The Turkiye–Israel trade boom: Talk is cheap, but money talks

MAR 14, 2024

While denouncing Israel’s actions in Gaza as a ‘genocide’ and ‘inhumane,’ Erdogan is stealthily supplying Israel and its military forces with all the necessary goods to keep on ticking.

(Photo Credit: The Cradle)

Muslim-majority countries have been especially vocal amid the global condemnation directed toward Israel for its genocidal war on Gaza. For obvious reasons, Muslim leaders face mounting pressure from their populations to adopt a firmer, more assertive position on the Palestinian cause. This pressure has only intensified as the war, now in its sixth month, coincides with the holy month of Ramadan.

Among these leaders is Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan, who initially adopted a relatively neutral stance toward Tel Aviv’s war in order to position himself as a mediator in the prisoner exchange between Hamas and Israel. 

However, the enormous Palestinian civilian death toll – now approaching 32,000 in Gaza – and mounting international condemnation of Israel’s actions have complicated Ankara’s mediation ambitions. 

Erdogan’s rhetoric shifted significantly and quickly in response to the global outrage when, on 20 October, he publically declared that Israel’s military actions amounted to “genocide.”

Then, during a pro-Palestine rally a week later, the Turkish president called Israel a “war criminal,” leading to the recall of ambassadors from both countries for a thorough assessment of the situation. 

Turkiye’s trade with ‘war criminal’ Israel

Considering Erdogan’s critical stance, the recall of Ankara’s ambassador from Tel Aviv, and the ongoing massacres of thousands of women and children in Gaza, Turkiye, under the rule of the Justice and Development Party (AKP) – whose political roots are mired in Islamist ideology – might have been expected to reassess its trade ties with Israel. 

Overnight, Turkiye, the only Muslim-majority NATO member state, could have imposed economic sanctions to pressure Israel into a Gaza ceasefire. But that did not happen.

Instead, not only has trade between Turkiye and Israel skyrocketed, but the majority of commerce and shipping operations are being conducted by companies affiliated with a group supported by Erdogan, the Independent Industrialists and Businessmen’s Association (MUSIAD). 

While publicly, pro-government factions in Turkiye target and censure individuals for patronizing Starbucks and other international franchises that have demonstrated support for Israel, in private, they milk profits out of Israel’s war on Gaza. 

Ergodan’s public condemnations mean nothing in light of his secretive expansion of trade activities with the occupation state.

In 1996, Turkiye and Israel signed a Free Trade Agreement (FTA) that mutually exempted both countries from customs duties on industrial product imports, in a deal that significantly developed Israeli–Turkish economic relations. 

Despite the various political crises that have cropped up between Turkiye and Israel – as in the Mavi Marmara incident, when Israeli commandos stormed a Turkish-flagged Gaza aid ship and killed aid workers – their economic ties have continued to grow quietly in the background, particularly since 2002, when Erdogan and the AKP came to power. 

That bilateral trade volume has seen a remarkable increase over the years: data from the Turkish Exporters Assembly (TIM), Turkish exports to Israel expanded five-fold from $1.4 billion in the early 2000s to $5.1 billion in 2023. Moreover, Turkiye is among the top four states for Israeli imports.

Fueling the Israeli war machine 

Turkiye provides 65 percent of Israel’s steel imports, with Turkish multi-sector conglomerate ICDAS – affiliated with MUSIAD – notable as a key exporter to the occupation state. Since the onset of the Gaza war on 7 October alone, ICDAS has shipped 50,000 tons of steel to Israel. 

A portion of this steel supports Israel’s military industry in the production of munitions that are currently being used to decimate the densely-populated Gaza enclave and attack neighboring Lebanon and Syria. Notably, ICDAS has facilitated steel exports to the port of Haifa with 64 shipments in 2023 and nine more after 7 October.

ICDAS’ contributions extend beyond trade; the company has also been recognized for its role in constructing a mosque in Canakkale, an effort that earned a commendation from Mehmet Gormez, the President of Religious Affairs. At a ceremony marking Israel’s 69th anniversary, ICDAS was, telling, honored as the top Turkish exporter to Israel.

In addition, Israel sources 95 percent of its cement from Turkiye, with notable clients that include the Israeli Ministry of Defence. According to the Turkish Statistical Institute (TUIK), cement exports to Israel totaled $174 million in 2023, with $6.39 million of that figure recorded from 7 October to the present. 

Leading Turkish cement exporters to Israel include Akcansa, Limak, Oyak, Nuh Cement, and Eren Holding. The latter, a member of the MUSIAD, has most notably supplied Israel with over 200,000 tons of materials since 7 October.

Facing Turkish public outrage over its exports to Israel, MUSIAD made a statement on 10 February to address its member companies’ trade with Israel: 

In recent days, our organization and members have been put under suspicion due to the alleged commercial activities of a few of our members with Israel. For this reason, we are meticulously examining the allegations that put our institution and members under suspicion in line with our charter and are operating our internal processes. Information will be provided when the processes are complete.

Despite that promise, MUSIAD did not respond to the Evrensel newspaper’s requests for information on its processes, and evidence of ICDAS’ unabated steel exports to Israel has emerged. According to TIM’s data, ICDAS exported steel worth $35 million in January 2024 and $38.5 million in February.

Bypassing the naval blockade 

An important indicator of the sustained economic engagement between Turkiye and Israel – despite Tel Aviv’s continued war crimes in Gaza – is the active maritime traffic linking the ports of both countries. This comes at a time when the Red Sea naval blockade of ships destined for Israeli ports by Yemen’s Ansarallah-aligned armed forces is heavily supported by Arab and Muslim populations worldwide.

Turkish Transport Minister Abdulkadir Uraloglu, in a conversation with journalist Kemal Ozturk, revealed that between 7 October and 31 December 2023, 701 ships embarked from Turkish ports to those in Israel, averaging eight voyages daily.

This tally encompasses 480 vessels departing directly from Turkish ports for Israel and 221 additional ships originating from third-country ports, which docked in Turkiye while en route to Israel.

Although AKP leaders and MUSIAD member companies have upped their negative rhetoric against Israel, Turkiye–Israel economic relations are thriving like never before. Turkiye continues to meet Israel’s critical needs for steel, cement, vegetables, fruits, automobiles, and electrical appliances, while Zorlu Holding meets 7 percent of Israel’s electricity needs thanks to its energy investments in the occupation state.

Publicly visible political tensions between Ankara and Tel Aviv appear to have had no impact on the commercial front. Erdogan’s calculations are not hard to discern: Turkiye is currently grappling with an economic crisis and is heavily invested in enhancing ties with pro-Israel Washington and EU to enable its recovery. 

After all, the full normalization of Turkiye’s relations with Israel in 2022 facilitated similar progress with Greece and Egypt.

Continuing the ‘shame trade’

In this context, Ankara is trying to stay clear of rekindling a political crisis with Israel, and so Erdogan directs most of his public criticism specifically at Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, whom he perceives as nearing the end of his political career. 

For Ankara, political and economic objectives take precedence over humanitarian concerns, allowing trade between Israel and Turkiye to persist despite the popular, widespread anger over the genocide taking place in Gaza and calls for severing bilateral relations altogether.

At a pro-Erdogan rally in western Sakarya province on 24 February, a banner demanding “End the shame trade with Israel” was promptly confiscated by police officers. Despite the gathering’s support for the president and his party, this rhetoric was clearly a step too far for Turkish political and business elites. 

The views expressed in this article do not necessarily reflect those of The Cradle.

Erdogan’s deafening silence on Palestine

OCT 26, 2023

Source

A lot has changed since Erdogan’s ‘one minute’ moment at Davos in 2009. Once celebrated for championing pro-Palestinian rhetoric and action in the region, Turkiye today, at best, aims for a backroom mediation role.

Photo Credit: The Cradle

Ceyda Karan

Turkiye has long since lost its ‘championship of the Palestinian cause’ under the leadership of Recep Tayyip Erdogan. While globally, and from the very start, there has been an outpouring of horrified outrage over Israel’s indiscriminate air bombing of Gaza, it took the Turkish president 20 days to ‘get tough’ on Tel Aviv.  

Despite strong reactions from his public, and especially his Islamist base, Erdogan waited an inexplicably long time before delivering a message at his party’s parliamentary group meeting this week: 

“Hamas is not a terrorist organization, but a group of mujahideen fighting to protect its citizens”, he said. Reminding the crowd of ‘the good old’ Ottomans, he added, “When the powers on whose backs Israel leans today are gone tomorrow, the first place the Israeli people will look for reassurance will be Turkiye, as it was 500 years ago.” Erdogan said that contrary to the west, Turkiye owed Israel nothing. 

And then he balanced his stance by saying, “We have no problem with Israel, but we have never and will never approve of the way it acts like an organization instead of a state.”

 If anything, his message can be interpreted as a direct embrace of Hamas, rather than criticism of Israel’s actions in Gaza. Importantly, while underlining the ‘guarantor’ offer that Ankara has been offering both sides for more than two weeks, he stated that Turkiye is not seeking this role alone but ‘with other participants’. 

But even this relatively balanced exit drew a reaction from the markets. The Turkish stock market dropped by 5 percent, forcing a halt in trading. This announcement is sure to complicate the job of Finance Minister Mehmet Simsek, who is busy trying to attract western capital to Turkiye. 

From Davos to Mavi Marmara 

Turkiye’s behavior in the recent Gaza crisis provides a peek into its West Asian policies, vis a vis its post-election pivot to the west.

On 29 January, 2009, at the Davos Summit of the World Economic Forum, then-Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan interrupted Israeli Prime Minister Shimon Peres’ speech with a stern: “One minute,” stating, “You know very well how to kill. I know very well how you kill children on the beaches,” before abruptly storming off stage. 

 This unexpected outburst, contravening Ankara’s decades-long amicable stance towards the occupation state, sent shockwaves through the audience and beyond. It was seen as a watershed moment that thrust Erdogan into the global spotlight, instantly making him a pro-Palestinian icon not only in the Arab and Islamic world but also at home in Turkiye, where he received a hero’s welcome.

At the time, Erdogan and his Justice and Development Party (AKP) were widely viewed as a symbol of “moderate Islam” and enjoyed the backing of the US and its western allies. As a result, the “One minute” crisis in Davos was quickly defused. However, tensions reached a boiling point a year later when the Turkish-flagged Mavi Marmara, part of a flotilla aiming to deliver aid to besieged Palestinians, attempted to break through Israel’s blockade of Gaza.

 On 31 May, 2010 Israeli commandos conducted a lethal raid on the Mavi Marmara, whose journey was sponsored by the Turkish charity IHH Relief Foundation and the Free Gaza Movement. This infamous operation resulted in the deaths of 10 Turkish citizens, injuries to 50 others, and the detention of the remaining passengers.

 This time, the rift could not be resolved amicably. Diplomatic ties between Israel and Turkiye were downgraded, military relations were suspended, and trade relations suffered a temporary disruption. 

Legal cases against four Israelis, including Israel’s then-Chief of Staff Gabriel Ashkenazi, were initiated in Turkish courts, but were dropped in 2016 when Tel Aviv agreed to a $20 million victim compensation payout, three years after an official apology was issued. 

Nevertheless, Erdogan continued to emerge as a prominent advocate for the Palestinian cause and a vocal figure in the Arab and Islamic world, just as West Asia was undergoing a seismic transformation. Turkiye found itself playing a pivotal role during and after the Arab Spring, throwing its weight behind Islamist parties and factions. 

Turkish-Israeli trade surge

Yet as the unrest spilled into neighboring Syria – the strongest Arab state supporter of the Palestinian cause – many were surprised at Erdogan’s “regime change” posture, particularly given the strength of Damascus’ ties with Ankara and the Turkish government’s “zero problem with neighbors” policy. 

Erdogan’s Arab romance came to a screeching halt when he made a startling sectarian accusation, calling Syrian President Bashar al-Assad’s rule a “Nusayri dictatorship” (a derogatory term for followers of the Alawi sect, to which the Assad family, along with political and military elites belong), and claiming the state was persecuting Syria’s Sunni-majority populace. 

 When Syria descended into war and chaos, sharp divisions emerged among sponsors of the armed opposition groups, including Turkiye, Persian Gulf states, the US, and Europe. Erdogan soon found himself increasingly isolated in the region – with the notable exception of Qatar, a staunch Arab ally similarly sympathetic to the Muslim Brotherhood. 

Today, Erdogan’s “one minute” at Davos and the “Mavi Marmara” incident are relics of the past. Despite Erdogan’s previous anti-Israel rhetoric and diplomatic posturing, a lot has changed on the ground, most notably, thriving trade relations between Turkiye and Israel.

Turkish-Israeli trade volume has seen an astonishing 532 percent increase over the past two decades, reaching a staggering $8.91 billion in 2022. According to the Turkish Statistical Institute (TurkStat) private trade system data, Turkiye’s exports to Israel in 2002 – the year the AKP came to power – were $861.4 million, while imports from Israel were $544.5 million.

Meeting in New York during the UN General Assembly sessions for the first time in person since the warming of ties, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and President Erdogan, discussed the potential for Israel to use Turkiye as an energy transit hub to Europe.

Erdogan’s shifting Palestinian support

Throughout his career, Erdogan has maintained support for the Palestinian cause, employing varying tones to balance his alliances with western countries while enhancing his reputation in West Asia and the wider Muslim world.

Erdogan strongly objected to the widely condemned relocation of the US embassy to Jerusalem during the Trump era and supported Palestine’s “non-member observer state” status at the UN. Over the years, he has shown a remarkable ability to opportunistically adjust his rhetoric to suit his evolving interests and alliances. 

While many Arab countries’ support for the Palestinian statehood cause has waned due to repeated defeats against Israel and their re-alignment with US interests, Erdogan has remained, at least vocally, as a steadfast advocate for the Palestinian struggle. 

After the Palestinian resistance’s 7 October Al-Aqsa Flood breakthrough operation inside occupied areas, in the absence of an immediate Israeli response, the Turkish Foreign Ministry issued a statement urging restraint and strongly condemning the loss of civilian lives. It emphasized that acts of violence would be detrimental and called for avoiding impulsive actions while advocating for an end to the use of force and a two-state solution. 

Ankara quickly expressed its readiness to contribute to mediation efforts. This measured tone was unusual considering Erdogan’s typically more flamboyant rhetoric. At the time of Al-Aqsa Flood, however, the Turkish president was preparing to host Netanyahu and planning a return visit to pray at the Al-Aqsa Mosque in Jerusalem.

That is not to say that Ankara isn’t raising the Palestinian issue on all appropriate platforms. Erdogan is engaged in diplomatic phone calls while Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan has advanced a proposal that somehow makes Turkiye a guarantor for Hamas. 

In spite of these gestures, Ankara’s tone remains muted. All it could do was declare a three-day period of mourning for Palestinians. Fidan’s words summarize the situation: 

“I wish patience to the Gazans. I want them to know that we are doing everything we can. God willing, these days will pass. Turkiye will continue to stand by them. We see this pain and sorrow as our own pain and sorrow. They are not alone.”

 What is clear, however, is that Turkiye and Erodgan are not at the forefront of the discourse today. The absence of a visit by US Secretary of State Antony Blinken to Ankara during his recent shuttle diplomacy in the region symbolizes this shift. 

At this juncture, Turkiye’s stance on the Palestinian issue lags behind that of many Arab states. Israel, with the backing of the US, is pushing for the “evacuation” of Gaza’s civilian population to facilitate its ground military operation, forcing Egypt and Jordan, key regional players, to reject plans for this forced and seemingly permanent displacement of Palestinians.

Jordan’s King Abdullah II and Egypt’s President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi have explicitly rejected this demand, deeming it a red line. 

Qatar, a financial powerhouse for the Muslim Brotherhood, and Turkiye, once seen as its political representative, now play more static roles in regional affairs. 

Erdogan’s involvement in Syria, while eroding Turkiye’s historically supportive position for both Fatah and Hamas in the Palestinian struggle, has contributed to a regional realignment in which Iran has grown stronger. Erdogan, once known for his vocal opposition to Israel, is now positioned as a “peace mediator.” 

Erdogan’s shift from idealism to hard interests

Several geopolitical, political, and economic factors underlie this transformation.

The influence of the Muslim Brotherhood has significantly declined after a tragic decade of “Arab Spring-ing,” and Erdogan now needs the support and cooperation of Egypt and the Persian Gulf states, especially Saudi Arabia. He also aims to strike a delicate balance with the US and the EU. 

His foreign policy motto now revolves around mediation, which has been evident in various conflicts, such as Libya and Ukraine — where Turkiye played a key role in grain distribution.

Domestically, Erdogan faces challenges too. Public discontent is growing due to the influx of refugees, as anti-Arab sentiments deepen in Turkish society. 

Erdogan’s failed Ottomanist aspirations have given rise to a resurgence of secular Turkish nationalism among the younger generation. The Turkish left, with its history of supporting the Palestinian struggle for a nation-state, protests against religious-based policies, now positioning itself against Islamist perspectives.

In these circumstances, Ahmet Davutoglu, the former architect of the disastrous West Asian foreign policy, and now the leader of the opposition Future Party, said the following:

“I knew a leader, a leader I was proud to be with, a leader who made my heart flutter when he said ‘One minute’ and when everyone was threatening him, I said ‘Mr. Prime Minister, don’t worry. You made history today. We will do what is necessary’ and I made him apologize to Shimon Peres. Today, my heart cannot accept that that leader has been silent for 10 days. My heart does not accept that he did not come out and shout, ‘O Israel’.”

 This reflects the sentiments of many AKP supporters when Davutoglu expressed disappointment in Erdogan’s relatively muted response to the Gaza war. Ironically, the Islamist Turkish president’s policy approach today is more realpolitik than the idealism inspired by the Muslim Brotherhood.

While some of his supporters at home and abroad may yearn for the fiery rhetoric of the past, Erdogan’s current approach seems to prioritize stability, economic interests, and a balanced foreign policy over Palestine.

How the Mossad finally crossed Turkiye’s red lines

July 05 2023

Photo Credit: The Cradle

Once intelligence-sharing partners, Israel’s notorious Mossad spy agency now faces a massive backlash from Turkiye for violating its sovereignty and infiltrating its national security arena.

By Hasan Illaik

In a series of covert operations spanning the past two years, Turkiye’s National Intelligence Organization (MIT) has relentlessly exposed Israeli spy networks operating on Turkish soil. The most recent revelation on 3 July, marking the fourth roundup of Israeli agents since October 2021, highlights a significant shift in the dynamics of security cooperation between Ankara and Tel Aviv.

For decades, Turkish intelligence and the Mossad – Israel’s foreign intelligence service – enjoyed an unwritten understanding, enabling Mossad agents to freely navigate Turkish territory. This arrangement was based on a political alliance between the two countries. However, recent years have witnessed a dramatic transformation, as the Mossad’s focus inside Turkiye shifted from pursuing Israel’s adversaries globally to recruiting Turkish citizens as its covert operatives.

Speaking to The Cradle on condition of anonymity, Turkish security officials say that the recruitment of Turkish citizens by Mossad operatives represents a significant breach of Turkiye’s national security. The implications of such a breach are far-reaching, providing the Mossad access to sensitive information on Turkiye’s security, military capabilities, and economic standing. The move also opens the door for potential covert operations on Turkish soil, posing a direct threat to Turkiye’s sovereignty.

The same sources reveal that several months ago, Turkish intelligence reached out to various security agencies involved in combating Israeli espionage, both within and beyond the Arab world, seeking an information exchange to dismantle Mossad agent networks. The collaboration extended to countries across West Asia, indicating the gravity of the situation and Ankara’s determination to address the growing threat.

Shutting down the spooks

In May of this year, MIT intelligence disclosed the dismantling of a Mossad network that was primarily gathering intelligence on Iranians and Palestinians residing in Turkiye. Initially, some observers linked the incident to the Turkish presidential elections, suggesting a strategic move by eventual winner President Recep Tayyip Erdogan, to garner popular support. However, security sources intimately connected to Turkish intelligence dismiss such speculations, highlighting the dismantling of previous Mossad cells in December 2022 and October 2021.

These espionage cells aimed to collect sensitive information, primarily focusing on Palestinian students who could potentially work in defense-related fields in the future, as well as influential Iranian figures and companies. Of particular concern was the Mossad’s infiltration into the realm of “special investigations,” a sector deeply valued by Turkish intelligence. This breach struck at the core of Turkiye’s sovereignty, providing Mossad with an infrastructure to compromise Turkish security and interests.

The latest crackdown on Mossad networks exemplifies the outcomes of a highly coordinated effort between Turkish intelligence and allied agencies. Turkish newspaper Daily Sabah, known for its pro-government leanings, revealed that the network included individuals of Turkish, Lebanese, and Syrian nationalities.

