Self sabotage: Why is Russia excluding Iran in the South Caucasus?

JUL 21, 2023

Russia’s exclusion of Iran from critical ‘tables’ in the South Caucasus has been detrimental for both states, allowing the NATO-aligned Israeli-Turkish-Azerbaijani axis to undermine their national security interests and snatch the regional advantage.

Yeghia Tashjian

The shift in the South Caucasus’ balance of power after the 10 November, 2020 Nagorno-Karabakh ceasefire has led to an unfavorable situation not only for Armenia but also for Iran. 

Despite Tehran’s proactive engagement in the region, Iranian experts and politicians have expressed frustration over their concerns being disregarded by the Russians who have a peacekeeping presence there as a result of the Nagorno-Karabakh ceasefire agreement. 

Some observers have gone as far as publicly criticizing Moscow for working against Iranian interests by collaborating closely with Turkiye while overlooking the encroaching Israeli threat. Consequently, there have been calls for a replication of the joint Russian-Iranian cooperation experience seen in Syria to prevent a “great catastrophe” in the South Caucasus. 

Russia and Iran: Diverging Interests in the South Caucasus?

In his article “Russia and Iran Diverge in the South Caucasus,” Iranian South Caucasus expert Vali Kaleji argued that despite Tehran and Moscow’s similar perspective on the conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan, the two have diverged when it comes to the highly-contentious “Zangezur Corridor,” its impact on the Armenian-Iranian border, and Israel’s relations with Azerbaijan. 

Moreover, following the war in Ukraine, Russia has distanced itself from developments in the region, leaving Armenia alone to face the Turkish-Azerbaijani-Israeli axis. This situation has created a security and strategic dilemma for Iran along its entire northwestern border.

According to Kaleji, there are three key points of contention between Tehran and Moscow. First, is Iran’s reservations over the fifth paragraph of the trilateral statement, which calls for the establishment of peacekeeping forces and a Russian-Turkish joint monitoring center in Aghdam. Iran did not participate in this mission, while Turkiye, not explicitly mentioned in the agreement, signed a memorandum of understanding with Moscow to establish the joint center. Iran’s exclusion from these decisions, despite Tehran’s national security concerns being directly impacted by the Nagorno-Karabakh war, demonstrated “Russia’s preparedness to disregard Iranian interests” in the region.

Second, there is a disturbing ambiguity from the Kremlin over the establishment of the highly sensitive Zangezur Corridor project. Baku aims to establish an uninterrupted and extraterritorial connection between Azerbaijan proper and the Nakhichevan exclave. Russia’s position on this project remains unclear, with some high-ranking officials disregarding the term “corridor” while others support its establishment. 

Both Iran and Armenia remain skeptical about Russia’s ultimate objective in controlling these routes and granting them a particular status. Iran’s concerns arise from the fact that Azerbaijan intends to sever the Armenian-Iranian border, effectively isolating Iran, and potentially bringing NATO to Iran’s northern border. Azerbaijan’s President Ilham Aliyev has even threatened to use force if Yerevan does not provide the desired corridor. 

Third, is Moscow’s passive stance toward Israel’s role in the region, which has raised serious concerns in Tehran. Kaleji argues that while Iran is deeply worried about Israeli military and intelligence infiltration into the region, including the threat posed by Israeli drones targeting Iranian nuclear facilities and assassinating scientists, Moscow has turned a blind eye. 

Moreover, “Russia has adopted an approach to Israel’s presence in the South Caucasus that is similar to that in Syria, which is definitely not favorable to Tehran,” argues the Iranian expert. 

Moscow’s motivations and Iran’s interests

In contrast, Dr. Ehsan Movahedian, a professor of international relations at Tehran’s ATU University, believes that Russia has no intention of allowing Iran to exert influence in the Caucasus and Central Asia.

Instead, he argues, Russia prefers to interact exclusively with Turkiye in these regions. Movahedian tells The Cradle that Russia’s motivation stems from its need for Ankara to bypass western sanctions, facilitate energy sales, and secure access to the Mediterranean Sea following the Ukraine war.

But Russia’s stance jeopardizes Iran’s interests, particularly in the Caucasus, where NATO and Israel have already established a presence, leading to security, political, and cultural challenges for both Russia and Iran.

According to Movahedian, Russia has badly miscalculated, failing to recognize that the South Caucasus situation has worsened significantly due to the Kremlin’s preoccupation with the Ukraine war and the opportunity this has presented for western interference in the region.

Taking advantage of this power vacuum, Turkiye has been advancing the interests of both NATO and Israel in the South Caucasus. Therefore, any time the Russians prioritize only their own ambitions in the South Caucasus, and exclude Iran from major decisions, Moscow’s own position and influence in the region will ultimately diminish.  

Movahedian also highlights the ongoing blockade on the Lachin corridor as a sign of Russia’s weakness. He questions how Moscow, unable to unblock the Lachin corridor, can guarantee the safety of trade routes in the region, specifically in Syunik, as mentioned in the trilateral statement. If the Russians cannot safeguard these most basic routes, how then can they prevent Turkiye and NATO from taking control of major trade corridors – a fact recognized in Tehran, but apparently not in Moscow.

Warning to Moscow: Ineffective foreign policy in South Caucasus

In a recent 12 July article, Ali Akbar Velayati, former Iranian Minister of Foreign Affairs, expressed concern and issued a warning to Moscow regarding its ineffective foreign policy in the South Caucasus.

Velayati questions the actual intentions of Azerbaijan and Turkiye, be it to establish a transit route through Armenia for trade, gas, and electricity exchange, or, in fact, to violate Armenia’s sovereignty and cut off the Iranian-Azerbaijani border.

He argues that the evidence now shows that their ultimate ambition is to divide Armenia into two parts, sever the historical link between Iran and Armenia, which dates back to the Achaemenid and Parthian Empires, and limit Iran’s connection to the outside world, North Caucasus, Russia, and Europe. The veteran Iranian diplomat further warns:

“The strong suspicion is that the dismantling of the connection between Istanbul and Xinjiang rather than the establishment of a fictional world called pan-Turkism, given the scope of Turkiye’s contacts with NATO, will lead to the formation of a strip that will encircle Iran from the north and Russia on the south and expand NATO’s influence in the region.”

Consolidation of the Israeli-Turkish-Azerbaijani axis

These concerns raised by Iranian experts and politicians reflect Tehran’s growing unease with the situation in the South Caucasus. They recognize that Iran alone cannot contain the Israeli, Turkish, and NATO infiltration into the region and therefore emphasize the importance of Russia stepping up and drawing some red lines. 

Russia’s focus, they point out, has shifted away from the South Caucasus – due to its distraction with Ukraine – while strengthening economic relations and transport transit with Turkiye and Azerbaijan through the International North-South Transport Corridor (INSTC).

As a result of this political vacuum, an Israeli-Turkish-Azerbaijani axis is being consolidated in the region, which has “made Iran extremely worried about geopolitical changes, the balance of power and changing international borders in the region,” says Kaleji. 

When Iran planned military drills on its northern border with Azerbaijan, Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov expressed his country’s opposition to the military exercise. According to Iranian experts, the Russians were concerned that the Iranian drills and Tehran’s involvement in the Armenian-Azerbaijani conflict would further complicate the region. 

Reversing the balance of power

Despite the challenges, Iranian experts and politicians have called on Russia to replicate their joint cooperation experience in Syria by training Armenian soldiers in the South Caucasus. If Russia continues on its current trajectory of disregarding critical South Caucasus developments, some Iranians warn that Tehran may be forced to take action to shake up Moscow, such as obstructing its access to the Persian Gulf.

To secure their national interests and prevent a potential catastrophe in Nagorno-Karabakh that could spill over into neighboring regions, both Tehran and Moscow need to coordinate with Yerevan, even if they mistrust the current Armenian authorities at the helm. 

If the Turkish-Azerbaijani-Israeli project succeeds in Nagorno-Karabakh, it may be too late for Moscow and Tehran to reverse the regional balance of power. Yerevan could directly accuse Moscow of abandoning its obligations and potentially shifting toward the west, putting both Moscow and Tehran in politically difficult positions. 

To prevent such a scenario, Moscow must prioritize unblocking the Lachin corridor, ensure the physical security of Armenians in the unrecognized republic, and take note of Iran’s national security concerns – which increasingly intersect with Moscow.

The views expressed in this article do not necessarily reflect those of The Cradle.

Russian-Turkish ‘co-opetition’ from Syria to Nagorno-Karabakh

March 17 2023

At a time when conflicts are increasingly interconnected, and provide tactical levers to assert pressure elsewhere, the competition between Russia-Iran and Turkiye in Syria and the South Caucasus is destined to overlap.

Photo Credit: The Cradle

By Yeghia Tashjian

Despite their robust diplomatic relations, Turkiye has been in direct competition with Russia and Iran in two major Asian conflict zones, Syria and Nagarno-Karabakh, tying together the fates of the Levant and the South Caucasus in any future resolution.

While Ankara seeks to establish its authority over northern Syria and advance Turkic hegemony in key Caucasian states like Azerbaijan for geopolitical advantage, Moscow and Tehran’s goals in these two theaters are to reduce US influence and promote long-term economic interdependence between regional and local states that will stabilize and enrich the region.

Despite these differences, there has been a flurry of meetings between senior Syrian and Turkish officials, with Russia hosting direct dialogues between their respective defense ministers and intelligence agency chiefs.

The desire to garner pre-election voter favor by Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan, and the devastating earthquakes that struck the Turkish-Syrian border towns, have played a role in facilitating the recent rapprochement between Ankara and Damascus.

However, it is unlikely that there will be full diplomatic normalization anytime soon due to the status of Idlib, the militant stronghold in northern Syria currently controlled by Turkiye and its proxies. Russia currently appears to favor maintaining the status quo in Idlib until rapprochement talks advance further.

Leveraging conflicts against each other

The resolution of the Syrian crisis depends on the outcome of regional developments, international disputes, and ongoing diplomatic struggles between Ankara and Moscow as they seek to consolidate or expand their influence in different regions, including in Syria and the South Caucasus.

The two conflicts, particularly the Nagorno-Karabakh dispute between Armenia and Azerbaijan, share some similarities. Both regions are characterized by significant ethnic and religious diversity, are heavily influenced by regional powers Russia, Iran, and Turkiye, and are in the strategic sights of global superpowers such as China and the US. As a result, the two conflicts have become internationalized, and local actors are unable to reach a resolution without external guarantees.

The South Caucasus is composed of three states – Georgia, Armenia, and Azerbaijan – each with a different foreign policy orientation. Georgia is committed to partnering with Euro-Atlantic and European institutions, while Armenia is a member of the Russian-led Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) military alliance.

Meanwhile, Azerbaijan and Turkiye are military allies that share similar worldviews, to the extent that Ankara’s decision to support one of the conflicting parties in Ukraine may prompt Baku to adopt a similar stance. Such is today’s increasing connection between local and international conflict – largely because major powers have inserted themselves into these regional disputes.

In addition, instability in the South Caucasus – a strategic geography for future trade routes that will empower Asia’s new hegemons – could create challenges that will impact trade and economic relations between regional states and their neighbors.

Recent developments indicate that Moscow believes its current troop deployment in Nagorno-Karabakh is sufficient to secure Russia’s long-term interests in Baku. However, this position is constantly challenged by Turkiye-backed Azerbaijan, especially following the signing of the Shushi Declaration on June 2021.

Azerbaijan: A major non-Nato ally

The declaration aimed to strengthen military, security, and diplomatic ties between the two Turkic countries and has led to Ankara’s regional ascension at Moscow’s expense. The Shushi Declaration has solidified Azerbaijan’s military and security relations with key NATO member Turkiye, with Baku reforming its army and increasing its special forces units using NATO standards.

According to Ahmad Alili from the Baku-based Caucasus Policy Analysis Center, Azerbaijan has transformed into a “major non-NATO ally” for Turkiye, similar to the role of Israel, Egypt, and Japan for the US:

“With Georgia having publicly declared NATO and EU aspirations, and Azerbaijan having closer military and diplomatic links with NATO member Turkiye, the region loses its ‘Russian backyard’ status and becomes a ‘Russian-Turkish’ playground.”

This development has prompted Moscow to increase its soft pressure over Baku and sign an “allied declaration” in February 2022 to solidify its political presence in the region. In the process, however, Armenia has found itself encircled by Turkiye and Azerbaijan without any land connection to Russia and thus, pushed into a corner.

Russian and Turkish ‘frenmity’  

Though Ankara and Moscow have an understanding of each other’s red lines in Syria, Turkiye’s aspiration to play a greater role in the South Caucasus has put its relationship with Russia to the test.

The 2020 outbreak of the second Nagorno-Karabakh war provided Turkiye with a unique opportunity to expand its influence in its immediate neighborhood – which has remained, since 1828, in Moscow’s sphere of national interest. To challenge Russia, Turkiye provided full active military and diplomatic support to Azerbaijan in its war against Armenia over Nagorno-Karabakh.

During the war, both Moscow and Ankara played tit-for-tat against each other. Observers noticed that while Russia was rather defensive in its own South Caucasus “backyard,” it was prepared to go on the offensive in Syria by bombing Turkish and Turkiye-backed rebel positions in Idlib.

By exerting pressure on Ankara in the Syrian theater, Moscow was attempting to balance its vulnerabilities and put Turkiye on notice over their other competitions. It didn’t seem to work. Turkiye made an offensive play in Russia’s own backyard, inaugurating, in November 2020, the connection of the Trans-Adriatic Pipeline (TAP) to the Trans-Anatolian Pipeline (TANAP), which enables Caspian Sea gas to reach southern Europe through Turkiye, bypassing Russia.

This project is crucial for Ankara as it transforms Turkiye from an importer to a transit route for gas. The geopolitical nature of this project aims to decrease Europe’s gas dependency on Moscow.

Not seeing eye-to-eye

On the diplomatic front, Turkiye has attempted to launch an “Astana style” deconfliction process for Nagorno-Karabakh. However, Moscow has not been keen to engage on a purely bilateral track with Ankara in its post-Soviet regions, as this runs the risk of legitimizing Turkiye’s intervention and presence in Russia’s backyard.

For this reason, Maxim Suchkov, a Moscow-based expert at the Russian International Affairs Council (RIAC), explains that Russia chose not to directly intervene in the war, taking a “watch and see approach,” which distressed its Armenian ally to no end.

Suchkov noted that if Azerbaijan had managed to occupy Stepanakert, the Nagorno-Karabakh capital, Turkiye’s gambit would have paid off, and its influence in the region would only accelerate. But this would have led to the ethnic cleansing of Armenians and to Yerevan blaming Moscow for its inaction – and by losing its only regional military ally, Russia would have potentially lost the whole region. Instead, Russia tried to satisfy Baku while not completely alienating Yerevan, which was crushed during Baku’s autumn 2020 blitzkrieg.

Consequently, the 10 November, 2020 trilateral statement brokered by Russia that ended the Nagorno-Karabakh war did not favor Turkiye’s aspirations. Despite pushing for a complete Azerbaijani victory – or at least the deployment of Turkish peacekeepers alongside Russian forces – Ankara’s requests were denied.

Regardless, Turkiye has managed to become an active player in shaping the new geopolitical landscape of the region. While Russia has expressed dissatisfaction with Turkish intervention in its traditional sphere of influence and has established some “red lines,” it has also been forced to recognize Turkiye as a junior player in the region, though parity in the post-conflict regional order still remains in Moscow’s favor.

Post-2020 regional order

However, the ongoing military conflict in Ukraine has had a significant impact on the balance of power in the South Caucasus. As hostilities between the west and Russia continue to spike, the region has become a new confrontation zone, with Azerbaijan and Armenia both seeking to secure their vital interests under cover of the Great Power competition.

While Yerevan’s immediate interest is to protect the safety of the local Armenian population in Nagorno-Karabakh, Azerbaijan seeks to resolve the Karabakh issue through brute force, which, if successful, could greatly reduce Moscow’s regional clout, particularly as its peacekeeper mandate is set to expire in 2025.

Despite the 2020 trilateral statement, it appears that a long-lasting peace is still far off. A prime example of the many differences that remain unresolved between Yerevan and Baku is their contrasting interpretation of the statement’s ninth article.

Azerbaijan insists that Armenia must provide a “corridor” through Syunik (southern Armenia) to connect the Azerbaijani mainland to the Nakhichevan exclave, which Baku calls the “Zangezur corridor.”

Armenia rejects this claim, arguing that the article only references the restoration of communication channels (such as highways and railways), with both sides able to access and utilize the routes. But Baku has raised the stakes by threatening to block the Lachin corridor if Armenia does not provide access to the Syunik corridor. Yerevan, in turn, maintains that the status of the Lachin corridor should not be linked to the opening of these communication channels.

Iran’s red line

This has prompted neighboring Iran to make a “comeback” to the South Caucasus, by warning that any territorial changes to the Armenian-Iranian border would constitute a red line for Tehran. Iran believes that such changes could threaten its own geopolitical interests, which include its stake in the strategic Moscow-Tehran-New Delhi-backed International North-South Transport Corridor (INSTC).

With Azerbaijan’s brutal blockade of the Lachin corridor – the only land route connecting Nagorno-Karabakh to Armenia – Russian troops remain the sole guarantors of the security of Karabakh Armenians. But contrary to what many analysts have predicted, the defeat of Armenia in the 2020 war has not diminished Russian influence in Armenia.

In fact, Russia has gained even more influence there, despite Yerevan’s growing frustration with Moscow’s inability to deter Azerbaijani attacks on sovereign Armenian territory. Baku officials have exacerbated matters by stating that they are not in favor of renewing the Russian peacekeeping mandate in 2025, and will instead push for the “reintegration” of the region into Azerbaijan.

If Baku succeeds in its objective and engages in demographic engineering in the region – forcing Armenians to leave Nagorno-Karabakh – there will no longer be a justification for Russian presence in the region, and Moscow will lose its leverage over the entire South Caucasus.

A Nagorno-Karabakh scenario in Syria?

The Nagorno-Karabakh conflict has highlighted Moscow’s success in preserving its influence in the region, despite Turkiye’s attempt to shrink Russian clout. However, the ongoing crisis in Ukraine, and its uncertain outcome, is also playing out in the South Caucasus.

As the world shifts from a US-led unipolar order to multipolarity, Azerbaijan and Armenia, like many other nations in conflict, are having to make strategic decisions on whether they align their interests with Russia or the west. Neutrality – when the major power stakes are this high – is unlikely to serve the vital interests of either country.

As such, mounting pressure on Erdogan to consolidate his power in Turkiye’s upcoming elections may force him to make concessions to one axis over the other. Such a move could have a significant impact on Baku and may lead to these “brotherly” nations ending up in opposing global camps.

Furthermore, the possibility of the US withdrawing its troops from northeastern Syria, coupled with the unclear political future of Syrian Kurds, their parallel economy, and autonomous governing structures, creates a risk of a sub-regional power vacuum.

This could push Turkiye and Russia towards managing or enhancing their cooperative rivalry, though it remains to be seen whether Russia can strike a game-changing deal between the Kurds and Damascus – which could gain Moscow leverage with Ankara in the South Caucasus.

The Ukraine war could present an obstacle to Russian diplomatic initiatives. Russia’s reluctance to counter Azerbaijan’s incursions and ceasefire violations after getting mired in the Ukraine war suggests that Moscow may not be up to the task of brokering a Nagorno-Karabakh-style peacekeeping scenario for Syria’s Kurds.

