Both the countries signed numerous agreements to boost their economic cooperation and called it a joint effort to face the impact of unilateral sanctions imposed by the US and its allies on their economies
Iranian President Ebrahim Raisi and Syrian President Bashar al-Assad signed a host of agreements in Damascus. Photo: SANA
The Syrian and Iranian presidents met in Damascus and announced their resolve to work for greater regional stability. They stressed that the withdrawal of all foreign troops from the region was necessary for this purpose. They emphasized that their mutual cooperation in the economic field is intended to be a strategic move to counter the impact of illegal unilateral sanctions imposed by the US and some of its allies.
The countries signed a long-term comprehensive strategic cooperation agreement during the state visit of Iranian President Ebrahim Raisi to Damascus on Wednesday, May 3. They also signed long-term cooperation agreements in various economic areas such as agriculture, oil, transport, and others.
Raisi is the first Iranian president to visit the country in the last 13 years. He was accompanied by his foreign, economic, and transport ministers, and the chief of Iran’s central bank.
After the meeting, Syrian President Bashar al-Assad claimed that the various economic projects agreed upon between Iran and Syria would help “mitigate the impacts of sanctions” and aid in liberating “international economics from Western hegemony.” He also emphasized that both countries agreed that it has been an old colonial tactic to “undermine the stability of countries and divide them.” However, countries in the region need to take advantage of the improving relations to find common grounds for peace and prosperity, Syrian Arab News Agency (SANA)reported.
Regional stability
Assad was referring to the recent rapprochement between Saudi Arabia and Iran after years of tension and hostility. Following the rapprochement, the peace talks in Yemen have made headway. Saudi Arabia has also discarded its decade long anti-Syria policy and has taken diplomatic steps to restore Syria’s membership to the Arab League from which it was suspended in 2011.
He also thanked Raisi for playing a significant role in the ongoing quadripartite meeting in Moscow. The representatives of Russia, Iran, Syria and Turkey participated in the last meeting held on April 25. The forum is primarily discussing ways to normalize relations between Syria and Turkey. Syria has emphasized that its focus is on the withdrawal of all occupying forces from its territory and halting of all international support to terrorism in the country.
It was with the help of Iran and Russia that the Syrian government was able to restore its control over most of the country’s territory after almost 12 years of war. However, Turkish and US forces still occupy significant parts of territory in Syria’s north-west and east, respectively. Both of them also support different anti-Assad forces in the country.
President Raisi praised the people of Syria for their steadfastness and for withstanding terrorism and international attempts to divide and destroy the country for over a decade. He said, “we [Iran] are in the process of developing our relations with countries of the region and we will seek to expand them without the presence of foreigners.”
Raisi noted that the presence of foreigners in the region brings conflicts and instability and asked the US forces to leave the region immediately. He emphasized that Syrian sovereignty over all its territory must be respected.
The leak of classified documents suggesting Emirati-Russian intel against the US has caused uncertainty about the future of US-UAE relations amid significant shifts in the geopolitics of the Persian Gulf.
The leak of highly classified Pentagon documents, including reports of the UAE’s alleged intelligence collusion with Russia against the US and UK, has captured headlines both regionally and globally.
According to the US intel reports leaked to the Associated Press, a document implicating the Russian Federal Security Service (FSB) entitled “Russia/UAE: Intelligence Relationship Deepening” states:
“FSB officials claimed UAE security service officials and Russia had agreed to work together against US and UK intelligence agencies, according to newly acquired signals intelligence.”
However, while US officials have declined to comment on the document, the Emirati government has vehemently denied any such accusation, calling it “categorically false.”
Although it is impossible to verify the authenticity of the leaked report, western officials and analysts have nonetheless been closely following increased cooperation between Abu Dhabi and Moscow, particularly since the outbreak of conflict in Ukraine.
Ties flourish between Russia and UAE
The claims are certainly credible, as close personal ties exist between the Kremlin and the Emirati ruling elite, and the two governments share similar views on several regional issues. The war in Ukraine has further boosted mutual commercial ties and cooperation between the Russia and the UAE, with non-oil trade increasing by 57 percent during the first nine months of the last year.
In early December 2022, Russia’s First Deputy Prime Minister Andrey Belousov estimated that mutual trade between Russia and the UAE will exceed $7.5 billion by the end of 2022 compared with $5.5 billion in 2021, reaching an all-time record in the history of their trade relations.
Additionally, UAE President Mohamed bin Zayed Al-Nahyan’s (MbZ) decision to support the OPEC+ move to slash oil production by two million barrels a day (bpd) in October despite pressure from the US and other countries, has been greatly praised by Kremlin.