The publication featured photographs of seven apprehended individuals, claiming they were part of a larger “ghost network” of 56 people linked to nine Mossad cells. The network had employed deceptive tactics, establishing fake websites masquerading as employment services while discreetly amassing the CVs of potential recruits.

The red line: Recruiting foreign spies in Turkiye

What is remarkable, according to the newspaper, is that a number of these spies had previously carried out missions for the Mossad in Beirut, Lebanon, and Syria – in Aleppo and the suburbs of Damascus. They collected information about a number of military officials in the Lebanese resistance movement Hezbollah, and identified the building in which one of them lives in the southern suburbs of the Lebanese capital.

This information, which was leaked by Turkish security, seems to be a political message to both Hezbollah and Israel, says a regional security official with close ties to the Turks: A positive message to the Lebanese resistance, and a negative one to Tel Aviv. In essence, a harsh warning that if the Mossad oversteps inside Turkish territory, Ankara will reveal additional data about Israeli intelligence efforts against Hezbollah.

In general, Turkiye is cracking down on regional intel operations launched in and from its territories. In February 2022, Turkish intelligence dismantled a spy cell allegedly working for Iranian intelligence, which it claims was planning to carry out a security operation against an Israeli businessman. Ankara has also announced crackdowns on Russian spy networks.

In doing so, Turkiye is sending a message to “all its allies that it will not allow them to transfer their conflicts to its territory,” the regional security source tells The Cradle.

Others, however, believe that the repeated revelations about the dismantling of Mossad networks reflect a political trend that is still in its infancy in the Turkish security services. In essence, the “good” political relationship and excellent commercial relationship between Ankara and Tel Aviv no longer applies to their intelligence relations.

According to officials linked to Turkish intelligence, relations between the latter and the Mossad are no longer as warm as they were before Hakan Fidan became the head of Turkish intelligence. Fidan – now Turkiye’s minister of foreign affairs – had remained committed to a position of neutrality between Israel and its enemies, albeit more inclined to sympathize with the latter.

Security officials say that Turkish intelligence had long ignored warnings from its Arab counterparts that the Mossad was attempting to recruit Lebanese, Syrians, Palestinians, and others on Turkish soil. But Fidan began to take this information into account, say Arab intel sources, which has now prompted Turkish intelligence to take action.

Spying on Palestinians in Turkiye

Ankara had previously requested the Palestinian resistance movement Hamas to limit its activities in Turkish territory, a move that failed to placate the Mossad. Israeli intelligence agencies have long expressed unease over the fields of study pursued by a significant number of Palestinian students in Turkish universities, including mechanical engineering, aeronautical engineering, and informatics.

The concerns surrounding Palestinian students enrolled in specialized STEM fields in Turkish universities add another layer of complexity to the Ankara-Tel Aviv relationship. While Turkiye’s provision of free scholarships to some 600 Palestinian students aims to promote education and opportunity, Israeli intelligence agencies fear that these specializations could be exploited for military purposes by Palestinian resistance factions. The surveillance of these students and individuals accused of supporting the Palestinian resistance further complicates the delicate dynamics between the two countries.

The future of Ankara-Tel Aviv ties is uncertain

Turkish security sources inform The Cradle that Mossad agents are actively monitoring certain Palestinian students while keeping tabs on associations and individuals accused by the US and Israel of supporting the Palestinian resistance. However, the Mossad’s activities in Turkiye go beyond mere intelligence gathering, with an evident focus on identifying potential threats to Israeli interests.

The scope of Mossad’s activities in the country raises questions about the future of Ankara-Tel Aviv political ties, which are currently not at their optimal level, despite the full resumption of relations last year. While an official close to the ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP) in Ankara suggests that “time will reveal the answer,” the repeated exposure of Mossad spies and their mission against Israel’s adversaries sends a clear political message.

Turkiye is making clear to Tel Aviv that any further interference with its national security will strain relations, potentially leading to a further deterioration in ties. This potential outcome poses a significant challenge for the occupation state, particularly as it seeks to readjust its geopolitical strategy amidst a new era of West Asian connectivity involving Russia and China.

The views expressed in this article do not necessarily reflect those of The Cradle.

Erdogan’s new cabinet should improve ties with the west

June 21 2023

Photo Credit: The Cradle

Erdogan’s power retention has prompted a significant reshuffling of key positions within the government, signaling Ankara’s focus on fostering ties with the west while engaging with the east.

By Mohamad Hasan Sweidan

Having won a hard-fought second round of presidential elections and secured another term in office, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan wasted no time in making an impression by unveiling a new government line-up on 3 June.

Surprising many, he retained only two ministers from the previous administration, choosing to shake things up in what seemed to be a departure from his usual approach.

As soon as Erdogan announced his election victory, he launched his party’s campaign for the municipal elections scheduled for next March. The Justice and Development Party (AKP) has set its sights on regaining control over major municipalities, especially Istanbul and Ankara, which were lost in the 2019 elections.

To achieve this ambitious goal, Erdogan must deliver on his campaign promises, with the most pressing issue being the current economic crisis.

Over the past five years, the Turkish lira has lost a staggering 80 percent of its value, while in October, the country experienced its highest inflation rate in a quarter of a century.

To make matters worse, Turkiye’s foreign currency reserves have been steadily depleting, with $26 billion expended this year alone to support the struggling lira and finance the country’s substantial current account deficit.

This dire economic situation highlights the crucial role of Erdogan’s new treasury minister, who will be tasked with navigating one of the most challenging financial crises in Turkiye’s history.

The British banker and former Wall Street exec

The appointment of Mehmet Simsek, the former Minister of Economy, as treasury minister highlights Erdogan’s attempt to improve relations with the west. Simsek’s impressive background reveals his ties to western institutions.

Having studied at the University of Exeter in the UK and possessing British citizenship, he brings a unique perspective to the table. His previous roles as an economist at the US Embassy in Ankara, equity analyst at UBS, economic advisor at Deutsche Securities, and his tenure at Merrill Lynch, one of the world’s largest wealth management firms, have equipped him with invaluable experience.

The appointment of Simsek as Minister of the Treasury reflects two trends. The first is a return to more conventional economic policies after a long period of Erdogan’s unconventional approach.

Contrary to most economists, Erdogan believes that high-interest rates stimulate inflation. As a result, his administration reduced interest rates from 19 percent to 8.5 percent in 2021. This caused the runaway inflation in the past two years Erdogan had sought to avoid.

It is expected that one of Simsek’s first decisions will be to reverse that policy. Furthermore, Simsek has emphasized the need for decision-making autonomy, highlighting his intention to exercise freedom in his new role.

Second, Simsek’s appointment carries broader implications for Ankara’s relationship with the west. Seen as someone with western sensibilities, his presence may help rekindle foreign investment in the country. After all, who better than a British banker to engage with western institutions? It was noteworthy that he first chose to tweet in English instead of Turkish, upon assuming his position.

Considering Simsek’s past experiences and the latitude given to him, there is potential for improved economic ties with the west. This sentiment is reinforced by the appointment of Hafize Gaye Erkan as governor of the Central Bank, making her the first woman to hold this esteemed position.

With her background at Goldman Sachs, one of the largest investment banks in the world, and at the American First Republic Bank, the financial sector in Turkiye is now being led by a British banker and a former Wall Street executive, two personalities with the expertise and experience favored by western institutions.

Improving relations with West Asia and the west

Erdogan’s selection of new ministers for foreign affairs, defense, and interior came as a surprising twist, deviating from the expectations that the previous ministers would retain in their positions.

Hakan Fidan, the Director of Intelligence, was chosen as Minister of Foreign Affairs, while Yashar Guler, Chief of the General Staff of the Army, became Minister of Defense, and Ali Yerlikaya, the governor of Istanbul, assumed the role of Minister of Interior. Ibrahim Kalin, the presidential spokesman, took over Fidan’s position as intelligence chief.

Between 1986 and 2001, Fidan served in the NATO Rapid Intervention Unit and worked in the Rapid Information Collection Branch in Germany. After 15 years in the Turkish Armed Forces, he resigned in 2001 and worked as a political and economic advisor at the Australian Embassy in Ankara.

His tenure as Director of Intelligence since 2010 brought him into contact with the decision-making process on key foreign policy issues, allowing him to gain Erdogan’s trust. Importantly, Fidan played a key role in the purges that followed the failed coup attempt in 2016. He is credited with being the first to uncover the conspiracy.

The deterioration of Turkiye’s relations with a number of West Asian countries over the past years, such as Syria, Egypt, the UAE, and even the occupation state of Israel, has allowed Fidan to lead Turkish foreign policy from behind the scenes.

Ibrahim Kalin’s appointment as Fidan’s replacement signifies a continuation of the institutional changes the latter initiated in the intelligence agency to diminish the army’s influence.

Kalin is a proponent of using the “power of persuasion” rather than hard power or coercion, which is expected to contribute to resolving many issues between Ankara and its neighbors.

He is also an advocate of a larger geopolitical “strategic conversation” with the US. He was one of the main figures working to coordinate Turkish policy with the US, the EU, Russia, and Iran. Kalin’s ability to maintain balanced relationships with these powers positions him well in establishing positive ties. The Fidan-Kalin team is expected to play a major role in the coming period in improving Turkiye’s relations with West Asia and the west.

Incorporating the deep state into the AKP

Regarding the Ministry of Interior, Erdogan’s decision to replace the former minister, Suleyman Soylu, despite his affiliation with the nationalist right that supported Erdogan in the recent elections, indicates a shift away from Soylu’s harsh rhetoric against the west and the US.

In February of this year, Soylu hit out at the US envoy to Turkiye, demanding “take your dirty hands off Turkiye” and accused Washington of meddling in the country’s internal affairs. Viewing Soylu as a potential liability, Erdogan substituted him with Ali Yerlikaya, the governor of Istanbul who has previous experience in governing various Turkish cities.

Yashar Guler, the newly appointed defense minister, has held the position of chief of staff since 2018, playing a crucial role in solidifying Erdogan’s control over the army after the failed coup attempt. With prior experience as Deputy Chief of Communications for NATO Southern Regional Command, Guler maintains good relations with his government colleagues and has established rapport with the west.

Overall, Erdogan’s aim to reduce the political influence of the military has been a long-standing goal, and he has made significant progress in achieving this objective. The inclusion of intelligence and military leadership in the government, along with the appointment of a bureaucrat to head the intelligence apparatus, represents a step towards integrating the deep state into the ruling party.

Erdogan’s choices for ministers aim to mitigate the strain in Turkiye’s relations with the west. In the financial realm, he selected individuals with experience in major western financial institutions, despite their views on resolving the economic crisis, which differed from his own.

For foreign affairs, Erdogan chose Fidan, who effectively shaped Turkish foreign policy behind the scenes. In defense, he appointed someone with NATO experience, while for intelligence, he opted for a proponent of a “geostrategic” dialogue with Washington.

However, the question remains: Will Erdogan’s chosen team succeed in resolving the internal and external challenges facing Turkiye?

The views expressed in this article do not necessarily reflect those of The Cradle.

‘Democracy won, Western media lost’: Erdogan makes victory speech

May 29, 2023

Source: Agencies

Turkish President and People’s Alliance’s presidential candidate Recep Tayyip Erdogan, center, gestures to supporters at the presidential palace, in Ankara, Turkey, May 28, 2023 (AP)

By Al Mayadeen English 

Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan addresses his supporters after winning the Turkish presidential election and underlines that democracy won in Turkey.

The Turkish presidential election went smoothly without any problems, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan said Sunday during his victory speech, adding that the people gave him the responsibility of managing the country for another five years.

Erdogan also thanked the Turkish people from all walks of life, regardless of their allegiance to him or other parties, as well as all those who contributed to the success of the electoral process, especially the Turkish security forces.

“We won the Parliament in the first round, and in the second round, we took the presidency. Turkey and democracy both won,” the Turkish leader underlined. “No one lost in Turkey.”

The Republican People’s Party gave seats to certain parties despite the latter not having even 1% of the vote.

Western media lost

All the obstacles that once stood in Turkey’s face are a thing of the past now, Erdogan added, telling his supporters that Turkey was before a “new and strong” century, referring to the 100-year-anniversary of the founding of the Turkish republic.

The Justice and Development Party (AKP) gave strength to Turkey throughout the past because of the Turkish people,” Erdogan said, stressing that “democracy reigns victorious, and Western media, as well as those who sided with Western institutions, lost.”

“Turkey knows about the Western media and organizations’ plans: they want to obstruct the country’s progress. The Turkish people will not accept this,” he added.

The government will be moving in the direction of developing the country’s economy and dealing with inflation as well as the repercussions of the earthquake, the Turkish leader revealed. “We are the only ones capable of dealing with the country’s problems, not the resistance that has nothing to show but words.”

Turkey working on return of refugees

Upon paying off its debts, the Turkish government severed its ties with the International Monetary Fund, the Turkish president said.

“The opposition wanted to bring in debts from abroad, and if that were to happen, it will open the country up to foreign interventions. This is unacceptable,” Erdogan added.

The government previously worked on and will continue working on extracting Turkish oil and gas, he stressed, pledging to work on developing the country’s tech sector and will increase the number of hospitals and investments in the energy sector.

“We are working on returning the refugees. We have repatriated a million refugees as of late.

Speaking on Turkey’s ties with Russia, Erdogan promised to work on developing economic ties with Russia while also bolstering the tourism and service sector.

The Supreme Election Council chief said on Sunday that Erdogan won the presidential election with 52.14% of the vote.

“After processing 99.43% of the ballots from polling stations in Turkey and in foreign missions and border crossings, Erdogan received 52.14% of the vote, while [Kemal] Kilicdaroglu received 47.86%,” Ahmet Yener told a press conference.

In the wake of learning of his election victory, Erdogan, alongside his supporters, celebrated the victory at his home in Istanbul before the official election results not being declared yet.

Speaking from the porch of his home in Istanbul, the Turkish President hailed his supporters and the Turkish people.

Saying: “Bye, bye, bye, Kemal,” referring to his opponent, opposition leader Kemal Kilicdaroglu, Erdogan declared his victory before thousands of his supporters in Istanbul as he prepared to lead the country for an additional five years while the country’s major cities were celebrating the major victory.

Related Videos

Special Coverage | The scene in Turkey after Erdogan’s victory

Turkey elects Erdogan and consecrates him as leader

What did Kamal Java say about the most important changes in Turkish politics after Erdogan’s victory?

How will the outcome of the Turkish elections affect the file of the displaced Syrians?

Related Stories

• Erdogan Declares Victory in Turkey Presidential Election 
• Turkish FM expects Erdogan to gain over 56% in 2nd round
• Turkey Votes in Runoff Election Expected to Extend Erdogan Rule .
• Over half of Turkish parliament comprises of newly elected MPs
• Turkish elections authority officially announce round 2, due on May 28
• Crunch time in Turkey’s run-off vote

‘Bye, bye, bye Kemal’, Erdogan declares election victory

28 May 2023

Source: Al Mayadeen

President Recep Tayyip Erdogan delivers a speech to supporters outside his residence in Istanbul, Turkey, Sunday, May 28, 2023 (AP Photo/Francisco Seco)

By Al Mayadeen English 

Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan declares his election victory after garnering the majority of the vote in the country’s runoff election.

Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan won Sunday the Turkish presidential election in the runoff round, and he, alongside his supporters, celebrated the victory at his home in Istanbul despite the official election results not being declared yet.

After 99.08% of the votes were counted, Erdogan had 52,07% of the vote, with opposition leader Kemal Kilicdaroglu lagging behind at 47,93%.

Speaking from the porch of his home in Istanbul, the Turkish President hailed his supporters and the Turkish people.

“We will be ruling the country for the coming five years […] God willing, we will be deserving of your trust,” he said.

Saying: “Bye, bye, bye, Kemal,” referring to his opponent, Erdogan declared his victory before thousands of his supporters in Istanbul as he prepared to lead the country for an additional five years while the country’s major cities were celebrating the major victory.

People celebrate #Erdogan like a rockstar, with firework, dancing and Islamic phrases. Shortly after his Minister of the interior left smilingly the AKP Centre in #Istanbul Erdogan appeared on screen. He said that all of #Turkey won, and then shouted that LGBT won’t get into AKP. pic.twitter.com/P006w9jflA

— Marion Sendker (@_MarionSendker) May 28, 2023

“The people has given us the responsibility [to lead the country] for the next five years,” Erdogan said. “We have repeatedly said that those who serve the people will never be defeated.”

A short while ago, #Turkey’s incumbent President Recep Tayyip Erdogan declared victory in his country's run-off election, extending his rule into a third decade.
Before the final results arrived, Erdogan's supporters hit the streets to celebrate.#TurkeyElections… pic.twitter.com/P3DS4ysush

— Sharon Ogunleye (@Sharon_Ogunleye) May 28, 2023

According to the Turkish President, Kilicdaroglu, the leader of the Republican People’s Party, leased parliamentary seats to certain parties.

“The supporters of the Republican People’s Party will hold the party’s leader accountable for these results,” the leader underlined. 

“From now on, we will continue our struggle for Turkey […] the only true winner today is Turkey,” he added. 

The AKP leader, 69, overcame Turkey’s biggest economic crisis in generations and the most powerful opposition alliance to ever face his party, winning the election by a landslide.

Near complete results showed him leading Kilicdaroglu by four percentage points.

Turks returned to the polls on Sunday for the runoff round of the Turkish election to decide whether President Recep Tayyip Erdogan will extend his rule or will be unseated by his opponent Kemal Kilicdaroglu who promised to “restore a more democratic society” in Turkey.

Polls opened at 8 am local time, and the process ended at 5 pm local time, while results are expected to be announced a few hours after polls close.

On May 14, no presidential candidate ensured 50%+1 of the vote in the first round of the elections.

More than 191,000 ballot boxes are set up in 973 districts and 1,094 electoral boards across the country.

Ogan, who won 5.2% of the votes in the first round, asked his voters to support Erdogan in the second round.

Many are attributing Erdogan’s victory to the move done by his third-party opponent in the first round, though the president had already garnered the majority.

Read next: Round II: Erdogan, Kilicdaroglu heading for presidential runoff

Take two: Turkiye’s election circus gets even crazier

May 26 2023

Photo Credit: The Cradle

The second round of Turkish presidential elections has drawn global attention for its increasingly bizarre alliances, outrageous propaganda, and personality politics. Ironically, not much is expected to change in its aftermath.

By Ceyda Karan

The political landscape in Turkiye has become increasingly convoluted after the 14 May presidential and parliamentary elections left the Turkish presidency up for grabs – with a critical, second round of polls to be held on Sunday.

As the main candidates who failed to secure the presidency in the first round prepare for the 28 May election, Turkiye’s patchwork system of political alliances has become more intricate, marked by polarizing debates on issues such as secularism, nationalism, Syrian refugees, and the Kurdish issue. In the very year that Turkiye celebrates the Republic’s 100th anniversary, the country’s political atmosphere has grown more uncertain than ever.

The official results of the first round of the presidential election saw incumbent Recep Tayyip Erdogan, the candidate of the People’s Alliance, obtain 49.5 percent of the vote, while main opponent Kemal Kilicdaroglu, the candidate of the National Alliance, received 44.8 percent – both remaining under the 50+ percent threshold required for an outright win.

Muharrem Ince, who withdrew from the race at the last minute, secured 0.43 percent of the vote, and Sinan Ogan, the candidate of the secular nationalist ATA Alliance, received 5.17 percent.

The sequel no one asked for

The second round between Erdogan and Kilicdaroglu has essentially transformed the election into a referendum on the former’s 21-year rule. The public’s sentiment and perception have therefore become crucial in this contest.

Despite the parliamentary election’s official results being due on 19 May, the Supreme Election Board (YSK) has not yet released them, leading to some frantic domestic speculation on the reasons for this. Some observers have raised concerns about the possibility of fraudulent voters, as the number of voters is reportedly double the population growth rate. In normal circumstances, parliament should convene on the third day after the official results are published, and elected MPs should be sworn in.

However, Erdogan is purportedly stalling the swearing-in procedure because members of his alliance, the radical Islamist Kurdish movement HUDA PAR, refuse to utter the phrase “Turkish nation” during the ceremonial oath. This leaves Erdogan keen to defer the ceremony – and this drama – until after the 28 May presidential election.

In the lead up to Sunday’s polls, the main topics dominating Turkiye’s political discourse are distrust in the fairness of the election, Turkish citizenships granted to Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) nationals in exchange for top-dollar real estate purchases, and the wildly disparate numbers of refugees currently residing in the country (the government says less than 4 million; the opposition claims 13 million).

These highly polarizing issues have triggered a number of realignments within the two main alliances contesting the presidency.

This time it’s personal

Since the country’s 2017 referendum, in which parliamentary democracy was replaced by a Turkish-style presidential system that recognizes unsealed ballots as valid, electoral irregularities have become a recurring concern. And so the opposition is understandably apprehensive about potential “vote theft” and the security of ballots.  