Hence, the Syrian crisis may remain frozen until relations between Ankara and Damascus are normalized – or Turkiye threatens further military attacks. The outcome of the Turkish elections on 14 May 2023 will undoubtedly play a significant role in this regard, both in Syria and the South Caucasus.

The views expressed in this article do not necessarily reflect those of The Cradle.

Will Erdogan’s Peacekeeping in Ukraine Work?

February 10, 2022

Claudio Gallo

His diplomatic stunts appear more aimed to protect his business while the ball is precisely over the net than an actual peace-building process.

Day by day, the western media cry wolf: “They are arriving, they are at three meters, two, one”. Cutting corners, Bloomberg, the top of the class, has already staged the invasion: why not anticipate the news? In reality, in Ukraine, we are as in the first image of Woody Allen’s 2005 movie Match Point where the shot remains frozen in the exact moment when the tennis ball is over the net. This suspension time, full of risks and opportunities, attracts some characters searching for a leadership role under the international spotlight and, of course, an image boost at home. Easy to guess we are speaking of the Turkish president Recep Tayyip Erdogan.

In the last weeks, he succeeded in defending the sale of lethal Turkish drones to the Ukrainians that are using them to terrorise Donbas and, at the same time, proposing himself as a peace mediator between Moscow and Kiev. Erdogan’s political identity card is irregular enough to give him some room for manoeuvre. But Turkey’s unpredictability, the chance to see the country in a soft version of non-alignment, stems more from its weakness and contradictions than from a position of strength that could support its credibility.

Although Ankara is the second-largest military force in Nato, after the U.S., it is buying the S-400 air defence system from Russia, rejecting the American Patriot. A little bit over rhetorically, someone in the country hailed the choice as a “country’s liberation from the West”. The gas import from Russia is crucial, and the economic ties include industrial, construction investments and tourism. Russian President Vladimir Putin has just accepted President Erdogan’s invitation to visit his country. The Turkish are expecting that the Kremlin will announce the date of his visit this month, after his return from the Beijing Winter Olympics.

Therefore, the relations with Moscow aren’t always good; sometimes, they are horrible. In Syria, Turkey downed a Russian Su-24 bomber in November 2015. Turkish weapons (the drones again) helped Azerbaijan blitz to retake Nagorno-Karabakh from Armenia in the 2020 war. A strategic area for Russia. Ali Akbar Velayati, the international affairs adviser to Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, said that Turkey is “adding fuel to the fire”. More recently, some reports suggested the Turkish secret services not so covert involvement in Kazaksthan’s violent upheaval on December’s beginning.

After many years of Bruxelles’ closed-door politics, the love and hate engagement with Europe is fading in resentment. So, in the last decade, the Asian soul of Turkey has grown dramatically at the expense of the European one.

The NATO links are still strong, but Ankara prefers to gather Asia’s Turkish populations under its Pan-Turkish flag than under America’s Global Police. The recent killing in Syria of the leader of the Islamic State, Abu Ibrahim al-Hashimi al-Qurashi, is also seen as an American message to its eastern NATO ally. In the words of the Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), Turkey “turned the areas of northern Syria into a safe zone for Daesh leaders”.

Ankara disowned the statement of its sworn enemies but its initial choice to sit out the war against ISIS speaks volumes.

The relationship with Tel Aviv has seen the same zigzag. Israeli-Turkish relations have been tense, especially since the 2010 Mavi Marmara incident in which IDF’s fire killed nine Turkish nationals. In May 2018, Turkey expelled Israel’s ambassador in Ankara after deadly clashes between the Israeli Army and Palestinians on the Gaza border. The Turkish diplomatic counterpart had to leave Israel. For the last two years, Turkey has been trying to reactivate its ties with Israel. A few days ago, Erdogan announced an official visit of Israeli President Isaac Herzog for mid-March. Pushed by its economic difficulties, Turkey may see normalisation with Israel to improve its economy and, at the same time, its political status in the Middle East and with the US. Especially in the new climate, real or not is too early to say, produced by the Abraham Accords, Ankara is betting on an economic opening to the Gulf countries.

Erdogan’s regard for Turkey’s geopolitical stance is conditioned partially by the wishful thinking of the pan-Turkish-New Ottoman ideology. Still, his action is more substantially guided by the urge to exit the deep Turkish economy’s crisis. Turkey’s annual inflation has just risen at nearly 49%, hitting a near 20-year high and further eroding people’s ability to buy even basic things like food. The Turkish Statistical Institute stated that the consumer price index increased by just over 11% in January from the previous month. According to the data, the yearly increase in food prices was more than 55%.

The Turkish opposition parties have repeatedly questioned the Statistical Institute’s independence and data. The independent Inflation Research Group put Turkey’s actual annual inflation at a stunning 114.87%. As financial hardship has spread, the crisis has prompted criticism of the president’s recent accumulation of authority, from appointing bank policymakers to university rectors to high court judges.

Ankara’s so-called “drones diplomacy” is easier to understand in this context. Its first success was in Libya in 2020. The Bayraktar TB2, purchased by Qatar and operated by Turkish personnel, helped the Tripoli-based Government of National Accord (GNA) stop Field Marshal Khalifa Haftar’s assault on Tripoli. The drones are manufactured by Istanbul-based Baykar, owned by Erdogan’s son-in-law Selcuk Bayraktar. Federico Borsari of the European Council on Foreign Relations noted that the Bayaktars had become a major asset: “Their most significant effects may be in the economic opportunities and political leverage they have provided Turkey”.

Further irritating Moscow, Turkey now is planning to build near Kiev a drones factory to produce the long-endurance Anka drone, made by Turkish Aerospace Industries.

Drones are not invincible; above all, their most significant advantage is comparatively low cost. Electronic countermeasures are one of the most used defences against them. Russia has the new Tor-M2 SAM; a lethal short-range air defence missile system developed expressly against drones. But in many cases, it is like “take a hammer to crack a nut”. General Oleg Salyukov, the commander of Russia’s ground forces, told Rossiyskaya Gazeta: “The cost of one guided air defence missile is way above the cost of a small-size drone. For this reason, a relatively inexpensive small missile is being developed for this system”.

President Erdogan’s peacekeeping attempt is welcome but challenging to pursue, not recognising the Russian incorporation of Crimea as legal (still, in 2008, he rushed to recognise Kosovo’s independence) and arming the Ukrainians to the teeth. More than everything, he seems not in a position to extract any concessions from NATO. His diplomatic stunts appear more aimed to protect his business while the ball is precisely over the net than an actual peace-building process.

Vladimir Putin held talks with President of the French Republic Emmanuel Macron at the Kremlin.

February 08, 2022

President of Russia Vladimir Putin: Mr President, Emmanuel,

It is a pleasure to see you.

Last time we met was two years ago and, of course, there is a backlog of issues that we can and should discuss in a direct format.

Still, over these years, our contacts have never been interrupted, and we remain in touch at all times. Moreover, despite the pandemic, bilateral trade is up. During the pandemic, it fell by 15 percent, but over 11 months of 2021 it grew by over 70 percent to reach pre-pandemic levels and, I think, even slightly exceeded them.

Our colleagues are working quite successfully in the political sphere, including the foreign ministries and a 2+2 meeting between our respective defence ministers and foreign ministers.

Relations in the humanitarian sphere are on the rise as well. We have held events that cover region-to-region cooperation. More than 150 events have been held, and this helps create a supportive environment for promoting relations between our two countries.

Here is what I would like to point out specifically: of course, I understand that we share concerns about security developments in Europe, and I want to thank you for the fact that France invariably and strongly participates in the development of fundamental decisions in this area.

This has been the case with our relations in recent years. It is symbolic that we are meeting today because a fundamental document, the agreement on special relations between Russia and France, was signed 30 years ago today.

Notably, throughout these years, as I have mentioned, France has taken a very active part in addressing fundamental European security issues. Your predecessors did the same. France engaged in addressing the crisis that broke out after Georgia attacked South Ossetia, and in developing the Minsk agreements, and then organising the Normandy format. I appreciate the amount of effort invested by the current leadership of France and personally the President of France in resolving the crisis around the need to ensure equal security in Europe for an extended historical perspective, and in overcoming the challenges that are related to resolving the domestic crisis in southeastern Ukraine.

We discussed these matters over the telephone in great depth. I am aware that you have your own thoughts on this matter, and I am pleased to have the opportunity to meet with you in person to discuss these things.

Welcome, Emmanuel.

President of France Emmanuel Macron (retranslated): Thank you very much, Mr President, thank you very much, Vladimir.

Indeed, today is the 30^th anniversary of resuming diplomatic relations, and I would like to reiterate that bilateral relations have made it possible to focus on many issues.

We have many hopes in the cultural, academic and scientific spheres. We hope to continue the Trianon Dialogue together and advance the economic agenda.

The critical situation in Europe is our shared concern, and our continent – you pointed this out – is in a critical situation, so we all need to act with great responsibility.

Together we laid the foundation for an open, straight, and full-fledged dialogue in 2019. Since then, there have been several exchanges of views in St Petersburg, Bregançon and other venues, and I believe this dialogue remains as relevant as ever.

We need this dialogue, because it is the only thing that, I think, can ensure genuine stability and security for the European continent. In this context, we have had several telephone conversations in recent weeks, as you mentioned. Despite the crisis, I had a chance to exchange views with President Zelensky about Ukraine, as well as to coordinate views with many Europeans and Allies, including the British, Americans and Canadians.

I think today’s conversation can pave the way to de-escalation, which is where we should be heading. We are aware of the military-political situation and the Ukraine issue. You noted its importance, including the Normandy format, security issues in Belarus and the entire region, as well as important collective security issues, which we will cover later.

I am glad we have this opportunity to discuss these issues in depth, so that we can collectively begin to develop a practical response for Russia and the whole of Europe. A useful and practical response would be one that helps avoid war and build stability, transparency and trust for all.

Thank you very much for your warm welcome and for your time.

<…>

---

News conference following Russian-French talks

President of Russia Vladimir Putin: Mr President, ladies and gentlemen,

It is a pleasure to welcome you to the Kremlin and to host the President of the French Republic, Mr Emmanuel Macron in Russia.

It appears symbolic that our meeting is taking place on February 7 (it looks like it will end on February 8, Moscow time), the day when a fundamental treaty between Russia and France was signed 30 years ago. That vital document provided a reliable foundation for the development of bilateral cooperation based on partnership and mutual respect for decades to come. Our talks with President Macron today were held in a business-like atmosphere and were substantive and meaningful.

It is clear to us that Mr President has come to Russia primarily to discuss the current issues of European and global security, for which our countries bear special responsibility as permanent members of the UN Security Council. In addition to this, France is holding the presidency of the Council of the European Union.

During the talks, we continued to exchange views on the proposals regarding long-term legally binding security guarantees, which Russia has made to the United States and NATO. I would like to remind everyone that these proposals include three key points: NATO’s non-expansion, non-deployment of offensive weapon systems near the Russian border, and the return of the bloc’s European capabilities and infrastructure to the 1997 level, when the NATO-Russia Founding Act was signed.

Regrettably, the replies from the USA and NATO, which we received on January 26, disregard these concerns of fundamental importance to us. Moreover, our Western partners once again said that all states have a right to freely choose their security arrangements and to enter into any military blocs and alliances. Well, we never questioned this principle. On the other hand, it is also obvious that these blocs and alliances have no obligation to admit any country that wishes to join them.

This open-door policy, which we have discussed with many of our partners, including with President Macron today, is very liberal. We believe that only the United States and possibly several other NATO members are benefitting from this interpretation of the fundamental principle of equal and indivisible security, which has been set down in many European documents and includes, as we all know, a pledge not to strengthen one’s security at the expense of the security of other states.

The reference to the open-door policy, which I have mentioned, is questionable as well. I would like to repeat (I have said this on numerous occasions, including in this very room during a recent news conference following Prime Minister of Hungary Viktor Orban’s visit) that according to Article 10 of the 1949 North Atlantic Treaty, the member states may, by unanimous agreement, invite any other European state in a position to contribute to European security to accede to that treaty. But this does not mean that the bloc is obligated to admit any country, as I have said as well. All right.

However, I would like to point out that they continue trying to placate Russia with deliberations that NATO is a peaceful and purely defensive alliance. People in many countries, namely Iraq, Libya and Afghanistan have learned the truth of this statement the hard way, and this is also true about the large-scale military operation against Belgrade waged without a UN Security Council sanction, which is definitely not an operation that could be waged by a peaceful organisation.

In addition, we cannot overlook the fact that the 2019 NATO Military Strategy openly describes Russia as the main security threat and an adversary. NATO has designated Russia an adversary. Moreover, while advancing its military infrastructure very close to our border, NATO and its member states believe that they have a right to teach us where and how we can deploy our armed forces. They consider it acceptable to demand that we do not hold planned drills and exercises and present the movement of our troops on our own – I repeat, our own – territory as a threat of a Russian invasion, in this case the invasion of Ukraine. They claim that the Baltic states and our other neighbours feel threatened as well. In any case, this presumption is being used to pursue an unfriendly policy towards Russia.

As for the NATO member-countries themselves, they continue to pump Ukraine with modern weapons to this accompaniment, allocating substantial financial resources to modernise the Ukrainian army, and sending military specialists and instructors to Ukraine.

Mr President and I have certainly spoken about this. As you can see, it took us a rather long time: the discussion went on for nearly six hours.

For our part, we have made a point of drawing Mr President’s attention to the reluctance of the current Kiev authorities to meet their commitments under the Minsk Package of Measures and the Normandy format agreements, including those reached at the summits in Paris and Berlin.

In my opinion, it is clear to everyone that the current authorities in Kiev have set a course for dismantling the Minsk accords. There are no shifts on such fundamental issues as constitutional reform, amnesty, local elections, and the legal aspects of a special status for Donbass. The well-known Steinmeier Formula – well-known to specialists, at any rate – when we have approved certain amendments to the Minsk accords and made definite concessions, is yet to be included in Ukrainian legislation. But even these items presented by the current President of the Federal Republic of Germany – at that time, he was the German foreign minister – are not being implemented. Kiev is still disregarding all opportunities for a peaceful restoration of the country’s territorial integrity via direct dialogue with Donetsk and Lugansk.

I have directed Mr President’s attention to the widespread and systematic violations of human rights in Ukraine. Dissenting media are closed in the country and political opponents are exposed to reprisals. Incidentally, when Mr Poroshenko was the President of Ukraine, I told him that Russia was ready to grant him political asylum, if he faced problems in the future. He was highly ironic in this regard at the time, but today I would like to reiterate my offer. Despite our serious differences regarding this matter, I mean the settlement in Donbass, as well as the fact that, to my mind, he has made a lot of mistakes in this area, his persecution as a state criminal is also, in my view, an exorbitant ‘bid for success’ on the part of today’s leaders. Russia is ready to grant asylum to Mr Poroshenko and persons like him.

What worries me most of all is that they are adopting legislation that discriminates against Russian speakers, who have been denied the right to be recognised as a core nation in what is, properly speaking, their homeland, and the right to speak their native language, which is quite odd because this is in no way reflected in the approaches adopted by the European countries.

We hope that Mr President intends – at any rate, he said so earlier today – to discuss what we have discussed today as regards European security and stability guarantees at his meeting with the Kiev leaders tomorrow.

We also touched upon other topical international and regional matters.

While reviewing the situation around Nagorno Karabakh, we noted the positive role of the Russian peacekeepers who are ensuring compliance with the ceasefire regime and helping the region return to peaceful life. We reaffirmed the great significance of efforts by the OSCE Minsk Group’s co-chairs in addressing topical humanitarian and socioeconomic matters in the region, among other things. The President of France informed us of the results of his recent videoconference meeting with President of the European Council Charles Michel, the President of Azerbaijan and the Prime Minister of Armenia.

We reviewed the situation around the Iranian nuclear programme and efforts to resume the full-fledged implementation of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, adopted in 2015 and approved by UN Security Council Resolution 2231. We agree that it is necessary to continue diplomatic efforts and to assist in the coordination of compromise solutions in the interests of preserving this highly important document. We agreed that our positions are very similar here or, as the diplomats say, they match.

Naturally, we did not overlook topical matters of bilateral relations, primarily those regarding economic interaction. Despite the complicated situation caused by the Covid-19 pandemic and volatility on the global markets, we underscored and noted that mutual trade grew by 71 percent in 11 months of 2021. French investment in Russia exceeds $23 billion. Over 600 French companies are operating successfully on the Russian market.

Overall, we agreed to continue our mutually beneficial cooperation in politics, trade and the economy, as well as in other spheres, including cultural and humanitarian ties.

To conclude, I would like to thank Mr President for his efforts and the efforts of France to resolve a highly acute matter linked with our relations with NATO in general, matters linked with maintaining security, creating a situation of stability and mutual trust on the European continent and, of course, resolving the crisis in southeastern Ukraine.

We have already met in Paris, and I know that, despite numerous problems facing any state leader, especially the leader of a major European state, Mr President deemed it necessary to come to Russia and to exchange opinions on how we should act in the future. I believe that, although it is still too early to talk about some of his ideas and proposals, it is possible to make them the foundation of our future joint steps.

Let us see what Mr President’s meeting will achieve in Kiev. We agreed that we will speak on the telephone after his trip to the capital of Ukraine and exchange opinions on this matter.

Thank you.

President of France Emmanuel Macron (retranslated): Thank you very much, Mr President. Thank you, Vladimir.

Thank you for this opportunity to come here at this complicated moment when the pandemic has not ended yet. Indeed, we are now marking the 30^th anniversary of establishing diplomatic relations, of this bilateral agreement you mentioned.

I will not discuss relations between our two countries in greater detail at present because we now realise that the situation is serious, and all of us should find a way, a peaceful path, a path towards stability in Europe. We still have the opportunity and the time to do this. The historical and strategic dialogue that we have developed over the past years can help accomplish this. We have decided to meet in precisely this context in Moscow today.

We held very substantial, to-the-point talks. We focused on current areas of tension and on options for de-escalation, to facilitate stability and security on our continent.

Mr President, you recalled history, NATO, the Ukrainian issue, and you mentioned the most diverse matters.

We can see that you have a very strong position, which does not always coincide with the European and Western position. It is necessary to underscore this. We have different views, and we need to understand and accept this. We discussed this in great detail. I believe in Europe and European unity, and this is a fundamental matter.

Indeed, NATO’s open-doors policy was heeded, and this is very important. These matters have existential significance for Sweden and Finland, for example, and it would be difficult to tell them all of a sudden that NATO is modifying its position.

However, we also heeded your statement that traumas had been inflicted over the past 30 years, and that it is necessary to build new mechanisms that would facilitate stability in the region. However, it is impossible to build these new provisions without revising fundamental principles or by limiting fundamental European rights that are currently not mentioned as part of the disagreements that we are discussing. I believe that this is a fundamental aspect.

Having said all this, we, nevertheless, tried to find points where our positions coincided, so as to make headway on them in the near future. Firstly, it is necessary to work very quickly to avoid any escalation. Tensions continue to rise today, and this exacerbates the risk of destabilisation. This is not in anyone’s interests.

Neither Russia, nor the Europeans need chaos and instability at a time when the nations and the continent have suffered so much from the pandemic. Everyone wants recovery and peace. This is why we need to come to an agreement on practical stabilisation and de-escalation measures.

We have discussed this together. This should be reaffirmed within the next few days or weeks. The result will depend on the talks and consultations with the United States, NATO and the Europeans, as well as on the outcome of my meeting with President Zelensky tomorrow.

