The Kurdistan Workers’ Party says a team from its so-called “Immortal Brigade” carried out the earlier bombing in Ankara.
Members of Turkish Police Special Forces secure the area near the Interior Ministry following a bomb attack in Ankara, on October 1, 2023 (AFP)
The Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK), listed as a “terror group” by Turkey and its Western allies, claimed responsibility for a suicide bombing in the Turkish capital of Ankara on Sunday that injured two police officers.
“A sacrificial action was carried out against the Turkish Interior Ministry by a team from our Immortal Brigade,” the PKK told the ANF news agency, which is close to the party.
Hours after the blast, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan said “terrorists” will never achieve their aims.
The powerful explosion outside the Interior Ministry, which was followed by large flames, was heard several kilometers away from the site of the attack.
The targeted district is home to several other ministries and the Turkish parliament, which reopened as planned in the afternoon with an address from Erdogan.
“The villains who threaten the peace and security of citizens have not achieved their objectives and will never achieve them,” Erdogan told the parliament.
The Turkish Interior Ministry said two attackers arrived in a commercial vehicle around 9:30 am (0630 GMT) in front of “the entrance gate of the General Directorate of Security of our Ministry of the Interior, and carried out a bomb attack.”
“One of the terrorists blew himself up. The other was killed by a bullet to the head before he had a chance to blow himself up,” Interior Minister Ali Yerlikaya explained in a press statement outside the Ministry.
“Two of our police officers were lightly injured” in the exchange of fire, but their lives were not in danger, he added.
The Ankara police headquarters said on social media platform X that it was carrying out “controlled explosions” of “suspicious packages” to prevent other explosions.
The Ankara prosecutor’s office said it was opening an investigation and banned access to the area. Local media were asked to stop broadcasting images from the scene of the attack.
It is noteworthy that the Turkish capital has been the scene of several attacks, particularly during the years 2015 and 2016 — many claimed by the PKK or ISIS.
In October 2015, an attack in front of a central station in Ankara claimed by ISIS resulted in 109 deaths.
The most recent bomb attack in Turkey targeted a shopping street in Istanbul in November 2022, claiming the lives of six people and injuring 81 others. There was no claim of responsibility, but Turkey accused the PKK of being behind the attack and said it had detained 46 people, including a Syrian woman suspected of planting the device.
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As Iran’s ultimatum to Baghdad inches closer, the challenge of removing Kurdish separatist groups from their mutual border lies not in Baghdad’s will to cooperate, but in Iraqi Kurds’ secret collaboration with US/Israeli agents to keep them there.
On 19 March, Iran signed a border security agreement with Iraq whereby the latter agreed to dismantle and relocate Kurdish separatists based in the Kurdistan region by a 19 September deadline. At the time, an image circulated of Iraqi Prime Minister Muhammad Shia al-Sudani standing behind a table where Iraqi National Security Advisor Qasim al-Araji and Iranian National Security Council Secretary Ali Shamkhani sat to ink the pact between the two countries.
Tehran issued a brief statement, saying the agreement aimed to address security challenges along their common border. Simultaneously, a statement from Sudani’s office underscored “Iraq’s firm position of rejecting any violation of its sovereignty, and that Iraqi lands should not be a launching pad for attacking any of the neighboring countries.”
Fast forward five months to 28 August, when Iran’s Ministry Of Foreign Affairs disclosed that Tehran and Baghdad had “Signed an agreement under which Iraq committed to disarming separatist militants and terrorist groups present on its territory, closing their bases, and moving them to other places before September 19, 2023.”
Zero hour approaches
Iranian Foreign Ministry spokesman Nasser Kanaani did not specify the locations to which the militants would be transferred, but warned that if the terms of the agreement are not upheld, Iran will fulfill its responsibility of “preserving our nation’s security.”
On the same day, Iraqi government spokesman Bassem al-Awadi announced that the two countries “signed an agreement to prevent the infiltration of militants, disarm them, hand over wanted persons, and remove camps,” stressing that one of the principles of Baghdad’s foreign policy is “that Iraq should not be a party to harming its neighbors.”
An Iraqi official source, who declined to be named, reveals to The Cradle some details of the agreement, outlining the plan to transfer Iranian-Kurdish separatist groups within Iraq to privately supervised camps, which will be under “direct supervision of Iraqi forces, supported by Peshmerga forces, who will work to prevent any attacks across the Iraqi-Iranian border.”
Additional anonymous sources say that these camps would be established deep in the Iraqi Kurdistan Region (IKR), far from the Iraqi-Iranian border. The sources also reveal that a proposal to transfer Iranian-Kurdish factions to the west of the country faced opposition from Sunni politicians in the Anbar Governorate.
“Security problems on the border go back more than 40 years. Despite Iraq’s seriousness, the solutions require several stages to be implemented.”
Dr. Ihsan al-Shammari, head of the Center for Political Thinking and former political advisor to ex-prime minister Haider al-Abadi, explains why the task of completely eliminating the Iranian-Kurdish militants or Iranian-designated terror groups like the Mojahedeen-e Khalq (MEK) is harder than it looks.
For starters, these Iranian opposition and secessionist groups have hidden allies in Iraq.
“In the event that these organizations are forced to leave Iraq, the central government (Baghdad) will be faced with opposition from the US administration and the ruling Kurdish forces in the region, as these organizations have undeclared relations with the politicians of the Kurdistan Region.”
Furthermore, Shammari warns that “members of the Iranian factions inside Iraqi territory are considered refugees and cannot be expelled.” Any such step, he explains, will encourage Turkey “to put pressure on Iraq to end the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) file in the same way.”
That is not necessarily the case, legally speaking. Habib Abdel, a France-based expert in international law, says that members of these organizations “cannot be considered refugees under international laws.”
“They did not acquire this status legally, and were embraced by Saddam Hussein’s regime for the purposes of using them against Iran.”
In any case, the Iraqi government announced on 12 September that it has begun relocating Kurdish factions away from the Iraqi border. This has been personally conveyed to Iranian President Ebrahim Raisi by Iraqi Foreign Minister Fuad Hussein, who arrived in Tehran the following day.
Foreign militancy, long overlooked by Iraq
The origins of this issue trace back to 1979, following the overthrow of the Shah of Iran and the rise of organizations opposing the newly established Islamic Republic. Many of these groups sought refuge in northern Iraq, including prominent factions like the Kurdish Democratic Party of Iran (KDPI), the Marxist leftist Kurdish Komala Party of Iranian Kurdistan, the Free Life Party (PJAK, the Iranian branch of PKK), and the nationalist Organization of the Iranian Kurdistan Struggle (Khabat). Most of these groups have, at some point, been armed and active on the Iraqi side of the border with Iran.
These organizations established their bases in areas north of Erbil and east of Sulaymaniyah, along the 1,460-kilometer Iraqi-Iranian border, which also includes approximately 550 kilometers of the border shared with the IKR. Over the last 40+ years, reports suggest that around 20,000 families of members affiliated with these Iranian armed organizations have settled along this border region.
Iraqi measures: mobilizing the military
On 23 November, 2022, the Ministerial National Security Council in Iraq convened, presided over by Prime Minister Sudani in his role as Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces, to address the security situation along the Iraqi border.
The Council made several notable decisions: the redeployment of Iraqi border forces along the borders with Iran and Turkiye; providing logistical support to the border forces command; reinforcing border police stations under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Interior; and collaborating with the Kurdistan Regional Government and the Ministry of Peshmerga to safeguard Iraqi borders.
According to a security source, the part of the Iraqi-Iranian border located within the IKR is under the command of the First District of the Border Guard Forces, which consists of three brigades of 9,000 soldiers. In mid-July, the Iraqi Ministry of Interiorannounced the deployment of the 21st Brigade of Border Guard Forces on the Iraqi-Iranian border line in Sulaymaniyah Governorate.
The Ministry’s Director of Media Relations Major General Saad Maan has said that “50 concrete towers and 40 thermal cameras have been erected” at the border, and Iraq will begin to construct 47 border posts on the Iraqi-Iranian zero line.
Iran’s gripe
In recent years, Iranian military forces have launched almost daily attacks with drones and surface-to-air missiles against “separatist terrorist groups that take the Iraqi Kurdistan region as their headquarters to destabilize security in Iran.”
The attack targets are very specific, and almost always target the headquarters of Kurdish militant groups.
The Iranian government includes these operations within the framework of “using its principled right to self-defense in accordance with international law” against groups that “exploit Iraqi territory to plan and carry out sabotage and terrorist acts in Iran,” as stated by the Iranian Permanent Mission to the UN in New York.
Iranian operations are often condemned by the IKR authorities,and sometimes by the central government in Baghdad. In September 2022, the US Military Command for the Middle East (CENTCOM) condemned in a statement “the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps’ unprovoked attack in Iraq’s Erbil Governorate this morning. Such indiscriminate attacks threaten innocent civilians and risk the hard-fought stability of the region.”
The spy wars
Last year, Iranian reports revealed that about 1,200 members of Iranian Kurdish factions set out from 50 bases across the border with the IKR towards Iranian territory, following protests over the death of Iranian-Kurdish woman Mahsa Amini while she was in police custody last September.
Iranian political researcher Hassan Hani tells The Cradle that those militants “were trained by officers from the Mossad and the CIA, and infiltrated Iranian territory to incite riots and carry out sabotage operations.”
Tehran has consistently accused Iranian Kurdish factions in Iraqi Kurdistan of engaging in “terrorist” activities in collusion with Israel and of fomenting anti-government protests. In recent years, Iranian authorities have repeatedly alleged that Tel Aviv is behind various terrorist acts, including the assassination of Iranian scientists and attempts to sabotage the country’s nuclear facilities.
In June 2022, well before the September protests broke out, Iran’s Ministry of Intelligence revealed the arrest of a spy network “whose members communicated with Mossad officers through a neighboring country and entered Iran through the Iraqi Kurdistan region.”
Two weeks ago, on 31 August, Tehran announced the foiling of what it described as “one of the biggest attempts at sabotage” against the country’s military missile, aviation, and space industries, and accused Israel of being behind it.
The IRNA news agency quoted an official of the Ministry of Defense’s Information Protection Agency as saying: “The professional network, in cooperation with some hackers, planned to introduce defective parts into the production wheel of advanced missiles at the missile industries of the Ministry of Defense.” He accused the network of operating “under the direct direction of the Israeli Mossad.”
The Iranian nuclear program is the main target of Israel and the US, and the majority of the security violations that Iran has witnessed in recent years, such as the assassination of scientists and attempts to sabotage nuclear facilities, were in the context of concerted – often violent efforts – to prevent Iran from entering the elite club of nuclear-armed states.
Security vs. diplomacy
Despite Iran’s continued efforts to contain the Iranian Kurdish armed factions situated along its border with Iraq, many of these groups have persisted and even thrived, in part due to both overt and covert support from Iraqi Kurdish parties, particularly the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) led by Masoud Barzani.
As Iraqi political analyst Jassem al-Moussawi explains to The Cradle:
“The support of Iraqi Kurdish parties for Iranian organizations equates to American support for them as well. It’s widely understood that the authorities in the Kurdistan Region of Iraq do not operate independently of American policy and directives.”
Moussawi points to a steady stream of information from local and international intelligence agencies, saying:
Reports “conclusively confirm the involvement of the Israeli Mossad in the attacks against Iran, and that the majority of these attacks are carried out across the Iranian border with the Kurdistan Region, and the use of Iranian Kurdish movements as a Trojan horse, every time Iran witnesses popular protests.”
Given the host of hidden parties who seek to disrupt this critical border area, the implementation of the Iranian-Iraqi agreement is expected to face formidable challenges. The Iraqi government will encounter internal (Kurdish) and external (US/Israeli) obstacles as it strives to resolve the issue of Iranian Kurdish factions within its territory and maintain mutually-beneficial relations with Iran.
The views expressed in this article do not necessarily reflect those of The Cradle.
While the massacre of Sinjar’s Yazidi community has often been blamed on Sunni Arab collusion with ISIS, evidence keeps mounting that Kurdish leaders played a big part in setting up the atrocity in order to advance their territorial ambitions in northern Iraq.
After the brutal August 2014 ISIS attack on the Yazidi community in northern Iraq, a narrative quickly emerged blaming Sinjar’s Sunni Arabs for supporting the genocide.
Yet a deeper delve into this harrowing episode uncovers a much darker reality — one that implicates Iraqi Kurdish politician Masoud Barzani and the leadership of the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) in a sinister collaboration with ISIS.
Yazidi massacre blame game
One of the massacres took place in the small village of Kocho on 15 August, which saw hundreds of women and children enslaved and their men executed. “All the Arabs around us were against us, with the terrorists of Daesh [an Arabic acronym for ISIS],” one male survivor was quoted as saying, pointing the finger at the Sunni Arabs of Sinjar.
In August 2016, Yazidi member of the Iraqi parliament Vian Dakhil claimed that around 1,000 foreign ISIS fighters invaded Sinjar, “But tens of thousands flocked to support them. Those tens of thousands were our neighbors.”
However, several Sunni Arab men from Sinjar spoke with The Cradle to challenge this narrative. They claim they were not willing executioners of their Yazidi neighbors, with whom they had lived peacefully for generations.
“Terrorism represents no tribe, no group, they represent themselves. If a family member becomes a terrorist or ISIS member, this does not mean his brother accepts it. But they could not resist it, or they would be killed by other ISIS members. Everybody surrendered under the gun.”
As rural farmers and sheep herders, they had little power to stop the ISIS massacres. Some individual Sunni Arabs did join ISIS when the group invaded Sinjar, but this was a relatively small number and joining ISIS was largely opposed by the Arab community, they say. As one of the men explains:
“Terrorism represents no tribe, no group, they represent themselves. If a family member becomes a terrorist or ISIS member, this does not mean his brother accepts it. But they could not resist it, or they would be killed by other ISIS members. Everybody surrendered under the gun.”
In fact, the grip of ISIS extended to the Sunni Arab populace in Sinjar and Mosul alike, leading to the execution of local law enforcement and security personnel as the terrorist group gained control over these regions.
One Sunni Arab informs The Cradle that ISIS executed 19 people from his village in 2014, including 11 members of his own family.
A report by the UN Mission to Iraq (UNAMI) corroborates the claim that ISIS also targeted Sunni Arabs, and documents the mass executions of Sunni Arab civilians and soldiers as ISIS seized power in Mosul and Tikrit. Even those who purportedly “repented” and swore allegiance to ISIS often met a grim fate, facing execution regardless.
‘We know they could see us’
The Arab Sunni men speaking with The Cradle ask how they as civilians could have resisted ISIS in Sinjar when the Iraqi army, Kurdish Peshmerga, and US air force were all unable to prevent ISIS from taking Sinjar and massacring its Yazidi inhabitants.
The men claim that US F-16s warplanes were flying in the skies above Kocho as the massacre took place, but failed to intervene and carry out airstrikes, even though ISIS militants were driving in convoys of new Toyota pick-up trucks that were easily identifiable.
“We could see the ISIS members killing the Yazidis and the airplanes did nothing,” one man tells The Cradle.
This was confirmed by human rights researcher Naomi Kikoler, who interviewed survivors of the Kocho massacre. One survivor told her there were “jets in the air. We know they could see us. We thought they would save us. I could still hear them after being shot.”
‘Even if I am slaughtered’
Despite the dangers Sinjar’s Sunni Arabs also faced from ISIS, there are many instances where they helped their Yazidi neighbors escape after the Kocho massacre. One member of the local Sunni Arab community informs The Cradle:
“When ISIS killed the Yazidis in Sinjar, no one could go to help them. No one could do anything. We were just scared and sad about them. Some people escaped in the night and were injured and came and we helped them. Some had been shot. We gave them bandages, and water, and food, and we took them to the mountain to help them escape.”
“When ISIS killed the Yazidis in Sinjar, no one could go to help them. No one could do anything. We were just scared and sad about them. Some people escaped in the night and were injured and came and we helped them. Some had been shot. We gave them bandages, and water, and food, and we took them to the mountain to help them escape.”
A prominent Yazidi figure, Sheikh Nayef Jasso, recounted the efforts of his Arab Sunni friend, Abu Saady, who lived in an adjacent village. Sheikh Jasso explained in an interview with the Iraq 24 news channel how he had asked Abu Saady to help two survivors of the massacre escape to the mountains. According to Sheikh Jasso, Abu Saady responded by saying, “I will try. Even if I am slaughtered myself, I have to do it.”
However, the misperception that Sinjar’s Sunni Arabs were responsible for the ISIS genocide still goes largely unchallenged, although it is a view that is propagated not by the broader Yazidi community, but rather by the political maneuverings of the KDP led by Masoud Barzani. Furthermore, allegations have emerged that the KDP paid select Yazidis to amplify these claims in the media, casting the shadow of blame on Sunni Arabs.
For example, Yazidi MP Vian Dakhil who blamed Sunni Arabs from Sinjar for the genocide, is a KDP member. The influential Kurdish political party often seeks to coopt politicians from Iraqi minority communities, hoping to control them and ensure these communities act in favor of KDP interests.
Sunni Arabs as scapegoats
Shifting culpability onto Sinjar’s Sunni Arabs serves as a calculated diversion from the core culprits — namely, the KDP, whose Peshmerga forces had undertaken the solemn duty to safeguard the Yazidis in Sinjar.