Furthermore, the unusually high voter turnout rate of over 80 percent in Turkiye’s devastated earthquake-affected areas that claimed the lives of tens of thousands and caused mass migration, has raised questions.

In the southeastern region, which has a significant Kurdish population, Erdogan’s far-right, ultra-nationalist, Nationalist Movement Party (MHP) coalition partner, made significant gains in the polls, sparking allegations of ballot manipulation. Similarly, suspicions arose due to the unchanging 5 percent vote share garnered by the third candidate and kingmaker, Sinan Ogan, throughout the vote count.

However, after an initial week of furious debates, these concerns have now been fully overshadowed by the impending second round of voting.

In fact, the parliamentary elections, where Erdogan’s Justice and Development Party (AKP) won 35.6 percent of the vote and the main opposition Republican People’s Party (CHP) secured 25.3 percent – and the subsequent uncertainty regarding the exact representation of the two parties and their allies – have been largely forgotten.

The presidential contest has taken center stage as the sole, focal political point of interest. And last-minute shifts and tweaks in the madcap alliances that make up the two leading coalitions are all the Turkish media talk about.

Switching slogans and alliances

Kilicdaroglu’s Millet (or Nation) Alliance, which leads the narrative for change (essentially, ousting Erdogan), has adopted patriotic slogans such as “Those who love their homeland should come to the ballot box” and “Let the gates of hell be closed.” Although he emphasized “unity” and objected to Erdogan’s polarizing politics in the first round of polls, Kilicdaroglu has adopted a more confrontational discourse in this second phase. Interestingly, he adopted the “hell” slogan from Sinan Ogan, a candidate who was eliminated in the first vote and who has since endorsed Erdogan ahead of the runoff vote.

Before 14 May, Ogan stated, “Maybe we won’t open the gates of heaven, but we will close the gates of hell.” The “hell” he referred to was the Erdogan government. While harshly criticizing Erdogan for his handling of Syrian refugees, Ogan also declared that Turkish nationalists – like himself – would never align themselves with the Islamist HUDA PAR. He even suggested that the Peoples’ Democratic Party (HDP), representing Kurdish politics, would negotiate a deal with Erdogan in the second round.

But, ironically, it was Ogan who ended up striking a deal with Erdogan, announcing his support for the president on the grounds of maintaining “stability” in Turkiye. This, despite the fact that Ogan’s main condition regarding the repatriation of refugees appears not to have been met: Although a popular election issue, Erdogan has ruled out repatriating Syrian asylum seekers.

Winning over the nationalists

It remains uncertain how much of Ogan’s nationalist voter base will take to Erdogan. The ATA Alliance, to which he owes his candidacy, has become heavily divided in advance of the second polls. The foundation of the alliance consists of the far-right Zafer Party, in collaboration with some smaller political parties. Two days after Ogan threw his weight behind Erdogan, Zafer Party Leader Umit Ozdag announced his support for Kilicdaroglu.

Unlike Ogan, Ozdag says he has clinched a deal with his candidate – Kilicdaroglu – to repatriate Syrian refugees on the basis of international law and humanitarianism. Ozdag has also said they agreed that there would be zero compromise in the fight against the Kurdish PKK and terrorism.

A staunch nationalist, Ozdag frequently invokes Mustafa Kemal Ataturk – the much-revered founder of the Turkish Republic – rails against Erdogan’s role in accepting millions of Syrian refugees and selling Turkish citizenship in exchange for cash, and constantly warns about Turkiye’s “demographic threat.”

In part, this refers to the Erdogan administration’s distribution of Turkish citizenship to anyone who purchases real estate for $400,000, sharply increased rents caused by the influx of foreigners, and the perceived influence of these people (without any ties to Turkiye or knowledge of the Turkish language) on elections. All these issues feature heavily in the nationalist movement’s narrative and propaganda.

As an example, during the first round of elections, the Turkish public reacted strongly to a live broadcast on the private, pro-government A Haber news channel. In the aired footage, a Kuwaiti individual speaking Arabic into the microphone after casting his vote shocked Turkish viewers. The channel swiftly cut the broadcast and deleted the video.

Unprecedented election propaganda

But if this election can be distilled into a popularity referendum on Erdogan, the sitting Turkish president has some clear advantages over his opponent: He uses every state tool at his disposal and has a mainstream media loyal to him. While TV channels cover Erdogan’s statements and rallies around the clock, Kilicdaroglu has few opportunities to be nationally heard outside of opposition media outlets.

As a result, Erdogan has been particularly sloppy about his political rhetoric, making ludicrous claims and sometimes outright lies – without being duly checked by the media.

In a Trumpian boast during a rally in the earthquake-stricken province of Malatya, Erdogan boasted that the number of people who came to listen to him in the square was higher than the number of deaths caused by the 6 February earthquake.

While victims had cried out for urgent government assistance for days without a response – which Erdogan himself has admitted – he told rally crowds: “We mobilized all means from the first hours of the disaster.” There have been many such gaffes along the campaign trail this year, which finally culminated in a major media scandal over a faked video montage.

Erdogan accidentally admitted that a video montage shown by his team in public squares before the first round of votes had been faked. The edited footage depicted PKK leaders in the Qandil region of Iraq singing along to a song in Kilicdaroglu’s political ad. The intent of the video was clearly to link the latter to the PKK and terrorism.

The opposition reacted strongly to the slander, with Kilicdaroglu calling Erdogan a “montage fraudster” and filing a lawsuit for compensation. But because of the president’s iron grip on mainstream Turkish media, it is not known how many voters at those rallies are aware of the fakery.

The propaganda has progressed well beyond the video scandal. Fake brochures attributed to Kilicdaroglu, including bizarre campaign promises and praise for terrorism, have been detected and prosecuted along the way. There’s no telling how much of an effect these fake-news scandals will affect Sunday’s polls.

‘Unprincipled coalitions’

As the second round vote approaches, Professor Emin Gurses from Sakarya University, highlights the shallow opportunism of these Turkish elections, telling The Cradle:

“In Turkiye, there is an understanding that it is permissible to lie while doing politics. Voters voted for the candidate they know and recognize through trust. They [politicians] act to win the election. They don’t look at friend or foe.”

The last-minute alliance shifts may not even change anything. According to Gurses, Sinan Ogan has little to gain by backing Erdogan, and on the other side, even if a deal is struck with Ozdag, it will be challenging for Kilicdaroglu to close the 2.5 million-vote gap with Erdogan.

Meanwhile, columnist Mehmet Ali Guller from Cumhuriyet has highlighted the consequences of the 50+1 system in Turkiye, which he argues leads to unprincipled coalitions, with ideology, programs, and politics pushed to the background. Guller charges that there are no significant differences in the fundamental policies of both sides:

“There is no fundamental difference between the two options in terms of economic policies, it is in the details. And in terms of foreign policy, there is no fundamental difference between the two options, there are details. Because both options are essentially Atlanticist and NATOist.”

100 years on: It’s looking bleak

Regardless of the election outcome, Guller foresees an ongoing economic crisis that offers no short-term solution. He also notes that both Islamists and nationalists exist in the two main political coalitions, creating an ideological stalemate of sorts, and predicts that Turkiye will be forced to hold another election within the next five years.

If Kilicdaroglu wins, he may find himself governing the country using decrees inherited from his predecessor despite advocating for a return to parliamentary democracy, as his alliance will be in the minority in parliament.

In this “unprincipled” political environment, it is even plausible that Erdodan, the architect of the Turkish-style presidential system, may consider reverting to a “parliamentary system.” On the other hand, if Erdogan emerges victorious, an unprecedented economic crisis is expected, with Turkiye’s CDS rating surpassing 700 and the US dollar projected to reach at least 24 Turkish liras. 

In the upcoming local elections, Erdogan is likely to continue his right-wing populist campaign to reclaim cities like Istanbul, which he lost in 2019.

Because Turkiye requires at least $200 billion in resources, Erdogan’s foreign policy stance will be determined by economic opportunity, as he is not seen as a reliable partner by any country, on either side of the global divide. He is expected to continue his balancing act: putting the “migrant issue” before the EU; Syria and Ukraine before Russia; relations with Russia before the US, and using Turkiye’s presence in Syria as leverage over the Arab world, using these as bargaining chips to maximize his gains.

In any case, the outlook for the Republic of Turkiye, on its 100th anniversary, appears bleak.

The views expressed in this article do not necessarily reflect those of The Cradle.

تركيا والتجاذب بين الخيارات والهويات في الرئاسة

 الثلاثاء 16 أيار 2023

ناصر قنديل

قدّم مشهد الانتخابات الرئاسية التركية صورة شديدة التركيب والتعقيد بين عناصر تتشكّل منها كل مشاكل وأزمات المنطقة والعالم، وتدور حول أسئلة كبرى وتفصيلية، لتقول إن هناك توازناً هشاً بين معسكرين متداخلين، لا يمكن للمفاضلة بينهما أن تتم إلا بصعوبة عالية، بما يُعبّر عن غياب الخيارات الواضحة في تعبيرها عن مقاربة مشاكل الغد بلغة متجانسة؛ حيث يمثّل الرئيس أردوغان نموذج الإسلام السياسي القريب من الغرب ومفهوم الدولة المدنية، مقابل منافسه كمال كليجدار كممثل للعلمانية الأصولية المشبعة بروح الغرب والمعادية للدين؛ ويمثل أردوغان من موقعه في زعامة الأخوان المسلمين ضمن معسكر الإسلام السياسي نموذج العنف وشهوة البحث عن دور على حساب استقلال دول المنطقة، وصولاً للاستعداد لاستضافة عشرات آلاف الإرهابيين التكفيريين، وبالمقابل تصدير بعضهم الى حيث يلزم، تحت عباءة مشروع العثمانية الجديدة وحلم السلطنة الكامن والجاهز للظهور دائماً، ومقابله منافس يريد استعادة نموذج أتاتورك لدور إقليمي ينضبط بالأجندة الغربية، لكن دون خوض حروب وطموحات التوسع؛ ويمثل أردوغان مشروعاً استقلالياً يقف على مسافة المصالح المتحركة بين الشرق والغرب، من حرب أوكرانيا إلى حرب سورية، والبحث عن شراكات سياسية واقتصادية تأخذ بالاعتبار متغيرات العالم ومخاطر البقاء في المركب الغربي بقيادة أميركية متوحشة، يأنس اليها منافسه ويأخذ عليه التقرّب من روسيا، بينما في الاقتصاد قدّم أردوغان نموذج اقتصاد قوميّ عماد النهوض بالصناعة وإنتاج دور يستند الى عناصر القوة في الجغرافيا الاقتصادية، ويقابله منافس يتبنى الليبرالية الكاملة، حيث لا دور للدولة في الاقتصاد؛ وفيما يقدم أردوغان مثالاً قاسياً في التعامل مع الحريات الشخصية والاجتماعية والسياسية والاعلامية، يتباهى خصمه بالذهاب الى أبعد الحدود دفاعاً عنها وصولاً لتشريع المثلية.

يقول المشهد الانتخابي في الجولة الأولى إن الأتراك حائرون. وهذا معنى توزعهم بنسب متساوية تقريباً بين المتنافسين، في لحظة يطلق عليها علماء الاجتماع والفلاسفة، لحظة انعدام اليقين. ولعل تصويت ستة وخمسين مليون تركي من أصل ستين مليوناً يحق لهم الانتخاب، يدل على حجم الانخراط الذي تعيشه المجتمعات في محاولة البحث عن اليقين، وانقسام هؤلاء الى نصفين شبه متساويين، بين ثمانية وعشرين مليوناً في ضفة وخمسة وعشرين مليوناً في ضفة مقابلة، ومقابل الإثنين ثلاثة ملايين صوّتوا للمرشح القومي المتطرف، تعبير عن حال عدم اليقين، وعدم وضوح الخيارات بصورة حاسمة؛ وبالتدقيق في اتجاهات التصويت، سوف يتبين أن المدن الكبرى كانت صاحبة الصوت الحاسم لصالح خيارات كليجدار، مقابل تصويت الأرياف بنسب أعلى لصالح أردوغان. وهذا يعني أن الأرياف صوتت بدافع الميل لصالح الهوية القومية الإسلامية المتصالحة مع المنطقة، خصوصاً في ضوء مرارة التجربة مع محاولات الانضمام الى الاتحاد الأوروبي، والإطار العنصري الذي قابلت به أوروبا طلب تركيا ذات الغالبية الإسلامية للانضمام إليها، بخلفية الخشية على التكوين الديمغرافي الأوروبي والحرص على ما وصفه الخبراء بالنقاء المسيحي، كما صوّتت لصالح دور الدولة الاقتصادي في السكن والتعليم والصحة ودعم الزراعة والسياحة والصناعة، بينما تأثرت المدن بالتطلع نحو الاندماج بالغرب خصوصاً مع الضائقة الاقتصادية وتراجع القيمة الشرائية لليرة التركية، وتغليب الدولة التي بلا هوية على نموذج الهوية التي قدّمها أردوغان، والتصويت للحريات بأبعادها الإعلامية والشخصية والاجتماعية بنسختها الليبرالية، بما فيها المثلية، والرغبة بالخروج من التوترات والنزاعات والحروب.

تكشف الانتخابات الدور المؤثر لشريحة وازنة وقضية بارزة. الشريحة هي الشباب الذين يتمركزون في المدن، ويبدو أن غالبية كبيرة منهم لم تصوّت لصالح أردوغان، ولو على خلفية طلب التغيير تحت شعار “عشرون عاماً تكفي”، أما القضية التي تعاني منها المدن وحضرت في خلفية التصويت بقوة فهي قضية اللاجئين السوريين، التي يتحمّل أردوغان مسؤولية تفاقمها، من موقعه ودوره في الحرب على سورية، مقابل التزام منافسه بإعادتهم خلال سنتين، ولو اقتضى الأمر ترحيلهم. والواضح أن ضغط قضية النزوح السوري على سكان المدن اقتصادياً واجتماعياً على خلفية الأزمة التي تعصف بالاقتصاد التركي وارتفاع نسب البطالة والتنافس على الأعمال بين العمال الأتراك والعمال السوريين، وتحميل البرجوازية السورية بين اللاجئين مسؤوليّة ارتفاع بدلات الإيجار والبيع في السوق العقاري، والسيطرة على بعض المهن، فيما يبدو أردوغان متردداً في اتخاذ القرار الذي يجعله أقرب لتقديم حل عملي لقضية النزوح، حيث يمكن التوصل مع الدولة السورية بدعم روسي إيراني خليجي، لروزنامة تتضمّن الانسحاب التركي من سورية وعودة النازحين وتفكيك الكانتونات التقسيمية والجماعات الإرهابية شمال شرق وشمال غرب سورية بالتوازي خلال سنتين.

يمكن القول إن الدورة الثانية قد تمنح فرصاً أفضل لمنافس أردوغان، إلا إذا أشهر أردوغان ورقته الرابحة بشجاعة، وأعلن استعداده للالتزام بروزنامة متوازية لعودة النازحين والانسحاب من سورية، عبر قمة سورية تركية بمشاركة روسية وايرانية تعقد في الرياض أو أبو ظبي تعلن هذا الالتزام وتضع له جداوله الزمنية.

فيديوات متعلقة

بعد تعذر حصد أي من المرشحين الثلاثة الأغلبية المطلقة من الأصوات.. الانتخابات التركية تتجه إلى جولة ثانية

من سيكون الأقدر على زيادة رصيده الانتخابي في الجولة الثانية؟

 بايدن يقلل من أهمية هوية الفائز في تركيا

مقالات متعلقة

• إردوغان أمام الاختبار الأصعب: تركيا أكثر انقساماً
• خريطة البرلمان ثابتة: «تحالف الجمهور» يكتسح
• في “تناقض محرج”.. بايدن يُقلّل من أهمية الفائز في الرئاسة التركية
• انتخابات تركيا: إردوغان و”طاولة الستة” وما تحتها
• من اللجوء في تركيا إلى النزوح في إدلب.. عودة السوريين المُرة
• موسكو تستبق النتائج: تعاوننا باقٍ

Turkey’s runoff elections: a precognitive outcome?

May 15, 2021

Source: Al Mayadeen English

By Lea Akil 

The current political scene in Turkey is significant as neither the incumbent President or his opposition rival were able to secure a majority in the first round of elections, leading to a runoff.

Turkey’s runoff elections: a precognitive outcome? Designed by: Zainab Roumani.

Voter support for Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan fell below the majority required for him to secure reelection outright. This outcome has necessitated run-off elections on May 28.

Erdogan secured 49.51% and opposition candidate Kemal Kilicdaroglo secured 44.88%. Divergent partial results emerged from Turkey’s presidential election earlier on Sunday. While the state-run news agency suggested that Erdogan would narrowly secure a victory, the private agency indicated that the contest was likely to proceed to a runoff.

In the upcoming second round, it is important to consider that Erdogan is expected to have an advantageous position over Kilicdaroglu due to his lead in the first round and the positive parliamentary results favoring the ruling coalition in contrast to the opposition.

The outcome came as a surprise and disappointment to the opposition, who had set high expectations for both the presidential and parliamentary elections. In the presidential race, the opposition was hopeful that even if they couldn’t secure victory in the first round, Kilicdaroglu would at least receive the highest number of votes.

Based on the results, it has become evident that Erdogan is leading by around four points over Kilicdaroglu in the first round. The parliamentary elections are also of great significance as the opposition had hoped to secure a majority in parliament, thereby assuming leadership. There has been an ongoing debate within opposition circles that even if Erdogan is not defeated in the presidential elections, simply gaining a majority in parliament would undermine his satisfaction of winning a new presidential term. It has become evident that the opposition is experiencing a crisis, not only in the parliamentary elections but also in achieving a presidential majority, as the ruling coalition has managed to secure a majority in parliament.

In terms of alliances, analysts indicate that there has been a significant shift for the Justice and Development Party (AKP) since it formed a coalition with the Nationalist Movement Party (MHP) in the middle of the previous decade. They argue that it is because the AKP is no longer able to reach power and govern independently; it is in need of forming a government.

Why is the current political scene important?

For the first time, the AKP and Erdogan are participating in elections under critical circumstances. This includes the aftermath of the devastating earthquake that claimed the lives of 50,000 people, caused over $100 billion in damages, and raised significant concerns regarding the government’s handling of the crisis. However, it is cruicial to mention that 8 out of 10 provinces that were severely devastated by the earthquake voted Erdogan, and the numbers surpassed expectations. 

For example, in Hatay Antakya, one of the earthquake stricken regions of Turkey, the voter turnout was 53.9% in favor of Erdogan with only 42.56% for Kilicdaroglo. In the epicenter of the devestating earthquake, Kahramanmaras, Erdogan was leading the polls with around 71.11% of the votes. 

In light of the upcoming elections, the #economy is the most prominent topic. How could #Erdogan's current economic policies and the opposition's proposed economic plans shape the outcome of the elections?#Turkey #TurkishElections pic.twitter.com/CqclIJfmiV

— Al Mayadeen English (@MayadeenEnglish) May 12, 2023

Furthermore, the current inflation rate stands at 45%, having reached 80% just a few months ago. These economic conditions are exerting immense pressure on Erdogan.

Moreover, for the first time in modern Turkish history, the majority of opposition parties have come together in a unified front to challenge and overthrow Erdogan’s rule.

Emphasizing these crucial points, it can be concluded that Erdogan’s accomplishment in the presidential elections is a significant victory. He successfully thwarted the opposition’s attempt to secure the presidency in the first round.

All eyes are on #Turkey as citizens cast their votes, determining the fate of their country's future.
Why are these elections important?
Stay tuned for #AlMayadeen's coverage of the #TurkishElections. #Turkeyelection2023 @LeaAAkil pic.twitter.com/cBBCJfrGR6

— Al Mayadeen English (@MayadeenEnglish) May 14, 2023

Erdogan in the second round, what to expect? 

Erdogan is now expected to be successful in the second round and here’s why. Strengthening this argument, the first reason is of psychological significance as Erdogan surpassed Kilicdaroglu by a margin of four points. Furthermore, the ruling coalition’s achievement of a parliamentary majority serves as another crucial factor. In the event of a runoff election, Erdogan will have the opportunity to appeal to undecided and unaligned voters who prioritize political stability when making their voting choices.

Erdogan will assert that he alone possesses the ability to uphold political stability and prevent a potential clash between the executive presidency and the legislative institution. With the ruling coalition’s current dominance in the legislative power, Erdogan will emphasize that this is a critical aspect to be considered. By highlighting his role in preserving the harmony between the branches of government, he aims to reassure voters that he is the best candidate to ensure a stable and functioning political system. 

That said, the division within the Good Party in response to Kilicdaroglu’s alliance with the HDP serves as a significant motivation for voters in their search for political stability. The opposition party’s decision to form a coalition with the HDP has created a rift among its members and supporters. This division raises concerns about the party’s coherence and its ability to provide a stable and united front against Erdogan’s ruling coalition. In light of these circumstances, voters who prioritize political stability may lean towards Erdogan, viewing him as a more reliable option in comparison to the opposition.