I would like to point out that President Vladimir Putin has said that he is ready to act in accordance with this logic so that these initiatives are balanced, including when it comes to the issue of Ukraine’s sovereignty and territorial integrity.

In other words, the next few days will be decisive. The intense discussions, which we have already begun, will contribute to this.

What should be very clear from our conversation is that reliable de-escalation calls for making headway on fundamental matters. We had a lengthy discussion on these matters. We must jointly show the will to work on security guarantees and to build a new security and stability order in Europe. It must be based on the foundation we have created together as sovereign states.

This is the principle of existence for all states. I am referring to Russia, France and the other states that are also parties to these treaties. Therefore, this is the fundamental principle of European security. We have approved them by signing the Paris Charter and the subsequent OSCE declarations. It should be said that these rights have been questioned and violated. I am not talking about border violations but about the principle of territorial integrity and violations of international law, of human rights and basic freedoms.

Whatever the historical interpretations of various crises and incidents may be, to maintain the security of our continent as we have said many times, we must not repeat the past mistakes.

We talked for several hours today. But we also talked about this in the past, several years ago. I understand that opinions can differ and that there can be misunderstandings and even traumatic elements. I know that many EU countries did not have the same experience in the 20th century as France did. We must not forget this experience, which has not faded away over the past 30 years. However, we cannot accept the collective risk of another confrontation between spheres of influence in Europe, another period of instability and unrest. This is creating new grievances and new threats. Starting a conflict is easy but ending it and building a lasting peace is difficult.

Therefore, I do not believe that we must choose between new rules and the absence of rules. This is optimism based on will, as I see it. Russia is committed to sovereignty and rights, but I believe that we can create security and stability in Europe by reaffirming our achievements within the framework of the OSCE. At the same time, we must also find new solutions, which should probably be more innovative.

As for our ability to offer concrete security guarantees, we raised this issue directly during our conversation, respecting the interests of all our European brothers and ensuring their stability and security, as well as with due regard for the security guarantees proposed by Russia, our neighbour and friend.

I have told President Putin that I was concerned about the draft Constitution of Belarus, which is lacking two fundamental principles that were sealed in 1994. I am also concerned about the statement on nuclear weapons made by Alexander Lukashenko in December. I would like to say that President Putin has put my mind at rest regarding this.

I am indeed concerned about these matters, because they are increasing destabilisation. We should work together on practical security guarantees for the EU member states and for the regional countries, namely Ukraine, Georgia, Belarus and Russia. This is the goal we must pursue.

In the course of our conversation, we coordinated several proposals. I would like to note that there are points of contact between the positions of France, Russia, NATO and the United States. We will continue practical talks with all our partners to create these new guarantees of peace and security.

Russia has long asked for certain security guarantees, such as restrictions on military deployment and presence of conventional weapons, the transparency of missile defence and on intermediate- and shorter-range missiles. These Russian proposals correspond to the requirements of European states, the EU states. I am sure that a response can only be collective.

We are Europeans, but we are also allies of the United States. We have already demonstrated that we can work together, including within the framework of the five permanent members of the UN Security Council. Both of us have pointed out that this format can help us make headway on these matters, in particular, on the issues of peace and security, and can help us coordinate common decisions.

The third element on which we have managed to find converging positions, which President Putin has mentioned in his statement, as I have said, is the Ukrainian conflict. I am going to Kiev tomorrow to meet with President Zelensky. Of course, we are doing this jointly with German Chancellor Olaf Scholz, with whom we coordinated our positions several days ago. I will see him tomorrow. We continue working within the framework of the Normandy format to ensure full compliance with the Minsk agreements and to achieve a complete settlement of the conflict in Donbass.

Serious agreements regarding the ceasefire regime were reached during the recent advisers’ meeting of the Normandy format countries, and now we must move forward in terms of practical steps to ensure a clear and full implementation of these agreements. We have made progress on several technical issues during the talks.

I would like to welcome President Zelensky’s efforts, the specific obligations that he assumed in this format, in particular, to scrap the legislation that was not in line with the Minsk agreements, and President Putin mentioned this. So, this law was withdrawn at President Zelensky’s initiative. We were also given clarification about draft laws proposed in Russia, but we were reassured that this would not happen if they were not in line with the Minsk agreements.

So, this conflict is at the centre of the tension that we are experiencing today, and Russia and the European Union definitely need to resolve it in order to move forward in our relations.

We also mentioned a number of other matters, in particular, the conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan. Here, I have the pleasure to say that eight prisoners were released this morning. The French crisis response centre provided an aircraft to transport them. Last Friday, President Aliyev, Prime Minister Pashinyan and I had a videoconference meeting, where we discussed missing persons, refugees, and a number of other matters that also affect stability.

During the talks with President Putin, we both expressed coinciding views on a number of matters. I would like to welcome the role that members of your military played on the border during the difficult period in Armenia and Azerbaijan.

Both France and Russia also play an appropriate role within the scope of the existing Minsk Group agreements.

We also mentioned the Iranian crisis, and the recent US and EU initiatives. Our positions on this score are also similar. I would rather not talk about it at length, I just want to emphasise that today, at a time that has serious implications for our countries’ collective security and peace, we were able to discuss various aspects and understand the differences in interpretation, the divergence of views, but we also found a similarity of positions. This enables us to move forward. I think we both agree there can be no rational and long-term solution without a political and diplomatic settlement.

In the coming days and weeks, there will be opportunities for additional consultations and contacts with all our European partners, with our allies, as well as with Ukraine and other countries in the region.

We will have the opportunity in the next few days to once again speak by telephone and discuss Ukraine and our collective security. We would like to build a framework of trust that would allow us to move forward. We are determined to maintain stability and peace and to restart the mechanisms of trust in Europe. This is our collective responsibility.

I would like to say that France is reaffirming its commitment to move in this direction.

Thank you.

Question (retranslated): Good afternoon, President Macron, President Putin.

I have a question for both of you.

President Macron, you have seen disappointing results from Russia over the past five years. You have come to Moscow at a time when Russian mercenaries in Mali have put in question our presence there. Does your presence here have any meaning?

President Putin, a simple question for you: do you intend to invade Ukraine?

As for Mali, can you say that your government is not connected in any way with the mercenaries in Mali?

Vladimir Putin: First of all, regarding Mali. President Macron raised this issue many times, we discussed it with him, and President Macron is aware of our position on this matter. The Russian government, the Russian state have nothing to do with the companies that are working in Mali. As far as we know, the Malian leadership has no complaints about the commercial activities of these companies.

Following the logic that may be applied to NATO, the current member states and potential members, if Mali has opted to work with our companies, it has the right to do so. However, I would like to point out – I will talk about this with President Macron after this news conference – I would like to point out that the Russian state has nothing to do with this. It concerns the commercial interests of our companies, which coordinate their activities with the local authorities.

We will take a closer look at this, but we have nothing to do with it. This is the first point.

The second, regarding the situation in Ukraine and the issues we have discussed, the issues of concern to us. I spoke about this right here several days ago, during the news conference after talks with the Prime Minister of Hungary. I would like to say this once again. We are categorically opposed to NATO’s eastward expansion through the admission of new members because we see this as an overall threat of NATO’s continued expansion towards our border. It is not us moving towards NATO but NATO moving towards us. Therefore, saying that Russia is behaving aggressively is at odds with logic. Have we approached anyone’s border? No, it is NATO’s infrastructure that has come close to us. This is my first point.

The second, why is Ukraine’s potential admission into NATO dangerous? The problem does exist. For example, European countries, including France, believe that Crimea is part of Ukraine, but we think that it is part of the Russian Federation. And what happens if attempts are made to change this situation by military means? Bear in mind that Ukraine’s doctrines declare Russia an adversary and state the possibility of regaining Crimea, even using military force.

Just imagine what could happen if Ukraine were a NATO member. Article 5 has not been cancelled. On the contrary, Mr Biden, the President of the United States, has said recently that Article 5 is a sacred obligation and will be honoured. This is fraught with a military confrontation between Russia and NATO. I asked during the above-mentioned news conference, “What are we supposed to do? Fight against the NATO bloc?” But this question has a second part: “Do you want to fight against Russia?” Ask your readers, your audiences and the users of online resources, “Do you want France to fight against Russia?” Because this is how it will be.

Our concerns also have to do with common European security.

As for Donbass, Ukrainian leaders first say that they will implement the Minsk agreements and then they denounce them and say they will never do this because “this would destroy the Ukrainian state.” I have only just mentioned this. Well, will they, or won’t they? This is the question.

They speak of security guarantees from us. But who will guarantee our security? The Ukrainian authorities have already made two attempts to settle the problem of Donbass militarily. When they failed again, the Minsk agreements were coordinated and endorsed by a resolution of the UN Security Council.

So, will they comply with the agreements or not? Or will they make some other attempt? What should we think? After all, they have tried twice, and who can guarantee that they will not try a third time? These questions require a thorough consideration by all of us.

I am deeply grateful to Mr President for discussing these matters in Moscow today. I believe that these security matters concern not only Russia but also Europe and the world as a whole.

Look, our proposals include not only NATO’s expansion, which we oppose, but also a second point: the non-deployment of offensive systems near our borders. If everyone wants peace, tranquillity, well-being and confidence, what is bad about not deploying offensive weapons near our borders? Can anyone tell me what is bad about this?

If NATO is a peaceful organisation, what is bad about returning its infrastructure to the level of 1997, when the NATO-Russia Act was signed? This would create conditions for building up confidence and security. Is this bad?

We can let the open-door pledge be, even though the issue remains on the agenda. It is a key priority for us, and I have explained why. We talked about this for six hours.

Tomorrow, President Macron will fly to Kiev. We have agreed that he will at least put forth his action plan regarding this. I am deeply grateful to him for giving so much attention to this and that he is trying to find a solution to this matter of great importance to all of us.

Emmanuel Macron: To get back to your question, I think that it is first of all France’s responsibility to have the strongest possible relationship with Russia. We are two great European nations and great world powers. We are two permanent members of the UN Security Council.

Bilateral relations are of great importance for us, firstly, to have them develop, and to have common decisions on acute international issues. We are trying to do so on the Iranian issue and attempting to find a point of contact on Libya and other matters. We do have disagreements but we still find compromise. This is obvious to me.

Secondly, I think that President Putin and I agree that Russia is a European country. Those who can see Europe should be able to work with Russia and find ways to build the future in Europe and with Europeans. Is it easy? No, but Europe was also created through difficult initiatives that had immediate effects. So, yes, we do have difficulties but we must not give up.

Finally, this is France’s mission, it is its role. During these six months we are presiding in the European Union. Our role is to make the voice of the European Union heard and take into account a variety of complex circumstances in communication with such neighbours as Russia, which plays a decisive role in our security, and listen to all Europeans as well. I have been doing this over the past days. Being here I am trying to be the person who can make a contribution to finding this proper way.

I have a simple conviction. Do we increase our collective capability for making peace without our contacts with Russia? No, we do not. Who do we leave this role for? For others.

We do have disagreements. We realise that. Sometimes we fail to move forward and it is the result of such disagreements. However, we are trying to find compromises. I consider it to be my responsibility. Our task is to make sure that these compromises protect the interests of our partners and allies. This is why in the coming days and weeks we must start this difficult work, find new decisions in order to protect these guarantees while still protecting our basic principles and our neighbourly relations, because our geography will not change. This is why we carry on.

To be continued.

Tensions between Azerbaijan and Iran… “Israel” is on the Line

 ARABI SOURI OCTOBER 1, 2021

Tel Aviv is not satisfied with this role and its effective military, intelligence, media, and economic presence in Azerbaijan, but it seeks to expand the scope of this influence in the Caucasus region through its presence in Georgia, which is also close to Iran.

The following is the English translation from Arabic of the latest article by Turkish career journalist Husni Mahali he published in the Lebanese Al-Mayadeen news site Al-Mayadeen Net:

Relations between Iran and Azerbaijan are experiencing coolness and sometimes noticeable tension, due to mutual accusations by officials of the two countries, led by President Ilham Aliyev, who spoke of “the incursion of Iranian military vehicles into Azerbaijani territory, during Iranian military maneuvers near the common border,” which was denied by the spokesman of the Iranian Foreign Ministry Saeed Khatibzadeh.

Apathy and tension appeared during the Azerbaijani-Armenian war last year, when information spoke of extensive and intensive Israeli support for the Azerbaijani army, along with Turkish support, which contributed to the victory achieved by the Azerbaijani army.

This victory, to which Tel Aviv contributed by selling Baku drones and spy technology operating via Israeli satellites, was a sufficient reason for further coordination and cooperation between the two ‘countries,’ where the press information talked about Israel establishing bases and radar stations near the border with Iran to monitor Iranian military movements and to monitor Iranian missiles if they are launched towards “Israel”, meanwhile, Israeli companies are working on establishing agricultural and industrial projects similar to the system of Jewish settlements in southern Azerbaijan, 50 km from the border with Iran.

This disturbs Tehran, which sees this Israeli presence, in its various military and intelligence forms, as a threat to its national security, especially with the information that talks about the role of the Mossad in provoking the nationalist sentiments of the Azerbaijani citizens of Iran, who live near the borders with Armenia and Azerbaijan, who number about thirty million, compared to eight million, the population of Azerbaijan.

This Israeli provocation is accompanied by some Turkish nationalist circles inciting the Azeris of Iran, given that they are of Turkish origin, noting that at least 90% of them are Shiites, and their loyalty is to the Iranian state, while the citizens of Azerbaijan are 80% of them Shiites, and they do not hide their discomfort, rather, they are concerned about provocative statements in the Azerbaijani media and talk about Israeli conspiracy from their lands against Iran.

Some Turkish nationalist circles had launched a media campaign against Iran during the Karabakh war, and talked about Iranian military support for Armenia during this war, in an attempt to provoke the nationalist feeling of the Azeris, while the Turkish-backed Azerbaijani authorities continue to obstruct the passage of Iranian trains and trucks transporting Azerbaijani and Russian goods arriving in Iran through the Caspian Sea on their way to Armenia, without that bothering President Ilham Aliyev, who is proud of his close relations with Tel Aviv, some influential Jewish businessmen in Baku, including Leonid Tayrov, Leonid Goldstein, Talman Ismailov and Aras Aglararv, who have Azerbaijani, Israeli and Russian citizenship, and some of them are American, and they all have close relations with influential Russian Jews in Moscow.

They play an influential role in developing relations between Azerbaijan and “Israel” in all fields, the most important of which are military and intelligence, as Tel Aviv sells one billion dollars annually in arms and military equipment to Azerbaijan. They also mediate between Tel Aviv and Ankara, as is the case with Ukrainian President Zalensky, who is also a Jew, and has a close relationship with “Israel” and the Jewish lobby organizations in America. In one of his leaked speeches, President Aliyev admitted the depth of the relationship with Tel Aviv, and said, “Eighty percent of the relations between the two ‘countries’ are underground,” meaning that they are hidden.

Turkey and Russia.. Central Asia after Afghanistan?

Turkey and Russia.. Central Asia after Afghanistan?

Azerbaijan covers 60% of Israel’s need for oil, which reaches the Turkish port of Ceyhan by pipelines and is transported to the Haifa port by oil tankers, whose owners are said to be the son of (Turkish) President Recep Tayyip Erdogan and the son of former Prime Minister Binali Yildirim.

Tel Aviv is not satisfied with this role and its effective military, intelligence, media, and economic presence in Azerbaijan, but it seeks to expand the scope of this influence in the Caucasus region through its presence in Georgia, which is also close to Iran, the biggest concern of Tel Aviv, which was benefiting from its extensive intelligence presence in Afghanistan During the American occupation there. The information talks about Tel Aviv’s efforts to establish Israeli espionage stations in Georgia, whose goal is to monitor Iranian military movements and eavesdrop on Iranian communications, which is the task carried out by the American Koracik base in southeastern Turkey, and its main task is to inform Tel Aviv as soon as any Iranian missile is launched towards “Israel” so that the Iron Dome can confront it before it enters Palestinian airspace.

The information also speaks of Israeli and Turkish efforts to achieve reconciliation between Azerbaijan and Armenia, to contribute to the formation of a new bloc in the Caucasus region that might target Iran, and even Russia, which together seek to confront such a move.

It seems clear that this bothers Moscow, especially after the establishment of Turkish military bases in Azerbaijan, and Ankara’s efforts to develop its relations with Georgia, and its continued refusal to the Crimean annexation to Russia, and its continued development of military relations with Ukraine, Bulgaria, and Romania, which are the countries bordering the Black Sea, this disturbs Moscow, which is watching the movements of Tel Aviv and Ankara, separately, in the Islamic republics of Central Asia, Russia’s backyard, and the neighbors of Iran and Afghanistan together!

And the last bet remains on the developments of the next stage, and the prospects for Turkish policy in the future after the last Sochi summit and all its details are directly or indirectly related to the calculations of “Israel” in the region, and its main target is undoubtedly Iran, which has obstructed and impeded its projects in Syria, Lebanon, Yemen, the Gulf, and other places in the world!

If you want us to remain online, please consider a small donation, or see how you can help at no cost.
Follow us on Telegram: https://t.me/syupdates link will open the Telegram app.

Related Videos

Tension between Iran and Azerbaijan. Look for Israel.

Related News

• Iran’s Defense Minister Vows Crushing Response to Any of Enemies’ Follies
• UNSC Klansmen: That Time of Month for another Anti-Syria Meeting

Turkish conflict with United States

July 14, 2021

by Batko Milacic – Independent analyst – for The Saker Blog

The events in the Middle East have made a large number of interstate relations of the former “allies” very complicated due to the large-scale operation “Arab Spring”. After the failure of the original idea of creating the Great Middle East, a project in which the main role was played by Washington, in alliance primarily with the Gulf monarchies but also with Turkey, there was a great redefinition of relations within the axis.

Realizing that its interests in the region will not be satisfied in the alliance with the United States, Turkey turned another page in foreign policy, trying to satisfy its own interests, thus at the same time defying the synergistic policy of the NATO pact in the Middle East.

This act was a revolt within the NATO bloc itself. The most concrete results were seen with the realization of the “Turkish Stream” project with Russia and the purchase of modern S-400 anti-aircraft systems from Russia, despite numerous warnings from official Washington.

However, the question arises as to what other choice the Turkish leadership had. The “Arab Spring” project failed, and European leaders were clear that Turkey would not become a member of the European Union. On the other hand, out of its own interests in the war against Syria, Washington continued to support the Kurds and their parastate in northeastern Syria, thus calling into question Turkey’s national interests.

Faced with these problems, Turkey has decided to formulate its own policy, of course paying the price. The coup organized against Erdogan was the best example of how Washington does not forgive betrayal but also neither the change in foreign policy of “allies“. Especially when foreign policy is not in line with the interests of official Washington.

The surviving coup was a good lesson for the Turkish leadership that the United States is a superpower, and that enmity with Washington is costly. This was best felt by Turkish citizens, as Turkey’s economy has weakened significantly, because of the escalation of economic sanctions by Washington towards Turkey.

However, strong pressure from Washington further united the Turks. The lived experience, regardless of the political differences, united a significant part of the Turkish, primarily nationalist opposition, with Erdogan in relation to the United States. Erdogan has begun to pursue an increasingly Turkish-oriented foreign policy. Turkish society, especially its nationalist and secular elements reached the historical peak of contempt for US foreign policy.

Turkey, no matter how economically weaker than the United States, has shown that it is not a small nation that a “big boss” can discipline simply as it has in some other periods of history. The example of Turkish resistance to subordinate its policy to Washington interests is becoming dangerous, because the Turkish example of sovereignty of foreign policy and rebellion within the NATO pact can be followed by others.

