“The Lost Lesson from the Arab-Israeli Struggle” by Dr. Rizk Elias…


Tuesday, 05 November 2019

==The October Liberation War confirmed the validity of the theory that the late President Hafez al-Assad adopted in preparing for the war…

==President Bashar al-Assad has placed the issue of the liberation of Golan at the forefront of the national priorities.

A 525 page long and eight chapter book titled “The Lost Lesson from the Arab-Israeli Struggle, written by Dr. Rizk Elias” has been recently published by the Syrian Ministry of Culture – the Syrian General Book Organization.

Through his field participation in the Arab-Israeli wars and his history as an army officer, the author tries to summarize the events of this struggle during the last century, using the wars that took place from 1948 to 1982 to explain lessons of both sides in each of these wars, as well as the reasons for the failure of the peace process which began in Madrid in 1991, stressing that the lesson of a just and comprehensive peace is still missing. For those reasons, Dr. Rizk Elias’ book could be considered as an important source to politicians and military men who are interested in the Arab-Israeli struggle from its inception to date. The writer dedicated his book to all those who have worked and still work to achieve a just and comprehensive peace and to find an end to the Arab-Israeli struggle, which has passed over a century.


Introducing his book which includes all about the Arab-Israeli wars and the negotiations between Syria and Israel, Dr. Rizk Elias said that he tries to show the influence of geography and politics in the decisions of wars and peace, the impact of the process of building power and the theory of its use, as well as the military balance between the two sides and the attempts of both  parties to evaluate the results of each round of  the conflict and to learn lessons from it in order to prepare for a coming war or to resort to a peaceful settlement. Therefore, “I resorted in the first chapter of the book to describe the  geographical and topographical characterizations of the theater of the war, while in the subsequent chapters, I tried to deal with  the successive wars which took place from 1948 to  1982” Dr. Elias added. In the last chapter, I talked about the peace process between Syria and Israel, which began at the Madrid conference in 1991 and the reasons for its failure, only to help the reader to form a comprehensive idea about the Arab-Israeli struggle which has not been ended yet, neither in war or peace. “My previous position as a staff officer in the General Command of the Syrian Army and Armed Forces, and then an adviser to the Minister of Defense as well as my participations in the Arab – Israeli wars from the 1967 war and my experience as a teacher of these subjects at the Higher Military Academy in Damascus, and my contribution as a member of the peace process between Syria and Syria have all helped me in the delicate job to write this book” he said.

Dr. Elias confirmed that the Zionist ideology which was based on immigration and settlement has begun to decline after the October war, the 1973 Lebanon war, the Palestinian uprising in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, and the liberation of the Lebanese resistance to south Lebanon in 2000 and the Second Lebanon War in 2006. Israel was forced to dismantle its settlements in the Sinai and the Gaza Strip. It also was forced to withdraw its forces from Lebanon after its arrival to the outskirts of Beirut as well as that Its scheme to establish a Palestinian state in Jordan has finally fell. The Israelis have resorted during the past few years to the idea of strategic defense and to build fortified walls in Gaza, the West Bank, the Lebanese borders and the occupied Golan Heights.

According to the writer, «Israel» now believes that arming the forces of the resistance axis consisting of Syria, Iran, Hezbollah and Palestinian organizations poses an existential danger to its existence, because such an armament can cause precise injuries in all vital targets in the depth of Israel as it has the powers and the means that enable them to break in through the barriers and walls built by Israel along the borders.

Chapters of the book:

The first chapter deals with some of the geographical characteristics of the theater of war in Palestine and the occupied Syrian Golan Heights including the boundaries of the Mandate and the armistice lines, and the topographical landmarks in Palestine and the Syrian Golan Heights.

The second chapter talks about the Arab-Israeli war in 1948, while the third talks about the tripartite aggression «British, French and Israeli» on Egypt in 1956.  In the fourth chapter, the writer explained all about the Israeli aggression against Egypt, Jordan and Syria in 1967. In the fifth chapter, the writer discussed the process that occurred in Syria to rebuild the Syrian armed forces before the liberation 1973 war and the first war of attrition (1968-1973).

In the sixth chapter, the writer talks about the October liberation war on the Syrian and Egyptian fronts, and the second war of attrition on the Syrian front (1973-1974), while Chapter seven deals with Syria’s approach to build a strategic balance with Israel and to confront the Israeli invasion of Lebanon in 1982. The last chapter of the book deals with the peace process between Syria and Israel and the reasons for its failure.