Nationalist votes tip the balance 

Following Muharrem Ince’s withdrawal, Sinan Ogan emerged as a prominent figure and showcased unexpected strength in the polls. However, in the event of a runoff round, Ogan’s support base would likely be divided into two factions. This division could potentially weaken the opposition’s collective strength and impact their ability to challenge Erdogan. The fragmented support for Ogan would present a challenge for the opposition in uniting their voter base and rallying behind a single candidate.

The first part consists of a small, solid bloc that accounts for around 1.5% to 2% of the votes. The second part, which is more significant, includes the nationalist votes that shifted their support away from the Good Party due to Kilicdaroglu’s alliance with the HDP. These nationalist votes have now aligned themselves with the ATA-Alliance after Ince’s withdrawal.

Earlier today, Ogan said that he will announce who he will vote for, within a day or two, depending on negotiations and consultations. He stressed that his decision is based on “red lines,” such as fighting terrorism, moving away from political parties supported by terrorist parties, and the return of Syrian refugees. He considered that the opposition “made a mistake somewhere,” because they failed to win the elections despite all the factors, which he considers are enough to cost Erdogan another term. 

It is worth stressing that before this statement, ATA Alliance Presidential Candidate Sinan Oğan denied that the Nation Alliance said it would support Kilicdaroglo only if HDP was excluded from the political system, after an interview with Der Spiegel. 

Hayırdır Der Spiegel, size verdiğim röportajda Türk basınına dediğimiz genel şartlardan farklı bir şey demedik. Bunu nereden uydurdunuz? https://t.co/n4QcDHF7Ht

— Dr. Sinan Oğan (@DrSinanOgan) May 15, 2023

The key factor influencing the voting behavior of the nationalist bloc in the runoff round will primarily be the nationalist ideology criterion. The nationalist voters will consider the candidates’ stances and policies regarding nationalist issues, including issues related to national identity, sovereignty, and the protection of national interests. Their decision will be driven by their alignment with the candidate who they perceive as most committed to promoting and advancing nationalist values and goals.

Far-right ATA Alliance nominee Sinan Ogan tells Al Mayadeen that nationalism is on the rise around the globe but in #Turkey, it is not exclusionary.@LeaAAkil pic.twitter.com/IDzbkAVNhC

— Al Mayadeen English (@MayadeenEnglish) May 4, 2023

The nationalist bloc opposes Erdogan and expresses criticism towards the government’s policies, including economic policies. However, their main concern lies with Kilicdaroglu due to his alliance with the HDP. They perceive the HDP as a political front for the PKK, the Kurdistan Workers’ Party. Given this perspective, the nationalist bloc may lean towards supporting Erdogan in the presidential elections, as they view him as a candidate who aligns more closely with their nationalist values and is less associated with the HDP and its alleged connections to the PKK. Even if the nationalist bloc in the opposition alliance decides to remain neutral in the runoff round, analysts suggest it is impossible for them to vote for Kilicdaroglu. 

In a case where they also don’t vote for Erdogan, the voter behavior is not expected to change drastically. Analysts suggest that if voters choose not to vote for either candidate, Erdogan will still benefit as long as he maintains a 4-point lead over Kilicdaroglu. It is worth emphasizing that the matter of winning the parliamentary elections is crucial and will have an impact on the presidential elections in the runoff round. Erdogan will be able to address the bloc of undecided voters who want to see political stability in Turkey, which they associate with economic recovery.

During the runoff round, undecided voters could conclude that electing Kilicdaroglu could trigger a power struggle between the legislative and executive branches. Since the legislative power is currently dominated by the ruling coalition and the executive power is controlled by the opposition, a political impasse is very likely. Based on that, analysts argue that the best scenario for Kilicdaroglu in the runoff round is if the nationalist votes don’t vote for Erdogan, since it is not likely for them to give their votes to Kilicdaroglu. In this case, Erdogan will be able to maintain what he achieved in the first round.

Related Stories

• Erdogan Heading for a Runoff in Turkey’s Knife-Edge Elections
• Election expression of Turkey democratic maturity: Erdogan
• Erdogan continues leading polls despite shrinking gap
• Nationalist votes up for grabs as Ince exits presidential race

Al Mayadeen launches its special coverage of Turkish elections

May 1, 2023

Source: Al Mayadeen Net

By Al Mayadeen English 

Al Mayadeen begins its special coverage to follow up on Turkey’s elections.

Supporters of the Republican People’s Party, CHP, wave Turkish flags, and one with a portrait of Kemal Ataturk, right, as they celebrate after preliminary results of the local elections were announced in Ankara, Turkey, April 1, 2019. (AP)

An MP fpr the Justice and Development Party, Iffet Polat, told Al Mayadeen that her party’s goal is to focus on winning these elections, adding that she was hopeful this goal would be achieved.

Presidential elections are scheduled to take place in Turkey on May 14, 2023. Voters will elect a new president for a term of five years.

During a special coverage that Al Mayadeen began Monday, Polat indicated that she is confident “the outcome of the presidential elections being decided in the first round in favor of the head of the Justice and Development Party, Recep Tayyip Erdogan,” adding that the AKP was able to achieve much for the people of Turkey.

هدفنا هو أن نركز على الفوز في هذه الانتخابات ولدينا أمل في تحقيق ذلك.

النائبة عن حزب العدالة والتنمية افت بولوت لـ #الميادين.#الميادين #تركيا #الانتخابات_التركية#تركيا_بوسفور_الانتخابات pic.twitter.com/ej969gKNNW

— قناة الميادين (@AlMayadeenNews) May 1, 2023

Al Mayadeen’s correspondent Omar Kayed explained that the electoral campaign battles in Turkey are neck and neck in Ankara, as it is a crucial region for several reasons. Firstly it is the capital and the seat of decision-making. Second, because it is the area with the second-largest number of parliamentary seats. And lastly, because the city has been in the grip of the AKP since the party’s foundation. 

كيف تبدو أجواء الانتخابات التركية والتنافس بين المرشحين في #أنقرة؟

موفد #الميادين إلى #أنقرة عمر كايد.@kayed_omar pic.twitter.com/uFCn0l3OtK

— قناة الميادين (@AlMayadeenNews) May 1, 2023

Last Thursday, voting in the general elections for Parliamentary and Presidential opened to Turkish nationals abroad. 

An opinion poll published by the American Al-Monitor website showed a statistical tie between Turkish President Rcep Tayyip Erdogan and his main opponent, opposition leader Kemal Kilicdaroglu.

Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan is facing the biggest challenge to his 20-year rule due to economic issues and the high cost of living, not to mention that victims of the earthquake are reconsidering where their loyalties lie after the disaster struck.

Related News

• Bombs, Exploitation and Terrorism: The Many Wars of Qatar
• FMs of Syria, Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Egypt and Iraq Meet in Amman, Call for Terror Eradication, Refugees Return 
• Amman Hosts 5-Party Meeting on Syria’s Return to Arab League
• Syrian Security Seizes More ISIS Weapons in Daraa Countryside
• Syrian Security Seizes More ISIS Weapons in Daraa Countryside
• Iran Arrests Individuals Charged with Ties to French Spies
• Iran: We’ve Hit “Israel” from Within

Al Qaeda Terrorists Protesting Turkey’s Rapprochement with Syria

JANUARY 7, 2023

 ARABI SOURI

NATO-sponsored Al Qaeda terrorists in Idlib took to the streets in angry protests against the latest rapprochement steps by the Turkish madman Erdogan toward Syria.

Euronews, a strong propaganda state-controlled arm of NATO and its financial arm, the European Union, shared a video clip showing a few dozen of all males protesting somewhere in the Al Qaeda stronghold in the Turkish-occupied and controlled Idlib province.

In the accompanying news, the EU propaganda outlet claimed that similar protests took place in a number of towns in the countryside of Idlib.

The video is also available on Rumble, and BitChute,

The protest shared by the EU propaganda arm Euronews showed protests spewing slogans with improper language reminiscent of the 2011 NATO-promoted protests in most remote villages and towns across Syria calling for NATO bombing of Syria to spread freedoms and democracy. These protests also witnessed the killings of dozens of Syrian policemen and civilians by 5th column instigators planted by foreign powers and funded by the US-led coalition which included Qatar and Saudi Arabia, the most retard political regimes in the whole world.

Without naming him, the al Qaeda fighters shown in the above video clip with their sons were expressing their anger toward their main sponsor, the Turkish madman Erdogan, after the recent steps taken by him to mend the ties with Syria and their fear he would drop his role in the regime change in Damascus which he played the central part in ever since he was assigned that task by George W. Bush years before the NATO-sponsored Arab Spring was initiated.

The Turkish madman Erdogan is in desperate need to speed up his rapprochement with Syrian President Bashar Assad before the upcoming elections in Turkey, all his policies during his very long reign in Turkey have brought draconian measures against freedoms in his own country, the jailing of tens of thousands of public workers and journalists under the pretext of supporting an opposition movement to him and the failed coup of 2016, in addition to the countless debacles in foreign interventions earning him zero friends in contrast to the policy of zero troubles with neighboring countries which he fooled his people with to vote for him.

Any meeting and agreement with President Assad would help Erdogan in his bid to be reelected, again, as it would give the Turkish people the impression of solving the refugee crises in their country, the crisis they blame for their deteriorating economy.

The main losers of such rapprochement with Damascus are the al Qaeda and ISIS terrorists in northern Syria, the Turkish madman Erdogan considers them, like his NATO colleagues, as moderate opposition; Syria and the normal world consider them as terrorists. The other losers of a Turkish rapprochement with Syria are the US-sponsored Kurdish SDF separatist terrorists. Both these terrorist entities share the same goals of creating cantons carving them out of Syria and placing a foothold of NATO and Israel where Syria’s main food basket farmlands and oil fields are.

Erdogan Sent 800 al Qaeda & ISIS Terrorists to Ukraine from Idlib

It’s no surprise that al Qaeda terrorists would express their anger toward any rapprochement between Turkey and Syria, however insincere their main sponsor Erdogan is, they fear they will be abandoned like all cheap cards are in the bigger strategic political game.

Syria’s main condition for any rapprochement with Turkey is exactly that, Turkey must drop its support to Al Qaeda and ISIS terrorists in their numerous groups and return to the Adana Accords of 1998 which only Turkey under Erdogan has breached every article of it.

It’s also no surprise that the NATO propaganda arms would return to promoting those same terrorists who wreaked havoc across Syria and all the countries that were infested with the Arab Spring, and even the countries that sponsored the Arab Spring and had their terrorists return home and carry out terrorist attacks, mainly in western European countries.

There are somewhere between 60,000 and 120,000 terrorists of al Qaeda, ISIS, and their affiliates controlling a Syrian population of around 4 million Syrians across the regions under the Turkish occupation in northern Syria including Idlib province, parts of Aleppo, Raqqa, Deir Ezzor, and Hasakah provinces, a large number of those terrorists are foreign terrorists brought into Syria from across the world all the way from the Chinese Uighur and their families through Central Asia to western Europe, literally wherever the anti-Islamic Muslim Brotherhood and Wahhabism doctrines have influence, the first is the twisted version of Islam followed by the Turkish AKP ruling party with Erdogan as its supreme leader, a number of radical parties empowered across the Arab world, and the latter is the main twisted version of Islam followed by the Saudi and Qatari rulers.

---

Syria News is a collaborative effort by two authors only, we end up most of the months paying from our pockets to maintain the site’s presence online, if you like our work and want us to remain online you can help by chipping in a couple of Euros/ Dollars or any other currency so we can meet our site’s costs.You can also donate with Cryptocurrencies through our donate page.
Thank you in advance.

• US Army Steals 60 Tankers and Trucks of Syrian Oil and Wheat
• Erdogan Sent 800 al Qaeda & ISIS Terrorists to Ukraine from Idlib
• US Sanctions are Killing Syrians and Are a Human Rights Violation

Erdogan reviving Ataturk-era Turkey, waging wars and claiming hegemony

January 2, 2023

Source: Politico

By Al Mayadeen English 

The AKP barely passes 30% of popular support as Erdogan still amps up preparations to enter Syria and dissolve Kurdish militias, which Turkey views as tied to the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) guerrillas.

The Turkish presidential election is set to take place on June 23 and is anticipated to be the most polarized this new year, determining the fate of 85 million citizens in the nation of 3 continents: Europe, the Middle East, and Asia.

Although the election is still six months away, Erdogan’s conservative Justice and Development Party (Adalet ve Kalkinma Partisi, or AKP), which came to power in 2002, may face a difficult challenge.

The country is already dealing with high inflation and a depreciation of the Turkish lira against the US dollar.

The AKP is barely passing 30% of popular support, according to recent polls in Turkey. Despite that, Erdogan is still amping up preparations to enter Syria and dissolve Kurdish militias, which Turkey views as tied to the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) guerrillas. 

He has also threatened to strike its NATO ally Greece over the regional disputes of Cyprus, alleged “militarization” of Greek islands, and expansion in the Aegean Sea. 

Turkish Defense Minister Hulusi Akar accused Greece on Monday of sabotaging bilateral meetings with Turkey, which intend to be for trust-building and cooperation in NATO. 

Greece took advantage of the meetings to present its problems “as Turkey’s issues in its relations with NATO, the US, and EU,” according to Akar, while simultaneously attempting to steer public attention away from domestic scandals. After Greek politicians’ called Turkey a threat, Akar responded by asserting that his country is a reliable ally and poses no threat. 

Erdogan placed Turkey as an irreplaceable mediator between Russia and Ukraine, proven in the most recent Black Sea Grain Deal initiative and by hosting talks between US and Russian security officials. 

Not only so, but he has worked both sides by supplying Kiev with arms and simultaneously safeguarding trade and energy ties with Russia.

History repeats itself

Istanbul Mayor Ekrem Imamoglu from the Republican People’s Party (CHP) was sentenced by a court last month to more than two years in prison, which prevented him from practicing politics for the same period, on charges of insulting members of the Supreme Electoral Council in 2019. 

The Istanbul Mayor is among a handful of opposition leaders that polls show could beat Erdogan in a head-to-head race during the presidential race next June. Thousands of Turks gathered in a square in the center of Istanbul last month to protest the political ban against the opposition mayor of the city.

In light of that, the US State Department expressed that it is “deeply troubled and disappointment” at the possibility of excluding one of Erdogan’s biggest rivals from the political scene. 

Germany described the decision as “a heavy blow to democracy,” while France urged Turkey “reverse its slide away from the rule of law, democracy, and respect for fundamental rights.”

Erdogan denied his involvement with the verdict against Imamoglu, as he said: “What is behind the storm sparked by a verdict these past few days? This debate has nothing to do with us – neither with me nor with our nation.”

It is worth recalling that Erdogan was a former Istanbul mayor, who was sentenced to a year in jail for reading an alleged Islamist poem in 1994 and was prohibited from running for office until further notice. 

Millet, iradesine sahip çıktı.

Bugün Saraçhane'de bu iradeye sahip çıkan kıymetli liderlerimize, vekillerimize, belediye başkanlarımıza ve bizi hiçbir zaman yalnız bırakmayan İstanbullulara teşekkürler. Hiçbir yargı oyunu, hiçbir engelleme çabası bizi yolumuzdan döndüremez. pic.twitter.com/jsoHBnDHht

— Ekrem İmamoğlu (@ekrem_imamoglu) December 15, 2022

A new world order?

In his political lifetime, Erdogan went from having no problems with neighboring nations to full-launch attacks on Syria and Greece. But, a ground execution of military operations in Syria could come and bite back as it already triggers US and Russian reactions against it. 

In a meeting with Russian President Vladimir Putin last month, Erdogan confirmed that it is “important to clear the (Kurdish fighters) from the border to a depth of at least 30 kilometers,” noting it was “a priority”.

Erdogan has been threatening to conduct a new military incursion into northern Syria to move out Kurdish forces, which he blames for the November bomb blast that killed six people in Istanbul. 

The Turkish President also said his country is committed to destroying the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) “until its last militant is neutralized” and raised the possibility of conducting a ground operation soon. 

It is worth noting that on November 20, Turkey launched airstrikes that targeted military bases belonging to the PKK and its armed wing, the YPK, in northern Syria and Iraq.

This year, November will mark the 100th anniversary of Mustafa Kemal Ataturk’s foundation of Turkey from the remains of the Ottoman Empire. 

It seems like Erdogan is taking advantage of the current multipolar world order between the US and Russia in order to replace both and make Turkey the global hegemonic power as it was back in the days of Ataturk. 

In the midst of all of this, the EU stands on the sidelines, watching the fight as it struggles with inflation and the energy crisis.

Turkey is the EU’s largest trade partner, but after delaying Turkey’s entry into the EU bloc, it has lost influence in Ankara, and Belgium now has to persuade and buy off Turkey in order to keep the nearly 4 million Syrian refugees from crossing into Greece.

Related Stories

Economic war, political and field agendas.. the most prominent events in Syria

Turkish transformations towards Syria… and an escalating project for the Netanyahu government

Related Stories

• Greece aggravating tensions in region: Turkish Defense Minister
• Turkey to withdraw from northern Syria if stability achieved: Minister
• Turkey warns Greece of consequences over actions in Aegean Sea
• NSC: Turkey will not tolerate terrorist groups operating in vicinity

Erdogan Jails His Main Rival in the 2023 Election

 DECEMBER 18, 2022

Posted by INTERNATIONALIST 360° 

Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan faces a tough re-election vote in six months.  His rival, the Mayor of Istanbul Ekrem Imamoglu, is very popular and far ahead in the polls.

Erdogan went back in time to find an obscure statement made by Imamoglu in 2019 which Erdogan used to order the Turkish courts to try Imamoglu on the charge of ‘insulting electoral officials’.

On December 14, Imamoglu was sentenced to 2 years, 7 months, and 15 days of prison, and was banned from politics.

Following his sentence, Imamoglu told his supporters, “Because this case is not a case against me. Because this case is not a party case. This case is a country case. This case is a justice case. This case is an equality case. Because we see this case as the case of leaving a strong and democratic Turkey to our children. Believe me, 2023 will be very beautiful.”

The US reaction to Erdogan’s move to rig the election

On December 15, Ned Price, US State Department Spokesperson said, “The United States is deeply troubled and disappointed by a Turkish court’s verdict against Istanbul Mayor Ekrem Imamoglu, sentencing him to two years and seven months in prison and banning him from political activity.  His conviction is inconsistent with respect for human rights, fundamental freedoms, and the rule of law.  We remain gravely concerned by the continued judicial harassment of civil society, media, and political and business leaders in Turkey, including through prolonged pretrial detention, overly broad claims of support for terrorism, and criminal insult cases.

We urge the government to cease prosecutions under criminal “insult” laws, and to respect the rights and freedoms of all Turkish citizens, including by ensuring an open environment for public debate.”

The Erdogan-Biden relationship has been weak despite Turkey being an ally, a fellow NATO member, and hosting a US airbase in Incirlik.  Turkey and the US are on opposite sides in northeast Syria, and Turkey is expected to increase their attacks on the US military’s partner there, the Kurdish SDF.

Erdogan’s policies have failed

Erdogan’s polling is so low for many reasons.  From 2011 he supported the US-NATO war on Syria for regime change. The Obama plan failed, and Turkey suffered from the effects of the support for the failed US-sponsored project.

His ruling AKP party aligned with the Muslim Brotherhood united Turkey with Qatar but broke its relationship with Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and UAE. He began an Islamist transformation from a secular democracy.

International terrorists were hosted by Erdogan as they transited through airports and set up headquarters in camps on the Syrian border.

In response to the terrorists battling the Syrian government, Syrian refugees who aligned themselves with the Muslim Brotherhood flooded Turkey in the millions as they sought protection under Erdogan and his Muslim Brotherhood-aligned party, AKP.  After 12 years of 3 million Syrian refugees living in Turkey, Turkish citizens have grown to hate and resent the refugees for racial, and economic reasons.

Turkey lost its biggest export market in 2012. Turkish exports to Syria represented 50% of all global Turkish exports, but in 2012 the Syrian government banned imports from Turkey because they participated in the US-NATO attack for regime change.

This huge loss to the Turkish economy began a downturn that saw the currency devalued and hyperinflation. Turkish citizens are suffering the loss of a prosperous lifestyle robbed of them by Erdogan’s failed foreign policy.

Erdogan and his close relatives have prospered as war profiteers; making money off of stolen oil, factories, and wheat, and transporting them to Turkey for resale.  Erdogan and his son sold stolen Syrian oil to the EU for $17 per barrel and sold stolen Syrian wheat to France for its croissants and Italy for its pasta.

