Syria, Yemen, Saudi Arabia, Turkiye: Truces, not peace

April 04 2023

As reconciliation efforts sweep through West Asia to mend ties between old foes, the new China- and Russia-brokered deals will not usher in real peace until the US stops prolonging conflict.

By Hasan Illaik

The mid-March Moscow summit between Syrian President Bashar al-Assad and his Russian counterpart Vladimir Putin was notable for being publicized in advance. Since the outbreak of the Syrian war, Assad’s foreign visits have not been publicly revealed until after they have occurred. This small but significant detail suggests the Syrian president has a newfound confidence in the political and security conditions outside his national borders.

While the participants kept a tight lid on leaks, informed sources from both Moscow and Damascus disclosed to The Cradle that the Syrian and Russian presidents discussed the following issues:

Economic ties: With a focus on Syria’s energy sector, Putin expressed Russia’s readiness to invest in the production of electricity in the Levantine state, which post-conflict, suffers from a 75 percent deficit in production. Putin also expressed Moscow’s willingness to help Syria meet its vital grain needs.

Relations with Turkiye: While in Moscow, Assad reportedly refused to hold a four-way meeting between the deputy foreign ministers of Syria, Turkiye, Russia, and Iran. The Syrian president reiterated that Turkiye occupies Syrian lands, and negotiations between the two countries cannot advance from the security to the political level without a clear and public pledge from Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan to withdraw his military forces from the occupied territories, and open the main roads linking Syrian provinces – particularly the Latakia-Aleppo road, known as the M4 highway.

However, Moscow pressed its case, and reportedly reached an agreement between Damascus and Ankara stipulating that their negotiations would continue and move to the political level, with the main item on the table being Turkish withdrawal from Syrian lands. The basis for a much-awaited summit between Assad and Erdogan will be discussed at a later date.

The sources say that, for domestic political purposes, Erdogan needs to meet Assad before Turkiye’s May presidential elections, to convey to voters that he seeks to stop the war at his country’s southern borders, intends to repatriate the approximately three million Syrian refugees back home – a hot topic for voters – and to assure the Turkish Alevi electorate that he is not hostile to their sect, to which his rival Kemal Kilicdaroglu belongs.

Relations with Saudi Arabia: Putin, who has been leading the mediation efforts to normalize Saudi-Syrian relations, briefed Assad on the results of his talks with Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman (MbS). According to official sources in Damascus and Moscow, Putin’s initiative has made progress in reactivating critical communication between Damascus and Riyadh.

Saudi Arabia’s strategic shifts

On 23 March, 2023, the Saudi Ministry of Foreign Affairs announced the start of talks with Syria to reactivate consular work, which is a prelude to the return of normal diplomatic relations between the two countries, as reported by Saudi daily Al-Sharq Al-Awsat.

Sources speaking to The Cradle have confirmed that any potential progress in Syrian-Saudi relations are the result of these Russian mediation efforts, and are unrelated to the game-changing Saudi-Iran agreement struck in Beijing on 10 March. The sources believe that a meeting between Riyadh and Damascus may occur after the end of the month of Ramadan.

While the success of Saudi-Iran negotiations under Chinese auspices, and the potential breakthrough in Saudi-Syria relations under Russian sponsorship, suggest a strategic eastward turn for the kingdom, sources close to Riyadh emphasize that there is no change in the Saudi-US relationship.

While Riyadh’s relations with Washington have experienced declines in the past, recent shifts in the global political, economic, and military landscapes have prompted MbS to diversify his country’s partnerships, while preserving the strategic alignment with Washington.

Yemen: Riyadh’s regional albatross

Today, the Saudi crown price is pursuing a “zero problems” policy with neighboring countries. After failing to “transfer the [regional] battle into Iran,” and after his war on Yemen transformed Yemeni Resistance movement Ansarallah from a small organization into a regional force, MbS has realized that his domestic economic, financial, and entertainment mega-projects are doomed without ensuring calm on the kingdom’s borders.

Therefore, since late 2022, he began earnest negotiations with Iran, responded assertively to Russian efforts to mediate with Syria, and began direct talks with Ansarallah in their Sanaa stronghold. The discussions reportedly made significant progress, then stalled in January over several key points, including Riyadh’s “inability” (or unwillingness) to lift the siege on Yemen, the withdrawal of foreign forces from the country, and agreement over an internal political solution to the Yemeni crisis.

As things stand, Riyadh claims that it “cannot force its partners” in the aggression – the UAE and US, in particular – to withdraw their forces from Yemeni territory.

Several Ansarallah allies have assessed that the Saudis want to end the war, but have been prevented from doing so by the US, UK, UAE, and France. However, this estimate changed after Saudi Arabia retracted a number of the pledges it made in the negotiations.

After initially ceasing restrictions on the port of Hodeidah, the UN has returned to obstructing the arrival of some ships to the port. The siege renewal coincided with a visit by US Ambassador to Yemen Stephen Fagin to the UN Verification and Inspection Mechanism (UNVIM) personnel in Djibouti which is tasked with inspecting ships bound for Hodeidah.

In a renewed escalation of tensions, Ansarallah threatened to expel the UN mission in Sanaa within 72 hours if a container ship seized by inspectors in Djibouti was not released. Indeed, before the deadline expired, the UN released the ship.

Although the threat coincided with the US ambassador’s provocative visit, and while it appears that the Americans were trying to undermine the Saudi-Ansarallah understandings, Yemeni sources tell The Cradle that the obstruction of the ships was not exclusively a US decision, but also a Saudi one.

Furthermore, the UN explicitly informed the Sanaa government that the detention of ships proven to be weapons-free was carried out by a decision of the “coalition leadership” – that is, from the Saudis.

So what is Riyadh up to, and who is really obstructing a final solution to the war in Yemen? Is it the Saudis or the Americans?

Sources close to the Sanaa government say that “a comprehensive US-Saudi consensus” still exists over Yemen. The two allies may differ sometimes, but until now, they say:

“Washington and Riyadh still agree on calming things down in Yemen, while keeping the blockade in place. They also agree that Yemen should not be an independent and strong country, capable of controlling its resources or exploiting its geographical location, because that entails strategic risks for Saudi Arabia’s regional role, and for US and Israeli interests in West Asia, the Horn of Africa, and the Red Sea.”

The sources add: “Saudi Arabia and America cannot afford to grant Ansarallah conditions that would enable it to accumulate additional strength and a larger and more effective arsenal.” Simply put, the duo are not seeking an actual end to the war, but are instead pursuing a drawn-out truce.

MbS wants some calm to ensure that missiles and drones do not rain down on his ambitious entertainment and development projects, while the US and the UAE want to keep Yemen fragmented, persist in the theft of its vital oil resource, and at the same time, hold Ansarallah (in northern Yemen) responsible for managing a country that continues to buckle under siege.

Truces, not peace – yet

In short, from Yemen in the south, to Iran in the east, and Syria, Iraq and Turkey in the north, West Asia has entered the post-Arab Spring phase, where once-battling neighbors are seeking to reconnect.

This is a phase governed by ‘armistice agreements’ between countries that have fought each other, directly or via proxies, for more than a decade. Armistice agreements, it should be noted, are not peace treaties, and what this suggests is the continuation of the US-style legacy of “managing conflict,” and never actually ending it.

As multipolarism beckons the world around, it is yet to be seen if Chinese and Russian efforts to stabilize the region in order to advance sweeping connectivity, economic, and development projects will be able to overcome the old “conflict management” and “forever wars” paradigm of the declining unipolar order.

The views expressed in this article do not necessarily reflect those of The Cradle.

See Also

The Syrian Earthquake Has United the Arab World

Steven Sahiounie

Posted by INTERNATIONALIST 360°

Close to 9 million people in Syria have been affected by the 7.8 magnitude earthquake, 65 seconds in duration on February 6, that Turkish President Erdogan has compared with the power released by atomic bombs. The hardest hit areas are Latakia, Aleppo, and Idlib.

The UN estimates that more than 4.2 million people have been affected in Aleppo province with 400,000 homeless, and 5,000 buildings declared unlivable. Aleppo has more than 1,600 dead and 10,000 injured.

The province of Idlib is a total population estimated at 3 million, but because there is no government or authority there, we can only guess how many have been affected.

UAE Aid plane landing in Aleppo International Airport

The UN says 5.5 million Syrians are without a home after the earthquake, with more than 7,400 buildings having been destroyed completely, or partially in Syria.

In Latakia, there are 820 dead, 142,000 homeless, and over 2,000 injured, with 102 buildings completely collapsed, and others condemned.

A total of 58 trucks have crossed from Turkey to north-west Syria through the Bab al Hawa crossing point over the past five days, carrying aid such as food, tents, and medicines. Those trucks are solely supplying Idlib, under the occupation of the armed group, Hayat Tahrir al-Sham. Eleven trucks have gone through the newly opened border crossing of Bab al Salam today, carrying non-food items such as blankets, and mattresses.

Iraqi AAid plan landing in Damascus international Airport

Location matters in this quake

The map will show that Aleppo, Syria is just south of Gaziantep, Turkey which was the epicenter. Aleppo was heavily damaged in the earthquake, adding more misery to a city that was under the occupation of Al Qaeda terrorists in the eastern section until being liberated in December 2016.

Looking at a map, you see that Latakia is a 2 ½ hour drive west of Aleppo on the M4 highway. It seems like a long distance, but the power of the 7.8 magnitude brought the epicenter and Latakia together because they share the same fault line, which Aleppo does not.

Tunisian Aid plane landing in Aleppo International Airport

UN: no roadblocks to aid, no politics

Rula Amin, UN Refugee Agency Senior Communications Advisor, urged cooperation among nations to help Turkey and Syria. She said there should be no roadblocks to assistance for people in need. Referring to the UN and western aid coming almost exclusively to Idlib, and by-passing those in need in Latakia and Aleppo, she urged all to put politics aside, and focus on getting aid to those in need regardless of whether they are in the US-EU supported area in Idlib, or whether they live in Aleppo and Latakia under the Syrian administration from Damascus. Amin is no stranger to Syria. In March 2011, Amin was one of the very first international journalists in Deraa, covering what she had claimed was a ‘popular uprising’, and even interviewed the cleric who was the key player of the Obama-designed US-NATO attack on Syria for ‘regime change

.’ She did not go as far as to demand the lifting of all US-EU sanctions on Syria to send aid, but her meaning was clear. The sanctions prevent aid from arriving in Damascus. On February 9 the US Department of the Treasury issued General License 23, which allows for a humanitarian waiver of supplies to government-controlled areas in Syria, but must be received by an NGO and not the Syrian government. The 180-day waiver is far too short, as the need is enormous, and will people will need years to grapple with the damages.  Rebuilding homes and businesses may take a decade or more. Also, most governments abroad would be sending official aid to Syria through a government-to-government mechanism, and using an NGO is a tedious stipulation designed to discourage aid from being sent.


Who gave to Damascus?

On Tuesday, a plane landed from Saudi Arabia at the Aleppo International Airport, carrying 35 tons of humanitarian aid.  Aid to Damascus also arrived from: ChinaRussia, AlgeriaIraqIranUAE, BangladeshLibyaBelarusJordanCuba, Venezuela, Tunisia, Armenia, Turkmenistan, Cyprus, Hungary, India, and Sudan.

Jordanian Aid plane landing in Damascus international Airport

Italy sent two planeloads of aid to Beirut, Lebanon to be transported to Syria by land. This demonstrates the extreme fear that western allies of the US have of the sanctions. By sending the aid to Lebanon, which is not sanctioned, Italy feels more comfortable that the US Treasury will not issue massive penalties against them.

Who refused aid to Damascus?

The US, the EU, and all US allies such as Canada have sent nothing to Syria for the earthquake-ravaged zones of Latakia and Aleppo.  According to America, the European Union, the United Kingdom, and the allies of the US, there is no place called Syria.  There is only a small, rural agricultural province called Idlib.  Syria is 10,000 years old, and Damascus and Aleppo both tie as the undisputed oldest inhabited cities on earth.  But the great minds in Washington, DC. only acknowledge the tiny area called Idlib.  The terrorist-controlled Idlib is suffering, and has innocent unarmed civilians in need of help; however, Latakia, and Aleppo are far bigger and have sustained more deaths, injuries, and structural damages than Idlib. The US and the west have used politics to judge who gets helped, and who is forgotten. The Syrian people will never forget this. The US and EU sanctions have made life unbearable in Syria before the earthquake of the century, and now when politics should be set aside for humanitarian needs, the US doggedly holds on to their dogmatic ideology to make sure the Syrian people know the full disdain of the American government. The Foreign Minister of the United Arab Emirates visited Damascus and met with President Assad after the quake, in an act of defiance of US-dictated policy.

Algerian aid plane in Aleppo International Airport

Where is Government controlled Syria?

The US-NATO attack on Syria beginning in March 2011 has resulted in three separate administrations in Syria.  The biggest territory, about 75%, is the central government in Damascus. Aleppo and Latakia are the two hardest hit by the earthquake which is under the Damascus administration.

The second administration is the province of Idlib, which is an olive-growing region between Latakia and Aleppo. There is no government there.  The 3 million persons there live under the occupation of an armed terrorist group, Hayat Tahrir al-Sham, formerly called Jibhat al-Nusra, the Syrian branch of Al Qaeda. The terrorists embedded themselves there in 2012, and until now are safe from attack because the US, EU, and UN all lobby for their protection, and aid. The US supports the Al Qaeda terrorists because they represent the US interests in Syria to be decided upon in a final political settlement in Syria under the auspices of the UN.

The third administration is the Kurdish self-proclaimed region of the northeast, where the US military is occupying the Syrian oil wells, and allowing the Kurds to sell the stolen oil in Iraq to cover their expenses. This area was not affected by the earthquake. This administration exists separate from Damascus only because of the US military illegal occupation

Where is Idlib?