On 3 August, 2014, the Peshmerga betrayed this trust by abruptly abandoning their posts in the early hours of the morning, leaving the Yazidis defenseless against the ISIS onslaught. This was confirmed by journalist Christine Van Den Toorn writing for the Daily Beast.
Van Den Toorn writes that a local KDP official told her that “higher-ups in the party told representatives to keep people calm, and that if people in their areas of coverage left, their salaries would be cut.”
Kurdish security officials also confiscated weapons from Christian communities in the Nineveh Plain, before abandoning these communities as ISIS invaded in using tactics similar to those in Sinjar.
By convincing Yazidis to stay in Sinjar despite the looming ISIS threat, confiscating their weapons, and then abandoning them at the last moment without warning, Barzani’s KDP and Peshmerga ensured that ISIS would be able to massacre and enslave as many Yazidis as possible.
The harsh reality was that without the intervention of fighters from rival Kurdish factions, the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK) and its Syrian offshoot, the People’s Protection Units (YPG), the atrocities carried out by ISIS would have been even larger. PKK and YPG militants coming from the Rabia border area with Syria created safe corridors for Yazidis to escape from Sinjar Mountain.
An explicit agreement
Several Yazidis who spoke with The Cradle said they knew the Peshmerga had betrayed them by suddenly withdrawing, but none said they understood why.
Several sources have alleged that Masoud Barzani made an agreement with ISIS, and this was the reason for the Peshmerga withdrawal.
According to French academic and Iraq expert Pierre-Jean Luizard, there was “an explicit agreement” between Barzani and ISIS, which “aims to share a number of territories.” ISIS was given the role of “routing the Iraqi army, in exchange for which the Peshmerga would not prevent ISIS from entering Mosul or capturing Tikrit.
Cemil Bayik, a senior PKK member also alleged that Barzani had sent senior KDP member Azad Barwari to meet with Sunni political figures and ISIS representatives in Amman, Jordan to make plans for ISIS to take Mosul.
As reported by The Cradle, prominent Sunni politician Atheel al-Nujaifi, then-governor of Nineveh province, “who was both collaborating with ISIS and acting as a Turkish proxy” played a key role in facilitating the fall of Mosul.
Barzani’s arrangement with ISIS apparently included supplying weapons to the notorious terror group. According to reporting from Michael Rubin of the American Enterprise Institute (AEI), these weapons included Kornet anti-tank missiles, which ISIS used to destroy M1A1 Abrams tanks in battles against the Iraqi army.
Journalists and members of the KRG parliament later verified that senior Peshmerga commanders had traded weapons with ISIS, and that none of them were ever charged.
The ‘Kurdish Jerusalem’
Barzani’s desire to share territories with ISIS, despite the atrocities that unfolded, was fueled by a calculated strategy to expand his influence and achieve his long-standing goal of establishing an independent Kurdish state.
At its core, Barzani’s ambition sought to secure new territories, access untapped oil reserves, amass weapons, and garner international backing for the realization of a sovereign Kurdish state. The essential idea was for ISIS to take over mostly Sunni Arab territories in northern Iraq, forcing much of that population to flee, and then have US-backed Kurds “liberate” those lands and “Kurdify” them.
Reuters quoted a KRG official saying: “Everyone is worried, but this is a big chance for us. ISIL gave us in two weeks what Maliki couldn’t give us in eight years.”
As the chaos instigated by ISIS enveloped Mosul and the Iraqi army faltered, Barzani’s swift directive was to mobilize his Peshmerga forces to capture the oil-rich city of Kirkuk — a region of geopolitical importance that was also home to Arab and Turkoman populations. This territorial conquest held symbolic value akin to the “Kurdish Jerusalem.”
Denise Natali of the National Defense University observed that “the Kurds’ most evident gain from the ISIS takeover of Mosul is territorial, as the Kurds had extended their territory by about 40 percent.” Assyrian writer Max Joseph sums it up well: “This is conquest masquerading as liberation.”
Journalist and expert on Kurdish affairs Wladimir Van Wilgenburg similarly explained that after Mosul fell, “The Kurds control now most of the disputed territories … They now almost have their national desired borders.”
By controlling Kirkuk, Barzani gained not only new territory but massive new oil reserves which he immediately began exporting via a newly built pipeline to the Turkish port city of Ceyhan.
As reported by Forbes, the majority of this oil was then sold to Israel, despite strong opposition from Iraqi Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki. The Jerusalem Post noted that by 2015, Kurdish oil was the source of 77 percent of Israel’s oil imports.
Gaining global sympathy
However, the question arises: why was the subsequent Yazidi massacre necessary, considering Barzani’s acquisition of the territory and resources he sought through the fall of Mosul?
A Kurdish businessman with links to the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) explains to The Cradle that Barzani realized that exploiting the threat to religious minorities was the best way to generate sympathy for his own cause in the west.
Two weeks after Mosul fell to ISIS, Barzani had told the BBC: “Everything that’s happened recently shows that it’s the right of Kurdistan to achieve independence. From now on, we won’t hide that that’s our goal. Iraq is effectively partitioned now.”
But Barzani’s goal of Kurdish independence had garnered little international support; US policy officially advocated maintaining the unity of Iraq and Kurdish independence was also opposed by key regional players Iran and Turkiye. Unsurprisingly, the only state willing to strongly support Barzani’s goal was Israel.
The politics of pity
The atrocities against the Yazidis has generated unprecedented international sympathy. The plight of the Yazidis who remained trapped on Sinjar Mountain under threat from black clad ISIS militants dominated the media cycle in the western press for many months.
Barzani effectively exploited the fear of ISIS and international sympathy for Yazidis by pressing the case that the Kurds needed direct help in liberating these areas, separated from the chaos plaguing the rest of Iraq. This allowed him to secure a reliable supply of weapons, independent of the central government in Baghdad.
The White House opened a direct weapons pipeline to Barzani’s Peshmerga on 11 August, as the massacre of Yazidis was still underway. The Washington Postreported that this had to be done off the books and through the CIA because the US military had no legal authorization to bypass Baghdad and send weapons directly to the Kurds.
“The idea of arming the Kurds has been the subject of weeks of internal deliberation and official silence by president Barack Obama’s foreign policy advisers. It is a fateful step in Iraq’s current crisis, one that risks facilitating the long-term disintegration of Iraq.”
Annexation ambitions
Over a year later, a disturbing revelation came to light as a coalition of forces including the PKK, Peshmerga, and the US-led coalition successfully reclaimed Sinjar city. Barzani’s ulterior motives for allowing the Yazidi massacre to unfold became startlingly evident as he moved to annex Sinjar, revealing his deeper motivations.
In a brazen statement, Barzani declared that Sinjar “belongs to Kurdistan in every way.” This proclamation was followed by an attempt to rewrite the narrative of the Yazidi genocide itself.
Barzani sought to recast Sinjar as “a symbol of the oppression of the Kurdish people,” essentially erasing the fact that the tragedy was fundamentally one of immense suffering endured by the Yazidis, posing an existential threat to this Kurdish religious minority.
He then went on to blame the Sunni Arab neighbors of the Yazidis in Sinjar for the crime he himself orchestrated:
“If the Arabs in the region have not committed crimes against the Yazidi brothers and have not helped ISIS, they are our brothers and we will protect them, but if their hands are red with the blood of Kurds and Yazidi brothers, they will have the same fate.”
Fear of retribution
Speaking to The Cradle,several Yazidis expressed resentment over Barzani and the Peshmerga’s role in betraying them.
However, they said the Yazidi community was afraid to speak about this openly and in the media, for fear of retribution. Even nine years later, few Yazidis from Sinjar have been able to return to their homes, and most instead live in tents in refugee camps dotting the Kurdistan region ruled by Barzani’s KDP.
Because most Yazidis continue to live under the very same political sphere that orchestrated their massacre and enslavement, they live in constant fear that another genocide may soon take place, even though ISIS has largely, but not entirely, been vanquished.
The views expressed in this article do not necessarily reflect those of The Cradle.
It’s not that Erdogan has a scheme to head east at the west’s expense. It’s just that the world’s grandest infrastructure, development, and geopolitical projects are all in the east today.
The collective west was dying to bury him – yet another strategic mistake that did not take into account the mood of Turkish voters in deep Anatolia.
In the end, Recep Tayyip Erdogan did it – again. Against all his shortcomings, like an aging neo-Ottoman Sinatra, he did it “my way,” comfortably retaining Turkiye’s presidency after naysayers had all but buried him.
The first order of geopolitical priority is who will be named Minister of Foreign Affairs. The prime candidate is Ibrahim Kalin – the current all-powerful Erdogan press secretary cum top adviser.
Compared to incumbent Cavusoglu, Kalin, in theory, may be qualified as more pro-west. Yet it’s the Sultan who calls the shots. It will be fascinating to watch how Turkiye under Erdogan 2.0 will navigate the strengthening of ties with West Asia and the accelerating process of Eurasia integration.
The first immediate priority, from Erdogan’s point of view, is to get rid of the “terrorist corridor” in Syria. This means, in practice, reigning in the US-backed Kurdish YPG/PYD, who are effectively Syrian affiliates of the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) – which is also the issue at the heart of a possible normalization of relations with Damascus.
Now that Syria has been enthusiastically welcomed back to the Arab League after a 12-year freeze, a Moscow-brokered entente between the Turkish and Syrian presidents, already in progress, may represent the ultimate win-win for Erdogan: allowing control of Kurds in north Syria while facilitating the repatriation of roughly 4 million refugees (tens of thousands will stay, as a source of cheap labor).
The Sultan is at his prime when it comes to hedging his bets between east and west. He knows well how to profit from Turkiye’s status as a key NATO member – complete with one of its largest armies, veto power, and control of the entry to the uber-strategic Black Sea.
And all that while exercising real foreign policy independence, from West Asia to the Eastern Mediterranean.
So expect Erdogan 2.0 to remain an inextinguishable source of irritation for the neocons and neoliberals in charge of US foreign policy, along with their EU vassals, who will never refrain from trying to subdue Ankara to fight the Russia-China-Iran Eurasia integration entente. The Sultan, though, knows how to play this game beautifully.
How to manage Russia and China
Whatever happens next, Erdogan will not hop on board the sanctions-against-Russia sinking ship. The Kremlin bought Turkish bonds tied to the development of the Russian-built Akkuyu nuclear power plant, Turkiye’s first nuclear reactor. Moscow allowed Ankara to postpone nearly $4 billion in energy payments until 2024. Best of all, Ankara pays for Russian gas in rubles.
So an array of deals related to the supply of Russian energy trump possible secondary sanctions that might target the steady rise in Turkiye’s exports. Still, it’s a given the US will revert to its one and only “diplomatic” policy – sanctions. The 2018 sanctions did push Turkiye into recession after all.
But Erdogan can easily count on popular support across the Turkish realm. Early this year, a Gezici poll revealed that 72.8 percent of Turkish citizens privilege good relations with Russia while nearly 90 percent rate the US as a “hostile” nation. That’s what allows Interior Minister Soylu to remark, bluntly, “we will wipe out whoever is causing trouble, including American troops.”
China-Turkiye strategic cooperation falls under what Erdogan defines as “turning to the East” – and is mostly about China’s multi-continent infrastructure behemoth, the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). The Turk Silk Road branch of the BRI focuses on what Beijing defines as the “Middle Corridor,” a prime cost-effective/secure trade route that connects Asia to Europe.
The driver is the China Railway Express, which turned the Middle Corridor arguably into BRI’s backbone. For instance, electronics parts and an array of household items routinely arriving via cargo planes from Osaka, Japan are loaded onto freight trains going to Duisburg and Hamburg in Germany, via the China Railway Express departing from Shenzhen, Wuhan, and Changsha – and crossing from Xinjiang to Kazakhstan and beyond via the Alataw Pass. Shipments from Chongqing to Germany take a maximum of 13 days.
It’s no wonder that nearly 10 years ago, when he first unveiled his ambitious, multi-trillion dollar BRI in Astana, Kazakhstan, Chinese President Xi Jinping placed the China Railway Express as a core BRI component.
Direct freight trains from Xian to Istanbul are plying the route since December 2020, using the Baku-Tblisi-Kars (BTK) railway with less than two weeks travel time – and plans afoot to increase their frequency. Beijing is well aware of Turkiye’s asset as a transportation hub and crossroads for markets in the Balkans, the Caucasus, Central Asia, West Asia, and North Africa, not to mention a customs union with the EU that allows direct access to European markets.
Moreover, Baku’s victory in the 2020 Nagorno-Karabakh war came with a ceasefire deal bonus: the Zangezur corridor, which will eventually facilitate Turkiye’s direct access to neighbors from the Caucasus to Central Asia.
A pan-Turkic offensive?
And here we enter a fascinating territory: the possible incoming interpolations between the Organization of Turkic States (OTS), the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), the BRICS+ – and all that also linked to a boost in Saudi and Emirati investments in the Turkish economy.
Sultan 2.0 wants to become a full member of both the Chinese-led SCO and multipolar BRICS+. This means a much closer entente with the Russia-China strategic partnership as well as with the Arab powerhouses, which are also hopping on the BRICS+ high-speed train.
Erdogan 2.0 is already focusing on two key players in Central Asia and South Asia: Uzbekistan and Pakistan. Both happen to be SCO members.
Ankara and Islamabad are very much in sync. They express the same judgment on the extremely delicate Kashmir question, and both backed Azerbaijan against Armenia.
But the key developments may lie in Central Asia. Ankara and Tashkent have a strategic defense agreement – including intel sharing and logistics cooperation.
The Organization of Turkic States (OTS), with a HQ in Istanbul, is the prime energizer of pan-Turkism or pan-Turanism. Turkiye, Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, and Kyrgyzstan are full members, with Afghanistan, Turkmenistan, Hungary, and Ukraine cultivated as observers. The Turk-Azeri relationship is billed as “one nation, two states” in pan-Turkic terms.
The basic idea is a still hazy “cooperation platform” between Central Asia and the Southern Caucasus. Yet some serious proposals have already been floated. The OTS summit in Samarkand late last year advanced the idea of a TURANCEZ free trade bloc, comprising Turkiye, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, Azerbaijan, and as observers, Hungary (representing the EU) and Northern Cyprus.
Meanwhile, hard business prevails. To fully profit from the status of the energy transit hub, Turkiye needs not only Russian gas but also gas from Turkmenistan feeding the Trans-Anatolian Natural Gas Pipeline (TANAP) as well as Kazakh oil coming via the Baku-Tblisi-Ceyhan (BTC) pipeline.
The Turkish Cooperation and Coordination Agency (TIKA) is heavy on economic cooperation, active in a series of projects in transportation, construction, mining, and oil and gas. Ankara has already invested a whopping $85 billion across Central Asia, with nearly 4,000 companies scattered across all the “stans.”
Of course, when compared to Russia and China, Turkiye is not a major player in Central Asia. Moreover, the bridge to Central Asia goes via Iran. So far, rivalry between Ankara and Tehran seems to be the norm, but everything may change, lightning fast, with the simultaneous development of the Russia-Iran-India-led International North South Transportation Corridor (INSTC), which will profit both – and the fact that the Iranians and Turks may soon become full BRICS+ members.
Sultan 2.0 is bound to boost investment in Central Asia as a new geoeconomic frontier. That in itself encapsulates the possibility of Turkiye soon joining the SCO.
We will then have a “turning to the East” in full effect, in parallel to closer ties with the Russia-China strategic partnership. Take note that Turkiye’s ties with Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, and Kyrgyzstan are also strategic partnerships.
Not bad for a neo-Ottoman who, until a few days ago, was dismissed as a has-been.
The views expressed in this article do not necessarily reflect those of The Cradle.
The second round of Turkish presidential elections has drawn global attention for its increasingly bizarre alliances, outrageous propaganda, and personality politics. Ironically, not much is expected to change in its aftermath.
The political landscape in Turkiye has become increasingly convoluted after the 14 May presidential and parliamentary elections left the Turkish presidency up for grabs – with a critical, second round of polls to be held on Sunday.
As the main candidates who failed to secure the presidency in the first round prepare for the 28 May election, Turkiye’s patchwork system of political alliances has become more intricate, marked by polarizing debates on issues such as secularism, nationalism, Syrian refugees, and the Kurdish issue. In the very year that Turkiye celebrates the Republic’s 100th anniversary, the country’s political atmosphere has grown more uncertain than ever.
The official results of the first round of the presidential election saw incumbent Recep Tayyip Erdogan, the candidate of the People’s Alliance, obtain 49.5 percent of the vote, while main opponent Kemal Kilicdaroglu, the candidate of the National Alliance, received 44.8 percent – both remaining under the 50+ percent threshold required for an outright win.
Muharrem Ince, who withdrew from the race at the last minute, secured 0.43 percent of the vote, and Sinan Ogan, the candidate of the secular nationalist ATA Alliance, received 5.17 percent.
The sequel no one asked for
The second round between Erdogan and Kilicdaroglu has essentially transformed the election into a referendum on the former’s 21-year rule. The public’s sentiment and perception have therefore become crucial in this contest.
