, in collaboration with some smaller political parties. Two days after Ogan threw his weight behind Erdogan, Zafer Party Leader Umit Ozdag announced his support for Kilicdaroglu.

Unlike Ogan, Ozdag says he has clinched a deal with his candidate – Kilicdaroglu – to repatriate Syrian refugees on the basis of international law and humanitarianism. Ozdag has also said they agreed that there would be zero compromise in the fight against the Kurdish PKK and terrorism.

A staunch nationalist, Ozdag frequently invokes Mustafa Kemal Ataturk – the much-revered founder of the Turkish Republic – rails against Erdogan’s role in accepting millions of Syrian refugees and selling Turkish citizenship in exchange for cash, and constantly warns about Turkiye’s “demographic threat.”

In part, this refers to the Erdogan administration’s distribution of Turkish citizenship to anyone who purchases real estate for $400,000, sharply increased rents caused by the influx of foreigners, and the perceived influence of these people (without any ties to Turkiye or knowledge of the Turkish language) on elections. All these issues feature heavily in the nationalist movement’s narrative and propaganda.

As an example, during the first round of elections, the Turkish public reacted strongly to a live broadcast on the private, pro-government A Haber news channel. In the aired footage, a Kuwaiti individual speaking Arabic into the microphone after casting his vote shocked Turkish viewers. The channel swiftly cut the broadcast and deleted the video.

Unprecedented election propaganda

But if this election can be distilled into a popularity referendum on Erdogan, the sitting Turkish president has some clear advantages over his opponent: He uses every state tool at his disposal and has a mainstream media loyal to him. While TV channels cover Erdogan’s statements and rallies around the clock, Kilicdaroglu has few opportunities to be nationally heard outside of opposition media outlets.

As a result, Erdogan has been particularly sloppy about his political rhetoric, making ludicrous claims and sometimes outright lies – without being duly checked by the media.

In a Trumpian boast during a rally in the earthquake-stricken province of Malatya, Erdogan boasted that the number of people who came to listen to him in the square was higher than the number of deaths caused by the 6 February earthquake.

While victims had cried out for urgent government assistance for days without a response – which Erdogan himself has admitted – he told rally crowds: “We mobilized all means from the first hours of the disaster.” There have been many such gaffes along the campaign trail this year, which finally culminated in a major media scandal over a faked video montage.

Erdogan accidentally admitted that a video montage shown by his team in public squares before the first round of votes had been faked. The edited footage depicted PKK leaders in the Qandil region of Iraq singing along to a song in Kilicdaroglu’s political ad. The intent of the video was clearly to link the latter to the PKK and terrorism.

The opposition reacted strongly to the slander, with Kilicdaroglu calling Erdogan a “montage fraudster” and filing a lawsuit for compensation. But because of the president’s iron grip on mainstream Turkish media, it is not known how many voters at those rallies are aware of the fakery.

The propaganda has progressed well beyond the video scandal. Fake brochures attributed to Kilicdaroglu, including bizarre campaign promises and praise for terrorism, have been detected and prosecuted along the way. There’s no telling how much of an effect these fake-news scandals will affect Sunday’s polls.

‘Unprincipled coalitions’

As the second round vote approaches, Professor Emin Gurses from Sakarya University, highlights the shallow opportunism of these Turkish elections, telling The Cradle:

“In Turkiye, there is an understanding that it is permissible to lie while doing politics. Voters voted for the candidate they know and recognize through trust. They [politicians] act to win the election. They don’t look at friend or foe.”

The last-minute alliance shifts may not even change anything. According to Gurses, Sinan Ogan has little to gain by backing Erdogan, and on the other side, even if a deal is struck with Ozdag, it will be challenging for Kilicdaroglu to close the 2.5 million-vote gap with Erdogan.

Meanwhile, columnist Mehmet Ali Guller from Cumhuriyet has highlighted the consequences of the 50+1 system in Turkiye, which he argues leads to unprincipled coalitions, with ideology, programs, and politics pushed to the background. Guller charges that there are no significant differences in the fundamental policies of both sides:

“There is no fundamental difference between the two options in terms of economic policies, it is in the details. And in terms of foreign policy, there is no fundamental difference between the two options, there are details. Because both options are essentially Atlanticist and NATOist.”

100 years on: It’s looking bleak

Regardless of the election outcome, Guller foresees an ongoing economic crisis that offers no short-term solution. He also notes that both Islamists and nationalists exist in the two main political coalitions, creating an ideological stalemate of sorts, and predicts that Turkiye will be forced to hold another election within the next five years.

If Kilicdaroglu wins, he may find himself governing the country using decrees inherited from his predecessor despite advocating for a return to parliamentary democracy, as his alliance will be in the minority in parliament.

In this “unprincipled” political environment, it is even plausible that Erdodan, the architect of the Turkish-style presidential system, may consider reverting to a “parliamentary system.” On the other hand, if Erdogan emerges victorious, an unprecedented economic crisis is expected, with Turkiye’s CDS rating surpassing 700 and the US dollar projected to reach at least 24 Turkish liras. 

In the upcoming local elections, Erdogan is likely to continue his right-wing populist campaign to reclaim cities like Istanbul, which he lost in 2019.

Because Turkiye requires at least $200 billion in resources, Erdogan’s foreign policy stance will be determined by economic opportunity, as he is not seen as a reliable partner by any country, on either side of the global divide. He is expected to continue his balancing act: putting the “migrant issue” before the EU; Syria and Ukraine before Russia; relations with Russia before the US, and using Turkiye’s presence in Syria as leverage over the Arab world, using these as bargaining chips to maximize his gains.

In any case, the outlook for the Republic of Turkiye, on its 100th anniversary, appears bleak.

The views expressed in this article do not necessarily reflect those of The Cradle.

تركيا والتجاذب بين الخيارات والهويات في الرئاسة

 الثلاثاء 16 أيار 2023

ناصر قنديل

قدّم مشهد الانتخابات الرئاسية التركية صورة شديدة التركيب والتعقيد بين عناصر تتشكّل منها كل مشاكل وأزمات المنطقة والعالم، وتدور حول أسئلة كبرى وتفصيلية، لتقول إن هناك توازناً هشاً بين معسكرين متداخلين، لا يمكن للمفاضلة بينهما أن تتم إلا بصعوبة عالية، بما يُعبّر عن غياب الخيارات الواضحة في تعبيرها عن مقاربة مشاكل الغد بلغة متجانسة؛ حيث يمثّل الرئيس أردوغان نموذج الإسلام السياسي القريب من الغرب ومفهوم الدولة المدنية، مقابل منافسه كمال كليجدار كممثل للعلمانية الأصولية المشبعة بروح الغرب والمعادية للدين؛ ويمثل أردوغان من موقعه في زعامة الأخوان المسلمين ضمن معسكر الإسلام السياسي نموذج العنف وشهوة البحث عن دور على حساب استقلال دول المنطقة، وصولاً للاستعداد لاستضافة عشرات آلاف الإرهابيين التكفيريين، وبالمقابل تصدير بعضهم الى حيث يلزم، تحت عباءة مشروع العثمانية الجديدة وحلم السلطنة الكامن والجاهز للظهور دائماً، ومقابله منافس يريد استعادة نموذج أتاتورك لدور إقليمي ينضبط بالأجندة الغربية، لكن دون خوض حروب وطموحات التوسع؛ ويمثل أردوغان مشروعاً استقلالياً يقف على مسافة المصالح المتحركة بين الشرق والغرب، من حرب أوكرانيا إلى حرب سورية، والبحث عن شراكات سياسية واقتصادية تأخذ بالاعتبار متغيرات العالم ومخاطر البقاء في المركب الغربي بقيادة أميركية متوحشة، يأنس اليها منافسه ويأخذ عليه التقرّب من روسيا، بينما في الاقتصاد قدّم أردوغان نموذج اقتصاد قوميّ عماد النهوض بالصناعة وإنتاج دور يستند الى عناصر القوة في الجغرافيا الاقتصادية، ويقابله منافس يتبنى الليبرالية الكاملة، حيث لا دور للدولة في الاقتصاد؛ وفيما يقدم أردوغان مثالاً قاسياً في التعامل مع الحريات الشخصية والاجتماعية والسياسية والاعلامية، يتباهى خصمه بالذهاب الى أبعد الحدود دفاعاً عنها وصولاً لتشريع المثلية.

يقول المشهد الانتخابي في الجولة الأولى إن الأتراك حائرون. وهذا معنى توزعهم بنسب متساوية تقريباً بين المتنافسين، في لحظة يطلق عليها علماء الاجتماع والفلاسفة، لحظة انعدام اليقين. ولعل تصويت ستة وخمسين مليون تركي من أصل ستين مليوناً يحق لهم الانتخاب، يدل على حجم الانخراط الذي تعيشه المجتمعات في محاولة البحث عن اليقين، وانقسام هؤلاء الى نصفين شبه متساويين، بين ثمانية وعشرين مليوناً في ضفة وخمسة وعشرين مليوناً في ضفة مقابلة، ومقابل الإثنين ثلاثة ملايين صوّتوا للمرشح القومي المتطرف، تعبير عن حال عدم اليقين، وعدم وضوح الخيارات بصورة حاسمة؛ وبالتدقيق في اتجاهات التصويت، سوف يتبين أن المدن الكبرى كانت صاحبة الصوت الحاسم لصالح خيارات كليجدار، مقابل تصويت الأرياف بنسب أعلى لصالح أردوغان. وهذا يعني أن الأرياف صوتت بدافع الميل لصالح الهوية القومية الإسلامية المتصالحة مع المنطقة، خصوصاً في ضوء مرارة التجربة مع محاولات الانضمام الى الاتحاد الأوروبي، والإطار العنصري الذي قابلت به أوروبا طلب تركيا ذات الغالبية الإسلامية للانضمام إليها، بخلفية الخشية على التكوين الديمغرافي الأوروبي والحرص على ما وصفه الخبراء بالنقاء المسيحي، كما صوّتت لصالح دور الدولة الاقتصادي في السكن والتعليم والصحة ودعم الزراعة والسياحة والصناعة، بينما تأثرت المدن بالتطلع نحو الاندماج بالغرب خصوصاً مع الضائقة الاقتصادية وتراجع القيمة الشرائية لليرة التركية، وتغليب الدولة التي بلا هوية على نموذج الهوية التي قدّمها أردوغان، والتصويت للحريات بأبعادها الإعلامية والشخصية والاجتماعية بنسختها الليبرالية، بما فيها المثلية، والرغبة بالخروج من التوترات والنزاعات والحروب.