Turkish nationalism got a new impetus by merging what previously seemed incompatible, and that is the greatest merit of US politics. With the failed Gulenist coup against Erdogan, Washington showed that it tried to treat this great nation as Haiti, which awakened Turkish national pride and opened the biggest gap in relations with the United States so far.

On the other hand, Russia, which was originally and still is in a geopolitical conflict with Turkey, accepted Turkish sovereignist policy and showed that, unlike America, it wants cooperation with Turkey and wants to treat Turkey without humiliation. In addition to the aforementioned “Turkish Stream” and the S-400 system, cooperation has also been established in the field of nuclear energy.

It is also very indicative that the last war in the Caucasus passed with the coordination of Moscow and Ankara, for mutual benefit. And guess who was the biggest loss of that war? Again of course the United States!

Russia and Turkey have demonstrated in a simple way who is the boss in the region, and that Washington is incapable of protecting its “allies”. This is especially related to Armenia, whose government is headed by a pro-US prime minister, Nikol Pashinyan. Turkey was a demonstrator of force through Azerbaijan, while Russia appeared as a protector, which was another slap in the face for Washington. Turkish society is increasingly mobilizing against the United States, especially in the media. The extent to which Turkish society is antagonized in relation to the United States is best shown by the new Turkish documentary “Dying Empire”:

• Turkey Deploys Its Fighters Again… This Time in Afghanistan

AFTER LIBYA AND AZERBAIJAN TURKEY SENDS LOYAL SYRIAN MILITANTS TO YEMEN

South Front

Illustrative image

Submitted by Khaled Iskef.

Informed sources in Idlib Governorate said that Turkey intends to transfer Syrian fighters to Yemen with the aim of engaging them in battles against the Houthis.

The same sources confirmed that representatives of the Turkish intelligence began to communicate with the Free Army factions to start the registration of those desiring to go, with the aim to transfer them to the Ma’rib governorate in Yemen to fight alongside the Islah party of the Muslim Brotherhood against the Houthis.

The sources pointed out that the salary that the fighter will receive in Yemen is $ 1500, in addition to food expenses of $ 400.

It is expected that the first batch of 300 Syrian fighters will be transferred within days.

According to private sources, the salaries of the militants may reach $ 5,000 for fighters and $ 2,300 for facility guards.

The private sources added that the transfer of the militants would take place before the fifth month of this year

It is worth noting that this is not for the first time that Turkey has transferred Syrian and non-Syrian militants from northern Syria, Idlib, and Aleppo, to conflict areas such as Libya and Azerbaijan.

The number of fighters that Turkey transferred to the Nagorno Karabakh region reached about 1450 militants during the outbreak of the war between Armenia and Azerbaijan, which ended with imposition of Turkish-backed Azerbaijan’s control of Shusha, the second-largest city in Karabakh.

Turkey’s role in the Libyan file was very large, and one could say said that they controlled most of the Libyan file’s papers, despite the fact that regional parties continued to play less important roles in this file.

But what draws attention is the role that the Syrian fighters are playing in the Libyan war, which began with the Turkish military intervention in Libya in support of the Sarraj government.

According to various sources, no less than 500 Syrian militants were killed in Libya during the battles, including leaders of the armed groups and 30 children.

Meanwhile, the Syrian Observatory announced that the number of mercenary soldiers from the Syrian factions loyal to Turkey who were fighting alongside the Azerbaijani forces has reached 72 people since their involvement in the fighting between Armenia and Azerbaijan.

One of activists said, on condition of anonymity out of fear for his safety, that the militants, most of whom are from the Turkish-backed factions, such as the Sultan Murad Brigade, the Hamza Brigade, and the Euphrates Shield go in exchange for money. Another activist explained that they are basically desperate fighters recruited by Turkey for about $ 1,500 to $ 2,000 a month.

The Turkish security companies oversee the transfer of militants by transporting them to Turkey and then  to Azerbaijan and Libya, while the Baku government denied information about the transfer of militants to Azerbaijan.

The British newspaper The Guardian quoted a Syrian young man  as saying that he had been transported to Azerbaijan by a Turkish military plane and that he had already worked there on the line of contact with Armenia before the conflict calmed down. According to the newspaper, the 23-year-old Syrian was transported from Idlib to the conflict zone in the South Caucasus in September as part of a battalion of 1,000 Syrians.

According to some information from French sources, fighters of jihadist groups from Syria have reached the conflict zone via Turkey.

Transport operations were not limited to these countries, as the military platforms were promoted via social media in order to attract more Syrian jihadists and send them to Qatar to work as security guards during the 2022 FIFA World Cup.

MORE ON THE TOPIC:

• Houthis Showcase New Missiles, Drones & Other Weapons At Military Exhibition (Videos)
• Syrian Army Continues Its Combing Operation In Eastern Hama (Video)

Russian President Putin Delivers Speech at Virtual World Economic Forum

January 27, 2021

This is the live stream video.  The transcript is now being posted as it becomes available.

Update: Transcript complete.

President of Russia Vladimir Putin: Mr Schwab, dear Klaus,

Colleagues,

I have been to Davos many times, attending the events organised by Mr Schwab, even back in the 1990s. Klaus [Schwab] just recalled that we met in 1992. Indeed, during my time in St Petersburg, I visited this important forum many times. I would like to thank you for this opportunity today to convey my point of view to the expert community that gathers at this world-renowned platform thanks to the efforts of Mr Schwab.

First of all, ladies and gentlemen, I would like to greet all the World Economic Forum participants.

It is gratifying that this year, despite the pandemic, despite all the restrictions, the forum is still continuing its work. Although it is limited to online participation, the forum is taking place anyway, providing an opportunity for participants to exchange their assessments and forecasts during an open and free discussion, partially compensating for the increasing lack of in-person meetings between leaders of states, representatives of international business and the public in recent months. All this is very important now, when we have so many difficult questions to answer.

The current forum is the first one in the beginning of the third decade of the 21^st century and, naturally, the majority of its topics are devoted to the profound changes that are taking place in the world.

Indeed, it is difficult to overlook the fundamental changes in the global economy, politics, social life and technology. The coronavirus pandemic, which Klaus just mentioned, which became a serious challenge for humankind, only spurred and accelerated the structural changes, the conditions for which had been created long ago. The pandemic has exacerbated the problems and imbalances that built up in the world before. There is every reason to believe that differences are likely to grow stronger. These trends may appear practically in all areas.

Needless to say, there are no direct parallels in history. However, some experts – and I respect their opinion – compare the current situation to the 1930s. One can agree or disagree, but certain analogies are still suggested by many parameters, including the comprehensive, systemic nature of the challenges and potential threats.

We are seeing a crisis of the previous models and instruments of economic development. Social stratification is growing stronger both globally and in individual countries. We have spoken about this before as well. But this, in turn, is causing today a sharp polarisation of public views, provoking the growth of populism, right- and left-wing radicalism and other extremes, and the exacerbation of domestic political processes including in the leading countries.

All this is inevitably affecting the nature of international relations and is not making them more stable or predictable. International institutions are becoming weaker, regional conflicts are emerging one after another, and the system of global security is deteriorating.

Klaus has mentioned the conversation I had yesterday with the US President on extending the New START. This is, without a doubt, a step in the right direction. Nevertheless, the differences are leading to a downward spiral. As you are aware, the inability and unwillingness to find substantive solutions to problems like this in the 20^th century led to the WWII catastrophe.

Of course, such a heated global conflict is impossible in principle, I hope. This is what I am pinning my hopes on, because this would be the end of humanity. However, as I have said, the situation could take an unexpected and uncontrollable turn – unless we do something to prevent this. There is a chance that we will face a formidable break-down in global development, which will be fraught with a war of all against all and attempts to deal with contradictions through the appointment of internal and external enemies and the destruction of not only traditional values such as the family, which we hold dear in Russia, but fundamental freedoms such as the right of choice and privacy.

I would like to point out the negative demographic consequences of the ongoing social crisis and the crisis of values, which could result in humanity losing entire civilisational and cultural continents.

We have a shared responsibility to prevent this scenario, which looks like a grim dystopia, and to ensure instead that our development takes a different trajectory – positive, harmonious and creative.

In this context, I would like to speak in more detail about the main challenges which, I believe, the international community is facing.

The first one is socioeconomic.

Indeed, judging by the statistics, even despite the deep crises in 2008 and 2020, the last 40 years can be referred to as successful or even super successful for the global economy. Starting from 1980, global per capita GDP has doubled in terms of real purchasing power parity. This is definitely a positive indicator.

Globalisation and domestic growth have led to strong growth in developing countries and lifted over a billion people out of poverty. So, if we take an income level of $5.50 per person per day (in terms of PPP) then, according to the World Bank, in China, for example, the number of people with lower incomes went from 1.1 billion in 1990 down to less than 300 million in recent years. This is definitely China’s success. In Russia, this number went from 64 million people in 1999 to about 5 million now. We believe this is also progress in our country, and in the most important area, by the way.

Still, the main question, the answer to which can, in many respects, provide a clue to today’s problems, is what was the nature of this global growth and who benefitted from it most.

Of course, as I mentioned earlier, developing countries benefitted a lot from the growing demand for their traditional and even new products. However, this integration into the global economy has resulted in more than just new jobs or greater export earnings. It also had its social costs, including a significant gap in individual incomes.

What about the developed economies where average incomes are much higher? It may sound ironic, but stratification in the developed countries is even deeper. According to the World Bank, 3.6 million people subsisted on incomes of under $5.50 per day in the United States in 2000, but in 2016 this number grew to 5.6 million people.

Meanwhile, globalisation led to a significant increase in the revenue of large multinational, primarily US and European, companies.

By the way, in terms of individual income, the developed economies in Europe show the same trend as the United States.

But then again, in terms of corporate profits, who got hold of the revenue? The answer is clear: one percent of the population.

And what has happened in the lives of other people? In the past 30 years, in a number of developed countries, the real incomes of over half of the citizens have been stagnating, not growing. Meanwhile, the cost of education and healthcare services has gone up. Do you know by how much? Three times.

In other words, millions of people even in wealthy countries have stopped hoping for an increase of their incomes. In the meantime, they are faced with the problem of how to keep themselves and their parents healthy and how to provide their children with a decent education.

There is no call for a huge mass of people and their number keeps growing. Thus, according to the International Labour Organisation (ILO), in 2019, 21 percent or 267 million young people in the world did not study or work anywhere. Even among those who had jobs (these are interesting figures) 30 percent had an income below $3.2 per day in terms of purchasing power parity.

These imbalances in global socioeconomic development are a direct result of the policy pursued in the 1980s, which was often vulgar or dogmatic. This policy rested on the so-called Washington Consensus with its unwritten rules, when the priority was given to the economic growth based on a private debt in conditions of deregulation and low taxes on the wealthy and the corporations.

As I have already mentioned, the coronavirus pandemic has only exacerbated these problems. In the last year, the global economy sustained its biggest decline since WWII. By July, the labour market had lost almost 500 million jobs. Yes, half of them were restored by the end of the year but still almost 250 million jobs were lost. This is a big and very alarming figure. In the first nine months of the past year alone, the losses of earnings amounted to $3.5 trillion. This figure is going up and, hence, social tension is on the rise.

At the same time, post-crisis recovery is not simple at all. If some 20 or 30 years ago, we would have solved the problem through stimulating macroeconomic policies (incidentally, this is still being done), today such mechanisms have reached their limits and are no longer effective. This resource has outlived its usefulness. This is not an unsubstantiated personal conclusion.

According to the IMF, the aggregate sovereign and private debt level has approached 200 percent of global GDP, and has even exceeded 300 percent of national GDP in some countries. At the same time, interest rates in developed market economies are kept at almost zero and are at a historic low in emerging market economies.

Taken together, this makes economic stimulation with traditional methods, through an increase in private loans virtually impossible. The so-called quantitative easing is only increasing the bubble of the value of financial assets and deepening the social divide. The widening gap between the real and virtual economies (incidentally, representatives of the real economy sector from many countries have told me about this on numerous occasions, and I believe that the business representatives attending this meeting will agree with me) presents a very real threat and is fraught with serious and unpredictable shocks.

Hopes that it will be possible to reboot the old growth model are connected with rapid technological development. Indeed, during the past 20 years we have created a foundation for the so-called Fourth Industrial Revolution based on the wide use of AI and automation and robotics. The coronavirus pandemic has greatly accelerated such projects and their implementation.

However, this process is leading to new structural changes, I am thinking in particular of the labour market. This means that very many people could lose their jobs unless the state takes effective measures to prevent this. Most of these people are from the so-called middle class, which is the basis of any modern society.

In this context, I would like to mention the second fundamental challenge of the forthcoming decade – the socio-political one. The rise of economic problems and inequality is splitting society, triggering social, racial and ethnic intolerance. Indicatively, these tensions are bursting out even in the countries with seemingly civil and democratic institutions that are designed to alleviate and stop such phenomena and excesses.

The systemic socioeconomic problems are evoking such social discontent that they require special attention and real solutions. The dangerous illusion that they may be ignored or pushed into the corner is fraught with serious consequences.

In this case, society will still be divided politically and socially. This is bound to happen because people are dissatisfied not by some abstract issues but by real problems that concern everyone regardless of the political views that people have or think they have. Meanwhile, real problems evoke discontent.

I would like to emphasise one more important point. Modern technological giants, especially digital companies, have started playing an increasing role in the life of society. Much is being said about this now, especially regarding the events that took place during the election campaign in the US. They are not just some economic giants. In some areas, they are de facto competing with states. Their audiences consist of billions of users that pass a considerable part of their lives in these eco systems.

In the opinion of these companies, their monopoly is optimal for organising technological and business processes. Maybe so but society is wondering whether such monopolism meets public interests. Where is the border between successful global business, in-demand services and big data consolidation and the attempts to manage society at one’s own discretion and in a tough manner, replace legal democratic institutions and essentially usurp or restrict the natural right of people to decide for themselves how to live, what to choose and what position to express freely? We have just seen all of these phenomena in the US and everyone understands what I am talking about now. I am confident that the overwhelming majority of people share this position, including the participants in the current event.

And finally, the third challenge, or rather, a clear threat that we may well run into in the coming decade is the further exacerbation of many international problems. After all, unresolved and mounting internal socioeconomic problems may push people to look for someone to blame for all their troubles and to redirect their irritation and discontent. We can already see this. We feel that the degree of foreign policy propaganda rhetoric is growing.

We can expect the nature of practical actions to also become more aggressive, including pressure on the countries that do not agree with a role of obedient controlled satellites, use of trade barriers, illegitimate sanctions and restrictions in the financial, technological and cyber spheres.

Such a game with no rules critically increases the risk of unilateral use of military force. The use of force under a far-fetched pretext is what this danger is all about. This multiplies the likelihood of new hot spots flaring up on our planet. This concerns us.

Colleagues, despite this tangle of differences and challenges, we certainly should keep a positive outlook on the future and remain committed to a constructive agenda. It would be naive to come up with universal miraculous recipes for resolving the above problems. But we certainly need to try to work out common approaches, bring our positions as close as possible and identify sources that generate global tensions.

Once again, I want to emphasise my thesis that accumulated socioeconomic problems are the fundamental reason for unstable global growth.

So, the key question today is how to build a programme of actions in order to not only quickly restore the global and national economies affected by the pandemic, but to ensure that this recovery is sustainable in the long run, relies on a high-quality structure and helps overcome the burden of social imbalances. Clearly, with the above restrictions and macroeconomic policy in mind, economic growth will largely rely on fiscal incentives with state budgets and central banks playing the key role.

Actually, we can see these kinds of trends in the developed countries and also in some developing economies as well. An increasing role of the state in the socioeconomic sphere at the national level obviously implies greater responsibility and close interstate interaction when it comes to issues on the global agenda.

Calls for inclusive growth and for creating decent standards of living for everyone are regularly made at various international forums. This is how it should be, and this is an absolutely correct view of our joint efforts.

It is clear that the world cannot continue creating an economy that will only benefit a million people, or even the golden billion. This is a destructive precept. This model is unbalanced by default. The recent developments, including migration crises, have reaffirmed this once again.

We must now proceed from stating facts to action, investing our efforts and resources into reducing social inequality in individual countries and into gradually balancing the economic development standards of different countries and regions in the world. This would put an end to migration crises.

The essence and focus of this policy aimed at ensuring sustainable and harmonious development are clear. They imply the creation of new opportunities for everyone, conditions under which everyone will be able to develop and realise their potential regardless of where they were born and are living

I would like to point out four key priorities, as I see them. This might be old news, but since Klaus has allowed me to present Russia’s position, my position, I will certainly do so.

First, everyone must have comfortable living conditions, including housing and affordable transport, energy and public utility infrastructure. Plus environmental welfare, something that must not be overlooked.

Second, everyone must be sure that they will have a job that can ensure sustainable growth of income and, hence, decent standards of living. Everyone must have access to an effective system of lifelong education, which is absolutely indispensable now and which will allow people to develop, make a career and receive a decent pension and social benefits upon retirement.

Third, people must be confident that they will receive high-quality and effective medical care whenever necessary, and that the national healthcare system will guarantee access to modern medical services.

Fourth, regardless of the family income, children must be able to receive a decent education and realise their potential. Every child has potential.

This is the only way to guarantee the cost-effective development of the modern economy, in which people are perceived as the end, rather than the means. Only those countries capable of attaining progress in at least these four areas will facilitate their own sustainable and all-inclusive development. These areas are not exhaustive, and I have just mentioned the main aspects.

A strategy, also being implemented by my country, hinges on precisely these approaches. Our priorities revolve around people, their families, and they aim to ensure demographic development, to protect the people, to improve their well-being and to protect their health. We are now working to create favourable conditions for worthy and cost-effective work and successful entrepreneurship and to ensure digital transformation as the foundation of a high-tech future for the entire country, rather than that of a narrow group of companies.

We intend to focus the efforts of the state, the business community and civil society on these tasks and to implement a budgetary policy with the relevant incentives in the years ahead.

We are open to the broadest international cooperation, while achieving our national goals, and we are confident that cooperation on matters of the global socioeconomic agenda would have a positive influence on the overall atmosphere in global affairs, and that interdependence in addressing acute current problems would also increase mutual trust which is particularly important and particularly topical today.

Obviously, the era linked with attempts to build a centralised and unipolar world order has ended. To be honest, this era did not even begin. A mere attempt was made in this direction, but this, too, is now history. The essence of this monopoly ran counter to our civilisation’s cultural and historical diversity.

The reality is such that really different development centres with their distinctive models, political systems and public institutions have taken shape in the world. Today, it is very important to create mechanisms for harmonising their interests to prevent the diversity and natural competition of the development poles from triggering anarchy and a series of protracted conflicts.

To achieve this we must, in part, consolidate and develop universal institutions that bear special responsibility for ensuring stability and security in the world and for formulating and defining the rules of conduct both in the global economy and trade.

I have mentioned more than once that many of these institutions are not going through the best of times. We have been bringing this up at various summits. Of course, these institutions were established in a different era. This is clear. Probably, they even find it difficult to parry modern challenges for objective reasons. However, I would like to emphasise that this is not an excuse to give up on them without offering anything in exchange, all the more so since these structures have unique experience of work and a huge but largely untapped potential. And it certainly needs to be carefully adapted to modern realities. It is too early to dump it in the dustbin of history. It is essential to work with it and to use it.

