Why is Jordan cracking down on support for Gaza?

APR 10, 2024

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Support for the Palestinian cause, at an all-time high globally, is being actively suppressed by Jordanian authorities, under pressure to keep a lid on anti-Israel displays in the kingdom.

(Photo Credit: The Cradle)

Kit Klarenburg

For the past fortnight, thousands of Jordanians have taken to the streets of Amman, besieging the Israeli embassy, condemning the Gaza genocide, demanding the Hashemite Kingdom sever all ties with Tel Aviv – and, in particular, tearing up the country’s 1994 peace treaty with Israel. 

Jordanian security forces have met these protests with increasing severity, signaling the government’s unease with too much public criticism of Israel. Amidst the turmoil, Saudi Arabia – Jordan’s biggest Arab patron – watches warily, concerned that a surge in Palestinian solidarity might challenge its own regional dominance and sink all prospects of Riyadh’s normalization with Tel Aviv.

Banning ‘Palestine’

This includes banning Palestinian flags, keffiyehs, and banners from protests – a mirror of the restrictions imposed in several pro-US Arab states. Attendees are also subjected to invasive body searches and identification checks, and select individuals are barred from participating. 

The crackdowns seem to change by the day – one day, protesters are seen with their keffiyehs, and the next, they are not. The same goes for Palestinian flags. At times, they are visible in the throngs; with the flip of a switch, protesters resort to flashing the flag only on their mobile phones.

The public demonstrations are mainly confined to the heavily barricaded courtyard of Kaluti Mosque, situated near Amman’s evacuated Israeli embassy, and restricted to a duration of only two hours.

During the month of Ramadan, protests commence at 10 PM, following the conclusion of mass Taraweeh prayers. As one protester relates to The Cradle:

Police insist it needs to be over by midnight, then break it off violently or through intimidation if people refuse to leave. Greater restrictions are a huge deterrent to attending, especially having to show your ID – people worry it’ll somehow be used against them later. Due to the barriers, some people often can’t even get in, and those who do can’t move. It’s meant to demoralize us, trapping us in a cage and preventing us from breaking out into the streets.

The banning of Palestine’s flag is an especially sensitive escalation by Jordanian authorities. A small majority of the Jordanian population is Palestinian by birth. They consist of refugees from Palestine and their descendants, as well as residents of the West Bank during the period of Amman’s administration from 1948 to 1967.

As there is no census in the country, the precise figure is unknown. This may be by design, in order to diminish Palestine’s societal and political influence in the British-created Hashemite Kingdom.

A symbolic struggle intensifies 

In a hugely symbolic development, violence towards Palestine solidarity protesters in Amman reached its zenith on 30 March, Land Day, which commemorates a fateful date in 1976 when Zionist authorities first began formally confiscating Palestinian territory for settlement. 

Six unarmed Palestinians – including three women – were murdered that day by Israeli occupation forces, with hundreds more injured during subsequent clashes. Ever since then, Jordanian officials have attempted to calm the situation and present themselves as committed anti-Zionists.

In their response to the past week of protests, authorities in Amman have tried to strike a quiet balance. Government Communications Minister Muhannad Mubaidin has claimed that condemning Israel is a core national ethos, affirming Amman’s solidarity with Palestine and the citizens’ right to protest despite “violations” committed by a minority of demonstrators.

Yet, as one anonymous Jordanian activist tells The Cradle, “many of us think this is just talk.” After all, many protesters arrested over the past two weeks remain in “administrative detention,” and formal restrictions on the protests have only ratcheted since 30 March.

The X account of the “Jordanian Youth Gathering for the Support of the Resistance” lists the names and photographs of 54 protesters they allege are currently being detained by Jordanian security forces. For supporting Palestine, they remain behind bars during the official Muslim Eid al-Fitr holiday that marks the end of the holy month of Ramadan.

Jordan’s Palestinian identity crisis 

In September 1970, in response to the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) using Jordan as a highly effective staging ground for strikes upon the occupation state, Jordanian forces began attacking cities, including Amman, with a substantial fedayeen presence. 