تكشف الانتخابات الدور المؤثر لشريحة وازنة وقضية بارزة. الشريحة هي الشباب الذين يتمركزون في المدن، ويبدو أن غالبية كبيرة منهم لم تصوّت لصالح أردوغان، ولو على خلفية طلب التغيير تحت شعار “عشرون عاماً تكفي”، أما القضية التي تعاني منها المدن وحضرت في خلفية التصويت بقوة فهي قضية اللاجئين السوريين، التي يتحمّل أردوغان مسؤولية تفاقمها، من موقعه ودوره في الحرب على سورية، مقابل التزام منافسه بإعادتهم خلال سنتين، ولو اقتضى الأمر ترحيلهم. والواضح أن ضغط قضية النزوح السوري على سكان المدن اقتصادياً واجتماعياً على خلفية الأزمة التي تعصف بالاقتصاد التركي وارتفاع نسب البطالة والتنافس على الأعمال بين العمال الأتراك والعمال السوريين، وتحميل البرجوازية السورية بين اللاجئين مسؤوليّة ارتفاع بدلات الإيجار والبيع في السوق العقاري، والسيطرة على بعض المهن، فيما يبدو أردوغان متردداً في اتخاذ القرار الذي يجعله أقرب لتقديم حل عملي لقضية النزوح، حيث يمكن التوصل مع الدولة السورية بدعم روسي إيراني خليجي، لروزنامة تتضمّن الانسحاب التركي من سورية وعودة النازحين وتفكيك الكانتونات التقسيمية والجماعات الإرهابية شمال شرق وشمال غرب سورية بالتوازي خلال سنتين.

يمكن القول إن الدورة الثانية قد تمنح فرصاً أفضل لمنافس أردوغان، إلا إذا أشهر أردوغان ورقته الرابحة بشجاعة، وأعلن استعداده للالتزام بروزنامة متوازية لعودة النازحين والانسحاب من سورية، عبر قمة سورية تركية بمشاركة روسية وايرانية تعقد في الرياض أو أبو ظبي تعلن هذا الالتزام وتضع له جداوله الزمنية.

فيديوات متعلقة

بعد تعذر حصد أي من المرشحين الثلاثة الأغلبية المطلقة من الأصوات.. الانتخابات التركية تتجه إلى جولة ثانية

من سيكون الأقدر على زيادة رصيده الانتخابي في الجولة الثانية؟

 بايدن يقلل من أهمية هوية الفائز في تركيا

مقالات متعلقة

• إردوغان أمام الاختبار الأصعب: تركيا أكثر انقساماً
• خريطة البرلمان ثابتة: «تحالف الجمهور» يكتسح
• في “تناقض محرج”.. بايدن يُقلّل من أهمية الفائز في الرئاسة التركية
• انتخابات تركيا: إردوغان و”طاولة الستة” وما تحتها
• من اللجوء في تركيا إلى النزوح في إدلب.. عودة السوريين المُرة
• موسكو تستبق النتائج: تعاوننا باقٍ

Turkey’s runoff elections: a precognitive outcome?

May 15, 2021

Source: Al Mayadeen English

By Lea Akil 

The current political scene in Turkey is significant as neither the incumbent President or his opposition rival were able to secure a majority in the first round of elections, leading to a runoff.

Turkey’s runoff elections: a precognitive outcome? Designed by: Zainab Roumani.

Voter support for Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan fell below the majority required for him to secure reelection outright. This outcome has necessitated run-off elections on May 28.

Erdogan secured 49.51% and opposition candidate Kemal Kilicdaroglo secured 44.88%. Divergent partial results emerged from Turkey’s presidential election earlier on Sunday. While the state-run news agency suggested that Erdogan would narrowly secure a victory, the private agency indicated that the contest was likely to proceed to a runoff.

In the upcoming second round, it is important to consider that Erdogan is expected to have an advantageous position over Kilicdaroglu due to his lead in the first round and the positive parliamentary results favoring the ruling coalition in contrast to the opposition.

The outcome came as a surprise and disappointment to the opposition, who had set high expectations for both the presidential and parliamentary elections. In the presidential race, the opposition was hopeful that even if they couldn’t secure victory in the first round, Kilicdaroglu would at least receive the highest number of votes.

Based on the results, it has become evident that Erdogan is leading by around four points over Kilicdaroglu in the first round. The parliamentary elections are also of great significance as the opposition had hoped to secure a majority in parliament, thereby assuming leadership. There has been an ongoing debate within opposition circles that even if Erdogan is not defeated in the presidential elections, simply gaining a majority in parliament would undermine his satisfaction of winning a new presidential term. It has become evident that the opposition is experiencing a crisis, not only in the parliamentary elections but also in achieving a presidential majority, as the ruling coalition has managed to secure a majority in parliament.

In terms of alliances, analysts indicate that there has been a significant shift for the Justice and Development Party (AKP) since it formed a coalition with the Nationalist Movement Party (MHP) in the middle of the previous decade. They argue that it is because the AKP is no longer able to reach power and govern independently; it is in need of forming a government.

Why is the current political scene important?

For the first time, the AKP and Erdogan are participating in elections under critical circumstances. This includes the aftermath of the devastating earthquake that claimed the lives of 50,000 people, caused over $100 billion in damages, and raised significant concerns regarding the government’s handling of the crisis. However, it is cruicial to mention that 8 out of 10 provinces that were severely devastated by the earthquake voted Erdogan, and the numbers surpassed expectations. 

For example, in Hatay Antakya, one of the earthquake stricken regions of Turkey, the voter turnout was 53.9% in favor of Erdogan with only 42.56% for Kilicdaroglo. In the epicenter of the devestating earthquake, Kahramanmaras, Erdogan was leading the polls with around 71.11% of the votes. 

In light of the upcoming elections, the #economy is the most prominent topic. How could #Erdogan's current economic policies and the opposition's proposed economic plans shape the outcome of the elections?#Turkey #TurkishElections pic.twitter.com/CqclIJfmiV

— Al Mayadeen English (@MayadeenEnglish) May 12, 2023

Furthermore, the current inflation rate stands at 45%, having reached 80% just a few months ago. These economic conditions are exerting immense pressure on Erdogan.

Moreover, for the first time in modern Turkish history, the majority of opposition parties have come together in a unified front to challenge and overthrow Erdogan’s rule.

Emphasizing these crucial points, it can be concluded that Erdogan’s accomplishment in the presidential elections is a significant victory. He successfully thwarted the opposition’s attempt to secure the presidency in the first round.

All eyes are on #Turkey as citizens cast their votes, determining the fate of their country's future.
Why are these elections important?
Stay tuned for #AlMayadeen's coverage of the #TurkishElections. #Turkeyelection2023 @LeaAAkil pic.twitter.com/cBBCJfrGR6

— Al Mayadeen English (@MayadeenEnglish) May 14, 2023

Erdogan in the second round, what to expect? 

Erdogan is now expected to be successful in the second round and here’s why. Strengthening this argument, the first reason is of psychological significance as Erdogan surpassed Kilicdaroglu by a margin of four points. Furthermore, the ruling coalition’s achievement of a parliamentary majority serves as another crucial factor. In the event of a runoff election, Erdogan will have the opportunity to appeal to undecided and unaligned voters who prioritize political stability when making their voting choices.

Erdogan will assert that he alone possesses the ability to uphold political stability and prevent a potential clash between the executive presidency and the legislative institution. With the ruling coalition’s current dominance in the legislative power, Erdogan will emphasize that this is a critical aspect to be considered. By highlighting his role in preserving the harmony between the branches of government, he aims to reassure voters that he is the best candidate to ensure a stable and functioning political system. 

That said, the division within the Good Party in response to Kilicdaroglu’s alliance with the HDP serves as a significant motivation for voters in their search for political stability. The opposition party’s decision to form a coalition with the HDP has created a rift among its members and supporters. This division raises concerns about the party’s coherence and its ability to provide a stable and united front against Erdogan’s ruling coalition. In light of these circumstances, voters who prioritize political stability may lean towards Erdogan, viewing him as a more reliable option in comparison to the opposition.

Nationalist votes tip the balance 

Following Muharrem Ince’s withdrawal, Sinan Ogan emerged as a prominent figure and showcased unexpected strength in the polls. However, in the event of a runoff round, Ogan’s support base would likely be divided into two factions. This division could potentially weaken the opposition’s collective strength and impact their ability to challenge Erdogan. The fragmented support for Ogan would present a challenge for the opposition in uniting their voter base and rallying behind a single candidate.

The first part consists of a small, solid bloc that accounts for around 1.5% to 2% of the votes. The second part, which is more significant, includes the nationalist votes that shifted their support away from the Good Party due to Kilicdaroglu’s alliance with the HDP. These nationalist votes have now aligned themselves with the ATA-Alliance after Ince’s withdrawal.

Earlier today, Ogan said that he will announce who he will vote for, within a day or two, depending on negotiations and consultations. He stressed that his decision is based on “red lines,” such as fighting terrorism, moving away from political parties supported by terrorist parties, and the return of Syrian refugees. He considered that the opposition “made a mistake somewhere,” because they failed to win the elections despite all the factors, which he considers are enough to cost Erdogan another term. 