The mission of liberation:

In the fifth chapter, the author talks about the features of the theory of the late President Hafez al-Assad to liberate the occupied Golan Heights and the rest of other occupied Arab territories.Image result for hafez assad

“Anyone who reads the speech of president Hafez al-Assad at the tenth extraordinary National Congress of the Arab Socialist Baath Party, which was held in early November 1970, touches the concern he had had to liberate the territories occupied by Israel in its aggression in 1967; a concern that remained his concern for a long time.” The writer said. People who were close to him knew that on the anniversary of the occupation of the Golan, which occurs on the tenth of June of each year, president Assad devoted all his day to evaluate what Syria had achieved on the road to liberate the Golan.

Also in his speech at the conference which was held several days before the establishment of the Corrective Movement in 1970, president Hafez al-Assad laid out his vision on how to liberate the Golan and the occupied Arab territories. He had worked according to this vision for thirty years until his death, that vision which is still valid to rationalize our steps in the struggle to liberate our territoriy.

The writer reviewed the clear and integrated vision of the late president Hafez al-Assad, explaining how it was interrelated in the domestic, Arab and international politics and also in the field of the battle for the accomplishment of the liberation mission.

The October War of Liberation

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After examining the details of the October liberation war, Dr. Rizk Elias listed in the sixth chapter the most important positive results of this war in 1973, including the moral victory not only of the fighters who participated in it, but also of the Arab Man who suffered frustration as a result of the June 1967 defeat. To liberate part of the occupied territories, this war showed the importance of Arab solidarity and its effectiveness and forced the enemy to treat the Palestinian issue as an issue of people rather than refugees. The October war also caused a major jolt in the psycho-political structure of the Israeli society, and strengthened the position of Arabs in the field of the international political action.

This war has also confirmed through practical experience the validity of the theory on which President Hafez al-Assad had based to prepare for the war and to conduct it.  It proved that Arab soldiers had appeared during the battle in their true image; brave and able to use modern war machines, love their nation and sacrifice for it, showing moral energy in the war. There was scientific evidence of unity of the Arab nation in the will, feelings, desires, hopes and goals, and its enormous military, human and economic energy capable of achieving victory if used correctly. There was great importance of incorporating the political and military battles. Late President Hafez al-Assad stressed that fact by saying: « we cannot, in any way, separate our political battle from our military battle, because the first came as a result of the second, and is associated with it. “We have achieved with our steadfastness in the military battle glorious results which shattered all the myths woven by the enemy around him” he concluded. “We are also able with steadfastness, self-confidence and strong cohesion at the home front, along with our solid cohesion with the Arab nation, to achieve success in the political battle either to achieve the goals for which we fought, or by saying a big “NO” if we were faced by manipulation or evasive or evasion of the implementation of the Security Council resolution as we understand. »

The Peace Process:

Image result for hafez assad

Dr. Rizk Elias revealed in Chapter eight which talks about the “peace process and the reasons for its failure”, the statement of late President Hafez al-Assad on 9 September 1992 in a meeting with a delegation of citizens of the Golan who came to visit Damascus: «In the past we have said that we want peace, and today we are saying that we want a comprehensive peace that preserves our dignity and is accepted by our people, and does not require any retreat from our national rights, and will in no way harm the dignity and pride of our nation. If others agree, this kind of peace can then be achieved.”

On August 1, 1993, on the occasion of the Syrian Arab Army Day, the late President al-Assad gave a clear indication of how serious Syria is in its attempts to achieve peace: “We are in the battle of peace and we are fighting it as seriously as we are in the military wars.

The book also reviewed President Bashar al-Assad’s position on the peace process. The president placed the question of the occupied land in the Golan Heights at the forefront of the national priorities. “Our main concern is to liberate our occupied land. “Land and sovereignty are an issue of dignity” he said. We have been clear in our positions since the beginning of the peace process in Madrid in 1991, contrary to the Israeli policy, which was characterized by fluctuation at times, and putting obstacles”, president Bashar al-Assad said in his Constitutional oath speech in front of the People’s Assembly (the parliament) on July, 17, 2000.

In the same speech, President al-Assad stressed that we must work as quickly as possible to liberate the Golan without compromising the land. “We are in a hurry for peace because it is our choice, and the Syrian Arab people a peace-loving people throughout history, but we are not ready, by any means, to abandon any part of our land, or to let our sovereignty to be touched » he said.