Commonly known as Black September, events that month spiraled into what was effectively a civil war, with Palestinians and Jordanians on both sides of the divide. Several protesters who spoke to The Cradle note the obvious parallels between then and now, with one saying banning symbols of Palestine solidarity “seems insane,” given the historical context of such actions in Amman.

Activists also say that accusations against Palestine solidarity protesters in Jordan of serving “foreign agendas” and being directed by overseas actors have reached unprecedented levels. 

Although blaming the ‘Other’ is an age-old tactic of authorities to dispel dissent among populations, several activists tell The Cradle it has reached “shocking” and unprecedented levels this time round. The cast of characters who stand accused include the Muslim Brotherhood, Iran, Hamas, and even the west.

Despite these accusations, the protests have a genuine international component, fostering a spirit of unity among Palestine solidarity activists across West Asia, including Egypt, Jordan, Morocco, and Oman. 

“People in Cairo were chanting against [Jordan’s King] Abdullah II a few days ago, while we chanted against [Egyptian President Abdel Fattah] al-Sisi. We call on each other to rise!” a Jordanian protester proudly tells The Cradle. Such scenes are absolute anathema to various governments within and outside West Asia.

Israel’s counterstrategy

This growing Arab solidarity with Palestine has not gone unnoticed by Israel, which is acutely aware of the horrendous reputational impact its Gaza genocide is having overseas. A leaked US State Department memo has revealed Tel Aviv is recruiting “influencers to help target social media users” in Europe and North America, and “Egypt, Jordan, and Gulf Arab countries” to highlight purported Hamas atrocities. 

Accordingly, open-source investigation platform EekadFacts has exposed a number of X accounts, reportedly based in Jordan, posting relentless anti-Hamas messaging.

These cloak-and-dagger activities have done nothing to quell Palestine solidarity in any corner of the world and have thrown pro-US Arab allies, particularly Saudi Arabia, for a loop.

Riyadh’s role 

As Lebanese daily Al-Akhbar forcefully noted on 4 April, Riyadh has “launched its press and electronic flies to defend the Hashemite throne” – ironic, given that in 2021, Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman (MbS) attempted to overthrow King Abdullah II and install his brother, Prince Hamzah, as regent. The coup plotters, it should be noted, remain on trial in Amman today.

A largely forgotten component of that failed putsch was Israel’s central involvement. As Al-Akhbar observed, Bin Salman is desperate to crush Palestine solidarity, for such activity interferes with his long-term “ambition to normalize relations with Israel, as a way to obtain American guarantees for the security and safety of the Saudi regime.” 

This includes US acquiescence to the sale of F-35 fighter jets to Riyadh and US assistance in establishing nuclear infrastructure that includes a nuclear fuel circuit on Saudi territory – both longtime Saudi demands.

Riyadh and Tel Aviv were on the verge of normalizing relations when Operation Al-Aqsa Flood struck, followed by the brutal assault on Gaza.

Israel’s military blitzkrieg made normalization an untenable proposition. While initially, MbS suggested it was off the table, this was clearly an expedient fudge to uphold his claim that the kingdom “represents the heart of the Muslim world” and “senses the hopes and pains of Muslims everywhere, strives to achieve unity, cooperation and solidarity in our Muslim world.” 

By January, he had reversed course, openly and repeatedly expressing “interest” in “recognition” of Tel Aviv – provided Israel agrees to advance the two-state solution and build a “renewed” Palestinian Authority that can, presumably, garner the support of actual Palestinians.

Concurrently, Riyadh has been meeting with representatives of Egypt, Jordan, Qatar, and UAE to hammer out a “joint plan” for Gaza, post-war. It would see the brutal, collaborationist, British-trained Palestinian Authority take over as the territory’s undisputed ruler, with Hamas frozen out of all official offices and agencies. 

It is a proposition neither Palestinian freedom fighters nor Palestine solidarity activists the world over are likely to accept.

Jordan’s Game of Thrones: Power struggle of the Hashemite family

February 14 2023

Photo Credit: The Cradle

The Jordanian monarchy is facing an uncertain future due to internal conflicts over which Queen’s son will succeed to the throne. Amid ongoing public protests against corruption and economic decline, this royal power struggle could have regional geopolitical implications.