It is worth stressing that before this statement, ATA Alliance Presidential Candidate Sinan Oğan denied that the Nation Alliance said it would support Kilicdaroglo only if HDP was excluded from the political system, after an interview with Der Spiegel. 

Hayırdır Der Spiegel, size verdiğim röportajda Türk basınına dediğimiz genel şartlardan farklı bir şey demedik. Bunu nereden uydurdunuz? https://t.co/n4QcDHF7Ht

— Dr. Sinan Oğan (@DrSinanOgan) May 15, 2023

The key factor influencing the voting behavior of the nationalist bloc in the runoff round will primarily be the nationalist ideology criterion. The nationalist voters will consider the candidates’ stances and policies regarding nationalist issues, including issues related to national identity, sovereignty, and the protection of national interests. Their decision will be driven by their alignment with the candidate who they perceive as most committed to promoting and advancing nationalist values and goals.

Far-right ATA Alliance nominee Sinan Ogan tells Al Mayadeen that nationalism is on the rise around the globe but in #Turkey, it is not exclusionary.@LeaAAkil pic.twitter.com/IDzbkAVNhC

— Al Mayadeen English (@MayadeenEnglish) May 4, 2023

The nationalist bloc opposes Erdogan and expresses criticism towards the government’s policies, including economic policies. However, their main concern lies with Kilicdaroglu due to his alliance with the HDP. They perceive the HDP as a political front for the PKK, the Kurdistan Workers’ Party. Given this perspective, the nationalist bloc may lean towards supporting Erdogan in the presidential elections, as they view him as a candidate who aligns more closely with their nationalist values and is less associated with the HDP and its alleged connections to the PKK. Even if the nationalist bloc in the opposition alliance decides to remain neutral in the runoff round, analysts suggest it is impossible for them to vote for Kilicdaroglu. 

In a case where they also don’t vote for Erdogan, the voter behavior is not expected to change drastically. Analysts suggest that if voters choose not to vote for either candidate, Erdogan will still benefit as long as he maintains a 4-point lead over Kilicdaroglu. It is worth emphasizing that the matter of winning the parliamentary elections is crucial and will have an impact on the presidential elections in the runoff round. Erdogan will be able to address the bloc of undecided voters who want to see political stability in Turkey, which they associate with economic recovery.

During the runoff round, undecided voters could conclude that electing Kilicdaroglu could trigger a power struggle between the legislative and executive branches. Since the legislative power is currently dominated by the ruling coalition and the executive power is controlled by the opposition, a political impasse is very likely. Based on that, analysts argue that the best scenario for Kilicdaroglu in the runoff round is if the nationalist votes don’t vote for Erdogan, since it is not likely for them to give their votes to Kilicdaroglu. In this case, Erdogan will be able to maintain what he achieved in the first round.

Related Stories

• Erdogan Heading for a Runoff in Turkey’s Knife-Edge Elections
• Election expression of Turkey democratic maturity: Erdogan
• Erdogan continues leading polls despite shrinking gap
• Nationalist votes up for grabs as Ince exits presidential race

Al Mayadeen launches its special coverage of Turkish elections

May 1, 2023

Source: Al Mayadeen Net

By Al Mayadeen English 

Al Mayadeen begins its special coverage to follow up on Turkey’s elections.

Supporters of the Republican People’s Party, CHP, wave Turkish flags, and one with a portrait of Kemal Ataturk, right, as they celebrate after preliminary results of the local elections were announced in Ankara, Turkey, April 1, 2019. (AP)

An MP fpr the Justice and Development Party, Iffet Polat, told Al Mayadeen that her party’s goal is to focus on winning these elections, adding that she was hopeful this goal would be achieved.

Presidential elections are scheduled to take place in Turkey on May 14, 2023. Voters will elect a new president for a term of five years.

During a special coverage that Al Mayadeen began Monday, Polat indicated that she is confident “the outcome of the presidential elections being decided in the first round in favor of the head of the Justice and Development Party, Recep Tayyip Erdogan,” adding that the AKP was able to achieve much for the people of Turkey.

هدفنا هو أن نركز على الفوز في هذه الانتخابات ولدينا أمل في تحقيق ذلك.

النائبة عن حزب العدالة والتنمية افت بولوت لـ #الميادين.#الميادين #تركيا #الانتخابات_التركية#تركيا_بوسفور_الانتخابات pic.twitter.com/ej969gKNNW

— قناة الميادين (@AlMayadeenNews) May 1, 2023

Al Mayadeen’s correspondent Omar Kayed explained that the electoral campaign battles in Turkey are neck and neck in Ankara, as it is a crucial region for several reasons. Firstly it is the capital and the seat of decision-making. Second, because it is the area with the second-largest number of parliamentary seats. And lastly, because the city has been in the grip of the AKP since the party’s foundation. 

كيف تبدو أجواء الانتخابات التركية والتنافس بين المرشحين في #أنقرة؟

موفد #الميادين إلى #أنقرة عمر كايد.@kayed_omar pic.twitter.com/uFCn0l3OtK

— قناة الميادين (@AlMayadeenNews) May 1, 2023

Last Thursday, voting in the general elections for Parliamentary and Presidential opened to Turkish nationals abroad. 

An opinion poll published by the American Al-Monitor website showed a statistical tie between Turkish President Rcep Tayyip Erdogan and his main opponent, opposition leader Kemal Kilicdaroglu.

Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan is facing the biggest challenge to his 20-year rule due to economic issues and the high cost of living, not to mention that victims of the earthquake are reconsidering where their loyalties lie after the disaster struck.

Related News

• Bombs, Exploitation and Terrorism: The Many Wars of Qatar
• FMs of Syria, Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Egypt and Iraq Meet in Amman, Call for Terror Eradication, Refugees Return 
• Amman Hosts 5-Party Meeting on Syria’s Return to Arab League
• Syrian Security Seizes More ISIS Weapons in Daraa Countryside
• Syrian Security Seizes More ISIS Weapons in Daraa Countryside
• Iran Arrests Individuals Charged with Ties to French Spies
• Iran: We’ve Hit “Israel” from Within

Russian-Turkish ‘co-opetition’ from Syria to Nagorno-Karabakh

March 17 2023

At a time when conflicts are increasingly interconnected, and provide tactical levers to assert pressure elsewhere, the competition between Russia-Iran and Turkiye in Syria and the South Caucasus is destined to overlap.

Photo Credit: The Cradle

By Yeghia Tashjian

Despite their robust diplomatic relations, Turkiye has been in direct competition with Russia and Iran in two major Asian conflict zones, Syria and Nagarno-Karabakh, tying together the fates of the Levant and the South Caucasus in any future resolution.

While Ankara seeks to establish its authority over northern Syria and advance Turkic hegemony in key Caucasian states like Azerbaijan for geopolitical advantage, Moscow and Tehran’s goals in these two theaters are to reduce US influence and promote long-term economic interdependence between regional and local states that will stabilize and enrich the region.

Despite these differences, there has been a flurry of meetings between senior Syrian and Turkish officials, with Russia hosting direct dialogues between their respective defense ministers and intelligence agency chiefs.

The desire to garner pre-election voter favor by Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan, and the devastating earthquakes that struck the Turkish-Syrian border towns, have played a role in facilitating the recent rapprochement between Ankara and Damascus.

However, it is unlikely that there will be full diplomatic normalization anytime soon due to the status of Idlib, the militant stronghold in northern Syria currently controlled by Turkiye and its proxies. Russia currently appears to favor maintaining the status quo in Idlib until rapprochement talks advance further.

Leveraging conflicts against each other

The resolution of the Syrian crisis depends on the outcome of regional developments, international disputes, and ongoing diplomatic struggles between Ankara and Moscow as they seek to consolidate or expand their influence in different regions, including in Syria and the South Caucasus.

The two conflicts, particularly the Nagorno-Karabakh dispute between Armenia and Azerbaijan, share some similarities. Both regions are characterized by significant ethnic and religious diversity, are heavily influenced by regional powers Russia, Iran, and Turkiye, and are in the strategic sights of global superpowers such as China and the US. As a result, the two conflicts have become internationalized, and local actors are unable to reach a resolution without external guarantees.

The South Caucasus is composed of three states – Georgia, Armenia, and Azerbaijan – each with a different foreign policy orientation. Georgia is committed to partnering with Euro-Atlantic and European institutions, while Armenia is a member of the Russian-led Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) military alliance.

Meanwhile, Azerbaijan and Turkiye are military allies that share similar worldviews, to the extent that Ankara’s decision to support one of the conflicting parties in Ukraine may prompt Baku to adopt a similar stance. Such is today’s increasing connection between local and international conflict – largely because major powers have inserted themselves into these regional disputes.

In addition, instability in the South Caucasus – a strategic geography for future trade routes that will empower Asia’s new hegemons – could create challenges that will impact trade and economic relations between regional states and their neighbors.

Recent developments indicate that Moscow believes its current troop deployment in Nagorno-Karabakh is sufficient to secure Russia’s long-term interests in Baku. However, this position is constantly challenged by Turkiye-backed Azerbaijan, especially following the signing of the Shushi Declaration on June 2021.

Azerbaijan: A major non-Nato ally

The declaration aimed to strengthen military, security, and diplomatic ties between the two Turkic countries and has led to Ankara’s regional ascension at Moscow’s expense. The Shushi Declaration has solidified Azerbaijan’s military and security relations with key NATO member Turkiye, with Baku reforming its army and increasing its special forces units using NATO standards.

According to Ahmad Alili from the Baku-based Caucasus Policy Analysis Center, Azerbaijan has transformed into a “major non-NATO ally” for Turkiye, similar to the role of Israel, Egypt, and Japan for the US:

“With Georgia having publicly declared NATO and EU aspirations, and Azerbaijan having closer military and diplomatic links with NATO member Turkiye, the region loses its ‘Russian backyard’ status and becomes a ‘Russian-Turkish’ playground.”