Many of the residents of Idlib most affected by the earthquake have had to sleep outside among the olive groves, in freezing temperatures. The UN acknowledged the international response to Idlib has been a failure.

Raed al-Saleh, head of the White Helmets, an award-winning video troupe headquartered in Washington, DC. has denounced the UN as incompetent in their response to the needs in Idlib. The White Helmets work solely in Idlib and have international donors. Al-Saleh was angry after UN Secretary-General Antonio Guterres said Syrian President Assad had agreed to allow UN aid deliveries to the area through two border crossings from Turkey for three months. The White Helmets and the terrorists do not recognize the Syrian government.  Damascus had tried to send aid to Idlib, but the terrorists turned it back saying, “We don’t want help from the enemy.”  Previously the UN trucks of aid to Idlib were also stalled after the terrorists demanded a $1,000 fee for each of the 10 trucks.

Why are the borders controlled?

The Syrian government has controlled the border crossings of Syria for security reasons. Serena Shim, an American journalist from Detroit, witnessed and reported seeing a UN food truck carrying Al Qaeda terrorists, and their weapons, from Turkey into Syria near Idlib. She was murdered in Turkey just days after publishing her report.

The terrorists in Idlib are contained in a small area and have weapons including missiles which have frequently been directed at Latakia, and Kessab, a small Christian Armenia village just north of Latakia. The Syrian government wants to keep the weapons from flowing into Idlib while allowing UN, and other humanitarian aid to flow into the 3 million civilians who are held there as human shields.


Steven Sahiounie is a two-time award-winning journalist

Related Videos

Arab official momentum towards Damascus
Is the earthquake a gateway to breaking the siege on Syria?
Syria and Jordan: The diplomatic lines are clear
President Bashar al-Assad receives Ayman Safadi, Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs and Expatriate Affairs of Jorda
Is the Arab blockade lifted on Damascus?

Related Articles

U.S. Declares War on Turkish Tourism Economy

February 7, 2023

Source

Steven Sahiounie is a Syrian American award-winning journalist based in Syria. He is specialized on the Middle East. He has also appeared on TV and radio in Canada, Russia, Iran, Syria, China, Lebanon, and the United States.

By Steven Sahiounie

On February 3, the Turkish interior minister, Suleyman Soylu, blasted the U.S. Ambassador to Turkey, Jeffry L. Flake, saying, “Take your dirty hands off of Turkey.”

The outrage was prompted after Washington and eight European countries issued travel warnings over possible terror attacks in Turkey. The U.S. and its western allies have attempted to connect a recent Quran burning in Sweden with travel danger inside Turkey. Muslim countries worldwide have denounced the burning as hate speech, not free speech, but this has no apparent connection to travel safety issues inside Turkey.

The U.S. travel warning is tantamount to a declaration of economic war on Turkey who is in an economic downturn of its tourism sector, which was 11 % of the GDP in 2019, representing $78.2 billion, and rose to $17.95 billion in the third quarter of 2022, of which 85.7 percent came from foreign visitors. In 2018, tourism directly accounted for 7.7% of total employment in Turkey.

“Every American ambassador wonders how they can hurt Turkey. This has been one of Turkey’s greatest misfortunes over the years. It gathers other ambassadors and tries to give them advice. They are doing the same thing in Europe, the American embassy is running Europe,” said Soylu.

Soylu has criticized the U.S. and blames Washington for the 2016 Turkish regime change attempt, and has accused the U.S. of ruling Europe. In foreign policies, the EU follows U.S. directives implicitly.

“I’m being very clear. I very well know how you would like to create strife in Turkey. Take your grinning face off from Turkey,” said Soylu.

Ankara warned its citizens abroad to be aware of possible anti-Islamic attacks in the U.S. and Europe following the burning of the Quran in Sweden. Turkey later summoned the nine ambassadors, including Flake, for talks over the warnings.

Soylu condemned the European consulate closures in Turkey as an attempt to meddle in campaigning for Turkey’s presidential and parliamentary elections, which are scheduled for May 14.

Soylu and Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan have suggested that the western states had issued the security warnings in order to pressure Turkey to tone down its criticism of the Quran burning and resolve the NATO dispute in which Erdogan has voiced opposition to Sweden joining the bloc.

After a right-wing Swedish Radical Christian burned the Quran in front of the Turkish embassy in Stockholm, Erdogan threatened that he would never consent to Swedish accession.

Sweden previously has refused to extradite the 120 terrorists Turkey has demanded, and the U.S. Senate has made it clear that if Turkey does not approve Swedish accession, arms sales to Turkey, specifically F-16s, will not be authorized.

Turkish elections

Turkish elections are scheduled for May 14, and will be the toughest reelection fight of Erdogan’s career, and he and his Justice and Development Party (AKP) may lose the election.

The six-party opposition coalition, composed of two larger and four smaller parties, has managed to present a unified front. The opposition to Erdogan support the restoration of Turkey’s parliamentary system and the curtailment of presidential powers.

Erdogan’s fear has grown so strong that he used the courts to ban a leading potential opposition candidate, Istanbul Mayor Ekrem Imamoglu, from running for the CHP. However, polls suggest that Ankara’s mayor, Mansur Yavas, could beat Erdogan.

The state has more overtly targeted some political parties, especially the pro-Kurdish, People’s Democracy Party (HDP). This left-leaning party was not invited into the opposition coalition, but HDP supporters will vote against Erdogan.

Biden supports opposition to Erdogan

U.S. President Joe Biden hosted an emergency meeting on Nov. 16 in Bali, Indonesia, with NATO and EU leaders to discuss a response to a missile blast in Poland, but Turkey was not invited. The meeting was held during the Group of 20 summit, and Turkey was present, but Biden snubbed them from the emergency meeting.

Turkey has been a full-fledged member of North Atlantic Treaty Organization since 1952, commands its second-largest military and has protected the southern flank of the alliance for 70 years.

Erdogan was again snubbed by Biden in December 2021 at the U.S. hosted virtual ‘Summit for Democracy’. In a New York Times interview published in 2020, the then candidate Biden called Erdogan an “autocrat.”

“What I think we should be doing is taking a very different approach to him now, making it clear that we support opposition leadership,” Biden said.

“He has to pay a price,” Biden said, adding that Washington should embolden Turkish opposition leaders “to be able to take on and defeat Erdogan. Not by a coup, not by a coup, but by the electoral process.”

Turkey recognized a clear attack by Biden using election meddling as a tool.

“The days of ordering Turkey around are over. But if you still think you can try, be our guest. You will pay the price.” Erdogan’s spokesman Ibrahim Kalin tweeted.

The main opposition CHP party quickly distanced themselves from Biden’s remarks of election meddling, calling for “respect for the sovereignty of Turkey”.

Turkey’s six-party opposition will select its candidate to run against Erdogan on February 13, CHP leader Kemal Kilicdaroglu said.

Obama and Erdogan

When President Obama conceived of his attack in Syria for regime change in 2011, using Radical Islamic terrorists as his foot soldiers, he called upon Erdogan to play a crucial role. Turkey hosted the CIA office which ran the Timber Sycamore program which trained and provided weapons for the Free Syrian Army. Erdogan also took in over 3 million Syria refugees fleeing the violence. Erdogan authorized his security forces to transport weapons to the terrorists in Syria.

Erdogan was a follower of the Muslim Brotherhood who provided the political ideology for the Free Syrian Army (FSA), who were terrorists attacking unarmed civilians, but were reported by the U.S. and western media as ‘rebels’.

However, the FSA disbanded due to lack of public support in Syria, and Al Qaeda stepped in the take its place, and finally ISIS emerged as the toughest terrorist group.

In 2017, President Trump cut off the CIA program in Turkey, and supporting of the Al Qaeda branch in Idlib, Hayat Tahrir al-Sham was left to Erdogan. The U.S.-NATO attack on Syria failed to produce regime change, but the country was partly destroyed in the process. Now, Erdogan proposes a reset in relations with Damascus, and is on track to establish business and diplomatic ties once more.

The U.S. State Department has issued warnings and threats to Erdogan if he follows through on his plan to have a neighborly relationship with Syria. Erdogan needs to make peace with Syria to return the 3.6 million Syrian refugees back home, and revive exports to Syria which will be a huge boost to the Turkish economy. If he accomplishes this soon, he has a good chance at winning reelection in May.

Kurds-PKK-YPG

A deadly terrorist bombing of a shopping district in Istanbul last November was carried out by a Syrian Kurd. The message was directed at Erdogan: don’t attack the YPG in north east Syria, or else. Those Kurds are supported by the U.S. military illegally occupying parts of Syria.

The U.S. partnered with the YPG to fight the ISIS, and both Erdogan and the opposition view that as a betrayal of a fellow NATO member, and U.S. ally. The YPG is directly linked with the PKK, an internationally designated terrorist organization and a threat to Turkey’s national security.

Erdogan has threatened a new military operation in Syria to disarm the YPG regardless of their U.S. partnership. The Syrian special enjoy under Trump, James Jeffrey, advised the Kurds to repair their relationship with Damascus, as the U.S. was not going to fight any war to defend them. The Kurd’s usefulness to the U.S. was over. Recently, the Turkish air force has been bombing them, with shells falling a few hundred feet from U.S. personnel stationed there.

Erdogan has asked Russian President Vladimir Putin for a green light to attack the Kurds in Syria, but was cautioned against it. However, the time might be ripe for a Turkish attack on the Kurds, which would disarm them and probably would lead to a withdrawal of the 200 American troops.

Turkey removed M4 outpost

On February 2, Turkish troops in Syria evacuated a military outpost near the M4 highway that connects the cities of Aleppo and Latakia. The former Al Qaeda branch in Syria, Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), occupy Idlib, the last terrorist controlled area in Syria.

Turkey had been defending the HTS from attacks from Syrian Arab Army, and the Russian military. However, Erdogan has decided to drop his support of the armed opposition as he repairs his relationship with Syria.

On January 31, Ankara informed the HTS leadership of its plan to conduct patrols on the HTS-controlled portion of the M4 (Aleppo-Latakia) road, which “may be followed by joint patrols with Russia, and eventually with Syria.”

The Terrorism Pretext: US-ISIS-Kurdish Nexus Preserves Occupation of Syria

February 03 2023

It’s getting harder to ignore. The persistent ISIS presence in the Syrian desert only serves US aims to continue its military occupation and support for Kurdish separatism.

Photo Credit: The Cradle

ByThe Cradle’s Syria Correspondent

In March 2019, former US President Donald Trump startled Washington’s war establishment by announcing that the mission of “eliminating terrorism” had been accomplished in Syria.

Seven months later, Trump solidified his claims by celebrating the assassination of ISIS leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi by a US special forces operation in rural Idlib, in the north of the country.

In reality, the US president had been angling to exit Syria for some time, and the absence of terrorism provided that excuse. Trump had promised his voter base to wind down expensive foreign military adventurism, and viewed the high cost of military deployment in Syria as disproportionate to the gains realized.

But while withdrawing US forces from various locations in Syria’s north and northeast, the American president was pressured to maintain a small number of troops in the oil-rich countryside of Hasakah and Deir Ezzor, and in the Al-Tanf base, an area crucial to Israel’s strategic interests as it is located on the border with of Iraq and Jordan, and on the hypothetical road that connects Tehran to Beirut.

Trump, known for his brazen proclamations, publicly stated that “oil interests” were the reason for keeping this small contingent of US troops in the embattled Levantine state. The wholesale exit of US forces would have paved the way for Syrian and Russian troops to take back control of the northeast, and for Moscow to move forward with its peace plan through the Astana Process with Iran and Turkiye.

The facade of ‘fighting terror’

With the arrival of Democratic President Joe Biden to the White House, Washington shifted its priorities and sought to maintain a protracted presence in Syria under the pretext of “fighting terrorism.” ISIS cells were magically reactivated in the Syrian desert, a development heavily circulated in US media through “intelligence sources.” This prompted accusations from Moscow that Washington is supporting terrorism from its Al-Tanf base, which Russian planes bombed last July.

Amidst escalating hostilities between the US and Russia over Ukraine, Syrian field sources have informed The Cradle of the existence of communication channels between the Al-Tanf base and ISIS cells that carry out scattered attacks in the Syrian Desert against the Syrian Arab Army (SAA) and its allied, Iran-backed factions.

The sources have also noted a marked shift in both ISIS tactics and the terror group’s access to advanced weapons and modern communication equipment that have been discovered in their hideouts. Given Iraq’s stringent measures on all border crossing with Syria – digging a trench along the border, building a separation fence, and installing surveillance cameras and checkpoints – it is unlikely that ISIS could obtain these resources without support from a powerful nation.

Kurdish forces employ the ISIS threat

During every Turkish threat to attack US-backed Kurdish forces in the country’s northern provinces, the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) raises the specter of ISIS and its expansion, which is used to justify the continued Kurdish occupation of northern Syria to repel these attacks.

This pattern repeated itself during the 2016-2017 Turkish Euphrates Shield operation against ISIS and Kurdish targets, the 2018 Olive Branch operation when Turkish forces invaded Afrin in Aleppo’s countryside, and the 2019 Turkish offensive called the Peace Spring operation.

The trend continued last December, when Ankara threatened to attack Kurdish-held territories in Syria’s north. The SDF, which had halted operations against ISIS, quickly reversed  its decision two days later.

In addition to playing the ISIS card to justify its relevance, the SDF – which is affiliated with the Kurdish Democratic Union Party (PYD) which Ankara considers an extension of the terrorist-designated Kurdistan Worker’s Party (PKK) – has another lever it frequently employs.

The Kurdish group controls dozens of prisons that house thousands of ISIS leaders, fighters, and their families, the most notorious of which are Al-Hol camp near the Iraqi border, and Al-Sinaa prison in the Hasakah Governorate.

And the SDF, in coordination with US strategists, have employed this leverage to release ISIS members and their families from camps or to allow prison breaks at important junctures.