By Firas Al-Shoufi

Recent protests in Jordan have highlighted the country’s political and economic instability, fueled in part by rising prices and deteriorating living conditions. Once a vital regional mediator, the absence of a significant role for Jordan in its neighborhood – and its utter dependence on foreign handouts – has also contributed to this unrest.

This public unrest also conceals an ongoing struggle over power and wealth within the Hashemite royal family. The competition is not limited to King Abdullah II and his half brother, former Crown Prince Hamzah bin Hussein, but also includes Queen Rania, mother of current Crown Prince Hussein bin Abdullah, and former Queen Noor Al-Hussein, mother of Prince Hamzah.

The failed coup

On 3 April, 2021, Jordanian authorities made the stunning announcement that they had foiled an attempted coup, and accused Prince Hamzah of conspiring against the kingdom, alongside a group of high-ranking figures. Among those implicated was Bassem Awadallah, a former chief of the royal court and finance minister who, until his arrest, was a close associate of King Abdullah II and one of the most prominent financial advisers to Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman (MbS).

Awadallah – who has reportedly gone on a hunger strike this week – and Hassan bin Zaid, the king’s special envoy to Saudi Arabia, were subsequently sentenced to 15 years in prison after being charged with “incitement against the ruling system” and “sedition.”

While the charge sheet acknowledged Prince Hamzah’s direct involvement in the plot, he himself was not on trial. Instead, King Abdullah chose to handle the matter within the confines of the royal family, placing his half-brother under house arrest and limiting his movements and communications.

The conflict between the two brothers is not new and has its roots in the appointment of Abdullah II as crown prince by their father King Hussein, who deposed his brother Hassan bin Talal while on his deathbed. The country’s 1951 constitution stipulates that a monarch’s sons should be the succeeding king and crown prince, with Abdullah expected to appoint his brother Hamzah as his successor.

Hamzah, the true heir

One former Jordanian diplomat who spoke on condition of anonymity, revealed to The Cradle that:

“Abdullah pledged to his late father in 1998 not only to appoint Hamzah as crown prince, but also to hand over power to him after five years, which Abdullah did not abide by. Instead, he relieved Hamzah of his duties on November 28, 2004, and the line of succession moved automatically to Abdullah’s eldest son, Prince Hussein. In July 2009, Abdullah affirmed this change by officially naming Hussein crown prince.”

According to the diplomat, King Hussein was grooming Hamzah for succession while Abdullah was not yet in a position of power and had difficulty speaking Arabic. The late king had appointed Samih al Batikhi, his national security advisor, to oversee the transfer of power, but Abdullah removed him from power and had him imprisoned on corruption charges in 2003.

A veteran journalist based in Amman suggests that Abdullah was simply not willing to hand over the kingship to Hamzah five years after their father’s death:

“Maybe King Hussein would have preferred Hamzah to succeed him, but Abdullah was not about to give up power at a delicate moment for Jordan and the region, after the occupation of Iraq and the death of Yasser Arafat, not to mention that he was receiving American support.”

Abdications and dispossessions

In his struggle against Hamzah, Abdullah has resorted to accusing him of insanity and of “conspiring with an external party,” without elaboration. Rumors have circulated in the country about MbS’s alleged support for Hamzah’s failed coup, but these allegations lack evidence and were countered by Saudi Arabia’s declaration of support for King Abdullah.

The Hashemite family has a history of conspiracies, deceptions, conflicts, and external interference during the transfer of the throne from Abdullah I to Al-Hussein, and then to Abdullah II. Prince Talal bin Abdullah I, the father of Hussein, faced the same charge of insanity and was overthrown in 1952 with the support of the British.

The strong man in the regime at that time, Sharif Nasser bin Jamil (brother of Queen Zain, Hussein’s mother) played a major role in King Hussein’s ascension to the throne. Later, Hussein sought to depose his brother Crown Prince Hassan in favor of Abdullah, using the constitutional right for a son to succeed the monarch, but Hassan bowed out gracefully and submitted his own resignation.

Although Hamzah has distanced himself from the public eye and relinquished his title of prince in the spring of 2022, King Abdullah II is still concerned about his brother’s strong influence among various Jordanian clans, such as Al-Huwaitat, Bani Sakhr, Bani Hassan, and others.