It’s worth noting that the emirate of Dubai has witnessed an uptick in investments from affluent Russians, as real estate purchases by Russian nationals in Dubai surged by 67 percent year-on-year. Furthermore, the UAE continues to rank high on the list of preferred travel destinations for Russians, with over a million Russians having visited or relocated to the Emirates in 2022 – an impressive 60 percent increase from the previous year.
In light of the UAE having emerged as a significant destination for wealthy Russians seeking to circumvent western-imposed sanctions, Andreas Krieg, an associate professor at King’s College in London, has labeled the UAE as “the most crucial strategic partner for Russia in both the Middle East [West Asia] and Africa.”
A ‘country of focus’ for the US
This flourishing partnership between Moscow and Abu Dhabi has not gone unnoticed in the west, and there are concerns about how cozying up with Russia may affect the UAE’s relations with the west, especially in light of the recent leak of compromising Pentagon intel.
As evidence of this, US Treasury official Assistant Secretary Elizabeth Rosenberg has explicitly designated the UAE as a “country of focus,” noting Russia has been able to evade sanctions and “obtain more than $5 million in US semiconductors and other export-controlled parts, including components with battlefield uses.”
While the UAE has historically been aligned with the US, it has developed its own foreign policy in recent years, according to Dr. Giuseppe Dentice, an expert on International Relations of the Middle East from Centro Studi Internazionali Ce.S.I and a teaching assistant at the Catholic University of the Sacred Heart in Milan. As Dentine explains to The Cradle:
“The UAE has positioned itself as a free rider in the international arena, able to dialogue with the west and Russia and China. This has led the UAE to pursue its own agenda increasingly distant from the US and western interests, but in any case still extremely connected to many of Washington’s objectives in the large quadrant between the Mediterranean, Africa and Asia.”
For Joost Hiltermann, program director of the Middle East and North Africa section at the International Crisis Group think tank, Abu Dhabi is not likely to turn against the US in a major way. Despite pursuing closer ties with Beijing and Moscow, the UAE and other Persian Gulf states have emphasized that the US remains their primary external security partner.
Persian Gulf states pursue strategic balancing
In essence, “the UAE and other Gulf Arab states pursue a foreign policy of strategic balancing and hedging among both regional and global actors,” he tells The Cradle.
Yet, the UAE, along with other Persian Gulf countries, has refrained from aligning with the US in the new cold war, which has become evident in the case of US escalation over Taiwan and the war in Ukraine. In this context, the UAE does not want to miss out on the lucrative opportunity to engage with wealthy Russians, even if it means turning down the west and its preoccupation with the proxy war in Ukraine.
Dentice observes that many regional powers, especially those in the Persian Gulf have taken advantage of this new competitive environment to raise their own ambitions and develop their interests. The case of Russia and its businessmen is emblematic of this condition.
While the US does not necessarily oppose Russians visiting and residing elsewhere, Hiltermann notes that:
“They have an issue with the UAE becoming a hub for sanctions-busting and illicit economies, and they’ve had this concern for some time as US concerns relate to Russia sanctions violations and Iran and Syria sanctions violations.”
However, Hiltermann points out that the US has not always been clear on its sanctions policies and enforcement, which has confused and frustrated regional actors like the UAE. He says “Gulf Arab officials express significant dissatisfaction with US sanctions politics in the region, and often underline their lack of impact and how much they hurt local populations.”
Feeling the pressure
Additonally, Dentice emphasizes that the “UAE must be very careful to balance its own interests with the ambitions of the great powers.” Abu Dhabi should avoid any unnecessary confrontations or the risk of being labeled as a “pariah state” as this could harm its development and reputation as a commercial hub.
Irrespective of growing ties, the UAE has introduced some strict requirements for Russian businessmen and real estate investors who find it ever more difficult to purchase or rent space in Dubai. According to reports, financial and consultancy firms have are being closely observed by US financial regulators, so country business subjects have to be more cautious when dealing with Russia.
Also, despite its “free-rider” foreign policy approach, which requires a difficult balancing act, the UAE as well as other Persian Gulf states still heavily rely on US security arrangements, so many observers believe that sooner or later the UAE will have to agree on some compromise related to western sanctions issues.
Due to US pressure, the UAE has already canceled a license it had issued to Russia’s MTS Bank, and Russia’s largest bank Sberbank was also forced to close its office in Dubai.