This development has prompted Moscow to increase its soft pressure over Baku and sign an “allied declaration” in February 2022 to solidify its political presence in the region. In the process, however, Armenia has found itself encircled by Turkiye and Azerbaijan without any land connection to Russia and thus, pushed into a corner.

Russian and Turkish ‘frenmity’  

Though Ankara and Moscow have an understanding of each other’s red lines in Syria, Turkiye’s aspiration to play a greater role in the South Caucasus has put its relationship with Russia to the test.

The 2020 outbreak of the second Nagorno-Karabakh war provided Turkiye with a unique opportunity to expand its influence in its immediate neighborhood – which has remained, since 1828, in Moscow’s sphere of national interest. To challenge Russia, Turkiye provided full active military and diplomatic support to Azerbaijan in its war against Armenia over Nagorno-Karabakh.

During the war, both Moscow and Ankara played tit-for-tat against each other. Observers noticed that while Russia was rather defensive in its own South Caucasus “backyard,” it was prepared to go on the offensive in Syria by bombing Turkish and Turkiye-backed rebel positions in Idlib.

By exerting pressure on Ankara in the Syrian theater, Moscow was attempting to balance its vulnerabilities and put Turkiye on notice over their other competitions. It didn’t seem to work. Turkiye made an offensive play in Russia’s own backyard, inaugurating, in November 2020, the connection of the Trans-Adriatic Pipeline (TAP) to the Trans-Anatolian Pipeline (TANAP), which enables Caspian Sea gas to reach southern Europe through Turkiye, bypassing Russia.

This project is crucial for Ankara as it transforms Turkiye from an importer to a transit route for gas. The geopolitical nature of this project aims to decrease Europe’s gas dependency on Moscow.

Not seeing eye-to-eye

On the diplomatic front, Turkiye has attempted to launch an “Astana style” deconfliction process for Nagorno-Karabakh. However, Moscow has not been keen to engage on a purely bilateral track with Ankara in its post-Soviet regions, as this runs the risk of legitimizing Turkiye’s intervention and presence in Russia’s backyard.

For this reason, Maxim Suchkov, a Moscow-based expert at the Russian International Affairs Council (RIAC), explains that Russia chose not to directly intervene in the war, taking a “watch and see approach,” which distressed its Armenian ally to no end.

Suchkov noted that if Azerbaijan had managed to occupy Stepanakert, the Nagorno-Karabakh capital, Turkiye’s gambit would have paid off, and its influence in the region would only accelerate. But this would have led to the ethnic cleansing of Armenians and to Yerevan blaming Moscow for its inaction – and by losing its only regional military ally, Russia would have potentially lost the whole region. Instead, Russia tried to satisfy Baku while not completely alienating Yerevan, which was crushed during Baku’s autumn 2020 blitzkrieg.

Consequently, the 10 November, 2020 trilateral statement brokered by Russia that ended the Nagorno-Karabakh war did not favor Turkiye’s aspirations. Despite pushing for a complete Azerbaijani victory – or at least the deployment of Turkish peacekeepers alongside Russian forces – Ankara’s requests were denied.

Regardless, Turkiye has managed to become an active player in shaping the new geopolitical landscape of the region. While Russia has expressed dissatisfaction with Turkish intervention in its traditional sphere of influence and has established some “red lines,” it has also been forced to recognize Turkiye as a junior player in the region, though parity in the post-conflict regional order still remains in Moscow’s favor.

Post-2020 regional order

However, the ongoing military conflict in Ukraine has had a significant impact on the balance of power in the South Caucasus. As hostilities between the west and Russia continue to spike, the region has become a new confrontation zone, with Azerbaijan and Armenia both seeking to secure their vital interests under cover of the Great Power competition.

While Yerevan’s immediate interest is to protect the safety of the local Armenian population in Nagorno-Karabakh, Azerbaijan seeks to resolve the Karabakh issue through brute force, which, if successful, could greatly reduce Moscow’s regional clout, particularly as its peacekeeper mandate is set to expire in 2025.

Despite the 2020 trilateral statement, it appears that a long-lasting peace is still far off. A prime example of the many differences that remain unresolved between Yerevan and Baku is their contrasting interpretation of the statement’s ninth article.

Azerbaijan insists that Armenia must provide a “corridor” through Syunik (southern Armenia) to connect the Azerbaijani mainland to the Nakhichevan exclave, which Baku calls the “Zangezur corridor.”

Armenia rejects this claim, arguing that the article only references the restoration of communication channels (such as highways and railways), with both sides able to access and utilize the routes. But Baku has raised the stakes by threatening to block the Lachin corridor if Armenia does not provide access to the Syunik corridor. Yerevan, in turn, maintains that the status of the Lachin corridor should not be linked to the opening of these communication channels.

Iran’s red line

This has prompted neighboring Iran to make a “comeback” to the South Caucasus, by warning that any territorial changes to the Armenian-Iranian border would constitute a red line for Tehran. Iran believes that such changes could threaten its own geopolitical interests, which include its stake in the strategic Moscow-Tehran-New Delhi-backed International North-South Transport Corridor (INSTC).

With Azerbaijan’s brutal blockade of the Lachin corridor – the only land route connecting Nagorno-Karabakh to Armenia – Russian troops remain the sole guarantors of the security of Karabakh Armenians. But contrary to what many analysts have predicted, the defeat of Armenia in the 2020 war has not diminished Russian influence in Armenia.

In fact, Russia has gained even more influence there, despite Yerevan’s growing frustration with Moscow’s inability to deter Azerbaijani attacks on sovereign Armenian territory. Baku officials have exacerbated matters by stating that they are not in favor of renewing the Russian peacekeeping mandate in 2025, and will instead push for the “reintegration” of the region into Azerbaijan.

If Baku succeeds in its objective and engages in demographic engineering in the region – forcing Armenians to leave Nagorno-Karabakh – there will no longer be a justification for Russian presence in the region, and Moscow will lose its leverage over the entire South Caucasus.

A Nagorno-Karabakh scenario in Syria?

The Nagorno-Karabakh conflict has highlighted Moscow’s success in preserving its influence in the region, despite Turkiye’s attempt to shrink Russian clout. However, the ongoing crisis in Ukraine, and its uncertain outcome, is also playing out in the South Caucasus.

As the world shifts from a US-led unipolar order to multipolarity, Azerbaijan and Armenia, like many other nations in conflict, are having to make strategic decisions on whether they align their interests with Russia or the west. Neutrality – when the major power stakes are this high – is unlikely to serve the vital interests of either country.

As such, mounting pressure on Erdogan to consolidate his power in Turkiye’s upcoming elections may force him to make concessions to one axis over the other. Such a move could have a significant impact on Baku and may lead to these “brotherly” nations ending up in opposing global camps.

Furthermore, the possibility of the US withdrawing its troops from northeastern Syria, coupled with the unclear political future of Syrian Kurds, their parallel economy, and autonomous governing structures, creates a risk of a sub-regional power vacuum.

This could push Turkiye and Russia towards managing or enhancing their cooperative rivalry, though it remains to be seen whether Russia can strike a game-changing deal between the Kurds and Damascus – which could gain Moscow leverage with Ankara in the South Caucasus.

The Ukraine war could present an obstacle to Russian diplomatic initiatives. Russia’s reluctance to counter Azerbaijan’s incursions and ceasefire violations after getting mired in the Ukraine war suggests that Moscow may not be up to the task of brokering a Nagorno-Karabakh-style peacekeeping scenario for Syria’s Kurds.

Hence, the Syrian crisis may remain frozen until relations between Ankara and Damascus are normalized – or Turkiye threatens further military attacks. The outcome of the Turkish elections on 14 May 2023 will undoubtedly play a significant role in this regard, both in Syria and the South Caucasus.

The views expressed in this article do not necessarily reflect those of The Cradle.

Turkish elections: Can Erdogan maintain his grip on power?

March 02 2023

The outcome of Turkiye’s upcoming vote could determine whether Ankara returns to a western-oriented foreign policy, or if Erdogan strengthens the country’s autonomous direction.

Photo Credit: The Cradle

By Mohamad Hasan Sweidan

As the centenary of the founding of the Turkish Republic approaches, Turkiye faces one of the most important elections in its history. Most importantly, the upcoming parliamentary and presidential elections, currently slated for May, could lead to major shifts in the country’s foreign policy.

But the February earthquakes that devastated swathes southern Turkiye have compounded the pressures on Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan, who was already dealing with a number of internal and external vulnerabilities that could lead to his electoral ousting.

Erdogan has described the earthquake as “the largest disaster the country has witnessed since the Erzincan earthquake in 1939.” Currently presiding over a deteriorating domestic economy, he has become an easy target for negative media campaigns, faces an unusually united front of opposition parties, and is the subject of constant attacks from the west, who support the Turkish opposition both politically and in the media. Despite these challenges, Erdogan is looking to cling to power by any means necessary.

Turkiye’s Military Coups

In modern Turkiye, one well-trodden path to abrupt power shifts has been the “military coup”: the country experienced four of these between 1923 and 2000. All were preceded by some common factors, including domestic economic deterioration and improving ties with the Soviet Union or Iran, especially after the Islamic Revolution in 1979. The combined result of these coups was to reaffirm Turkiye’s loyalty to the western axis and to halt rapprochement with Moscow or Tehran.

Two decades ago, when Erdogan was first elected as prime minister, Turkiye was governed under a parliamentary system. But a 2017 constitutional referendum transformed it into a presidential one, where the authority of the parliament and cabinet diminished in relation to the presidency. Erdogan understood from the onset that the key to his survival in power was to prevent economic decline and to contain the influence of the military over civilian authority.

Consequently, his government has implemented policies to reduce the powers of the Turkish military, extend full state control over the army, and reduce its grip on political power. This has inhibited the army’s ability to overthrow civilian power centers whenever it wants.