So why are ISIS attacks on the rise?

A clear correlation can be observed between the rise in ISIS attacks and US attempts to fortify its presence in Syria in order to ‘fight terror.’ After a period of relative decline during Trump’s presidency, the terrorist organization has regained strength, ironically, following Biden’s decision to expand operations against ISIS.

In early 2022, ISIS launched an attack on Al-Sinaa Prison, which holds prominent ISIS leaders and fighters. The operation came less than three weeks after several noteworthy developments: First, international coalition forces brought in large shipments of weapons, including Bradley vehicles and anti-tank weapons; Second, coalition forces returned to the Lafarge base on the strategic international M4 highway north of Aleppo; Third, western forces had just completed maintenance operations for the oil fields.

Notably, the attack also took place after US Caesar Act sanctions were lifted from areas controlled by the SDF and Turkiye.

US support for the SDF through exempting Kurdish areas from the Caesar Act demonstrates Washington’s goal of solidifying the Kurdish Autonomous Administration in SDF-controlled areas. This serves to ensure a continued US presence and foothold in resource-rich northeastern Syria in the event of a future withdrawal of troops – and ongoing obstruction of Russian peace efforts to stabilize the country.

Terrorism: a tool for US expansionism

As soon as Ankara voiced its willingness to reconcile with Damascus, the US began preparing for a new troop deployment to fortify its position in Syria, particularly since rapprochement – backed by Russia and Iran – hinges on several key agreements, the most prominent of which requires the exit of US forces from the country as a necessity for a political solution.

The new US military expansion – which is essentially a redeployment – returns troops to previous bases in former ISIS-stronghold Al-Raqqa Governorate all the way to the border with Turkiye, restructures and revitalizes the jihadist-aligned Raqqa Revolutionaries Brigade (Liwa Thuwwar al-Raqqa), and provides them with weapons and equipment to form an SDF-like force in this predominantly Arab province.

In December 2022, ISIS launched a series of attacks in Raqqa, which served as the necessary pretext for the US and SDF to launch a large-scale security operation in and around the governorate. The US military used the attacks as an opportunity to reposition its forces, bring in heavy machinery, and rehabilitate helicopter airstrips.

Similarly, US-led coalition forces and the SDF launched the Al-Jazeera Thunderbolt security campaign in and around Al-Hasakah early this year, which resulted in the arrest of 154 ISIS members – according to an SDF statement on 7 January. However, these figures were questioned by locals, who accused the SDF and coalition forces of arresting countless innocent civilians in the Tel Hamis area.

Local sources accuse the SDF of drawing up indiscriminate lists that include personal targets, which have led to accusations against innocent people, the arrest of US occupation opponents who have nothing to do with ISIS, and a desire to increase detainee numbers as part of “the show” that accompanies all US operations.

In light of these facts, Syrian military sources in the eastern desert anticipate an increase in ISIS attacks – particularly as Syrian-Turkish reconciliation talks progress and exert negative pressure on US ambitions in Syria’s north. The sources says that the connection between the US and ISIS, which is used opportunistically and strategically to achieve political goals, is no longer a secret and will only gather further steam in the months ahead.

The views expressed in this article do not necessarily reflect those of The Cradle.

A Moscow meeting shatters fantasies of a Syrian ‘confederation’

January 11 2023

Source

Photo Credit: The Cradle

Malek al-Khoury

The newly-initiated Syrian-Turkish rapprochement talks are headed in Damascus’ favor and the “Turkish concessions” derided by opponents are just the start, insiders tell The Cradle.

Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan has already abandoned his dream of “praying in the Umayyad Mosque” in Damascus. But sources say this will be swiftly followed by further concessions that will throw a wrench into the ambitions of Syria’s opposition factions.

An undivided Syria

There will be no “federalism” or “confederation” – western codewords for the break up of the Syrian state – at these talks, but rather a “Turkish-Russian” acceptance of Damascus’ conditions.

For starters, Ankara plans to open the strategic M4 highway – which runs parallel to the Turkish border and connects all the vital Syrian cities and regions – as a prelude to opening the legal border crossings between Syria and Turkiye, which will re-establish trade routes between the two countries.

This move, based on an understanding between Damascus and Ankara, will essentially close the door on any opposition fantasies of breaking Syria into statelets, and will undermine the “Kurdish-American divisive ambition.”

It is not for nothing that Washington has sought to thwart communications between Ankara and Damascus. Under the guise of “fighting ISIS,” the US invested heavily in Syrian separatism, replacing the terror group with “Kurdish local forces” and reaped the rewards in barrels of stolen Syrian oil to help mitigate the global energy crisis.

Now Turkiye has closed the door to that ‘federalization’ plan.

A Russian-backed proposal

The Syrian-Turkish talks in Moscow on 28 December focused mainly on opening and establishing the necessary political, security, and diplomatic channels – a process initiated by their respective defense ministers.

While resolving the myriad thorny files between the two states is not as easy as the optimists would like, it is also nowhere as difficult as the fierce opponents of rapprochement try to suggest.

The Moscow discussions centered on mild, incremental solutions proposed by Russia. The Kremlin understands that the minefield between Ankara and Damascus needs to be dismantled with cold minds and hands, but insists that the starting point of talks is based on the political formulas of the Astana peace process that all parties have already accepted.

On the ground, Moscow is busy marketing satisfactory security settlements for all, though those on the battlefield appear to be the least flexible so far. The Russian plan is to “present security formulas to the military,” intended to be later translated into the integration of forces – whether Kurdish fighters or opposition militants – into the ranks of the Syrian Arab Army (SAA).

This will be achieved via committees led by both Syrian and Turkish intelligence services, a Russian source involved in coordinating the talks tells The Cradle.

Occupied areas of Syria, in 2023

Co-opting the Kurds

The Russian proposals, according to the source, rely on two past successful models for reconciliation on the battlefield. The first is the “Sheikh Maqsoud neighborhood model in northern Aleppo,” an area once controlled by Kurdish forces who began to coordinate with the SAA after the sweeping 2016 military operation that expelled opposition militants from the eastern neighborhoods of the city.

The Russian source says that the “Sheikh Maqsoud” model succeeded because of “security coordination,” revealing that “Syrian state security is deployed at the entrances to the neighborhood with checkpoints that coordinate with the Kurdish forces inside – in every way, big and small.” This security coordination includes “arresting criminally wanted persons, and facilitating administrative and service services” in coordination with Damascus.

The second reconciliation model used by Russian forces in Syria succeeded in bringing together the SAA and Sheikh Maqsoud Kurdish militias in a joint military maneuver conducted near the town of Manbij in the countryside of Aleppo last August.

While the Russian source confirms that the experience of “security coordination” between the SAA and the Kurdish forces was “successful,” he cautions that these models need “political arrangements” which can only be achieved by “an agreement in Astana on new provisions to the Syrian constitution, which give Kurds more flexibility in self-governance in their areas.”

Opposition amnesty

A parallel proposal revealed to The Cradle by a Turkish source, approaches ground solutions from a “confederation” angle, anathema to the Syrian authorities. According to him, “Damascus must be convinced of sharing power with the qualified factions of the (Turkish) National Army for that.”

While the Turkish proposal tried to move a step closer to Damascus’ aims, it seems that Russian mediation contributed to producing a new paradigm: This would be based on the tried-and-tested Syrian “military reconciliation” model used for years – namely, that opposition militants hand over their arms, denounce hostility to the state, and are integrated into the SAA.

Turkiye’s abandonment of its “demand to overthrow the regime” applies also to its affiliated military factions inside Syria, as the latter’s goals have dwindled to preserving some areas of influence in the north of the country. This is the current flavor of Turkiye’s reduced “confederation” ambitions: To maintain Turkish-backed factions within “local administrations” in northern areas where Turkiye has influence. This, in return for giving up on Ankara’s political ambition of “regime change” in Damascus and redrawing Syria’s northern map.

The solution here will require amending the Syrian constitution, a process that began several years ago to no avail.

From the Syrian perspective, officials are focused on eliminating all opposing separatist or terrorist elements who do not have the ability to adapt to a “unified” Syrian society.

Therefore, Damascus rejects military reconciliation proposals for any “sectarian” separatist or factional militias. Syrian officials reiterate that “the unity of the lands and the people” is the only gateway to a solution, away from the foreign interests that promote “terrorism or secession” – a reference to the Turkish and American role in Syria’s war.

Reconciliation on Damascus’ terms

There is no “confederation” in the dictionary of the Syrian state, and it is determined to stick hard to the principle of Syrian unity until the end. Damascus is intent on one goal: Reconciliations based on surrendering arms in the countryside of Latakia, Idlib, Aleppo, Raqqa, Hasakah, Qamishli, and al-Tanf, which are the areas that are still outside the control of the state.

According to the Turkish source, Syria refused to discuss anything “outside the framework of reconciliations and handing over weapons and regions,” which he says “makes it difficult for Ankara to undertake its mission,” especially in light of the fact that the Al Qaeda-affiliated Nusra Front controls large parts of these target areas.

A Syrian source tells The Cradle that the “Qamishli model” of military reconciliation is the closest one that applies to this case: Wherein “the SAA and national defense forces (the majority of which are pro-Damascus Kurds) coordinate fully.”

He makes clear that Damascus has already provided ample self-governance mechanisms for Kurds in the country’s north:

“The (Kurdish-run) Autonomous Administration in Syria already exists. It deals directly with Syria’s Ministry of Local Administration (in Damascus) and has multiple agencies that work through local representative councils to implement government plans in terms of security, tax collection, and services,” and of course it consists of the people of the region – Kurds.

The recent statement of top Erdogan advisor Yassin Aktay may throw a wrench in those works. His insistence that Turkiye should maintain control over the city of Aleppo – Syria’s second most populous, and its industrial heart – did not come out of nowhere.

Ankara considers that its repatriation of three million Syrian refugees should start from “local administrations run by the (Turkish-backed) Syrian National Army (a rebranded version of the opposition ‘Free Syrian Army),” says the Turkish source.

He is referring to Idlib, Aleppo, and their countrysides, and the areas in which Turkiye launched its “Olive Branch” and “Euphrates Shield” military operations. These locales in Syria’s north include the northern and eastern countryside of Aleppo, including Azaz, Jarabulus, al-Bab, Afrin, and its environs.

Turkiye may consider gradually handing over these strategic zones to its allied Syrian militias, he says.

“Call it confederation or not, these areas should be controlled by the Syrian National Army factions instead of the Al-Nusra Front – in order to ensure the safe return of the refugees.”

Steady progress

In short, the Russian mediation to bring Damascus and Ankara closer is moving slowly, but according to the Turkish source, “it is closer to reconciliation because the Syrian Ministry of Local Administration is beginning to take charge of regional affairs after holding new local council elections – in compliance with plans forged in the Astana process.”

Regarding Astana, the Turkish source says, “Let the Syrians treat the Kurdish and opposition areas as one, if the Kurds agree to dismantle their factions and join the Syrian army within a certain equation, the opposition factions will also accept.”

Regarding the complicated geopolitics of Syria’s east – currently occupied by US troops and their proxies – a high-ranking Syrian official who recently visited Saudi Arabia and Cairo, proposed “Arab intervention with the Syrian tribes to disengage tribe members in the Al-Tanf region from the US forces.” But according to the official, this would be subject to “the progress of relations between Damascus, Riyadh, Cairo, and possibly even Jordan.”

A few days ago, a video message was sent by Nusra Front leader Abu Muhammad al-Julani, in which he thundered: “Where are the armies of the Muslims?” It is a topical message from Al Qaeda’s Syria boss, who is angling to maintain his sectarian “area of ​​influence” in northwest Syria – strategic Idlib on the Turkish-Syrian border. Julani’s destructive narrative may be the last barrier to break for Damascus, Ankara, and Moscow to strike a deal on the ground.

Syrian Media: Turkey Agrees to Fully Withdraw Troops from Syria

January 1, 2023

By Staff, Agencies

Turkey has agreed to a complete pull-out of its troops from Syria after a recent meeting between defense ministers of Russia, Turkey and Syria in Moscow, according to a report published in Syrian media.

The Arabic-language al-Watan newspaper said in a Friday report that Russia had brokered the meeting in Moscow after intelligence authorities of Turkey and Syria held several rounds of discussions to sort out their differences.

It said that Turkish media outlets, especially those who are close to President Recep Tayyip Erdogan, have also published articles and opinion pieces in recent months suggesting that the Turkish government would better put aside differences with Syria in line with political changes and developments that have happened in the region.

The report said that the meeting in Moscow on Wednesday was held after Damascus and Ankara reached consensus on some key issues, including the need to take into account conditions set by Syria in previous rounds of negotiations.

A source told al-Watan that Turkey had agreed in the tripartite meeting in Moscow to fully withdraw its forces from Syria and to respect sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Arab country.

Turkish Defense Minister Hulusi Akar, his Syrian counterpart Ali Mahmoud Abbas and Russia’s defense chief Sergei Shoigu attended the meeting.

The report said that Syria and Turkey had also discussed the implementation of a 2020 agreement to reopen the M4 highway in northwest Syria along the border with Turkey.

The participants also emphasized that the PKK terrorist group has been a pawn in the hands of the United States and the Zionist regime and should be considered as a major threat to both Syria and Turkey.

They also agreed to set up some specialized committees follow up on agreements reached in the meeting and to hold other rounds of talks between Ankara and Damascus in future.

Late on Wednesday, the Syria’s Ministry of Defense described the meeting between defense ministers of Turkey and Syria as positive.

It said the meeting paved the way for pursuing efforts meant to fight terrorism and to review the situation in Syria, especially with regards to the refugees.

Defense ministers attending the meeting also emphasized the need for continued trilateral talks in order to create stability in Syria and in the wider region.

Russian Defense Ministry also issued a statement after the meeting and said that defense ministers of the three countries had discussed the crisis in Syria, the issue of refugees and fight against terrorism.