Abu Dhabi’s diplomatic dilemma
Despite efforts by Abu Dhabi and other Persian Gulf capitals to appeal to Washington about the importance of maintaining ties with Moscow by supporting de-escalation measures between Russia and the west – such as prisoner exchanges – it is becoming increasingly challenging to maintain good relations with a Russia so profoundly vilified in western capitals.
Hiltermann doubts whether this approach will be effective in the long run. He points out that while the “US claims that it does not push Gulf Arab states to choose sides, Russia has turned into an existential issue for the US and Europe in many ways, and sooner or later western pressures on the UAE will increase.”
It is clear that the UAE’s foreign policy approach is complex and involves a delicate balancing act between its own interests and the ambitions of great powers. Withstanding its efforts to maintain good relations with both Washington and Moscow, the UAE is increasingly feeling the western pressure to untangle from Russia, especially in the form of sanctions threats.
While Abu Dhabi’s strategic partnerships with a broad range of countries have reaped economic benefits, in the foreign policy realm, the same choices have caused acute diplomatic challenges.
But the UAE cannot merely focus on the great power contests unfolding abroad. Closer to home, Abu Dhabi has had to navigate the changing dynamics in West Asia, including peace talks to end the conflict in Yemen and the game-changing, Beijing-brokered rapprochement between Iran and Saudi Arabia.
The UAE’s success and stability in its own region will ultimately hinge on its proficiency in managing these local shifts. Meanwhile, the entry of China and Russia into West Asia offers Abu Dhabi some further leverage in managing Washington’s demands. Unless and until the US decides to draw a hard red line, the Emiratis will likely play all their cards in all arenas.
The views expressed in this article do not necessarily reflect those of The Cradle.
The recent China-brokered rapprochement between Saudi Arabia and Iran may have a significant effect on the ongoing peace efforts between the Houthis and Saudi Arabia
Thousands took to the streets across major Yemeni cities including Sanaa, Sa’ada, and Taiz on Sunday, March 26, to mark the eighth anniversary of the beginning of the Saudi-led aggression in the country. The protesters reiterated their demand for an end to the aggression and the lifting of the blockade on the country. The leaders of the Houthi movement have called these essential conditions for peace.
The National Day of Resilience and Steadfastness, as March 26 is celebrated by the Yemenis, symbolizes their resolve amid the large-scale destruction caused by the Saudi-led coalition’s airstrikes and blockade.
Meanwhile, after eight long years of suffering caused by foreign aggression and the ill effects of the war, hopes for peace in Yemen have been renewed following the recent rapprochement between Iran and Saudi Arabia. This is relevant as Saudi Arabia has been suggesting that Iranian influence in the region and alleged support to the Houthis is one of the main reasons for the war.
Eight years of Saudi-led war in Yemen
On March 26, 2015, an international coalition led by Saudi Arabia launched its war on the Houthi-controlled areas of Yemen and imposed a punishing land, sea, and air blockade on the country, depriving it of essential commodities including food and medicine. The Saudi-led coalition alleged that the Houthis were a proxy of Iran and wanted the reinstatement of President Abd Rabbuh Mansour Hadi, who had fled capital Sana’a for the southern city of Aden after the Houthis took control of Sana’a in September 2014. Hadi later left the country to live in Riyadh.
The Saudi-led forces were supplied armaments and technical support by the US, the UK, and France.
The war has had a devastating impact on Yemen’s 33 million people, killing hundreds of thousands and forcing millions into displacement. Yemen, already the poorest country in the Arab world before the war, has, according to the UN, become the “world’s worst humanitarian crisis” of the century.
While the UN had claimed that by the end of 2021 a total of 377,000 Yemenis had been killed due to the war, the Houthi-backed administration in Sana’a claims that the real figure is over 1.5 million. This figure includes deaths caused by both direct and indirect acts of war. It also claims that the war and blockade are the primary reasons for the rise in poverty (currently at 95%) and unemployment (65%) in the country.
UNICEF has reported at least one child dies in Yemen every 10 minutes from causes that are easily preventable. According to UNICEF, at least 2.2 million Yemeni children suffer from acute malnutrition. The UN has estimated more than 11,000 Yemeni children have been either killed or severely injured in the eight years of war, also noting that actual figures could be far higher.
As per the UN, “a staggering 21.6 million people require some form of humanitarian assistance in 2023, as 80% of the country’s population struggles to access food, safe drinking water and adequate health services.”
The Houthis have repeatedly raised the continued Saudi blockade as the main reason for avoiding talks to extend the ceasefire. The Saudis have refused to respond to this, and had only partially lifted the blockade during the six months of the ceasefire.
The Saudi coalition has also had to grapple with infighting. Last year, the coalition replaced Hadi and instead installed a seven-member Presidential Council as an alternative government in Yemen.