Rampant corruption

The former crown prince enjoys a good reputation among these groups, untainted by corruption, while the king’s image is being tarnished by the worsening economic crisis and the financial scandals surrounding his personal wealth – estimated at over $500 million as revealed in the “Pandora Papers.” As the aforementioned diplomatic source says:

“Corruption has always existed in Jordan. During the reign of King Hussein, commissions were deducted from foreign deals. Today, news has been circulating about huge deposits owned by the king abroad, and about transferring ownership of state lands to his personal account.”

The journalist in Amman highlights the scandal of the British Tornado planes, where the price of the planes and King Hussein’s commission were alleged to have been paid from the money of the Persian Gulf monarchies. But the deal was halted after the scandal was exposed. He notes that “today, in the absence of Gulf money and external support, any waste or corruption will be at the expense of the Jordanian treasury.”

According to The Observer on 19 March, 1989, the share of the king and the intermediaries in the £800 million deal for Jordan to acquire eight Tornado fighters was reportedly up to 30 percent.

The rivalry of Queens

The journalist believes that the main reason for the conflict between King Abdullah II and former Queen Noor – Hamzah’s mother – is her control of King Hussein’s estate outside Jordan: “We are talking here about $1.4 billion worth of funds and property around the world controlled by Queen Noor.”

A parallel power struggle between Queen Rania and former Queen Noor is playing out in tandem with the battle over the royal estate: Both are vying to secure the succession of their respective sons to the Jordanian throne.

Queen Rania is leveraging her position as the current queen to pave the way for her son, Hussein II, to ascend to power, while Noor is seeking to exploit her ties to the US Democratic Party as a counterweight to King Abdullah’s close relationship with the Pentagon.

The accession of either Prince Hussein or Prince Hamzah to the throne would have far-reaching implications for the structure of royal rule in Jordan. Since Queen Rania is of Palestinian origin, some east Jordanians fear that if Hussein bin Abdullah takes the throne, it could result in the end of Hashemite rule in favor of Palestinians, and the realization of the “alternative Palestinian homeland” project – a notion that has long been used by the Hashemite family to maintain the loyalty of Jordanian clans.

The 1987 disengagement between Jordan and the West Bank lacks legal validity since the Jordanian constitution still recognizes the West Bank as part of Jordanian territory. In a June 2022 article on Al-Arabiya, Saudi journalist Ali al-Shihabi proposed the annexation of the West Bank and Gaza Strip to Jordan and the establishment of a kingdom for Palestinians and Jordanians.

The article which received strong online criticism, serves as an important indicator of Jordan’s potential future amid ongoing international and regional efforts to find a palatable “solution” to the Palestinian conflict and achieve full normalization with Israel – at the expense of both the Palestinians and Jordanians.

The future of Jordan’s monarchy

However, the question remains as to whether Hamzah was genuinely preparing to stage a royal coup. As the diplomat tells The Cradle:

“There is no strong evidence that Hamzah was preparing for a successful coup. Most likely, he wanted to shake the ground under Abdullah’s feet, so that the Americans would be convinced that the king could not achieve stability in Jordan, and they would start searching for alternatives that would ensure the regime would continue to play the roles required of it.”

Regardless of Hamzah’s intentions, the challenge for King Abdullah is significant. Hamzah’s strong popular support and ambition to rule, as well as the potential for Queen Rania to seek an early ascension to the throne for their son Hussein, add to his pressure. Additionally, there are concerns that the assimilation of Palestinians into the Jordanian state as an “alternative homeland” could lead to the demise of Hashemite rule.

Despite recent achievements by King Abdullah, such as the approval of increased US military aid to Jordan and the F-16 Block 70 fighter jet deal, corruption remains a root cause of danger for the country in the medium and long term.

Jordan’s government is still funding the corruption necessary to satisfy decision-making circles, and faces a debt estimated at $41 billion. Furthermore, it has not learned from the mistakes of the failed Egyptian administrative capital project, recently announcing a new capital project for Jordan at a cost of $11.5 billion. This only serves to increase corruption and popular anger, further strengthening the arguments of the king’s opponents.

The views expressed in this article do not necessarily reflect those of The Cradle.