«إدلب واللاجئون» مختبَراً أوّل للتقارب | دمشق – أنقرة: جارٍ تسليك الطريق

 الجمعة 30 كانون الأول 2022

علاء حلبي

تزامن اللقاء مع الجدل الدائر حالياً في مجلس الأمن حول قضية المساعدات الإنسانية (أ ف ب)

أنبأ تطابق التعليقات الرسمية السورية والتركية على اللقاء الثلاثي الذي انعقد في موسكو على مستوى وزراء الدفاع ورؤساء الاستخبارات، فضلاً عن الأصداء الإيجابية التي حملتْها تلك التعليقات، بأن هذا اللقاء غير المسبوق منذ 11 عاماً، ستتبعه بالفعل خطوات عملية على الأرض، من شأنها أن تَدفع قُدُماً بمسار التقارب بين أنقرة ودمشق. خطواتٌ يُفترض لمسها خلال الفترة القليلة المقبلة في نطاق ملفَّين رئيسَين: أوّلهما إدلب وطريق حلب – اللاذقية، وثانيهما اللاجئون السوريون الذي يُنتظَر أن تتسارع خطوات إعادتهم إلى بلادهم. وفي خضمّ ذلك، تجد القوى الكردية نفسها أمام اختبار جديد، في ظلّ خشيتها من أن يأتي التطبيع السوري – التركي على حساب وجودها وسلطتها، وهو ما دفعها إلى إطلاق حملة استنكار للاجتماع الأخير، على رغم أنها واصلت، على مدار اللقاءات التي انعقدت بينها وبين الحكومة السورية خلال الأشهر الماضية، رفْض أيّ حلول وسطية، متمسّكة بتحالفها مع الأميركيين وتعويلها عليهم

لعدّة ساعات أوّل من أمس، اجتمع وزير الدفاع السوري، العماد علي عباس، ونظيره التركي، خلوصي آكار، إلى جانب وزير الدفاع الروسي، سيرغي شويغو، بحضور رؤساء استخبارات البلدان الثلاثة، في لقاء هو الأوّل من نوعه بين مسؤولين رفيعي المستوى من سوريا وتركيا، منذ اندلاع الحرب السورية قبل أكثر من 11 عاماً. الاجتماع الذي جاء بعد بضعة أشهر من المباحثات الأمنية والوساطة الروسية المتواصلة، بالإضافة إلى جهود إيرانية بدت واضحة خلال قمّة دول «مسار أستانا» التي عُقدت في العاصمة الإيرانية طهران في شهر تموز الماضي، ركّز على مجموعة قضايا أبرزها المخاطر الأمنية ومسألة اللاجئين. وهاتان القضيّتان كانت قد شكّلتا محور لقاءات أمنية سابقة بين دمشق وأنقرة، في ظلّ رغبة العاصمتَين المشتركة في إخراج القوّات الأميركية من سوريا وإنهاء مشروع «الإدارة الذاتية» الكردية من جهة، وطيّ ملفّ اللاجئين السوريين من جهة أخرى، بهدف سحبه من أروقة السياسة، بعد أن تمّ استثماره لسنوات عدّة من قِبَل الدول الغربية.

وخلال الشهرَين الماضيَين، أبدت تركيا رغبتها في استعجال خطوات الانفتاح على سوريا، بهدف قطف مكاسب هذا الانفتاح في الداخل، في وقت ربطت فيه دمشق التطبيع مع أنقرة بمجموعة خطوات يتعيّن على الأخيرة اتّخاذها، أبرزها وقف دعم الفصائل المسلّحة، وإخراج قوّاتها من الشمال السوري، بالإضافة إلى إنهاء تحكّمها بالمياه الواردة عبر نهر الفرات، والذي يؤدي إلى أزمات جفاف متلاحقة أضرّت بشكل كبير بالقطاع الزراعي السوري، ومنعت إيصال مياه الشرب إلى آلاف القرى. وفي وقت لم تَصدر فيه عن دمشق أيّ توضيحات حول فحوى اللقاء ونتائجه، باستثناء البيان المقتضب الذي أصدرته وزارة الدفاع السورية، والذي وصف الاجتماع بـ«الإيجابي»، ذكرت مصادر سورية أن تركيا تَقدّمت بضع خطوات على المسار الذي تريده سوريا، الأمر الذي سهّل عقْد هذا اللقاء، متوقّعةً ارتقاء الاجتماعات إلى المستوى السياسي في وقت لاحق، من دون تحديد وقت دقيق لذلك، في ظلّ الملفّات المعقّدة والمتشابكة التي تحيط بالعلاقات السورية – التركية، والتي ترجئ الحديث عن التسوية النهائية إلى ما بعد الانتخابات الرئاسية التركية.

خلال الشهرَين الماضيَين، أبدت تركيا رغبتها في استعجال خطوات الانفتاح على سوريا


اللافت في موعد عقد هذا اللقاء، أنه يأتي بالتزامن مع الجدل الدائر حالياً في مجلس الأمن حول قضية المساعدات الإنسانية، إذ ترغب أنقرة في ضمان استمرار تدفّق المساعدات خلال الشهور المقبلة لمنع حدوث اضطرابات في الشمال السوري، في وقت تصرّ فيه دمشق وموسكو على أن تفي الدول الغربية بتعهّداتها حول تقديم دعم ملموس لمشاريع التعافي المبكر، وخصوصاً منظومتَي المياه والطاقة الكهربائية، بما من شأنه أن يؤمّن أرضية مناسبة لإعادة اللاجئين. كذلك، يأتي الاجتماع بعد تعثّر الخطّة التركية لشنّ هجوم برّي جديد في الشمال السوري، بفعل رفض كلّ من موسكو وواشنطن إيّاه، ليبقى الحلّ الوحيد بالنسبة إلى أنقرة هو الانفتاح على دمشق وفق الخطّة الروسية، خصوصاً أن الولايات المتحدة لا تملك سوى تجديد طرح مشروعها لربْط المناطق الخارجة عن سيطرة الحكومة السورية (الإدارة الذاتية والشمال السوري)، الأمر الذي تَعتبره تركيا وصْفة لتجذير «الإدارة الذاتية» بدلاً من إنهائها.
وعلى أيّ حال، ترى مصادر سورية مطّلعة، في حديث إلى «الأخبار»، أن الأصداء الإيجابية الصادرة عن وزارتَي الدفاع السورية والتركية عقب اللقاء، تشي بوجود خطوات على الأرض يُفترض لمسها خلال الفترة القليلة المقبلة، وأُولاها تقديم دفعة حقيقية لحلحلة ملفّ إدلب وفتح طريق اللاذقية – حلب المغلَق من جهة، ومن جهة ثانية، تسريع وتيرة إعادة اللاجئين السوريين، ولا سيما أنه جرى تحديد معابر دائمة لإعادتهم، وافتتاح مراكز مصالحة خاصة بهم في إدلب. ويضع التوافق السوري – التركي، القوى الكردية، أمام اختبار وجودي جديد، في ظلّ إعلان الرئيس التركي، رجب طيب إردوغان، اتّباع آلية جديدة في محاربة تلك القوى، عبر استهداف بنيتها التحتية ومصادر تمويلها، في إشارة إلى قوافل النفط التي يجري تهريبها، ومراكز تكرير النفط البدائية، بالإضافة إلى مقرّاتها العسكرية. وفي الإطار نفسه، أعلن وزير الخارجية التركي، مولود جاويش أوغلو، أن ثمّة مساعيَ حثيثة لإيجاد مخرج سياسي عبر لقاءات سورية – سورية (بين الحكومة والمعارضة)، وفق مسارَين: الأوّل هو «مسار أستانة» بدعم روسي، والثاني هو مسار «اللجنة الدستورية» (المسار الأممي)، المجمَّد حالياً، علماً أن كليهما لا يضمّان أيّ تمثيل لـ«قسد». ويأتي ذلك في وقت تتابع فيه واشنطن، التي تحاول جاهدة إفشال المساعي الروسية للحلّ ومنْع الانفتاح السوري – التركي، التصعيد السياسي والميداني في سوريا، سواء عبر تقديم دفعات من الأسلحة المتطوّرة لـ«قسد»، أو عن طريق إنشاء «جيش رديف من مكوّنات عربية» في منطقتَي التنف في المثلث الحدودي مع العراق والأردن، والرقة على الحدود مع تركيا.

مقالات ذات صلة

مقالات ذات صلة

قمّة طهران تثمر في إدلب: تحضيرات تركيّة لفتْح «M4»

الجمعة 22 تموز 2022

تعمّد أردوغان خلال قمّة طهران ذكر إدلب والتشديد على ضرورة الإبقاء على الهدوء فيها (أ ف ب)

سوريا 

علاء حلبي 

لم تكد ساعات تمضي على انتهاء قمّة طهران، التي احتلّ الملفّ السوري حيّزاً رئيساً منها، حتى بدأت تركيا سلسلة خطوات على الأرض تمهيداً لفتح طريق حلب – اللاذقية، ضمن مقايضة أوّلية تشمل تسليماً جزئياً لمنبج وتل رفعت للجيش السوري. وعلى رغم تواضع الإجراءات المتّصلة بتلك المقايضة إلى الآن، إلّا أن من شأنها، إذا ما آلت إلى نهايتها، ولم تفلح الولايات المتحدة في عرقلتها، أن تُحقّق انفراجة جزئية في الملفّ الإدلبي الشائك، وأن تؤدّي إلى إعادة تشغيل أحد أبرز الطرق الاستراتيجية (M4) في سوريا

دمشق | تُعتبر إدلب، أكبر المعاقل التي تتجمّع فيها الفصائل المتشدّدة في سوريا في ظلّ سيطرة «هيئة تحرير الشام» (جبهة النصرة) عليها، أحد أكثر الملفّات إشكالية بين كلّ من تركيا من جهة، وإيران وروسيا من جهة أخرى. وقد حاولت أنقرة، على مدار الأعوام الأربعة الماضية، المماطلة في معالجة هذا الملفّ، وتثبيت أمر واقع لصالحها، بالتوازي مع عمليات تبييض لصفحة «جبهة النصرة» تستهدف إعادة تصديرها على أنها فصيل معتدل، ضمن معادلة تشابكت فيها مجموعة من العوامل. وتفرض اتفاقات سوتشي الموقَّعة بين روسيا وتركيا عام 2018، ومتمّمتها عامَي 2019 و2020، على أنقرة، فتح طريق حلب – اللاذقية (M4)، وعزل الفصائل الإرهابية، مقابل إبعاد «خطر الأكراد» في الشمال والشمال الشرقي من سوريا مسافة 30 كلم عن الحدود التركية، وهو ما تعهّدت روسيا بتنفيذه. غير أن التسويف التركي في تنفيذ تلك الالتزامات، التي ظلّت محدّدة بجدول زمني واضح بعد كلّ لقاء بين الرئيس الروسي فلاديمير بوتين ونظيره التركي رجب طيب إردوغان، دفع الروس إلى الردّ بالمثل والمماطلة في حلّ قضية الأكراد، على الرغم من تنشيط دوريات المراقبة المشتركة.

وتعمّد الرئيس التركي، في كلمته التي ألقاها خلال قمّة طهران وفاقت بطولها كلمتَي الرئيس الروسي ونظيره الإيراني، ذكر إدلب في أكثر من موقع. كما تعمّد التشديد على ضرورة الإبقاء على الهدوء فيها، مشيراً إلى أن بلاده «تتفهّم مخاوف جميع الأطراف حول الوضع هناك، لكنها تبذل جهوداً كبيرة في المنطقة وتقدّم الدعم للنازحين على الحدود من دون دعم من دول أخرى». وسبق لإردوغان أن جادل، خلال لقاءات سوتشي السابقة، بالمسائل نفسها، وعلى رأسها وجود أكثر من 1500مخيّم تضمّ مئات آلاف النازحين في ريف إدلب وقرب الحدود مع تركيا، الأمر الذي يمثّل، وفق الرئيس التركي، تهديدات بموجات لجوء جديدة إلى بلاده لا يرغب فيها، في الوقت الذي يحاول فيه أصلاً التخلّص من اللاجئين الموجودين لديه عبر بناء تجمّعات سكنية لهم قرب الشريط الحدودي، من أجل إعادة توطينهم.

ترى موسكو في فتح طريق حلب – اللاذقية خطوة مقبولة ضمن الظروف الحالية


وبالتوازي مع عقد قمّة طهران، وفي اليوم التالي لها، زار وفد أمني وعسكري تركي مناطق عدّة في إدلب، حيث أجرى سلسلة من اللقاءات، بعضها مع ممثّلين عن سكّان قرى على خطّ التماس في جبل الزاوية، حيث يمرّ طريق حلب – اللاذقية. وبحسب مصادر تحدّثت إلى «الأخبار»، فإن الوفد طلب من الأهالي الاستعداد للعودة إلى قراهم، وسط وعود بمنْع تدهور الأوضاع الأمنية والعسكرية خلال الفترة المقبلة، بالإضافة إلى أخرى بتحسُّن اقتصادي كبير، حيث سيتمّ فتح طريق «M4»، ومجموعة من المعابر الاقتصادية التي تربط بين إدلب بشكل عام ومناطق سيطرة الحكومة، مع ضمانات باستمرار وصول المساعدات إلى تلك القرى بدلاً من المخيمات. ونقلت المصادر أن الوفد أكّد أكثر من مرّة أن «ملفّ إدلب لن ينزلق إلى العسكرة»، وأنه «بات مرتبطاً بالحلّ السياسي»، لافتةً إلى أن الوفد أجرى لقاءات مغلقة مع «هيئة تحرير الشام»، تسرّب عنها وجود أوامر تركية واضحة لـ«الهيئة» بضبْط محيط الطريق، ومنْع أيّ محاولات من فصائل منفلتة لعرقلة الاتفاق، ومتابعة العمل على إزالة مظاهر التشدّد. وكان أبو محمد الجولاني، زعيم «النصرة»، بدأ، قبل مدّة، بهذه المهام بالفعل، عبر زيارات لقرى تسْكنها أقلّيات، آخرها زيارة لقرية تقطنها عائلات مسيحية لتطمين الأهالي وإزالة مخاوفهم من «الهيئة»، وذلك بالتوازي مع إدخال تعزيزات عسكرية تركية إلى نقاط تمركز القوات التركية في جبل الزاوية. غير أن الجهود التركية لا يبدو أنها تمكّنت حتى الآن من ضبط الأمن، حيث سُجّلت خلال الساعات الماضية عدّة خروقات لوقف إطلاق النار من طرف الفصائل المسلّحة، بالإضافة إلى محاولة شنّ هجمات بطائرتَين انتحاريتَين على قاعدة حميميم الروسية في جبلة.