The favorable conditions created by the Saudis’ dismissal of Hadi and the prolonged ceasefire gave Oman an opportunity to mediate talks between the Houthis and the Saudi-led coalition. The Oman-mediated process also received a boost when Saudi Arabia and Iran signed a China-mediated deal to restore diplomatic relations after a gap of seven years.
However, Yemenis are still skeptical. The US, which had actively supported Saudi Arabia’s war in Yemen until at least 2020, still sees the Houthis as dangerous to its attempts to maintain hegemony in the region.
Abdul Malik al-Houthi, leader of Ansar Allah or the Houthi movement, has made it clear that the withdrawal of foreign troops from Yemen is essential for peace. Without elaborating on the reasons, he recently expressed his apprehensions about the success of the Oman-led mediation, saying that the US was attempting to postpone “the withdrawal of foreign forces from Yemen for an indefinite period.”
Related Videos
Mr. Leader draws lines of confrontation and lines of peace
Prince Mohammed bin Salman surprises China, strengthens its presence inside Saudi Arabia, and defeats America’s followers,
Mohammed bin Salman stops a royal coup, arrests, which America reveals because of the alliance with China and Russia
تحوّلات الإقليم المرتبطة بالاتفاق الإيراني – السعودي، تترافق مع حراك ديبلوماسي يتكثف يوماً بعد آخر، وحديث عن مبادرات لحل في اليمن وآخر في العراق وثالث في سوريا. أما بالنسبة إلى لبنان، فحجم التفاؤل بـ«حل سريع» يستوجِب بعض التروي.
درجت العادة أن يكون هذا البلد أولى حلبات التقاتُل في أزمنة الصراعات وأولى ساحات الانفراج في لحظات التسويات. في السنوات الأخيرة من الحرب الأهلية، أنتجَ الاتفاق السوري – السعودي – الأميركي اتفاق الطائف، وجاءت الـ «سين – سين» بعد اتفاق الدوحة. ومنذ اندلاع الحرب على سوريا حملَ لبنان مع سوريا قميصها الملطخ بالدم ومخاطر على مختلف المستويات، أدت في نهاية المطاف إلى حافة الانفجار. اليوم، مع عودة الهدوء إلى الساحة الإقليمية، وعلى بُعد حجر من التطبيع السوري – السعودي، ليس السؤال متى يصل قطار التسوية إلى محطة بيروت، بقدر ما صارَ السؤال عن شكل هذه التسوية. مهما يكُن من أمر، فإن إنهاء الشغور الرئاسي بات يحتّم توافقاً سياسياً لا مناص منه. هذا التوافق، يقرأه عديدون، كرافعة لأسهم وصول الوزير السابق سليمان فرنجية كرئيس حلّ بالتوازي مع التغيرات الإقليمية.
ليسَت الضوضاء الرئاسية جديدة على بنشعي، ولا على اسم فرنجية في بورصة الأسماء المرشحة لبلوغ قصر بعبدا. بدأ ذلك عام 2004، مع طرح الرئيس الراحل رفيق الحريري اسمه لقطع طريق التمديد على الرئيس إميل لحود، ثم عام 2015 عندما قرّر الرئيس سعد الحريري دعمَه بمباركة من رئيس مجلس النواب نبيه برّي ووليد جنبلاط والرئيس الفرنسي فرنسوا هولاند. جعلَ ذلكَ من رئيس تيار «المردة» عضواً «طبيعياً» في نادي المرشّحين الدائمين والطبيعيين، وإن لم يخرج إلى الناس شاهراً ترشيحه. لكن «العبرة» تبقى في التوقيت، على ما تقول مصادر «المردة»، رداً على الأسئلة الملغومة عن إحجام الرجل حتى الآن عن فعل ذلك، والتي تقود إلى إجابات تدينه أو تقلّل من شأن حيثيته التمثيلية وأحقيته، أو القول إنه غير واثق من قدرة الفريق الذي يدعمه على خوض معركته حتى النهاية. حالياً «يعتبر فرنجية نفسه الأوفر حظاً لأن مواصفات التسوية مطابقة له أكثر من أي وقت مضى»، لذا «لن يكون انسحابه بالبساطة التي يتوقعها أي طرف، وهو يُعتبر مرشحاً طبيعياً استناداً إلى حيثيته المسيحية والوطنية، ومن البديهي أن يكون اسمه متداولاً في الكواليس المعنية بالشأن اللبناني».
