Sheikh Qassem Recalls the Days of The April 1996 Aggression: Details of The Resistance & Negotiations

April 13, 2023

By Al-Ahed News

A total of 27 years has passed since “Israel’s” Grapes of Wrath Operation in 1996. The enemy sought to break the resistance and violate Lebanon’s sovereignty and that of its people. But the grapes turned sour and “Israel” was soon getting a bitter taste of regret and defeat.

This is the anniversary of the wounds inflicted on the shield that protected civilians in Lebanon and secured recognition for the right of the Lebanese to resist. On this occasion Al-Ahed News sat down with the Deputy Secretary General of Hezbollah His Eminence Sheikh Naim Qassem.

He took us back to the days of the difficult negotiations in Damascus that paved the way for what became known as the Israeli–Lebanese Ceasefire Understanding. He also shed light on the role of late Syrian President Hafez al-Assad in its success and his cooperation with Hezbollah Secretary General His Eminence Sayyed Hassan Nasrallah, who was in Damascus at the time.

Furthermore, Sheikh Qassem told Al-Ahed about the role of a “central military official” at the time – the martyred commander Sayyed Mustafa Badr al-Din.

“He prepared the fighters in an organized way; he had a strategic mind; he loved precision in his work and planned everything; and he was known to be a disciplined person in the sense that he desired a high degree of discipline and equipped the fighters with the best types of equipment, weapons, and capabilities. He provided supplies, means of transportation, hiding places and hiding in a distinctive way. He was the military commander in this battle and was keen to ensure that the number of missiles being fired never decreased.”

Sheikh Qassem was referring to Sayyed Badr al-Din’s role in maintaining the rate of rocket fire throughout the war and the divine guidance that accompanied the process.

He also touched on the Secretary General’s statement during the aggression, which came to serve as a principle for Hezbollah – “Hezbollah will not sign the same document as the ‘Israelis’”. Sheikh Qassem explained how the party applied it in all subsequent events.

The Hezbollah Deputy Secretary General also used the interview to send a message to Palestine, its people, and its resistance in the climate of the approaching International Quds Day:

You have proven your true worth through sacrifices, martyrs, and the wounded and through the participation of men, women, children, and everyone in resisting the occupier. It turns out that when some capabilities are available to you, you at the forefront, you give your souls and your money and you sacrifice your homes.

This people are great people, and I am confident that they will be victorious and will liberate Palestine and Al-Quds, God willing, and it is only a matter of time. A country with such a people can only triumph.

On another note, Sheikh Qassem pointed out the positive effects of the Saudi-Iranian rapprochement on the region.

Below is the full transcript of the interview:

Q – On the anniversary of the April 1996 aggression, during which the resistance established the first equation for the protection of civilians, how did this equation develop as “Israel” is known to study its options well before initiating any aggression on Lebanese territory?

A – The April aggression is the second juncture in the post-1993 broad “Israeli” attacks. The aim of the aggression was to stop the resistance, incite the Lebanese public against it, and obtain an international resolution, one way or another, that would restrict the resistance.

But the steadfastness of the resistance, the continuous bombing of the settlements, the pace of the barrage and the number of missiles launched daily, which showed the “Israelis” that the resistance was not diminishing and that its capabilities were not weakened, are all important factors.

We succeeded in letting the enemy understand that the battle is long and that it cannot defeat Hezbollah and that if it continues, it will pay a heavy price which entails the continuous bombing of the settlements in northern Palestine.

We see the April Understanding as “Israeli” and international recognition of that fact that resisting is a legitimate act and that the mutual bombing and reaction by the resistance is an acceptable response because it is self-defense and the defense of the Lebanese citizens, and this is an important equation.

In fact, we were bombing because they were bombing civilians in general. Otherwise, we consider the “Israeli” soldiers and not the settlements as our main target.

Hence, in the face of the aggression in April 1996, we established an understanding that is meant to protect civilians by threatening to bomb “civilians” in the “Israeli” entity. I can say that this is the first equation that strikes a balance between civilians and “civilians”.

However, this equation laid the foundation for another equation that took place after 2006, when the balance of deterrence became much more comprehensive without a written understanding.

In other words, today if “Israel” attacks anyone in Lebanon and if carries out military attacks on any region or citizen, there will be a response against the “Israeli” entity.

This new equation is the fruit of the April Understanding. There is a balance between civilians and “civilians”, but in a developed way. It has now become an equation of a balanced deterrence that includes all of Lebanon, not just civilians in Lebanon. This is a great achievement.

The Syrian role during April 1996

Q – What did Syria represent to the resistance at that time, especially during the negotiations? Did this role change or develop during the July 2006 war? What about this relationship today?

A – Syria’s role, especially that of President Hafez al-Assad, during the April 1996 aggression was central and essential.

“Israel” was in Sharm el-Sheikh, and all the talk at the conference was about not disturbing “Israel”, preventing the resistance from working, and protecting “Israel”. All of this was sponsored by America.

So, nothing has changed for us between the past and present. The Americans directly attack us. The latest of which, as we know in Lebanon, are the sanctions against the Lebanese, offering complete cover for the July 2006 aggression, trying to cause chaos in Lebanon, controlling and trying to prevent institutions from functioning normally, and the people backed by the embassies adopting the popular movement in 2019 in an attempt to direct hostility towards the resistance and Lebanon. American behavior has always been on the side of “Israel”.