ويبدو، حتى الآن، أن ثمّة قبولاً، على مضض، من قِبَل موسكو، التي ترى في فتح طريق حلب – اللاذقية، والمتأخّر نحو أربع سنوات عما اتُّفق عليه، خطوة مقبولة ضمن الظروف الحالية، في وقت ينصبّ فيه اهتمام الدول الثلاث (إيران وروسيا وتركيا) على زيادة الضغوط لإخراج القوات الأميركية من الشمال الشرقي من سوريا، وهي الأرضيّة المشتركة التي بنت عليها إيران قمّتها، وحاولت ترسيخها كونها قد تساهم في فتح الأبواب المغلقة بين دمشق وأنقرة. وبشكل عام، يمكن القول إن الرئيس التركي نجح، إلى حدّ ما، في تجميد ملفّ إدلب، وتجاوُز المعادلة الروسية التي تربط بين منبج وتل رفعت من جهة، وإدلب من جهة ثانية، عبر خطوات صغيرة في الأخيرة مقابل تسليم الأُوليَين للجيش السوري. ومن شأن ذلك أن يؤدّي، في حال تمّت الخطوات المتّفق عليها، ولم تنجح المساعي الأميركية القائمة في عرقلتها عبر الضغط على «قسد» ومنعها من تسليم المدينتَين، إلى تحقيق انفراجة جزئية في الملفّ الإدلبي الشائك، بالإضافة إلى فتح أحد أبرز الطرق الاستراتيجية (M4)، والذي يمتدّ من أقصى الشرق السوري مروراً بحلب وصولاً إلى الساحل السوري، علماً أن الخطّة الروسية، التي أبلغها قائد القوات الروسية في سوريا، ألكسندر تشايكو، لممثّلي «قسد»، خلال لقاء في القامشلي قبل يومين، تقضي بأن تنسحب قواتها من الشريط الحدودي إلى ما بعد الطريق، على أن يتسلّم الجيش السوري المنطقة بما فيها «M4».

فيديوات متعلقة

مقالات متعلقة

Terrorists from Syria Go to Ukraine to Fight Russia: Will Turkey Suffer?

March 09, 2022

By Steven Sahiounie

Global Research,

All Global Research articles can be read in 51 languages by activating the “Translate Website” drop down menu on the top banner of our home page (Desktop version).

To receive Global Research’s Daily Newsletter (selected articles), click here.

Visit and follow us on Instagram at @globalresearch_crg and Twitter at @crglobalization.


Today, the dangers of military escalation are beyond description.

What is now happening in Ukraine has serious geopolitical implications. It could lead us into a World War III scenario.

It is important that a peace process be initiated with a view to preventing escalation. 

Global Research condemns Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.

A Bilateral Peace Agreement is required.


Russian-Turkish diplomatic relations are quite complex, while some collaboration exists in several sectors, competition is dominant in other sectors and domains, particularly the security sector.

Ukraine’s President Volodymyr Zelensky on February 27 urged foreigners to head to Ukrainian embassies worldwide in order to sign up to volunteer to fight Russia in Ukraine.  Now, Zelensky says that 16,000 foreign volunteers have arrived in Ukraine to assist in their fight against Russia.

The pro-Serb Democratic Front, the largest bloc in Montenegro’s governing coalition, called on the authorities to prevent the recruitment of Montenegrin fighters for Ukraine’s armed militia. “Such a call from the Ukrainian embassy is an obvious attempt to destabilize our country and the authorities must react. They must prevent Montenegrin citizens from fighting in foreign wars as this is also prohibited by law”, the Democratic Front said in a press release.  According to Interior Ministry data, some 31 Montenegrin citizens have fought in foreign wars since 2012, with 26 having fought alongside ISIS in Syria and Iraq.

The majority in Montenegro have strong sympathies for their fellow Orthodox Christian Russians, who have been targeted by Nazi militias such as the Azov Battalion in the Donbas.  Montenegro criminalized participation in foreign conflicts in March 2015, and those convicted face prison sentences of up to ten years. Montenegro joined NATO in June 2017.

Radical Islamic terrorists in Idlib/ Syria are among those foreigners seeking to reach Ukraine to fight the Russians.  Radical Islam is a political ideology that has been called Islamo-fascist, and shares commonalities with the Nazi militias in Ukraine.  Both the Nazis in Ukraine and the terrorists in Idlib are fighting the Russians.  The terrorists in Idlib have devised a plan to send fighters to Ukraine, while also fighting the Russians in Idlib, thus hitting Russia on two battlefronts.

Suhail Hamoud, a famed terrorist in Idlib, who is nicknamed Abu TOW for his skill in operating the American anti-tank missile BGM-71 TOW, recently offered assistance to Ukraine.  Hamoud said on Twitter, “There is a strong will I am in Idlib now and ready to go to support the Ukrainian army. I want to help someone”.  He is said to have more than 100 confirmed hits of Russian-made tanks in Syria during the battles against the Syrian Arab Army. Former President Obama had sent the TOW anti-tank missiles to Idlib.

War or Peace: Turkish backed Terrorists, Erdogan’s Decision on Idlib

Iraqi terrorist leader Maysara bin Ali, also known by Abu Maria al-Qahtani, said on Telegram that if a Muslim in Ukraine fights and defeats the Russians, he would be rewarded in heaven, and if he gets killed he would be a martyr, having died in a Holy War.

The most powerful terrorist force in Idlib is Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), a coalition of Islamist groups made up of Syrian and foreign fighters, and dominated by Al Qaeda affiliate known as Jibhat al Nusra.

“The main problem is the foreign fighters, they have nowhere to go,” said Sinan Ulgen, a former Turkish diplomat and analyst with Carnegie Europe. Sending the terrorists to Ukraine is one solution that the US and NATO are using. Just as the Obama administration used the Al Qaeda terrorists to fight the Syrian government for regime change, those same terrorists can be utilized to fight the Russians in Ukraine and Idlib.

The UN envoy to Syria has said there are around 10,000 HTS terrorists in Idlib. Other terrorists are fighting under the Free Syrian Army banner. However, once President Erdogan of Turkey began sponsoring them, he changed their name to the “National Front for Liberation”. The US-NATO war on Syria for regime change used the Muslim Brotherhood partisans as boots on the ground in Syria.  The terrorists were originally named Free Syrian Army but were taken over by Al Qaeda, and finally morphed into ISIS.

Ankara considers the Kurdish militia in northeast Syria as terrorists but supports the Al Qaeda-linked terrorists in Idlib. Turkey invaded Syria in several places, and Idlib was one of their occupation points. The Turkish military convoys pass freely amidst the terrorists in Idlib.

Ankara depends on its good relationship with Russia to control Idlib.  Russia controls the air space and performs military patrols near Idlib which holds together a fragile ceasefire between the terrorists, Russia, Turkey, and the Syrian government in Damascus.

In 2018, Russia and Turkey entered into an agreement in Sochi concerning Idlib. Turkey was to separate the terrorists from the innocent civilians and guarantee the safety of the M4 highway linking Latakia with the industrial capital of Syria, Aleppo. This plan was to prevent the Syrian Arab Army from attacking Idlib and clearing out all the terrorists. Turkey was desperate to sign the deal to prevent refugees in Idlib from fleeing to Turkey should an attack begin.  Idlib is thought to have about 3 million civilians and tens of thousands of terrorists.

Turkey has a dozen military posts in Idlib and said that it would isolate terrorists, but after almost four years Turkey has not lived up to its agreement. Idlib has remained a tense status quo, with no political settlement in sight or even discussed.

On February 27, Turkey declared the conflict in Ukraine a war. This invoked the 1936 convention concerning the waterway at Istanbul, the Bosphorus, and Turkey has now locked out Russian warships from the Black Sea, which include destroyers, a frigate, and one of Russia’s most advanced warship that carries cruise missiles.  These ships were to join a fleet of warships already assed outside of Odessa.

In 2017, Turkey signed a deal to buy the Russian-made S-400 air defense system against strong US objections. In 2019, the system was installed. Given the current fragile relationship between Russia and Turkey over Ukraine, Russia could turn off the system, like what the US did to Saddam Hussein of Iraq. In this process, the codes are known by the manufacturer of the air defense system and can make the S-400 worthless.

Russia is building Turkey’s first nuclear reactor, it has recently constructed a pipeline underneath the Black Sea to Turkey, and it is supplying the bulk of Turkey’s natural gas to stay warm. Turkey imports more than 90% of its energy and Russia is one of its main suppliers.

Turkey has been selling armed drones to Kyiv, and the Ukrainian military has already used them in Donbas against pro-Russian targets. Turkey is also a close ally of Russia, and a key trading partner, and Ankara have been careful not to step on Moscow’s toes in Syria. On March 2, Ukraine said it is getting more Turkish drones, despite warnings from Moscow.

The Ukrainian Defense Ministry has posted videos of Turkish-made drones targeting Russian forces. Last week, Moscow warned countries supplying Ukraine with weapons they would be held responsible for losses. Turkish-Russian ties are facing a critical test.

Erdogan has domestic problems as well as those with Russia.  His opposition is united against him and opinion polls show an anti-Erdogan majority. Turkey would pay a huge price in Syria if Russia turned against it over its stance on Ukraine.

Russia could retaliate against Turkey in Idlib. If the Syrian Arab Army were to begin an attack of Idlib against the Turkish-protected terrorists, it could create a panic among the civilians and unleash millions to cross the border into Turkey, which would further destabilize Turkey amid an economic downturn and growing anti-Syrian sentiment among the public.

Conversely, should Turkey perceive Russia weakening from the US-NATO position against it in Ukraine, Turkey may choose to step-up attacks against Russian and Syrian positions and assets in Idlib, and take even more territory in northwest Syria on the Turkish border. All eyes are on Ukraine now, but keep one eye on Idlib as well.

*

Note to readers: Please click the share buttons above or below. Follow us on Instagram, @globalresearch_crg and Twitter at @crglobalization. Forward this article to your email lists. Crosspost on your blog site, internet forums, etc.

This article was originally published on Al Mayadeen.

Steven Sahiounie is a two-time award-winning journalist, and Chief editor of MidEastDiscourse News. He is a regular contributor to Global Research.

Featured image is from Al Mayadeen

The original source of this article is Global Research

Copyright © Steven Sahiounie, Global Research, 2022

Syrian, Russian aircraft intensify missions over Idlib as SAA awaits green light for offensive

By News Desk -2020-09-02

BEIRUT, LEBANON (12:00 P.M.) – For the last 48 hours, the Syrian and Russian air forces have been conducting reconnaissance missions over the Idlib Governorate, as their aircraft capture important images of the enemy whereabouts and defensive positions.

According to a source in the Hama Governorate, the Syrian Arab Army and their Russian partners have intensified their reconnaissance missions for the purpose of intelligence gathering, amid reports of a new offensive inside Idlib.

In July, the Syrian Arab Army sent a large number of reinforcements to the Idlib Governorate, which prompted the Turkish military and their allied militants to rush troops to these front-lines in the Jabal Al-Zawiya region.

However, the offensive was put on hold, along with future operations inside the Jabal Al-Akrad region of the Latakia Governorate.

It now appears that the Syrian Army is once again moving forces back to the southern countryside of the Idlib Governorate, as the SAA awaits the green light to launch a new operation along the southern and eastern fronts of Idlib.

Should a new offensive commence, the Syrian Army will likely concentrate on the areas along the M-4 Highway (Aleppo-Latakia), specifically, the key town of Ariha and the Jabal Al-Zawiya region.

Related Videos

Related News

Russian, Syrian Forces Eliminated Over 300 ISIS Militants In Desert

August 26, 2020

Video Here

South Front

Russian and Syrian forces eliminated 327 ISIS militants during a joint security operation that took place in the desert areas of Homs and Deir Ezzor from August 18 to August 24.

According to the Russian side, strikes of the Syrian Air Force, the Russian Aerospace Forces, field artillery and actions of special forces units in the desert also allowed to eliminate 134 shelters, 17 observation posts, 7 warehouses and 5 underground storage areas belonging to ISIS terrorists.

The operation came in response to a series of successful ISIS attacks on pro-government forces in the Homs-Deir Ezzor desert. One of these attacks, near Deir Ezzor city on August 18, led to the killing of Russian Major-General Vyacheslav Gladkih. Taking into account the numbers provided by the Russian side, the August 18-24 operation likely delivered a powerful blow to ISIS cells hiding in the desert. Nonetheless, it is unlikely that the ISIS threat was fully removed.

As long as areas not controlled by Damascus remain, ISIS will always have a place to hide and restore its forces.

On August 25, a Russian military vehicle was targeted with an RPG along the M4 Highway, during the 25th Turkish-Russian Joint Patrol. No Russian personnel received serious injures. According to photos from the site, a BTR-80’s wheel was damaged during the attack. This became the second attack on a joint Turkish-Russian patrol in southern Idlib in a week. The previous one targeting a Turkish military vehicle took place on August 17.