يخوض فرنجية معركة وصوله إلى القصر الجمهوري بهدوء، مستنداً إلى لعبة الوقت، ومراهناً على المتغيرات الإقليمية التي «تصبّ لمصلحته»، والتي إذا ما سارت وفقَ الطريق المرسوم لها فإنها حتماً ستدفع خصومه إلى التراجع. لا علاقة للأمر بعدد الأصوات التي ستدعمه، ورهاناته غير مرتبطة بحسابات الورقة والقلم. رصيده السياسي الحالي في الكواليس الخارجية والداخلية يجعله متقدماً على منافسيه المعلنين وغير المعلنين. هذا ما تؤكده دردشات سفراء الدول على موائد الاجتماعات حيث صارَ النصِاب الدولي والإقليمي شبه مكتمل، في انتظار الصوت السعودي. المباركة الفرنسية متوافرة والفيتو الأميركي غائب، باعتراف من السفيرة الأميركية في بيروت دوروثي شيا التي أكدت قبلَ أيام في مأدبة عشاء أقامها على شرفها الرئيس تمام سلام «أننا سنكون سعداء بانتخاب رئيس للجمهورية، وبالتأكيد سنتعامل مع فرنجية في حال انتخب». مع ذلكَ، يتمسك رئيس المردة، وفقَ مقربين منه، بالتسوية الكاملة وبالإجماع عليه، فذلك من «موجبات الانتخاب»، لأن الأهم من وصوله هو «توافر ظروف إقليمية ودولية تسمح له بممارسة حكمه من دون ضغوط ولا كيديات، فيتحول عهده إلى عهد تنتيع لا عهد انفراجات».
على عكس خصومه الذين يستحضرون اجتهادات سياسية للقول إنها ستخرجه من السباق، يُنظر في بنشعي إلى التوافق في الإقليم كرافعة لحظوظ الرجل. يستند المقربون من فرنجية إلى معطيات، تبدأ في ما يدور في كواليس باريس التي هي «على تواصل دائم مع فرنجية عبر أفراد من خلية الإليزيه»، وقد طرح الفرنسيون فكرة المقايضة على السعوديين لإيصال فرنجية مقابل تولي السفير نواف سلام رئاسة الحكومة، لكن توقيت طرحهم لم يأت على هوى السعوديين الذين كانوا يرفضون «مبدأ النقاش في الملف اللبناني لا بأسماء بعينها، ما حالَ دون الوصول إلى النتيجة المطلوبة».
يعتبر فرنجية نفسه الأوفر حظاً لأن مواصفات التسوية مطابقة له أكثر من أي وقت مضى
اليوم، بعد الاتفاق السعودي – الإيراني، تشتد التحريات في بيروت لفهم ما إذا كانَ قد حصل تبدّل في الموقف السعودي من الملف اللبناني ومن ترشيح فرنجية نفسه، وهو سؤال يجيب عليه مقربون من فرنجية بالقول إن «المواقف التي نٌقلِت عن السعوديين في ما خصّ فرنجية كانت أقرب لتمنيات معارضيه من كونها تمثل الموقف السعودي الحقيقي». وما وصلَ إلى بنشعي عن أجواء الاجتماعات الفرنسية – السعودية لم يكُن إيجابياً، لكنه أيضاً لم يكُن سلبياً بالمعنى الحرفي لما حاولت بعض الأطراف الداخلية إشاعته. السعوديون «لم يقولوا يوماً أنهم يرفضون سليمان فرنجية، هم وضعوا مواصفات ومعايير محددة قد لا تنطبِق عليه كما لا تنطبق على غيره»، لكن المستجدّ أنهم، بحسب ما ينقل أصدقاء بنشعي من الفرنسيين، «أصبحوا أكثر ليونة في الحديث عن لبنان». ولم يخفِ هؤلاء اعتقادهم بأن «الرياض بعد الاتفاق أصبحت في مكان آخر، فالسياسة الخارجية السعودية خرجت من العباءة التقليدية في إدارة أزماتها، بالتالي فإن الساحة اللبنانية ليست هي ساحة المكاسب السياسية، بل الساحة اليمنية. والرياض اليوم تعلَم أن مكاسبها في اليمن تدفعها إلى التصرف بإيجابية في ساحات أخرى، وأن أي مكسب في دول المنطقة يُمكن أن تحققه السعودية بالنسبة إليها أهم وأكبر من الزواريب اللبنانية».