President al-Assad called on the United States of America to play a neutral, impartial and effective role to implement the resolutions of international legitimacy. In a later speech, President Bashar al-Assad called on Russia and the European Union to play a more active role.

In another speech, President al-Assad referred to the peace-loving nature of the Syrian people by saying: Peace is an ideology for the Syrian people and not just a political act. If you go back to the history of Syria for hundreds and thousands of years, you will find that it has no history of aggression. The real struggle between us and the Israelis is between those who start wars and those who prevent it ».

President al-Assad also explained the contrast between the terms “Syria’s conditions” and “Syria’s rights” by saying: “There is no such a thing as” Syria’s conditions” but there is something called” “Syria’s rights”. “There are international conditions that correspond to the Syrian and Arab rights in general. Israel stands in the face of restoration of the Syrian rights and, at the same time, in the face of the international conditions ».

Referring to Syria’s strategy of steadfastness and liberation and its ability to confront the Israeli aggression, President al-Assad said: «Syria does not seek to ignite the war, but if imposed a war on Syria, will defend itself, and is able to do so. It may be able for anyone to control the beginning of the war, but he will never be able to control its end or its results. The Arab side, and we are at the forefront of it, who possess the decision to end the war; how, where and what how it ends ».

The decisions of the tenth regional conference of the Arab Socialist Baath Party which was held between June 6 and 9, 2005, underlined the peaceful approach taken by the President in his official statements and positions. The first recommendation taken by that conference stressed the need of liberating the occupied Syrian Golan to the line of the fourth of June 1967».

Also, The Charter of the National Progressive Front issued on 12 October 2004 affirmed the commitment of the Front to a peaceful approach in its international policy according to the principles of the international legitimacy and the UN decisions relating to the Arab – Israeli struggle on the basis of justice, rights, international law and finding peaceful resolutions to conflicts.»


Adapted by Haifaa Mafalani

إسرائيل لا تثق بجيشها البرّي: «حرب 73 ستكون نزهة»!

إسرائيل لا تثق بجيشها البرّي: «حرب 73 ستكون نزهة»!

غولان: وضع سلاح البر سيء جداً، وقائد ذراع البر لا يعمل (أ ف ب )

 علي حيدر

 السبت 9 شباط 2019

لم يعد الحديث عن عدم جاهزية سلاح البر في جيش العدو مجرد تقدير أو تحذير من لجان متخصصة أو من مفوض شكاوى الجنود. بل أتى من قلب المؤسسة العسكرية ومن قيادتها العليا. في وثيقة سرية قدمها نائب رئيس الأركان السابق اللواء يائير غولان، كان الأخير صريحاً إلى حد الإقرار بعدم ثقة القيادة العليا بالجيش البري، والتحذير مما ينتظر الجبهة الداخلية من سيناريوات لم تشهدها طوال تاريخها في كل الحروب التي خاضتها في مواجهة الجيوش العربية.

لم يعد بإمكان المؤسسة الإسرائيلية بكافة عناوينها، التغطية على هذه الحقيقة المؤلمة بالنسبة لكل إسرائيلي محتل، جندياً كان أو مستوطناً، خصوصاً أن من قدمها هو من القيادة العسكرية العليا، وكان أحد المرشحين لخلافة رئيس الأركان السابق غادي آيزنكوت في منصبه. ومما أضفى على الوثيقة المزيد من الصدقية أيضاً أنها لم تستند إلى تقديرات نظرية، بل إلى تجارب عملانية أيضاً، الأمر الذي رفع من مستوى الخطورة لدى قادة تل أبيب – حتى لو تمت التغطية على ذلك – خصوصاً أن هذا الواقع يمهد لمزيد من النكسات والهزائم التي ستكون مفاعيلها أشد خطورة على وجودها وأمنها.

أكد اللواء غولان أن انعدام الثقة بقدرات سلاح البر، والخوف من الخسائر، أديا إلى عدم تنفيذ اجتياح بري خلال العدوان على قطاع غزة في العام 2014، في ما سمي بـ«الجرف الصامد». وأشار إلى أن «انعدام الثقة بسلاح البر انتقل إلى الشبان، وألحق هذا الأمر ضرراً لا يمكن إصلاحه من حيث ثقة الضباط بأنفسهم وبقدرتهم على الانتصار». في المقابل، اعتبر رئيس معهد القدس للأبحاث الاستراتيجية، أفرايم عنبر، أن «الخشية هذه موجودة منذ سنوات طويلة وكما يبدو منذ أيام حرب لبنان الثانية» (حرب تموز 2006)، مشيراً إلى أنه «ليس عبثاً تم إهمال سلاح البر لمصلحة قدرات السايبر وسلاح الجو».