Erdogan used the pretext of joining the EU to launch a reform process in Turkiye, enacting national laws that were more compatible with European standards, including respect for freedoms. Through these reforms, a body of laws was amended, limiting the powers of military justice and subjecting military personnel to common law. The Erdogan government has also ousted secular military figures over alleged links to terrorist organizations.

The ruling  Justice and Development Party (AKP) continued to work towards limiting the role of Turkiye’s armed forces, and after a long and taxing process of normalizing civil-military relations, Erdogan was able to gain full civilian control of the Turkish military following the 2016 coup attempt.

This move limited the military’s traditional status and role as guardian of the republic, and after achieving this milestone, economic pressure became Ankara’s only tool for change. The ballot box has thus become the only means of overthrowing the Turkish president, as the military, which was previously a means of reorienting Turkiye whenever it veered from its pro-west orientation, is now subordinate to political authority in Ankara.

A western or independent foreign policy

It is worth noting that Erdogan’s Turkiye is no longer viewed as the “Turkish model,” which was once widely lauded as a democratic, Islamic leadership in a secular, pro-western country. At the beginning of the twenty-first century, Turkiye was seen as an example of a western-allied Islamic power, and its positive relationship with the US provided evidence for Washington that its wars in Afghanistan and Iraq were wars against terror, and not Islam.

However, today, Turkiye has lost this vaunted ‘status,’ and the US and EU increasingly view Erdogan as helming an undemocratic authority. As a result, Ankara was not invited to attend the Summit of Democracies held by Washington in December 2021, because countries like Turkiye have been “undermining their democratic systems for years.”

A report issued by the European Commission on 19 October, 2021 also criticized the performance of Turkish institutions, stating:

“There are serious deficiencies in the functioning of Turkiye’s democratic institutions. Democratic backsliding continued during the reporting period…The constitutional architecture continued to centralise powers at the level of the Presidency without ensuring a sound and effective separation of powers between the executive, legislative and the judiciary.”

The west’s primary concern with Erdogan is his pursuit of an autonomous foreign policy that may clash with western interests. Erdogan’s policies after the 2011 Arab uprisings, which conflicted with western interests in Libya and Egypt – as well as his support for Turkish Cypriot independence, ongoing tensions with Greece, Turkiye’s growing ties with Russia and Iran, and rejection of Sweden and Finland’s accession to NATO – have all contributed to growing western dissatisfaction with Erdogan’s leadership.

In order to pursue his foreign policy goals, Erdogan has strengthened his position domestically, notably through the 2017 referendum that transformed Turkiye’s government into a presidential system and consolidated his power.

This has left the west with few options to influence change in Turkiye, limiting their options to supporting a fragmented opposition, applying economic, political, and media pressure on the AKP, and working toward establishing an opposition coalition that can defeat Erdogan at the ballot box.

As US-European policies begin to re-unify after the Trump era, and with the year-old conflict in Ukraine still escalating, Erdogan’s independent policies are increasingly seen as unacceptable, with demands that Turkiye reposition itself within the western axis. This is despite the fact that the west recognizes the world order is shifting toward a more inclusive, multipolar one. According to US Secretary of State Antony Blinken, “we’re no longer in the post-Cold War era. There’s a competition on to shape what comes next.”

Erdogan’s vision for his country’s place in the new world order differs from Washington’s: He seeks to position Turkiye as a regional power with interests in both the east and west, while the US wants Turkiye’s regional clout to be exercised in concert with western interests, and aligned against Russia and Iran.

To achieve western objectives, Turkiye must return to being a secular, pro-western state. Thus, Erdogan’s defeat in the next election is crucial for Ankara to return to the western fold as a fully committed ally.

The quake’s aftershocks

The devastating earthquakes in Turkiye have had far-reaching political and economic impact, with Erdogan’s opponents leading charges that his government lacked all basic emergency preparations for the disaster. Influential media outlets, both domestic and international, have heavily criticized Ankara’s earthquake response initiatives, which have morphed into a wider campaign against Erdogan.

In a way, the catastrophe was an unexpected gift to Erdogan’s opponents, who, from the very outset, blamed the Turkish president. Kemal Kilicdaroglu, who leads Turkiye’s main opposition, the Republican People’s Party (CHP), said:

“If there is anyone responsible for this process, it is Erdogan. It is this ruling party that has not prepared the country for an earthquake for 20 years.”

To counter the criticism, Erdogan has initiated steps to help those affected by the earthquake, promising to rebuild damaged buildings within a year, and pay rents while the reconstruction is underway. He has also been filmed and photographed while participating in the burial of victims and inspecting the conditions of affected families, particularly by pro-AKP media.

However, the economic impact of the earthquake – a loss of $2.9 billion in manpower, according to a report by Turkish business group Turkonfed – and damage to infrastructure, including roads, electricity grids, hospitals, and schools, estimated at $84 billion, constituting around 10 percent of Turkiye’s GDP – will have severe repercussions for the Turkish economy.

Who is Erdogan up against?

The 2019 local elections in Turkiye demonstrated the opposition’s ability to win in municipalities previously dominated by the AKP, notably in Istanbul and Ankara. Erdogan’s surprise and discontent with voting results were evident in his demands for re-election in Istanbul. Instead, the rerun resulted in a significant increase in votes for the opposition at the expense of Erdogan’s candidate.

Image 1: Map distributing the results of the 2019 municipal elections in Turkiye

For Washington to be rid of Erdogan, it will be necessary to establish a strong alliance against the Turkish strongman. The “Alliance of Six,” which includes six opposition parties seeking to agree on a single candidate for the upcoming presidential elections, is an example of this strategy.

The following is a table of the key political parties in Turkiye:

The different orientations of these parties, as shown in the table above, are perhaps one of the main reasons why the Alliance of Six has failed to rally around a single candidate. To minimize competition within the opposition, it is likely that CHP leader Kilicdaroglu and Istanbul Mayor Ekrem Imamoglu will be the top contenders for the position, with the former currently most in favor.

If the Alliance of Six wins power, it could lead to a more western-aligned Turkiye that is less inclined toward foreign policy autonomy. The opposition coalition’s manifesto, which spans 240 pages and includes 2,300 points, highlights the importance of restoring “mutual trust” with the US, pursuing Turkiye’s goal of “full membership in the European Union,” and seeking the reinstatement of Turkiye’s involvement in the F-35 fighter jet program. Ankara was ejected from the program after it purchased Russian-made S-400 missiles following the failed 2016 coup attempt, which is often viewed by Turks as being US-instigated.

The following chart depicts the positions of opposition parties on a number of foreign policy topics:

The survival of Turkiye’s autonomous foreign policy

Erdogan is acutely aware that the upcoming elections will pose the greatest challenge of his political career. In order to secure a victory, he may have to make bold decisions that were previously unimaginable.

This conviction is further reinforced by the west’s support for the Turkish opposition and their desire to replace Erdogan with a more compliant candidate. With the Turkish elections expected to take place between May and July, and with ongoing western pressure on the Turkish leader, Erdogan has been forced to strengthen cooperation with those who want him to remain in power.

This is one of the main reasons why Turkiye’s relations with Russia have strengthened both economically and politically, and why Erdogan has sought to normalize relations with the Syrian government and improve ties with Iran.

Erdogan realized early on that he would not be the west’s favored candidate in the upcoming elections. In response, he shifted his foreign strategy to increase his chances of retaining power in Ankara. In 2022, he paid visits to the UAE in February and Saudi Arabia in May, and launched initiatives to improve relations with Israel, Egypt, and Syria.

Erdogan has also recognized that his political survival is aligned with Russian President Vladimir Putin’s interests, as his successor would likely be a candidate fully compliant with the west. This was one of the primary reasons for the continued Russian-Turkish rapprochement.

That, and the fact that Turkish public sentiment has broadly shifted in favor of Russia – and away from the US – as revealed in a December 2022 poll, where nearly two-thirds of Turks supported relations with Moscow.

Undoubtedly, the earthquakes that struck Turkiye and Syria have complicated matters for Erdogan. However, he has long demonstrated his ability to turn threats into opportunities by shifting tactics advantageously. His ace for many years has also been to capitalize on his opposition’s weaknesses, fragmentation, and inability to unite effectively against him.

The views expressed in this article do not necessarily reflect those of The Cradle.

AKP Alliance of Six CHPEarthquake Egypt EU Iran Israel NATO opposition parties

U.S. Declares War on Turkish Tourism Economy

February 7, 2023

Source

Steven Sahiounie is a Syrian American award-winning journalist based in Syria. He is specialized on the Middle East. He has also appeared on TV and radio in Canada, Russia, Iran, Syria, China, Lebanon, and the United States.

By Steven Sahiounie

On February 3, the Turkish interior minister, Suleyman Soylu, blasted the U.S. Ambassador to Turkey, Jeffry L. Flake, saying, “Take your dirty hands off of Turkey.”

The outrage was prompted after Washington and eight European countries issued travel warnings over possible terror attacks in Turkey. The U.S. and its western allies have attempted to connect a recent Quran burning in Sweden with travel danger inside Turkey. Muslim countries worldwide have denounced the burning as hate speech, not free speech, but this has no apparent connection to travel safety issues inside Turkey.

The U.S. travel warning is tantamount to a declaration of economic war on Turkey who is in an economic downturn of its tourism sector, which was 11 % of the GDP in 2019, representing $78.2 billion, and rose to $17.95 billion in the third quarter of 2022, of which 85.7 percent came from foreign visitors. In 2018, tourism directly accounted for 7.7% of total employment in Turkey.

“Every American ambassador wonders how they can hurt Turkey. This has been one of Turkey’s greatest misfortunes over the years. It gathers other ambassadors and tries to give them advice. They are doing the same thing in Europe, the American embassy is running Europe,” said Soylu.

Soylu has criticized the U.S. and blames Washington for the 2016 Turkish regime change attempt, and has accused the U.S. of ruling Europe. In foreign policies, the EU follows U.S. directives implicitly.