Q – Sayyed Zulfiqar was the cornerstone of confrontation in that aggression. What do you remember of his strength during those days? What was his presence like?

A – Sayyed Mustafa Badr al-Din “Zulfiqar” was the central military official. He prepared the fighters in an organized way; he had a strategic mind; he loved precision in his work and planned everything; and he was known to be a disciplined person in the sense that he desired a high degree of discipline and equipped the fighters with the best types of equipment, weapons, and capabilities. He provided supplies, means of transportation, hiding places and hiding in a distinctive way.

He was the military commander in this battle and was keen to ensure that the number of missiles being fired never decreased.

I remember back then, the plan was to make sure there were enough missiles along the posts on the frontlines to last for several days, and if they needed additional projectiles, some would be transferred from the villages north of the river or sometimes from the Bekaa or Beirut.

Due to the ferocity of the battle, ammunition and rockets were consumed quickly, causing a shortage. Had this same pace continued, the “Israelis” would have felt, after a few days, that we have reduced the number of missiles that we will be launching.

Sayyed Zulfiqar believed that we should continue and look for any way to move the missiles to the frontline posts.

Thanks to God Almighty’s support, clouds appeared in the skies of April, blocking the “Israelis’” view. So, the brothers moved large quantities of missiles to the frontline positions.

Because of Sayyed Zulfiqar’s boldness, he agreed that the pace continue despite the danger of it stopping after a few days. This is one form of divine guidance.

Q – During the negotiations, the Secretary General of Hezbollah said that Hezbollah will not sign the same document as the “Israelis”. How did this principle remain constant in the events that followed, up to the agreement to stop military operations in July 2006, and all prisoner exchanges, as well as others that led to the protection of Lebanon and its wealth?

A – We had a discussion in the Shura Council led by His Eminence the Secretary General on how a group of countries could sponsor this understanding without having Hezbollah’s signature, and we are the main stakeholders.

Since we cannot sign on a document that has “Israel’s” signature, the solution was naming Lebanon as the representative of the resistance. Therefore, it was possible for Lebanon to sign the understanding document that had the signatures of major countries, including America and France. Syria’s signature was there too.

Lebanon acted as the official signatory because it was trying to deal with major countries and trying to bind the “Israeli” entity, which has no respect for any covenant or pact. Meanwhile, Hezbollah did not sign the understanding.

Technically, the April Understanding does not have Hezbollah’s signature, even though it was a written understanding. But it does have the signature of the Lebanese state.

Later, the United Nations Security Council Resolution 1701 was passed in 2006. This international resolution did not need to be signed because it was issued by the Security Council.

Then, during the demarcation of the maritime borders, an agreement was reached with the Lebanese state that there would be two separate copies. The “Israelis” would sign one, and the Lebanese would sign the other. The two copies would go to the United Nations. This means that the signatures were not on the same paper.

We maintained this practice at all stages, and Hezbollah did not sign on the same document as the “Israelis”. Even during prisoner swaps, the exchange took place through a mediator. We never engaged in direct discussions or signed the same documents as part of keeping our distance and not recognizing the “Israeli” entity. As a resistance, we had to establish the project of fully rejecting this entity and refusing to legitimize it, even partially.

Q – What are the implications of what we have witnessed during the past few days, when the “Israeli” entity came under missile attacks from several fronts in response to the violations against Al-Aqsa Mosque? Has the Zionist entity become more vulnerable to shakes as a result of the unity of the resistance axis?

A – Before we discuss the source of the missiles that were launched from Lebanon, the Golan Heights, Gaza, or any other place, we must talk about the “Israeli” aggression against Al-Quds and the Palestinians, whether in the West Bank, Al-Quds and its surroundings, or Gaza. This is where the primary responsibility lies.

So, when the world talks about missiles launched from here or there, I consider this the wrong discussion. The discussion should be, “Why is “Israel” attacking?” The Palestinians have the right to defend themselves in the ways they see fit, and we are not here to justify any action.

But we are talking about principles and rules. The question must be: Why does the world not stop the Zionist attacks on Al-Aqsa Mosque and put an end to the “Israeli” crimes against the Palestinians? This is the question and not where the missiles were launched from.

Q – There has been a lot of talk in the “Israeli” media in recent weeks about the role of Hezbollah, not only on the southern borders with occupied Palestine, but also along the borders all the way to the occupied Golan. What is the truth about this role with this expansion?

A – Hezbollah is present in Lebanon, and its resistance emanates from Lebanon. Those who are resisting the temporary “Israeli” entity in the region are the Palestinian people and the other forces in and surrounding Palestine. Hezbollah does not hide that it supports anyone who resists “Israel” anywhere, and we consider that the Palestinians have every right to fight “Israel” inside Palestine and to liberate Palestine and Al-Quds. We are by their side and support them. They are the compass, and we support and fight to liberate the land in the way we see fit.

Q – In the Quds Day climate and with the escalating situation in Al-Aqsa, what is your message to the Palestinian people?

A – A great salute must be given to the founder, Imam Khomeini, who founded the International Quds Day. This heralded a new phase in which people, resistance groups, and countries stand alongside the Palestinian people to fight the “Israeli” enemy, in addition to the open support for the Palestinian people and resistance to expel the occupier.