Jordan issues royal decree restricting Prince Hamzah’s movement and communications

King Abdullah II justified the move against his half-brother, calling him ‘irresponsible’ and accusing him of seeking to sow unrest in the kingdom

May 19 2022

(Photo credit: KHALIL MAZRAAWI/AFP via Getty Images)

ByNews Desk

Jordan’s King Abdullah II approved a royal decree on 19 May to “restrict the contacts, residence, and movements” of his half-brother, Prince Hamzah bin Hussein, who was accused last year of orchestrating an alleged sedition case that shook the Arab country.

In a statement posted on social media, the Royal Hashemite Court of Jordan said it approved this measure due to what it described as the prince’s “irresponsible” behavior, which “could cause instability in the country.”

In early April this year, Prince Hamzah renounced his title of prince and publicly apologized for his behavior.

Royal Decree approves recommendation of council formed under Royal Family Law to restrict communications, place of residence, and movements of Prince Hamzah. Following is the translation of His Majesty King Abdullah II’s letter to Jordanians:https://t.co/aCbjrKSc19

— RHC (@RHCJO) May 19, 2022

Abdullah II said he delayed this recent measure to give Hamzah “another chance,” but finally implemented it because the former prince “continues to deny all facts and evidence, is “manipulating reality and living in an illusion,” according to the note.

“I came to the conclusion that he will never change, and my conviction was strengthened with every fact and every word,” the King noted, accusing Hamzah of “seeing himself as the one responsible for the Hashemite legacy,” referring to Jordan’s royal family.

Likewise, King Abdullah also accused the former prince of “turning away from his family for many years,” and “opting for negative behavior … and being surrounded by people who promote the opposition.”

On 3 April, Prince Hamzah bin Hussein announced the relinquishment of his royal title.

Prince Hamzah bin Hussein made the announcement on Twitter.

pic.twitter.com/HSuet5cpht

— Hamzah bin AlHussein (@HamzahHKJ) April 3, 2022

The statement explains that the decision was based on “current approaches, policies and methods of our institutions” that could not be reconciled with the convictions of Prince Hamzah.

But while the statement refrained from criticizing the King or other ruling elites, the move was seen as a continuation of the strained relations between Hamzah and his half-brother.

Hamzah has clashed with the Royal Hashemite Court of Jordan in the past.

In early April 2021, Jordanian authorities accused Hamzah of having had contact with external parties and carrying out “movements and activities” aimed at destabilizing the security of Jordan, for which he was placed under house arrest, state news agency Petra reported.

The State Security Court sentenced two members of the royal court to 15 years in prison after finding them guilty of “incitement against the king, carrying hostile intentions against the state and seeking to sow anarchy and sedition in the country.”

JordanKing Abdullah IIPrince Hamzah bin HusseinrestrictionsRoyal Hashemite Court of JordanseditionState Security Court

The Washington Post Details US, ‘Israel’, Saudi Role in Coup Plot Against Jordan King

14/06/2021

By Staff, Agencies

The Zionist entity, Saudi Arabia and the US joined forces to pressure Jordan’s King Abdullah II to partake in the US-sponsored “normalization deals” with Tel Aviv, according to the Washington Post.

The Jordanian monarch resisted the attempts, leading to a plot to “destabilize” the country, that ensnared the king’s half-brother Prince Hamza and former senior officials Bassem Awadallah and Sharif Hassan bin Zaid.

According to the report, Saudi crown prince Mohammad bin Salman [MBS], former Zionist PM Benjamin Netanyahu and former US President Donald Trump were at the center of the intrigue.

“It became a belief of Trump that the king was a hindrance” to his plan, a former senior CIA official was quoted as saying.

The report noted the close relations that Trump and his son-in-law and senior adviser Jared Kushner had forged with MBS, Saudi Arabia’s de-facto ruler.

Abdullah was said to be concerned those expanded ties came at Jordan’s expense, because of his reservations over the US proposal for the Middle East.

Abdullah is recognized as the custodian of the Haram esh-Sharif and the al-Aqsa Compound, and other Muslim sites in the Old City, which the Zionist regime occupied in the 1967 Six Day War.