“I’m being very clear. I very well know how you would like to create strife in Turkey. Take your grinning face off from Turkey,” said Soylu.

Ankara warned its citizens abroad to be aware of possible anti-Islamic attacks in the U.S. and Europe following the burning of the Quran in Sweden. Turkey later summoned the nine ambassadors, including Flake, for talks over the warnings.

Soylu condemned the European consulate closures in Turkey as an attempt to meddle in campaigning for Turkey’s presidential and parliamentary elections, which are scheduled for May 14.

Soylu and Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan have suggested that the western states had issued the security warnings in order to pressure Turkey to tone down its criticism of the Quran burning and resolve the NATO dispute in which Erdogan has voiced opposition to Sweden joining the bloc.

After a right-wing Swedish Radical Christian burned the Quran in front of the Turkish embassy in Stockholm, Erdogan threatened that he would never consent to Swedish accession.

Sweden previously has refused to extradite the 120 terrorists Turkey has demanded, and the U.S. Senate has made it clear that if Turkey does not approve Swedish accession, arms sales to Turkey, specifically F-16s, will not be authorized.

Turkish elections

Turkish elections are scheduled for May 14, and will be the toughest reelection fight of Erdogan’s career, and he and his Justice and Development Party (AKP) may lose the election.

The six-party opposition coalition, composed of two larger and four smaller parties, has managed to present a unified front. The opposition to Erdogan support the restoration of Turkey’s parliamentary system and the curtailment of presidential powers.

Erdogan’s fear has grown so strong that he used the courts to ban a leading potential opposition candidate, Istanbul Mayor Ekrem Imamoglu, from running for the CHP. However, polls suggest that Ankara’s mayor, Mansur Yavas, could beat Erdogan.

The state has more overtly targeted some political parties, especially the pro-Kurdish, People’s Democracy Party (HDP). This left-leaning party was not invited into the opposition coalition, but HDP supporters will vote against Erdogan.

Biden supports opposition to Erdogan

U.S. President Joe Biden hosted an emergency meeting on Nov. 16 in Bali, Indonesia, with NATO and EU leaders to discuss a response to a missile blast in Poland, but Turkey was not invited. The meeting was held during the Group of 20 summit, and Turkey was present, but Biden snubbed them from the emergency meeting.

Turkey has been a full-fledged member of North Atlantic Treaty Organization since 1952, commands its second-largest military and has protected the southern flank of the alliance for 70 years.

Erdogan was again snubbed by Biden in December 2021 at the U.S. hosted virtual ‘Summit for Democracy’. In a New York Times interview published in 2020, the then candidate Biden called Erdogan an “autocrat.”

“What I think we should be doing is taking a very different approach to him now, making it clear that we support opposition leadership,” Biden said.

“He has to pay a price,” Biden said, adding that Washington should embolden Turkish opposition leaders “to be able to take on and defeat Erdogan. Not by a coup, not by a coup, but by the electoral process.”

Turkey recognized a clear attack by Biden using election meddling as a tool.

“The days of ordering Turkey around are over. But if you still think you can try, be our guest. You will pay the price.” Erdogan’s spokesman Ibrahim Kalin tweeted.

The main opposition CHP party quickly distanced themselves from Biden’s remarks of election meddling, calling for “respect for the sovereignty of Turkey”.

Turkey’s six-party opposition will select its candidate to run against Erdogan on February 13, CHP leader Kemal Kilicdaroglu said.

Obama and Erdogan

When President Obama conceived of his attack in Syria for regime change in 2011, using Radical Islamic terrorists as his foot soldiers, he called upon Erdogan to play a crucial role. Turkey hosted the CIA office which ran the Timber Sycamore program which trained and provided weapons for the Free Syrian Army. Erdogan also took in over 3 million Syria refugees fleeing the violence. Erdogan authorized his security forces to transport weapons to the terrorists in Syria.

Erdogan was a follower of the Muslim Brotherhood who provided the political ideology for the Free Syrian Army (FSA), who were terrorists attacking unarmed civilians, but were reported by the U.S. and western media as ‘rebels’.

However, the FSA disbanded due to lack of public support in Syria, and Al Qaeda stepped in the take its place, and finally ISIS emerged as the toughest terrorist group.

In 2017, President Trump cut off the CIA program in Turkey, and supporting of the Al Qaeda branch in Idlib, Hayat Tahrir al-Sham was left to Erdogan. The U.S.-NATO attack on Syria failed to produce regime change, but the country was partly destroyed in the process. Now, Erdogan proposes a reset in relations with Damascus, and is on track to establish business and diplomatic ties once more.

The U.S. State Department has issued warnings and threats to Erdogan if he follows through on his plan to have a neighborly relationship with Syria. Erdogan needs to make peace with Syria to return the 3.6 million Syrian refugees back home, and revive exports to Syria which will be a huge boost to the Turkish economy. If he accomplishes this soon, he has a good chance at winning reelection in May.

Kurds-PKK-YPG

A deadly terrorist bombing of a shopping district in Istanbul last November was carried out by a Syrian Kurd. The message was directed at Erdogan: don’t attack the YPG in north east Syria, or else. Those Kurds are supported by the U.S. military illegally occupying parts of Syria.

The U.S. partnered with the YPG to fight the ISIS, and both Erdogan and the opposition view that as a betrayal of a fellow NATO member, and U.S. ally. The YPG is directly linked with the PKK, an internationally designated terrorist organization and a threat to Turkey’s national security.

Erdogan has threatened a new military operation in Syria to disarm the YPG regardless of their U.S. partnership. The Syrian special enjoy under Trump, James Jeffrey, advised the Kurds to repair their relationship with Damascus, as the U.S. was not going to fight any war to defend them. The Kurd’s usefulness to the U.S. was over. Recently, the Turkish air force has been bombing them, with shells falling a few hundred feet from U.S. personnel stationed there.

Erdogan has asked Russian President Vladimir Putin for a green light to attack the Kurds in Syria, but was cautioned against it. However, the time might be ripe for a Turkish attack on the Kurds, which would disarm them and probably would lead to a withdrawal of the 200 American troops.

Turkey removed M4 outpost

On February 2, Turkish troops in Syria evacuated a military outpost near the M4 highway that connects the cities of Aleppo and Latakia. The former Al Qaeda branch in Syria, Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), occupy Idlib, the last terrorist controlled area in Syria.

Turkey had been defending the HTS from attacks from Syrian Arab Army, and the Russian military. However, Erdogan has decided to drop his support of the armed opposition as he repairs his relationship with Syria.

On January 31, Ankara informed the HTS leadership of its plan to conduct patrols on the HTS-controlled portion of the M4 (Aleppo-Latakia) road, which “may be followed by joint patrols with Russia, and eventually with Syria.”

دمشق – أنقرة: تصلّب المواقف يؤخّر الخرق

الإثنين 16 كانون الثاني 2023

لا تزال العملية العسكرية البرية في سوريا «خياراً» تركيّاً مطروحاً على الطاولة (أ ف ب)

محمد نور الدين  

تتزايد الإشارات الصادرة عن الجانبَين التركي والسوري حيال مسألة التطبيع وما يعتيرها من معوّقات لا تزال تحول دون إتمامها. ويجلّي تلك المعوّقات اشتراط الجانب السوري إنهاء الاحتلال التركي كمقدّمة لأيّ مصالحة محتمَلة من جهة، وعودة الأتراك إلى العزف على نغمة التهديد بعملية عسكرية بريّة في الشمال السوري، قالوا إنها لا تزال خياراً مطروحاً، من جهة أخرى. في هذا الوقت، يَظهر الرئيس التركي، رجب طيب إردوغان، التواق إلى إحراز أيّ اختراق يعزِّز من شعبيته المتراجعة قبل الانتخابات، إلى الآن، كَمَن «يبيع سمكاً في الماء»، أقلّه بالنسبة إلى دمشق

صدرت، في اليومَين الماضيَين، عن الجانبَين التركي والسوري، إشارات عكست أنّ «شيئاً ما» يَعترض مسار المصالحة بينهما، وإنْ كان جليّاً أن الطريق ليس سهلاً أو مفروشاً بالورود. ففي حوار إذاعي أبرزته الصحف التركية في صدْر صفحاتها، يوم أمس، تحدّث الناطق باسم الرئاسة، إبراهيم قالين، عن أن العملية العسكرية البرية في سوريا لا تزال «خياراً» مطروحاً على الطاولة، ويمكن أن تُنفَّذ في أيّ لحظة، ووفقاً لمستوى التهديد الأمني. وأعلن قالين أن اجتماعاً لوزراء خارجية تركيا وسوريا وروسيا سيُعقد في أواسط شهر شباط المقبل، وحتى ذلك الحين بإمكان وزراء دفاع الدول الثلاث أن يجتمعوا مجدَّداً، مؤكداً، في الوقت ذاته، أن العملية السلمية ستستمرّ، وأن أنقره تدعمها، وإنْ جدّد الإشارة إلى أن «قوات حماية الشعب» الكردية، و«حزب العمّال الكردستاني» مجموعتان «إرهابيتان» يجب التخلُّص منهما لحماية أمن تركيا. وجاء حديث قالين في أعقاب تأجيل موعد اجتماع وزيرَي خارجية البلدَين، مرّتَين على التوالي: الأولى على إثر الاجتماع الأوّل لوزيرَي دفاع البلدَين في موسكو، في 28 كانون الأوّل الماضي، حين توقّع وزير الخارجية التركي، مولود تشاووش أوغلو، أن ينعقد اللقاء في منتصف كانون الثاني الجاري، ثمّ قال إنه سيجري في مطلع شباط المقبل. والثانية، لدى الإعلان أن وزيرَي الدفاع قد يجتمعان مجدّداً، وهذا يعني أن هناك قضايا لوجستية وميدانية وأمنية وعسكرية لا تزال عالقة، وتحتاج إلى المزيد من التشاور لإيجاد حلول لها. وعلى ضوء نتائج هذه الاجتماعات، يمكن أن ينعقد أو يتأخّر أو لا ينعقد لقاء وزيرَي الخارجية.