Despite the parliamentary election’s official results being due on 19 May, the Supreme Election Board (YSK) has not yet released them, leading to some frantic domestic speculation on the reasons for this. Some observers have raised concerns about the possibility of fraudulent voters, as the number of voters is reportedly double the population growth rate. In normal circumstances, parliament should convene on the third day after the official results are published, and elected MPs should be sworn in.
However, Erdogan is purportedly stalling the swearing-in procedure because members of his alliance, the radical Islamist Kurdish movement HUDA PAR, refuse to utter the phrase “Turkish nation” during the ceremonial oath. This leaves Erdogan keen to defer the ceremony – and this drama – until after the 28 May presidential election.
In the lead up to Sunday’s polls, the main topics dominating Turkiye’s political discourse are distrust in the fairness of the election, Turkish citizenships granted to Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) nationals in exchange for top-dollar real estate purchases, and the wildly disparate numbers of refugees currently residing in the country (the government says less than 4 million; the opposition claims 13 million).
These highly polarizing issues have triggered a number of realignments within the two main alliances contesting the presidency.
This time it’s personal
Since the country’s 2017 referendum, in which parliamentary democracy was replaced by a Turkish-style presidential system that recognizes unsealed ballots as valid, electoral irregularities have become a recurring concern. And so the opposition is understandably apprehensive about potential “vote theft” and the security of ballots.
Furthermore, the unusually high voter turnout rate of over 80 percent in Turkiye’s devastated earthquake-affected areas that claimed the lives of tens of thousands and caused mass migration, has raised questions.
In the southeastern region, which has a significant Kurdish population, Erdogan’s far-right, ultra-nationalist, Nationalist Movement Party (MHP) coalition partner, made significant gains in the polls, sparking allegations of ballot manipulation. Similarly, suspicions arose due to the unchanging 5 percent vote share garnered by the third candidate and kingmaker, Sinan Ogan, throughout the vote count.
However, after an initial week of furious debates, these concerns have now been fully overshadowed by the impending second round of voting.
In fact, the parliamentary elections, where Erdogan’s Justice and Development Party (AKP) won 35.6 percent of the vote and the main opposition Republican People’s Party (CHP) secured 25.3 percent – and the subsequent uncertainty regarding the exact representation of the two parties and their allies – have been largely forgotten.
The presidential contest has taken center stage as the sole, focal political point of interest. And last-minute shifts and tweaks in the madcap alliances that make up the two leading coalitions are all the Turkish media talk about.
Switching slogans and alliances
Kilicdaroglu’s Millet (or Nation) Alliance, which leads the narrative for change (essentially, ousting Erdogan), has adopted patriotic slogans such as “Those who love their homeland should come to the ballot box” and “Let the gates of hell be closed.” Although he emphasized “unity” and objected to Erdogan’s polarizing politics in the first round of polls, Kilicdaroglu has adopted a more confrontational discourse in this second phase. Interestingly, he adopted the “hell” slogan from Sinan Ogan, a candidate who was eliminated in the first vote and who has since endorsed Erdogan ahead of the runoff vote.
Before 14 May, Ogan stated, “Maybe we won’t open the gates of heaven, but we will close the gates of hell.” The “hell” he referred to was the Erdogan government. While harshly criticizing Erdogan for his handling of Syrian refugees, Ogan also declared that Turkish nationalists – like himself – would never align themselves with the Islamist HUDA PAR. He even suggested that the Peoples’ Democratic Party (HDP), representing Kurdish politics, would negotiate a deal with Erdogan in the second round.
But, ironically, it was Ogan who ended up striking a deal with Erdogan, announcing his support for the president on the grounds of maintaining “stability” in Turkiye. This, despite the fact that Ogan’s main condition regarding the repatriation of refugees appears not to have been met: Although a popular election issue, Erdogan has ruled out repatriating Syrian asylum seekers.
Winning over the nationalists
It remains uncertain how much of Ogan’s nationalist voter base will take to Erdogan. The ATA Alliance, to which he owes his candidacy, has become heavily divided in advance of the second polls. The foundation of the alliance consists of the far-right Zafer Party, in collaboration with some smaller political parties. Two days after Ogan threw his weight behind Erdogan, Zafer Party Leader Umit Ozdag announced his support for Kilicdaroglu.
Unlike Ogan, Ozdag says he has clinched a deal with his candidate – Kilicdaroglu – to repatriate Syrian refugees on the basis of international law and humanitarianism. Ozdag has also said they agreed that there would be zero compromise in the fight against the Kurdish PKK and terrorism.
A staunch nationalist, Ozdag frequently invokes Mustafa Kemal Ataturk – the much-revered founder of the Turkish Republic – rails against Erdogan’s role in accepting millions of Syrian refugees and selling Turkish citizenship in exchange for cash, and constantly warns about Turkiye’s “demographic threat.”
In part, this refers to the Erdogan administration’s distribution of Turkish citizenship to anyone who purchases real estate for $400,000, sharply increased rents caused by the influx of foreigners, and the perceived influence of these people (without any ties to Turkiye or knowledge of the Turkish language) on elections. All these issues feature heavily in the nationalist movement’s narrative and propaganda.
As an example, during the first round of elections, the Turkish public reacted strongly to a live broadcast on the private, pro-government A Haber news channel. In the aired footage, a Kuwaiti individual speaking Arabic into the microphone after casting his vote shocked Turkish viewers. The channel swiftly cut the broadcast and deleted the video.
Unprecedented election propaganda
But if this election can be distilled into a popularity referendum on Erdogan, the sitting Turkish president has some clear advantages over his opponent: He uses every state tool at his disposal and has a mainstream media loyal to him. While TV channels cover Erdogan’s statements and rallies around the clock, Kilicdaroglu has few opportunities to be nationally heard outside of opposition media outlets.
As a result, Erdogan has been particularly sloppy about his political rhetoric, making ludicrous claims and sometimes outright lies – without being duly checked by the media.
In a Trumpian boast during a rally in the earthquake-stricken province of Malatya, Erdogan boasted that the number of people who came to listen to him in the square was higher than the number of deaths caused by the 6 February earthquake.
While victims had cried out for urgent government assistance for days without a response – which Erdogan himself has admitted – he told rally crowds: “We mobilized all means from the first hours of the disaster.” There have been many such gaffes along the campaign trail this year, which finally culminated in a major media scandal over a faked video montage.
Erdogan accidentally admitted that a video montage shown by his team in public squares before the first round of votes had been faked. The edited footage depicted PKK leaders in the Qandil region of Iraq singing along to a song in Kilicdaroglu’s political ad. The intent of the video was clearly to link the latter to the PKK and terrorism.
The opposition reacted strongly to the slander, with Kilicdaroglu calling Erdogan a “montage fraudster” and filing a lawsuit for compensation. But because of the president’s iron grip on mainstream Turkish media, it is not known how many voters at those rallies are aware of the fakery.
The propaganda has progressed well beyond the video scandal. Fake brochures attributed to Kilicdaroglu, including bizarre campaign promises and praise for terrorism, have been detected and prosecuted along the way. There’s no telling how much of an effect these fake-news scandals will affect Sunday’s polls.
‘Unprincipled coalitions’
As the second round vote approaches, Professor Emin Gurses from Sakarya University, highlights the shallow opportunism of these Turkish elections, telling The Cradle:
“In Turkiye, there is an understanding that it is permissible to lie while doing politics. Voters voted for the candidate they know and recognize through trust. They [politicians] act to win the election. They don’t look at friend or foe.”
The last-minute alliance shifts may not even change anything. According to Gurses, Sinan Ogan has little to gain by backing Erdogan, and on the other side, even if a deal is struck with Ozdag, it will be challenging for Kilicdaroglu to close the 2.5 million-vote gap with Erdogan.
Meanwhile, columnist Mehmet Ali Guller from Cumhuriyet has highlighted the consequences of the 50+1 system in Turkiye, which he argues leads to unprincipled coalitions, with ideology, programs, and politics pushed to the background. Guller charges that there are no significant differences in the fundamental policies of both sides:
“There is no fundamental difference between the two options in terms of economic policies, it is in the details. And in terms of foreign policy, there is no fundamental difference between the two options, there are details. Because both options are essentially Atlanticist and NATOist.”
100 years on: It’s looking bleak
Regardless of the election outcome, Guller foresees an ongoing economic crisis that offers no short-term solution. He also notes that both Islamists and nationalists exist in the two main political coalitions, creating an ideological stalemate of sorts, and predicts that Turkiye will be forced to hold another election within the next five years.
If Kilicdaroglu wins, he may find himself governing the country using decrees inherited from his predecessor despite advocating for a return to parliamentary democracy, as his alliance will be in the minority in parliament.
In this “unprincipled” political environment, it is even plausible that Erdodan, the architect of the Turkish-style presidential system, may consider reverting to a “parliamentary system.” On the other hand, if Erdogan emerges victorious, an unprecedented economic crisis is expected, with Turkiye’s CDS rating surpassing 700 and the US dollar projected to reach at least 24 Turkish liras.
In the upcoming local elections, Erdogan is likely to continue his right-wing populist campaign to reclaim cities like Istanbul, which he lost in 2019.
Because Turkiye requires at least $200 billion in resources, Erdogan’s foreign policy stance will be determined by economic opportunity, as he is not seen as a reliable partner by any country, on either side of the global divide. He is expected to continue his balancing act: putting the “migrant issue” before the EU; Syria and Ukraine before Russia; relations with Russia before the US, and using Turkiye’s presence in Syria as leverage over the Arab world, using these as bargaining chips to maximize his gains.
In any case, the outlook for the Republic of Turkiye, on its 100th anniversary, appears bleak.
The views expressed in this article do not necessarily reflect those of The Cradle.
The current political scene in Turkey is significant as neither the incumbent President or his opposition rival were able to secure a majority in the first round of elections, leading to a runoff.
Turkey’s runoff elections: a precognitive outcome? Designed by: Zainab Roumani.
Voter support for Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan fell below the majority required for him to secure reelection outright. This outcome has necessitated run-off elections on May 28.
Erdogan secured 49.51% and opposition candidate Kemal Kilicdaroglo secured 44.88%. Divergent partial results emerged from Turkey’s presidential election earlier on Sunday. While the state-run news agency suggested that Erdogan would narrowly secure a victory, the private agency indicated that the contest was likely to proceed to a runoff.
In the upcoming second round, it is important to consider that Erdogan is expected to have an advantageous position over Kilicdaroglu due to his lead in the first round and the positive parliamentary results favoring the ruling coalition in contrast to the opposition.
The outcome came as a surprise and disappointment to the opposition, who had set high expectations for both the presidential and parliamentary elections. In the presidential race, the opposition was hopeful that even if they couldn’t secure victory in the first round, Kilicdaroglu would at least receive the highest number of votes.
Based on the results, it has become evident that Erdogan is leading by around four points over Kilicdaroglu in the first round. The parliamentary elections are also of great significance as the opposition had hoped to secure a majority in parliament, thereby assuming leadership. There has been an ongoing debate within opposition circles that even if Erdogan is not defeated in the presidential elections, simply gaining a majority in parliament would undermine his satisfaction of winning a new presidential term. It has become evident that the opposition is experiencing a crisis, not only in the parliamentary elections but also in achieving a presidential majority, as the ruling coalition has managed to secure a majority in parliament.
In terms of alliances, analysts indicate that there has been a significant shift for the Justice and Development Party (AKP) since it formed a coalition with the Nationalist Movement Party (MHP) in the middle of the previous decade. They argue that it is because the AKP is no longer able to reach power and govern independently; it is in need of forming a government.
Why is the current political scene important?
For the first time, the AKP and Erdogan are participating in elections under critical circumstances. This includes the aftermath of the devastating earthquake that claimed the lives of 50,000 people, caused over $100 billion in damages, and raised significant concerns regarding the government’s handling of the crisis. However, it is cruicial to mention that 8 out of 10 provinces that were severely devastated by the earthquake voted Erdogan, and the numbers surpassed expectations.
For example, in Hatay Antakya, one of the earthquake stricken regions of Turkey, the voter turnout was 53.9% in favor of Erdogan with only 42.56% for Kilicdaroglo. In the epicenter of the devestating earthquake, Kahramanmaras, Erdogan was leading the polls with around 71.11% of the votes.
— Al Mayadeen English (@MayadeenEnglish) May 12, 2023
Furthermore, the current inflation rate stands at 45%, having reached 80% just a few months ago. These economic conditions are exerting immense pressure on Erdogan.
Moreover, for the first time in modern Turkish history, the majority of opposition parties have come together in a unified front to challenge and overthrow Erdogan’s rule.
Emphasizing these crucial points, it can be concluded that Erdogan’s accomplishment in the presidential elections is a significant victory. He successfully thwarted the opposition’s attempt to secure the presidency in the first round.
— Al Mayadeen English (@MayadeenEnglish) May 14, 2023
Erdogan in the second round, what to expect?
Erdogan is now expected to be successful in the second round and here’s why. Strengthening this argument, the first reason is of psychological significance as Erdogan surpassed Kilicdaroglu by a margin of four points. Furthermore, the ruling coalition’s achievement of a parliamentary majority serves as another crucial factor. In the event of a runoff election, Erdogan will have the opportunity to appeal to undecided and unaligned voters who prioritize political stability when making their voting choices.
Erdogan will assert that he alone possesses the ability to uphold political stability and prevent a potential clash between the executive presidency and the legislative institution. With the ruling coalition’s current dominance in the legislative power, Erdogan will emphasize that this is a critical aspect to be considered. By highlighting his role in preserving the harmony between the branches of government, he aims to reassure voters that he is the best candidate to ensure a stable and functioning political system.
That said, the division within the Good Party in response to Kilicdaroglu’s alliance with the HDP serves as a significant motivation for voters in their search for political stability. The opposition party’s decision to form a coalition with the HDP has created a rift among its members and supporters. This division raises concerns about the party’s coherence and its ability to provide a stable and united front against Erdogan’s ruling coalition. In light of these circumstances, voters who prioritize political stability may lean towards Erdogan, viewing him as a more reliable option in comparison to the opposition.
Nationalist votes tip the balance
Following Muharrem Ince’s withdrawal, Sinan Ogan emerged as a prominent figure and showcased unexpected strength in the polls. However, in the event of a runoff round, Ogan’s support base would likely be divided into two factions. This division could potentially weaken the opposition’s collective strength and impact their ability to challenge Erdogan. The fragmented support for Ogan would present a challenge for the opposition in uniting their voter base and rallying behind a single candidate.
The first part consists of a small, solid bloc that accounts for around 1.5% to 2% of the votes. The second part, which is more significant, includes the nationalist votes that shifted their support away from the Good Party due to Kilicdaroglu’s alliance with the HDP. These nationalist votes have now aligned themselves with the ATA-Alliance after Ince’s withdrawal.
Earlier today, Ogan said that he will announce who he will vote for, within a day or two, depending on negotiations and consultations. He stressed that his decision is based on “red lines,” such as fighting terrorism, moving away from political parties supported by terrorist parties, and the return of Syrian refugees. He considered that the opposition “made a mistake somewhere,” because they failed to win the elections despite all the factors, which he considers are enough to cost Erdogan another term.
It is worth stressing that before this statement, ATA Alliance Presidential Candidate Sinan Oğan denied that the Nation Alliance said it would support Kilicdaroglo only if HDP was excluded from the political system, after an interview with Der Spiegel.
Hayırdır Der Spiegel, size verdiğim röportajda Türk basınına dediğimiz genel şartlardan farklı bir şey demedik. Bunu nereden uydurdunuz? https://t.co/n4QcDHF7Ht
The key factor influencing the voting behavior of the nationalist bloc in the runoff round will primarily be the nationalist ideology criterion. The nationalist voters will consider the candidates’ stances and policies regarding nationalist issues, including issues related to national identity, sovereignty, and the protection of national interests. Their decision will be driven by their alignment with the candidate who they perceive as most committed to promoting and advancing nationalist values and goals.
Far-right ATA Alliance nominee Sinan Ogan tells Al Mayadeen that nationalism is on the rise around the globe but in #Turkey, it is not exclusionary.@LeaAAkilpic.twitter.com/IDzbkAVNhC
— Al Mayadeen English (@MayadeenEnglish) May 4, 2023
The nationalist bloc opposes Erdogan and expresses criticism towards the government’s policies, including economic policies. However, their main concern lies with Kilicdaroglu due to his alliance with the HDP. They perceive the HDP as a political front for the PKK, the Kurdistan Workers’ Party. Given this perspective, the nationalist bloc may lean towards supporting Erdogan in the presidential elections, as they view him as a candidate who aligns more closely with their nationalist values and is less associated with the HDP and its alleged connections to the PKK. Even if the nationalist bloc in the opposition alliance decides to remain neutral in the runoff round, analysts suggest it is impossible for them to vote for Kilicdaroglu.
In a case where they also don’t vote for Erdogan, the voter behavior is not expected to change drastically. Analysts suggest that if voters choose not to vote for either candidate, Erdogan will still benefit as long as he maintains a 4-point lead over Kilicdaroglu. It is worth emphasizing that the matter of winning the parliamentary elections is crucial and will have an impact on the presidential elections in the runoff round. Erdogan will be able to address the bloc of undecided voters who want to see political stability in Turkey, which they associate with economic recovery.