Erdogan is low in the polls and is afraid of losing the election

Erdogan finished with the constitutional three-term limit in 2015, so he changed the constitution to allow himself more time to reign.

Cemil Cicek is a former parliamentary speaker from Erdogan’s ruling AKP, who also has served as deputy prime minister and justice minister, and is now a member of the Turkish Presidency’s High Advisory Board.

“If you decide on a one-sentence defamation claim after such a long time, and at such a critical threshold, neither the legality nor the accuracy of your decision will be convincing,” said Cicek of the Imamoglu sentence, and added “I don’t believe that it is credible either. This both harms the judiciary and a lofty concept such as justice. It will do a lot of damage to the country as well.”

Bulent Arinc, former parliamentary speaker and one of the founding members of the AKP also slammed the court’s decision on Imamoglu. “The court’s verdict is a shame and a despair for the Turkish judiciary,” Arinc said.

The Mayor of Istanbul

Ekrem Imamoglu is a Turkish businessman, building contractor, and center-left politician. First elected as Mayor of Istanbul with 4.1 million votes and won with a margin of 13,000 votes against his AKP opponent in the March 2019 mayoral election as the joint Nation Alliance candidate, but served only from April 17, 2019, until May 6, 2019, when the election was annulled on orders of Erdogan. Imamoglu was then reelected in a renewed election on June 23, 2019, by an even larger margin of 800,000 votes.

Condemning the decision in 2019, Imamoglu said “Those who canceled the election are fools.”

The opposition to Erdogan

Turkey’s six opposition parties including the CHP have formed the Nation Alliance to unite their strength against the ruling bloc AKP (Justice and Development Party) and its supporter MHP (Nationalist Movement Party). The opposition candidate for president will be determined by the leaders of six opposition parties, who are: CHP Chairman Kılıçdaroğlu, IYI Party Chairman Akşener, Future Party Chairman Davutoğlu, Democrat Party Chairman Uysal, DEVA Party Chairman Babacan, and IMM President Ekrem Imamoglu.

The opposition parties are united in their goal to defeat Erdogan

200 thousand Turkish citizens gathered in Sarachane in support of Imamoglu and protested his prison sentence. The setting of the rally was the site of the July 15, 2016 coup attempt to overthrow Erdogan’s government.

The leaders of the six opposition parties gave speeches to the crowd and stressed justice and the ultimate victory awaiting the nation.

IBB President Ekrem Imamoglu spoke to the crowd, “I will tell you: The people who run this country are sick, very sick. These are people who are allergic to the will of the nation.”

Referring to Erdogan and his nepotism and cronyism, “You manage some interest groups, elected associations, close family foundations, and some dark circles. They have established an order of waste in Istanbul and they want it to last forever. This was an order that enriched the wealth of a handful of people and hurt the people of Istanbul,” said Imamoglu.

“If 16 million Istanbulites are not equal in your eyes; If you do not see our 85 million citizens of the Republic of Turkey,” he said and added, “You showed your day to those who want to set a barrier to your will three and a half years ago and twice. You will show it again; I have no doubt. Never lose your hope.”

CHP Chairman Kilicdaroglu said “In Turkey today, no one feels safe. The rule of law is not the rule of the superiors. No one speaks to the one who has an uncle. But when a teenager tweets, there is a knock on his door early in the morning and he is taken into custody. We will finish this scene. Don’t worry. You will never, ever experience these sights again.”

Kilicdaroglu added, “This is not a 100m run. It’s a marathon, and we’ve come to the end of the marathon. After six months you will see a new Turkey. You will see a beautiful Turkey. You will see an embracing Turkey. You will see a fertile Turkey.”

IYI Party Chairman Aksener said forcefully, “Democracy is ours. The ballot box is ours.”

DEVA Party Babacan said, referring to the long reign of Erdogan, “The 3-term rule, these three terms expired in 2015.  Absolute power corrupts absolutely. 85 million is bigger than one. Turkey is bigger than one.”

Uysal, Chairman of the Democratic Party said, “May 6, 2019, is the date of a major break for Turkish democracy. It is the date when the main pillar of our democracy collapsed.”

The Chairman of the Future Party, Davutoğlu said “Yesterday, the judiciary became politicized. But our issue is above politics. We are here as six general presidents. We are in different political parties. But we all say ‘Honor’ with the same loud voice. We call it ‘fundamental rights and freedoms’. We call it the ‘democratic state of law’.

I say on behalf of 85 million democracy lovers: We are not afraid, we are not afraid, we will not be afraid. We did not bow to you, we do not bow, we will not bow. We will protect everyone’s rights, law, and justice, regardless of their political views.”

---

Steven Sahiounie is a two-time award-winning journalist

Ukraine: Somewhere between Afghanization and Syrianization

Ukraine is finished as a nation – neither side will rest in this war. The only question is whether it will be an Afghan or Syrian style finale.

August 30 2022

Photo Credit: The Cradle

By Pepe Escobar

One year after the astounding US humiliation in Kabul – and on the verge of another serious comeuppance in Donbass – there is reason to believe Moscow is wary of Washington seeking vengeance: in the form of the ‘Afghanization’ of Ukraine.

With no end in sight to western weapons and finance flowing into Kiev, it must be recognized that the Ukrainian battle is likely to disintegrate into yet another endless war. Like the Afghan jihad in the 1980s which employed US-armed and funded guerrillas to drag Russia into its depths, Ukraine’s backers will employ those war-tested methods to run a protracted battle that can spill into bordering Russian lands.

Yet this US attempt at crypto-Afghanization will at best accelerate the completion of what Russia’s Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu describes as the “tasks” of its Special Military Operation (SMO) in Ukraine. For Moscow right now, that road leads all the way to Odessa.

It didn’t have to be this way. Until the recent assassination of Darya Dugina at Moscow’s gates, the battlefield in Ukraine was in fact under a ‘Syrianization’ process.

Like the foreign proxy war in Syria this past decade, frontlines around significant Ukrainian cities had roughly stabilized. Losing on the larger battlefields, Kiev had increasingly moved to employ terrorist tactics. Neither side could completely master the immense war theater at hand. So the Russian military opted to keep minimal forces in battle – contrary to the strategy it employed in 1980s Afghanistan.

Let’s remind ourselves of a few Syrian facts: Palmyra was liberated in March 2016, then lost and retaken in 2017. Aleppo was liberated only in December 2016. Deir Ezzor in September 2017. A slice of northern Hama in December and January 2018. The outskirts of Damascus in the Spring of 2018. Idlib – and significantly, over 25 percent of Syrian territory – are still not liberated. That tells a lot about rhythm in a war theater.

The Russian military never made a conscious decision to interrupt the multi-channel flow of western weapons to Kiev. Methodically destroying those weapons once they’re in Ukrainian territory – with plenty of success – is another matter. The same applies to smashing mercenary networks.

Moscow is well aware that any negotiation with those pulling the strings in Washington – and dictating all terms to puppets in Brussels and Kiev – is futile. The fight in Donbass and beyond is a do or die affair.

So the battle will go on, destroying what’s left of Ukraine, just as it destroyed much of Syria. The difference is that economically, much more than in Syria, what’s left of Ukraine will plunge into a black void. Only territory under Russian control will be rebuilt, and that includes, significantly, the bulk of Ukraine’s industrial infrastructure.

What’s left – rump Ukraine – has already been plundered anyway, as Monsanto, Cargill and Dupont have already bagged 17 million hectares of prime, fertile arable land – over half of what Ukraine still possesses. That translates de facto as BlackRock, Blackstone and Vanguard, top agro-business shareholders, owning whatever lands that really matter in non-sovereign Ukraine.

Going forward, by next year the Russians will be applying themselves to cutting off Kiev from NATO weapons supplies. As that unfolds, the Anglo-Americans will eventually move whatever puppet regime remains to Lviv. And Kiev terrorism – conducted by Bandera worshippers – will continue to be the new normal in the capital.

The Kazakh double game

By now it’s abundantly clear this is not a mere war of territorial conquest. It’s certainly part of a War of Economic Corridors – as the US spares no effort to sabotage and smash the multiple connectivity channels of Eurasia’s integration projects, be they Chinese-led (Belt and Road Initiative, BRI) or Russian-led (Eurasian Economic Union, EAEU).

Just like the proxy war in Syria remade large swathes of West Asia (witness, for instance, Erdogan about to meet Assad), the fight in Ukraine, in a microcosm, is a war for the reconfiguration of the current world order, where Europe is a mere self-inflicted victim in a minor subplot. The Big Picture is the emergence of multipolarity.

The proxy war in Syria lasted a decade, and it’s not over yet. The same may happen to the proxy war in Ukraine. As it stands, Russia has taken an area that is roughly equivalent to Hungary and Slovakia combined. That’s still far from “task” fulfillment – and it’s bound to go on until Russia has taken all the land right up to the Dnieper as well as Odessa, connecting it to the breakaway Republic of Transnistria.

It’s enlightening to see how important Eurasian actors are reacting to such geopolitical turbulence. And that brings us to the cases of Kazakhstan and Turkey.

The Telegram channel Rybar (with over 640k followers) and hacker group Beregini revealed in an investigation that Kazakhstan was selling weapons to Ukraine, which translates as de facto treason against their own Russian allies in the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO). Consider too that Kazakhstan is also part of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) and the EAEU, the two hubs of the Eurasian-led multipolar order.

As a consequence of the scandal, Kazakhstan was forced to officially announce the suspension of all weapons exports until the end of 2023.

It began with hackers unveiling how Technoexport – a Kazakh company – was selling armed personnel carriers, anti-tank systems and munitions to Kiev via Jordanian intermediaries, under the orders of the United Kingdom. The deal itself was supervised by the British military attaché in Nur-Sultan, the Kazakh capital.

Nur-Sultan predictably tried to dismiss the allegations, arguing that Technoexport had not asked for export licenses. That was essentially false: the Rybar team discovered that Technoexport instead used Blue Water Supplies, a Jordanian firm, for those. And the story gets even juicier. All the contract documents ended up being found in the computers of Ukrainian intel.

Moreover, the hackers found out about another deal involving Kazspetsexport, via a Bulgarian buyer, for the sale of Kazakh Su-27s, airplane turbines and Mi-24 helicopters. These would have been delivered to the US, but their final destination was Ukraine.

The icing on this Central Asian cake is that Kazakhstan also sells significant amounts of Russian – not Kazakh – oil to Kiev.

So it seems that Nur-Sultan, perhaps unofficially, somehow contributes to the ‘Afghanization’ in the war in Ukraine. No diplomatic leaks confirm it, of course, but bets can be made Putin had a few things to say about that to President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev in their recent – cordial – meeting.

The Sultan’s balancing act

Turkey is a way more complex case. Ankara is not a member of the SCO, the CSTO or the EAEU. It is still hedging its bets, calculating on which terms it will join the high-speed rail of Eurasian integration. And yet, via several schemes, Ankara allows Moscow to evade the avalanche of western sanctions and embargoes.

Turkish businesses – literally all of them with close connections to President Recep Tayyip Erdogan and his Justice and Development Party (AKP) – are making a killing, and relishing their new role as crossroads warehouse between Russia and the west. It’s an open boast in Istanbul that what Russia cannot buy from Germany or France they buy “from us.” And in fact several EU companies are in on it.

Ankara’s balancing act is as sweet as a good baklava. It gathers    economic support from a very important partner right in the middle of the endless, very serious Turkish economic debacle. They agree on nearly everything: Russian gas, S-400 missile systems, the building of the Russian nuclear power plant, tourism – Istanbul is crammed with Russians – Turkish fruits and vegetables.

Ankara-Moscow employ sound textbook geopolitics. They play it openly, in full transparence. That does not mean they are allies. It’s just pragmatic business between states. For instance, an economic response may alleviate a geopolitical problem, and vice-versa.

Obviously the collective west has completely forgotten how that normal state-to-state behavior works. It’s pathetic. Turkey gets “denounced” by the west as traitorous – as much as China.

Of course Erdogan also needs to play to the galleries, so every once in a while he says that Crimea should be retaken by Kiev. After all, his companies also do business with Ukraine – Bayraktar drones and otherwise.

And then there’s proselytizing: Crimea remains theoretically ripe for Turkish influence, where Ankara may exploit the notions of pan-Islamism and mostly pan-Turkism, capitalizing on the historical relations between the peninsula and the Ottoman Empire.

Is Moscow worried? Not really. As for those Bayraktar TB2s sold to Kiev, they will continue to be relentlessly reduced to ashes. Nothing personal. Just business.

The views expressed in this article do not necessarily reflect those of The Cradle.

Peace with Syria: The final piece in Turkey’s foreign policy puzzle

August 15 2022

Ankara has managed to reset relations with several neighbors, yet normalization with Damascus has remained the most elusive, until recently. Why now? And what will it take?

Photo Credit: The Cradle

By Hasan Ünal

The 5 August meeting in Sochi between Turkey’s President Recep Tayyip Erdogan and Russian President Vladimir Putin has given rise to speculation in the west over Turkish-Russian rapprochement – and its possible negative impact on western efforts to curtail the imminent multipolar order.

Western NATO states have reason to be concerned about Ankara’s recent moves, given the momentum created on 19 July during Astana talks in Tehran – between Iranian President Ebrahim Raisi, Erdogan, and Putin – geared to resolve the Syrian crisis.

United against the States

What was striking about the meeting in the Iranian capital was its defiant tone, slamming US-led unipolarity (the so-called rules-based order), and accusing Washington of looting Syria’s resources and sponsoring terrorism, all while demanding that the US exits the region immediately.

Washington has long sought to undermine the Astana Process, launched in January 2017 by Russia, Iran and Turkey to demilitarize the Syrian conflict and establish ceasefires. To that end, it manipulated Turkey’s ill-defined Syria policy, expecting that Ankara and Moscow would collide head-on over “opposition-controlled” Idlib or elsewhere, thereby hindering possible rapprochement between the two Eurasian states.

However, it seems as if the Erdogan-Putin meeting has instead advanced beyond their earlier encounter on 29 September 2021, also held in Sochi, where it was then leaked that the two leaders had somewhat agreed on a broad geopolitical vision.

The two leaders focused on a wide range of areas of close cooperation – particularly on trade and economy – but also on prospective fields of mutual benefit such as defense industry ventures, as well as on regional issues like Syria, Crimea, and Cyprus.

Turkey’s shift on Syria

Although few details have been released following that closed-door meeting, it is interesting to note the discernable change in Ankara’s stance on Syria since then.

There is now serious talk of normalization with Damascus and a renewal of the Syrian-Turkish 1998 Adana Agreement, which will entail a joint effort to defeat US-sponsored Kurdish separatists in Syria, especially in the areas to the east of the Euphrates where the latter are striving to install a US-backed statelet.

As things stand, there is no reason why Erdogan and Putin could not iron out a deal to end the Syrian conflict, especially since Ankara – in an 18-month flurry of diplomatic outreach to regional foes – has largely given up on its Muslim Brotherhood-oriented foreign policy by mending ties with Egypt, Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and even Israel.

Today, Erdogan’s personal obstinacy over Syria remains the main hurdle obstructing an overall peace with Turkey’s war-stricken southern neighbor.

Why make peace?

The Turkish president certainly has a lot to gain from a well-orchestrated rapprochement with the Syrian government. For starters, Ankara and Damascus could agree on a protocol to repatriate millions of Turkish-based Syrian refugees back to their places of origin, and renew the Adana Agreement to create a common front against the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK) and its Syrian affiliates.

Conceivably, Erdogan could even ask Damascus to recognize the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus – a very dear issue for Ankara – in return for Turkey’s full support for the re-establishment of Syrian sovereignty over all its territories, including those areas currently under Turkish occupation.

With strong Russian guidance, is not entirely inconceivable that the two states could return to a comfortable neighborly states quo, with trade, investment, and reconstruction activities leading the way.

It would be a far cry from the 1998 to 2011 Syrian-Turkish ‘golden era,’ when Ankara studiously worked to bolster friendly relations with Damascus, to such an extent that joint-cabinet meetings were occasionally held between the administrations of Syrian President Bashar al-Assad and Erdogan, where the latter would refer to the former as “my brother.”

Today, the emerging multipolar order makes diplomatic and economic re-engagement all the more conducive, because as NATO’s Madrid Summit demonstrated, the west needs Turkey more than ever, and Ankara’s moves to normalize relations with Damascus is less likely to incur a significant cost than before the Ukraine crisis erupted.

Indeed, even before events in Europe unfolded, Turkey undertook several military operations against the PKK/ Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) in northern Syria, much to Washington’s dismay and outrage.

Ankara could proceed with these operations with less censure today, but it has not. Turkey appears to have realized – possibly under Russian advisement – that without normalization with Damascus, Turkish military moves on Kurdish separatists would yield significantly fewer results.

Problems closer to home

Moreover, Erdogan’s administration has been beset by the contentious domestic issue of the millions of Syrian refugees who remain inside Turkey. The days when the president and his close associates were preaching Islamic solidarity in defense of hosting Syrian refugees have long past.

The mood across Turkey has changed dramatically amid rising inflation, a collapse of the lira, and the general public’s disenchantment with the ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP). For the first time since Erdogan’s ascension to power in 2003, the masses sense that his once-unbeatable, Islamist-leaning populist party may be defeated in upcoming presidential polls slated for May-June next year.

True or not, there are public rumblings that the AKP – to escape an election loss – plans to bestow millions of Syrian refugees with Turkish citizenship, allowing them to vote in the pivotal polls.

The disoriented outlook of Turkey’s main opposition party has always played to Erdogan’s advantage in previous elections. The feeble-looking Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu, who took the helm of the Republican People’s Party (CHP) after a sex scandal involving its previous leader, has never managed to rally the public around him.

Importantly, Kılıçdaroğlu has typically trailed behind Erdogan in opinion polls because of his pro-American, pro-EU approach to almost everything – at a time when anti-US sentiment in the country polls at a startling 85 to 95 percent of the population.

Repatriating refugees

Furthermore, Kılıçdaroğlu and his party do not make any clear-cut pronouncements about a peace with Syria. If anything, the CHP was as critical of Assad as Erdogan’s AKP, and its spokespeople barely weighed in on the divisive Syrian refugee issue, even though economically-challenged Turkey currently hosts more refugees than any other country.

The entry of a new figure – Ümit Özdağ, a professor of Political Science and International Relations, who recently formed the Party of Victory (Zafer Partisi) – onto the Turkish national political scene, has introduced a radical change in the discourse about Syrian refugees and their repatriation.

Almost overnight, Özdağ has gained widespread support from voters across the political spectrum. His unexpected surge in the polls has clearly contributed to a reassessment by the government and ruling party on the Syrian issue.

Ankara needs Damascus

Today, almost all voices from the CHP to the AKP are floating arguments for some sort of repatriation, but as even the Turkish public understands, this cannot be done without normalization with Damascus.

Hence, Erdogan’s test-balloon musings to Turkish journalists on his flight back from Sochi, hinting that Putin had repeatedly recommended that Ankara coordinate with Damascus on any military operation in Syria to rout out the PKK/SDF.

Despite the positive national outlook on normalizing with Syria, Erdogan won’t have a smooth path ahead. Turkish foreign minister Mevlut Cavusoglu’s untimely remark a few days ago that Ankara should try to bring the Syrian opposition (a clear reference to the Turkish-backed Syrian National Army) and the Assad government together with a view to striking a deal, didn’t go down well at all with those oppositionists.

It almost led to an uprising in Syrian areas under Turkish control – particularly in Azaz, where militants burned down Turkish flags and vowed to fight to the bitter end against the “Assad regime” and even Turkey.

Same old foreign policy

The statement the Turkish Foreign Ministry issued following these events underlined the long hard slog to a Syrian peace settlement, and revealed the depth of the Erdogan government’s involvement with these militants.

As it has predictably done since 2011, the FM statement conveniently shifted blame back onto the Syrian government for foot-dragging toward overall peace and reconciliation.

But Ankara desperately needs to drop its tired old refrain: demanding that Damascus agrees to a new constitution, pushing for federalization of the state, and insisting on new Syrians elections, under a care-taker government, composed of opposition politicians, and preferably without Assad at its helm.

Having failed to oust Assad militarily, Turkey once imagined it could unseat him through this convoluted political and electoral formula. Erdogan’s logic was that the millions of Syrians under Ankara’s influence – both in Turkey, as well as in Turkish-controlled Syrian territories – in addition Syrian Kurds in areas under the PKK/PYD, especially to the east of the Euphrates, would vote Assad out.

Trading the ‘rebels’ for the Kurds

This ‘fantasy’ contrasts sharply with realities on the Syrian ground, and also totally undermines Turkey’s own national interests.

Years of these haphazard AKP policies, premised on the unrealistic scenario of a sudden collapse of Assad’s government, all while stealthily transforming the country into a jihadist paradise – in the name of democracy – has instead become Ankara’s biggest foreign policy quagmire, and has emboldened its separatist Kurdish foes as never before.