وعلى الجانب الآخر، السوري، صدرت مواقف ربّما تكون الأكثر إشارةً إلى دقّة مسار المصالحة، وما يعتريه من تعقيدات لا تُحلّ بمجرّد لقاء أو اثنين أو صورة مشتركة. وفي هذا الإطار، قال الرئيس السوري، بشار الأسد، بعد لقائه المبعوث الروسي إلى سوريا، ألكسندر لافرنتييف، إن «هذه اللقاءات، حتى تكون مثمرة، يجب أن تُبنى على تنسيق وتخطيط مسبقَين بين سوريا وروسيا من أجل الوصول إلى الأهداف والنتائج الملموسة التي تريدها سوريا، انطلاقاً من الثوابت والمبادئ الوطنية للدولة والشعب المبنيّة على إنهاء الاحتلال ووقْف دعم الإرهاب». وجاءت الإشارة الثانية على لسان وزير الخارجية، فيصل المقداد، بعد لقائه نظيره الإيراني، حسين أمير عبد اللهيان، في دمشق، السبت، من أنه «لا يمكن عودة العلاقات الطبيعية بين تركيا وسوريا من دون إزالة الاحتلال التركي». من جهته، تحدّث الوزير الإيراني عن أن أيّ حوار بين دمشق وأنقرة يمثّل خطوة إيجابية تصبّ في مصلحة البلدَين والمنطقة «إذا كان جادّاً»، مؤكداً أن بلاده «تثق ثقة كاملة» بالمواقف والقرارات السورية. ولربّما يعكس ما تقدَّم تشكيكاً إيرانياً في جديّة الجانب التركي، كما أن الحديث عن «ثقة كاملة» بالموقف السوري ربّما يبدو ردّاً على شائعات تباينات الموقف بين طهران ودمشق في شأن المصالحة مع أنقرة. إلى ذلك، عكست تطوّرات ميدانية أيضاً ما يعتري عملية التطبيع من عوائق، من مثل مقتل جنود سوريين في قصف تركي في شمال البلاد، ومن ثم إعلان أنقرة أن أحد جنودها قتل في قصف على قاعدة تركية في ريف حلب، فضلاً عمّا أفيد به من مقتل أربعة جنود سوريين جرّاء اشتباكات عنيفة مع مسلّحي «هيئة تحرير الشام» في ريف اللاذقية.

بات مؤكداً أن اللقاء بين الرئيسَين التركي والسوري لن يجري في الموعد الذي يرغب فيه إردوغان

وفي ضوء المواقف الصادرة عن الجانبَين التركي والسوري وأيضاً الإيراني، بات مؤكداً أن اللقاء بين الرئيسَين التركي والسوري، لن يجري في الموعد الذي يرغب فيه الأول، وربّما تأتي الانتخابات التركية لتطيحه إلى ما بعدها، في حال مضيّ مسار المصالحة قُدُماً. كذلك، تطرح التصريحات المختلفة أكثر من علامة استفهام تتعلّق بأساسيات ومحدّدات التطبيع بين تركيا وسوريا، كما مواقف الأطراف الأخرى، ومنها روسيا وإيران. كما أتت التصريحات «الصارمة» للأسد والمقداد، بعدما لفت المراقبين «تأخُّر» الردّ الرسمي السوري على ما كان يَصدر من مواقف تركية منذ مطلع آب من العام الماضي. وكان كل ما يتعلّق بالمصالحة المفترَضة يأتي من الجانب التركي، وآخرها ما اعتُبر خريطة طريق رسمها إردوغان قبل حوالي شهر ونصف شهر، على أساس لقاءات تتدرّج من المستوى الاستخباري إلى وزراء الدفاع، فالخارجية والرؤساء. وجاء بيان وزارة الدفاع السورية الإيجابي بعد لقاء موسكو، في إطار العموميات، ليُحكى من بعده عن تأجيل لقاء وزيرَي الخارجية ومن ثم اشتراط الأسد، للقاء إردوغان، زوال الاحتلال أوّلاً، ليؤكد الموقف الرسمي السوري الحذر من الرغبة التركية المفاجئة في المصالحة، خصوصاً أن هذه الرغبة لم تقترن إلى الآن بأيّ خطّة عملية ومبرمجة زمنيّاً. وقد انتظرت القيادة السورية اجتماع موسكو لتبني على الشيء مقتضاه، وقد بُني هذا الشيء، أخيراً، على لسان الأسد والمقداد، وعنوانه أن الرئيس التركي «يبيع سمكاً في الماء»، ويُقدّم وعوداً غير مقنعة لدمشق.

في المقابل، فإن العزف التركي الجديد على وتر العملية العسكرية البرّية جاء كما لو أنه ردّ على موقفَي الأسد والمقداد، وأيضاً كمؤشر من شأنه تعزيز التقديرات القائلة بأن تركيا ليست جادّة في عملية التطبيع ولا تريد منها سوى تقطيع الوقت من الآن وحتى الانتخابات الرئاسية في حزيران (وربّما في أيار) المقبل، وأن الأهمّ لإردوغان هو الظهور في صورة مشتركة مع الأسد يستثمرها في الانتخابات الرئاسية، فيما تنتظر دمشق من أنقرة أجوبة واضحة ومفصّلة عن خريطة طريقها للانسحاب من الأراضي السورية وتصفية المسلّحين المعارضين في إدلب والمناطق المحتلّة، بمن فيهم ما يسمّى «الجيش الوطني»، وعدم الاكتفاء، كما قال قالين، بتصفية قوات «قسد».

فيديوات ذات صلة

مقالات ذات صلة

• واشنطن تكثّف جهود العرقلة | تأنٍّ سوريّ في وجه أنقرة: الانسحاب أوّلاً
• قصف مدفعي متبادل على خطوط التماس شمال حلب
• “المصالحة الروسي”: 3 شهداء سوريين بقصف لـ”النصرة” في الشمال السوري
• عبد اللهيان في دمشق: التمهيد لزيارة رئيسي وبحث الملفات الثنائية والإقليمية 
• طهران: سنتسلّم في آذار مقاتلات سوخوي 35 الروسية
• مصير «الذاتية» على المحكّ: «قسد» لا تيأس من واشنطن
• ماذا تعلمنا التجربة المصرية؟
• صندوق النقد يبتز مصر بحاجتها للعملات الصعبة بعد تحرير الجنيه… فيشترط بيع شركة قناة السويس/ عبد اللهيان يلتقي الأسد تمهيداً لزيارة رئيسي… والمقداد يربط لقاء الأسد أردوغان بمصير الاحتلال/ جلسة رئاسية الخميس… وحكومية الأربعاء… ونصرالله غداً… وجعجع يعترف بالتدخل السعودي/
• بوتين: العملية العسكرية في أوكرانيا تسير إيجابياً

Al Qaeda Terrorists Protesting Turkey’s Rapprochement with Syria

JANUARY 7, 2023

 ARABI SOURI

NATO-sponsored Al Qaeda terrorists in Idlib took to the streets in angry protests against the latest rapprochement steps by the Turkish madman Erdogan toward Syria.

Euronews, a strong propaganda state-controlled arm of NATO and its financial arm, the European Union, shared a video clip showing a few dozen of all males protesting somewhere in the Al Qaeda stronghold in the Turkish-occupied and controlled Idlib province.

In the accompanying news, the EU propaganda outlet claimed that similar protests took place in a number of towns in the countryside of Idlib.

The video is also available on Rumble, and BitChute,

The protest shared by the EU propaganda arm Euronews showed protests spewing slogans with improper language reminiscent of the 2011 NATO-promoted protests in most remote villages and towns across Syria calling for NATO bombing of Syria to spread freedoms and democracy. These protests also witnessed the killings of dozens of Syrian policemen and civilians by 5th column instigators planted by foreign powers and funded by the US-led coalition which included Qatar and Saudi Arabia, the most retard political regimes in the whole world.

Without naming him, the al Qaeda fighters shown in the above video clip with their sons were expressing their anger toward their main sponsor, the Turkish madman Erdogan, after the recent steps taken by him to mend the ties with Syria and their fear he would drop his role in the regime change in Damascus which he played the central part in ever since he was assigned that task by George W. Bush years before the NATO-sponsored Arab Spring was initiated.

The Turkish madman Erdogan is in desperate need to speed up his rapprochement with Syrian President Bashar Assad before the upcoming elections in Turkey, all his policies during his very long reign in Turkey have brought draconian measures against freedoms in his own country, the jailing of tens of thousands of public workers and journalists under the pretext of supporting an opposition movement to him and the failed coup of 2016, in addition to the countless debacles in foreign interventions earning him zero friends in contrast to the policy of zero troubles with neighboring countries which he fooled his people with to vote for him.

Any meeting and agreement with President Assad would help Erdogan in his bid to be reelected, again, as it would give the Turkish people the impression of solving the refugee crises in their country, the crisis they blame for their deteriorating economy.

The main losers of such rapprochement with Damascus are the al Qaeda and ISIS terrorists in northern Syria, the Turkish madman Erdogan considers them, like his NATO colleagues, as moderate opposition; Syria and the normal world consider them as terrorists. The other losers of a Turkish rapprochement with Syria are the US-sponsored Kurdish SDF separatist terrorists. Both these terrorist entities share the same goals of creating cantons carving them out of Syria and placing a foothold of NATO and Israel where Syria’s main food basket farmlands and oil fields are.

Erdogan Sent 800 al Qaeda & ISIS Terrorists to Ukraine from Idlib

It’s no surprise that al Qaeda terrorists would express their anger toward any rapprochement between Turkey and Syria, however insincere their main sponsor Erdogan is, they fear they will be abandoned like all cheap cards are in the bigger strategic political game.