The newspaper wrote that Abdullah felt the US, ‘Israel’ and Saudi Arabia were trying to push him out as custodian.

As Kushner’s campaign to advance Trump’s plan picked up last year, he also hoped to help facilitate a normalization pact between the Zionist entity and Saudi Arabia, according to the report. However, Abdullah was seen as an obstacle to such a rapprochement.

A key figure in the report was Awadallah, one of the former senior officials implicated in the alleged recent plot. Awadallah, a cabinet minister and onetime head of the royal court, moved to Saudi Arabia in 2018 and became close with the Saudi crown prince.

“A sticking point for us is al-Aqsa. The king [Abdullah] uses that to browbeat us and keep his role in the Middle East,” Awadallah was reported to say regarding the US plan.

An unnamed former US official, according to the report, said he was told by Awadallah that “MBS is upset because he can’t get a deal because he can’t handle the reactions of Palestinians if the king holds his position” on occupied al-Quds.

The Post also quoted from a Jordanian investigative report on the coup plot.

“Awadallah was working to promote the ‘deal of the century’ and weaken Jordan’s position and the King’s position on Palestine and the Hashemite Custodianship of Islamic and Christian holy sites in al-Quds,” the Jordanian report said.

According to the same report, bin Zaid, the other senior Jordanian official implicated alongside Awadallah, met in 2019 with two officials from a foreign embassy in Amman “to inquire about their country’s position on supporting Prince Hamzah as an alternative to the King.”

The Post said an unnamed Western official who gave him the report believes the embassy was likely the US mission in the Jordanian capital.

The plot against Jordan’s King Abdullah

Jordan’s King Abdullah II is pictured in Amman on 11 April 2021 (Yousef Allan/Jordanian Royal Palace/AFP)

David Hearst is co-founder and editor-in-chief of Middle East Eye. He is a commentator and speaker on the region and analyst on Saudi Arabia. He was The Guardian’s foreign leader writer, and was correspondent in Russia, Europe, and Belfast. He joined the Guardian from The Scotsman, where he was education correspondent.

David Hearst

14 April 2021 

Abdullah fell foul of the axis of Mohammed bin Salman and Benjamin Netanyahu after refusing to go along with the Trump plan to push West Bank Palestinians into Jordan

For once, just for once, US President Joe Biden got something right in the Middle East, and I say this conscious of his abysmal record in the region.

In accepting the intelligence he was passed by the Jordanians that Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman was up to his ears in a plot to destabilise the rule of King Abdullah, Biden brought the scheme to a premature halt. Biden did well to do so.

His statement that the US was behind Abdullah had immediate consequences for the other partner in this scheme, Benjamin Netanyahu, the prime minister of Israel.

While bin Salman was starving Jordan of funds (according to former Foreign Minister Marwan Muasher, the Saudis have not provided any direct bilateral assistance since 2014), Netanyahu was starving the kingdom of water.

Without Washington’s overt support, King Abdullah would now be in serious trouble, the victim of a two-pronged offensive from Saudi Arabia and Israel

This is water that Israel siphons off the River Jordan. Under past agreements, Israel has supplied Jordan with water, and when Jordan asks for an additional amount, Israel normally agrees without delay. Not this year: Netanyahu refused, allegedly in retaliation for an incident in which his helicopter was refused Jordanian airspace. He quickly changed his mind after a call from US Secretary of State Antony Blinken to his counterpart, Gabi Ashkenazi.

Had former US President Donald Trump still been in power, it is doubtful whether any of this would have happened.

Without Washington’s overt support, King Abdullah would now be in serious trouble: the victim of a two-pronged offensive from Saudi Arabia and Israel, his population seething with discontent, and his younger half-brother counting the days until he could take over.

The problem with Abdullah

But why were bin Salman and Netanyahu keen to put the skids under an ally like Abdullah?

Abdullah, a career soldier, is not exactly an opposition figure in the region. He of all people is not a Bashar al-Assad, Recep Tayyip Erdogan or Ayatollah Ali Khamenei. 