The regular attacks on Russian-Turkish patrols in southern Idlib reveal that the de-escalation process is not going very well. In fact, al-Qaeda-linked groups still keep a dominant position in the ‘opposition-controlled’ Idlib and have not been separated from their ‘moderate’ allies.

On August 14, Russia even temporarily suspended joint patrols with Turkey in the area due to Ankara’s inability to guarantee the security of patrols and fulfill its obligations under the de-escalation deal. It appeared that the decision had been reversed, as they began again on August 17, however the attacks resumed shortly thereafter.

In these conditions, the continuation of joint patrols by Turkey and Russia apparently puts its forces involved in such actions in danger. If the threat of al-Qaeda-linked radicals is not addressed, militants bolstered by the previous successes will likely increase their attacks on these patrols even further.

FIRST EVER FULL TURKISH-RUSSIAN PATROL ON M4 HIGHWAY IN SYRIA’S GREATER IDLIB COMPLETED (VIDEO)

South Front

On July 22, the Russian Military Police and the Turkish military completed their first ever full joint patrol on the M4 highway in the northwestern Syrian region of Greater Idlib.

The joint patrol set off from the government-held town of Tronba in southern Idlib. The patrol passed through the entire opposition-held section of the M4. In the end, Russian forces reached the government-held town of Ain Hawr in northern Lattakia, while Turkish forces headed back to Greater Idlib.

Video

This was the 22nd joint Russian-Turkish patrol on the M4 and the first to pass through the entire opposition-held section of the M4 highway. The patrol didn’t encounter any problem.

Turkey committed to secure the M4 under the agreement with Russia signed on March 5. The highway links the port city of Lattakia with Aleppo city, Syria’s industrial hub.

suicide bombing targeted the 21th patrol more than a week ago. Three Russian service members were injured in the attack. Russian and Syrian forces responded with a series of airstrikes and intense shelling.

By securing the M4 highway, Turkey has fulfilled a part of its commitments. Under the agreement with Russia, Ankara is also obliged to neutralize the remaining terrorist groups in Greater Idlib, including Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham. Turkish forces are yet to take any action to achieve this goal.

MORE ON THIS TOPIC:

Al-Qaeda Factions Create New Coalition In Idlib

South Front

 15.06.2020 

Early on June 14, the Russian Aerospace Forces reportedly carried out airstrikes on positions of Hayat Tahrir al-Sham near the villages of al-Bara and Deir Sunbul in southern Idlib. Since the signing of the new de-escalation agreement with Turkey on March 5, the Russian military has halted active operations in Greater Idlib. Nonetheless, it continued isolated precise strikes on high value terrorist targets.

The June 14 airstrikes followed the creation of a new coalition by several al-Qaeda-linked groups operating in the region: Horas al-Din, Ansar al-Din, Ansar al-Islam, Liwa al-Muqatlin al-Ansar and Tansiqiyat al-Jihad. The coalition, dubbed “Fa Ithbatu”, is in fact an expanded variant of another al-Qaeda-linked coalition, Ghurfat Eamaliat wa-Harid al-Mu’minin. This very faction recently conducted a large attack on Syrian Army positions near Tanjarah and Fattirah killing several soldiers and destroying at least one BMP infantry fighting vehicle.

Therefore, despite the claims of pro-militant propaganda that militant groups are uniting their forces in order to fight back the possible aggression of the ‘bloody Assad regime’, the creation of Fa Ithbatulikely reveals preparations for more aggressive actions against government forces.

The Turkish leadership, which is also committed to pushing propaganda about the ‘evil Assad regime’, clearly understands the real situation on the ground. So, it has continued expanding the network of observation posts along the M4 highway in southern Idlib in an attempt to keep the situation under control. The most recent Turkish observation posts were created near the villages of Farkia, Bsanqul, Kafer Shalaya, Urum al-Jawz and Mareian. Nonetheless, even these extensive efforts did not allow Turkish forces to at least create the image of order in the so-called opposition-held area.

On June 13, fighting erupted between Hayat Tahrir al-Sham and a local armed group in the village of Salqin near the Turkish border. The conflict started after Hayat Tahrir al-Sham members assaulted a displaced civilian from Ma`arat al-Nu`man for setting a food stand near their shop. The fighting stopped only after Hayat Tahrir al-Sham deployed large reinforcements to the village. This was just the most recent incident in a long pattern of violence, which has been ongoing in the militant-held areas.

On June 14 and June 15, warplanes of the Syrian Air Force bombed ISIS hideouts near the town of Uqayribat in southeastern Hama. Last weekend, the Syrian Army, the National Defense Forces and Liwa al-Quds launched an anti-ISIS operation in the very same area. The operation came in response to ISIS attacks near the town on June 11 and June 12. However, it is unlikely that limited security operations in the desert area, which are being conducted by government forces, will fully remove the ISIS threat from the region.

Military Situation In Syria On June 15, 2020 (Map Update)

Military Situation In Syria On June 15, 2020 (Map Update)

A brief overview of the recent developments in Syria:

  • A suspected U.S. drone strike on Idlib’s city center killed two commanders of al-Qaeda-affiliated Horas al-Din;
  • The Turkish military claimed that it had eliminated 3 Kurdish rebels in northeastern Syria;
  • Russia is allegedly preparing to establish a military base near the ancient city of Palmyra;
  • Syrian warplanes conducted airstrikes on ISIS cells near Uqayribat;
  • Gunmen attacked Syrian government forces in Jasim.

RELATED VIDEOS

MORE ON THE TOPIC:

مخاض ربع الساعة الأخير… الشرق الأوسط إلى أين؟

د. ميادة ابراهيم رزوق

أثارت تصريحات الجنرال كينيث ماكينزي قائد القيادة الأميركية المركزية الوسطى تساؤلات كثيرة عن نعت منطقة غرب آسيا بالغرب المتوحش، والتحذير من تعاظم القوة الإيرانية، والصعود الصيني المقلق، والدور الروسي الانتهازي الذي أظهر براعة في سورية، وسوْق الملاحظات بضرورة إدارة الولايات المتحدة الأميركية لغرب آسيا المتوحش، وهي في طور التفاوض على طريقة الخروج من المنطقة، وهنا مكمن السؤال في ما قاله أمام التحديات التي تمرّ بها الولايات المتحدة الأميركية من ارتباك في إدارة الملفات الخارجية، والانقسام الداخلي بين إدارة ترامب والقيادة العسكرية، وخلافه مع بعض حكام الولايات، والتظاهرات والاحتجاجات ضدّ التمييز العنصري وعنصرية الشرطة، بدور ترامب الرئيسي في تسريع تظهيرها وتفاقمها، بكذبه وغطرسته وعنجهيته وعنصريته وسياساته الفاشلة الداخلية والاقتصادية وفي مواجهة جائحة كورونا، التي أدّت إلى زيادة العنف وتفاقم الاضطرابات وإفلاس وإغلاق آلاف الشركات، وازدياد نسبة الفقر والبطالة ليكون تعداد العاطلين عن العمل أكثر من 40 مليون مواطن أميركي، رغم استمرار العبث في منطقة الشرق الأوسط من خلال الإصرار على فرض الحصار والعقوبات الجائرة، وتردّي الأوضاع الاقتصادية، وتجويع الشعوب وإثارة الفوضى في غير مكان؛ كسباً للوقت واللعب على عامل الزمن، آملا بتحسين الظروف لتمرير جزءاً من صفقة القرن بضمّ الضفة الغربية، قبل الوصول للحظة انتخابات الرئاسة الأميركية.

تَعتبر أنظمة الدول الخليجية الرجعية وفي مقدّمتها السعودية والإمارات نفسها جزءاً من تلك الأجندة، علّها تحافظ على عروشها التي بدأت معالم انهيارها بالوضوح تحت وطأة الأزمة الاقتصادية والافلاس وانهيار أسعار النفط بالتشبيك مع جائحة كورونا ومشاكلها وانقساماتها الداخلية، وعدم إمكانية الخروج من حرب اليمن بماء الوجه.

ففي ظلّ أزماتها وخسارة مقومات أمنها القومي المالية والدينية فقدت الدعم والحماية الأميركية المباشرة، إلا من صفقات الأسلحة التي تفرغ ما تبقى في الخزائن والاحتياطات بمزاعم درء الخطر الإيراني، وأوراق الاعتماد الوحيدة لضمان الحفاظ على العروش في جعبة كيان العدو الصهيوني، باستمرار ركوب قطار التطبيع بكلّ صفاقة، وليس آخرها مقدار الذلّ في هبوط الطائرة الإماراتية الثانية في مطار بن غوريون بمزاعم تقديم المساعدات لقطاع غزة والضفة الغربية دون تنسيق مع الفلسطينيين الذين رفضوها جملة وتفصيلا بعزة واباء، لمشهد ذلّ آخر فيما فضحته مجلة «ناشيونال انترست» عن رغبة الأنظمة الخليجية بنسج علاقات اقتصادية واستراتيجية أكبر مع (إسرائيل) من وراء الكواليس، وليطلّ صباح يوم الجمعة الوزير الإماراتي يوسف العتيبة بمقالته الحصرية لصحيفة «بديعوت أحرنوت» لمغازلة الكيان الصهيوني بتفاصيل مبادرات بلاده بالانفتاح والعلاقات الاقتصادية والعمل المشترك والدعوة للمشاركة في معرض «الاكسبو» الدولي المخطط إقامته في دبي العام المقبل، وتكريس أسس التطبيع واعتبار (إسرائيل) فرصة وليست عدواً، لدمجها في المنطقة.

يتخلل هذا المشهد المأساوي تنامي الوعي العربي في رفض مشاريع الأجندة الصهيوأميركية، وخاصة في تونس والسودان نحو تغييرات قد يكون، وسيكون الانتصار السوري بالتحرير الكامل حجر الرحى لانتصار خيارات الشعوب العربية المقاومة، وبتبلور قيادات ثورية تقود نضالاتها.

في خضمّ هذه التفاصيل والانشغال الأميركي والأوروبي باضطراباته الداخلية، يتقن أردوغان سياسة اللعب على الحبال، واستثمار فائض القوة التي يشعر بها بعد تقدّم حليفته حكومة الوفاق الليبية بمواجهة الجنرال خليفة حفتر الذي تدعمه روسيا، لاستثمارها بسياسة ديكتاتورية قمعية في الداخل التركي، ومحاولة تكريس احتلال إدلب السورية اقتصادياً وعسكرياً أمراً واقعاً، بضخ كميات كبيرة من العملة التركية وفرض التعامل بها، وربطها بالتعاملات التجارية والرسوم الجمركية للبضائع العابرة من الحدود، وبمسار متصل في تعزيز بيئة حاضنة لوجودها بفرض منهاجها التعليمي المدرسي، وزيارة وزير الداخلية التركي سليمان صويلو في سابقة أولى لمخيمات النازحين في إدلب، بالتوازي مع استمرار التحشيد العسكري التركي بآلاف الجنود والآليات في مناطق التماس مع خطوط انتشار الجيش السوري، ونشر بطاريات دفاع جوي في مطار تفتناز، قد تكون لفرض منطقة حظر جوي في وجه الطائرات السورية والروسية، واستمرار دعم وجود مجاميع العصابات الإرهابية التكفيرية في مناطق قريبة من نقاط المراقبة التركية، وهجومها على مواقع الجيش السوري، ومنع فتح طريق حلب – اللاذقية الدولي (M4)وتسيير الدوريات (الروسية – التركية) المشتركة عليه بحجج واهية بقطع المجموعات المتشدّدة للطريق وتخريب جزء منه، ضاربة بعرض الحائط تعهداتها لروسيا بالالتزام بتنفيذ آليات وبنود بروتكول موسكو واتفاق سوتشي، دون استبعاد الصدام العسكري مع القوات الروسية والجيش العربي السوري.

في كلّ هذا المشهد يحاول رجب طيب أردوغان وكعادته الكذب والمناورة لحجز مكان ودور قادم يوفر له أوراقاً ثمينة على طاولة التفاوض والتسويات، يقدمها كبطاقة اعتماد للداخل التركي وبما يدعي من أمن تركيا القومي.

باعتقادنا أجراس معركة إدلب الأخيرة تقرع لتنهي العربدة الأردوغانية، وتدق ناقوس إنهاء حياته السياسية، مع ما تمّ توقيعه خلال الأيام القليلة الماضية على اتفاق إيطالي – يوناني بشأن ترسيم الحدود البحرية لكبح الجماح التركي وتقويض فرصته بالقرصنة النفطية والغازية البحرية، لنطلّ في الختام وبتنامي وتعاظم قدرات وإمكانيات محور حلف المقاومة على مرحلة عنوانها الخروج الأميركي من غرب آسيا، وتكريس الانتصارات العسكرية والاقتصادية، وتغيير وجه المنطقة، والعين على فلسطين إلى مشهد حزم المستوطنين الصهاينة حقائبهم.

ISRAEL STRIKES SENSITIVE TARGETS IN SYRIA. IEDS EXPLODE NEAR TURKISH-RUSSIAN PATROL

South Front

Early on June 5, the Israeli Air Force conducted strikes on a Syrian military facility near Masyaf. The strikes were conducted from Lebanese airspace. The Syrian Air Defense Forces intercepted several missiles, however the rest hit their targets. The bombed facility, which is run by the Syrian Scientific Studies and Research Center, is reportedly involved in the development and manufacturing of missiles.

Two improvised explosive devices exploded near a joint Russian-Turkish patrol moving along the M4 highway in southern Idlib on June 4. The explosions happened when the patrol was passing the militant-held town of Arihah. However, they caused no damage to military vehicles or casualties among Turkish or Russian personnel. Despite the incident, the 15th joint patrol became even longer than all the previous ones. It started in the government-held town of Tronba bypassed Arihah and reached the village of Kafer Shalaya.