Naturally, in addition to this, it is important to use new, additional formats of cooperation. I am referring to such phenomenon as multiversity. Of course, it is also possible to interpret it differently, in one’s own way. It may be viewed as an attempt to push one’s own interests or feign the legitimacy of one’s own actions when all others can merely nod in approval. Or it may be a concerted effort of sovereign states to resolve specific problems for common benefit. In this case, this may refer to the efforts to settle regional conflicts, establish technological alliances and resolve many other issues, including the formation of cross-border transport and energy corridors and so on and so forth.

Friends,

Ladies and gentlemen,

This opens wide possibilities for collaboration. Multi-faceted approaches do work. We know from practice that they work. As you may be aware, within the framework of, for example, the Astana format, Russia, Iran and Turkey are doing much to stabilise the situation in Syria and are now helping establish a political dialogue in that country, of course, alongside other countries. We are doing this together. And, importantly, not without success.

For example, Russia has undertaken energetic mediation efforts to stop the armed conflict in Nagorno-Karabakh, in which peoples and states that are close to us – Azerbaijan and Armenia – are involved. We strived to follow the key agreements reached by the OSCE Minsk Group, in particular between its co-chairs – Russia, the United States and France. This is also a very good example of cooperation.

As you may be aware, a trilateral Statement by Russia, Azerbaijan and Armenia was signed in November. Importantly, by and large, it is being steadily implemented. The bloodshed was stopped. This is the most important thing. We managed to stop the bloodshed, achieve a complete ceasefire and start the stabilisation process.

Now the international community and, undoubtedly, the countries involved in crisis resolution are faced with the task of helping the affected areas overcome humanitarian challenges related to returning refugees, rebuilding destroyed infrastructure, protecting and restoring historical, religious and cultural landmarks.

Or, another example. I will note the role of Russia, Saudi Arabia, the United States and a number of other countries in stabilising the global energy market. This format has become a productive example of interaction between the states with different, sometimes even diametrically opposite assessments of global processes, and with their own outlooks on the world.

At the same time there are certainly problems that concern every state without exception. One example is cooperation in studying and countering the coronavirus infection. As you know, several strains of this dangerous virus have emerged. The international community must create conditions for cooperation between scientists and other specialists to understand how and why coronavirus mutations occur, as well as the difference between the various strains.

Of course, we need to coordinate the efforts of the entire world, as the UN Secretary-General suggests and as we urged recently at the G20 summit. It is essential to join and coordinate the efforts of the world in countering the spread of the virus and making the much needed vaccines more accessible. We need to help the countries that need support, including the African nations. I am referring to expanding the scale of testing and vaccinations.

We see that mass vaccination is accessible today, primarily to people in the developed countries. Meanwhile, millions of people in the world are deprived even of the hope for this protection. In practice, such inequality could create a common threat because this is well known and has been said many times that it will drag out the epidemic and uncontrolled hotbeds will continue. The epidemic has no borders.

There are no borders for infections or pandemics. Therefore, we must learn the lessons from the current situation and suggest measures aimed at improving the monitoring of the emergence of such diseases and the development of such cases in the world.

Another important area that requires coordination, in fact, the coordination of the efforts of the entire international community, is to preserve the climate and nature of our planet. I will not say anything new in this respect.

Only together can we achieve progress in resolving such critical problems as global warming, the reduction of forestlands, the loss of biodiversity, the increase in waste, the pollution of the ocean with plastic and so on, and find an optimal balance between economic development and the preservation of the environment for the current and future generations.

My friends,

We all know that competition and rivalry between countries in world history never stopped, do not stop and will never stop. Differences and a clash of interests are also natural for such a complicated body as human civilisation. However, in critical times this did not prevent it from pooling its efforts – on the contrary, it united in the most important destinies of humankind. I believe this is the period we are going through today.

It is very important to honestly assess the situation, to concentrate on real rather than artificial global problems, on removing the imbalances that are critical for the entire international community. I am sure that in this way we will be able to achieve success and befittingly parry the challenges of the third decade of the 21^st century.

I would like to finish my speech at this point and thank all of you for your patience and attention.

Thank you very much.

Klaus Schwab: Thank you very much, Mr President.

Many of the issues raised, certainly, are part of our discussions here during the Davos Week. We complement the speeches also by task forces which address some of the issues you mentioned, like not leaving the developing world behind, taking care of, let’s say, creating the skills for tomorrow, and so on. Mr President, we prepare for the discussion afterwards, but I have one very short question. It is a question which we discussed when I visited you in St Petersburg 14 months ago. How do you see the future of European-Russian relations? Just a short answer.

Vladimir Putin: You know there are things of an absolutely fundamental nature such as our common culture. Major European political figures have talked in the recent past about the need to expand relations between Europe and Russia, saying that Russia is part of Europe. Geographically and, most importantly, culturally, we are one civilisation. French leaders have spoken of the need to create a single space from Lisbon to the Urals. I believe, and I mentioned this, why the Urals? To Vladivostok.

I personally heard the outstanding European politician, former Chancellor Helmut Kohl, say that if we want European culture to survive and remain a centre of world civilisation in the future, keeping in mind the challenges and trends underlying the world civilisation, then of course, Western Europe and Russia must be together. It is hard to disagree with that. We hold exactly the same point of view.

Clearly, today’s situation is not normal. We need to return to a positive agenda. This is in the interests of Russia and, I am confident, the European countries. Clearly, the pandemic has also played a negative role. Our trade with the European Union is down, although the EU is one of our key trade and economic partners. Our agenda includes returning to positive trends and building up trade and economic cooperation.

Europe and Russia are absolutely natural partners from the point of view of the economy, research, technology and spatial development for European culture, since Russia, being a country of European culture, is a little larger than the entire EU in terms of territory. Russia’s resources and human potential are enormous. I will not go over everything that is positive in Europe, which can also benefit the Russian Federation.

Only one thing matters: we need to approach the dialogue with each other honestly. We need to discard the phobias of the past, stop using the problems that we inherited from past centuries in internal political processes and look to the future. If we can rise above these problems of the past and get rid of these phobias, then we will certainly enjoy a positive stage in our relations.

We are ready for this, we want this, and we will strive to make this happen. But love is impossible if it is declared only by one side. It must be mutual.

Klaus Schwab: Thank you very much, Mr President.

Erdogan Used 3000 Syrian Terrorists in the Nagorno Karabach Battles

DECEMBER 17, 2020 ARABI SOURI

Erdogan sent at least three thousand Syrian terrorists to fight on the side of Azerbaijan in the battles of Nagorno Karabach against the Armenian army and the Artsakh defense army, reports reveal.

The Turkish madman Erdogan took advantage of the brainwashed mercenaries from the ‘armed Syrian opposition’ groups operating in northern Syria in his military adventures in Libya and now in the contested region of Artsakh – Nagorno Karabach. Hamzat, Sultan Murad Brigade, and Sultan Sulaiman Shah (Aamshat) were the main groups Erdogan recruited his cross-border mercenaries from.

Despite their sacrifice for their deity Erdogan, the Al Qaeda affiliated terrorists of the above-mentioned groups and the families of their killed and injured ones are still waiting for the balance of their pay.

Erdogan paid 10,000 Turkish Lira for each terrorist as a down payment in exchange for joining the fight in the Caucasian conflict he ignited, the balance was supposed to be paid later on, yet to be done. The families of the killed and injured terrorists, however, haven’t received their blood money until now, some of the ‘armed opposition’ propaganda outlets started reporting.

One of those media outlets reported that most of the casualties among the Syrian terrorists were from bombing by the Artsakh Defence Forces.

Terrorists ‘media’ reporting on Syrian mercenaries sent by Erdogan to Nagorno Karabakh

A report published by one of the ‘armed Syrian opposition’ organizations in early last November stated that two thousand mercenaries were transferred to the battlefields via Turkey in the second half of September, many of them were civilians with no military experience and have joined the fight because of the miserable living situation in the regions controlled by Erdogan forces, the Turkish Army and its Al Qaeda affiliated terrorist groups, in northern Syria.

One of the terrorists described to a media outlet how their movements were only at night in Azerbaijan. They’d arrive at the airport and immediately taken to a military academy by military buses and cars. They stayed in the academy for 4 days, handed over weapons, uniforms, and military badges with engraved numbers on them then were taken to a camp to join the fight.

The 25-years-old terrorist added that the Syrian mercenaries were sent to the battlefront for direct fighting and breaking into ‘enemy lines’ while the Azeri military was ‘a step behind’. This terrorist, who had earlier military experience killing Syrian civilians, complained that fighting in Karabach was very difficult, the terrain was rigid, they had to walk for long distances in mountain narrow strips to reach the battleground. Injured mercenaries were taken to a hospital in the Azeri capital Baku for treatment and were treated much better by the Azeris than how the Turks treated them, the terrorist concluded.

Erdogan propaganda outlets and his officials repeatedly denied using Syrian terrorists in the Sultan wannabe military adventures in both Libya and Karabach, despite the multiple reports by the terrorists themselves in both areas and even after the Armenian army arrested two of them during the battles and the Azeri and the Turks refused to include them in the prisoners’ exchange deal after the Russian-brokered ceasefire was established.

President Bashar Assad slammed Erdogan’s abuse of the living conditions of the Syrians in the regions under the Turkish occupation in the Turkish madman’s military adventures and in instigating the crisis in Nagorno Karabach:

President Assad Slams Erdogan for Instigating Nagorno-Karabakh Escalations

AZERBAIJAN RESCHEDULES ‘VICTORY DAY’ TO PLEASE SULTAN ERDOGAN. HEZBOLLAH DRONE BUZZES ISRAELI FORCES

South Front

An unmanned aerial vehicle operated by Lebanese Hezbollah managed to cross into Israel’s north and monitor the Israeli military drills dubbed “Lethal Arrow”, Lebanese media affiliated with Hezbollah reported on December 3. The incident allegedly took place on November 26, on the second day of the drills.

The Israeli side promoted the drill as an exercise to put to the test a strategy based on network-centered warfare bringing together the capabilities of ground, air, naval and cyber forces to quickly eliminate hostile targets in the event of the conflict in the area. The Hezbollah drone buzzed Israeli forces just during these military exercises. Additionally, on December 3, the Israeli government urged its citizens to avoid travel to the United Arab Emirates and Bahrain, citing threats of Iranian attacks.

At the same time, the United States and its allies continue demonstrating concerns regarding possible attacks in Iraq in the wake of an expected Iranian retaliation to the assassination of its top nuclear scientist near Tehran in an alleged US-Israeli plot. According to media reports, following the earlier move of the United States, France and Spain are also considering at least partial withdrawal of diplomatic staff from Iraq. US officials speculate that Iranian-backed factions of the Iraqi Popular Mobilization Forces, an official branch of the Iraqi military, are preparing attacks on facilities and personnel of the US diplomatic mission.

Meanwhile, in the South Caucasus, Azerbaijan for the first time released an official number of its casualties in the Second Nagorno-Karabkah War. According to the defense ministry, 2783 Azerbaijani soldiers were killed, 1245 were injured and over 100 are still missing. In own turn, the Health Ministry of Armenia reported that at least 2718 Armenian soldiers were killed as a result of the conflict. The almost equal casualties of the advancing and defending forces in the standoff in such a complex mountainous area as Nagorno-Karabkah is another factual demonstration of the overwhelming Azerbaijani dominance in the manpower, and firepower, including heavy military equipment, artillery and air support, the in the 1.5-month conflict with the Armenians.

Azerbaijan, however, seems to have already started paying price of its sovereignty for the Turkish support in the war. On December 2, President Ilham Aliyev declared the establishment of the new national holiday ‘Victory Day’ in Azerbaijan. The holiday scheduled for November 10 was dedicated to the start of the implementation of the peace agreements in Karabakh, under which Armenian forces in fact accepted their defeat and agreed to withdraw from Agdam, Kalbajar and Lachin districts.However, a day later Baku was reminded by Ankara that November 10 is the Day of Remembrance of Mustafa Kemal Ataturk, the founder of the Republic of Turkey. So, on December 3, the presidential administration of Azerbaijan changed its order and rescheduled the Azerbaijani national holiday for November 8. Let’s hope the Big Neo-Ottoman Brother is now satisfied. In other case, the Azerbaijani leadership will have to reschedule a few more national holidays and rename ministries to please it.

Related Videos

Related News/Posts

• Russians Deliver MANPADs To Hezbollah?
• Hezbollah Drones Roam the Skies of Occupied Palestine, Fighters Ready for Next Confrontation
• If This Is the Way ‘Israel’ Monitors Hezbollah, Then It Better Brace Itself!
• حسان اللقيس ومعركة الجليل
• Hassan Al-Laqqis: The Man Who Flew Over Palestine حسّان اللقيس: الرجل الذي حلّق… فوق فلسطين
• Lebanon, Syria and the region after the return to nuclear understanding لبنان وسورية والمنطقة بعد العودة للتفاهم النوويّ
• Hezbollah Drone Buzzed Israeli Forces During War-Simulation Exercises In Border Area Near Lebanon
• عن الصواريخ التي تَحرِم قادة إسرائيل من النوم: رسالة فريدمان إلى «عزيزه» بايدن
• After the assassination of the scientist Mohsenzadeh: Let Iran act and don’t rushit! ما بعد اغتيال العالِم محسن زاده: اتركوا إيران تتصرّف ولا تستعجلوها!
• Iranian military reveals weapon used to assassinate nuclear scientist
• Second Karabakh-War Reshapes Transport Corridors In South Caucasus
• Response to Fakhrizadeh’s assassination in Iran time الردّ على اغتيال فخري زاده بتوقيت إيران
• Warnings of not responding to the assassination of Mohsen Fakhri محاذير عدم الرد على اغتيال محسن فخري زادة
• Sanaa, beyond Ma’rib: Here is the Great Sabian fortress صنعاء ما بعد مأرب: هنا الحصن السبئي الكبير
• Chicken Kiev Meets Cold Turkey: Black Sea Axis Emerges?
• Azerbaijani Troops Are In Lachin, But Unresolved Karabakh Status Remains Source Of Tensions

Israel Enjoys Last Weeks Of Love With Trump. Azerbaijan Controls Kalbajar District In Karabkah

On November 25, Azerbaijani troops entered the district of Kalbajar in the Nagorno-Karabakh region. The district was handed over to Baku under the ceasefire deal reached between Armenia and Azerbaijan to put an end to the Second Nagorno-Karabakh War earlier in November.

In total, Armenian forces were set to hand over the following districts: Agdam, Kalbajar, and Lachin, excluding the Lachin corridor. Agdam and Kalbajar are already in the hands of Azerbaijani forces. Lachin will be handed over on December 1. Withdrawing Armenians are destroying their properties and even evacuating graves of their relatives. Just a day ago, on November 24, Armenians troops blew up their barracks in Kalbajar.

In these conditions, the presence of the Russian peacekeepers remains the only guarantee of the security of the local Armenian population. And Russian forces already suffered first casualties as a part of this mission. On November 23, a Russian peacekeeper, four employees of the Ministry of Emergency Situations of the Nagorno-Karabakh Republic were wounded, and an Azerbaijani officer was killed in a mine explosion near the village of Magadiz. A joint group, that also included representatives of the International Committee of the Red Cross, was searching bodies of those killed in the war.

A large number of IEDs, not exploded ammunition and projectiles are an important security factor that prevents the potential return of displaced civilians to Nagorno-Karabkah. A group of Russian sappers has been already working on demining key roads and areas in the Russian zone of responsibility. Baku also vowed to demine territories that its forces captured and already started building a new road linking the town of Shusha and Ahmedbeyli.

In the coming months, the security and humanitarian situation in Nagorno-Karabkah will likely improve, but there are almost zero chances the Armenian population that fled the Azerbaijani advance would return. Therefore, the Azerbaijani-controlled part of Nagorno-Karabakh is in fact empty and the Azerbaijani leadership would have to launch some settlement program if it wants re-populate the region.

Pro-Kurdish sources, waging a propaganda campaign against the traditional Azerbaijani ally, Turkey, already claimed that Ankara is planning to settle families of fighters of Turkish-backed Syrian militant groups in Karabakh. According to reports, Turkish authorities opened 2 offices in the Turkish-occupied Syrian town of Afrin for this purpose. If such plans even exist, it is unlikely that Azerbaijan would be happy to support them. The one thing is to use a cheap cannon fodder recruited by the Big Turkish Brother and the very different thing is to allow multiple Syrian radicals to become the permanent factor of your internal security. The implementation of such a plan would inevitably turn the Azerbaijani-controlled part of Nagorno-Karabkah into the hotbed of terrorism.

Meanwhile, Israel has been desperately exploiting the last months of the current Trump presidency term. Early on November 25, the Israeli Air Force carried out a series of airstrikes on targets in the southern countryside of Damascus and the province of Quneitra. According to Syrian state media, missiles were launched from the direction of the occupied Golan Heights. As of now, the Syrian side denies any casualties and claims that the strike caused a material damage only. Pro-Israeli sources insist that the strike led to multiple casualties among Iranian-backed forces and Iranian personnel.

This became the second Israeli strike on Syria in the last 7 days. The previous one took place on November 18 and hit the very same areas, including Damascus International Airport. The activation of the Israeli military activity in the region indicates that Tel Aviv expects a particular decrease of unconditional support that it was receiving from the United States under the Trump administration. Therefore, it seeks to use the last days of this 4-year-long honeymoon as effective as possible. Even more Israeli and potentially US actions against Iranian interests in the region and Iran itself could be expected in the coming weeks.

Related

• Armenia Is Trolling Russia, Digging Its Own Grave Around The Clock
• Turkey expresses rage over French Senate’s decision to recognize Karabakh’s independence
• Azerbaijani soldiers desecrate Armenian graves in newly handed over area: video
• Azerbaijani Troops Entered Largest Armenian Gold Mine On Nagorno-Karabakh Border (Videos)
• Map Update: Military Situation In Nagorno-Karabakh On November 26, 2020

AZERBAIJANI TROOPS ENTER FIRST OF DISTRICTS THAT ARE SET TO BE RETURNED UNDER KARABAKH DEAL

South Front

Late on November 19, Azerbaijani troops started entering the district of Agdam in the Nagorno-Karabakh region. Agdam is one of the districts surrounding the Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Oblast of the Azerbaijan Soviet Socialist Republic that Azerbaijan lost to Armenian forces after the collapse of the USSR, as a result of the First Karabkah War. On November 20, the district is set to be fully transfered to Azerbaijan under the peace deal reached by Baku and Yerevan to put an end to the Second Karabkah War earlier in November. An overwhelming majority of Armenians living in Agdam have already left the area. Over the past days, authorities of the self-proclaimed Nagorno-Karabakh Republic (also known as the Republic of Artsakh) were assisting in the evacuation. Many of the leaving Armenians were burning their homes in order to not allow the Azerbaijanis to seize them and use them in the future.

The next district, which is set to be transferred to Azerbaijani control, is Kalbajar. Originally, it had to be handed to Baku forces on November 15, but this development was rescheduled for November 25. The Armenians currently fleeing Kalbajar are burning their homes and properties that they cannot evacuate. If the control over Agdam and Kalbajar is transferred to Azerbaijan without major incidents, Lachin will become the next district that will face this fate. Nonetheless, the Lachin corridor linking Armenia with Stepanakert and other Karabakh territories that will remain in the hands of the Armenians will be secured by the Russian peacekeeping force. Currently, the Russian military has 23 checkpoints in the conflict zone. The Lachin-Stepanakert road was reopened and over 1235 displaced civilians have returned to Stepanakert.