Here, we tell the Palestinian people: You have proven your true worth through sacrifices, martyrs, and the wounded and through the participation of men, women, children, and everyone in resisting the occupier.

It turns out that when some capabilities are available to you, you, who are at the forefront, give your souls and your money and you sacrifice your homes.

This people are great people, and I am confident that they will be victorious and will liberate Palestine and Al-Quds, God willing, and it is only a matter of time. A country with such a people can only triumph.

Q – What is your interpretation of the resumption of Saudi-Iranian relations?

A – The resumption of Saudi-Iranian relations carries two main subjects. The first is the change in direction in the region by focusing on the central enemy – the “Israeli” entity – instead of tirelessly working on making Iran the central enemy, and we clearly see the repercussions of this issue.

As for the second, the Saudi-Iranian agreement will open a new page and phase in which there will be strength and dignity for the peoples and countries of the region through stability, solidarity, cooperation and help in changing the pattern that the Americans wanted in our region, and this is a great achievement for future generations.

For us, the Saudi-Iranian agreement is a new phase in every sense of the word in our region towards more cooperation and stability, isolating “Israel” and confronting it, and restraining America’s hand from many issues of concern to our region.

We hope that the outcomes of this agreement will be influential on the entire region. According to what we have learned, the resumption of bilateral relations is proceeding very quickly, and a resolution to the problem between Yemen and Saudi Arabia is also proceeding at a rapid pace. The resumption of Saudi relations with Syria is moving ahead, and all of this is an indication that the agreement is progressing quickly. Certainly, it has positive effects on Lebanon, but the exact impact and its timing remain unknown. We do know that this agreement is a good thing.

Q – Is there anything new concerning the Lebanese presidential file?

A – The Lebanese presidential file is still pending due to the insistence of a number of parliamentary blocs not to engage in dialogue and not to be rational in their choices.

Today, the only person who has a large number of votes, according to all the statistics and evidence, is Minister Suleiman Frangieh. All the other names presented in the media cannot catch up with him.

Therefore, these blocs that were not able to unanimously agree on a candidate that has the ability to pass the quorum in parliament should engage in dialogue to see if it is possible to bridge points of view in favor of this option – Minister Suleiman Franjieh to be president.

The alternative is to waste time and prolong the vacuum, and we want to elect a president as soon as possible because it is a constitutional challenge that all solutions in Lebanon depend on.

The time has come for the various parliamentary blocs to be realistic and head towards finding common denominators for a president who has the ability to be open to everyone and is able to save Lebanon, God willing.

SayyedHassanNasrallah Lebanon SheikhNaimQassem april 1996 aggresion Hezbollah IsraeliOccupation

Syria Rising from the Ashes of Twelve Years of Hybrid War

APRIL 9, 2023

Posted by INTERNATIONALIST 360° 

Vanessa Beeley

I talk with Syrian journalist and analyst Kevork Almassian about the recent seismic events in Syria starting with the earthquake on February 6th and culminating in some unexpected and positive geopolitical shifts towards a new Pan-Arabism in the region.

We discuss what the US, UK and Israel can do to prevent normalisation of trade and economic relations between Syria and former US/UK/Israel-allies in the destabilisation project that began in 2011. The US occupation will end sooner or later and while Israel flexes its military muscles for war it knows it is faced with an unprecedented Resistance unity and military prowess in the region that threatens its existence. Turkey is painting itself into a very tight corner – which way will it turn, East or West? All these questions are discussed in depth.

• A Thaw in Türkiye-Syria Relations a Step Toward a ‘New Europe’ in the Middle East
• Recent Hostilities Between Syrian and US Forces Could Be a Turning Point

Tishreen Liberation War: A Compass of Struggle to Liberate Lands & Restore Rights

OCTOBER 6, 2022

Posted by INTERNATIONALIST 360°
Damascus, SANA

Forty-Nine years have passed since Tishreen Liberation war and men of the Syrian Arab Army, who have defeated the Israeli enemy in 1973, continue victories over the tools of this enemy of terrorist organizations to restore security and stability to the majority of the Syrian territory after being cleared off terrorism thanks to the sacrifices of the army soldiers.

Tishreen liberation war, led by the late leader, Hafez al-Assad, has formed a compass of the struggle to liberate the usurped lands and restore the Arab rights. The liberation war was a clear declaration to start the era of victories and end the time of defeats to be the war of liberation, the first war in the Arab-Zionist conflict which broke the wall of despair after Naksa of June 1967 . Tishreen war has consolidated a fact that Syria is the fortress of the resilience of the Arab nation that defends its existence and future.

The Successive victories against the Zionist enemy since the October war stress that it has formed a solid rock on which the glory of national resistance against Colonial plots was built in the region. This enemy tried to steal the victory of October by occupying South Lebanon, but the Syrian Arab army with the blood of its martyrs and heroisms of 1982, defeated the Zionist enemy, followed by standing beside the patriotism of Lebanese Resistance until liberating most of the territories of southern Lebanon in 2000 and the defeat of the Israeli enemy there.