الساحة الداخل
كل تلكَ العناصر المذكورة، يُضاف إليها عنصر «القبول الداخلي» الذي يتمسّك به فرنجية. فهو «ليسَ مرشّح حزب الله وحركة أمل، كما يحاول البعض تصويره، بل مرشّح كل من يؤيده»، وربما «لو ترِك للنواب حرية الاختيار فإن اجتياز حاجز الـ 65 صوتاً سيكون أسهل معارك فرنجية». وفي بنشعي كلام واضح بأن فرنجية «ليسَ رئيس مواجهة أو رئيساً مفروضاً بالقوة وليسَ في برنامجه الرئاسي بند الانتقام من خصومه، لكنه أيضاً لن يقدم ضمانات لأي أحد بمعنى المكاسب، خصوصاً أولئك الذين يعمدون إلى طرح شروط تعجيزية أو معرقلة». وعلى الموجة نفسها، يشدد «المرديون» على أن «فرنجية لن يمارس سياسة الإلغاء ضد أحد، بل سيعطي لكل طرف حقه». أما عن المعضلة المسيحية المتمثلة برفض أكبر كتلتين مسيحيتيْن، فالعبرة «ليست في كثرة المؤيدين لفرنجية قبلَ انتخابه، بل في قدرته على استقطاب الجميع واحتوائهم بعدَ وصوله إلى بعبدا، وهذا أحد الأهداف التي يضعها فرنجية نصب عينيه، لأنه واحد من أسباب نجاح العهد». يستعين هؤلاء بتجربة الرئيس ميشال عون الذي «أتى بغطاء مسيحي وطني، لكنه فقدَ الغطاءين بعدَ انتخابه وصارَ على خصومة مع غالبية القوى السياسية، ما أدى إلى تدمير عهده». تكمن المشكلة، بالنسبة لبنشعي، في «خوف خصوم فرنجية من توافر عوامل داخلية وخارجية تساعده على النجاح، وهذا ما لا يصبّ في مصلحتهم، وهم يفضلون رئيساً ضعيفاً يفشل في إدارة عهده لأن نجاح أي شخصية رئاسية سيهدد حجمهم»، وهنا تظهر مخاوف من أن يعمَد هؤلاء، وعلى رأسهم سمير جعجع، إلى «التمرّد المتهور على التسوية الآتية بشكل يهدّد المصلحة المسيحية والوطنية». ولا يخفي المقربون من فرنجية قناعتهم بأن «بكركي ليسَت في صف المعارضين، بل هي تتعامل بإيجابية وهدوء مع ترشيحه استناداً للكلام الذي نقله موفدوها إلى زعيم المردة». أما بالنسبة للقوى السياسية الأخرى، فيفضل تيار «المردة» ترك رئيس الحزب الاشتراكي وليد جنبلاط ليقرر وحده موقعه في التسوية المقبلة لدى حلول موعدها، من دون تكهنات حول موقفه النهائي. أما النواب السّنة، فإن «فرنجية في ميزانهم هو الأكثر اعتدالاً واستقطابهم في ظل التوافق الإقليمي أمر طبيعي».
البرنامج الرئاسي حاضر
لا يغوص أهل بنشعي في تفاصيل البرنامج الرئاسي لفرنجية، والذي أصبحَ في متناول يد المعنيين بالملف الرئاسي. لكن الأكيد أن «البيك يحسبها جيداً ويفكّر استراتيجياً. فمواقفه المعروفة لن تتبدل لا في التأكيد على علاقة جيدة مع الرياض ولا في التمسك بدعم المقاومة ولا المجاهرة بالعلاقة العميقة مع سوريا، وهو رئيس لكل اللبنانيين ورئيس للتعاون مع كل الدول الصديقة للبنان». وكل من سأله عن عدد من القضايا «سمع رأيه بموضوعية لا تتناقض مع سلوكياته السياسية، مثل ملف الاستراتيجية الدفاعية التي لا يرفض فرنجية إجراء حوار بشأنها ولكن ليسَ من باب الشروط الانتقامية وإنما بما يخدم مصلحة البلد والدفاع عنه».
The Beijing-brokered rapprochement between Tehran and Riyadh is expected to have significant implications for peace and prosperity in and around West Asia, given the considerable influence the two nations wield in the region.
The China-mediated Saudi-Iran peace agreement, inked on 10 March in Beijing, marks a significant geopolitical shift with far-reaching implications for the Persian Gulf and Iran’s neighboring countries. For decades, Saudi Arabia and Iran have been engaged in ideological and economic competition on the territories of their neighbors, causing regional tensions to escalate.
If the agreement is successful and relations between Riyadh and Tehran improve as envisioned, tensions will likely begin to significantly subside in the Persian Gulf, Levant, and further afield in neighboring Pakistan and Afghanistan. The former, long concerned about its security and energy supply vulnerabilities, will potentially benefit from improved relations between Saudi Arabia and Iran, which could help address its oil and gas crises.