Furthermore, Erdogan’s disastrous Syria policy has isolated Turkey for almost a decade in the region, even among Sunni states, and threatened to set off a conflagration with Russia, a major source of energy and tourism for the Turkish economy.

In fairness, the Turkish leader appears to be making some sound political maneuvers of late, and reaching out to Damascus is the most important of these for the region’s stability. Whether Erdogan will crown his new grand foreign policy moves with a Syrian peace by normalizing relations with Damascus remains to be seen.

If he doesn’t take this bold step, particularly in advance of Turkey’s presidential elections, Erdogan runs the risk of joining the long list of politicians determined to oust Assad, who have themselves left or been ousted from office under the weight of the so-called “Assad Curse.”

The views expressed in this article do not necessarily reflect those of The Cradle.

Author

Syrian refugees in Turkey: From opportunity to Achilles heel

Even though Turkey’s massive refugee problem is a direct consequences of the AKP’s Syria policy, both the government and the opposition try to avoid its solution: ending the war in Syria.

June 23 2022

Photo Credit: The Cradle

By Erman Çete

In a recent TV interview, one of the most powerful political figures in Turkey, Interior Minister Suleyman Soylu, could barely restrain his anger.

Turning to Umit Ozdag, president of the newly-established Zafer (Victory) Party, Solyu lashed out: “This man is lower than an animal…an intelligence agent…the son of Soros.”

Ozdag is a former member of the Nationalist Action Party (MHP), a party now staunchly allied to President Recep Tayyip Erdogan.

A political science professor and a hardline Turkish nationalist, Ozdag reciprocated in kind, calling Soylu a “coward” for his lack of leadership at the Interior Ministry.

Ozdag’s Zafer Party has been at the forefront of harsh criticism against Erdogan’s refugee policy within the Turkish political scene. His popularity has been growing recently, with his anti-refugee and anti-AKP policies galvanizing Turkey’s dispirited urban youth.

The issue of refugees, now a critical one in the Turkish political landscape – alongside the country’s catastrophic economic decline – has become a focal point for upcoming elections.

The geopolitics of displacement

The AKP’s Syria policy is one of the main issues at stake. Their aggressive policies towards ‘former Ottoman regions’ have dramatically shifted traditional Turkish foreign policy away from Kemal Ataturk’s motto “peace at home, peace in the world.”

Turkish academic Ozgur Balkilic writes about the AKP’s geopolitical interpretation of the refugee question in a broader context.

He argues that Turkey’s various responses to the Syrian refugee crisis are the product of a geopolitical discourse based on Islamist ideology, highlighted by the AKP discourse on civilization, and the effort to build a completely different moral and political space for Turkey.

“The geographical vision of Kemalism produced an ideological framework in which Turkey tried to integrate with the west and stay as far away from the east as possible,” Balkilic told The Cradle.

By criticizing the ‘old Turkey’ as defensive, ineffective and obsessed with security, the AKP views Turkey’s new geopolitical orientation as “indispensable” in the new international system.

“The AKP reads the Syrian refugee crisis as a repercussion of the larger political and moral crises of the international system, in which it demarcates a leadership role for Turkey. State discourse on the Syrian refugee crisis can only be understood within this geopolitical scenario,” Balkilic says.

The AKP uses the legal framework in relation to refugees for its own agenda. While party to the 1951 Refugee Convention, Turkey maintains the geographical limitation only to people originating from Europe.

In reference to Syrian migrants and refugees, the AKP uses a religious definition of the word ‘guest’, not one clearly defined by official regulations.

Balkilic points out that authority-led public debates about Syrians are not shaped around the classic immigrant problems such as integration issues, legal and economic rights, and the labor market.

The language used by AKP officials is, instead, geopolitical. When Syrian immigrants are referred to as guests, they are viewed as part of the larger Islamic community, the Ummah, Balkilic stated.

This concept does not exist in the universal literature of migration, and Turkey has, as a result, been freed from its many obligations and responsibilities toward refugees and/or immigrants.

While Turkey uses a religious term to refer to Syrian refugees as guests of the nation, Turkey’s own role is expressed using another Islamic term –Ansar – which means hosting those in need.

The refugee issue as a weapon

Despite all this, the AKP’s policy towards Syria and the Syrian refugees has been forced to shift over time. First, its ‘regime change’ operation in Syria hit a brick wall. Second, the migration issue became a fault line in domestic politics.

After 2016, Turkey initiated various military operations in Syria: Operation Euphrates Shield, Operation Olive Branch, Operation Peace Spring, and Operation Spring Shield.

One of the announced goals of these operations was the settlement of Syrian refugees inside so-called ‘safe zones.’

Senior AKP executives have also often underlined the ‘cheap labor’ value of Syrian (and Afghan) refugees. Erhan Nalcaci, a Turkish professor and a columnist of the leftist daily Sol, believes the AKP sought to use refugees as “cheap labor and a large reserve army.”

“This was a unique opportunity to reduce wages, ignore social rights and make commodities produced in Turkey advantageous in international competition,” Nalcaci says, adding that the Turkish bourgeoisie has an “unspoken annexation agenda for northern Cyprus and the north-west of Syria.”

According to Nalcaci, Turkey considers these locations in Cyprus and Syria “areas of Turkish dominion.”

Nalcaci argues that placing Syrian refugees within this agenda “appears to be aimed at changing the ethnic structure of northern Syria from west to east and establishing a sharia management model, as well as Turkish hegemony over a region that is economically and politically dependent on Turkey.”

Some opposition politicians argue against hosting Afghan and Syrian refugees due to the possibility of AKP using them against their domestic political opponents.

Nalcaci agrees with this claim, saying “refugees provided a suitable basis for building a rented jihadist army if they needed it, just like in northern Syria.”

Turkey as a buffer zone for Europe

A further aspect is Turkey’s role in EU refugee policy. In 2016, the EU and Turkey reached an agreement on refugees. This was a re-admission agreement and had three important aspects.

Turkey would take any measure necessary to stop people travelling irregularly from Turkey to the Greek islands; anyone who arrived on the islands irregularly from Turkey could be returned to Greece; and for every Syrian returned from the islands, the EU would accept one Syrian refugee who had waited inside Turkey.

In return, Turkey would receive six billion euros from the EU.

Human right groups and the Turkish opposition have criticized this refugee agreement. In 2013, before the deal, Turkey had re-adjusted its Law on Foreigners and International Protection to the EU legislation.

According to Nalcaci, due to imperialist interventions and poor economic situations in their home countries, people have been forced to turn to the west as a better option for living conditions, and this mass migration is a threat to western imperialism.

Nalcaci claims that in the face of this migration, it is obvious that the EU used Turkey as a buffer country to attract qualified workforce and overlook refugees in Turkey, rather than in their own territory.

However, the AKP ambition to create a dependent area in northern Syria may backfire. On one hand, Nalcaci says, Syrian refugees are valued by the AKP as an expansionist tool in the region. On the other hand, he says, it is impossible for the imperialist mind to not anticipate that up to 10 million refugees in Turkey would create instability and open an area of ​​intervention.

An opposition smeared by the same brush

The views of the main Turkish opposition barely differ from those of the AKP government in relation to the Syrian problem. A north Cyprus-type ‘solution’ to the Syrian crisis is also on the CHP (Republican People’s Party) agenda.

The leader of the CHP, Kemal Kilicdaroglu, has often promised to send Syrian refugees back to Syria “with a flourish of trumpets.”

The newcomer party of Zafer is also committed to the expulsion of the refugees. The party’s so-called Fortress Anadolu project claims to deal with eight million refugees in Turkey. Within this framework, Ozdag announced that a commission from Zafer was to meet with Syrian President Bashar al-Assad.

Neither the CHP nor the Zafer party responded to our questions.

Nalcaci underlines the opposition’s stand on Syria and its refugees: “They do not include any substantive foreign policy changes in their program. Moreover, they have always supported AKP initiatives in the parliament, especially the resolutions to send soldiers.”

The most anti-refugee politician Umit Ozdag and his party Zafer have not raised any objection to sending Turkish troops to Syria. When it comes to ‘national security,’ the opposition sings the same tune as the AKP.

Although CHP voted against the last motion to send Turkish troops to Iraq and Syria, battling the ‘national security’ narrative is a difficult task.

“The practice of establishing a hegemonic zone on Syrian territory will continue unless there is a great upheaval that overturns the situation,” Nalcaci asserts.

It seems that things will have to change in order to remain the same.

The views expressed in this article do not necessarily reflect those of The Cradle.

Turkey swings west: the Ukraine war and domestic elections

Ankara’s rapprochement with the US has been accelerated by events in Ukraine. These ties will also shape Turkey domestically, with or without a 2023 Erdogan electoral win.

May 17 2022

While Ankara has always sought to maintain a careful balance between east and west, Turkey’s 2023 election candidates believe they need US support to win.Photo Credit: The Cradle

By Erman Çete

On 7 April, Turkish Defense Minister Hulusi Akar chaired a videoconference meeting with his counterparts from five other states to discuss, among other things, the pressing issue of naval mines drifting into the Black Sea.

According to Akar, the origin of the mines could not be identified, but an investigation is ongoing.

The meeting’s agenda was ultimately less notable than its curious participant list. Five of the attending countries – Bulgaria, Georgia, Romania, Turkey and Ukraine – have borders with the Black Sea, but Russia, a major littoral state, was not invited, while Poland, which has no borders with the waterway, was present.

The mines threat has emerged amid the escalating armed conflict in Ukraine. Russia’s principal intelligence agency, the Federal Security Service (FSB), warned on 21 March that several hundred mines had drifted into the Black Sea after breaking off from cables near Ukrainian ports. The claim was dismissed by Kiev which accused Moscow of disinformation and trying to close off parts of the strategic waterway.

Nevertheless, since the onset of the conflict in February, four mines have ‘drifted’ into the Black Sea, including one discovered off Romania’s coastline, and three stray mines found in Turkish waters which were safely neutralized.

Turkey’s balancing act

Throughout the crisis, Ankara has had to navigate between Russia and Ukraine and balance its diplomatic ties with both states carefully. As an important NATO member, this has not been a straightforward task for Turkey.

Between 19 to 22 April, NATO’s Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence (CCDCOE) organized  Exercise Locked Shields 2022, the largest cyber defense exercise in Tallinn, Estonia. The Turkish Armed Forces (TAF) attended this drill with TAF-affiliated defense company HAVELSAN.

The following day, Turkish Foreign Minister Mevlut Cavusoglu announced that Turkey would close its airspace for a three-month period to Russian planes flying to Syria. But the Turkish minister also announced the cancellation of a pre-planned NATO drill to avoid provoking Russia.

Concurrent with this precarious balancing act, President Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s government has worked overtime to thaw relations between Ankara and Persian Gulf states and Israel. There are also plans afoot to add Egypt to Turkey’s various regional diplomatic forays.

Resetting relations with the US

At the same time, Turkey’s ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP) government has tried to exploit any opportunity to present itself as an indispensable ally to Washington. Talks hosted in Istanbul between Russia and Ukraine may have failed to lead to a breakthrough in negotiations, but US President Joe Biden endorsed Turkey’s role as mediator, while State Department Spokesperson Ned Price said that Turkey was “in full coordination and consultation with the US” during the process.

Ankara’s role as a mediator has also been encouraged by US think-tanks such as the United States Institute of Peace, which has called on the US and Europe to support Turkey as the only mediation channel between Russia and the west.

Undoubtedly, the Ukraine conflict has enabled Turkey to reposition itself with Washington as a valuable NATO ally. This has become evident with reports that US military F-16 sales to Turkey are now back on the table again after a period of doubt.

Naturally, pro-AKP media has been praising Erdogan’s role as ‘peacemaker’ and are keen to parlay his accomplishments into a domestic political bonanza. But according to Turkish journalist and commentator Murat Yetkin, AKP’s initial prognosis on the Ukraine conflict was that it would cool down around June and Turkey could shortly thereafter reverse its economic losses arising from the crisis.

It has become apparent, however, that the AKP may have been too rash with that timeframe. Ankara’s leading NATO allies appear less concerned about the destruction of Ukraine and its fallout across Europe than about ‘weakening’ Russia via proxy, with a prolonged war of attrition in mind. For the AKP brass, if the conflict continues into next year, Erdogan’s chances of eking out a victory in Turkey’s 2023 elections could be seriously jeopardized.

Ukraine, a foreign policy tool

Rear Admiral Turker Erturk, Turkey’s former Black Sea commander, believes that the US government gave Turkish military operations in northern Iraq (Operation Claw Lock) the green-light, mainly because of the war in Ukraine. Washington, according to Erturk, will need Turkey in the upcoming stages of the conflict, and has thus become more flexible and transactional with Ankara.

For Erturk, this is a major reason why Erdogan’s government is seeking a balanced approach – in order to negotiate with the US and win the upcoming elections. “Promises made to the US regarding the Ukraine War will be implemented after the election,” he predicts.

Erturk also claims that Washington favors former chief of staff and current Defense Minister Hulusi Akar as the next president of Turkey. The retired rear admiral interprets the Black Sea mines meeting led by Akar – which included the Poles and excluded the Russians – as an message of support to the US. It should be noted that even at the height of US-Turkish tensions and its accompanying leverage contest, Akar stuck his neck out by guaranteeing that Ankara would never break with the western world.

The role of the Turkish Army, post-Erdogan

Akar is not the only military man with a shot at the presidency. Erdogan’s son-in-law Selcuk Bayraktar, who masterminded the famous Turkish armed drone Bayraktar could also be a political successor. He has also openly voiced support for Ukraine, a gesture likely not intended for domestic audiences.

Bayraktar’s now deceased father, Özdemir Bayraktar, threw his support behind the jailed army officers during the highly politicized Ergenekon (2008-2019) and Balyoz (Sledgehammer, 2010-2015) ‘coup d’etat’ trials. That makes the Bayraktars respected even amongst Kemalist circles – not just for their game-changing armed drones, but also for placing their political clout against the trials.

A Foreign Affairs piece earlier this year by Soner Cagaptay, director of the Turkish Research Program at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy, provides an insight into a hypothetical scenario involving an Erdogan-opposition deal for a transition. If a deal cannot be reached, Cagaptay says, Turkish democracy will crumble.

A possible solution to ease this transition, Cagaptay argues, is for the two sides to accept the Turkish Army’s mediation as a “non-partisan” institution, with backing from the US and the EU. The opposition ensures that Erdogan and his family will not be tried, while Erdogan transfers power to the opposition’s candidate and the TAF acts as a guarantor.

Intact foreign policy

Turkey’s opposition alliance, Millet (Nation), which consists of six parties for now, has not decided on its presidential candidate yet. The governing coalition, Cumhur (People), has accused Millet of being agents of the west.

Although both the government and opposition are pro-NATO, some parties in Millet, such as the pro-west Turkish nationalist IYI (Good) Party, want to play a more proactive role in Ukraine against Russia. Istanbul Mayor Ekrem Imamoglu, who belongs to the main opposition Republican People’s Party (CHP), sparked a debate when he was spotted out with the British Ambassador amidst a heavy fall of snow last winter.

Imamoglu once was a leading opposition figure against Erdogan. He defeated the Turkish president twice in local 2019 elections, and his right-wing/moderate political stance was influential even among Erdogan supporters. However, his recent tour in the Black Sea region where his hometown is located, unleashed angry reactions amongst Millet supporters for including pro-Erdogan journalists to cover his visit. Even his own party, CHP, criticized Imamoglu for “breaking the party discipline.”

Now an underdog, Ankara’s Mayor Mansur Yavas, also a CHP member, is leading in Turkey’s election polls. He is a former member of the Nationalist Movement Party (MHP), and popular amongst Cumhur’s voter base. Yavas gives the impression that he could be a bipartisan president, a statesman who would oversee a smooth Turkish transition to the post-Erdogan era.

But will the upcoming 2023 elections signify a sharp geopolitical shift in the country’s bearings? A close look at Turkey’s economic situation, and its government’s overtures to the west, suggests not.

Turkey’s relations with Russia, even as a bargaining chip against the west, will likely continue independently of election results, as Ankara has historically sought to maintain its east-west equilibrium. Today, however, both wings of Turkish politics seem set on soliciting western support – to different degrees and in various arenas – to secure an electoral win.

The views expressed in this article do not necessarily reflect those of The Cradle.

Why does Turkey have 38 illegal bases in northern Iraq?

January 28 2022

The illegal Turkish military presence in Iraq is a blatant violation of that country’s territorial integrity. While Ankara claims it is a national security priority, it actually uses this military cover to influence and manage Iraqi and regional affairs

By Erman Çete

Almost 100 years after the Treaty of Ankara (1926), Iraq-Turkey relations remain fraught. Despite various disputes over water rights, territorial violations, unlawful oil trades, and alliances, the overriding reason for tensions remains the problem of Kurdistan.

Today, media headlines across Turkey continue to reflect the nation’s antagonism with the armed groups of the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK) inside Iraq, a neighboring state in which the Turkish Armed Forces (TSK) launch military operations with impunity.

But despite the repeated protests of the Iraqi government over these violations of its sovereignty, Turkish presence and operations in northern Iraq continue unabated.

In May last year, Turkish Defense Minister Hulusi Akar visited the Turkish military base Biliç Hill Base in northern Iraq to supervise Turkish troops deployed for an ongoing operation against the PKK.

Furious about the visit, Baghdad summoned the Turkish diplomatic envoy in Baghdad to express displeasure at Akar’s presence inside Iraq without providing prior notice.

Official numbers concerning the presence of TSK in northern Iraq are unclear. According to an Anadolu Agency article back in 2017, TSK had a battalion in the Bamarni Airport, near Duhok, as well as commando units in Kani Masi and Begova in northern Iraq.

In accordance with Ankara’s goal of unilaterally creating a 40km-deep security belt in northern Iraq, TSK has established new bases in the Iraqi regions of Hakurk and Metina.

One source claims that the number of Turkish troops in Iraq has risen to over 10,000, but a news outlet aligned with Turkey’s ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP) says there are only 2,000 troops, with approximately 500 of them mechanized units in Bamarni, and 400 of them from Bolu Commando Brigade in Kani Masi.

It also claims that there are 130 Special Forces as liaison officers in Erbil, Zaho, Dohuk, Batufa, Sulaymaniyah, and Amadiya. In the town of Simele, Turkish intelligence units are reinforced with new recruits, while military tanks, recently updated by Israel, are deployed in Bashiqa base.

In a rare move, Turkey’s Directorate of Communications published a map in 2020 which showed the positions of Turkish troops in northern Iraq. The map has since been removed.

According to the map, from Zakho to Hakurk in the west–east axis and from Avashin to Erbil in the north–south axis, Turkey has 38 military posts or bases in northern Iraq.

Source: Turkey’s Directorate of Communications, 2020

Bargaining chips in northern Iraq and wars on terror

It is quite significant that pro-Justice and Development Party (AKP) news outlets portray Iraqi resistance against the US presence – many of them pro-Iran – as an indirect threat to Turkey.

Moreover, it appears that the US has given Turkish military operations a green light inside Iraqi territory, but attempted to create a schism between the PKK and its Syrian militia affiliate, the People’s Defence Units (YPG), with which Washington has common cause – to Turkey’s detriment.

Ankara, which enjoys cordial diplomatic and robust economic relations with Iran, can be just as opportunistic. According to the US’s former Syria special representative James Jeffrey, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan had personally told him twice that he too “considers Iran a threat.”

Such expressions reflect a constant principle within Turkish foreign policy: If you have problems with the west, turn to the east to create bargaining chips.

In this regard, Turkish hard power instruments in Iraq and Syria work against the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK), developing elements of pressure against Damascus and Tehran, and creating new opportunities to negotiate with Washington.

A new era for Turkey

During the 1980s, Turkey stepped into a new era marked by two intertwined developments.

The first development occurred when the Stabilization Decisions of 24 January 1980 changed the country’s existing economic model. The external debt of Turkey during the 1970s had triggered a ‘balance of payment’ crisis. The Turkish bourgeoisie desperately needed both foreign exchange and to transform import-substitution industrialization into an export-oriented economic policy.

Second, the dissolution of the USSR and the end of the Cold War created a sense of opportunity for Turkey. Neo-Ottomanism entered the Turkish political scene when the newly established Central Asian and Caucasian republics were seen as ‘Turkic hinterland’ for the post-Soviet order.

Today, among left-wing circles inside Turkey, it is still widely believed that the 12 September 1980 coup d’état was initiated to apply these economic policies.

As a result, the Turkish state re-evaluated its foreign policy in two broad ways: via the economic prism – diversifying export destinations to bolster and transform the economy; and via identity politics, transforming Turkey from a ‘secular’ state and society into a country in which Turkish and Islamic identities were promoted forcefully by the putschist government of the 1980s.

Turgut Ozal, the first post-coup prime minister, and later the eighth President of the Republic of Turkey, implemented these policies to ‘re-orient’ the new Turkey.