Heroic battles were carried on by the sons and grandsons of October liberation men in their war against terrorism during which they wrote heroic epics and engraved deeply in the conscience of the Syrians the meanings of pride and dignity, the blood of the martyrs, was the title of liberation from terrorism in Aleppo, Deir Ezzor and Ghouta ,Daraa, Hama, Quneitra, the countryside of Homs, Hama, the Syrian desert.

Fedaa al-Rhayiah/ Mazen Eyon

Documents from October 1973

A documentary film entitled “October .. The Epic of Victory”

Hezbollah: Forty Dimensions of Uniqueness In Local & Regional Contexts [1/3]

August 26, 2022

By Housam Matar | Al-Akhbar Newspaper

Translated by Al-Ahed News
 
Hezbollah holds a special place among national liberation movements, especially on a regional level. Its success is manifested through its outstanding military efficiency in confronting “Israel” to liberate territory and deter aggression. This success is also evident in the group’s soft and hard regional influences, and in its ability to politically adapt within the Lebanese system.
 
The triumphs and accomplishments have their own reasons and circumstances. These are both subjective and objective, to which the party adds metaphysical and spiritual factors (divine guidance) that are linked to its religious identity.
 
When talking about the success of this model throughout its history one must acknowledge the fact that it is not free of problems, weaknesses, and failures, and this is the case for every political actor from the greatest empires to the smallest political groups.
 
Hezbollah is a small organization fighting “Israel”, which is a regional entity and project with unlimited international support. Therefore, it needed material and financial assets, cadres, an incubating environment, a logistical structure, a dynamic and charismatic leadership, and a strategic geopolitical depth (national and supranational). How did Hezbollah achieve this?
 
The dimensions of this success and its historical circumstances are intertwined, but it is necessary to sort and disassemble them to get a clearer picture.
 
Also, focusing on the elements of success and uniqueness does not translate into ignoring the obstacles, challenges, and changes. Shedding light on these elements contributes to enhancing our understanding of their importance and their role in the party’s march, in a way that encourages interaction with them in terms of reform, correction, and care. Hence, their inclusion is not the result of complacency or vanity.
 
1- The founding generation gains experience: The first generation of Hezbollah gained experience and expertise within Lebanese and Palestinian political and military movements, during difficult times of civil war and confronting the “Israeli” enemy.
 
They experienced challenges, problems, and failures that reinforced their desire and need for changes and acquiring the necessary resources, skills, and networks of influential interpersonal relationships.
 
A number of cadres belonging to the first generation had plenty of experience in large parties such as the Amal movement, local Islamic movements, mosque groups, and a few of them were part of non-Islamic resistance forces (Fatah movement).
 
This generation experienced communist and nationalist ideas, argued with them, responded to them, and often competed with them.
 
This generation suffered the disappointments of the defeat of the Nasserist project, the kidnapping of Imam Musa al-Sadr, the assassination of Sayyed Muhammad Baqir al-Sadr in Iraq, the repeated “Israeli” aggressive operations, and the expulsion of the Palestine Liberation Organization from Jordan and then Lebanon.
 
All of these prompted the founders to try and think in a different way. For example, from a military point of view, their collective experience contributed to the planning and implementation of the most dangerous military and security operations during the 1980s, which established a solid foundation for the party’s saga.
 
2- Taking inspiration from the Islamic Revolution and integrating with it.
 
The victory of the revolution in Iran transformed the broader Islamic world. For the Shiites this was a historic opportunity to break out of the state of oppression.
 
The Lebanese Shiites were the first to network with the victorious revolution, especially since some of the cadres had built strong personal relations with Iranian cadres opposed to the Shah’s regime and provided them with assistance in Beirut, in addition to religious relations with Iranian figures due to contacts through the Hawzas in Najaf and Qom.
 
Thus, the benefits of the Islamic revolution reached Lebanon quickly. The most prominent of these was the arrival of the training groups sent by the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps by order of Imam Khomeini to the Bekaa Valley through Syria following the “Israeli” invasion in 1982.
 
To carry on and grow, this resistance required organizational frameworks that gradually took shape until the structure of Hezbollah emerged.
 
The existence of this regional support for the resistance is indispensable in light of the imbalance of power. The Iranian regional political support and Iranian material resources (arms, training, and money) enabled Hezbollah throughout the decades to focus on the conflict with the “Israeli” enemy without needing to be constantly preoccupied with securing support or searching for compromises with regional powers in pursuit of protection.
 
The religious/ideological link between the party and the Wali al-Faqih [guardian Islamic jurist] organized the party’s relationship with Iran and facilitated an understanding between them. It allowed the latter to look at the party from several perspectives, namely the Islamic revolution, which is hostile to the American system of hegemony in the Islamic field (specifically the resistance in Lebanon and Palestine) and Iranian national security as well as preserving Shiism.
 
3- Solidifying the historical resistance framework of the Lebanese Shiites
 
Hezbollah engraved and reproduced the history of the Lebanese Shiites from the angle of their role in resisting the Ottomans, the French, and the Zionists.
 
Imam Khomeini’s fatwa for the delegation of the nine (they formed the nucleus of establishing Hezbollah) on the duty to resist the “Israeli” occupation with the available capabilities, no matter how modest, played a pivotal role in activating the resistance project as a religious duty first and foremost.
 