Abdullah was fully signed up to the counter-revolution against the Arab Spring. Jordan joined the Saudi-led anti-Islamic State coalition, deployed aircraft to target the Houthis in Yemen, and withdrew its ambassador from Iran after the Saudi embassy in Tehran and consul in Mashhad were sacked and Saudi Arabia consequently cut diplomatic relations.Jordan arrested senior suspect over contact with Saudi crown prince Read More »

He attended the informal summit on a yacht in the Red Sea, convened to organise the fight against the influence of Turkey and Iran in the Middle East. That was in late 2015.

In January 2016, Abdullah told US congressmen in a private briefing that Turkey was exporting terrorists to Syria, a statement he denied making afterwards. But the remarks were documented in a Jordanian foreign ministry readout passed to MEE.

Jordan’s special forces trained men that Libyan general Khalifa Haftar used in his failed attempt to take Tripoli. This was the pet project of the UAE.

Abdullah also agreed with the Saudis and Emiratis on a plan to replace Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas with Mohammed Dahlan, the Emirati- and Israeli-preferred choice of successor.

Why then, should this stalwart of the cause now be considered by his Arab allies, Saudi Arabia and the UAE, an inconvenience that needs to be dealt with?

Insufficiently loyal

The answer partly lies in the psychology of bin Salman. It is not good enough to be partially signed up to his agenda. As far as he is concerned, you are either in or out. 

“But there is also a feeling [in Riyadh] that Jordan and others should be with us or against us. So we were not completely with them on Iran. We were not completely with them on Qatar. We were not completely with them on Syria. We did what we could and I don’t think we should have gone further, but to them, that was not enough.”

Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman welcomes Jordan’s King Abdullah II to Riyadh on 8 March 2021 (Bandar al-Jaloud/Saudi Royal Palace/AFP)

Abdullah’s equivocation certainly was not enough for the intended centrepiece of the new era, Saudi Arabia’s normalisation of relations with Israel.

Here, Jordan would have been directly involved and King Abdullah was having none of it. Had he gone along with the Trump plan, his kingdom – a careful balance between Jordanians and Palestinians – would have been in a state of insurrection.

In addition, Abdullah could not escape the fact that he was a Hashemite, whose legitimacy stems in part from Jordan’s role as custodian of Al-Aqsa Mosque and the holy sites in Jerusalem. This, too, was being threatened by the Al Sauds.

The importance of Aqaba

But the plan itself was regarded by both bin Salman and Netanyahu as too big to stop. I personalise this, because in both Saudi Arabia and Israel, there are experienced foreign policy and intelligence hands who appreciate how quickly this plan would have destabilised Jordan and Israel’s vulnerable eastern border.

The plan has been years in the preparation and the subject of clandestine meetings between the Saudi prince and the Israeli leader. At the centre of it lies Jordan’s sole access to the Red Sea, the strategic port of Aqaba.

The two cities of Aqaba and Ma’an were part of the kingdom of Hejaz from 1916 to 1925. In May 1925, Ibn Saud surrendered Aqaba and Ma’an and they became part of the British Emirate of Transjordan.

The price for turning on the tap of Saudi finance was too high for Abdullah to pay. It was total subservience to Riyadh

It would be another 40 years before the two independent countries would agree on a Jordan-Saudi border. Jordan got 19 kilometres of coastline on the Gulf of Aqaba and 6,000 square kilometres inland, while Saudi Arabia got 7,000 square kilometres of land.

For the new kid on the block, bin Salman, a prince who was always sensitive about his legitimacy, reclaiming Saudi influence over Aqaba in a big trade deal with Israel would be a big part of his claim to restoring Saudi dominance over its hinterland.

And the trade with Israel would be big. Bin Salman is spending $500bn constructing the city of Neom, which is eventually supposed to straddle Saudi Arabia, Jordan and Egypt. Sitting at the mouth of the Gulf of Aqaba, the Jordanian port would be firmly in Saudi sights.

This is where Bassem Awadallah, the former chief of Jordan’s royal court, comes in. Two years before he definitively broke with King Abdullah, and while he was still Jordan’s envoy to Riyadh, Awadallah negotiated the launch of something called the Saudi-Jordanian Coordination Council, a vehicle that Jordanian officials at the time said would “unblock billions of dollars” for the cash-starved Hashemite kingdom.