Mixed occasionally with both pan-Turkist and pan-Islamist ideologies, neo-Ottomanism became increasingly attractive for Turkey in furthering its economic and political visions.

It is no surprise then, that Erdogan views Ozal as his role model for Turkey. Both figures bind export–growth economic policies with proactive foreign policy adventures.

Along with other neighbors of Turkey, northern Iraq was now being viewed as strategically significant in this new political context. Iraq was the bridge through which Turkey could reach the Persian Gulf. Turkish state and foreign policy were thus restructured along this line in the early 1990s.

The First Gulf War, according to Ozal, was an opportunity for Turkey’s new foreign policy realignments. The president went on to join the US-led anti-Saddam Hussein coalition and began publicly championing the theme of a ‘Greater Turkey’ as the protector of Turkomen and Kurds in northern Iraq.

Although the Turkish army and foreign ministry resisted Ozal’s efforts, Ankara allowed the Poised Hammer force – an aviation unit consisting of American, Australian, British, Dutch and French troops – to deploy in Silopi, Şırnak and operate on Turkish soil.

In the meantime, Turkey continued its armed operations against the “terrorist threat of the PKK,” alongside efforts to legitimize its presence in northern Iraq, which are assessed by the Iraqi government as illegal.

There were two large operations in northern Iraq in the 1990s. In 1995, the Turkish Armed Forces (TSK) launched Operation Steel, during which over 35,000 Turkish troops crossed the border.

The second operation, in 1997, was Operation Hammer, and it had two goals: to destroy PKK camps and to strengthen the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) against the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) in the Kurdish civil war.

The anti-PUK strategy overlapped with the PUK’s so-called ‘pro-Iranian’ stance. This was another reason for Turkey to support the KDP against the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK), and occasionally against the PUK, and it has been the repertoire of the Turkish state ever since.

Alongside irredentist claims over Iraq, Turkey began to exploit the post-Soviet world around it, exporting cheap and relatively high-tech Turkish goods to new destinations assessed as crucial areas.

The tide turned in 2008. The Justice and Development Party (AKP), with its neo-Ottoman figures like former Prime Minster Ahmet Davutoglu, reversed the Turkish course in Iraq. Ankara started to handpick Sunnis to take under its wings, and to develop solid relations with the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG).

Energy cooperation, particularly oil and natural gas investments, were primary motivations for both these governments. In 2004, Turkey’s exports to Iraq were less than two billion dollars, but by 2013, it had risen over 10 billion dollars, and the destination was the KRG, in particular.

Turkish construction companies earned lucrative contacts in the KRG. Erbil Airport was built by Cengiz İnsaat, which is owned by one of Erdogan’s closest allies, Mehmet Cengiz.

In 2014, despite the protests of Baghdad, the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) started to sell its oil through Turkish ports.

The new Turkey makes a retreat

After 2016, however, Turkish policy towards northern Iraq underwent a re-assessment.

One of the reasons was due to domestic political shifts. The pro-Kurdish People’s Democratic Party (HDP) acquired strong support in the June 2015 general elections, and AKP lost its majority for the first time in 13 years, bringing an abrupt end to the AKP’s so-called ‘Kurdish opening.’

There were strong clashes between pro-Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK) forces and Turkish Armed Forces (TSK) in southern parts of Turkey, which paved the way for a return to the old counter-insurgency TSK tactics in regard to the Kurdish question.

Then, on 15 July 2016, a failed coup d’état triggered a further restructuring of the Turkish state.

Another reason for the change in Turkish policy towards Iraq was that foreign policy failures and disappointments had taken their toll on Ankara.

The Arab Spring and the Muslim Brotherhood’s brief regional ascendence were snuffed out in Egypt and Tunisia, sending shockwaves throughout the Turkish government, and ending the rise of the Turkish model of a modern Muslim state throughout West Asia.

The Syrian government, with its allies Hezbollah, Iran, and Russia, held its ground and the US-backed regime change operation in Syria fell apart.

The so-called ‘Friends of Syria’ group splintered into Qatar-Turkey vs. Saudi Arabia-UAE, and started to fight each other.

The outward flows of Syrian refugees heightened tensions within Turkish society, and fueled both anti-AKP and anti-refugee sentiment.

Importantly, the YPG occupation of northern Syria, and its partnership with the US ‘anti-ISIS’ coalition supported by the PKK, created a ‘national threat’ for the Turkish government.

Turkey then set about modifying its policy on Syria. The result was a retreat from the aim of toppling Syrian President Bashar al-Assad to the more humble goal of “eliminating the terror corridor alongside [Turkey’s] southern border.”

The paranoia of ‘Iranian influence’

As a result of its hard power policies over the years, Turkey has been denied access via Syria and Iraq to the lucrative markets of the Persian Gulf’s Arab states. These policies include Turkey’s too-cozy relationship with Iraq’s KRG, as well as its economic and sometimes military competition with Iran in Iraq.

Soaring inflation in Turkey also decreased the competitiveness of Turkish goods in regional markets, and the Iraqi government’s protective policies have slowed down Iraq–Turkey trade volume. At the same time, Iranian trade with Iraq began to increase.

Strategic calculations have also played their part. Turkey’s eagerness to wipe out Kurdish militias from northern Iraq’s Sinjar region has caused tensions with both Baghdad and Tehran.

When TSK launched a military operation against the PKK in Gara, northern Iraq, in February 2021, Iraq’s Popular Mobilization Units (PMU, or Hashd al-Shabi) deployed forces in the Sinjar area against Turkish troops.

Turkish Armed Forces (TSK) have also been training anti-PKK Iraqi politician Osama al-Nujaifi’s Hashd al-Watani forces in a Turkish base in Bashiqa, near Mosul. In Sinjar, a tacit alliance between the PMU and PKK-affiliated Sinjar Resistance Units (YBS) confronted the TSK-backed Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP).

For Turkey, this confrontation represents an unholy alliance between Iran and the PKK. When Iran’s ambassador to Iraq, Iraj Masjedi, criticized Turkish operations in northern Iraq, then Turkish envoy Fatih Yıldız hit back, saying Masjedi should be “the last person to lecture Turkey.”

Ambitious goals, ambiguous future

Today, officially and firstly, TSK claims that its troops and bases are in northern Iraq for ‘fighting against terrorism’ and maintaining national security.

Secondly, as in the case of Bashiqa, Turkey lays claim to Iraqi Sunnis and legitimizes its assets by exploiting the sectarian fragmentation of Iraqi politics.

Thirdly, as long as the US remains in Iraq and maintains its ‘countering Iran’ policy in West Asia, Turkey will present its policy towards the KRG as a counterbalancing act against the so-called ‘Iranian influence.’

It appears that the KRG, and Sinjar in particular, will be the current focal point for the quarrel between Iran and Turkey. As a distant aim, in the event of the fragmentation of Iraq, Turkey would likely explore the annexation of northern Iraq, where it believes it has historic claims.

With respect to the Iraqi government, options against Turkey’s breaches of sovereignty and territorial integrity are limited. Ankara will remain as a big trading partner for Baghdad, with a staggering trade deficit to the detriment of the latter.

Turkey’s deep reach inside the KRG and warm relations with the ruling Barzani family will allow it to use northern Iraq as a bargaining chip with Baghdad in the post-US era – both unilaterally, and for the benefit of its NATO alliance.

Lastly, the recent thaw between Turkey, some Gulf states, and Israel may force Baghdad to accept the Turkish fait accompli in northern Iraq.

In short, Turkish troops in northern Iraq are useful for three things: Influencing the Kurdish question and directly tackling its PKK problem; boosting Turkish regional ambitions; and establishing a bargaining chip with its western allies.The views expressed in this article do not necessarily reflect those of The Cradle.

2021 in its Last Quarter, the End of the Erdogan Miracle 2021 في ربعه الأخير.. نهاية المعجزة الإردوغانية

DECEMBER 25, 2021

Turkish Erdogan Economy – the End of the Development Miracle

ARABI SOURI 

The “remarkable successes” achieved by Turkey during the first years of the “Justice and Development” rule turned out to be just myths that are expected to turn into hurricanes at the beginning of the new year.

The following is the English translation from Arabic of the latest article by Turkish career journalist Husni Mahali he published in the Lebanese Al-Mayadeen news site Al-Mayadeen Net:

When the West marketed the Justice and Development Party as an “Islamic party that democratically took power in a secular Muslim country” in the countries and peoples of the Arab region, it, also, had to prove to them the impressive successes of its “experience” in economic development that made Turkey the focus of everyone’s attention.

The leader of this “Islamist” experiment, Recep Tayyip Erdogan, achieved wide popularity, not only in the region, but among all Muslims in the world, and together they praised these successes, which they wished to bring them back the memories of the Caliphate and the Ottoman Sultanate that ruled large areas of the world.

The policies of openness to the countries of the region under the slogan “zero problems with neighboring countries”, which Erdogan pursued in the first eight years of his rule (2003-2011), contributed to gaining more popularity for him, his party, and Turkey, and achieved great economic gains thanks to this openness and positive relations with everyone, this will have repercussions on Ankara’s international relations, particularly with Europe, America, and Russia.

And the ‘bloody spring’ (Arab Spring) came to reveal what was hidden in Erdogan’s calculations, who believed that the time was right to impose his experience on the countries of the region, especially after the Muslim Brotherhood took power in Tunisia, Egypt, and Morocco, and partly in Yemen and Libya, so that neighboring Syria would be Erdogan’s main target in all his calculations, ideologically, nationally and strategically.

This was the beginning of the decline in the Erdogan project with its repercussions on the internal reality, especially after the failed coup attempt carried out by the followers of Fethullah Gulen (a former strategic ally of Erdogan) on July 15, 2016. Erdogan took advantage of this attempt, which, at the time, was said that “America, Israel, and the UAE stand behind it,” so he changed the political system from parliamentary to presidential, and took control of all state institutions, facilities, and apparatuses, the most important of which were the army, intelligence, security, judiciary, media, and even the central bank.

This was the beginning of revealing the mysteries and secrets of “the economic development”, which the Turkish opposition proved to be a lie after having had dire consequences for the economic and financial situation a year after Erdogan declared himself absolute ruler of the country, after the rigged referendum of April 2017, according to the words of Kilicdaroglu, leader of the opposition People’s Party.

Erdogan became president in June 2018, and appointed himself as chairman of the board of directors of the sovereign fund, and appointed his son-in-law, Berat Albayrak, as minister of finance and treasury and his deputy on the board of directors of the fund, this would be the beginning of the economic and financial collapse. The opposition accused Erdogan of privatizing $70 billion of public sector institutions, including airports, ports, dams, factories, military industries, forests, and highways, without anyone knowing where these billions went. The opposition also proved the involvement of Erdogan and those around him in serious corruption cases worth tens of billions of dollars, during the construction of bridges, tunnels, and airports by foreign companies that implemented their projects in hard currencies, and obtained their guarantees in hard currencies for long years as well.

All of this caused severe damage to the Turkish treasury, estimated at hundreds of billions of Turkish liras, which no longer has any notional value in foreign transactions. The opposition also proved the disappearance of 128 billion dollars (some say 150 billion) from the reserves of the Central Bank, without there being any logical explanation from Erdogan about the fate of these sums, because the state has not executed any strategic projects. The opposition said that Erdogan has spent some of these billions on his foreign adventures, especially in Syria, Libya, and other regions in which Erdogan wanted to promote his ideological, political and historical ideas, “while he lives in a fantasy world,” a quote by opposition leader Kilicdaroglu.

NSFW- Fire in her stomach, the Turkish Lira is Sick, its Immune System Collapsed… When Turkey Sold her Honor

As for the volume of external debts, which exceeded 460 billion dollars, with larger amounts of internal debts, they, in turn, proved the collapse of development slogans that finally collided with the lira crisis that Turkey has been suffering since the past three months after it suffered from similar crises last year, and in 2018, albeit with less powerful tremors.

The value of the lira depreciated within only one month by thirty percent (60% since the beginning of the year, and it may reach 65% before the end of the year) and this was reflected in the prices, which increased by between 50 and 100%, which thwarted the government’s efforts to control inflation, which statistics indicate that it will not be less than 60%, to bring President Erdogan and his economic miracles to the end of the dark tunnel, and there is no escape from it for many reasons.

Experts, led by the former Minister of Economy and the current leader of the Democratic and Progress Party, Ali Babacan, all blamed President Erdogan for this economic and financial disaster, with its repercussions on Turkish society, which is experiencing its most difficult and darkest days. Babacan, who was one of the builders of “the development”, considered Erdogan’s foreign and domestic policies the main reasons for all that Turkey suffers from, accusing him of ignoring the simplest laws and rules of the economy and money. Babacan says that Erdogan is acting unilaterally, far from any legal and constitutional oversight or accountability, which has made Turkey lose the confidence of foreign capital after Erdogan took control of the judiciary and eliminated the independence of the central bank.

CHP leader Kemal Kilicdaroglu and former Prime Minister and Future Party leader Ahmet Davutoglu supported Babacan’s words, and together they refuted the statements issued by the State Institute of Statistics regarding development rates, which were always according to the mood of Erdogan and his media and all those who were and still are admired about “the brilliant successes” Turkey achieved during the first years of the “Justice and Development” rule, finally, it turned out that they are just myths that did not withstand the bitter winds of truth that some expect to turn with the beginnings of the new year into storms and hurricanes, and no one knows how Erdogan will deal with them before they are accompanied by earthquakes that destroy all his “successes” before the so-called “Arab Spring,” when his experience, at the time, was a successful model that many praised, and some of them are now setting an example of its abject failure.

Others, at home and abroad, remain in their sentimental opinion of Erdogan’s miracles, either for self-interest or an ideological consensus that will not benefit any of them, as long as the truth has become completely exposed. The last three months of 2021 demonstrated the fragility of the Turkish economy and the “developmental miracles” that it has achieved, which “Islamists” have emotionally drummed and trumpeted about, as they are now emotionally defending them, they say that “Turkey’s economy is strong and its development is great, and it is exposed to a global war waged by imperialist, colonial, Zionist and Arab hostile countries and powers,” ignoring that Erdogan is courting all of these (countries and powers) in order to help him save Turkey, which will be very difficult by all standards and measures because Erdogan is absolutely indifferent to them, otherwise he would not have emphasized more than once his commitment to “religious texts” during his handling of the current crisis because “what matters to him is staying in power no matter what it costs him,” his former Prime Minister Ahmet Davutoglu says.

Donate

2021 في ربعه الأخير.. نهاية المعجزة الإردوغانية

الاثنين 20 كانون الأول 2021

المصدر: الميادين نت

حسني محلي

“النجاحات الباهرة” التي حققتها تركيا خلال السنوات الأولى من حكم “العدالة والتنمية” تبيّن أنها مجرد أساطير يتوقع أن تتحول مع بدايات العام الجديد إلى أعاصير.

أصبح إردوغان رئيساً للجمهورية في حزيران/ يونيو 2018

عندما قام الغرب بتسويق حزب العدالة والتنمية “كحزب إسلامي تسلّم السلطة بشكل ديمقراطي في بلد مسلم علماني” في دول المنطقة العربية وشعوبها، كان عليه أن يثبت لها أيضاً النجاحات الباهرة “لتجربته” في التنمية الاقتصادية التي جعلت من تركيا محط أنظار الجميع. 

وحقّق زعيم هذه التجربة “الإسلامي” رجب طيب إردوغان شعبية واسعة، ليس فقط في المنطقة، بل بين جميع المسلمين في العالم، وتغنّوا معاً بهذه النجاحات التي تمنّوا لها أن تعيد إليهم ذكريات الخلافة والسلطنة العثمانيتين اللتين حكمتا مساحات واسعة من العالم. 

وأسهمت سياسات الانفتاح على دول المنطقة تحت شعار “صفر مشاكل مع دول الجوار”، والتي انتهجها إردوغان في السنوات الثماني الأولى من حكمه (2003-2011)، في كسب المزيد من الشعبية، له ولحزبه ولتركيا، وحققت مكاسب اقتصادية عظيمة بفضل هذا الانفتاح والعلاقات الإيجابية مع الجميع، بانعكاسات ذلك على علاقات أنقرة الدولية، وفي مقدمتها مع أوروبا وأميركا وروسيا. 

وجاء الربيع الدموي ليكشف المستور في حسابات إردوغان، الذي اعتقد أن الوقت بات ملائماً لفرض تجربته على دول المنطقة، وخاصة بعد تسلّم الإخوان المسلمين السلطة في تونس ومصر والمغرب، وجزئياً في اليمن وليبيا، لتكون الجارة سوريا هدف إردوغان الرئيسي في مجمل حساباته، عقائدياً وقومياً واستراتيجياً. 

وكان ذلك بداية التقهقر في المشروع الإردوغاني بانعكاساته على الواقع الداخلي، وخاصة بعد محاولة الانقلاب الفاشل الذي قام به أتباع فتح الله غولن (وهو الحليف الاستراتيجي السابق لإردوغان) في الـ 15 من تموز/يوليو 2016. واستغلّ إردوغان هذه المحاولة التي قيل آنذاك “إن أميركا وإسرائيل والإمارات تقف خلفها”، فقام بتغيير النظام السياسي من برلماني إلى رئاسي، وسيطر على جميع مؤسّسات الدولة ومرافقها وأجهزتها، وأهمها الجيش والاستخبارات والأمن والقضاء والإعلام، بل حتى البنك المركزي. 

وكان ذلك بداية الكشف عن خفايا “التنمية الاقتصادية” وأسرارها، والتي أثبتت المعارضة التركية كذبها بعد أن انعكست بنتائجها الوخيمة على الوضع الاقتصادي والمالي بعد عام من إعلان إردوغان نفسه حاكماً مطلقاً للبلاد، بعد استفتاء نيسان/أبريل 2017 المزوّر بحسب كلام كليجدار أوغلو زعيم حزب الشعب المعارض.

وأصبح إردوغان رئيساً للجمهورية في حزيران/ يونيو 2018، وقام بتعيين نفسه رئيساً لمجلس إدارة الصندوق السيادي، وتعيين صهره برات البايراك وزيراً للمالية والخزانة ونائباً له في  مجلس إدارة الصندوق، ليكون ذلك بداية الانهيار الاقتصادي والمالي. واتهمت المعارضة إردوغان بخصخصة ما قيمته 70 مليار دولار من مؤسسات القطاع العام، بما فيها المطارات والموانئ والسدود والمعامل والمصانع العسكرية والغابات والطرقات السريعة، من دون أن يعرف أحد أين ذهبت هذه المليارات. كما أثبتت المعارضة تورّط إردوغان ومَن حوله في قضايا فساد خطيرة بعشرات المليارات من الدولارات، خلال بناء الجسور والأنفاق والمطارات من قبل شركات أجنبية نفّذت مشاريعها بالعملات الصعبة، وحصلت على ضماناتها بالعملات الصعبة أيضاً ولسنوات طويلة. 

وألحق كل ذلك أضراراً جسيمة بالخزانة التركية تُقدّر بمئات المليارات من الليرات التركية التي لم يعد لها أي قيمة اعتبارية في التعاملات الخارجية. كما أثبتت المعارضة اختفاء 128 مليار دولار (البعض يقول 150 ملياراً) من احتياطي المصرف المركزي، من دون أن يكون هناك أي توضيح منطقي من إردوغان حول مصير هذه المبالغ، لأن الدولة لم تنفّذ أي مشاريع استراتيجية. وقالت المعارضة إن إردوغان قد صرف البعض من هذه المليارات في مغامراته الخارجية، وخاصة في سوريا وليبيا ومناطق أخرى أراد إردوغان أن يسوّق فيها أفكاره العقائدية والسياسية والتاريخية، “وهو يعيش في عالم الخيال”، والقول لزعيم المعارضة كليجدار أوغلو. 

وأما حجم الديون الخارجية التي زادت على 460 مليار دولار مع مبالغ  أكبر من الديون الداخلية، فقد أثبتت بدورها انهيار شعارات التنمية التي اصطدمت أخيراً بأزمة الليرة التي تعاني منها تركيا منذ ثلاثة أشهر، بعد أن عانت من أزمات مماثلة في العام الماضي، وفي عام 2018، ولو بهزّات أقل قوة. 

فتراجعت قيمة الليرة خلال شهر واحد فقط بنسبة ثلاثين في المئة (منذ بداية العام 60% وقد تصل إلى 65% قبل نهاية العام) وانعكس ذلك على الأسعار التي زادت بنسبة تراوح بين 50 و100%، وهو ما أفشل مساعي الحكومة في السيطرة على التضخم الذي تبيّن الإحصاءات أنه لن يكون أقل من 60%،  ليوصل الرئيس إردوغان ومعجزاته الاقتصادية إلى نهاية النفق المظلم، ولا نجاة منه لأسباب عديدة. 