Thus, Hezbollah became a natural extension, compliment, and boost to the experiences of the Shiite revolutionaries at the beginning of the twentieth century and the positions of their great scholars such as Sayyed Abdul Hussein Sharaf al-Din and Imam Musa al-Sadr. All these are figures deeply enshrined in the conscience of the Shiite community, especially Imam al-Sadr (the founder of the Lebanese resistance regiments “Amal”) due to the temporal rapprochement between its experience and the birth of Hezbollah.
 
Therefore, loyalty to the resistance project is no longer loyalty to the party, but to the sect’s heroic role in defending the natural unity of Syria and in the face of the “Israeli” occupation since the beginning of its aggression against occupied Palestine.
 
4- Spreading power and confidence within an oppressed sect
 
The historical grievances and the structural marginalization of the Lebanese Shiites, especially after the defeat of their revolution in 1920 (and they had been defeated before that in the second half of the 18th century in Mount Lebanon), contributed to their thirst for changing their reality and the presence of a high revolutionary readiness that was being nourished by the restoration of the revolutionary practices of the Imams of Prophet Muhammad’s household (PBUH).
 
Hezbollah presented the resistance project under the title of confronting occupation and hegemony to which the sectarian system is affiliated. This would free the society from marginalization and oppression – the world in the party’s ideology is divided between the oppressed and the arrogant.
 
What helps the party perpetuate this narrative is its already strong presence among ordinary people born after the mid-1940s.
 
Hezbollah recalls this marginalization, which the society is actually experiencing firsthand – once directly as Shiites and once as part of the center’s marginalization of the parties in the north, the Bekaa, and the south. These areas are inhabited by an Islamic majority, and this made it easier for the party to communicate with various national groups under the rubric of confronting deprivation and marginalization.
 
Accordingly, Hezbollah’s success with resistance had multiple dimensions, serving as a remedy for dissipated pride dating back nearly two hundred years.
 
5- Filling the void in the shadow of a failed state
 
The civil war and the resulting settlement, which the party was not a part of, led to the emergence of a weak state incapable of carrying out many of its sovereign duties.
 
This allowed the party to carry the responsibility of the resistance and conduct social work for relief and development.
 
This state was not, in several stages, in agreement with the resistance project. It was even hostile towards it at times, including the era of Amin Gemayel and later Fouad Siniora’s destitute government.
 
However, it [Siniora’s government] was too weak to confront the resistance even with the help of external supporters.
 
This chronic state deficit that resulted in a lack of sovereignty reinforced the popular legitimacy of the resistance and forced the party to assume responsibilities that were not at the heart of its project, especially with the deterioration of the economic situation in the past two years.
 
6-  Benefiting from the advantages of Lebanese Shiism, which tested nationalist, leftist, patriotic, and Islamic currents and produced a large number of intellectual and scholarly figures (Sheikh Muhammad Jawad Mughniyeh, Sayyed Mohsen al-Amin, Sayyed Muhammad Hussein Fadlallah, and Sheikh Muhammad Mahdi Shams al-Din, etc.).
 
It was historically characterized by a moderate tendency resulting from the peculiarities of the highly diverse and complex Lebanese reality, and later due to the many waves of migration towards Africa and the West.
 
In recent decades, the Shiite community has also witnessed the phenomenon of displacement to urban centers (Beirut, the southern Matn coast, and Tyre) and integration into the contracting and trade sectors, which had repercussions on their social class and political awareness.
 
Hezbollah had to work and grow within this type of complex Shiism, and therefore, its relationship with the general Shiite environment is based on a mixture of loyalty to it and negotiation at the same time.
 
This requires the party to be distinguished by social flexibility and targeted communication for each circle of its incubating environments, each of which has its own cultural, class, and regional characteristics for the Shiites themselves.
 
The party gradually attracted elements and cadres from these circles, which was reflected in an internal organizational vitality capable of understanding the complexities of the Shiite scene, dealing with it, and understanding its various internal sensitivities.
 
7-   Maneuvering within the complexities of the Lebanese system resulting from deep-rooted sectarianism, its exposure to external interference, and its highly centralized financial-business economic model, required Hezbollah to maintain a safe distance. The movement positioned itself on the system’s external edge and approached it only to the extent that was needed to protect the resistance from local players with foreign ties to the United States and its allies.
 
Therefore, this complexity imposed on Hezbollah to weave broad horizontal relations in the general political sphere (it had to develop its political thought and initiatives to build a network of cross-sectarian national alliances) and restricted vertical relations within the political system.
 
However, the deterioration of the political system and its poles, leading to the danger of the state’s disintegration, put the party in a historical dilemma; it must work through the system itself to ward off the danger of the state’s collapse (a concern that has grown in the party’s awareness after the devastation that befell Syria and Iraq and the accompanying disintegration of state structures) with apprehension that engaging in regime change or reform would lead to an externally backed civil war.
 
From the beginning, Hezbollah, in particular, had to be aware of the external interference in Lebanon, its channels, borders, and goals, as they represented an imminent threat to it.
 
Just like that, the party’s local political choices could have reinforced tension or appeasement with local and international forces.
 
It was not possible for the party to estimate the direction of the policies of foreign powers (such as America, Saudi Arabia, and France) in internal affairs and how to deal with them regardless of the international and regional situations.
 
Therefore, the party has developed complex decision-making mechanisms from its developing experience in Lebanese politics, which are mechanisms that it can employ in other areas related to the resistance and its regional role.
 