During the runoff round, undecided voters could conclude that electing Kilicdaroglu could trigger a power struggle between the legislative and executive branches. Since the legislative power is currently dominated by the ruling coalition and the executive power is controlled by the opposition, a political impasse is very likely. Based on that, analysts argue that the best scenario for Kilicdaroglu in the runoff round is if the nationalist votes don’t vote for Erdogan, since it is not likely for them to give their votes to Kilicdaroglu. In this case, Erdogan will be able to maintain what he achieved in the first round.
The most successful Kurdish political experiment in West Asia is unravelling due to increasing divisions between the KDP and PUK, the two biggest political parties in Iraqi Kurdistan.
From right to left: Kurdistan Democratic Party leader (KDP) Masoud Barzani, Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) party leader Bafel TalabaniPhoto Credit: The Cradle
Iraq’s Kurds, as with other mainly Iranic populations across western and southern Asia, are busy preparing to celebrate Nowruz on March 21, the Persian new year which marks the beginning of Spring.
But this year’s festivities will be marred by a conflict raging between political and military forces in the city of Sulaymaniyah – stronghold of the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) – and between Sulaymaniyah and Erbil – stronghold of the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP ). To complicate matters further, Iraq’s central government in Baghdad has been drawn into this conflict with the semi-autonomous Kurdish region.
These fiery disputes have burned through the patience and loyalties of Iraqi Kurds, who have watched their political representatives lock horns over virtually everything: the relationship with Baghdad, oil production and revenues, the public sector salary crisis, the conflict between Turkey and Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) militants, and disunity within the region’s vital institutions in their respective strongholds.
Kurdish internal ‘division and discontent’
Last February, an opinion poll conducted by Erbil-based research firm Sheekar Research, which is funded by the US National Endowment for Democracy, revealed that just over half of respondents (50.7 percent) believe they would be better off if the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) was dissolved and central authority from Baghdad was re-established.
The reasons cited by polls participants were the KRG’s deteriorating financial and service conditions, general administrative failure, and widespread corruption. In the PUK’s stronghold,, 64 percent of respondent supported dissolving the Kurdish administration, and 59 percent said they would not participate in demonstrations urged against the federal government in Baghdad.
The survey polled 1,000 people across Iraqi Kurdistan, and included a high proportion of the region’s government employees.
Respondents were also asked about how they view recent decisions by the federal supreme court against the KRG. Last February, the Baghdad court ruled that Iraqi Kurdistan’s oil and gas law was unconstitutional, which threw its contracts with international oil companies into legal jeopardy.
A plurality of survey respondents (46 percent) viewed the court’s decision as “illegal” and “issued against” Iraqi Kurdistan. Yet, most respondents either supported (10 percent) or expressed neutrality (42 percent) over the rulings, as they felt the court was primarily punishing the KDP and PUK.
The survey also asked who shoulders the responsibility for the KRG’s apparent weakness in Baghdad. A fifth of respondents (21 percent) blamed the KDP and the PUK, while a further 47 percent blamed all Kurdish political parties – including the ruling duopoly and opposition groups. One-third of respondents were unsure.
The poll, published by the semi-official Iraqi newspaper Al-Sabah and other Iraqi and Arab newspapers, led to an escalation of tension between Baghdad and the KRG. Iraqi government Spokesman Basim al-Awwadi called the Al-Sabah report an ‘opinion piece’ that did not represent Baghdad’s view.
However, the head of the Kurdish opposition New Generation Movement (NGM) bloc, Sarwa Abdel Wahed, confirmed in a television interview that the federal government had been subjected to significant pressure from Kurdistan to retract the poll and apologize for its publication.
Power struggle within the PUK
Since the late 1970s, Sulaymaniyah has been a political and military stronghold for the PUK, which had been founded by former Iraqi president (2005-2014) Jalal Talabani in 1975. After Jalal’s death in 2017, his wife Hero Ibrahim assumed party leadership for three years before that position became violently contested between his son Bafel Talabani (head of Kurdistan’s counter-terrorism affairs) and his nephew Lahur Jangi Talabani (heads one of Kurdistan’s two intelligence services).
In February 2020, the PUK’s leadership council elected both men as co-chairs of the party. The partnership did not last long. An assassination attempt against Bafel and two party leaders ended in accusations against Lahur for the poisonings.
In July 2021, Bafel ousted Lahur from the co-presidency, stripped him of his posts, dismissed officials loyal to him, and had Sulaymaniyah’s judiciary issue an arrest warrant for him and his two brothers.
But Lahur’s popularity among the region’s security and military institutions was something Bafel had not yet addressed, and security tensions broke out in the city. Violent clashes between the two parties erupted repeatedly, culminating, most notably, in the assassination of Officer Hawkar Al-Jaf in Erbil on July 10, 2022. Meanwhile, accusations against Lahur for planning assassination plots and establishing armed groups continued.
The most recent political agitation took place on 14 March, when KDP sources announced an assassination attempt against Wesi Barzani, the youngest son of its former president Massoud Barzani, the single most influential figure in the KRG. The KDP accused Bafel Talabani of the attack because Erbil backs his cousin Lahur in their conflict.
Since the outbreak of the PUK’s war of succession, the KDP in Erbil – its historical partner in governing the Kurdish region – has supported Lahur Talabani. This unvoiced loyalty was demonstrated by KRG Prime Minister Masrour Barzani – after the killing of Officer Al-Jaf – when he demanded pro-Bafel security service leaders be arrested in Sulaymaniyah. Furthermore, Erbil’s judicial authority has supported Lahur’s appeal against the procedures that led to his dismissal from the PUK’s co-chairmanship.
Bipartisan disputes
The succession dispute, however, is by no means the only major impediment in the relationship between Iraqi Kurdistan’s two most important cities and political parties. They also have acute differences over the KRG’s election law and the falsification of voter data, which has led to the postponement of the region’s parliamentary elections for over a year.
The two parties also differ on their relationship with the PKK in Qandil mountains and the Kurdish, US-backed Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) in northeastern Syria. The PUK supports the activities of the PKK, while a Turkish-KDP alliance to siphon off Iraqi oil has the Barzanis at odds with the PKK, designated by Ankara as a Kurdish terrorist group.
The dispute between the two parties further intensified over the selection of a candidate for Iraq’s presidency (which is reserved for a Kurd) after the country’s 2021 elections. The position has been filled by either Jalal Talabani, Fuad Masum, or Barham Salih since 2003 – all PUK politicos – in exchange for KDP candidates being assigned the presidency of the Kurdistan region.
On October 13, 2022, Iraq’s parliament elected Abdul Latif Rashid as president of the republic after a bitter struggle with the KDP’s Masoud Barzani, who tried to nominate his uncle Hoshyar Zebari, a former foreign minister (2004-2014) and the regional interior minister, Rebar Ahmed Barzani.
As a result of these differences, KRG Deputy Prime Minister Qubad Talabani – younger brother of Bafel – and his party’s ministers boycotted the meetings of the regional government. Baghdad is now trying to heal the rift between Sulaymaniyah and Erbil by increasing the Kurdistan region’s share of state revenues and finding a solution to the unlawful sale of Iraqi oil by the KRG.
In this context, Baghdad has referred a draft law to Iraq’s parliament to create the Halabja Governorate in Kurdistan. This will increase the number of governorates in the KRG to four (Erbil, Dohuk, and Sulaymaniyah), will lead to greater financial allocations for the Kurdistan region in the federal budget, and strike a more equitable budget balance between the two parties.
Can Kurdistan ever be united?
Keeping the Kurdistan region united and cohesive is a major US objective in Iraq, and is repeatedly emphasized by Washington. Efforts are currently underway to find a solution to the dispute between Baghdad and Erbil over the KRG’s unlawful sale of Iraqi oil outside of central government authority. In both 2022 and 2023, the Federal Court issued decisions obligating the KRG to hand over oil revenues to Baghdad, and invalidating the unlawful oil and gas law in force in Iraqi Kurdistan.
The political agreement which was struck to form the government of Iraq’s current Prime Minister Muhammad Shia al-Sudani, includes the enactment of a federal law that regulates the process of extracting and selling oil and gas; the implementation of the constitution’s Article 140 (determining the administrative authority over disputed Iraqi areas); resolving the issue of internally displaced people (900 thousand are displaced in Iraqi Kurdistan); and the implementation of the 2020 “Sinjar AgreementSinjar Agreement” between Erbil and Baghdad to remove the PKK from the Sinjar district in the Nineveh Governorate.
The prime minister’s visit to Erbil this week was an effort to resolve outstanding issues and bridge gaps between competing Kurdish agendas. Sudani met with officials from the two rival parties and the opposition NGP to gain approval for the federal general budget for the years 2023, 2024, and 2025, before referring the bill to Parliament.
Sudani aspires to strengthen his position as prime minister by satisfying all parties, including those in the KRG, whose political parties collectively represent 59 of Iraq’s 329 parliamentary seats. He has moved quickly. On 13 March, Sudani announced an agreement to end the dispute over the oil revenues – on the same day the KRG’s Ministry of Finance received 400 billion dinars (around $274 million) from Baghdad to pay government employee salaries.
While the agreement details are still “unclear,” political sources say its most prominent breakthrough appears to be the payment of KRG oil revenues into the Iraqi financial system, via a designated account in the Iraqi Trade Bank. This will – for now at least – allow Baghdad to see, but not touch, KRG energy revenues.
According to the sources, these measures come in response to conditions set by the US in advance of Sudani’s scheduled visit to Washington in the next few days.
The views expressed in this article do not necessarily reflect those of The Cradle.
Filed under: IRAQ, Kurdistan, kurds | Tagged: Erbil, Masoud Barzani, PKK | Comments Off on The clash of two cities: Erbil, Sulaymaniyah, and the future of Iraq’s Kurdistan
Steven Sahiounie is a Syrian American award-winning journalist based in Syria. He is specialized on the Middle East. He has also appeared on TV and radio in Canada, Russia, Iran, Syria, China, Lebanon, and the United States.
The outrage was prompted after Washington and eight European countries issued travel warnings over possible terror attacks in Turkey. The U.S. and its western allies have attempted to connect a recent Quran burning in Sweden with travel danger inside Turkey. Muslim countries worldwide have denounced the burning as hate speech, not free speech, but this has no apparent connection to travel safety issues inside Turkey.
The U.S. travel warning is tantamount to a declaration of economic war on Turkey who is in an economic downturn of its tourism sector, which was 11 % of the GDP in 2019, representing $78.2 billion, and rose to $17.95 billion in the third quarter of 2022, of which 85.7 percent came from foreign visitors. In 2018, tourism directly accounted for 7.7% of total employment in Turkey.
“Every American ambassador wonders how they can hurt Turkey. This has been one of Turkey’s greatest misfortunes over the years. It gathers other ambassadors and tries to give them advice. They are doing the same thing in Europe, the American embassy is running Europe,” said Soylu.
Soylu has criticized the U.S. and blames Washington for the 2016 Turkish regime change attempt, and has accused the U.S. of ruling Europe. In foreign policies, the EU follows U.S. directives implicitly.
“I’m being very clear. I very well know how you would like to create strife in Turkey. Take your grinning face off from Turkey,” said Soylu.
Ankara warned its citizens abroad to be aware of possible anti-Islamic attacks in the U.S. and Europe following the burning of the Quran in Sweden. Turkey later summoned the nine ambassadors, including Flake, for talks over the warnings.
Soylu condemned the European consulate closures in Turkey as an attempt to meddle in campaigning for Turkey’s presidential and parliamentary elections, which are scheduled for May 14.
Soylu and Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan have suggested that the western states had issued the security warnings in order to pressure Turkey to tone down its criticism of the Quran burning and resolve the NATO dispute in which Erdogan has voiced opposition to Sweden joining the bloc.
After a right-wing Swedish Radical Christian burned the Quran in front of the Turkish embassy in Stockholm, Erdogan threatened that he would never consent to Swedish accession.
Sweden previously has refused to extradite the 120 terrorists Turkey has demanded, and the U.S. Senate has made it clear that if Turkey does not approve Swedish accession, arms sales to Turkey, specifically F-16s, will not be authorized.
Turkish elections
Turkish elections are scheduled for May 14, and will be the toughest reelection fight of Erdogan’s career, and he and his Justice and Development Party (AKP) may lose the election.
The six-party opposition coalition, composed of two larger and four smaller parties, has managed to present a unified front. The opposition to Erdogan support the restoration of Turkey’s parliamentary system and the curtailment of presidential powers.
Erdogan’s fear has grown so strong that he used the courts to ban a leading potential opposition candidate, Istanbul Mayor Ekrem Imamoglu, from running for the CHP. However, polls suggest that Ankara’s mayor, Mansur Yavas, could beat Erdogan.
The state has more overtly targeted some political parties, especially the pro-Kurdish, People’s Democracy Party (HDP). This left-leaning party was not invited into the opposition coalition, but HDP supporters will vote against Erdogan.
Biden supports opposition to Erdogan
U.S. President Joe Biden hosted an emergency meeting on Nov. 16 in Bali, Indonesia, with NATO and EU leaders to discuss a response to a missile blast in Poland, but Turkey was not invited. The meeting was held during the Group of 20 summit, and Turkey was present, but Biden snubbed them from the emergency meeting.
Turkey has been a full-fledged member of North Atlantic Treaty Organization since 1952, commands its second-largest military and has protected the southern flank of the alliance for 70 years.
Erdogan was again snubbed by Biden in December 2021 at the U.S. hosted virtual ‘Summit for Democracy’. In a New York Times interview published in 2020, the then candidate Biden called Erdogan an “autocrat.”
“What I think we should be doing is taking a very different approach to him now, making it clear that we support opposition leadership,” Biden said.
“He has to pay a price,” Biden said, adding that Washington should embolden Turkish opposition leaders “to be able to take on and defeat Erdogan. Not by a coup, not by a coup, but by the electoral process.”
Turkey recognized a clear attack by Biden using election meddling as a tool.
The main opposition CHP party quickly distanced themselves from Biden’s remarks of election meddling, calling for “respect for the sovereignty of Turkey”.
Turkey’s six-party opposition will select its candidate to run against Erdogan on February 13, CHP leader Kemal Kilicdaroglu said.
Obama and Erdogan
When President Obama conceived of his attack in Syria for regime change in 2011, using Radical Islamic terrorists as his foot soldiers, he called upon Erdogan to play a crucial role. Turkey hosted the CIA office which ran the Timber Sycamore program which trained and provided weapons for the Free Syrian Army. Erdogan also took in over 3 million Syria refugees fleeing the violence. Erdogan authorized his security forces to transport weapons to the terrorists in Syria.
Erdogan was a follower of the Muslim Brotherhood who provided the political ideology for the Free Syrian Army (FSA), who were terrorists attacking unarmed civilians, but were reported by the U.S. and western media as ‘rebels’.
However, the FSA disbanded due to lack of public support in Syria, and Al Qaeda stepped in the take its place, and finally ISIS emerged as the toughest terrorist group.
In 2017, President Trump cut off the CIA program in Turkey, and supporting of the Al Qaeda branch in Idlib, Hayat Tahrir al-Sham was left to Erdogan. The U.S.-NATO attack on Syria failed to produce regime change, but the country was partly destroyed in the process. Now, Erdogan proposes a reset in relations with Damascus, and is on track to establish business and diplomatic ties once more.
The U.S. State Department has issued warnings and threats to Erdogan if he follows through on his plan to have a neighborly relationship with Syria. Erdogan needs to make peace with Syria to return the 3.6 million Syrian refugees back home, and revive exports to Syria which will be a huge boost to the Turkish economy. If he accomplishes this soon, he has a good chance at winning reelection in May.
Kurds-PKK-YPG
A deadly terrorist bombing of a shopping district in Istanbul last November was carried out by a Syrian Kurd. The message was directed at Erdogan: don’t attack the YPG in north east Syria, or else. Those Kurds are supported by the U.S. military illegally occupying parts of Syria.
The U.S. partnered with the YPG to fight the ISIS, and both Erdogan and the opposition view that as a betrayal of a fellow NATO member, and U.S. ally. The YPG is directly linked with the PKK, an internationally designated terrorist organization and a threat to Turkey’s national security.
Erdogan has threatened a new military operation in Syria to disarm the YPG regardless of their U.S. partnership. The Syrian special enjoy under Trump, James Jeffrey, advised the Kurds to repair their relationship with Damascus, as the U.S. was not going to fight any war to defend them. The Kurd’s usefulness to the U.S. was over. Recently, the Turkish air force has been bombing them, with shells falling a few hundred feet from U.S. personnel stationed there.
Erdogan has asked Russian President Vladimir Putin for a green light to attack the Kurds in Syria, but was cautioned against it. However, the time might be ripe for a Turkish attack on the Kurds, which would disarm them and probably would lead to a withdrawal of the 200 American troops.
Turkey removed M4 outpost
On February 2, Turkish troops in Syria evacuated a military outpost near the M4 highway that connects the cities of Aleppo and Latakia. The former Al Qaeda branch in Syria, Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), occupy Idlib, the last terrorist controlled area in Syria.
Turkey had been defending the HTS from attacks from Syrian Arab Army, and the Russian military. However, Erdogan has decided to drop his support of the armed opposition as he repairs his relationship with Syria.
On January 31, Ankara informed the HTS leadership of its plan to conduct patrols on the HTS-controlled portion of the M4 (Aleppo-Latakia) road, which “may be followed by joint patrols with Russia, and eventually with Syria.”