Contrary to the situation within districts that would be transferred to the Azerbaijani forces, Armenians do not flee the areas that will remain in the zone of responsibility of the Russians. Instead, many people that fled the conflict have opted to return their homes. Nonetheless, the local humanitarian crisis can hardly be avoided. According to the 2015 census, the population of the Nagorno-Karabakh Republic was about 151,000. The conflict reportedly displaced about a half of them, somewhere between 75,000-80,000. Even more people are now fleeing districts that are set to be transferred to Azerbaijan under the fear of violence, ethnic cleansing and other kinds of threats from the Azerbaijani forces and authorities. A part of the displaced people is now returning to Stepanakert and other nearby areas under Russian protection. However, even in the best case, the Armenian state will still have to deal with tens of thousands of displaced people in its territory. Yerevan already announced some financial help and economic support to these people, but the situation in Karabkah itself also requires attention. So far, the only side conducting humanitarian actions there has been Russia that created a special humanitarian center for this purpose.

The coming weeks will demonstrate the ability of the sides to compel each other to the reached ceasefire accords and, in the event of their implementation, a sufficient level of peace and security will finally be achieved in the region.

Related News

• High-Ranking Russian Delegation Came To Baku And Yerevan, While Turkey To Send Forces To Azerbaijan
• Armenian Government ‘Accidentally’ Forgot To Put Russian Flag During Meetings With Russian Delegation
• Map Update: Military Situation In Nagorno-Karabakh On November 21, 2020
• Ugly Truth Behind Devastating Armenian Defeat In Karabakh Was Revealed
• Silent Retreat Of Neo-Ottoman Forces From Syria
• Russian Karabakh And Other Consequences Of Armenian-Azerbaijani War
• Russia Returns To Power Game In Red And Arabian Seas

UGLY TRUTH BEHIND DEVASTATING ARMENIAN DEFEAT IN KARABAKH WAS REVEALED

South Front

Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan led Armenian forces to collapse in the Nagorno-Karabakh war and lost Shusha because he was refusing to accept Russian peacekeepers and allow displaced Azerbaijani citizens to return. This was revealed by Russian President Vladimir Putin during answers to media questions on November 17.

“On October 19-20, I had a series of telephone conversations with both President Aliyev and Prime Minister Pashinyan. And then the Azerbaijani armed forces regained control over an insignificant southern part of Karabakh. In general, I managed to convince President Aliyev that it is needed to stop hostilities, but a mandatory condition on his part was the return of refugees, including to the city of Shusha,” Putin said. The proposed peace agreement supposed to allow Armenian forces to maintain control over their side of the contact line, including Shusha, and to allow the return of civilians under the supervision of Russian peacekeepers. However the Pashinyan government said that it was “unacceptable” for them because this move would supposedly threaten Armenian interests. In the ensuing weeks after the refusal to accept the Russian peacekeepers deployment, Armenian forces retreated from a large number of areas in southern and central Karabakh, lost the symbolic town of Shusha and in the end accepted a much worse peace deal. After total defeat in the war with Azerbaijan, it was obliged to surrender the districts of Lachin, Kalbajar and Agdam. Shusha is in the hands of Azerbaijani troops. Thousands of Armenians were killed. These are the costs of the actions of the Soros-grown Pashinyan clique that was obsessed with pleasing its western puppeteers by distancing from Russia rather than defending Armenians.

As to the current status of Nagorno-Karabakh, it has not been settled and, according to Putin, the sides agreed to “maintain the status quo”. A “significant factor” that played a role in the Second Karabakh War and now influences the potential settlement process is that Armenia itself has neither recognized Karabakh as an independent state nor as a part of Armenia.

“To put it bluntly, after the former Georgian leaders’ undoubtedly criminal moves, I mean the attacks against our peacekeepers in South Ossetia, Russia recognized the independence of South Ossetia and Abkhazia. We recognized the expression of the will of the people living in Crimea to reunite with Russia as just, and we met the people halfway, we did so openly. Some people may like it, others may not like it, but we did it in the interests of the people who live there and in the interests of Russia, and we are not ashamed to speak about it openly.

This did not happen with Karabakh, and this, of course, has significantly influenced the developments there,“ Putin noted.

Meanwhile, the Armenian prime minister and his circle continue crying foul blaming previous governments, the Armed Forces and even the Armenian nation in general for the loss of the war. Armenia has become another sad example of how color revolutions and the seizure of power by pro-globalist grant-suckers eventually lead to the destruction of statehood and major territorial or economic losses for the countries where this happens.

Related

• Silent Retreat Of Neo-Ottoman Forces From Syria
• Russian Karabakh And Other Consequences Of Armenian-Azerbaijani War
• Russia Returns To Power Game In Red And Arabian Seas
• Russian Troops Took Control Of Lachin Corridor, Other Key Areas In Nagorno-Karabakh

IRGC RELEASES ALLEGED PHOTO OF AZERBAIJANI PRESIDENT IN SNIPER’S SIGHTS, IRAN SAYS PRESENCE OF MILITANTS IN KARABAKH UNACCEPTABLE

South Front

In a reminder that Iran opposes any further Azerbaijani ambitions in Nagorno-Karabakh and beyond, the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) released an interesting photograph.

It shows Azerbaijan’s President Ilham Aliyev in the sights of an Iranian sniper, while he was visiting the Khodaafarin bridge at the Karabakh-Iran border.

#Iran's IRGC released the photos of the scope of an Iranian sniper while President Aliyev was visiting Khodaafarin bridge at the Karabakh-Iran border.#Azerbaijan
📸 pic.twitter.com/soE8TR6ipV

— Mete Sohtaoğlu (@metesohtaoglu) November 17, 2020

Earlier, on November 16^th, Iranian Foreign Ministry spokesman Saeed Khatibzadeh said that no changes have occurred in Iran’s northwestern borderlines.

This happened in reference to the peace deal between Azerbaijan and Armenia after several weeks of conflict over the Nagorno-Karabakh region near the Iranian borders.

Stating that no change has occurred at the borderlines, he stressed that Iran will never accept anything other than what has been announced by the two sides.

Khatibzadeh added that the corridor that has become controversial these days is simply a transit route, the case of which is closely monitored by the Iranian Foreign Ministry.

He further said that Iran welcomes any peaceful settlement of the case as it did over the past three decades.

He reiterated that no change has occurred at the Iranian borders and will never occur in the future.

According to Iranian Foreign Ministry knowledge, the Syrian militants must have already left the region, the spokesman said that a peaceful settlement of the conflict between Azerbaijan and Armenia will benefit the entire region.

The spokesman, however, said Iran will not tolerate presence of any foreign elements in the region.

About killing of Iranian border guards in northwest of the country, Khatibzadeh said Iran’s response to such measures is strong.

A senior advisor to Leader of the Islamic Revolution Ayatollah Seyyed Ali Khamenei says there is no place for Syrian militants close to Iran’s northern borders.

“There is no place for Wahhabi and Takfiri terrorists among people of Azerbaijan who are known for their love for Prophet Muhammad (PBUH)’s progeny, and track records of such groups are very bleak,” Ali Akbar Velayati said in an address to a webinar held to discuss Ayatollah Khamenei’s views on the Karabakh region. “The people of Azerbaijan are capable of liberating their land and the presence of Wahhabi terrorists in north of Iran’s borders [with Azerbaijan] will be fruitless.”

MORE ON THE TOPIC:

• Russian Peacekeepers Open Lachin Corridor Post, Equipment Deliveries Continue
• In Video: Azerbaijani President Visists Fuzuli District Captured From Armenians During Second Karabakh War

موسكو تهزم الإنجليز على ضفاف الفولغا وتطيح بالطورانيّة في القوقاز…!

محمد صادق الحسيني

قد لا يخطر لأحد حتى للمتابع الفطن للوهلة الاولى بأن سبب اندلاع حرب القوقاز الاخيرة انما يقف وراءها نزوع بريطانيّ شره قديم للسيطرة على مقدرات أمم القوقاز عاد وتجدّد في معركة السيطرة على قره باغ..!

فالحرب، التي شنها الجيش الأذربيجاني على إقليم ناغورني قره باغ الأرمني السكان، منذ 27/9/2020 وحتى توقيع اتفاقية وقف إطلاق النار، بين روسيا وأرمينيا وأذربيجان، قبل أيام معدودة لم تكن حرباً وليدة الساعة وليست ناتجة عن رد فعل اذربيجاني، على أطلاق نار من طرف قوات إقليم ناغورني قره باغ مثلاً، وإنما هي حرب تشكل استمراراً للحروب التي كانت تشنها بريطانيا في مناطق جنوب القوقاز ووسط آسيا (ما يعرف حالياً بالجمهوريات السوفياتية الإسلامية السابقة) بهدف وقف ما كانت تسميه لندن «التمدد الروسي» في آسيا… تلك السياسة التي لا زالت بريطانيا ومعها الولايات المتحدة ودول حلف شمال الاطلسي تمارسها حتى الآن، ليس تجاه روسيا فحسب وانما تجاه إيران أيضاً، التي تتهمها قوى الاستعمار الاوروبي «بالتمدد وتوسيع نفوذها» في «الشرق الاوسط»…!

للمتابع الفطن نقول إن هذه الحرب لم تقع صدفةً وإنما تم التخطيط لها بعناية فائقة، وبقيادة بريطانية أميركيةٍ، كان بطلها السفير البريطاني السابق في تركيا، ريتشارد مور ، الذي كان سفيراً فيها منذ بداية سنة 2014 وحتى نهاية 2017، وهو الصديق الحميم لأردوغان شخصياً ولمعظم السياسيين والجنرالات الأتراك، خاصة أنه يتكلم اللغة التركية بطلاقة ويدير مدوّنة شخصية باللغة التركية حتى اليوم، على الرغم من أنه كان قد سُمّيَ رئيساً لجهاز المخابرات البريطانية الخارجية أم 16، في شهر تموز 2020، وتسلم منصب قائد هذا الجهاز بتاريخ 2/10/2020 بعد إنهاء الإجراءات المتعلقة بتقلد هذا المنصب.

وهو كان ضابطاً فيه، حتى أثناء عمله كسفير في تركيا.

وهذا يعني أن الأب «الشرعي» لهذه الحرب هي بريطانيا، من تحت المظلة الأميركية، بينما لعب اردوغان وجنرالاته، ونتن ياهو وضباط جيشه ومخابراته، دور الأدوات لا أكثر، بهدف تنفيذ الخطة العسكرية لغزو إقليم ناغورني قره باغ وأجزاء من جنوب أرمينيا.

وقد كانت الأركان الرئيسية للخطة الشاملة تقضي بزعزعة الاستقرار في جنوب القوقاز وجمهوريات آسيا الوسطى، وصولاً الى الحدود الغربية للصين مع جمهورية قرقيزستان.

وإن الأركان الأساسية كانت هي التالية:

أولاً: أن يقوم الجيش الأذربيجاني بشنّ هجوم خاطف وسريع (ما يُسمّى بليتس كريغ أي حرب خاطفة باللغة الألمانية أصل هذه التسمية)، لا يستمرّ أكثر من أسبوع، لاجتياح إقليم ناغورني قره باغ وجنوب أرمينيا، وذلك انطلاقاً من حسابات المخطّطين العسكريين الأميركيين والبريطانيين والإسرائيليين والأتراك، الذين كانوا قد أعدوا الجيش الأذري بشكل جيد لمثل هذه المهمة، على صعيد التسليح والاستخبارات، ورفده بآلاف عدة من فلول داعش والنصرة الذين تمّ نقلهم جواً، عبر الأجواء الجورجية إلى أذربيجان، وغير ذلك من وسائل الدعم.

ثانياً: واستكمالاً لهذه الخطة العسكرية، التي بدأ تنفيذها بتاريخ 27/9/2020، يتمّ تفجير حرب ناعمة (ملوّنة)، موازية لهذه الحرب، ولكن في جمهورية قرغيزستان، المحاذية لحدود الصين الشمالية الغربية. وهو ما حصل فعلاً، حيث انفجرت يوم 4/10/2020، أعمال شغب وفوضى على نطاق واسع، احتحاجاً على نتائج انتخابية أجريت هناك، والتي كان للمخابرات المركزية الأميركية دور واسع في إشعالها وتأجيجها، خاصة أن الإدارة الاميركية كانت قد أُجبرت، سنة 2014، على إخلاء قاعدتها الجوية من شمال شرق قرقيزستان، والتي كانت تعتبر قاعدة متقدّمة ورأس جسر هام جداً، في إطار الحشد الاستراتيجي الأميركي ضدّ روسيا والصين.

ولكن هذه الحلقة من حلقات الحرب الناعمة الملوّنة قد فشلت، بتضافر جهود محلية وأخرى دوليّة، نجحت في وأد تلك المؤامرة «بشكل خاطف» وحاسم. وبالتالي وجهت ضربة استراتيجية لمخططات قوى الاستعمار الغربي، القديمة والجديدة، والتي كانت تهدف الى إحداث تغيير استراتيجي في موازين القوى في منطقة وسط آسيا.

ثالثاً: كان من المفترض، وبعد نجاح الجيش الاذربيجاني – حسب الخطة – في حسم الحرب وتحقيق أهدافه العسكرية، أن يعقد في باكو، عاصمة اذربيجان. أواخر شهر 10/2020، مؤتمر مجلس التعاون للدول الناطقة باللغة التركية، الذي تأسس في اسطنبول بتاريخ 16/9/2010، وأن يتم خلال هذا المؤتمر الإعلان عن تأسيس «جيش طوران العظيم».

وهذا يعني، عملياً وعملياتياً، إدخال اذربيجان في الأطر العسكرية التركية وبالتالي تلك الأطر التابعة لحلف شمال الأطلسي، تمهيداً لابتلاع بحر قزوين والتمدد، عبر تركمنستان، الى أوزبكستان وطاجيكستان وقرغيزستان، كما ذكرنا أعلاه. اي تطويق روسيا، عند حدودها الجنوبية، ليس فقط بقوات الاطلسي، وانما بعشرات آلاف العناصر الإرهابية، التي كان من المفترض ان تنقل الحرب الى داخل الأراضي الروسية شمالاً، أي شمال القوقاز، والى داخل الاراضي الصينيه شرقاً عبر قرغيزستان، والى داخل الأراضي الإيرانية في الجنوب الغربي، الى محافظة أذربيجان الغربية بدايةً وما يعنيه ذاك من تهديد للأمن القومي الإيراني، إضافة الى ما كان سيشكله من إخلال خطير بموازين القوى الاستراتيجية، في تلك المنطقة، خاصة اذا ما أخذنا العامل الإسرائيلي بعين الاعتبار وما كان يمكن أن يقوموا به من أدوار ضد الجمهورية الإسلامية الإيرانية.

رابعاً: لكن فطنة وحنكة الرئيس الروسي والتنسيق العميق، بين القيادة الروسية والإيرانية، لإيجاد حل دبلوماسي لتلك الحرب، انطلاقاً من اتفاقية لوقف إطلاق النار الفوري، قد نجحت في افشال الخطط العسكرية والسياسية، ذات الطبيعة الاستراتيجية، التي خططت لها قوى الاستعمار الغربي. وقد كان المنطلق الاساسي، لمهندس هذه النتيجة (وقف الحرب)، هو خلق نوع من التوازنات الميدانية عسكرياً، بما يفرض على الطرفين القبول بوقف إطلاق النار، تمهيداً للبدء في البحث عن وسائل ديبلوماسية وسياسية قادرة على خلق الاستقرار في كل منطقة جنوب القوقاز واواسط آسيا وإخراج المنطقة نهائياً من دائرة تجدد الحروب والنزاعات المسلحة، التي تقضي على كل فرص النمو والازدهار.علماً أن فشل الجيش الاذربيجاني، في اجتياح إقليم ناغورني قره باغ وجنوب أرمينيا، بالسرعة المطلوبة كان عاملاً أساسياً في الوصول الى النتيجة التي نراها أمامنا، والمتمثلة في ما يلي:

أ ـ نجاح روسيا، من دون أن تتدخل عسكرياً او تطلق حتى رصاصةً واحدةً، في وقف القتال، وبالتالي منع توسع نطاق الحرب الى دول مجاورة، جنوباً وشرقاً، او الى جمهوريات روسية جنوبية (جمهوريات منطقة الڤولغا).

ب ـ الأهمية القصوى لهذا النجاح بالنسبة لإيران، حيث إنه قد قضى على إمكانية انتشار العصابات الإرهابية المسلحة على حدودها الشمالية الغربية، وما كان سيرافق ذلك من تسلل إسرائيلي الى أطراف تلك الحدود الإيرانية.

ج ـ إخراج تركيا، كعضو في حلف شمال الاطلسي، وأردوغان كحالم بإمبراطورية طورانية جديدة، من توازنات القوقاز وأواسط آسيا، على الرغم مما تردده وسائل الإعلام المختلفة عن تنسيق تركي روسي يتعلق بمراقبة وقف اطلاق النار.

فمن يراقب وقف إطلاق النار ومنع التسلل التركي / الاطلسي، الى اذربيجان وبقية انحاء آسيا الوسطى، هو لواء القوات الخاصة الروسية، الذي انتشر على خطوط التماس، والقوات التي سيجري تعزيزه بها، اذا ما دعت الضرورة الى ذلك. ستكون هي القوات التي تمسك بالأرض، وهي التي ستشرف على الممرات الآمنة، بعرض 5 كلم، بين إقليم قره باغ (ممر لاشين) وأرمينيا، وبين إقليم نقچوان واذربيجان، عبر جنوب أرمينيا.

وهو ما يعني أيضاً استعادة روسيا زمام المبادرة الاستراتيجية في كل فضائها الجنوبيّ، وإن بشكل يختلف عن الوجود الروسي، في هذه المناطق، إبان الحقبة السوفياتية.

إنه حضور مرن قادر على التكيّف مع كلّ المتغيرات الجيو استرتيجية والحفاظ على مصالح روسيا العليا ومصالح حلفائها، على الصعيد الدولي.

لكن كلّ هذه النجاحات لا تعني انّ التآمر الاستعماري الغربي، خاصة البريطاني الأميركي، قد انتهى الى غير رجعة، وإنما يعني ان الأرضية الاستراتيجية لإنهاء هذه المؤامرات والأطماع قد وضع لها حدّ مبدئياً.

والتطبيق العملياتي لهذه الإجراءات هو الذي سيخبرنا عن قريب عن حقيقة حجم كلّ لاعب إقليمي او دولي هناك.

فضاء القوقاز هو فضاء تمّ حسمه بشكل نهائي لصالح روسيا في الحرب العالمية الثانية. ولن تسمح روسيا لأحد مشاركتها به إلا اللهم الدخول في حلف استراتيجي معها، وهو ما تتقنه إيران باستقلالية قرار قلّ نظيرها، وهو ما لن تقدر عليه تركيا لأنها تلعب دور مخلب الناتو رغم كل الضجيج الذي تثيره حول طموحاتها المتهافتة على سواحل البحار الخمسة من الأسود حتى المتوسط والخليج الفارسي.

فنون قتال لا يتقنها إلا كبار العقول
بعدنا طيبين قولوا الله….

The Karabakh war is over. The crisis is not. What comes next?

Source

First, I want to begin this analysis by posting the full translation of an article posted yesterday by the Russian webzine Vzgliad.  I materially don’t have the time to make my own translation, so what I will post is just a minimally retouched machine translation, I apologize for this.

original Russian text: https://vz.ru/world/2020/11/12/1070326.html

Five main mysteries of the second Karabakh war

by Evgenii Krutikov

The end of the second Karabakh war gave rise to many riddles and conspiracy theories. Indeed, some of the circumstances of this conflict are extremely mysterious, or at least paradoxical from the point of view of conventional military logic. Apparently, the Armenian leadership itself provoked a political catastrophe.