لكن المشكلة الكبرى بالنسبة لإسرائيل، تكمن في الخطورة الكبرى التي ستواجهها انطلاقاً من أن «الضربة التي ستوجه إلى الجبهة الداخلية ستكون (في الحرب المقبلة) أكبر مما تحتمله، وأن إخفاق حرب يوم الغفران (حرب تشرين العام 1973) سيكون «نزهة» قياساً بالضربة التي ستوجه إلى الجبهة الداخلية»، بحسب غولان. في المقابل، رأى قائد سلاح البر السابق اللواء غاي تسور، أنه «إذا نظرنا إلى المستقبل، وبموجب إدراكنا لطبيعة الحرب المقبلة في لبنان، فعلينا تعزيز ثقة صناع القرار بسلاح البر».

ويعود منشأ هذه الخطورة، بحسب منطق غولان، من أن «سلاح الجو لن يتمكن من وقف آلاف الصواريخ في الحرب المقبلة، وبالتالي سيكون من الضروري دخول القوات البرية إلى أراضي العدو ووقف إطلاق الصواريخ. وإلا فإن الجبهة الداخلية ستتلقى ضربات صاروخية سيكون من الصعب عليها تحملها»، «والوضع سيشكل صدمة للجمهور». يتلاقى هذا «التحذير» أيضاً مع ما سبق أن أقر به الرئيس السابق لأركان جيش العدو غادي آيزنكوت عشية رأس السنة العبرية في أيلول الماضي، بأن سلاح الجو غير قادر على الانتصار في الحرب، وأن «الانتصار سيأتي حصراً عبر عمل القوات البرية».

لكن المشكلة أن هناك قدراً من التسليم الضمني بأن سلاح البر في جيش العدو، عاجز عن تحقيق أي حسم عسكري، فضلاً عن الكلفة الباهظة التي سيتلقاها. ومن هنا تنبع عدم ثقة القيادة العليا به، وهو ما وصفه غولان في الوثيقة، بأنه «مفهوم كارثي» وأن «وضع سلاح البر سيء جداً، وقائد ذراع البر لا يعمل…». ويضيف أيضاً أن «مشكلة القيادة العليا للجيش الإسرائيلي تكمن في الوعي، وهذه القيادة فعلاً لا تعتمد على سلاح البر… وحتى الاستثمارات المالية الكبيرة في سلاح البر لن تفيد». وهكذا يتضح فعلياً أن إسرائيل عالقة بين «خيار جوي عقيم وغزو بري متعذر» 

(«الأخبار»، 10 أيلول 2018 ).

يادلين مشكّكاً: إلى أي مدى يمكن أن يصل الهجوم البري؟ إلى بيروت؟ شمال لبنان؟ العراق؟

كل ذلك توالى بعد محاولات المؤسستين العسكرية والسياسية التشكيك بتقارير مفوض شكاوى الجنود في الجيش اللواء يتسحاق بريك، الذي أكد عدم جاهزية الجيش للحرب. لكن انكشاف وثيقة غولان أطاح بكل هذه الجهود الدعائية.

في المقابل، تدرك تل أبيب خطورة الصورة التي تتشكل في وعي أعداء إسرائيل حول عدم جاهزية سلاح البر. وتدرك أيضاً القدرات الصاروخية الهائلة التي يمتلكها محور المقاومة، والقادر من خلالها على دك الجبهة الداخلية، وهو ما وفَّر ردعاً استراتيجياً في مقابل القوة النارية والتدميرية الهائلة لجيش العدو. وانعكاس كل ذلك على معادلات الردع المتبادل، وعلى المدى الذي يمكن أن يبلغه أعداء إسرائيل في حال نشوب أي مواجهة كبرى.