It’s getting harder to ignore. The persistent ISIS presence in the Syrian desert only serves US aims to continue its military occupation and support for Kurdish separatism.
In March 2019, former US President Donald Trump startled Washington’s war establishment by announcing that the mission of “eliminating terrorism” had been accomplished in Syria.
Seven months later, Trump solidified his claims by celebrating the assassination of ISIS leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi by a US special forces operation in rural Idlib, in the north of the country.
In reality, the US president had been angling to exit Syria for some time, and the absence of terrorism provided that excuse. Trump had promised his voter base to wind down expensive foreign military adventurism, and viewed the high cost of military deployment in Syria as disproportionate to the gains realized.
But while withdrawing US forces from various locations in Syria’s north and northeast, the American president was pressured to maintain a small number of troops in the oil-rich countryside of Hasakah and Deir Ezzor, and in the Al-Tanf base, an area crucial to Israel’s strategic interests as it is located on the border with of Iraq and Jordan, and on the hypothetical road that connects Tehran to Beirut.
Trump, known for his brazen proclamations, publicly stated that “oil interests” were the reason for keeping this small contingent of US troops in the embattled Levantine state. The wholesale exit of US forces would have paved the way for Syrian and Russian troops to take back control of the northeast, and for Moscow to move forward with its peace plan through the Astana Process with Iran and Turkiye.
The facade of ‘fighting terror’
With the arrival of Democratic President Joe Biden to the White House, Washington shifted its priorities and sought to maintain a protracted presence in Syria under the pretext of “fighting terrorism.” ISIS cells were magically reactivated in the Syrian desert, a development heavily circulated in US media through “intelligence sources.” This prompted accusations from Moscow that Washington is supporting terrorism from its Al-Tanf base, which Russian planes bombed last July.
Amidst escalating hostilities between the US and Russia over Ukraine, Syrian field sources have informed The Cradle of the existence of communication channels between the Al-Tanf base and ISIS cells that carry out scattered attacks in the Syrian Desert against the Syrian Arab Army (SAA) and its allied, Iran-backed factions.
The sources have also noted a marked shift in both ISIS tactics and the terror group’s access to advanced weapons and modern communication equipment that have been discovered in their hideouts. Given Iraq’s stringent measures on all border crossing with Syria – digging a trench along the border, building a separation fence, and installing surveillance cameras and checkpoints – it is unlikely that ISIS could obtain these resources without support from a powerful nation.
Kurdish forces employ the ISIS threat
During every Turkish threat to attack US-backed Kurdish forces in the country’s northern provinces, the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) raises the specter of ISIS and its expansion, which is used to justify the continued Kurdish occupation of northern Syria to repel these attacks.
This pattern repeated itself during the 2016-2017 Turkish Euphrates Shield operation against ISIS and Kurdish targets, the 2018 Olive Branch operation when Turkish forces invaded Afrin in Aleppo’s countryside, and the 2019 Turkish offensive called the Peace Spring operation.
The trend continued last December, when Ankara threatened to attack Kurdish-held territories in Syria’s north. The SDF, which had halted operations against ISIS, quickly reversed its decision two days later.
In addition to playing the ISIS card to justify its relevance, the SDF – which is affiliated with the Kurdish Democratic Union Party (PYD) which Ankara considers an extension of the terrorist-designated Kurdistan Worker’s Party (PKK) – has another lever it frequently employs.
The Kurdish group controls dozens of prisons that house thousands of ISIS leaders, fighters, and their families, the most notorious of which are Al-Hol camp near the Iraqi border, and Al-Sinaa prison in the Hasakah Governorate.
And the SDF, in coordination with US strategists, have employed this leverage to release ISIS members and their families from camps or to allow prison breaks at important junctures.
So why are ISIS attacks on the rise?
A clear correlation can be observed between the rise in ISIS attacks and US attempts to fortify its presence in Syria in order to ‘fight terror.’ After a period of relative decline during Trump’s presidency, the terrorist organization has regained strength, ironically, following Biden’s decision to expand operations against ISIS.
In early 2022, ISIS launched an attack on Al-Sinaa Prison, which holds prominent ISIS leaders and fighters. The operation came less than three weeks after several noteworthy developments: First, international coalition forces brought in large shipments of weapons, including Bradley vehicles and anti-tank weapons; Second, coalition forces returned to the Lafarge base on the strategic international M4 highway north of Aleppo; Third, western forces had just completed maintenance operations for the oil fields.
Notably, the attack also took place after US Caesar Act sanctions were lifted from areas controlled by the SDF and Turkiye.
US support for the SDF through exempting Kurdish areas from the Caesar Act demonstrates Washington’s goal of solidifying the Kurdish Autonomous Administration in SDF-controlled areas. This serves to ensure a continued US presence and foothold in resource-rich northeastern Syria in the event of a future withdrawal of troops – and ongoing obstruction of Russian peace efforts to stabilize the country.
Terrorism: a tool for US expansionism
As soon as Ankara voiced its willingness to reconcile with Damascus, the US began preparing for a new troop deployment to fortify its position in Syria, particularly since rapprochement – backed by Russia and Iran – hinges on several key agreements, the most prominent of which requires the exit of US forces from the country as a necessity for a political solution.
The new US military expansion – which is essentially a redeployment – returns troops to previous bases in former ISIS-stronghold Al-Raqqa Governorate all the way to the border with Turkiye, restructures and revitalizes the jihadist-aligned Raqqa Revolutionaries Brigade (Liwa Thuwwar al-Raqqa), and provides them with weapons and equipment to form an SDF-like force in this predominantly Arab province.
In December 2022, ISIS launched a series of attacks in Raqqa, which served as the necessary pretext for the US and SDF to launch a large-scale security operation in and around the governorate. The US military used the attacks as an opportunity to reposition its forces, bring in heavy machinery, and rehabilitate helicopter airstrips.
Similarly, US-led coalition forces and the SDF launched the Al-Jazeera Thunderbolt security campaign in and around Al-Hasakah early this year, which resulted in the arrest of 154 ISIS members – according to an SDF statement on 7 January. However, these figures were questioned by locals, who accused the SDF and coalition forces of arresting countless innocent civilians in the Tel Hamis area.
Local sources accuse the SDF of drawing up indiscriminate lists that include personal targets, which have led to accusations against innocent people, the arrest of US occupation opponents who have nothing to do with ISIS, and a desire to increase detainee numbers as part of “the show” that accompanies all US operations.
In light of these facts, Syrian military sources in the eastern desert anticipate an increase in ISIS attacks – particularly as Syrian-Turkish reconciliation talks progress and exert negative pressure on US ambitions in Syria’s north. The sources says that the connection between the US and ISIS, which is used opportunistically and strategically to achieve political goals, is no longer a secret and will only gather further steam in the months ahead.
The views expressed in this article do not necessarily reflect those of The Cradle.
Tomorrow, the Foreign Ministers of Turkey and Syria will meet in Moscow. This is the highest level meeting between the two countries who have been on opposite sides of the US-NATO war on Syria for regime change since 2011.
The outcome of that meeting, and the expected follow-up meeting between Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan and Syrian President Bashar al-Assad, may form the basis for the recovery of Syria, circumventing the UN resolution 2254, which has failed to produce results.
The US has lost the war, but has used armed militias to remain occupying parts of Syria, and to impose a stalemate which prevents a peaceful solution and recovery for Syria. America is no longer the only superpower, and decisions made in the new Middle East no longer depend on orders from the US State Department.
Erdogan is up for re-election in June and faces heavy opposition. The economy is dismal, and people blame the Syrian refugees for lost jobs and social ills. Erdogan and the opposition promise to send the refugees packing.
The Turkish export market to Syria in 2011 represented half of the entire global export market for Turkey. That was lost when Damascus banned all Turkish imports because of their participation in the war on Syria. Erdogan could get the Syrian market restored by repairing the relationship.
In order to win re-election, Erdogan proposes a rapprochement with Assad. The US has voiced its displeasure at any attempt of any country to repair relations with Syria. However, Erdogan will not be swayed by US opinion or threats, in light of the fact that the US supports, trains and supplies weapons to the Kurdish militia (SDF and YPG) linked to an internationally banned terrorist organization (PKK), which have killed thousands in Turkey over three decades of terrorism. The Kurds know that Turkey is a much more important ally to the US, and the US will never fight Turkey to save the Kurds. Former US envoy to Syria, James Jeffrey, told the Kurds they should repair their relationship with Damascus for protection. The US never supported a “homeland” for the Kurds.
Syria and Turkey are united in their goal to demilitarize the Kurdish northeast of Syria. Syria and Turkey share a common enemy (the Kurds), and a common ally (Russia). This may be the basis of forming a new foreign policy between the two neighbors.
Syria
Syrian officials have met with Turkish officials and Arab Gulf officials. Some Arab embassies in Damascus were re-opened, and Assad made a visit to the UAE.
The Assad administration in Damascus controls the vast majority of the Syrian territory. The exceptions are: Idlib province in the northwest is under the occupation of Hayat Tahrir al-Sham, a Radical Islamic terrorist group which was the former Al Qaeda branch in Syria, and the Kurdish administration region in the northeast under the occupation of about 600 US troops and two local Kurdish militias (SDF and YPG) which follow a communist political ideology first promoted by the jailed PKK leader, Abdullah Ocalan.
Syria and Russia have been prevented from attacking and liberating Idlib from terrorist control. The US uses the three million civilians living under occupation as human shields to prevent attack. The US and its allies in the UN demand that the UN food and medical supplies be delivered to Idlib. The civilians are being fed and clothed, but the terrorists and their families are as well. The international community is supporting the welfare of the terrorists, who are there at the behest of the US, to prevent peace and recovery in Syria. Despite the UN protocol which demands all UN members to fight Al Qaeda, or their affiliates, anywhere on earth, the US and Turkey have circumvented the protocol and use the terrorists as guards of the political stalemate which the US imposed on Syria.
The US
America has maintained an iron grip on Syria through the use of US sanctions and a brutal military occupation which has prevented the Syrian citizens from fuel for transportation and home heating, and to generate electricity. Syrian houses, hospitals, schools and businesses have between 15 minutes to 1 hour of electricity in four intervals per day because of the US imposed sanctions, which have not affected the Syrian government, but have brought the Syrian people to desperation. Kidney dialysis machines require electricity constantly. A gasoline powered generator can suffice when there are blackouts, but the US sanctions also prevent the importation of gasoline. How can Syrians survive?
Despite Richard Haass writing in 1998 that US sanctions are ineffective and immoral against civilians, the US State Department hangs on to sanctions as a tool for regime change.
Iran
Iran and Syria have been united in their resistance to the occupation of Palestine Golan Heights and Shebaa Farms. Iran stood firmly with Syria during the US-NATO attack on Syria because it is a key in the land route from Iran to Lebanon. Recently, there are some cracks appearing in the relationship between Damascus and Tehran. Iranian President Ebrahim Raisi’s meeting in Damascus was postponed recently. Some experts feel Iran has been asking too much of Syria, and with new opportunities for improved relations with the Arab Gulf and Turkey, Syria may be taking time to evaluate its options.
Israel, Saudi Arabia, and other Arab countries want to see Iran out of Syria. As long as Iran is in Syria the Israeli airstrikes will continue, which have been deadly and destructive.
There were 32 Israeli raids in 2022 that destroyed and struck 91 targets, including civilian infrastructure, buildings, weapons caches and vehicles. Eighty-eight military personnel were killed and 121 wounded in the attacks.
Perhaps this may explain why the US takes no action against Saudi Arabia even when there have been deadly issues, or when Biden asked the Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman (MBS) to pump more oil, and he refused.
MBS is making huge reforms, which includes loosening restrictions on women, and creating new tourism and international sports opportunities.
MBS and Netanyahu are united in a common issue: to prevent Iran from obtaining a nuclear weapon, despite Iran insisting on wanting nuclear capabilities for peaceful purposes, such as energy production and medical research. Netanyahu has stated one of his main priorities in office will be to normalize relations with Saudi Arabia.
The Arab League
The upcoming Arab League Summit will take place in Saudi Arabia, traditionally scheduled yearly in March. Depending on the outcome of meetings between now and spring, Syria could possibly be reinstated and occupy their seat at the table. Big changes have been taking place in the region involving the relations between Arab countries and the US, China and Russia. Saudi Arabia is in the driver’s seat and will use their hosting of the summit to project their ranking as the Middle East’s power broker.
Israel
Israeli Foreign Minister Eli Cohen has announced that the next Abraham Accords summit will be held in Morocco in March 2023.
The US had brokered in 2020 the Abraham Accords for the normalization of relations between Israel, Morocco, the UAE and Bahrain. Later, Sudan joined the accords. Areas of shared interests are: defense, investment, agriculture, tourism, and energy.
The meetings and realignments between Syria and Turkey, mediated by Russia, may produce lasting changes in the Middle East, and bring enemies together as new friends. The Israeli occupation of Palestine will continue to be the primary cause of instability and violence in the region. It fuels religious extremism and terrorism. If Israel values the establishment of relations with their Arab neighbors, they must first look at their closest neighbors in Gaza and the West Bank. The Middle East and the world wait for a peace summit to begin the process of peace for Israel and Palestine, and the host country will not likely be the US.
Steven Sahiounie is a two-time award-winning journalist
On 12 January, Syrian President Bashar al-Assad met with the special envoy of his Russian counterpart Vladimir Putin to discuss Moscow’s proposal to establish bilateral talks between Damascus and Ankara; however, Assad remarked that any talks between the two states would require Ankara to end its presence in northern Syria.
The Syrian government indicated that the discussions during the meeting revolved around international and regional issues, with Assad noting that media and political battles are at their height in recent years, adding that these disputes require more stability regarding clarity on political positions, referencing Damascus’s position on Russia’s military operation in Ukraine.
Russia’s envoy, Alexander Lavrentiev, clarified that Moscow appreciates Damascus’s position throughout the Russia-Ukraine conflict, and despite Washington’s efforts in placing pressure on nations on good and neutral terms with Russia, it failed to isolate Moscow and Damascus.
Lavrentiev also reiterated that Moscow is seeking a tripartite meeting between Turkiye, Russia, and Syria, stressing the importance of following up with one another to resolve tensions between the neighboring countries.
Earlier this month, the US Department of State spokesman, Ned Price, expressed grave concern over Turkiye’s recent rapprochement with the Syrian government, adding that the US calls on its allies and international partners to refrain from normalizing ties with Damascus.
The Turkish Minister of Defense, Hulusi Akar, has previously affirmed Turkiye’s respect for the sovereignty of Syria and announced their presence in the country is limited to fighting Turkish-designated terrorist groups, such as the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK).
Turkiye has been launching indiscriminate artillery attacks across northern Syria and Iraq over recent months, targeting positions held by the People Protection Units (YPG) and the PKK.
Despite Moscow’s stress on the importance of mending ties between Damascus and Ankara, Akar revealed last month that discussions are being held with Russia to use the airspace above northern Syria for a potential cross-border operation that targets Kurdish militant groups.
As the UAE tries to join Russia in mediating between Ankara and Damascus, the US is looking to establish a middle ground between Turkiye and the SDF in hopes of preventing normalization with Syria
During a speech in Ankara on 5 January, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan hinted that a meeting with his Syrian counterpart Bashar al-Assad may soon take place, “as part of efforts for peace.” He added that a tripartite meeting between the foreign ministers of Turkiye, Russia and Syria is scheduled to be held in the near future for the first time since 2011.
The upcoming meeting aims to enhance communication after Russian-sponsored talks between the Turkish and Syrian defense ministers were held in Moscow on 28 December. The meeting was the highest-level of official meetings between Ankara and Damascus since the start of the Syrian war.
In a phone call with Russian President Vladimir Putin on 5 January, Erdogan called on the Syrian government to “take the steps to achieve a tangible solution concerning the case of Syria.”
The US seeks to establish a middle ground between Ankara and the SDF in order to prevent Turkish-Syrian reconciliation
The Syrian-Turkish rapprochement via declared Russian mediation was paralleled by Emirati-Syrian rapprochement – the latest of which was a “brotherly” meeting aimed at strengthening cooperation and restoring historical relations between Assad and Foreign Minister of the UAE Abdallah bin Zayed Al-Nahyan, according to SANA.
Saudi newspaper Asharq Al-Awsat reported that the UAE seeks “to join Russia in sponsoring Syrian-Turkish relations at a high level,” noting that the Emirati foreign minister’s visit to Damascus sought to arrange Turkiye’s participation in the tripartite meeting of Syrian-Turkish-Russian foreign ministers, making it a quadripartite meeting.
The meeting is meant to pave the way for a presidential meeting between Erdogan and Assad in the presence of Putin. Reportedly, the UAE has offered to host this summit, with a possibility of a high-level UAE official being present at the meeting if it will be held in Moscow.
Asharq Al-Awsat added that Turkish Foreign Minister Mevlut Cavusoglu plans to visit Washington on 16-17 January to brief US officials on the developments of Turkish-Syrian normalization, his meeting with Syrian Foreign Minister Faysal Mikdad, and the “roadmap” sponsored by Moscow in the context of security, military, political and economic fields – as agreed upon by the defense ministers as well as the intelligence chiefs in Syria, Turkiye and Russia over the past weeks.