8- The rapid positioning within the Lebanese political arena of conflict is crowded with competitors. Hezbollah came into existence amid a heavy presence of political forces, armed and unarmed, most of which have external relations. It had to expand its influence within all this fierce competition.

In its infancy, the party underwent several field tests and intense political competition with major Lebanese forces rooted locally and forces with a regional reach.
 
Then the party became vulnerable to severe political attacks from the anti-resistance forces, especially after 2004. The burden of this competition increased after Hezbollah confronted the leadership of a national alliance with the so-called March 8 forces and the Free Patriotic Movement.
 
Hezbollah’s opponents receive extensive external support and are distinguished by their presence in various cultural, media, and political spheres in the form of parties, elites, platforms, the private sector, and non-governmental organizations, which are entities closely integrated with regional and international financial and political networks hostile to the resistance.
 
Some of these adversaries play security roles that double their threat. This reality produces constant pressures on the party, forcing it to dedicate part of its resources and capabilities to the local political sphere. It also makes it accumulate skills, frameworks, and criteria for managing political competition in a way that guarantees it the local and national stability necessary to avoid open internal conflicts that distract it from its main mission.
 
9-   Intellectual rivalry in a complex and open public sphere resulting from the richness of the Lebanese political and intellectual life, contrary to what is the case in most Arab countries.
 
The party had to present its Islamic thesis in a highly competitive intellectual market where leftist, liberal, and nationalist currents have deep roots and prominent thinkers in the region.
 
This is what the party quickly realized in its infancy and prompted it to self-review the Islamic state and the Islamic revolution.

The party is constantly confronting political and cultural arguments that are highly critical of its political and cultural project (apart from a fierce information war) that prompted a number of its elites and institutions to engage in this “market” and root the party’s proposals on issues such as Wilayat al-Faqih, the homeland, the Lebanese system, multiple identities, the legitimacy of the resistance weapon, American hegemony, and social justice.
 
As a result, despite the party’s intense preoccupation with the issue of resistance and its requirements from the tactical cultural discourse, it finds itself obliged to engage in many discussions and develop its intellectual, research, and scientific institutions and cadres – a challenge still facing the party.
 
10- The ability to transform geography into its environment.
 
The geographical contact of the Shiite communities in Lebanon with occupied Palestine in southern Lebanon and the western Bekaa made this environment targeted by “Israeli” aggression and under constant and imminent threat.
 
Thus, the party gained enormous influence and wide embrace within these communities through the success of its experiment in resistance, liberation, and deterrence.
 
This contact and the success of the party produced what is called the incubating environment, which is the most important element in the success of the resistance’s experiences.
 
The party has succeeded in completely assimilating into this environment, including its fighters, cadres, leadership, voters, and supporters.
 
This contact gave rise to a historical Shiite awareness of the Palestinian issue resulting from the historical personal and commercial ties between the Shiite and Palestinian communities and then Shiite engagement with Palestinian organizations and the residents of Palestinian camps after the 1948 Nakba.
 
On the other hand, this contact with “Israeli” aggression had a significant impact on Shiite urbanization and migration, as the occupied areas witnessed extensive Shiite migration to Africa and North America, and internally to coastal cities, specifically Tyre and Beirut.
 
This migration was a decisive element in the social and political rise of the Shiites, as well as giving Hezbollah popular incubators in vital areas and providing it with necessary human and material resources.
 
11- The participatory nature of the relationship with Iran:
 
The two sides dealt from the beginning on the basis that Iran’s role is to support the party’s decisions that it takes in accordance with the data of the Lebanese reality, especially since the Iranian state was preoccupied with major internal and external challenges.
 
Therefore, the Wali al-Faqih used to grant legitimacy to the act, provided that the party takes the necessary decisions. Later, Hezbollah was able, due to its successes and the role of its Secretary General Sayyed Hassan Nasrallah, to become a partner in the Iranian regional decision-making process, especially in the files related to the resistance project.
 
This partnership is reinforced by the influence of the Revolutionary Guards within the Iranian national security establishment, and the broad respect for the party’s experience among the Iranian people is a lever for this partnership.
The Iranians were keen from the beginning to play the role of an assistant to Hezbollah, which is why the decision was to send trainers instead of fighters to Lebanon after the “Israeli” invasion.
 
This independence is reinforced by the theory of Wilayat al-Faqih itself, which recognizes local and national specificities.
 
With the Wali al-Faqih having the authority to command in all administrative affairs, but according to wisdom, justice, and the ability to understand interests and conditions of time, which are among the obligatory attributes of the Wali al-Faqih, he realizes that every local and national society has deep peculiarities that its people tell about.
 
Therefore, the Wali often leaves the party to determine the interests after he adjusts their terms.
 
This partnership had a direct reflection on Hezbollah’s regional influence, as the Iranians realize that the party’s Arab identity, along with what it has accumulated in the Arab conscience, makes it, among other arenas and files, a major player in managing the resistance project.
 
12- Mastering the administration in connection with the experience of Iranian institutionalization.
 
Hezbollah has benefited from its deep ties with Iranian institutions, whether the Revolutionary Guards, the civil services, or even the hawza in Qom, to draw inspiration from the experience of building institutions and organizing administration, which is one of the historical characteristics of the Iranian experience.
 