فالخبراء، وفي مقدمتهم وزير الاقتصاد الأسبق والزعيم الحالي لحزب الديمقراطية والتقدم علي باباجان، حمّلوا جميعاً الرئيس إردوغان مسؤولية هذه الكارثة الاقتصادية والمالية بانعكاساتها على المجتمع التركي، الذي بات يعيش أصعب أيامه وأحلكها. واعتبر باباجان، وكان من بُناة “التنمية”، سياسات إردوغان الخارجية والداخلية سبباً رئيسياً لكل ما تعاني منه تركيا، متّهِماً إياه بجهل أبسط قوانين وقواعد الاقتصاد والمال. ويقول باباجان إن إردوغان يتصرف بشكل فردي، بعيداً عن أي رقابة أو محاسبة قانونية ودستورية، وهو ما أفقدَ تركيا ثقة الرساميل الأجنبية، بعد أن سيطر إردوغان على الجهاز القضائي، وقضى على استقلالية المصرف المركزي. 

وأيّد زعيم حزب الشعب الجمهوري كمال كليجدار أوغلو ورئيس الوزراء السابق وزعيم حزب المستقبل أحمد داود أوغلو كلام باباجان، وكذّبا معاً البيانات التي تصدر عن المعهد الحكومي للإحصاء في ما يتعلّق بنسب التنمية، وكانت دائماً وفق مزاج إردوغان وإعلامه وكل الذين كانوا وما زالوا يتغنّون “بالنجاحات الباهرة” التي حققتها تركيا خلال السنوات الأولى من حكم “العدالة والتنمية”، وتبيّن أخيراً أنها مجرد أساطير لم تصمد أمام رياح الحقيقة المرّة التي يتوقع لها البعض أن تتحول مع بدايات العام الجديد إلى عواصف وأعاصير، ولا يدري أحد كيف سيتصدّى لها إردوغان قبل أن ترافقها زلازل تدمّر كل ما حققه من “نجاحات” قبل ما يُسمّى “الربيع العربي”، حيث كانت تجربته آنذاك نموذجاً ناجحاً يتغنّى به الكثيرون، وبدأ البعض منهم الآن يضرب المثل بفشله الذريع. 

ويبقى آخرون في الداخل والخارج عند حسن ظنهم العاطفي بمعجزات إردوغان، إما لحسابات مصلحية أو لتوافق عقائدي لن ينفع أحداً منهم، ما دامت الحقيقة قد أصبحت مكشوفة تماماً. فقد أثبتت الأشهر الثلاثة الأخيرة من 2021 هشاشة الاقتصاد التركي وما حققه من “معجزات تنموية” طبّل وزمّر لها “الإسلاميون” عاطفياً كما يدافعون عنها الآن عاطفياً وهم يقولون إن “اقتصاد تركيا قوي وتنميتها عظيمة وهي تتعرض لحرب كونية تشنها دول وقوى أمبريالية واستعمارية وصهيونية وعربية معادية”، غافلين عن أن إردوغان يتودد إليها جميعاً كي تساعده لإنقاذ تركيا وهو ما سيكون صعباً جداً بكل المعايير والمقاييس، ذلك لأن إردوغان غير مبال بها على الإطلاق، وإلا لما أكد أكثر من مرة على التزامه “بالنصوص الدينية” خلال معالجته للأزمة الحالية لأن “ما يهمه هو البقاء في السلطة مهما كلفه ذلك” والقول لرئيس وزرائه السابق أحمد داود أوغلو.  

• تركيا: مقابل ارتفاع الليرة.. تراجع كبير في الاحتياطيات الأجنبية
• إردوغان يتخذ إجراءات جديدة.. ولا رجعة عن أسعار الفائدة المنخفضة

Erdogan’s Democracy… Tension in a Dangerous Direction! ديمقراطية إردوغان.. التوتر في اتجاه خطِر!

Erdogan’s Democracy… Tension in a Dangerous Direction!

ARABI SOURI NOVEMBER 22, 2021

Opinion polls rule out that Erdogan will win the upcoming elections, which leads him to more tension and hostility towards opposition parties.

The following is the English translation from Arabic of the latest article by Turkish career journalist Husni Mahali he published in the Lebanese Al-Mayadeen news site Al-Mayadeen Net:

The Turkish political and media scene is witnessing an exciting debate after some media professionals loyal to Erdogan spoke about the possibility of banning the CHP’s activity, prosecuting its leader Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu and some of the party’s leaders, and placing them in prisons.

This media talk was accompanied by a very violent attack by the Turkish president on the leader of the Republican People’s Party, Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu, and his ally in the ‘Nation’s Alliance,’ the leader of the Good Party, Maral Aksanar. Erdogan does not miss any occasion, whether internal or external, without attacking Kılıçdaroğlu and Aksanar, with the most violent words, descriptions, and phrases, including those targeting their dignity and honor.

In all of his speeches, Erdogan accuses Kılıçdaroğlu (Kilitchdar-oglu) and Aksanar of allying with the Peoples’ Democratic Party, the political wing of the Kurdistan Workers’ Party, in an attempt to win the sympathy, solidarity, and support of the popular street, arguing that “Kurdistan Party” is a terrorist organization and the enemy of the Turkish nation and state. This has failed, at least so far, as all independent opinion polls have proven the decline in the popularity of the Justice and Development Party (Erdogan’s AKP) and its ally the National Movement, in return for a noticeable increase in the popularity of the Good Party and the Republican People’s Party and the Democratic People’s Party.

All polls also ruled out a victory for President Erdogan in the upcoming elections and expected his rivals, including Istanbul Mayor Ekrem Imamoglu and Ankara Mayor Mansur Yavas, to receive at least 58% of the vote compared to Erdogan’s 40-42%.

Such possibilities push Erdogan to increase tension and hostility towards opposition parties and all opponents, with all their political and social affiliations and alignments, and they are all subjected to a very violent attack by Erdogan and his ally, the leader of the nationalist movement Devlet Bakhchali and the media loyal to them together. The media attack acquires a frenzied character without limits, as long as the judiciary does not move a finger against these, and unlike everyone who utters even one word against Erdogan, the judiciary is prosecuting him for insulting the President of the Republic.

The judiciary is also prosecuting Erdogan’s opponents, including journalists, academics, intellectuals, artists, and others, and without this attack being sufficient for Erdogan and his media to limit the activity of the opposition parties and their forces, which are taking advantage of Erdogan’s failure in the foreign and domestic policies, the most important of them is the serious economic and financial crisis that the opposition leaders expect to bring the country to the brink of complete bankruptcy with the continued depreciation of the Turkish lira by at least 15% in just one month, which was reflected very dangerously on the high prices of all services and basic materials and the cost of living, then unemployment, poverty, and hunger which have become a daily phenomenon.

The opposition expects Erdogan and his government to impose a new series of taxes to cover the budget deficit, which will burden the citizen who will take revenge on Erdogan in the first upcoming elections. Such a possibility prompts Erdogan to seek “hellish” plans, as characterized by the opposition, to ensure that he remains in power, no matter what it costs him. Within these endeavors, Erdogan seeks and will seek to divide the ranks of the nation’s coalition parties, which includes the Republican People’s Party – CHP (28%) and the Good Party (14%), and indirectly the HDP – People’s Democratic Party (10%).

The polls expect Ali Babacan’s Progress and Democracy Party (3%) and Davutoğlu’s Future Party (2%), along with the Democratic and Happiness Party, to agree with the Nation’s Alliance against the Public Alliance, which includes the Justice and Development Party – AKP (30%) and the National Movement (8%), in addition to the Great Unity Party.

The opposition also expects Erdogan to impose strict control over the media and social media networks, while working to change the election law at the last moment, with the possibility of postponing or canceling the elections with security justifications, both internal and external, which is Erdogan’s prerogative according to the constitution. The opposition also talks about the possibility of electoral fraud, as was the case in the April 16, 2017 referendum. On the basis of this referendum, Erdogan changed the political system to become a presidential one, taking control of all state agencies, facilities, and institutions, and becoming the absolute ruler of the country. The leader of the Republican People’s Party, Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu, accused the Supreme Electoral Commission, at the time, of falsifying the results by agreeing, after the polls were closed, to adopt the more than two million unsealed ballot papers.

Turkish Lira Continues its Sliding in Value Thanks to Erdogan’s Failed Policies

Talking about the possibility of banning the activity of the Republican People’s Party and prosecuting its leaders remains the most dangerous scenario for Turkey’s future, because Ataturk was the one who founded this party that ruled the country alone until the end of World War II. This concern may not be enough to deter Erdogan from thinking in this way, after he put the two co-leaders of the Peoples’ Democratic Party, Selahattin Demirtaş and Vikan Yoksakdag, and a number of party leaders in prison, five years ago, and joined them with about forty of the mayors elected in 2019, which was not enough for the party’s supporters and followers to take to the streets, because they know that the authorities will not spare them, even though 5.86 million voted for the party in the June 2018 elections.

In all cases, and with the exclusion of any possibility of holding early elections in light of the difficult internal and external conditions that the country is going through, everyone knows that Erdogan does not and will not, in any way, accept defeat and hand over power to his enemies. He knows that they will pursue him on many charges, the most important of which is serious corruption and his involvement in foreign files, the most important of which is his relations with armed groups in Syria and Libya.

Washington’s position is not clear, at least until now, on the overall developments inside Turkey, recalling that President Biden had spoken at the end of 2019 “about the need to get rid of Erdogan democratically”, after describing him as “authoritarian.”

The media presents many future scenarios, not only regarding Washington’s possible position, but also the position of Western capitals, and even Moscow, all of which are said to turn a blind eye to Erdogan’s staying in power, whatever his negatives, as long as it benefits directly or indirectly of him. Defenders of this view say that the mentioned capitals are more likely to deal with the absolute ruler Erdogan instead of a new president or a new coalition government with several contradictory parties, and their agreement even on crucial issues will never be easy.

Some see in such a scenario a sufficient reason for Erdogan to continue his current policies internally and externally, as long as the aforementioned capitals content themselves with denunciation and condemnation, without taking any practical action against Ankara.

Everyone knows that Erdogan plans to stay in power, drawing lessons from the experiences of regimes in Arab and Islamic countries, and whether they remain in power or fall from it was in most cases subject to American indication.

This is the case for Adnan Menderes, who made Turkey (1950-1960) an “American state.” The military overthrew him and executed him, while Washington did nothing, which it did with the Shah of Iran, Hosni Mubarak, Zine El Abidine Ben Ali, and others in other countries in which America has accounts and accounts!

Turkey’s Madman Erdogan Sends NATO Troops to Defend al-Qaeda Terrorists in Idlib

If you want us to remain online, please consider a small donation, or see how you can help at no cost.
Follow us on Telegram: https://t.me/syupdates link will open the Telegram app.

ديمقراطية إردوغان.. التوتر في اتجاه خطِر!

2021 18 تشرين ثاني

المصدر: الحسني محلي

استطلاعات الرأي تستبعد أن يفوز إردوغان في الانتخابات المقبلة ما يدفعه إلى مزيد من التوتر والعداء تجاه أحزاب المعارضة.

يبقى الحديث عن احتمالات حظر نشاط حزب الشعب الجمهوري وملاحقة قياداته قضائياً السيناريو الأخطر بالنسبة إلى مستقبل تركيا.

تشهد الساحة السياسية والإعلامية التركية نقاشاً مثيراً بعد أن تحدث البعض من الإعلاميين الموالين لإردوغان عن احتمالات حظر نشاط حزب الشعب الجمهوري، وملاحقة زعيمه كمال كليجدار أوغلو والبعض من قيادات الحزب قضائياً، ووضعهم في السجون. 

حديث الإعلاميين هذا رافقه هجوم عنيف جداً من الرئيس التركي على زعيم حزب الشعب الجمهوري كمال كليجدار أوغلو وحليفته في تحالف الأمة، زعيمة الحزب الجيد مارال أكشانار. فلا يفوّت إردوغان أي مناسبة، داخلية كانت أو خارجية، من دون أن يهاجم كليجدار أوغلو وأكشانار، وبأعنف الكلمات والأوصاف والألفاظ والعبارات، بما فيها تلك التي تستهدف كرامتيهما وشرفيهما. 

ويتهم إردوغان في كل أحاديثه كليجدار أوغلو وأكشانار بالتحالف مع حزب الشعوب الديمقراطي، الجناح السياسي لحزب العمال الكردستاني، في محاولة منه لكسب تعاطف الشارع الشعبي وتضامنه ودعمه، بحجة أن” الكردستاني” تنظيم إرهابي وعدو الأمة والدولة التركيّتين. هذا الأمر فشل فيه، على الأقل حتى الآن، حيث أثبتت جميع استطلاعات الرأي المستقلة تراجع شعبية حزب العدالة والتنمية وحليفه الحركة القومية، مقابل زيادة ملحوظة في شعبية الحزب الجيد وحزبي الشعب الجمهوري والشعوب الديمقراطي. 

واستبعدت كل الاستطلاعات أيضاً الفوز للرئيس إردوغان في الانتخابات المقبلة، وتوقعت لمنافسيه، ومنهم رئيس بلدية إسطنبول أكرم إمام أوغلو، ورئيس بلدية أنقرة منصور ياواش، أن يحصلوا على ما لا يقل عن 58٪ من الأصوات مقابل 40-42٪ لإردوغان. 

وتدفع مثل هذه الاحتمالات إردوغان إلى مزيد من التوتر والعداء تجاه أحزاب المعارضة وكل المعارضين، بميولهم وانتماءاتهم السياسية والاجتماعية كافة، ويتعرّضون جميعاً لهجوم عنيف جداً من إردوغان وحليفه زعيم الحركة القومية دولت باخشالي والإعلام الموالي لهما معاً. ويكتسب الهجوم الإعلامي طابعاً مسعوراً من دون حدود، ما دام القضاء لا يحرك ساكناً ضد هؤلاء، وخلافاً لكل من يتفوّه ولو بكلمة واحدة ضد إردوغان، حيث يلاحقه القضاء بتهمة الإساءة إلى رئيس الجمهورية، كما يلاحق القضاء معارضي إردوغان من الصحافيين والأكاديميين والمثقفين والفنانين وغيرهم، ومن دون أن يكون هذا الهجوم كافياً بالنسبة إلى إردوغان وإعلامه للحدّ من نشاطِ أحزاب المعارضة وقواها، والتي تستغل فشل إردوغان في السياستين الخارجية والداخلية، وأهمهما الأزمة الاقتصادية والمالية الخطيرة التي تتوقع لها قيادات المعارضة أن توصل البلاد الى حافة الإفلاس التام مع استمرار تراجع قيمة الليرة التركية بما لا يقل عن 15٪ خلال شهر واحد فقط، وهو ما انعكس بشكلٍ خطير جداً على ارتفاع أسعار كل الخدمات والمواد الأساسية وغلاء المعيشة ثم البطالة والفقر والجوع الذي تحول الى ظاهرة يومية. 

وتتوقع المعارضة لإردوغان وحكومته أن يفرضا سلسلة جديدة من الضرائب لتغطية العجز في الموازنة، وهو ما سيثقل كاهل المواطن الذي سينتقم من إردوغان في أول انتخابات مقبلة. ويدفع مثل هذا الاحتمال إردوغان إلى السعي من أجل خطط “جهنمية”، بتوصيف المعارضة، لضمان بقائه في السلطة، ومهما كلفه ذلك. وضمن هذه المساعي، يسعى وسيسعى إردوغان لشق وحدة الصف بين أطراف تحالف الأمة الذي يضم حزب الشعب الجمهوري (28٪) والحزب الجيد (14٪)، وبشكل غير مباشر حزب الشعوب الديمقراطي (10٪) . 

وتتوقع الاستطلاعات لحزب التقدم والديمقراطية بزعامة علي باباجان (3٪) وحزب المستقبل بزعامة داود أوغلو (2٪)، ومعهما الحزب الديمقراطي والسعادة، أن تتفق مع تحالف الأمة ضد تحالف الجمهور الذي يضم حزب العدالة والتنمية (30٪) والحركة القومية (8٪) إضافة إلى حزب الوحدة الكبرى. 

كما تتوقع المعارضة لإردوغان أن يفرض رقابة صارمة على الإعلام وشبكات التواصل الاجتماعي، مع العمل على تغيير قانون الانتخابات في آخر لحظة، مع احتمالات تأجيل أو إلغاء الانتخابات بمبررات أمنية، داخلية وخارجية، وهو من صلاحيات إردوغان وفق الدستور. كما تتحدث المعارضة عن احتمالات تزوير الانتخابات، كما جرى في استفتاء 16 نيسان/أبريل 2017. وقام إردوغان بناء على هذا الاستفتاء بتغيير النظام السياسي ليصبح رئاسياً، فسيطر على كل أجهزة الدولة ومرافقها ومؤسساتها، وأصبح الحاكم المطلق للبلاد. واتهم زعيم حزب الشعب الجمهوري كمال كليجدار أوغلو آنذاك الهيئة العليا للانتخابات بتزوير النتائج عبر موافقتها، بعد إغلاق صناديق الاقتراع، على اعتماد بطاقات الاقتراع غير المختومة، وعددها أكثر من مليوني بطاقة.   

ويبقى الحديث عن احتمالات حظر نشاط حزب الشعب الجمهوري وملاحقة قياداته قضائياً السيناريو الأخطر بالنسبة إلى مستقبل تركيا، لأن أتاتورك هو الذي أسّس هذا الحزب الذي حكم البلاد حتى نهاية الحرب العالمية الثانية بمفرده. وقد لا يكون هذا القلق كافياً لردع إردوغان عن التفكير بهذا الأسلوب، بعد أن وضع الزعيمين المشتركين لحزب الشعوب الديمقراطي صلاح الدين دميرطاش وفيكان يوكساكداغ وعدداً من قادة الحزب في السجون، قبل خمس سنوات، وضمَّ إليهم نحو أربعين من رؤساء البلديات المنتخبين عام 2019، من دون أن يكون ذلك كافياً بالنسبة إلى أنصار وأتباع الحزب للخروج الى الشوارع، لأنهم يعرفون أن السلطات لن ترحمهم، مع أن عددهم كان 5.86 ملايين صوّتوا للحزب في انتخابات حزيران/يونيو 2018. 

وفي جميع الحالات، ومع استبعاد أي احتمال لإجراء الانتخابات المبكرة في ظل الظروف الداخلية والخارجية الصعبة التي تعيشها البلاد، يعرف الجميع أن إردوغان لا ولن يقبل بأي شكل من الأشكال بالهزيمة وتسليم السلطة لأعدائه. فهو يعرف أنهم سيلاحقونه بتهم كثيرة، أهمها الفساد الخطير، وتورطه في ملفات خارجية، وأهمها علاقاته مع المجموعات المسلحة في سوريا وليبيا.  

ومن دون أن يكون واضحاً، على الأقل حتى الآن، موقف واشنطن من مجمل تطورات الداخل التركي، مع التذكير بأن الرئيس بايدن كان قد تحدث نهاية 2019 “عن ضرورة التخلص من إردوغان ديمقراطياً”، بعد أن وصفه “بالاستبدادي”. 

ويطرح الإعلام العديد من السيناريوهات المستقبلية، ليس فقط بالنسبة إلى موقف واشنطن المحتمل، بل أيضاً موقف العواصم الغربية، وحتى موسكو، والتي يقال إنها جميعاً قد تغض النظر عن بقاء إردوغان في السلطة، ومهما كانت سلبياته، ما دامت المستفيدة منه بشكل مباشر أو غير مباشر. ويقول المدافعون عن هذا الرأي إن العواصم المذكورة ترجّح التعامل مع الحاكم المطلق إردوغان بدلاً من رئيس جديد أو حكومة ائتلافية جديدة بعدة أحزاب متناقضة، واتفاقها حتى في القضايا المصيرية لن يكن سهلاً أبداً. 

ويرى البعض في مثل هذا السيناريو سبباً كافياً لاستمرار إردوغان في سياساته الحاليةِ داخلياً وخارجياً، ما دامت العواصم المذكورة تكتفي بالاستنكار والتنديد، من دون أن تتَّخذَ أي إجراء عمليّ ضدّ أنقرة.

ويعرف الجميع أن إردوغان يخطط للبقاء في السلطة، مستخلصاً الدروس من تجارب الأنظمة في الدول العربية والإسلامية، وبقاؤها في الحكم أو سقوطها منه كان في معظم الحالات رهن الإشارة الأميركية. 

وهذه هي الحال بالنسبة إلى عدنان مندرس الذي جعل من تركيا (1950-1960) “ولاية أميركية”، فأطاحه العسكر وأعدموه، فيما لم تحرّك واشنطن ساكناً، وهو ما فعلته مع شاه إيران وحسني مبارك وزين العابدين بن علي وآخرين في دول أخرى، ما زال لأميركا فيها حسابات وحسابات!