The slowly but steadily expanding length of Russian-Turkish patrols is a visual confirmation of the implementation of the de-escalation deal reached by Moscow and Ankara. At the same time, the full implementation of the deal still faces serious difficulties due to the presence of terrorist groups in the area. For example, Hayat Tahrir al-Sham militants are still in control of Arihah and recent developments show that they are not planning to sit there idly.

Ankara understands this and its forces continue expanding a network of observation posts along the M4 highway to secure the patrols. Recently, the Turkish Army set up positions near Bsanqul, Kafer Shalaya, Urum al-Jawz and Mareian. Nonetheless, without proactive measures to put an end to the terrorist threat, the situation cannot be changed strategically.

Just recently, a new wave of violence rolled across the militant-held part of Greater Idlib after Hayat Tahrir al-Sham detained a member of another radical militant group – Houras al-Din. The militant was detained when he was collecting taxes from locals for military purposes and kept in a Hayat Tahrir al-Sham-run prison in Jisr al-Shughur. Later, Houras al-Din fighters stormed the prison and freed their counterpart.

Earlier, Houras al-Din and the Turkistan Islamic Party criticized Hayat Tahrir al-Sham for having too soft a stance towards the Russian-Turkish de-escalation agreement in southern Idlib. Tensions, caused by the internal struggle for influence and resources, often grow among Idlib militant groups during the ceasefire phases of the conflict. Therefore, if some power wants to unite them and use them as at least a relatively homogenous force, a new escalation would be very useful.

Related Videos

Related News

VIOLENCE AND CHAOS SPREAD IN TURKISH-OCCUPIED PART OF SYRIA

South Front

Turkish-backed militant groups continue fighting each other in northern Syria.

On June 2, clashes broke out among members of the Sultan Murad Division, the al-Hamza Division and Ahrar al-Sharqiya in the villages of Bab al-Khair and Um Ushba in the province of al-Hasakah. According to local sources, the tensions erupted when militants failed to settle their differences over the looting of the fields of crops, which they had seized from the locals.

A separate incident happened in the town of al-Bab in the province of Aleppo early on June 3. The so-called Free Syrian Police (FSP) confronted their counterparts from other Turkish-backed groups after the FSP had detained a woman supposedly linked to ISIS. Last weekend, several civilians had already been injured in a firefight between the FSP and other armed groups.

Another problem is the regular occurrence of assassinations and bombing attacks happening in the Turkish-occupied area. On June 3, an explosion of a booby-trapped motorcycle in the village of al-Beshar injured one person and caused a fire in local wheat and barley fields. A day earlier, a civilian was killed and at least 3 others injured in a supposed IED explosion in the border town of Jarabulus. A car bomb also exploded in the village of Jenderes.

The total death toll from infighting among Turkish-backed militants and from various security incidents is over a dozen civilians in the past week alone.

At the same time, Syrian government forces have been putting extensive effort into securing the civilian areas that they have liberated from militants. Late on June 2, government troops announced that they had found and dismantled over 700 landmines and explosive devices in the area east of the town of Salamiya in Hama province.

Units of the Syrian Army also conducted a new anti-ISIS raid in the countryside of Palmyra. This time they were able to detect and destroy an ISIS position southeast of the ancient city. An active search operation is ongoing near the village of Maadan in Raqqa province after a supposed ISIS cell staged an IED attack there.

The contact line between the Syrian Army and militants in southern Idlib remains in a stable instable situation. Recently, clashes between Hayat Tahrir al-Sham and the army have been reported north of Hantutin and west of al-Jaradah.

Meanwhile, on June 2, the Turkish Army and the Russian Military Police held a 14th joint patrol along the M4 highway. The patrol started east of Saraqib and reached the western entrance to Ariha amid protests by supporters of Idlib radicals. Videos and photos from the Ariha entrance also showed lots of Hayat Tahrir al-Sham flags confirming that the town is currently in the hands of the terrorists. Further patrols to the area west of Ariha are not possible as long as Hayat Tahrir al-Sham maintains its positions there.

Related News

RUSSIANS REOPEN CHUNK OF M4 HIGHWAY IN NORTHEASTERN SYRIA

South Front

 26.05.2020 

A part of the M4 highway between the towns of Ayn Issa and Tell Tamir in northeastern Syria has been reopened for civilian traffic. This chunk of the highway is located close to the contact line with the Turkish-occupied area. In previous months, the constant threat of attacks by Turkish-led forces disrupted the movement of civilian vehicles in the area. However, now, the highway is reopened under the supervision of the Russian Military Police. This step will contribute to the strengthening of commercial and social ties between the cities of Aleppo and Hasakah, and the stability in the region, in general.

The reopening of the M4 highway in northeastern Syria did not occur without incidents. Just a few days ago, on May 23, US forces briefly blocked a Russian Military Police convoy east of Tell Tamr. Pro-Damascus sources say that the US-led coalition may try to oppose the restoration of commercial and social links between the government-controlled part of Syria and the areas that remain in the hands of the US-backed Syrian Democratic Forces.

At the same time, the Syrian Army, the National Defense Forces and their allies continued operations against ISIS in southern Raqqah, western Deir Ezzor and southern Mayadin. The anti-ISIS efforts were coordinated with the combing operation led by Liwa al-Quds and the National Defense Forces in the countryside of Palmyra. Despite this, ISIS cells still remain active on the both banks of the Euphrates and in the desert area between Palmyra and al-Tanf.

The Turkish military reportedly deployed an MIM-23 Hawk medium-range air defense system in the vicinity of the town of Almastumah in southern Idlib. Earlier in 2020, Turkey sent several MIM-23 Hawk systems to Idlib to support its attack on the Syrian Army there. Now, Ankara is apparently working to strengthen the air defense and EW capabilities of its contingent deployed in the area. According to different sources, the number of Turkish troops in Greater idlib varies from 7,000 to 10,000.

Despite the large Turkish military presence, radical groups have a freedom of actions in their attempts to consolidate their efforts to oppose the implementation of the de-escalation agreement in southern Idlib. Houras al-Din and the Turkistan Islamic Party, both groups allied with Hayat Tahrir al-Sham, united their propaganda efforts in the push against the implementation of the de-escalation deal and the expansion of the Russian-Turkish troops within the agreed to security zone on part of the M4 highway in southern Idlib. Right now, these groups are conducting no notable offensive operations or attack on the Syrian Army. Nonetheless, they are actively recruiting new members and training them in the camps created across the region. In these conditions, a new round of escalation is just a matter of time.

هل سقط وقف إطلاق النار في إدلب؟ وماذا بعد؟

العميد الركن د. أمين محمد حطيط

. لم نكن نتوقع أن تنفذ تركيا بروتوكول موسكو الإضافي الذي «منحها» هدية كبرى هي وقف إطلاق النار في ريف إدلب وتجميد العمليات القتالية على طرفي خطوط التماس التي رسمتها بنادق رجال الجيش العربي السوري وأقدامهم التي لو تابعت الحركة القتالية لكانت وصلت إلى الحدود مع تركيا وطوت صفحة الإرهاب في إدلب وريفها. فتركيا امتهنت منذ أن فتح لها باب استنة وأعطيت فرصة عضوية المثلث الراعي للمسألة السورية ميدانياً، ومن ثم سياسياً، سياسة النكول والابتزاز وتلمّس الطرق إلى حيث يؤكل الكتف بأقل جهد ممكن.

أما روسيا التي منحت تركيا هذه الهدية العظيمة بعد ان كانت وجهت عبر رئيسها بوتين لأردغان رسائل المهانة والإذلال في قصر الكرملين في موسكو، فقد ظنت ان الرسائل القاسية معطوفة على العطية التي حملها لها بروتوكول موسكو من شأنها أن تغيّر السلوك التركي في سورية وأن تتجه تركيا بشكل جدي هذه المرة ليس إلى تنفيذ بروتوكول موسكو فحسب، بل وكل الاتفاقات السابقة بدءاً من مخرجات استنة وصولاً لاتفاق سوتشي. وهذا يعني بالفهم الروسي توقف تركيا عن السير بمشروعها الخاص في سورية والذي يشمل اقتطاع أرض وتهجير سكان وتغيير ديمغرافي للمناطق الحدودية ووضع اليد على ثروات طبيعية وعرقلة الحركة الاقتصادية والصناعية في الشمال السوري. وكلها أمور تستحق بالفهم الروسي التضحية لضمان حل يحفظ الحقوق السورية دون ان يغضب تركيا او يستفزها.

بيد ان الميدان السوري شهد بعد بروتوكول موسكو مناورات تركية وتذاكياً من نوع جديد، حيث عملت تركيا هذه المرة باستراتيجية الباطن والظاهر المتناقضين او المتعاكسين، ففي خطابها مع الروسي كانت تؤكد المرة تلو المرة على التزامها ببروتوكول موسكو بما في ذلك طي صفحة المطالب بتراجع الجيش السوري بعيداً عن الخطوط التي وصل اليها إثر انتصاراته في عملياته العسكرية الأخيرة، كما وفتح الـ M4 الذي يربط حلب باللاذقية وضمان أمن الحركة عليه بتسيير الدوريات المشتركة الروسية التركية والسير قدماً بتفكيك الجماعات الإرهابية المسلحة المناهضة للحل السياسي، ومن جهة ثانية كانت توجّه جبهة النصرة وغيرها من الإرهابيين المتطرفين من تركمان وإيغور وسواهم لقطع طريق M4 ومنع تسيير الدوريات المشتركة عليها مع ضمان عدم استعمال القوة ضدهم. وفي النتيجة ربحت تركيا بـ»تذاكيها» وأبقت الطريق مقطوعة وجاءت الأيام بعد ذلك لتغيّبها عن جدول الأعمال المشترك لروسيا وتركيا.

لكن تركيا لم تكتف بما حصلت عليها، بل قادها غدرها إلى خرق وقف إطلاق النار ومهاجمة الجيش العربي السوري في سهل الغاب عبر تنظيمات إرهابية متطرفة جلها يعمل بأوامر المخابرات التركية ما يثبت أن تركيا مستمرة في مشروعها الخاص الذي لم تتراجع عنه، حيث لا يوجد أي دليل او أي قرينة تشير إلى هذا التراجع او توحي به، لا بالعكس فإن كل ما تقوم به تركيا ميدانياً يثبت استمرارها على السير قدماً فيه. وهي إذا توقفت فترة فإنما يكون توقفها لعائق ميداني لا علاقة له لا من قريب او بعيد بقرار تركي استراتيجي او مراجعة للسياسة التركية في سورية.

شنّ الهجوم الإرهابي في سهل الغاب شمالي غربي حماه، وإسقاط قرار وقف إطلاق النار عملياً وتمكّن المهاجمون من السيطرة على مساحة جنوبي خط التماس القائم (رغم أنها صغيرة ومحدودة) معطوفة على الإخفاق في فتح طريق الـ M4 مواكبة مع التصعيد التركي ضد الحكومة السورية، كلها وقائع وسلوكيات تدعو إلى وقف الرهان على سياسة تركية يمكن أن تكون صادقة ونظيفة ووفية لتعهداتها وتستحق أن يكون لها شرف الانضواء في منظومة إقليمية دولية لرعاية الحل في سورية.

وإذا كانت الحسابات الروسية تحول دون الانتقال في العلاقة مع تركيا من العمل المشترك إلى المواجهة والعداء الآن، وأن إيران تجد ان حسن التعامل مع تركيا يروّضها ويقلل الخسائر التي يفرضها الحل الذي لا تشارك فيه تركيا، فإن الحسابات السورية تبقى مقروءة من منظار أخر يوحي بأن سورية لا تستطيع أن تنتظر إلى ما شاء الله لإنجاز تحرير إدلب ووضع حد للإرهاب العالمي فيه، ولا تستطيع أن تعطي وقتاً إضافياً لتركيا لتعميق مشروعها الخاص في سورية بشكل يصعب معالجة آثاره ومفاعيله، ولذلك نرى أن الوقت الآن لا يلعب لصالح سورية التي تحتاج بإلحاح لطي صفحة إدلب والتفرغ لصفحة الشرقي الشمالي السوري حيث الاحتلال الأميركي وظاهرة الانفصال الكردي وتلاعب اليد التركية. وهي حالة مركبة فيها قدر من التعقيد تُفضل معالجتها بالتفرغ الميداني والسياسي حتى لا تتزاحم المؤثرات فتعرقل الحل.

لكل ذلك يبدو أن سورية ستجد نفسها وقريباً جداً مضطرة لاستئناف القتال والعمل باستراتيجيتها الناجعة القائمة على التحرير بالوثبات المتتالية، وهي الاستراتيجية التي مكّنتها من تحرير أكثر 5000 كلم 2 في ريفي حلب وحماه وأدت إلى السيطرة على طريق الـ M5 وأظهرت الوهن التركي في مواجهة الجيش العربي السوري وحلفائه وأجبرت أردوغان على أن يستغيث ببوتين استجداء لوقف إطلاق النار، أما روسيا فتجد نفسها مضطرة لأكثر من سبب لمواصلة دعم وإسناد الجيش العربي السوري في عملياته تلك، خاصة أنها فهمت مغزى الزيارة الإيرانية لدمشق مؤخراً.

فالسلوكيّات التركية في سورية باتت تبرّر العودة السورية لاستئناف التحرير بالقوة واجتثاث الإرهاب بكل مسمّياته وأشكاله من إدلب وتُضاف إليها الظروف الإقليمية والدولية هذه المرة التي تعزز هذا الاتجاه وتؤكد عليه إذ إنها اليوم في أفضل الأحوال التي تساعد على إطلاق هذه العمليات. فتركيا تحت وطأة ضغوط وبائية وسياسية واقتصادية داخلية فضلاً عن غرقها وانشغالها في ليبيا ما يمنعها من الدخول في مواجهة واسعة في سورية، وأميركا تنفذ في المنطقة إعادة انتشار عسكري، صحيح أنه لن يصل إلى الانسحاب منها، لكنه يشير إلى خفض في قواتها المنتشرة حالياً وأوروبا مشغولة عن العالم بوباء كورونا الذي لم تسيطر عليه حتى الآن. كل ذلك لا يطرح السؤال هل سيتخذ قرار تحرير إدلب بالقوة العسكرية، بل متى سيوضع هذا القرار موضع التنفيذ؟ الذي نتوقعه قريباً.