As Turkiye has been launching successive operations against Kurdish groups both on the Turkish-Syrian border as well as within Syria itself under ‘Operation Claw Sword,’ a Western official informed Asharq Al-Awsat that a high-ranking US official will be visiting Ankara in the coming hours as part of efforts to mediate between Turkiye and the SDF in northeastern Syria.
Ankara has demanded that Moscow and Washington commit to the implementation of the bilateral military agreements signed at the end of 2019. The agreements stipulate the withdrawal of the Kurdish People’s Protection Units (YPG) and the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) to beyond 30 kilometers from the Turkish border, and from the areas of Manbij and Tal Rifaat, in addition to the withdrawal of all heavy weaponry.
The SDF says that it has fulfilled its obligations, and will not withdraw its police force – known as the Asayish – nor dismantle its local councils, despite Turkiye’s insistence on dissolving all Kurdish military and civil institutions in the area.
Meanwhile, Cavusoglu told media on 29 December that Ankara is willing to withdraw from the territory it occupies in northern Syria and hand it over to Damascus in the event that “political stability” is reached – after cooperation in “neutralizing ISIS members, the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) and the YPG.”
The Saudi newspaper’s report stated that US mediation seeks to reach a “compromise” between the Kurdish groups and Ankara without a new Turkish incursion taking place ahead of the Turkish presidential and parliamentary elections in mid-2023. This mediation seems to be an attempt at circumventing the imminent Syrian-Turkish reconciliation.
Another official source disclosed that Ankara was “uncomfortable with the leaks following the meeting of the Syrian, Turkish and Russian defense ministers in Moscow, and that it had agreed to a full withdrawal.” However, the source confirmed that, “it is true that Ankara and Damascus consider the PKK a common threat, and will work against any separatist agenda, because it is an existential threat to both countries,” adding that the two countries will “work to open the Aleppo-Latakia Highway.”
Following the UAE’s visit to Damascus, which came after the US called on its allies and international partners to refrain from normalizing ties with Syria, Asharq Al-Awsat quoted an official as saying that the US has been the only western country to issue a statement against normalization, and is working alongside Paris, Berlin, and London to assume a united stance against normalization with Syria.
Communication is currently underway for a meeting between the representatives of Paris, Berlin, London, and Washington and UN Special Envoy for Syria Geir Pederson in Geneva on 23 January. This meeting will take place before Pedersen’s visit to Damascus to meet with the Syrian foreign minister to “confirm the position against normalization, and support the provision of funding for electricity projects within the timeline of early recovery,” stipulated by a resolution for international aid that will be extended before 10 January.
Asharq Al-Awsat said that the UAE has proposed to contribute to the funding of economic and electrical projects in Syria – within the confines of the Caesar Act.
Simultaneously, Jordan, who was the first to open high-level channels of communication with Damascus, is leading efforts alongside other Arab countries to reach a “united Arab position that defines Arab demands in order to make normalization possible.”
The newspaper quoted another western official as saying that Jordan is calling for coordination to put pressure on Damascus to provide political and geopolitical steps for the coming phase in southern Syria, as Amman confirmed that there has been an increase in the smuggling of Captagon, weapons and ammunition across the Syrian border following the start of the normalization process. Additionally, Amman has said that the Iranian presence in southern Syria near the Jordanian border has not diminished, and that there has been an expansion of ISIS activity in the area, according to the official.
Syria’s Arab League membership was suspended in November of 2011 following the start of the Syrian war, and it has been excluded ever since.
Alexandr Svaranc In today’s geopolitical dynamics, Russia and Turkey maintain a relevant regional presence in strategically important regions of the Near and Middle East, where the interests of the two powers can combine and diverge. However, the ruling elites have a high sense of maintaining a balance of power, respecting national interests, avoiding the prospect of radicalization of conflict situations and seeking decoupling to strengthen regional peace and mutually beneficial cooperation.
It should be recognized that the administrations of Presidents Vladimir Putin and Recep Tayyip Erdoğan have so far succeeded in finding relatively acceptable solutions to crisis situations through constructive dialogue, guiding the diplomacy of the two countries towards finding joint solutions on the same issue of Syria, overcoming the burden of historical stereotypes and building a new example of a worthy partnership.
In this context, Russia and Turkey have established a number of effective negotiating platforms (in particular the Astana, Sochi and Geneva summits in multilateral and bilateral formats). Russia understands the concerns of Turkish partners on key issues of Turkey’s national security (including ethnic separatism, external threats to territorial integrity and international terrorism). Russia, given its economic, resource, technological, intellectual and military-industrial strength, does not set out to suppress its important geographical neighbor. On the contrary, Moscow is developing a high level of strategic partnership in all the aforementioned areas, making a significant contribution to stabilizing Turkey’s financial and economic situation and strengthening its defense potential, and expects to expand trade with the ambitious goal of reaching USD 100 billion.
The stability and progress of each country depends not least on border security and the normalization of relations with its immediate neighbors. The political course of Turkey’s ruling Justice Party, led by its charismatic leader Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, proclaimed the “Zero Problems with the Neighbors” strategy in the early 2000s. For the Republic of Turkey, which will celebrate its 100th anniversary in 2023, the tradition of a post-imperial state remains high, where the complex history of the collapse of the Ottoman Empire following World War I was partly transformed into a painful relationship with many of its neighbors, who regained or lost their independence on the wreckage of the collapsed state.
Of course, the declaration of the said strategy without taking into account current realities cannot simultaneously succeed on all directions of Turkey’s borders and requires time and painstaking diplomatic work on bilateral and multilateral levels. At the same time, Turkey has had a number of positive achievements in shaping better relations with Russia, Georgia, Bulgaria and African countries. There is every reason to believe that Ankara is also interested in restoring full-fledged friendly relations with such a key country in the Arab East as Syria.
The peculiarities of the US regional policy in the Middle East have led to widespread destabilization in a number of Arab countries, to the negative phenomenon of the growth of radical Islamic movements with their institutionalization as Al Qaeda and ISIS (both terrorist groups banned in Russia), which eventually led to the chaos in a large part of the Levant. Accordingly, the destabilization of the political situation in the same Syria has provoked ethnic and religious strife, triggered a wave-like flow of a large army of refugees mainly to neighboring Turkey, and caused a significant social and economic crisis which took a heavy toll on the Turkish economy.
For Turkey, the politicization of the Kurdish issue within and near its national borders is an objective concern, forcing the authorities to pursue a tough course to prevent another territorial redistribution and, as a consequence, new social cataclysms in the Near and Middle East. Both Turkey and its reliable partners have to contend with these challenges.
The Russian peacekeeping operation in Syria since fall 2015 has set a new precedent for eliminating the US foreign monopoly in this region. With the arrival of the Russian Air Force, conditions have developed on Syrian territory for more effective interaction with key states in the Near and Middle East (in particular Turkey and Iran) to curb the threat of international terrorism emanating from ISIS (terrorist group banned in Russia) and to find political ways to resolve the accumulated differences in the Syrian-Turkish agenda, combining them with effective peacekeeping operations.
Turkey, which has problems with Kurdish separatism, is very sensitive to attempts to activate the Kurdish militant movement in Syria. This is why, after the Syrian Kurds declared political autonomy in 2014, Ankara recognized the Syrian Kurdish Democratic Union Party (PYD) as a terrorist organization and ally of the PKK, which is banned in Turkey, and the fighting wing of the PYD, the People’s Protection Units (YPG), as a military opponent. Partly due to the Russian presence in Syria, a number of Turkey’s limited military operations in the north have become a reality in order to avoid the creation of quasi Kurdish independent territorial entities capable of intensifying terrorist and separatist threats to Ankara. In particular:
– Operation Euphrates Shield in 2016-2017 (as a result, the cities of Jarablus and al-Bab were subjected to military mop-ups, 2,000 square kilometers of Syrian territory came under Turkish control with the formation of a security buffer zone there);
– Operation Olive Branch in 2018 to prevent the Kurdish-populated cantons of Jazira, Kobani and Afrin from uniting and the Kurds from reaching the Mediterranean Sea (Afrin ended up under full control of Turkish forces);
– Operation Peace Spring in October 2019, with Turkish military and pro-Turkish Free Syrian Army (FSA) units advancing deep into northern Syria, taking control of new population centers – Ras al-Ain and Tel Abyad, cutting the strategic M-4 highway. Thanks to effective negotiations between the Russian and Turkish leaders in Sochi on October 22, 2019, new zones of influence in north-eastern Syria were secured, with the status quo maintained in Turkish-occupied areas and the withdrawal of all Kurdish groups from the entire border with Turkey 30km inland, as well as the establishment of Russian-Turkish patrols in the area.
It should be noted that from operation to operation, Turkey has built up its military forces from special forces units to the use of armored vehicles, artillery and air force with a combination of infantry from the same FSA units, gaining new experience in combat operations in this theater.
In November 2022, with air strikes against Kurdish military bases (in Kobani, Aleppo, Raqqa, al-Hasakah), Turkey announced a new “Operation Claw-Sword” in northern Syria. The formal occasion was the terrorist act of November 13, 2022 in Istanbul’s Istiklal Square, which the Turkish intelligence services recognized to be organized by Kurdish insurgents (in particular the PKK and a Kurdish fighter executor from Syria). Ankara aims to implement a declared plan to establish a 30-kilometer security zone along the entire border with Syria.
Erdoğan has announced his intention to conduct a ground operation involving regular army forces alongside the air operation. He also criticized Russia to a certain extent. Turkey’s leader believes that Moscow has not fully met its obligations under the 2019 Sochi agreements to withdraw Kurds from the 30-kilometer zone. However, the creation of the same “Idlib Security Zone” with Russian participation was, infamously, prevented by the fact that the US refused to withdraw its forces from the zone with the support of local Kurdish forces.
Russia and Turkey have gone a long way towards an effective partnership in the Syrian crisis. Of course, every time Moscow and Ankara make progress in finding new solutions to stabilize the situation in northern Syria, the US, aware of the loss of its own hegemony in the region, finds another form of torpedoing the Russian-Turkish agreements. Accordingly, the Russian-Turkish effective partnership is perceived in Washington as a kind of attack on America’s monopoly and a breakdown of NATO unity, plagued by equally obvious internal contradictions.
Meanwhile, Russia-Turkey relations are progressing with strong results to show for it. Thus, according to Mehmet Samsar, Turkish Ambassador to Russia, the trade turnover between Russia and Turkey by the end of 2022 could be close to USD 50 billion, an increase of USD 15 billion over 2021. The scope of this partnership is expanding: from a gas pipeline to a nuclear power plant, from military and technical cooperation to joint actions for regional peace, from a grain deal to a gas hub. Turkey remains one of the few NATO countries that has not supported total sanctions against Russia in the context of the special military operation in Ukraine, pursues a traditionally pragmatic policy and maintains its role as a reliable partner and effective mediator in relations with its northern neighbor.
The author believes that, in the new year too, the Russian-Turkish situational alliance that has developed in recent years will maintain its momentum of growth, trust and optimization of new opportunities. The coming year 2023 will prove to be a time of intense and important political, economic, military and cultural events in the lives of the two countries. In particular, the next presidential election in Turkey, the launch of ambitious new economic projects (the gas hub, the unblocking of important regional communications, the prospect of a second nuclear power plant near Sinop on the Turkish Black Sea Coast), the establishment of stability in the safe corridor on the Turkish-Syrian border, the approach of peace in the Russian-Ukrainian conflict, etc. All this points to a broader agenda of Russia-Turkey relations, where the parties can complement each other and interact effectively.
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The AKP barely passes 30% of popular support as Erdogan still amps up preparations to enter Syria and dissolve Kurdish militias, which Turkey views as tied to the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) guerrillas.
The Turkish presidential election is set to take place on June 23 and is anticipated to be the most polarized this new year, determining the fate of 85 million citizens in the nation of 3 continents: Europe, the Middle East, and Asia.
Although the election is still six months away, Erdogan’s conservative Justice and Development Party (Adalet ve Kalkinma Partisi, or AKP), which came to power in 2002, may face a difficult challenge.
The country is already dealing with high inflation and a depreciation of the Turkish lira against the US dollar.
The AKP is barely passing 30% of popular support, according to recent polls in Turkey. Despite that, Erdogan is still amping up preparations to enter Syria and dissolve Kurdish militias, which Turkey views as tied to the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) guerrillas.
He has also threatened to strike its NATO ally Greece over the regional disputes of Cyprus, alleged “militarization” of Greek islands, and expansion in the Aegean Sea.
Turkish Defense Minister Hulusi Akar accused Greece on Monday of sabotaging bilateral meetings with Turkey, which intend to be for trust-building and cooperation in NATO.
Greece took advantage of the meetings to present its problems “as Turkey’s issues in its relations with NATO, the US, and EU,” according to Akar, while simultaneously attempting to steer public attention away from domestic scandals. After Greek politicians’ called Turkey a threat, Akar responded by asserting that his country is a reliable ally and poses no threat.
Erdogan placed Turkey as an irreplaceable mediator between Russia and Ukraine, proven in the most recent Black Sea Grain Deal initiative and by hosting talks between US and Russian security officials.
Not only so, but he has worked both sides by supplying Kiev with arms and simultaneously safeguarding trade and energy ties with Russia.
History repeats itself
Istanbul Mayor Ekrem Imamoglu from the Republican People’s Party (CHP) was sentenced by a court last month to more than two years in prison, which prevented him from practicing politics for the same period, on charges of insulting members of the Supreme Electoral Council in 2019.
The Istanbul Mayor is among a handful of opposition leaders that polls show could beat Erdogan in a head-to-head race during the presidential race next June. Thousands of Turks gathered in a square in the center of Istanbul last month to protest the political ban against the opposition mayor of the city.
In light of that, the US State Department expressed that it is “deeply troubled and disappointment” at the possibility of excluding one of Erdogan’s biggest rivals from the political scene.
Germany described the decision as “a heavy blow to democracy,” while France urged Turkey “reverse its slide away from the rule of law, democracy, and respect for fundamental rights.”
Erdogan denied his involvement with the verdict against Imamoglu, as he said: “What is behind the storm sparked by a verdict these past few days? This debate has nothing to do with us – neither with me nor with our nation.”
It is worth recalling that Erdogan was a former Istanbul mayor, who was sentenced to a year in jail for reading an alleged Islamist poem in 1994 and was prohibited from running for office until further notice.
Millet, iradesine sahip çıktı.
Bugün Saraçhane'de bu iradeye sahip çıkan kıymetli liderlerimize, vekillerimize, belediye başkanlarımıza ve bizi hiçbir zaman yalnız bırakmayan İstanbullulara teşekkürler. Hiçbir yargı oyunu, hiçbir engelleme çabası bizi yolumuzdan döndüremez. pic.twitter.com/jsoHBnDHht
In his political lifetime, Erdogan went from having no problems with neighboring nations to full-launch attacks on Syria and Greece. But, a ground execution of military operations in Syria could come and bite back as it already triggers US and Russian reactions against it.
In a meeting with Russian President Vladimir Putin last month, Erdogan confirmed that it is “important to clear the (Kurdish fighters) from the border to a depth of at least 30 kilometers,” noting it was “a priority”.
Erdogan has been threatening to conduct a new military incursion into northern Syria to move out Kurdish forces, which he blames for the November bomb blast that killed six people in Istanbul.
The Turkish President also said his country is committed to destroying the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) “until its last militant is neutralized” and raised the possibility of conducting a ground operation soon.
It is worth noting that on November 20, Turkey launched airstrikes that targeted military bases belonging to the PKK and its armed wing, the YPK, in northern Syria and Iraq.
This year, November will mark the 100th anniversary of Mustafa Kemal Ataturk’s foundation of Turkey from the remains of the Ottoman Empire.
It seems like Erdogan is taking advantage of the current multipolar world order between the US and Russia in order to replace both and make Turkey the global hegemonic power as it was back in the days of Ataturk.
In the midst of all of this, the EU stands on the sidelines, watching the fight as it struggles with inflation and the energy crisis.
Turkey is the EU’s largest trade partner, but after delaying Turkey’s entry into the EU bloc, it has lost influence in Ankara, and Belgium now has to persuade and buy off Turkey in order to keep the nearly 4 million Syrian refugees from crossing into Greece.
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Turkey has agreed to a complete pull-out of its troops from Syria after a recent meeting between defense ministers of Russia, Turkey and Syria in Moscow, according to a report published in Syrian media.
The Arabic-language al-Watan newspaper said in a Friday report that Russia had brokered the meeting in Moscow after intelligence authorities of Turkey and Syria held several rounds of discussions to sort out their differences.
It said that Turkish media outlets, especially those who are close to President Recep Tayyip Erdogan, have also published articles and opinion pieces in recent months suggesting that the Turkish government would better put aside differences with Syria in line with political changes and developments that have happened in the region.
The report said that the meeting in Moscow on Wednesday was held after Damascus and Ankara reached consensus on some key issues, including the need to take into account conditions set by Syria in previous rounds of negotiations.
A source told al-Watan that Turkey had agreed in the tripartite meeting in Moscow to fully withdraw its forces from Syria and to respect sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Arab country.
Turkish Defense Minister Hulusi Akar, his Syrian counterpart Ali Mahmoud Abbas and Russia’s defense chief Sergei Shoigu attended the meeting.