Let’s list which riddles raise the biggest questions and provoke the appearance of “conspiracy theories” in Armenia (and not only).

1. Why was not a full-fledged mobilization carried out in Armenia, and full-fledged military units were not deployed to the conflict area?

Despite loud Patriotic statements, there was no real mobilization in Armenia. The permanent number of the Armenian army – about 50 thousand people-was increased only by volunteers. While the conditions of the fighting required to increase the number of defenders of Karabakh to 80-100 thousand people at least. At the same time, very soon the lack of specialists (for example, artillery calculations and MLRS) began to affect the front in the Armenian army. There was no one to fill in the losses.

It is inexplicable why Yerevan did not conduct a real mobilization. The Armenian leadership simply avoids talking about this topic. If there was a mobilization plan, no one tried to implement it. As a result, there was no rotation of military personnel on the first line, in some areas people were sitting in the trenches for a month without a shift. 18-20-year-olds were on the front line, and at some point the untrained youth made up up to 80% of the personnel. The Karabakh detachments, made up of professionals and veterans, suffered heavy losses in the first week, which there was no one and nothing to make up for, since there were simply no reinforcements.

Groups of volunteers in Armenia were formed along party lines. The scandal was caused by an attempt to form a separate detachment of the prosperous Armenia party named after the oligarch Gagik Tsarukyan, who is now Pashinyan’s main opponent. The two have been in conflict for more than a decade. Now the Prime Minister openly calls Tsarukyan “the culprit of the fall of Shusha”, since his phantom squad allegedly did not have enough at the front to win. These conflicts could have been avoided simply by having a mobilization plan and a desire to implement it.

The main military forces of Armenia did not move to Karabakh. But in order to relieve the tension created by Azerbaijani UAVs, it was enough to simply relocate early detection locators to Goris. And one army corps would have been enough to cover the southern direction even at the stage when the Azerbaijanis were languidly marking time in front of the first line of defense. Proper supplies were not organized, and after a month of fighting, this led to a shortage of missiles for the MLRS and shells for the barrel artillery. And without artillery support, the infantry can only die heroically.

All this borders on sabotage, although it may be partly explained by local sloppiness and unwillingness to weaken the defense of Armenia proper. The latter is a very controversial position and it looks like the Armenian leadership has simply abandoned Karabakh to its fate.

2. Why did the Northern front behave so strangely?

In the North and North-East of Karabakh, in the area of the Kyrgyz Republic, there was a large fortified area of the Armenian defense, which included very combat-ready units. And they really put up a serious resistance to the advancing Azerbaijani group and in the end actually stopped it (losing, however, several positions and significant villages).

But after that, the elite Yehnikner battalion suddenly retreated, although its commander managed to get the “Hero of Artsakh”. Moreover, since October 3, neither “Ehnikner” nor any military unit at all was removed from the Northern front and was not transferred to help the burning South. At the same time, the Azerbaijanis only once decided to simulate an offensive in the North again, clearly for distracting purposes. There was no need to keep up to 20 thousand people in the North.

The Karabakh Leadership informally explains all this with a lack of resources. But now the” lack of resources ” in Karabakh explains everything.

3. Why did the southern front collapse?

The fact that the main blow is being inflicted by the Azerbaijanis in the South, in the steppe zone, was visible to the naked eye already in the first few days of the war. Nevertheless, resources – human and technical-began to arrive on the southern front when this front was no longer in fact there. The steppe zone was lost, and the front stopped along the edge of the mountains from Krasny Bazar to Martuni. As a result, up to 30 thousand people defending Karabakh have accumulated in this area. They were threatened with complete encirclement and death, which was one of the reasons for signing the ceasefire agreement. At the same time, before the occupation of Jabrayil, the Azerbaijani troops advanced very slowly, disrupting their own pace of attack. This gave the Armenians a small, but still a head start in order to understand the situation and engage in relocation.

After the occupation of Jabrayil, the front began to fall apart, and the advance of the Azerbaijanis sharply accelerated. The moment was lost.

For some reason, the Armenian command has not made a decision about the transfer of additional resources to the southern front? This is another mystery.

4. Why did the Armenian side limit itself to passive defense?

During the entire war, the Armenian side only twice attempted a counterattack against the advanced units of the Azerbaijanis who were running far ahead. Both times this happened opposite Lachin in a narrow gorge, with the extreme vulnerability of the Azerbaijani battalion-tactical group (BTG). Once even successfully. But these operations were simply reduced to a massive attack by the MLRS on enemy clusters. Operations to block the gorge and encircle the enemy in other sections of the southern front were suggested. But not a single Armenian unit moved. An amazing war in which one of the parties did not conduct a single offensive operation on the ground, limited only and exclusively to passive defense.

A successful counteroffensive in the gorge before Lachin would have crushed so many Azerbaijani forces in the cauldron that they would not have thought about attacking Shusha for at least a couple of weeks. And later it was quite possible to destroy the Azerbaijani infantry in the ravine Averatec. But it took a lot of effort.

There is no explanation for why the Armenian side did not even try to counterattack or use other methods to use the operational advantage that it repeatedly had. The lack of resources can only be referred to endlessly in the last stages of warfare, but passive defense has been a constant tactic since the beginning of the war.

5. Why was Shusha handed over?

The most sensitive and incomprehensible question. The first assault on the city by Azerbaijani infantry was extremely unsuccessful. Then the second column of Azerbaijanis was covered by the MLRS strike. With some effort and assistance from Armenia, the Azerbaijani group that broke through to the city could be destroyed. However, suddenly a decision is made to leave the city without a fight and not to attempt to liberate it with the favorable operational and tactical situation remaining for another day.

It is believed that the decision to leave Shusha was made by NKR President Araik Harutyunyan and Secretary of the NKR security Council General Samvel Babayan, a local legend. Now, in protest against the signing of the armistice, he left his post and renounced the title of Hero of Artsakh. The Armenian YouTube channel “Lurer” (“news”) published a recording of Babayan and Harutyunyan’s talks, from which it follows that General Babayan really considered the possibility of recapturing Shusha even after its abandonment,but the further prospect of resistance was very gloomy.

Fragment of a conversation (not translated verbatim): “Let’s calculate the (combat) task. Twenty, thirty volleys of the “Smerch” MLRS blanket Shushi. We kill everyone there. Taking the city back. What’s next? The state of the army and the civilian population does not allow for war. We gave battle, took Shushi, then what? ( … ) we Can’t fight with the NATO army, with mercenaries, fully equipped… I tried to organize an operation with three battalions yesterday. We only have four howitzers. If we are not provided with artillery, how will you ensure the offensive or cut off his (the enemy’s) tails? (…) Today we must finally negotiate with Russia that we are handing over these territories and leaving them. Or they help us. Imagine that we have two Grads for the entire army today, a dozen howitzers, for which we have no shells.”

To sum up, General Babayan believed that resistance was useless at this stage of the fighting. We must refuse to continue the war and either surrender, or ask for ten days for an organized exit of the local population and the 30 thousand soldiers of the southern front who are completely surrounded. As an alternative, it was proposed to urgently ask Russia for direct military assistance in the form of PMCs or volunteers, equipment and ammunition.

But all this does not negate the question of why a small group of Azerbaijani infantrymen without heavy equipment, who broke through to Shusha, was not destroyed before the Armenian army began to panic. The retention of Shusha created a completely different architecture of political agreements for the NKR and Armenia. If this is a political decision, then who actually made it?

* * *

This list of mysteries of the second Karabakh war is far from complete. In addition, the Armenian leadership has accumulated many similar questions about preparing for war. This war was lost before it even started, precisely because of the inaction or strange action of Yerevan.

The proceedings will continue for a long time. The situation in the region has changed so radically in these forty days that all the old approaches to resolving the conflict and its military component have died out of themselves. And the new reality will require new solutions for Armenia. And it is not yet clear who will take these decisions.  

---

Personally, I do not see any dark conspiracy here.  What I do see is a truly PHENOMENAL level of incompetence from the Sorosite leadership of Armenia.  Simply put, the vast majority of the truly competent Armenian leaders, civilian and military, were either jailed or, at the very least fired en masse.  There is a very simple explanation for this too.

From Pashinian’s (and, from now on, when I say “Pashinian” I mean the usual suspects: MI6, CIA, Soros, etc.) point of view, the “old guard” of Soviet trained leaders had to be removed because they could not be trusted.  But what this imbecile, and his masters, did not realize is that the “Soviet educated” leadership was far more competent than the “woke and transgender friendly democrats” which took power in 2018.

[Sidebar: Did you notice something quite interesting? The “old” and “Soviet trained” military forces in general, and their commanders especially, are systematically much better trained that those forces trained by NATO or “the most powerful military in the history of the galaxy”.  Why is it that the democratic, progressive and advanced forces like, say, the Saudis, the Israelis, the Georgians, the Yemeni or all the other many “good terrorists” always perform miserably in combat?  I will let you ponder this question :-)]

By the way, Pashinian, who is hiding in a bunker or inside the US embassy compound in Erevan, is still at it!  Yesterday he called Macron, who is under pressure from the huge Armenian immigration in France to do something, to ask for his help and Macron promised to help find a solution acceptable to all sides, implying two things:

1. That the “Russian solution” (in reality Armenian the acceptance by Erevan of the Azeri terms) is not acceptable and that
2. That France has some kind of magic wand that Macron can wave a few times and forever turn the entire area of operation into a peaceful land of milk and honey were everybody would hold hands, sing Kumbaya, and “feel the love” forever and ever.

As usually, the Brits are much more devious, secretive and smart: the head of MI6 is in Turkey to meet with “senior officials”.  Yeah, right!  By the way, this guy, Richard Moore, is a former UK Ambassador to Turkey.  To get a sense of what this is all about, all you need to do is look into any history book to see that the Brits have always used the Ottomans as canon-fodder against Russia.

As for the US Americans, they are basically paralyzed by the chaos in their own country.  But either one of the dummies running might try something desperate to “show the flag” and prove that he is “tough on Russia”.

So what’s next?

For years now I have been saying the following about the Western political leaders: they are unable to build anything worthwhile, but they are most definitely able to spread chaos, anarchy, violence, insurgencies, etc.  So the first thing you can be sure of is that the AngloZionists will do everything in their power to egg on the Armenians, the Azeris and even the Turks to reject an outcome which the West sees as a triumph for Russia (and for Putin personally!).

Then there is Erdogan, who is furious at the Russian categorical rejection of his demands to be part of the peacekeeping force.  All the Russians have agreed to is to create a special “monitoring post” staffed by Russians and Turks, far away from the Nagorno-Karabakh region where a joint team of observers would “monitor” the situation by looking at computers.  There will be no Turkish soldiers in the peacekeeping area (see Russian military map above).

As a fallback option, the Turks are also demanding they they be allowed to fly their own drones over the area of operations.  In response, the Armenian side has declared that Armenia and Russia have jointly declared a no-fly zone over the entire area.  As far as I know, the Russians have not confirmed that “yet”, but you can be pretty sure that they will immediately shoot down any unauthorized aircraft approaching their positions.

To get a sense of how the Russians are acting, you need to know two things:

First, the Russian liberal media is already complaining that Russia has included “undeclared” weapons systems in its peacekeeping force (MLRS and APCs).  This is hardly surprising considering the very high probability of provocations (by both sides).  Besides, the vague language of the agreement allows Russian to bring in “specialized vehicles” which could mean anything and everything.

Furthermore, I am pretty confident that the Russian 102nd Military Base is a Russian military base in Gyumri will receive reinforcements and will serve as the logistical support hub for the Russian peacekeeping force.

Lieutenant General Rustam Muradov and Vladimir Putin

Second, it is worth looking at the career of the man who will be commanding the Russian peacekeeping force, Lieutenant General Rustam Muradov.  You can check his biography here and here.  I will simply summarize this man’s career by saying two words: Donbass, Syria.

He is not some kind of pretend-general whose qualifications are mainly as organizers and politicians.  This guy is a real combat general, the kind who personally comes under fire because he makes sure to regularly be with his men on the frontlines and who has experience dealing with the Axis of Kindness and its “good terrorists” (whether local or special ops).

The West perfectly understands this and is absolutely furious about being “cheated” by Russia again!

First, the Russians stopped the bloody war in Syria, now they stopped the war in Azerbaijan.  For the Empire, this means the total loss of the axis of instability which they lovingly tried to create in the Caucasus and the Middle-East to eventually hit the Russian underbelly.  They failed.  They won’t forgive this.

Second, most Armenians worldwide are absolutely horrified at the outcome of this war, and they have my sincere sympathy.  The problem here is that many of them blame Russia, rather than their own leaders.  Furthermore, there are many truly rabid nationalists amongst the anti-Pashinian forces in Armenia.  Right now, Pashinian is hiding somewhere and he still refuses to resign (backed to the hilt by the West, of course).  But this will change, I can’t imagine anybody staying in power after such a catastrophe.

However, Pashinian gone does not at all mean that pro-Russian, or even Russia-neutral, forces will succeed him.  In fact, as in most chaotic situations, it is the extremists who are most likely to seize power.  And God only knows what they might do next!

In a paradoxical way, the best outcome for Russia would be to have Pashinian stay in power just a little longer, just long enough to create a fait accompli on the ground which no nutcases could meaningfully overturn.

Right now, two things are happening: Armenian refugees are clogging the only roads which will allow them to flee to Armenia.  These poor people will never trust the word of an Azeri or, even less so, a Turk, could say (and who could blame them?!).

This is truly a heart-breaking tragedy which could have been completely avoided had Pashinian and his Sorosites done a few, really basic, things (preparing for war and settling for an imperfect peace agreement for starters).

Armenian-NK forces are also withdrawing, and it’s not like they have much of an option here: escaping with their lives is really all these poor soldiers could hope for (and by no fault of theirs, I would add!).

The next couple of weeks will be crucial and I can only hope that the Russians are fully ready to deal with any contingency, including a complete Armenian turnaround if Pashinian is overthrown very soon.

It is now a race against the clock: on one side, the West wants Russia out at quite literally *ANY* costs in Azeri and Armenian lives while the Russians are scrambling to make the agreement a well-defended reality on the ground.  In the Ukraine they say that “the West is willing to fight Russia down the the very last Ukrainian“.  I hope and pray that this does not happen in the Caucasus.

The Saker

PS: on the really sad and tragic side, I personally can’t imagine any refugees willing to come back, in spite of all the pious promises made by all sides.  Look, let’s be honest here: during the first NK war, which the Armenians won, the Azeris were brutally expelled, there were several instances of mass murder of Azeri civilians by the triumphant Armenian forces.  This time around, the Azeris made all sorts of promises, but if I was an Armenian I would not trust a single word the Turks or Azeris say (heck, these two still deny that there was any genocide of Armenians by the Ottomans!).  Keep in mind that in this short war, about 4000 civilians have died; that is the official figure, the real one is probably even worse!

Maybe in a decade or two, and only if Russia remains the peacekeeper of the Caucases, will some refugees, or their sons and daughters return to their historical homelands.  But right now, the Russian peacekeeping force will probably end up maintaining the peace in a very empty Nagorno-Karabakh.  This is a revolting outcome which, I will repeat this, could have been avoided by Pashinian and his gang of Sorosites.  May that be a lesson to anybody else taking these evil clowns seriously!

RUSSIAN TROOPS TOOK CONTROL OF LACHIN CORRIDOR, OTHER KEY AREAS IN NAGORNO-KARABAKH

South Front

The Russian peacekeeping force has entered the Nagorno-Karabakh region and is working to establish 16 observation points to monitor the ceasefire regime. According to updated information, the core of the force is made up of units of the 15th Separate Motorized Rifle Brigade “Alexandria” and the Military Police.

Russian forces have already taken control of the Lachin corridor, which links Armenia with Karabakh. The Armenian town of Goris is being using by the Russians as the build-up area for further deployment. The tasks of Russian observation posts in Karabakh, according to the Russian General Staff, are the following:

• collecting information on ceasefire violations and communicating this information to the peacekeepers’ command;
• maintaining the safety of free transit and transport;
• suppression of illegal actions against the civilian population.

As it was revealed earlier, the deployment includes 1,960 personnel, 90 armored personnel carriers, 380 motorized vehicles and special equipment. The deployment includes BTR-82A, Tigr, Typhoon armoured vehicles as well as Mi-8 and Mi-24 military helicopters which will be used to monitor the ceasefire together with reconnaissance drones. Photos and videos from the ground also showed specialized electronic equipment and even battle tanks. The tanks were not noticed as a part of the peacekeeping force. So, most likely they will remain in the Lachin corridor area only, on the Armenian side of the border.

The deployment of Turkish peacekeepers to Nagorno-Karabakh boasted of by Ankara appears to equate to the participation of the Turkish side in the ceasefire monitoring center with Russia. Ankara and Moscow have already signed a memorandum of understanding on its creation. The center will be located on Azerbaijani-controlled territory and will allow the coordination of ceasefire monitoring efforts and the review of ceasefire violation complaints.

The Azerbaijani side also reported that it has already started to set up policing units on the territories it has taken during the war. Meanwhile, Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev promised to turn the areas captured from the self-proclaimed Armenian Republic of Nagorno-Karabakh into a paradise.

“Our people’s unity will enable us to bring back life to the liberated territories. Karabakh will be reborn. It will be revived and reinvigorated. It will become a real paradise,” Aliyev said. According to him, Baku is now going to focus on demining and securing the retaken territory as well as restoring infrastructure there.

These developments come amid a developing political crisis in Armenia. Last night, the opposition was unable to dismiss the country’s prime minister Nikol Pashinyan, who is still in hiding, because of a lack of quorum in the Parliament. At the same time, security forces started arresting protesters and opposition leaders demanding the resignation of the cabinet.

The crisis was accompanied by revelations of Arayik Harutyunyan, the President of the Nagorno-Karabakh Republic, who claimed that the Armenian forces had suffered from a lack of proper command, manpower, equipment and combat morale in the crucial days of the war.

“When we were supposed to go to Yehnikner with our elite units and the Armenian special forces, our units refused to go there. I asked, begged, said that I would go ahead, but received a negative answer! They didn’t go with me, they left the President of their country alone,” Harutyunyan said.

The president added that 18-20-year-old conscripts were the main forces fighting against the Azerbaijani military and its allies in Karabakh. The statement of the Karabakh leader highlights the real state of events and the lack of authentic and much needed assistance from the government of Armenia to the self-proclaimed republic during the war.

Related Videos

Related News

• Moments Of War: Azerbaijani Advance In Nagorno-Karabakh
• What We Know About Russia’s Peacekeeping Force In Nagorno-Karabakh
• Leadership Of Armenia: How To Lose Territories And Surrender Interests For Dummies
• Nagorno-Karabakh War Is Over. What Now?
• Russia Returns To Power Game In Red And Arabian Seas
• Return To Global Ocean: Russia Will Officially Establish Naval Base In Sudan

Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov – wide ranging news conference with Russian and foreign journalists on international politics.