Similarly, Afghanistan, whose Taliban-led government is still struggling to gain international recognition and is in dire need of reconstruction and investment initiatives, may also benefit from the kingdom’s rapprochement with the Islamic Republic.
Persian Gulf States
An early litmus test for the Saudi-Iranian reconciliation will be its impact on Lebanon, Iraq, Syria, and Yemen, where a perceived proxy war has wreaked havoc on their respective economies and in their public spheres.
One of the most critical areas where the impact of the peace agreement will be tested is Yemen, where Iran and Saudi Arabia have backed opposing sides in the country’s eight-year war. The conflict has resulted in one of the world’s worst humanitarian crises after a Saudi-UAE-led coalition in 2015 launched military attacks against Yemen’s pro-Iran Ansarallah movement, which had seized control of the capital, Sanaa.
Iran’s permanent mission to the UN said in a statement that the Iran-Saudi deal will “accelerate the ceasefire, help start a national dialogue, and form an inclusive national government in Yemen.”
Meanwhile, in the Levant, Lebanon is deeply mired in an unprecedented economic crisis, exacerbated by the deterioration of ties between Riyadh and Beirut. This divide has been fueled by the expansion of Iran-backed Lebanese resistance group Hezbollah’s power in Lebanon. The World Bank has reported that Lebanon’s economic crisis is among the worst globally in a century, and the situation continues to deteriorate as quickly as the country’s free-falling lira.
Tensions came to a head in 2017 when then-Prime Minister Saad Hariri, who had previously been Saudi Arabia’s closest ally in Lebanon, announced his resignation in a televised statement from Riyadh. Lebanese lawmakers charged that he was forced to step down after being detained and roughed up by his Saudi hosts.
The rivalry between Iran and Saudi Arabia has also impacted Iraq, which has suffered greatly since the illegal US-led invasion in 2003. Despite various domestic and foreign initiatives to stabilize matters and reach a consensus on vital issues of governance, the Iraq arena remains volatile, with ongoing violence and political instability.
The crisis in Syria is often viewed as a collection of proxy wars between regional and international powers. The 12-year conflict has been fueled by the involvement of various foreign actors, including the US, UK, Russia, Iran, Turkey, Qatar, France, and Saudi Arabia. These powers have politically and militarily backed different sides in the conflict – and in the case of the west, imposed oppressive economic sanctions – leading to a complex and ongoing crisis that has caused significant suffering for the Syrian people.
Relief for Pakistan?
Pakistan’s top policymakers are optimistic about the resumption of work on the “Peace Gas Pipeline” following the restoration of diplomatic ties between Iran and Saudi Arabia. A source in the Pakistani Foreign Office informs The Cradle that Riyadh’s opposition was the main reason the project stalled.
Geopolitical analyst Andrew Korybko goes a step further, predicting that the reconciliation between Tehran and Riyadh will unlock the full potential of a Russia-Iran-India led trade route project – the International North-South Transport Corridor (INSTC) – by connecting the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) to a series of promising Eurasian megaprojects. These projects will run through Pakistan and connect Russia and India by road, making it a significant development for the region’s transportation infrastructure.
Authorities in Islamabad also believe that the Saudi-Iran agreement will help reduce the activities of Saudi-sponsored sectarian militant groups, such as Lashkar-e-Jhangvi and Sippa-e-Sahaba (later renamed Ahle Sunnat Wal Jamaat), as well as the Sunni militia Jundallah, based in Iran’s Sistan and Baluchistan province, which has claimed to have killed hundreds of Iranian security personnel. These organizations have been involved in terrorist activities in Pakistan, particularly targeting the Shia community. According to Korybko:
“Inadvertently, the Baloch element of Pakistan’s security issues may worsen soon. After being cut off by Riyadh and losing their jobs, these militants may join other extremist groups like the Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) or sub-nationalist groups like the Balochistan Liberation Army (BLA), unless Islamabad detains them or initiates their disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration.”
Afghanistan
For years, Riyadh went head-to-head with Iran to shape Afghanistan’s internal governance and politics and limit Tehran’s influence in its bordering state. Following the 1979 Soviet occupation of Afghanistan and the establishment of a communist government under the six-year leadership of Babrak Karmal, the Saudis used Afghan ethnic and religious groups to spread their Salafist, jihadi ideology.
Meanwhile, Iran supported several Shia groups that took over parts of Hazarajat in central Afghanistan near the western periphery of the Hindu Kush range, leading to the formation of Hezb-e Wahdat after Iranian Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini’s death in 1989.