A giant Jordanian flag is raised during a celebration in the port of Aqaba in 2016 (AFP)

Awadallah promised that the council would invest billions of Saudi dollars in Jordan’s leading economic sectors, focusing on the Aqaba Special Economic Zone.

The money, of course, never materialised. Saudi support for the kingdom diminished to a trickle, and according to an informed source, Muasher, Saudi funds stopped almost completely after 2014.Jordan: Why King Abdullah’s troubles are not over Read More »

The price for turning on the tap of Saudi finance was too high for Abdullah to pay. It was total subservience to Riyadh. Under this plan, Jordan would have become a satellite of Riyadh, much as Bahrain has become.

Netanyahu had his own sub-agenda in the huge trade that would flow from Neom once Saudi Arabia had formally recognised Israel.

A confirmed enemy of the Oslo plan to set up a Palestinian state in the West Bank and Gaza, Netanyahu and the Israeli right have always eyed annexation of Area C and the Jordan Valley, which comprises 60 percent of the West Bank. Under this new Nakba, the Palestinians living there, denied Israeli citizenship, would be slowly forced to move to Jordan. This could only happen under a Saudi-oriented plan, in which Jordanian workers could travel freely and work in Saudi Arabia. As it is, remittances from the Jordanian workforce in Saudi Arabia are an economic lifeblood to the bankrupt kingdom. 

The money pouring into Jordan, accompanied by a  mobile workforce of Jordanians and  stateless Palestinians, would finally put to bed grandiose visions of a Palestinian state, and with it the two-state solution. On this, Netanyahu and bin Salman are as one: treat them as a mobile workforce, not citizens of a future state.

Hussein’s favoured son

That Prince Hamzah should be seen as the means by which Jordan is enlisted to this plan represents the final irony of this bizarre tale.

If the Hashemite blood runs deep in any veins, it is surely in his. He was King Hussein’s favoured son. In a letter sent to his brother Prince Hassan in 1999, King Hussein wrote: “Hamzeh, may God give him long life, has been envied since childhood because he was close to me, and because he wanted to know all matters large and small, and all details of the history of his family. He wanted to know about the struggle of his brothers and of his countrymen. I have been touched by his devotion to his country and by his integrity and magnanimity as he stayed beside me, not moving unless I forced him from time to time to carry out some duty on occasions that did not exceed the fingers on one hand.”

Abdullah broke the agreement he made with his father on his death bed when he replaced his half-brother with his son, Hussein, as crown prince in 2004.

The new foreign policy establishment in Washington should wean itself off the notion that US allies are its friends

But if Hashemite pride in and knowledge of Jordan’s history runs deep in Hamzah, he of all princes would have soon realised the cost to Jordan of accepting bin Salman’s billions and Netanyahu’s tacit encouragement, just as his father did.

Hamzah’s friends ardently dispute they are part of this plot and downplay connections with Awadallah. Hamzah only owns up to one thing: that he is immensely concerned at how low Jordan has fallen under years of misrule. In this, Hamzah is 100 percent right.

It is clear what has to happen now. King Abdullah should finally see that he must completely overhaul the Jordanian political system, by calling for free and fair elections and abiding by their result. Only that will unite the country around him.

This is what King Hussein did when he faced challenge and revolt by Jordanian tribes in the south of the kingdom; in 1989, Hussein overhauled the political system and held the freest elections in the history of the kingdom. 

The government that emerged from this process led the country safely out of one of the most difficult moments for Jordan: Saddam Hussein’s invasion of Kuwait and the subsequent Gulf War.

The real villains

Biden, meanwhile, should realise that letting bin Salman get away with the murder of Saudi journalist Jamal Khashoggi has a cost. 

Bin Salman did not learn anything from the episode and carried on in exactly the same way, reckless and swift, against an Arab neighbour and ally, with potentially disastrous consequences.

The new foreign policy establishment in Washington should wean itself off the notion that US allies are its friends. It should learn once and for all that the active destabilisers of the Middle East are not the cartoon villains of Iran and Turkey. 

Rather, they are the closest US allies, where US forces and military technology are either based, or as in the case of Israel, inextricably intertwined: Saudi Arabia, the UAE and Israel.

Jordan, the classic buffer state, is a case in point.