The report said that Syria and Turkey had also discussed the implementation of a 2020 agreement to reopen the M4 highway in northwest Syria along the border with Turkey.
The participants also emphasized that the PKK terrorist group has been a pawn in the hands of the United States and the Zionist regime and should be considered as a major threat to both Syria and Turkey.
They also agreed to set up some specialized committees follow up on agreements reached in the meeting and to hold other rounds of talks between Ankara and Damascus in future.
Late on Wednesday, the Syria’s Ministry of Defense described the meeting between defense ministers of Turkey and Syria as positive.
It said the meeting paved the way for pursuing efforts meant to fight terrorism and to review the situation in Syria, especially with regards to the refugees.
Defense ministers attending the meeting also emphasized the need for continued trilateral talks in order to create stability in Syria and in the wider region.
Russian Defense Ministry also issued a statement after the meeting and said that defense ministers of the three countries had discussed the crisis in Syria, the issue of refugees and fight against terrorism.
While Damascus is open to negotiations with Ankara, it is wary of being used as a Turkish pre-election political ploy.
On 15 December, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan announced that his government planned to schedule a tripartite mechanism with Russia to work toward Syrian-Turkish rapprochement.
Initially, he suggested the establishment of meetings between intelligence agencies, and defense and foreign ministries, to be followed by a meeting of the respective leaders. “I offered it to Mr Putin and he has a positive view on it,” the Turkish president was cited as saying.
In the past few months, Erdogan has displayed an increasing interest in meeting with Syrian President Bashar al-Assad, whom he characterized as a “murderer” only a few short years ago.
Diplomatic developments
Early signs of rapprochement between Ankara and Damascus are already evident in multiple, ongoing meetings between their respective intelligence agencies.
Somer Sultan, a Turkish journalist residing in Syria, told The Cradle that recently the level of talks between intelligence services has been raised.
According to Sultan, one of the outcomes of these talks is the establishment of the 25th Special Mission Forces Division of the Syrian Arab Army (SAA) – commonly known as the ‘Tiger Forces’ – on the Turkish-Syrian border in many areas evacuated by the US-backed Kurdish militia, the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF).
It also appears that – at least for now – Russia and the US have blocked a new Turkish ground offensive in Syria against SDF/YPG Kurdish militias, which Erdogan has been threatening to launch for several months.
Meeting of the US, SDF, and PUK
Two days before Turkish Foreign Minister Mevlut Cavusoglu and his US counterpart Antony Blinken met on 22 December, an interesting meeting was held in Syria.
US General Matthew McFarlane, the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) leader and the son of Jalal Talabani, Bafel Talabani, and SDF leader Mazloum Abdi participated in this meeting. During his visit to North Syria, Bafel Talabani also met with PYD co-leaders Asya Abdullah and Salih Muslim.
It is important to note that Turkiye has recently threatened the PUK-held Sulaymaniyah in northern Iraq, and accused the PUK of supporting the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK), a group viewed as a terrorist organization by both Washington and Ankara.
So far, the US and Russia have managed to deter Turkiye from launching a ground incursion into Syria. However, a new Turkish security concept, “meeting and eliminating threats across borders,” continues in Iraq and Syria whereby PKK targets continue to be identified and eliminated.
Turkish journalist Murat Yetkin quotes a senior Turkish security officer as saying that Ankara has warned the US to stop escorting PKK/YPG elements in Syria. According to this officer, Turkiye has advised the US forces to affix a UN or US flag on their cars to avoid any friendly fire.
What does Turkiye offer?
Relations with Syria, its related refugee conundrum, and generalized economic crisis are among the most heated topics in Turkiye’s domestic politics. Indeed, several Turkish opposition parties have attributed the refugee problem as a direct consequence of Erdogan’s misguided Syrian policy – a popular view in Turkiye today.
Former Turkish Ambassador Ahmet Kamil Erozan, now a deputy of the opposition IYI (Good) Party, revealed to The Cradle that Turkiye has thus far not made any serious offer to the Syrian side.
“What the government says in public is the threat of YPG/PKK,” Erozan said. “But we, IYI Party, think that this is not enough. Idlib is the hotbed of terrorism and AKP (Erdogan’s ruling Justice and Development Party) has not touched upon this topic during the negotiations yet.”
He believes that Erdogan does not have an exit strategy from Syria, and is biding his time on this issue until Turkiye’s next key elections in June 2023.
Erozan says that the IYI Party, as a potential ruling party after the elections, will seek to make direct contact with the Syrian government. “We wrote a letter to our foreign ministry about our intention to visit Syria and waited for a response until December 15. They did not respond and now we will try to contact Bashar al-Assad on our own,” he said.
If the Assad government accepts, Erozan said, then they are open for dialogue with Damascus even before the elections, at any time and in any place.
“When we are in power, we are going to raise the dialogue level in our negotiations,” Erozan claimed. He said that the most important point is to solve the urgent Syrian refugee question, and then the difficult issues about the PKK/YPG and Idlib.
When asked whether his party has a plan to withdraw Turkish troops from Syria, he said this could be negotiable. According to Erozan, the Erdogan government has itself not yet put the withdrawal of the Turkish troops from Syria on the table.
However, it is unclear whether the Syrian government would accept IYI’s offer — Somer Sultan thinks that the party’s offer would not satisfy Damascus “because IYI wants the Syrian government to accept an alliance against the PKK/YPG but for other terrorist organizations they want a ‘common approach.’ This is not acceptable for Syria.”
The view from Syria
A Syrian source with close ties to the government told The Cradle that in a closed meeting Assad assured his audience that he will not meet Erdogan prior to Turkiye’s elections.
However, according to Lebanese daily Al-Akhbar, the Syrian president has also said that the level of dialogue between intelligence agencies will rise in the near future – which has, in fact, recently happened. Assad also said Syrians will continue to keep an eye open regarding the Turkish government’s intentions.
Editor-in-Chief of the Syrian newspaper Al-Watan and a close Assad confidante, Waddah Abdrabbo, wrote an editorial in a similar tone: “No pro bono gift for Erdogan.”
Abdrabbo said that the Syrians are waiting for a concrete step from Ankara. “Syrians want territorial integrity, end terrorism, and lifting sanctions,” he stressed.
Despite Erdogan’s overtures and Assad’s willingness to expand dialogue with Ankara, Syria is cautious about her neighbor’s intentions and does not intend to play a hand in Erdogan’s electoral ambitions.
Rapprochement scenarios
For both Turkiye’s ruling AKP and its opposition, any possible Syrian-Turkish reconciliation process must include a settlement on the Syrian refugee problem. One of the ostensible reasons for all Turkish ground offensives into Syria after 2016 has been the safe repatriation of the Syrian refugees.
However, Erozan is doubtful about Assad’s intentions: “He may not accept all refugees to his country.” When reminded that Syrian refugees in Lebanon had already started to return, he stated that Lebanon is a different case.
IYI’s negotiation plans depend on Damascus’ signals. Last September, the party convened a “Migration Doctrine”conference and announced that through negotiations with the Syrian government and the participation of the EU, refugees will be able to return to Syria. If the plan does not go ahead, then Turkiye would take matters into its own hands and create a safe zone in Syria. It appears, on the surface, to be a carbon copy of Erdogan’s post-2016 policies.
While it is inevitable that high level negotiations will eventually take place between Syria and Turkiye, Damascus’ primary condition will always remain the withdrawal of Turkish troops. If a future Turkish government can view this condition as negotiable, things can rapidly improve on the rapprochement front.
For Syria, reclaiming territory from Turkiye, but also from the US-backed SDF, is of utmost importance. Securing Turkish cooperation against the SDF (and the US) would be a huge achievement for Damascus. However, the Syrian leadership evaluates the US presence in Syria as ephemeral. Therefore, cutting a deal with a powerful neighbor like Turkey is more important than to drive out American forces first.
Second, although the SDF poses a mutual threat for both countries, Syria and Turkiye have starkly different views on Islamist groups. Regaining Idlib, the northern Syrian governorate which remains the last bastion of extremist militants, is not just a question of territorial integrity for Syria – it also illustrates continued Turkish support for armed Islamist militias. Therefore, Ankara severing ties with those takfiri-salafist groups could provide an important basis for high level negotiations.
Whether the AKP or its opposition can provide this outcome is doubtful. Erdogan is not a reliable partner for Damascus for obvious reasons, but the opposition coalition also hosts some dubious figures, such as Erdogan’s former foreign minister, Ahmet Davutoglu, a champion of the catastrophic Syrian war.
For now, both countries choose to maintain their mutual talks at a certain level, and it seems unlikely that the Syrian question will be resolved until after the Turkish elections.
After hours of traveling around the Iraqi border between the autonomous Kurdistan Region of Iraq (KRI) and Iran, you will come to a single conclusion: “This is a one-sided border.”
Since April 2003, after the illegal US invasion of Iraq, West Asia transformed into a vast playground for an array of foreign states and entities. Among them are Iranian Kurdish separatist parties and organizations stationed in northern Iraq.
Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) often targets the sites of these armed militias with airstrikes because of the separatist threat they pose. But why are these groups even based in Iraq, and do Baghdad and Erbil play any direct role in hosting militias that target Iranian territory?
These questions persist – unanswered – bar the ever-present Iranian military responses, as in September when the IRGC carried out targeted drone and missile strikes against separatist Kurdish militias for 13 consecutive days.
When the operation concluded on 7 October, the IRGC announced it had achieved its goals,” but warned that it “will resume its operations, if the threat to Iran’s national security returns again.”
Iranian Kurdish separatists
The most prominent of these Kurdish militias is the Kurdistan Free Life Party (Partiya Jiyana Azad a Kurdistanê – PJAK), whose activities against Iranian interested suddenly escalated after the US occupation of Iraq.
After 2004, PJAK appeared for the first time as an armed force, in the same areas controlled by the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) led by Abdullah Ocalan. The PKK are primarily based in the Qandil Heights in the far north-east of Iraq, which lies within the Zagros Mountain range that extends deep into Iranian territory.
The “East Kurdistan Forces” are the military arm of the anti-Iran Kurdish militia, and its fighters are estimated to be between 800 and 1,200, most of them from Syria, Iraq, Turkey, Iran and various Kurdish regions.
In a series of articles published in The New Yorker in 2006, journalist Seymour Hersh revealed that the US and Israel were training this party and supporting it financially and with intelligence in order to undermine Tehran.
Shortly after its invasion of Iraq, the administration of US President George W. Bush began a covert program to train and equip PJAK, with Israeli assistance. “The group has been conducting clandestine cross-border forays into Iran,” Hersh reported, as “part of an effort to explore alternative means of applying pressure on Iran.”
Taking advantage of social unrest
The recent and on-going unrest witnessed in a number of Iranian cities following the death of the young Iranian-Kurdish woman, Mahsa Amini, while in police custody on 16 September, provided an opportunity for PJAK and other Kurdish separatist parties to step up their subversive activities.
The Cradle’s Iraq correspondent was able to reach sites targeted by IRGC in the town of Koysanjak (60 km east of Erbil, the capital of the KRI) near the Iranian border, and to approach one of the largest camps of PJAK in one of the town’s valleys, surrounded by a mountain range.
It is almost impossible for journalists to reach these sites, so we had to travel disguised, alongside local villagers and with a Kurdish coordinator who arranged our visit. The militia fighters often shop in villages surrounding the camp.
However, “their goal is not to shop, but to carry out security and intelligence operations that the ruling Kurdistan Democratic Party in Erbil turns a blind eye to,” confirms a shepherd who moonlights as a tobacco and fuel smuggler on both sides of the border.
He estimates the number of fighters here to be just over 1,000, The mountains provide a comfortable and secure space to carry out their military activities, which include daily exercises and a live-fire military drill in the Autumn.
‘Dangerous dreamers’
Our source calls the PJAK fighters “dreamers” because their military arsenal dates back to the 1950s, and includes light weapons, explosive devices, mortars, and anti-vehicle mines. “The Americans will not give these people modern weapons,” adds the smuggler, who fought in the Iran-Iraq war in the 1980s, and has experience in traversing the rugged border terrain.
Nevertheless, he warns that these people are “dangerous,” with “Eastern Kurdistan Forces” now transitioning to security work and “management of operations” inside Iran. Their work is conducted in cooperation with special forces from the Peshmerga of the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) and the “coalition” forces (which are mainly US troops).
This cooperation is not new, and has accompanied every major incident of internal civil strife witnessed by Iran since at least 2009, including turmoil in 2016, 2017, 2019, 2020, and most recently, 2022.
In the past two years, PJAK’s activity has ceased to be purely military, and “we see its fighters accompanying guests. It is true that they disguise themselves, but we are not naive,” the Iraqi source says, adding, however, that the Kurdistan region “will not reap a profit from this game as usual.”
Iraqi Kurdish links to PJAK
Officially, the KDP and the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK), which are the two main political parties in the Kurdistan region, deny any connection with PJAK. However, Kurdish leaders acknowledge the existence of “coordination,” “transmission of messages,” and “exchange of information” with the militia group. The KDP has previously called on PJAK and PKK to lay down their arms.
Certainly, it would be difficult – if not impossible – for PJAK to manage activities of this magnitude on Iraqi territory, and to globally market themselves as “freedom fighters,” without the collusion and support of both Kurdish and Iraqi authorities.
A high-ranking Iranian diplomatic source with experience in Baghdad for more than ten years, confirms the existence of a tripartite committee that includes representatives from Tehran, Baghdad, and Erbil to exchange information about the “subversive activities” carried out by PJAK against Iran.
The committee does not, however, hold regular meetings, and the Iranians have become convinced that its trouble-shooting initiatives are not serious because of Baghdad’s ineptitude, and because of the involvement of foreign states in supporting the separatists.
This has prompted Tehran to adopt a policy of “force to deter what threatens its national security,” with one or two officials in the Iraqi state being informed half an hour before any Iranian military strike operations commence.
The diplomatic source, who has military experience, adds: “We constantly monitor everyone who visits PJAK sites, the movements of its fighters, all their steps, and the support they receive. We broadcast recordings of the moment of the bombing to assure the separatists and the intelligence services that support them that we know their locations very well.”
Baghdad turns a blind eye
Yet in Baghdad, official sources deny the existence of a tripartite committee, as well as any prior warning of Iranian airstrikes. In fact, a high-ranking Iraqi officer even informed The Cradle that there are headquarters and safe houses for Kurdish separatists and their leaders in both Erbil and Sulaymaniyah, with coordination between PJAK and the PKK.
There is also evidence that the separatist militias are active in illegal, cross-border activities that generate revenues for PJAK which, in turn, enable it to pay its fighters’ salaries. Baghdad is aware of all this, sources say, but turns a blind eye.
Safe-guarding Iran’s territorial integrity
The high-ranking officer claims, nevertheless, that Iraq’s new Prime Minister Muhammad Shia’ al-Sudani is serious about his initiative to establish a new Border Guards Force stationed between the region of Turkiye and Iran, and to prioritize supporting these forces with human resources, weapons, and modern equipment.
But the source has also expressed pessimism over this border venture, and expects the continuation of PJAK’s activities in the mountainous area they know so well.
He points out that Tehran “will not be convinced of the Iraqi field and military measures. The Iranians know our capabilities. The presence of the separatists at their borders will remain a source of security concern. And they told us that they will not stand hands folded in the face of this threat.”
“Practically,” he concludes, “Tehran is the one that controls the borders in the area of the Jasusan mountain range.”
Needless to say, as a sovereign state Iran will adopt a proactive stance in confronting threats to its national security posed by foreign-backed, separatist groups – even though this may undermine the sovereignty of its weaker Iraqi neighbor.
While it is collectively in the interests of Iran, Iraq and indeed Turkiye and Syria to co-ordinate over this mutual ethno-nationalist, separatist, security threat, Baghdad has been too slow to rise to the challenge.
Instead, we may see this process begin first in the Northeast of Syria, where all four states are currently gathered in heightened concern over militarized Kurdish separatism, its foreign sponsors, and the imminent threat of a military confrontation.
The views expressed in this article do not necessarily reflect those of The Cradle.
ترسّخت قناعة في دول المنطقة، بأن الغرب أصبح يعتمد «الورقة الكردية» كوسيلة لزعزعة استقرارها وتهديد وحدتها (أ ف ب)
«نحن حلفاء أميركا الأكثر إخلاصاً في سوريا. لا تنسونا». يعكس هذا العنوان، الذي اختاره مظلوم عبدي، قائد «قوات سوريا الديموقراطية»، لمقاله المنشور في «واشنطن بوست» بتاريخ 3 من الشهر الحالي، المنطق العميق الذي بات يحكم الخيارات الإستراتيجية لقيادات التنظيمات السياسية التي تدّعي تمثيل الأكراد في سوريا والعراق وإيران وتركيا. لا ريب في أن خيار التحوّل إلى قوة وكيلة للتحالف الأميركي – الغربي – الإسرائيلي، تشارك في حروبه المتصاعدة، الحامية أو الهجينة، ضدّ بلدان الإقليم، في مقابل دعمه لتوجّهاتها الانفصالية، لا يلقى إجماعاً البتّة في أوساط الرأي العام الكردي ونخبه السياسية والثقافية. قطاعات معتبرة منهم تعارض مثل هذا الخيار الانتحاري لأنه سيضع الأكراد في مواجهة بقية شعوب المنطقة، وليس الأنظمة السياسية فحسب، ولأنه يضرب عرض الحائط بوشائج الأخوة التاريخية والثقافية – الاجتماعية التي تجمع بينهم وبين هذه الشعوب. إضافة إلى ذلك، هناك الكثير من المعطيات عن وجود خلافات داخل بعض الأحزاب السياسية المشار إليها سابقاً – «حزب العمال الكردستاني» على سبيل المثال -، حول وجاهة خيار الاندراج في إستراتيجية الغرب ضدّ المنطقة، أي أداء وظيفة مطابقة لتلك التي أقيم لأجلها الكيان الصهيوني، انطلاقاً من اعتبارات واقعية في الأساس تذكّر بأن الوجود العسكري الغربي فيها محكوم بالزوال مهما طال أمده، على عكس دول وشعوب المنطقة الباقية على رغم الأزمات التي تعصف بها راهناً.