The US, Saudi Arabia, and Pakistan formed a Pashtun jihadi fighter – or mujahidin resistance force – to fight the Soviet troops, with groups such as Gulbuddin Hikmatyar’s Hizb-i Islami and Abdul Rasul Sayyaf’s Ittihad-i Islami joining the US-backed war against the communist Afghan government.
Saudi Arabia’s rivalry with Iran led to the funding of an Islamic complex in Kabul in 2012, with the intention of competing against Iran’s Khatam al-Nabyeen mosque and Islamic University, built in 2006.
With diplomatic relations set to resume between Iran and Saudi Arabia in two months, it remains to be seen whether Afghanistan will benefit from this detente. While some experts are skeptical that Afghanistan will see any immediate relief from this rivalry, they note that the country is likely to benefit from the progress made in Iran’s Chabahar Port – co-developed with India – which is expected to accelerate in the near future.
Nonetheless, the Taliban’s international and especially regional recognition will likely be a key factor in determining whether Afghanistan can benefit from the resumption of diplomatic ties between Iran and Saudi Arabia.
The ‘Asian Century’
On 17 March, Pakistan announced that it facilitated communication between Saudi Arabia and Iran during the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation (OIC) meeting in Islamabad in March last year. During a recent weekly briefing, a Foreign Office spokesperson stated: “We applaud this advancement. Together with various other countries and supporters of both Iran and Saudi Arabia, Pakistan encouraged the talks.”
Mushahid Hussain Syed, Chairman of Pakistan’s Senate Defense Standing Committee, tells The Cradle that the Iran-Saudi peace deal is a clear setback for the US and Israel, noting that there is little they can now do about the trend of declining US influence in West Asia and the concurrent rise of China in what is now being termed the “Asian Century.”
“The world has rejected the notion of a new cold war, which some hawkish elements in the west are peddling. The time has come when Asian hands must shape the Asian future, a process on which the region has already embarked,” emphasizes Syed.
He also adds that for Islamabad, this is excellent news, as China, Saudi Arabia, and Iran are close friends and partners.
China, Syed says, has achieved a major diplomatic victory in midwifing this agreement, which is a major step forward toward peace, stability, and harmony in the Muslim world and could bring proxy wars to an end in the volatile region.
China-led security paradigms
What motivated Beijing to take on the role of mediator in the Iran-Saudi peace talks and engage directly in Persian Gulf security matters?
In recent years, China’s foreign policy has become more assertive, particularly since Xi Jinping became president in 2012. Analysts believe that Beijing’s decision to broker peace talks between Iran and Saudi Arabia is in line with its growing involvement in West Asia, which today extends beyond satisfying its energy needs, and includes conflict resolution, regional security, and domestic politics.
Another factor is China’s substantial investments in its Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) projects across the region, with agreements and understandings signed by twenty Arab states.
Xi Jinping’s Global Security Initiative (GSI) and “the Middle Eastern security architecture” have driven China to become more deeply involved in Persian Gulf politics and address the region’s security concerns. At the Communist Party’s annual congress in Hong Kong in 2022, President Xi stated that the GSI’s security parameters could effectively handle geopolitical conflicts, the food crisis, and the COVID-19 epidemic.
Tuvia Gering, a nonresident fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Global China Hub, explains to The Cradle that as China strives towards “national rejuvenation” and grows its vested interests in the Global South, top Chinese experts are debating whether to increase their involvement in political and security issues in West Asia and North Africa.
“Yang Cheng, a former diplomat and expert on Sino-Russian relations, thinks that China might eventually be able to work with [West Asian] countries on security issues and may become a major provider of security-related public goods,” Gering says, adding that the majority of China’s intelligentsia is in favor of getting more involved in regional issues.
The normalization of relations between Iran and Saudi Arabia clearly has the potential to greatly impact West Asia and the wider region as a whole. By reducing political and sectarian rivalry, the deal could effectively neuter the tendency toward proxy wars and the spread of extremist ideologies.
Importantly, the rapid advancement of economic cooperation between the two countries and their regional neighbors could provide an excellent testing ground for Xi’s grand vision of replacing western-sponsored “endless war” with his “peaceful modernization” alternative for the Global South. While it is still too early to determine the extent of the deal’s impact, it is clear that this Iran-Saudi rapprochement is a positive step towards stability in West Asia.
The views expressed in this article do not necessarily reflect those of The Cradle.
UPROOTED PALESTINIANS: SALAM ALQUDS ALAYKUM 