A number of the institutions of the Islamic Revolution either initially opened branches in Lebanon and then were run by the party, or transferred their experience to the party, which copied it with a local flavor and peculiarities.
 
Iranian experts in management and human resources have transferred knowledge, skills, and administrative systems to party cadres that worked to build and develop active and efficient civil institutions in the fields of education, development, party organization, health, services, and local administration.
 
The party’s institutions usually benefit from Arab and Lebanese experts and academics from outside its environment to gain access to qualitative experiences and new knowledge.
 
The above-mentioned party institutions in the capital and the outskirts attracted thousands of young men and women graduates of universities who chose these majors or who were encouraged by the party to study in them to benefit from modern sciences in management and human resources.
 
This institutional momentum contributes to the efficiency of the party’s activities and its ability to meet its needs, to preserve and transfer experience, to development, to attract energies, and to adapt to transformations, especially since the “Israeli” enemy has repeatedly targeted these institutions.
 
13- Building strategic interests with Syria after years of mutual anxiety.
 
The relationship between the party and Syria was characterized by mistrust and suspicion at the beginning, with several field frictions between the two parties taking place, which reinforced the mutual distrust.
 
Damascus aspired to gain the regulating position of the Lebanese reality with international and regional recognition and to employ this in Syria’s internal stability, regional influence, and balance with the “Israeli” enemy.
 
Some Syrian government officials were apprehensive that the party’s agenda, identity, and relationship with Iran could disrupt their Lebanese project.
 
But with the war on Iraq, after Saddam Hussein’s invasion of Kuwait, the failure of the Arab-“Israeli” settlement project, the end of the Iraqi-Iranian war, and Hezbollah’s steadfastness in the face of the “Israeli” enemy in the 1993 aggression, a new path was launched, the beginning of which was to prevent President Hafez al-Assad, at the initiative of the then commander of the Lebanese army, Emile Lahoud, using the army to clash with the resistance in 1993.
 
Since then, it can be said that a door for direct communication opened on the issue of resistance between the party and President al-Assad, regardless of the complexities of the so-called Syrian-Lebanese security system.
 
This relationship was strengthened during the “Israeli” aggression in 1996 when Syria played a key role in the birth of the April Understanding.
 
The relations between the two parties were strengthened after the American invasion of Iraq and Resolution 1559, as Syria realized its need for the party and its necessity regionally and in Lebanon.
 
Syria also became a vital strategic depth for the party with the expansion of the confrontation arena after 2011, which was proven by the party’s entry into the war in Syria in 2013.
 
The party succeeded in understanding Syria’s concerns in Lebanon and kept pace with its vital interests by not clashing with the post-Taif regime and revealed to it its weight in the conflict with the “Israeli” enemy. The strategic partnership that developed over time between Syria and Iran helped in this.
 
14- The awakening of the marginalized Arab Shiites.
 
With its rise, the party became the center of the Shiites’ eyes, hearts, and minds in the Arab world. They have experienced decades of exclusion and abuse, similar to the Zaydis in Yemen.

Thus, they found in the successes of the Shiite Hezbollah a possible entry point for Islamic and national recognition. This oppression of the Arab Shiites served as an amplifier for Hezbollah’s achievements and a motivator for being identified with it and drawing inspiration from it.
 
Thus, Hezbollah’s regional influence is primarily a product of its soft power, a power characterized by long-term results and acceptable costs. It is a fully legitimate influence.
 
The party supports the choice of these Shiites in peaceful struggle, encourages climates of dialogue with their partners and the governments of their countries, emphasizes Islamic unity, respects their national privacy, helps them in the media to raise their voice to demand rights, and urges them to political, media, and popular participation in support of the resistance project within the region.
 
15- Healing the Arab psychological defeat through victory over the “Israeli” enemy and support for the rising resistance project in Palestine.
 
A large part of Arab societies took pride in Hezbollah’s resistance, interacting with it and getting closer to it, as they found it a response to decades of disappointment and defeats.
 
Hezbollah has been keen to highlight its Arab identity in its political, cultural, and media discourse and in its artistic products (anasheed) and has strengthened its institutions concerned with communicating and engaging in dialogue with Arab elites, parties, and groups.
 
This Arab fascination with the party’s experience in fighting the “Israeli” enemy and in its leadership constituted a provocative factor for the Arab official regimes that emerged from the conflict with the enemy, as the party’s successes practically undermined the discourses of complacency and the legitimacy of its advocates.
 
This explains the insistence of a number of regional regimes on creating sectarian tensions that have had negative repercussions on the party’s relationship with part of its Arab incubators.
 
But the decline of the sectarian wave as the party continues to lead Arab resistance efforts against the “Israeli” entity can create conciliatory atmospheres with Arab incubators on the basis of understanding and dialogue, organizing differences, and neutralizing them from the resistance project.
 
16- Inspiration, representation, and transfer of experience
 
Hezbollah has limited material, human, and financial resources. Therefore, its building of partnerships and alliances at the regional level within the resistance project had to be based on its most prominent assets, namely its ability to inspire and transfer its experience and lessons learned to its peers within movements and forces that practice the act of resistance.
 
What made this possible was that the party’s victories revived the spirit of resistance in the Arab and Islamic spheres (for example, the comparison between Sayyed Nasrallah and President Abdel Nasser abounded) and thus stimulated the desire of many groups and elites to understand and benefit from the party’s experience.