Syria’s main condition for any rapprochement with Turkey is exactly that, Turkey must drop its support to Al Qaeda and ISIS terrorists in their numerous groups and return to the Adana Accords of 1998 which only Turkey under Erdogan has breached every article of it.

It’s also no surprise that the NATO propaganda arms would return to promoting those same terrorists who wreaked havoc across Syria and all the countries that were infested with the Arab Spring, and even the countries that sponsored the Arab Spring and had their terrorists return home and carry out terrorist attacks, mainly in western European countries.

There are somewhere between 60,000 and 120,000 terrorists of al Qaeda, ISIS, and their affiliates controlling a Syrian population of around 4 million Syrians across the regions under the Turkish occupation in northern Syria including Idlib province, parts of Aleppo, Raqqa, Deir Ezzor, and Hasakah provinces, a large number of those terrorists are foreign terrorists brought into Syria from across the world all the way from the Chinese Uighur and their families through Central Asia to western Europe, literally wherever the anti-Islamic Muslim Brotherhood and Wahhabism doctrines have influence, the first is the twisted version of Islam followed by the Turkish AKP ruling party with Erdogan as its supreme leader, a number of radical parties empowered across the Arab world, and the latter is the main twisted version of Islam followed by the Saudi and Qatari rulers.

---

Syria News is a collaborative effort by two authors only, we end up most of the months paying from our pockets to maintain the site’s presence online, if you like our work and want us to remain online you can help by chipping in a couple of Euros/ Dollars or any other currency so we can meet our site’s costs.You can also donate with Cryptocurrencies through our donate page.
Thank you in advance.

• US Army Steals 60 Tankers and Trucks of Syrian Oil and Wheat
• Erdogan Sent 800 al Qaeda & ISIS Terrorists to Ukraine from Idlib
• US Sanctions are Killing Syrians and Are a Human Rights Violation

Turkey swings west: the Ukraine war and domestic elections

Ankara’s rapprochement with the US has been accelerated by events in Ukraine. These ties will also shape Turkey domestically, with or without a 2023 Erdogan electoral win.

May 17 2022

While Ankara has always sought to maintain a careful balance between east and west, Turkey’s 2023 election candidates believe they need US support to win.Photo Credit: The Cradle

By Erman Çete

On 7 April, Turkish Defense Minister Hulusi Akar chaired a videoconference meeting with his counterparts from five other states to discuss, among other things, the pressing issue of naval mines drifting into the Black Sea.

According to Akar, the origin of the mines could not be identified, but an investigation is ongoing.

The meeting’s agenda was ultimately less notable than its curious participant list. Five of the attending countries – Bulgaria, Georgia, Romania, Turkey and Ukraine – have borders with the Black Sea, but Russia, a major littoral state, was not invited, while Poland, which has no borders with the waterway, was present.

The mines threat has emerged amid the escalating armed conflict in Ukraine. Russia’s principal intelligence agency, the Federal Security Service (FSB), warned on 21 March that several hundred mines had drifted into the Black Sea after breaking off from cables near Ukrainian ports. The claim was dismissed by Kiev which accused Moscow of disinformation and trying to close off parts of the strategic waterway.

Nevertheless, since the onset of the conflict in February, four mines have ‘drifted’ into the Black Sea, including one discovered off Romania’s coastline, and three stray mines found in Turkish waters which were safely neutralized.

Turkey’s balancing act

Throughout the crisis, Ankara has had to navigate between Russia and Ukraine and balance its diplomatic ties with both states carefully. As an important NATO member, this has not been a straightforward task for Turkey.

Between 19 to 22 April, NATO’s Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence (CCDCOE) organized  Exercise Locked Shields 2022, the largest cyber defense exercise in Tallinn, Estonia. The Turkish Armed Forces (TAF) attended this drill with TAF-affiliated defense company HAVELSAN.

The following day, Turkish Foreign Minister Mevlut Cavusoglu announced that Turkey would close its airspace for a three-month period to Russian planes flying to Syria. But the Turkish minister also announced the cancellation of a pre-planned NATO drill to avoid provoking Russia.

Concurrent with this precarious balancing act, President Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s government has worked overtime to thaw relations between Ankara and Persian Gulf states and Israel. There are also plans afoot to add Egypt to Turkey’s various regional diplomatic forays.

Resetting relations with the US

At the same time, Turkey’s ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP) government has tried to exploit any opportunity to present itself as an indispensable ally to Washington. Talks hosted in Istanbul between Russia and Ukraine may have failed to lead to a breakthrough in negotiations, but US President Joe Biden endorsed Turkey’s role as mediator, while State Department Spokesperson Ned Price said that Turkey was “in full coordination and consultation with the US” during the process.

Ankara’s role as a mediator has also been encouraged by US think-tanks such as the United States Institute of Peace, which has called on the US and Europe to support Turkey as the only mediation channel between Russia and the west.

Undoubtedly, the Ukraine conflict has enabled Turkey to reposition itself with Washington as a valuable NATO ally. This has become evident with reports that US military F-16 sales to Turkey are now back on the table again after a period of doubt.

Naturally, pro-AKP media has been praising Erdogan’s role as ‘peacemaker’ and are keen to parlay his accomplishments into a domestic political bonanza. But according to Turkish journalist and commentator Murat Yetkin, AKP’s initial prognosis on the Ukraine conflict was that it would cool down around June and Turkey could shortly thereafter reverse its economic losses arising from the crisis.

It has become apparent, however, that the AKP may have been too rash with that timeframe. Ankara’s leading NATO allies appear less concerned about the destruction of Ukraine and its fallout across Europe than about ‘weakening’ Russia via proxy, with a prolonged war of attrition in mind. For the AKP brass, if the conflict continues into next year, Erdogan’s chances of eking out a victory in Turkey’s 2023 elections could be seriously jeopardized.

Ukraine, a foreign policy tool

Rear Admiral Turker Erturk, Turkey’s former Black Sea commander, believes that the US government gave Turkish military operations in northern Iraq (Operation Claw Lock) the green-light, mainly because of the war in Ukraine. Washington, according to Erturk, will need Turkey in the upcoming stages of the conflict, and has thus become more flexible and transactional with Ankara.

For Erturk, this is a major reason why Erdogan’s government is seeking a balanced approach – in order to negotiate with the US and win the upcoming elections. “Promises made to the US regarding the Ukraine War will be implemented after the election,” he predicts.

Erturk also claims that Washington favors former chief of staff and current Defense Minister Hulusi Akar as the next president of Turkey. The retired rear admiral interprets the Black Sea mines meeting led by Akar – which included the Poles and excluded the Russians – as an message of support to the US. It should be noted that even at the height of US-Turkish tensions and its accompanying leverage contest, Akar stuck his neck out by guaranteeing that Ankara would never break with the western world.

The role of the Turkish Army, post-Erdogan

Akar is not the only military man with a shot at the presidency. Erdogan’s son-in-law Selcuk Bayraktar, who masterminded the famous Turkish armed drone Bayraktar could also be a political successor. He has also openly voiced support for Ukraine, a gesture likely not intended for domestic audiences.

Bayraktar’s now deceased father, Özdemir Bayraktar, threw his support behind the jailed army officers during the highly politicized Ergenekon (2008-2019) and Balyoz (Sledgehammer, 2010-2015) ‘coup d’etat’ trials. That makes the Bayraktars respected even amongst Kemalist circles – not just for their game-changing armed drones, but also for placing their political clout against the trials.

A Foreign Affairs piece earlier this year by Soner Cagaptay, director of the Turkish Research Program at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy, provides an insight into a hypothetical scenario involving an Erdogan-opposition deal for a transition. If a deal cannot be reached, Cagaptay says, Turkish democracy will crumble.

A possible solution to ease this transition, Cagaptay argues, is for the two sides to accept the Turkish Army’s mediation as a “non-partisan” institution, with backing from the US and the EU. The opposition ensures that Erdogan and his family will not be tried, while Erdogan transfers power to the opposition’s candidate and the TAF acts as a guarantor.

Intact foreign policy

Turkey’s opposition alliance, Millet (Nation), which consists of six parties for now, has not decided on its presidential candidate yet. The governing coalition, Cumhur (People), has accused Millet of being agents of the west.

Although both the government and opposition are pro-NATO, some parties in Millet, such as the pro-west Turkish nationalist IYI (Good) Party, want to play a more proactive role in Ukraine against Russia. Istanbul Mayor Ekrem Imamoglu, who belongs to the main opposition Republican People’s Party (CHP), sparked a debate when he was spotted out with the British Ambassador amidst a heavy fall of snow last winter.

Imamoglu once was a leading opposition figure against Erdogan. He defeated the Turkish president twice in local 2019 elections, and his right-wing/moderate political stance was influential even among Erdogan supporters. However, his recent tour in the Black Sea region where his hometown is located, unleashed angry reactions amongst Millet supporters for including pro-Erdogan journalists to cover his visit. Even his own party, CHP, criticized Imamoglu for “breaking the party discipline.”

Now an underdog, Ankara’s Mayor Mansur Yavas, also a CHP member, is leading in Turkey’s election polls. He is a former member of the Nationalist Movement Party (MHP), and popular amongst Cumhur’s voter base. Yavas gives the impression that he could be a bipartisan president, a statesman who would oversee a smooth Turkish transition to the post-Erdogan era.

But will the upcoming 2023 elections signify a sharp geopolitical shift in the country’s bearings? A close look at Turkey’s economic situation, and its government’s overtures to the west, suggests not.

Turkey’s relations with Russia, even as a bargaining chip against the west, will likely continue independently of election results, as Ankara has historically sought to maintain its east-west equilibrium. Today, however, both wings of Turkish politics seem set on soliciting western support – to different degrees and in various arenas – to secure an electoral win.

The views expressed in this article do not necessarily reflect those of The Cradle.