أياً كانت المساعي التي تبذلها القيادة الإسرائيلية لتبديل صورة جيشها بنظر جمهورها وبنظر أعدائها، فإنها من الناحية العملية لم تعد تثق بجيشها في مواجهة قوى المقاومة، وباتت أمام حقيقتين لخّصهما رئيس الاستخبارات العسكرية السابق، اللواء عاموس يادلين. الأولى عبّر عنها بالقول: «أنا لا أوافق على الادعاء أن العملية البرية ستوقف إطلاق الصواريخ. إلى أي مسافة ستصل العملية البرية؟ حتى بيروت؟ حتى شمال لبنان؟ إلى غرب العراق؟». وهو أراد بذلك الإشارة إلى أن هذا التمدد الإسرائيلي المفترض لن يوقف أيضاً دك الجبهة الداخلية بالصواريخ. والثانية، أن «ذراع البر في الجيش الإسرائيلي يمثّل شعب إسرائيل الذي لا يريد إرسال جنوده إلى هجوم بريّ في الحرب المقبلة». وهي الحقيقة الأكثر إيلاماً وحضوراً في وعي قادة تل أبيب على المستويين السياسي والأمني.

The Yom Kippur Syndrome

September 18, 2018  /  Gilad Atzmon


A message to Jews from Gilad Atzmon

When the Yom Kippur War broke out 45 years ago I was ten years old.  I recall a lot of fear all around me. Israel was my home and it was about to be wiped out. This is what I believed at the time, and this is what everyone around me repeated. We were all certainly caught unprepared.

My father was called up by the Air Force in the early hours of Yom Kippur (October 6th 1973). We didn’t hear from him for a few weeks. We didn’t know whether he was alive. In fact, we had good reason to believe he wasn’t. We were very worried.  For the adults around me, the first days of the war were a reminder of the Shoah. Israeli leaders, Golda Meir and Moshe Dayan as well as the top Israeli military command appeared perplexed and hesitant on TV. Their message was: ‘the future isn’t clear, we may even witness the destruction of the 3rd temple.’

Years later, when I became an avid reader of history and military texts, it became clear to me that the collective Shoah dread into which we immersed ourselves was a manifestation of Jewish pre traumatic stress disorder (Pre TSD). We were tormented by a phantasmic fear. Neither the Syrians nor the Egyptian armies had plans to ‘destroy Israel,’ wipe out the Jewish state or ‘throw the Jews into the sea’. Their military objectives were, in fact, very limited. Neither the Egyptians nor the Syrians wished to expand their military ground operation beyond a few miles into the Sinai and the Golan Heights. Both Arab armies were dependent on Soviet ground to air missiles that severely limited Israeli air superiority above the battlefield. The Soviet missile umbrella provided about 10 miles of anti air cover and the Arab armies had no intent to proceed beyond that ‘safe’ zone.

It took me years to grasp that Israel’s panic during the first few days of the war led to some serious military blunders (such as the IDF’s disastrous counter offensive on the 8th of October). This panic was fuelled by projection.  Believing that the Arabs were ‘about to throw the Jews into the sea’, Israeli generals and cabinet members reacted irrationally and wasted their limited reserve forces in a  counter offensive that failed and cost many Israeli lives.

But why did the Israelis believe that the Arabs were about to throw them into the sea? Why did they assume the Arab armies were murderous or possibly genocidal? Why did PM Golda Meir and Defense Minister Moshe Dayan believe that the ‘3rd temple’ was about to be annihilated?  Simple, because the Israelis were and still are driven by lethal inclinations towards their neighbours. It was the Israelis who literally pushed the Palestinians into the sea in 1948 into the sea. Israelis were panicking because they were projecting their own symptoms onto the Arabs. 

In ‘The Wandering Who’ I elaborate on projection in the context of Jewish ‘pre traumatic stress.’ The principle is simple. The more murderous and sinister one is, the more fearful one becomes of others. Humans tend to attribute their own reasoning and symptoms onto others. Accordingly, the more menacing one is, the more sinister one believes the other to be.

Israelis consistently attribute their own racist and barbarian symptoms onto the Palestinians. The possibility that a Palestinian or an Arab would be as merciless as the IDF causes real and total panic for the Israeli. The thought that the Palestinians, for instance, would want to displace a quarter of Israeli citizens and massacre Israelis as the IDF has done to Gaza numerous times must evoke terror amongst Israelis and for a good reason.