أستاذ جامعي – باحـث استراتيجي.

PROSPECTS OF TURKISH-RUSSIAN MILITARY CONFLICT IN SYRIA

Dear friends, during the past 2 weeks, there were signals of the growing confrontation between Hayat Tahrir al-Sham as well as the intensifying coordination between Turkey and Russia in Greater Idlib.

See Video here



The region of Greater Idlib remains the main source of tensions in Syria.

The March 5th ceasefire deal reached by Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan and Russian President Vladimir Putin in Moscow allowed an end to be made to the open military confrontation between the Turkish Armed Forces and the Syrian Army. However, as of mid-April, the main provisions of the deal have yet to be implemented. Members of al-Qaeda-linked groups still enjoy freedom of movement across Greater Idlib and keep their positions with weapons and heavy equipment in southern Idlib.

The safe zone along the M4 highway, the creation of which was agreed, has not been created. All Russian-Turkish joint patrols have been conducted in a limited area west of Saraqib and have just been a public move needed to demonstrate that the de-escalation deal is still in force.

Ankara turns a blind eye to regular ceasefire violations and other provocative actions by militant groups and their supporters. Additionally, it has continued its military buildup in Idlib. The number of Turkish troops in the region reportedly reached 7,000, while the number of so-called ‘observation posts’ exceeded 50. Meanwhile, Turkish-affiliated media outlets ramped up a propaganda campaign accusing the Assad government of killing civilians, of ceasefire violations, of using chemical weapons and of discrediting the de-escalation agreement by calling it the surrender of the goals of the so-called Syrian revolution.

On the diplomatic level, neither Turkey nor Russia demonstrate open antagonism, but statements coming from the  top military and political leadership of Turkey regarding the conflict in Syria demonstrate that Ankara is not planning to abandon its expansionist plans or aggressive posture towards the country.

These factors set up a pretext for and increase the chances of a new military escalation in Idlib. However, this time the conflict is likely to lead to at least a limited military confrontation between the Turkish and Russian militaries. Both sides have troops deployed in close proximity to the frontline, including the expected hot point of the future escalation – Saraqib.

Possible phases of escalation are the following:

  1. Without the full implementation of the Moscow de-escalation deal and neutralization of radicals, the military situation in southern and eastern Idlib will continue to deteriorate. Militants, inspired by their impunity and the direct protection of the Turkish Army, will increase their attacks on the positions of Syrian forces and their Russian and Iranian allies. These attacks will gradually increase in scale until they provoke a painful military response from the Syrian Armed Forces. Militants, surprised at this blatant ceasefire violation by the bloody Assad regime, will continue their attacks, now justifying them by the right of self-defense. G_4 (A) Turkish diplomats and media outlets will immediately accuse the Assad government of violating the word and spirit of the de-escalation deal and will claim that the “unjustified aggression of the regime”, which is supported by the Russians, led to the killing of dozens of civilians and will film several staged tear-jerkers from Idlib to support this. The so-called ‘international community’ led by the Washington establishment and EU bureaucrats will denounce the aggression of the Assad regime and its backers.
  2. In the face of the continued and increased attacks from Idlib armed groups, the Syrian Army will have two options:
  • To retreat from their positions and leave the hard-won, liberated areas to the mercy of Turkey and its al-Qaeda-affiliated groups;
  • To answer the increased attacks with overwhelming force and put an end to the ceasefire violations by radicals.

It’s likely that the Syrians will choose the second option. The military standoff in Idlib will officially re-enter a hot phase. The previous years of conflict have demonstrated that militants cannot match Syrian troops in open battle. Therefore, if the Turkish leadership wants to hold on to its expansionist plans, it will have no choice but to intervene in the battle to rescue its proteges. Syria and Turkey will once again find themselves in a state of open military confrontation.

  1. As in previous escalations, the Turkish military will likely opt to start its military campaign with massive artillery and drone strikes on positions of the Syrian Army along the contact line in southeastern Idlib and western Aleppo. Special attention will be paid to the area of the expected confrontation between Syrian troops and Turkish proxies: the countryside of Saraqib, Maarat al-Numan and Kafr Nabel. Turkish forces will not be able to stop the Syrian Army advance without taking massive fire damage to their infrastructure and to the forces deployed in these areas. Such strikes will also result in  further escalation because they will pose a direct danger to the Russian Military Police in Saraqib and Maarat al-Numan, and to Russian military advisers embedded with the Syrian units, which are deployed in southeastern Idlib.
  2. If Turkish strikes target Russian positions and lead to notable losses among Russian personnel, Moscow will be put in a situation where they will be forced to retaliate. Since the start of the military operation in Syria in September 2015, the Russian Armed Forces have concentrated a capable military group in the country protected by short- and long-range air defense systems and reinforced by Bastion-P coastal defense and Iskander-M ballistic missile systems. Additionally, the Russian Black Sea and Caspian Fleets and Russian long-range aviation have repeatedly demonstrated that they are capable of destroying any target on the Syrian battleground and thus also in any nearby areas.

The Russian retaliatory strike will likely target Turkish military columns in close proximity to the frontline as well as Turkish depots, positions of artillery, armoured vehicles, and material and technical support points in Greater Idlib.

Prospects Of Turkish-Russian Military Conflict In Syria

If, after the Russian strike, the Turkish leadership does not halt its aggressive actions and its forces continue attacks on Russian and Syrian positions in Syria, the escalation will develop further.

The second wave of Russian retaliatory strikes will target Turkish military infrastructure along the border with Syria. HQs and logistical hubs in the province of Hatay, which were used to command and supply its Operation Spring Shield, will immediately be destroyed. The decision to deliver strikes on other targets along the border will depend on the success of Turkish forces in their expected attempt to attack Russia’s Hmeimim airbase and put it out of service.

Prospects Of Turkish-Russian Military Conflict In Syria
Prospects Of Turkish-Russian Military Conflict In Syria

Prospects Of Turkish-Russian Military Conflict In Syria
Prospects Of Turkish-Russian Military Conflict In Syria
Prospects Of Turkish-Russian Military Conflict In Syria

Another factor to consider is that should Turkey appear to be too successful in their attack on the Hmeimim airbase, they risk losing their entire Black Sea fleet. While theoretically the Turkish naval forces deployed in the Black Sea are superior to the Russian ones in numbers, the real balance of power there tells a different story. The combined means and facilities of the Russian Black Sea fleet, the Caspian Sea fleet, air forces and coastal defense forces deployed in the region would allow Moscow to overwhelm and sink the entire Turkish Navy. On top of this, Russia, unlike Turkey, is a nuclear power.

Turkey’s NATO allies have already demonstrated that they are not planning to risk their equipment or personnel in order to support Erdogan’s Syrian adventure. Furthermore, a new round of complaints to the UN or demonstrative sanctions will be no help to any destroyed Turkish airbases or to a fleet resting deep underwater.

Ankara will have to find a diplomatic way to de-escalate the confrontation before it gets to this point. The format of this diplomatic solution and the consequences, which Turkey will have to suffer for its military adventure, will depend only on the moment, when the Erdogan government understands that it’s time to stop.

Related

Prospects Of Turkish-Russian Military Conflict In Syria

South Front

Dear friends, during the past 2 weeks, there were signals of the growing confrontation between Hayat Tahrir al-Sham as well as the intensifying coordination between Turkey and Russia in Greater Idlib.

The region of Greater Idlib remains the main source of tensions in Syria.

The March 5th ceasefire deal reached by Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan and Russian President Vladimir Putin in Moscow allowed an end to be made to the open military confrontation between the Turkish Armed Forces and the Syrian Army. However, as of mid-April, the main provisions of the deal have yet to be implemented. Members of al-Qaeda-linked groups still enjoy freedom of movement across Greater Idlib and keep their positions with weapons and heavy equipment in southern Idlib.

The safe zone along the M4 highway, the creation of which was agreed, has not been created. All Russian-Turkish joint patrols have been conducted in a limited area west of Saraqib and have just been a public move needed to demonstrate that the de-escalation deal is still in force.

Ankara turns a blind eye to regular ceasefire violations and other provocative actions by militant groups and their supporters. Additionally, it has continued its military buildup in Idlib. The number of Turkish troops in the region reportedly reached 7,000, while the number of so-called ‘observation posts’ exceeded 50. Meanwhile, Turkish-affiliated media outlets ramped up a propaganda campaign accusing the Assad government of killing civilians, of ceasefire violations, of using chemical weapons and of discrediting the de-escalation agreement by calling it the surrender of the goals of the so-called Syrian revolution.

On the diplomatic level, neither Turkey nor Russia demonstrate open antagonism, but statements coming from the  top military and political leadership of Turkey regarding the conflict in Syria demonstrate that Ankara is not planning to abandon its expansionist plans or aggressive posture towards the country.

These factors set up a pretext for and increase the chances of a new military escalation in Idlib. However, this time the conflict is likely to lead to at least a limited military confrontation between the Turkish and Russian militaries. Both sides have troops deployed in close proximity to the frontline, including the expected hot point of the future escalation – Saraqib.

Possible phases of escalation are the following:

  1. Without the full implementation of the Moscow de-escalation deal and neutralization of radicals, the military situation in southern and eastern Idlib will continue to deteriorate. Militants, inspired by their impunity and the direct protection of the Turkish Army, will increase their attacks on the positions of Syrian forces and their Russian and Iranian allies. These attacks will gradually increase in scale until they provoke a painful military response from the Syrian Armed Forces. Militants, surprised at this blatant ceasefire violation by the bloody Assad regime, will continue their attacks, now justifying them by the right of self-defense. G_4 (A) Turkish diplomats and media outlets will immediately accuse the Assad government of violating the word and spirit of the de-escalation deal and will claim that the “unjustified aggression of the regime”, which is supported by the Russians, led to the killing of dozens of civilians and will film several staged tear-jerkers from Idlib to support this. The so-called ‘international community’ led by the Washington establishment and EU bureaucrats will denounce the aggression of the Assad regime and its backers.
  2. In the face of the continued and increased attacks from Idlib armed groups, the Syrian Army will have two options:
  • To retreat from their positions and leave the hard-won, liberated areas to the mercy of Turkey and its al-Qaeda-affiliated groups;
  • To answer the increased attacks with overwhelming force and put an end to the ceasefire violations by radicals.

It’s likely that the Syrians will choose the second option. The military standoff in Idlib will officially re-enter a hot phase. The previous years of conflict have demonstrated that militants cannot match Syrian troops in open battle. Therefore, if the Turkish leadership wants to hold on to its expansionist plans, it will have no choice but to intervene in the battle to rescue its proteges. Syria and Turkey will once again find themselves in a state of open military confrontation.

  1. As in previous escalations, the Turkish military will likely opt to start its military campaign with massive artillery and drone strikes on positions of the Syrian Army along the contact line in southeastern Idlib and western Aleppo. Special attention will be paid to the area of the expected confrontation between Syrian troops and Turkish proxies: the countryside of Saraqib, Maarat al-Numan and Kafr Nabel. Turkish forces will not be able to stop the Syrian Army advance without taking massive fire damage to their infrastructure and to the forces deployed in these areas. Such strikes will also result in  further escalation because they will pose a direct danger to the Russian Military Police in Saraqib and Maarat al-Numan, and to Russian military advisers embedded with the Syrian units, which are deployed in southeastern Idlib.
  2. If Turkish strikes target Russian positions and lead to notable losses among Russian personnel, Moscow will be put in a situation where they will be forced to retaliate. Since the start of the military operation in Syria in September 2015, the Russian Armed Forces have concentrated a capable military group in the country protected by short- and long-range air defense systems and reinforced by Bastion-P coastal defense and Iskander-M ballistic missile systems. Additionally, the Russian Black Sea and Caspian Fleets and Russian long-range aviation have repeatedly demonstrated that they are capable of destroying any target on the Syrian battleground and thus also in any nearby areas.

The Russian retaliatory strike will likely target Turkish military columns in close proximity to the frontline as well as Turkish depots, positions of artillery, armoured vehicles, and material and technical support points in Greater Idlib.

If, after the Russian strike, the Turkish leadership does not halt its aggressive actions and its forces continue attacks on Russian and Syrian positions in Syria, the escalation will develop further.

The second wave of Russian retaliatory strikes will target Turkish military infrastructure along the border with Syria. HQs and logistical hubs in the province of Hatay, which were used to command and supply its Operation Spring Shield, will immediately be destroyed. The decision to deliver strikes on other targets along the border will depend on the success of Turkish forces in their expected attempt to attack Russia’s Hmeimim airbase and put it out of service.

Another factor to consider is that should Turkey appear to be too successful in their attack on the Hmeimim airbase, they risk losing their entire Black Sea fleet. While theoretically the Turkish naval forces deployed in the Black Sea are superior to the Russian ones in numbers, the real balance of power there tells a different story. The combined means and facilities of the Russian Black Sea fleet, the Caspian Sea fleet, air forces and coastal defense forces deployed in the region would allow Moscow to overwhelm and sink the entire Turkish Navy. On top of this, Russia, unlike Turkey, is a nuclear power.

Turkey’s NATO allies have already demonstrated that they are not planning to risk their equipment or personnel in order to support Erdogan’s Syrian adventure. Furthermore, a new round of complaints to the UN or demonstrative sanctions will be no help to any destroyed Turkish airbases or to a fleet resting deep underwater.

Ankara will have to find a diplomatic way to de-escalate the confrontation before it gets to this point. The format of this diplomatic solution and the consequences, which Turkey will have to suffer for its military adventure, will depend only on the moment, when the Erdogan government understands that it’s time to stop.