The Saker

November 12, 2020

روسيا وتركيا وسورية والوقت الأميركيّ الحرج هل يستفيد لبنان؟

ناصر قنديل

–

بينما كان العالم منشغلاً في معرفة اسم المرشح الرئاسي الأميركي الذي تؤيده موسكو، كنا منشغلين بوضع اللمسات الأخيرة على خطة شهور الانتقال بين ولايتين رئاسيتين أميركيتين، سواء للرئيس نفسه أو لرئيس آخر، هذا الكلام المنسوب لمسؤول في الفريق الروسي المتابع للسياسة الدولية، تبدو ترجمته قد بدأت عملياً على جبهتين محوريتين في مفهوم الأمن القومي الروسي، هما جبهة القوقاز والجبهة السورية، حيث ليس من باب المصادفة أن يتزامن ظهور دور الراعي الروسي في تثبيت وقف النار في ناغورني قره باغ مع انعقاد المؤتمر الخاص بعودة النازحين السوريين الى بلادهم، وليس خافياً أن الحركة الروسية في الملفين تقتنص الإنجاز من موقع الاشتباك مع مصالح وسياسات أميركية وإسرائيلية واضحة، وبالاحتكاك مع حركة تركية لا تنضبط تحت السقف الروسي وتسير على حافة خطوط التماس.

–

في أذربيجان قواعد عسكرية أميركية ونقاط ارتكاز إسرائيلية تتصل بمشروع الحرب مع إيران، وفي أرمينيا حكم يدور في الفلك الأميركي، وفي حرب ناغورني قره باغ بين أذربيجان وأرمينيا تمثل تركيا مشروعاً خاصاً بالتنسيق مع أذربيجان في مواجهة أرمينيا، والحركة الروسية تتوّج سريعاً وبأمر عمليات ينقل مئات الجنود من الشرطة العسكرية الروسية وآلياتهم، لفرض وقف للنار، في منطقة تتوسط دولتين غير مواليتين، للسياسات الروسية ولكن في بيئة جغرافية استراتيجية لم يعد ممكناً تجاهل ثقل الحضور الروسي فيها، خصوصاً مع متغيرات السنوات الأخيرة وما شهدته من تصاعد في الحضور العسكري الروسي، وترسم موسكو خطوطاً حمراء للدور التركي، وتضع أرمينيا مجدداً تحت إبطها، وتنتشر قواتها على خط تماس مع أذربيجان وبرضا حكومتها، بصورة تجعل مشهد الانتشار الأميركي والروسي في جغرافيا واحدة شبيهاً بالمشهد السوري.

–

في سورية يتصدّر الرئيسان السوري بشار الأسد والروسي فلاديمير بوتين، الدعوة لانعقاد مؤتمر النازحين عبر لقاء جمعهما قبل يوم من انعقاد المؤتمر المخصّص لعودة النازحين، وملف العودة منذ سنتين موضوع اهتمام الرئيس الروسي الذي أطلق مبادرة خاصة تجمّدت عند خطوط الاشتباك مع الأميركي، والالتزام العربي والأوروبي والأممي بالسقوف الأميركية، لكن هذه المرة نجح المؤتمر باجتذاب مشاركة الأمم المتحدة، ودولة الإمارات، ومشاركة لبنانية وازنة، وبدا أن المؤتمر قد تزامن مع قرارات سوريّة تشجيعيّة ذات أهمية لضمان العودة الواسعة، سواء عبر ما أعلنه الرئيس الأسد من اتجاه لاتخاذ إجراءات تتصل بالإعفاءات، أو بضمانات أمنية للذين كانوا على ضفاف المعارضة، أو عبر ما ترجمه كلام نائب وزير الخارجية السورية فيصل المقداد بالإعلان عن توجيهات الرئيس الأسد بتأمين المسكن والمدرسة والطبابة للعائدين.

–

خلال شهور ستكون أميركا في وضع حرج، في التعامل مع خيارات صعبة لمرحلة الانتقال، وموسكو المستعدّة لفرضيات متشائمة لا تعتقد بإمكانية تحققها عبر حماقات عسكرية وأمنية تخرج الوضع عن السيطرة، تضع ثقلها لفرض حقائق ووقائع جديدة، عنوانها وضع سورية على سكة مسار السلم الداخلي، وفقاً لضوابط جديدة للدور التركي، وملف عودة النازحين ومن خلفه مشروع إعادة الإعمار سيكونان على الطاولة، مع دعوة مفتوحة للأميركيين للانسحاب وللإسرائيليين بالتوقف عن العبث، ودعوة موازية للأوروبيين والعرب للانضمام لخيار السلم في سورية، بينما على ضفة موازية تتجه موسكو لحسم الوضع في القوقاز، الذي يشكل الانسحاب الأميركي والإسرائيلي سقفاً لا يمكن تفاديه للسياق الذي بدأ بانتشار الشرطة العسكرية الروسية، وحيث تركيا أيضاً مطالبة بالانتباه للخطوط الحمر الروسية، وحيث أوروبا مدعوة للخروج من سلبيتها.

–

لبنان أمام فرصة ذهبية ليكون ملف عودة النازحين من لبنان الى سورية، الترجمة الواقعية المتاحة. والتردّد هنا خسارة لبنانية قد يصعب تعويضها إذا ربط لبنان مصير عودة النازحين السوريين بساعة توقيت غير لبنانية.

Understanding the outcome of the war for Nagorno-Karabakh

THE SAKER • NOVEMBER 11, 2020 • 3,100 WORDS • 

A lot has happened very rapidly in the past two days and I will begin this analysis by a few bullet points summarizing what just happened (not in any particular order, including chronological):

• The war which has just ended was a real bloodbath and it has seen more casualties (counting both sides) than what the Soviet Union lost in 10 years of warfare in Afghanistan
• This war is now over, Russian peacekeepers have already been deployed along the line of contact. So far, neither side has dared to resume hostilities (more about that below).
• There have been two days of celebrations in Baku where President Aliev has declared that the war was a triumph for Azeri forces and that Pashinian got nothing. He is right.
• The Azeris are now declaring that they want compensation from Armenia.
• There are now Turkish forces in Azerbaijan and Russian and Turkish forces have created a joint committee to coordinate actions.
• Erdogan has insisted that he wanted Turkey to send in peacekeepers, but Putin has categorically rejected this demand: like any other state, Azerbaijan has the undisputed right to invite foreign forces on its territory, but these forces will not have the status and rights of a peacekeeping force.
• Violent riots have broken out in Erevan where violent mobs have stormed government buildings, beaten officials and sacked the Parliament.
• Seventeen Armenian opposition parties have declared that they want a committee of national salvation and the resignation of Pashinian.
• Nobody knows where Pashinian is hiding, but he seems to still be somewhere in Armenia.
• These mobs also destroyed the Soros offices in Erevan and they are now looking for Pashinian “the traitor” to lynch him.
• Pashinian has complained on Twitter that his offices were sacked, that a computer, his driver license and, I kid you not, a bottle of perfume (poor perfumed baby!) were stolen.
• The Russian peacekeeping force will be constituted of subunits of the 15th Independent Motorized Rifle Brigade which itself is part of the 2nd Guards Combined Arms Army of the Central Military District. It will include about 2000 armed soldiers, APCs and IFVs, specialized vehicles (EW, C3I, etc.), drones and air defense systems.
• Russians peacekeepers will stay deployed in this area for no less than 5 years.
• Russia will now control both the Nagorno-Karabakh (NK) corridor and the Nakhichevan corridor.

Now let’s look at the position of the parties at the end of this war and compare them.

Armenia: there is no doubt that Armenia is the biggest loser in this war. Pashinian and his gang of russophobic Sorosites has brought a real calamity upon his people. Since he came to power his anti-Russian actions included almost totally eliminating any Armenian participation on the CSTO, he completely ceased any collaboration with Russia (including in the intelligence and security domains), he purged the Armenian military and security forces from all the supposed “pro-Russian” elements, he banned Russian language schools. In contrast, Armenia has an absolutely huge US embassy with about 2000 personnel (as much as the entire Russian peacekeeping force!) and when the Azeris attacked, Pashinin refused to ask Russia for help for a full month. He did ask Trump, Merkel and Macron for help instead. Needless to say, they did exactly nothing once the crisis erupted.

Truth be told, the Armenians had absolutely no other option but to accept the Azeri terms. The Armenians have suffered huge losses while the Azeris have taken Shushi, the key strategic city which controls both the capital of NK Stepanakert and the corridor between NK and Armenia. Had Pashinian not signed, the surrounded Armenians would have been slaughtered by the Azeris (in this war, both sides reported having almost no prisoners. Why? Because almost all were all executed, often after gruesome tortures by both sides). Russian analysts also say that Armenia was simply running out of supplies very fast (a fact also mentioned by Pashinian).

Simply put: Aliev’s plan worked, the blind arrogance of the Armenian leaders, along with their suicidal polices have almost cost Armenia the complete loss of NK and, possibly, even the existence of their own country. With all the best Armenian officers removed (including heroes from the first Karabakh war, which Armenia won), what was left were delusional clowns who promised that Armenia, without any help including without Russian help, could win the war and drive its forces to Baku (yes, they did sound just as delusional as some Ukie leaders).

Turkey: the next big loser in this war is Turkey whose objectives of bringing all Turkic nations under one neo-Ottoman empire have, predictably, crashed. Again. Erdogan is a world class megalomaniac and trouble maker, and he has involved Turkey in wars (or quasi wars) with Syria, Israel, Iraq, Greece, Libya, Iran, Russia and even (to some degree) NATO. And let’s not forget the bloody operations against the Kurds everywhere. He is a bona fide megalomaniac and that makes him very, very dangerous. Russia has intervened militarily in Syria, Libya and now Azerbaijan to deny Turkey its wannabe empire status and each time we saw that Turkey, as a country, simply does not have the resources to try to build an empire, especially since Erdogan simply does not understand that simultaneously opening conflicts on several fronts in a recipe for disaster.

There is also pretty strong likelihood that it was the Turks who shot down the Russian Mi-24 right inside the Armenian air space: their goal was to force Russia to stop seeking a negotiated solution and to impose a continuation of hostilities. Thank God for Aliev’s superb strategic skills which made it possible for him to do something very smart: he took the blame for what he called a tragic mistake and offered all sorts of compensations and excuses. Aliev’s decision to take the blame probably came after he and Putin (who are close friends) had what diplomats call a “frank exchange of views”.

The Turks are making a big deal out of the fact that the Azeris have invited Turkish forces into Azerbaijan. But let’s be honest here: the Azeris and Turks were always close and there was no outcome which could have prevented the Azeris from legally inviting Turkish forces into Azerbaijan. The real issue is what these forces can do. I submit that while we should never discard the toxic potential of any Turkish force anyway, there is little this force will be able to do than to a) monitor the situation and 2) coordinate with the Russians to stay out of each other’s way. But what these forces won’t be able to do is to attack, or even threaten to attack, Armenian and/or Russian forces (see below why).

Russia: Russia is the only true winner of this war. I know, there is a powerful Armenian lobby in the USA, in Europe and in Russia, and they are trying to present their defeat as a defeat for Russia. Frankly, I understand their bitterness and I feel sorry for them, but they are absolutely wrong. Here is why:

First, Russia has now established herself as the sole power in the Caucasus which can bring about peace. 2000 US personnel in Erevan did absolutely nothing for years to really help Armenia, all they did is force suicidal russophobic policies on Armenia, that’s about it. The same amount of Russian soldiers literally brought peace overnight. Here I have to explain a little something about the units which was sent Azerbaijan: 15th Independent Motorized Rifle Brigade (15IMRB).

The 15IMRB is not a peacekeeping force in the western meaning of the world. This is an elite combat force which specializes in peacekeeping and peacemaking (“coercion to peace” in Russian terminology) missions. It’s personnel is 100% composed of professionals, most of whom have extensive combat experience: they participated in the coercion to peace operation against Georgia in 08.08.08 and in Syria. These are top of the line, well trained, superbly equipped forces who, on top of their own capabilities, can fully count on the support of the Russian forces in Armenia and from the full support of the entire Russian military. Those who say that this force is a lightly armed token force simply do not understand these issues.

The entire theatre of operations of this war is very much inside the (conceptual) under 1000 kilometers from the Russian border which the Russian military wants to be capable of domination escalation should a war break out. To repeat, the Russian military is not organized the way the US military is: the Russian military doctrine is purely defensive, this is not propaganda, and it relies for this defense on its ability to very rapidly deploy high readiness mechanized forces anywhere inside Russia and within about 1000km from the Russian border and the ability to destroy any force entering this zone. Russia also relies on advanced weapons systems capable of unleashing a lot of firepower in defense of its deployed task forces forces. In other words, while the 15IMRB is only a brigade sized expeditionary force, it is trained to hunker down and hold a position until the reinforcements (personnel and/or firepower) are deployed from Russia. You can think of this as something similar to the Russian task force in Syria, only much closer to Russia and, therefore, much easier to support if needed.

Coming back to the shooting down of a Russian Mi-24, this action will not go unnoticed or forgotten, of that you can be sure. The fact that Putin (and the Russian military) don’t act like the US would and immediately initiate reprisals does not mean that the Russians don’t care, have forgotten or are afraid. There is a Jewish proverb which says “a good life is the best revenge”. I would paraphrase this by saying that Putin’s motto could be “an advantageous outcome is the best retaliation”: this is what we saw in Syria and this is what will happen in Azerbaijan.

Another sweet spot for Russia is that she can now (truthfully) declare that color revolutions inevitably result in territorial losses (the Ukraine, Georgie and now Armenia) and political chaos (everywhere).

Next, please look at the following map (in Russian, but that is no problem):

Please look at the two thick blue lines: they are showing corridors between Azerbaijan and the Azeri province of Nakhichevan and the corridor between Armenia and Nagorno-Karabakh. These two corridors are absolutely vital for both of these countries and they will now be under the control of FSB Border Guards (Russian border guards are light, mobile and elite units comparable in terms of training and capabilities to their colleagues from the Airborne Forces. Again, don’t assume that they are anything like the US or EU border or customs officials). They are very tough elite units which are trained to fight a much superior force until reinforcements come in.

What that means in strategic terms is that Russia now has an iron grip on what is a vital strategic artery for both Azerbaijan and Armenia. None of the parties are willing to comment very much on this, no need to humiliate anybody, but those in the know realize what a fantastic pressure capability Putin has just added to Russia in the Caucasus. You can think of these two corridors as a lifeline for both states as long as you also realize that these corridors are also strategic daggers in Russian hands pointed at the vital organs of both states.

The usual Putin-hating choir which has been singing the “Putin lost control of the near abroad” mantra should now be both ashamed of their lack of understanding, and livid at what “Putin” did to their hopes, but that kind of magical thinking won’t change reality on the ground: far from losing anything, Putin secured an immense strategic Russia victory at the cost of 2 dead soldiers, one wounded and one helicopter.

From now on, Russia will have permanent military forces in both Armenia and Azerbaijan. Georgia has been effectively neutered. The Russian Caucasus is mostly peaceful and prosperous, both the Black Sea and the Caspian are de facto “Russian lakes” and the Russian “underbelly” is now much stronger than it ever was before.

Let’s when any western power achieves a similar result 

Conclusion:

This war is now only frozen and, like in Syria, there will be provocations, false flags, setbacks and murdered innocents. But, like in Syria, Putin will always prefer a quiet strategy with minimal losses over one with a lot of threats, grandstanding and instant retaliations. There is also what I call the “Putin use of force rules”: never use force where expected, always use force when least expected and always use force in a way your enemies do not plan for. Still, let’s not see all this in rosy colors, there will be setbacks for sure, Erdogan is angry and he still wants to play a role. Putin, in a typical Russian manner will give him exactly that “a role”, but that role will be minimal and mostly for internal Turkish PR consumption. Erdogan, far from being a new Mehmed The Conqueror and “The Great Eagle”, will go down in history as Erdogan The Loser and the “Defeated Chicken”. Megalomania might be a prerequisite for an empire builder, but that alone is clearly not enough.

What comes next?

Pashinian will be overthrown, that is pretty sure. What matters most for Armenia is who will replace him. Alas, there are anti-Pashinian nationalists out there who are just as russophobic as the Pashinian gang. Furthermore, considering the hysterics taking place in Armenia, there is a real possibility that a new government might annul the ceasefire and demand a “fight to the end”. This could be a major problem, including for the Russian forces in Armenia and the peacekeepers, but it is also likely that by the time the Armenian people really understand that 1) they have been lied to and 2) they have suffered a crushing defeat these calls will eventually be drowned out by more sane voices (including those of the currently jailed pre-2018 leaders).

There is also a huge Armenian immigration in Russia which will hear all the reporting and analyses produced in Russia and will be fully aware of the reality out there. These immigrants represent a huge ressource for Armenia as they are going to be the one who will push for a strong collaboration with Russia which, frankly, Armenia now needs more than anything else. Right now, judging by what pro-Armenian Russian analysts are saying, the Armenians and their supporters are absolutely horrified by this outcome and they are promising that the Turks have now penetrated deeply inside the Russian sphere of influence. To them sane voices reply that this so-called “move” into the Russia sphere of influence will be mostly PR and that it is far better for some Turkish forces to move inside the Russian sphere of influence than for some Russian force to be deployed inside the Turkish sphere of influence. In other words, when these Armenia supporters say that Erdogan has moved deeply inside the Russian sphere of influence, they are also thereby admitting that this is a Russian, not Turkish, sphere of influence. They just don’t realize what they are saying, that’s all.

Frankly, the Armenian diasporas in Russia, the EU and the USA are superbly organized, they have a lot of money, and they currently control the narrative in the EU and the USA (in Russia they tried and miserably failed). Add to this the fact the Aliev was the one who started that war and that he is deeply enmeshed with Erdogan’s Turkey and you will see why the magnitude of the Armenian defeat is systematically underplayed in the western media. That’s fine, let a few months go by and the reality of the situation will eventually convince those currently in denial.

Right now, this is exactly the process which is (violently) taking place in Erevan. But sooner or later, looting mobs will be replaced by some kind of government of national unity and if that government wants to put an end to the horrendous losses and wants to rebuild what is left standing, they will have to call the Kremlin and offer Russia some kind of deal. Needless to day, the immense US embassy, and the hundred of Soros-sponsored “NGOs” will oppose that with all their might. But with the USA itself fighting for survival, the EU in total disarray and the Turks failing at everything they try, that is simply not a viable option.

Russians used to joke that it takes 2 Jews to cheat 1 Armenian, meaning that Armenians are possibly even smarter than Jews (who, in all fairness, are not that smart at all, that is mostly self-serving and self-worshiping propaganda). I tend to share this admiration of the Armenian people: Armenians are an ancient, truly noble and beautiful nation and culture, who deserve to live in peace and security and who have suffered many horrors in their history. They deserve so much more than this CIA/MI6 stooge Pashinian! Right now, the Armenian nation is definitely at a low moment in its history, comparable to the “democratic” 90s in Russia or the current “liberal” horror taking place in the USA. But, as Dostoevsky liked to say, “one should never judge a nation by how low it can sink, but by how high it can soar”.

The best thing for Armenia, objectively, would be to become part of Russia (which Armenia was in its recent past). But that is not going to happen: first, Armenian nationalism is as blind and as obtuse as ever and, furthermore, Russia would never accept Armenia into the Russian Federation, and why would she? Armenia has exactly nothing to offer Russia, except a difficult to protect territory with potentially dangerous neighbors. No, Russia never lost Armenia – it was Armenia which lost Russia. Now the most the Kremlin will offer to Armenia is 1) protection against all neighbors and 2) economic help.

As for the rest, let’s see if the next Armenian government re-joins the CSTO not only in words (as was the case for the past couple of years), but in actions (like resume intel exchanges, military collaboration, joint security operations, etc.). That would be a great first step for Armenia.