The most prominent results of this appeared in occupied Palestine, especially in the second intifada.
 
Therefore, Hezbollah was interested in transferring its experience in resistance, administration, media, and organization to a large network of Arab and Islamic non-governmental political actors involved, militarily or politically, in confronting the American hegemony system.
 
The transfer of experience naturally includes the transfer of values, ideas, patterns of behavior and practical culture, as well as establishing networks of links and relations with the cadres of these movements and parties.
 
Thus, over time, additional groups joined the equations of force and deterrence for the resistance project. The Zionists started talking about multiple circles of the resistance axis that extend to Iraq and Yemen.

• حزب الله… أربعون بعداً للفرادة [1/3]: السياقات المحلّية والإقليمية

Sayyed Nasrallah reveals Hezbollah’s project in Palestine

22 Jul 2022

Source: Al Mayadeen

By Al Mayadeen English 

Sayyed Nasrallah stresses that Hezbollah’s project in Palestine rests on the Palestinian people liberating their land by resisting the enemy.

The Secretary-General of Hezbollah, Sayyed Hassan Nasrallah

In the fifth and final episode of the “40 and Beyond” documentary series, the Secretary-General of Hezbollah, Sayyed Hassan Nasrallah, revealed that the death of the great Syrian President Hafez Al-Assad constituted a huge loss.

In an interview with Al Mayadeen CEO, Ghassan Ben Jeddou, Sayyed Nasrallah highly valued the role of late President Hafez Al-Assad in the equation of the Arab-Israeli struggle.

Sayyed Nasrallah recalled that President Hafez Al-Assad exerted strained efforts for the sake of the Resistance project in the region for a period of 20 years.

"We highly value this man in the equation of the #Arab-Israeli struggle."

Sayyed Hassan #Nasrallah speaks of the late #Syrian President Hafez Al-Assad and his importance to the resistance against "Israel".#Hezbollah #أربعون_وبعد pic.twitter.com/7rxEQw7xxW

— Al Mayadeen English (@MayadeenEnglish) July 22, 2022

Sayyed Nasrallah narrated two experiences with late Syria President Hafez Al Assad. The first was in July 1993, when the July Understanding was reached, and the second was in 1996 during Operation “Grapes of Wrath.

The Secretary-General iterated the extent to which late President Hafez Al-Assad was careful to consult Hezbollah.

Sayyed Nasrallah stated that late President Hafez Al-Assad took Hezbollah’s opinion into consideration, preserving the Resistance, its project, morale, and victories.

President Al-Assad did whatever maintained the interest of the Resistance and fulfilled the Resistance’s requests in all the negotiations that used to take place in Damascus, according to Sayyed Nasrallah.

“Our opinion was always taken into consideration; we weren’t just consulted as someone might consult you, but then does the opposite however, our opinion was always applied even in texts and agreements,” he stressed.

He further detailed that President Al-Assad did whatever maintained the interest of the Resistance and fulfilled the Resistance’s requests in all the negotiations that used to take place in Damascus.

Training Palestinian factions

On the role of Hezbollah in training Palestinian factions in the past, the Secretary-General revealed that the resistance movement used to train the Lebanese and Palestinians that were and still are fighting “Israel”.

Sayyed Hassan #Nasrallah on #Hezbollah's role in assisting #Lebanese and #Palestinian factions for the fight against "Israel".#أربعون_وبعد pic.twitter.com/HyNbvyQq6j

— Al Mayadeen English (@MayadeenEnglish) July 22, 2022

The Secretary-General pointed out that the military training was not only limited to Islamic factions, noting that some factions may not need training.

No Hezbollah in Palestine

In the course of the interview, Sayyed Nasrallah exposed that he received letters from Palestinian youths and even from Palestinian cadres urging him to establish a new faction in Palestine under Lebanese Hezbollah’s leadership.

However, Hezbollah’s decision was clear in this regard; no Hezbollah in Palestine, Sayyed Nasrallah tersely stated.  

According to Sayyed Nasrallah, Hezbollah does not have its own project in Palestine.

The Secretary-General went on to say that there are several resistance factions in Palestine, asserting that Hamas and the Islamic Jihad were present, as well as the rest of the national factions.

Why didn't #Hezbollah establish its own faction in #Palestine?#أربعون_وبعد pic.twitter.com/2qdhaRxp9V

— Al Mayadeen English (@MayadeenEnglish) July 22, 2022

Elsewhere in his remarks, Sayyed Nasrallah suggested that if someone in Palestine wanted to cooperate with us; he can cooperate with the national factions there if he has a national ideology or with Hamas and the Islamic Jihad if he has an Islamic ideology.

Sayyed Nasrallah concluded by reasserting that Hezbollah’s project is that Palestine will be liberated by its people who resist the enemy.

“Therefore, we can cooperate with every Palestinian, regardless of his ideological, intellectual, organizational, or political background”, he said.

It is noteworthy that on the occasion of the 40th anniversary of the establishment of Hezbollah and the 30th anniversary of the election of Sayyed Nasrallah as the Lebanese party’s Secretary-General, Al Mayadeen produced a five-part documentary series, featuring a rare interview with the Resistance leader dating back to 20 years.

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