But this state of collective anxiety is not unique to Israelis; it is embedded in Jewish culture. Basically, Jews are tormented by anti Semitism because they assume that their own ‘goy hatred’ is echoed by ‘Jew hatred’ from their gentile neighbours. As Martin Heidegger noted in the 1930s, the Jews opposed in the Nazis the racism which they recognized from themselves. Heidegger wrote in his Black Notebooks: the Jewish people, with their talent for calculation, were so vehemently opposed to the Nazi’s racial theories because

“they themselves have lived according to the race principle for longest.”

In 1973 Israel believed that that the Arabs were out to eradicate them because this is exactly what the Israelis would have liked to do to the Arabs.

The Syndrome

Projection is just one aspect of the Yom Kippur war. I guess that, at least from a philosophical perspective, the most interesting aspect of the 73 War was that it marked a sudden switch from Judeo centric manic ‘hubris’ to melancholia, apathy and depression.

Following their outstanding 1967 military victory, the Israelis developed an arrogant disrespectful attitude toward Arabs and their military capability. Israeli intelligence predicted that it would take years for Arab armies to recover. The Israeli military didn’t believe that the Arab soldier had the ability to fight, let alone score a victory.

But on 6 October 1973, the Israelis had a devastating surprise. This time the Arab soldier was very different. The Israeli military strategy that was built on air superiority and fast ground maneuvers supported by tanks was crushed in only a few hours. The Egyptians and Syrians helped by new Soviet antitank and ground to air missiles managed to dismantle Israeli’s might. In the first days of the war Israel suffered heavy casualties and, as mentioned above, the Israeli leadership and high command were in a state of despair. This type of crisis wasn’t new to the Jews. It is consistently symptomatic of Jewish culture to be ‘surprised’ and overwhelmed by the Goyim’s fierce resilience.

The Israeli military fiasco at the first stage of the war was a repetition of a tragic syndrome that is as old as the Jews themselves. Jewish hubris that is driven by a strong sense of choseness and that repeatedly leads to horrific consequences is what I call ‘The Yom Kippur Syndrome.’  The syndrome can be defined as a repeated chain of events that drive Jewish societies towards an extreme irrational sense of pride, arrogance, self-confidence and blindness toward others and the tragedy that inevitably follows.

On October 6th, the Israelis realised that they had grossly underestimated their enemies.  But it wasn’t the first time such a mistake occurred in Jewish history. Every Jewish disaster is, to a certain extent, a repetition of the Yom Kippur Syndrome. In 1920s Berlin the Jewish elite boasted of its power. Some rich Jews were convinced that Germany and its capital were Jewish occupied territories. At the time, a few German Jews dominated banking and influenced Germany’s politics and media. In addition, the Frankfurt School as well as other Jewish school of thoughts were openly dedicated to the cultural uprooting of Germans, all in the name of, ‘progress,’ ‘working class politics,’ phenomenology and cultural Marxism. Then, almost from nowhere, as far as German Jews were concerned, a tidal wave of resentment appeared. And the rest is known.

But was there really a sudden shift in German consciousness? Should German ‘anti Semitism’ have come as a surprise? Not at all. All necessary signs had been present for some time. In fact, Early Zionists such as Herzl and Nordau correctly predicted the inevitable rise of European anti Jewish sentiments. But Jewish hubris prevented Berlin’s Jewish elite from evaluating the growing opposition around them. The Yom Kippur Syndrome.

The same could be said of the Jewish Lobby, AIPAC, Friends of Israel clubs in Britain, the BOD, the three British Jewish papers that, in the name of British Jewry, declared war on Jeremy Corbyn and the Labour Party.  These Jewish lobbies and institutions that relentlessly seek influence over Western foreign affairs and the Labour Party in particular: do they grasp the level of resentment and the potential disaster they are bringing on their fellow Jews?

Can the Jew recover from the Yom Kippur Syndrome? Can the Jew somehow detect resentment as it grows and amend his or her ways?  All it takes is drifting away from choseness. But once stripped of choseness what is left of the Jew or for the Jew?

This may be the most devastating question and the true meaning of the existential Yom Kippur Syndrome; there is no Jewish collective ideological escape for the Jew. Zionism failed to provide the goods and the so called ‘anti Zionists’ have done little other than form their own racially exclusive enclaves of chosenness within the so called ‘Left over.’

The only escape route from the Yom Kippur Syndrome is personal and individual. Try leaving the tribe late in the night, crawl under the ghetto fence, dig a tunnel under the ‘separation wall’ if necessary and then once on land of the free, proceed quietly and modestly towards the humane and the universal.

Good luck

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