من المفترض أن يدفع إدراك حقائق التاريخ والجغرافيا، القوى السياسية الحريصة فعلاً على مصالح الشعب الكردي، إلى البحث عن تسويات وتوافقات مع بلدان المنطقة تضمن حقوق هذا الشعب، وتزيل جميع المظالم وأشكال التمييز التي تعرّض لها، من دون تهديد وحدة الكيانات الوطنية القائمة. فعلى الرغم من اختلاف طبيعة أنظمة الحكم في بلدان كسوريا والعراق وإيران وتركيا، ومن الخلافات وحتى الصراعات التي تدور أحياناً بين بعضها البعض، ترسّخت قناعة في أوساط قياداتها ورأيها العام، بأن الغرب أصبح يعتمد «الورقة الكردية» كوسيلة رئيسة من وسائل زعزعة استقرارها وتهديد وحدتها الترابية. لا يعني الكلام المتقدّم رفع المسؤولية عن الأنظمة المتعاقبة في الإقليم عمّا عاناه الأكراد من اضطهاد وتنكيل في حالات عديدة، لكن النقاش ينبغي أن يتمحور حول كيفية توفير الشروط اللازمة لحلول جذرية دائمة تسمح بتغيير الواقع القائم. أمّا الخيار الآخر، أي الاستزلام للغرب المنحدر، والذي تأخذ به التنظيمات الكردية المسلّحة في البلدان الـ4 المشار إليها، فإنه كفيل بتأجيج النزاع بينها وبين هذه البلدان، وحمْل الأخيرة على المزيد من التعاون في ما بينها، للتصدّي لسياسة التخريب والتدمير الغربية وتصفية أدواتها، مع ما قد يترتّب على ذلك من أثمان تدفعها الشعوب، بما فيها الشعب الكردي.
مَن يراهن على «الوفاء» الأميركي مقابل ما قدّمه من خدمات، سيندم ولو بعد حين
فكرة استغلال التناقضات الإثنية والطائفية في المنطقة لإضعاف دولها المركزية بعد الاستقلالات، إسرائيلية في الأساس، ومثّلت جزءاً لا يتجزّأ من «الاستراتيجية الطرفية» التي اتّبعها الكيان الصهيوني منذ خمسينيات وستينيات القرن الماضي، والمرتكزة على السعي للتحالف مع دول الجوار غير العربية، ومع من صنّفهم «أقليات» في داخل البلدان العربية. يشير الصحافي الأميركي، جوناثان رندال، في كتابه الهام «أمّة في شقاق»، إلى أن إسرائيل أقامت علاقات في بداية الستينيات مع الملا مصطفى البرزاني، رئيس «الحزب الديموقراطي الكردستاني»، وقدّمت له دعماً عسكرياً ومالياً كبيراً مع انفجار النزاع بين قواته وبين الجيش العراقي في تلك الفترة، وأن هذه العلاقات شهدت تطوّراً مستمرّاً فيما بعد. غير أن المنعطف الحقيقي في تاريخ توظيف القضية الكردية، كان الدعم النوعي والمتعدّد الأبعاد الذي وفّرته الولايات المتحدة للحركة الكردية في العراق عام 1991، بعد ما سُمّي بـ«حرب تحرير الكويت»، بدءاً بالحظر الجوّي الذي فرضته فوق كردستان، وأتاح تحوّل الأخير إلى إقليم خارج عن سيطرة الدولة العراقية. لقد أشرفت واشنطن على إنشاء شبه دولة كردية في شمال العراق تنامت قوّتها وقدراتها مع مرور الزمن، خاصة بعد الغزو الأميركي عام 2003، والذي كان مقدّمة لإعادة صياغة «الشرق الأوسط» على أسس طائفية وإثنية.
زمرة المحافظين الجدد الصهيونية، التي وقفت خلف هذا المشروع، حاولت تكرار ما جرى بعد اجتياح جيوش الغرب للإقليم إثر الحرب العالمية الأولى، عندما تمّ تقسيمه وزرع إسرائيل في قلبه. اعتبر هؤلاء أن الكيان الكردي الناشئ سيضطلع بمهام وظيفية شبيهة بتلك التي قام بها الكيان الإسرائيلي في سياق عملية التقسيم الجديدة التي خطّطوا لها. وفي الحقيقة، ومن منظور التنظيمات القومية الكردية المسلّحة في البلدان الأخرى كإيران وتركيا، وفي مرحلة متأخّرة سوريا، أضحى هذا الإقليم «قصّة نجاح»، ونموذجاً يُحتذى، وملجأً لبعضها، كالمجموعات الكردية الإيرانية أو التركية، تستخدمه كقاعدة خلفية لعملياتها في تركيا وإيران. التناقضات السياسية والأيديولوجية بين بعض تلك التنظيمات، كـ»حزب العمال الكردستاني» و»الحزب الديموقراطي»، والتي أدت إلى صدامات دموية أحياناً، لم تَحُل دون استبطان الأوّل، وغيره من المجموعات المسلّحة الكردية، لاعتقاد مفاده أن النجاح في تحقيق أهدافها منوط بمدى قدرتها على نسج تحالف مع الولايات المتحدة والغرب. ومن الجدير ذكره، هنا، أن حزب «بيجاك»، الفرع الإيراني لـ»حزب العمال» الناشط ضدّ تركيا، باشر عمله المسلّح ضدّ إيران عام 2004، أي سنة بعد غزو العراق، وأن العديد من قادته وعناصره، كإلهام أحمد مثلاً، انضمّوا فيما بعد إلى «قوات سوريا الديمقراطية»، وساهموا في الدفع نحو توثيق الصلات مع الأميركيين، ومع الإسرائيليين، كما اتّضح في فضيحة تهريب النفط السوري، بعد توقيع عقد لهذه الغاية بين أحمد ورجل الأعمال الإسرائيلي موتي كاهانا (راجع: نفط الشمال السوري بيد إسرائيل!، الأخبار، 15 تموز 2019).
لقد أدّى غزو العراق إلى انتشار مواقع عسكرية ومراكز تدريب للمجموعات المسلّحة الكردية الإيرانية في كردستان، تشنّ منها هجمات على إيران برعاية ومساندة أميركية وإسرائيلية. وقد اتّضح مع الأحداث التي تشهدها إيران أخيراً، حجم الدور الذي تضطلع به هذه المجموعات، وشبكاتها العاملة داخل أراضي الجمهورية الإسلامية. أما «قوّات سوريا الديمقراطية»، فهي استغلّت الحرب الدولية – الإقليمية ضدّ سوريا، ودورها كقوة رديفة للقوات الأميركية في الحرب على «داعش»، لتسيطر على مساحات واسعة من الشرق السوري، وأسهمت في استراتيجية واشنطن لحرمان الدولة السورية من مواردها. استلهمت جميع تلك المجموعات «التجربة الكردية العراقية»، وأهمّ دروسها هو الاندراج في الأجندة الأميركية والسعي إلى بلوغ الغايات الخاصة في إطارها. هي حرصت أيضاً على الإفادة من التناقضات بين دول الإقليم، والتقاطع أحياناً مع بعضها ضدّ بعضها الآخر، للاحتفاظ بمكاسبها وتوسيع هامش مناورتها. لكن المستجدّات المرتبطة بتداعيات الحرب في أوكرانيا على السياق الجيوسياسي الإقليمي، وما نراه من جهود روسية للتقريب بين دمشق وأنقرة، ومن اعتدال في نبرة المعارضة الروسية والإيرانية لتدخّل عسكري تركي ضدّ «قسد» في سوريا، ومن تزامن في توظيف «الورقة الكردية» في إيران وفي تركيا (تفجير إسطنبول)، جميعها عوامل قد تفضي إلى تقاطع أكبر بين دول الإقليم في مواجهة التنظيمات الانفصالية الكردية. مَن يراهن على «الوفاء» الأميركي مقابل ما قدّمه من خدمات، سيندم ولو بعد حين.
Turkey will be completing the security strip along its southern border, which is 30 kilometers deep into Syrian territory.
Turkish soldiers from the 1st Border Regiment Command patrol along the border wall on the Turkey-Syria border on March 2, 2017, in Kilis, Turkey. (Getty Images)
Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan on Saturday said that Turkey will be completing the security strip along its southern border, which is 30 kilometers deep into Syrian territory.
Erdogan, speaking at a meeting in southern Sanliurfa province, said that the attacks (by namely the Kurdistan Workers’ Party – or the PKK – and the YPG, which is the PKK’s branch in Syria) will not deter the country from its determined stance on securing its southern border: “We will definitely complete the 30-kilometer-deep security corridor that we are establishing along our southern borders, attacks will not dampen our resolve,” he said.
Since 2016, Turkey has engaged in three anti-terror operations in northern Syria – which have also consequentially resulted in the occupation of the region. The operations are Euphrates Shield (2016), Olive Branch (2018), and Peace Spring (2019).
The PKK is listed as a terrorist organization by Turkey, the European Union, and the US, and it has been responsible for the deaths of 40,000 civilians according to Turkey.
Erdogan: Turkey is committed to destroying PKK
Erdogan underlined on Monday that Turkey is committed to destroying the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) “until its last militant is neutralized.”
He further stressed Turkey’s determination to establish a 30-kilometer-deep (18.6-mile) security strip next to its borders, on Syrian soil, claiming that it is something Turkey previously sought to do with US and Russian cooperation on its southern border.
“We do not need to get permission from anyone while taking steps concerning the security of our homeland and our people, and we will not be held accountable to anyone,” he stressed.
The Turkish President said no one will be able to force Turkey into any position against its own interests in political, diplomatic, economic, and military terms through what he called “empty threats”.
He also claimed that no side should be disturbed by Ankara’s offensives, which are aimed at “expanding the circle of security and peace.”
“We do not have to tolerate the hypocrisy of those who support registered terrorist groups with naming-change games,” he said, adding that it is unacceptable for a number of countries to support PKK militants in northern Syria.
The Kurds in northeastern Syria have established their semi-autonomous administration which they call “Rojava”. They are now under threat of an increased invasion and occupation by Turkish ground troops, which could end in ethnic cleansing and mass casualties.
Turkish President Erdogan has demanded for years that the US must stop supporting the Syrian Defense Forces (SDF) and their armed wing the Peoples Protection Units (YPG) which serve as the army of “Rojava”.
Although Turkey and the US are partners in NATO, and long-term allies, with a US military base in Turkey, the two sides have diverged sharply over the issue of the Kurds establishing an administration independent of Damascus in northeast Syria.
The Turkish view the YPG as an offshoot of the PKK, which is an internationally outlawed terrorist group, responsible for about 40,000 deaths in Turkey over three decades. Yet, the US partnered with the SDF and YPG in their joint attack to eradicate ISIS from Syria.
The Kurds have never been the majority of the population in northeastern Syria; however, they have a very sizeable community there, and in recent years they have carried out ethnic cleansing in the region with Syrian Arabs and Syrian Christian populations having been displaced.
The administration of “Rojava” is carried out by officials, such as Ilham Ahmed and General Mazloom Kobane, who follow the communist political ideology of the founder of the PKK, Abdullah Ocalan. Despite the American hatred of communism, the 30 years of US combat in Vietnam to eradicate communism there, and the current US antagonism with communist China, Washington, and the Pentagon put their hands firmly with the communist leadership of “Rojava”.
Syria is 10,000 years old and is home to multiple religions, and ethnicities. The Kurds are only one of many ethnicities, and before the outbreak of the conflict in Syria in 2011, the Kurds were full Syrian citizens with legal rights under the secular and socialist government in Damascus. The current narrative, used to defend their separatist aims, is that the Kurds were oppressed by the Damascus central government.
The US-NATO attack on Syria for ‘regime change’ beginning in 2011 presented an opportunity for the Kurds to use the chaos and destruction carried out by the terrorists following Radical Islam, to establish an Islamic government in Damascus. The terrorists attacking Syria were funded by oil-rich Arab Gulf countries, but the weapons, training, and logistics were supported by Washington through offices of the CIA in Turkey, which were finally shut down in 2017 by President Trump. With the US military and intelligence services already on the ground in Syria, the Kurds presented themselves as a military partner and fulfilled the long-term goal of the US to split Syria into smaller units, following the age-old military rule of “divide and conquer”. Idlib was divided from Damascus by the Al Qaeda branch in Syria, Jibhat al-Nusra, now branded as Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS). HTS is supported by Turkey and the UN and other charities feed the terrorists, their families, and other civilians living there. The northeastern region was divided from Damascus by the Kurdish administration of “Rojava”, which is supported by the US.
The US partnered with the Kurds in ‘Rojava’, but never promised them support in their ultimate goal of a homeland for the Kurds. The US has consistently told the Kurds they need to seek to repair their relationship with Damascus to protect themselves from the threat of extermination at the hands of the Turkish government, and the HTS which are mercenaries for Turkey in Syria. The US has not had any plan to solve the suffering of the Syrian people and allow them to repair homes and lives. Instead, over the past years, the US has supported a status quo in Syria with the US, Turkey, Russia, and Iran all acting in various regions, but without a unified plan for recovery from a decade of war. The current US policy is to keep US-EU sanctions in place which prevent Syrian civilians from recovering.
Syria was self-sufficient in oil resources and wheat production. The Kurds in ‘Rojava’ stopped that by seizing control militarily and occupying those areas in cooperation with the US military occupation forces. Now, the main oil field of Al Omar and Conoco are producing oil which is shipped in tankers by the US Army to Iraq and processed in Erbil, in the Kurdistan Region (KRI), an autonomous region in Iraq comprising the four Kurdish-majority governorates.
The Baghdad government of Iraq has asked the US military to leave, but the US refused to end their occupation of Iraq and Syria. The US is directly connected to the Kurds in both countries. In Syria, the US objective is to prevent the Damascus government from benefitting from its oil resources, which has kept the Syrian people without electricity, home heating fuel, and gasoline. Some homes are without electricity, and others across Syria receive from one to four hours per day.
The largest wheat fields in Syria are under the occupation of the Kurds and the wheat is used for local consumption in “Rojava” and the rest is sold to the European Union or other buyers. Damascus has said it is running low on wheat supplies and cannot import. During the conflict years, the terrorists stole huge wheat supplies in Syria. They trucked them to Turkey, where Erdogan’s government re-sold the stolen wheat to the EU to produce French croissants and Italian pasta.
With the suffering of the civilians in Iraq and Syria, it is no wonder the people hold intense hatred towards the US. This hatred of Washington is not considered by the White House and Capitol Hill as American lawmakers are insulated in the hubris of a super-power, with no thought of generations to come, or the crumbling demise of the American Empire.
The world is watching violence and deaths in Iran in what appears to be an increasingly popular uprising against the Islamic government. The young woman who died was Kurdish and her death has sparked unrest in the western Kurdish region of Iran, which shares a border with the Kurdish region in Iraq, which in turn shares its border with “Rojava” in Syria. Looking at a map, we can see a straight line through northeast Syria, to northern Iraq and culminating in the west of Iran. The Kurds in Iran now have weapons, which were smuggled into Iran from the Kurds in Iraq, and the US military partners in “Rojava” in Syria. The increasing armed uprising in Iran will need more weapons and they will be supported by the US which has long sought a ‘regime change’ in Iran.
Israel has offices in Erbil and has conducted business openly with the Kurdish administration there. The Israeli offices there have come under attack presumably by Iranian forces. Iran has long been viewed by Israel as a prime threat. The recent change of government in Israel to an extremist right-wing alliance may produce increasing support for weapons smuggled from Erbil to Iran to fuel the revolution.
Turkey and Syria have a common enemy, the Kurds. Both countries are opposed to Kurdish independence, and both want to see the US break their alliance with the Kurds in Syria. With the new opportunity for ‘regime change’ in Iran, both Israel and their ally the US will want to stay on the ground to support the transfer of weapons into Iran through Iraq. Turkey may invade northeast Syria massively to upset the US-imposed status quo. Turkey may find old friends in Damascus to shore up their southern flank once the bombs start falling. The negotiations to save the Kurds in “Rojava” may see General Mazloom Abdi in Damascus asking for salvation at the same table as Turkey.
Steven Sahiounie is a two-time award-winning journalist and political commentator.
UPROOTED PALESTINIANS: SALAM ALQUDS ALAYKUM 