ترامب يعلن هزيمة بلاده من هلسنكي و»إسرائيل» تتجرّع طعمها في الميدان!

يوليو 18, 2018

محمد صادق الحسيني

لقد أصاب وزير الخارجية الأسبق جون كيري كبد الحقيقة عندما أعلن في تغريدة له نشرت على تويتر عند الساعة 22,56 من مساء 16/7/2018، وأعلن فيها أنّ ترامب «قد استسلم بقدّه وقديده» للرئيس الروسي فلاديمير بوتين، خلال القمة التي عُقدت بينهما يوم أول أمس الاثنين 16/7/2018.

حيث بدا الرئيس الأميركي في غاية الضعف والوهن، أمام الرئيس الروسي، المسلح بكمّ هائل من الانتصارات العسكرية في الميدان السوري، والتي ليس آخرها الانتصارات المتلاحقة التي يحققها الجيش السوري في ريفي درعا والقنيطرة، بمساعدة الجيش والقوات الجوفضائية الروسية، والتي ستتوّج قريباً، وقبل نهاية هذا الشهر، باستكمال الجيش السوري إعادة تحرير جميع المناطق التي يسيطر عليها المسلحون، بما في ذلك تلك الموجودة داخل ما يُسمّى المنطقة المنزوعة السلاح بين الجولان المحتلّ والمحرّر.

في هذه الأثناء فقد أصدرت وزارة الحرب الأميركية، عبر القيادة المركزية للمنطقة الوسطى والموجودة في الدوحة، أمر عمليات لغرفة العمليات الميدانية الأميركية في قاعدة التنف، نص على ما يلي:

1- يتمّ تسليم كافة أسلحة التنظيمات السورية المسلحة، أسود الشرقية، احمد العبدو، الموجودة في منطقة التنف، للسلطات العسكرية الأردنية فوراً ودونما إبطاء.

2- يتمّ نقل عناصر هذه التنظيمات الى مناطق الحسكة وشرق دير الزور فوراً ودمجها مع القوات الكردية التي تقاتل داعش.

علماً انّ مصدر استخبارات عسكرية أوروبية قد أكد انّ عمليات إخلاء القوات الأميركية ومعداتها العسكرية من شرق سورية قد كلّفت الخزينة الأميركية 300 مليون دولار حتى الآن!

وهذا يعني في ما يعني أنّ ما على «إسرائيل» الا أن تبلع لسانها وتقبل بالأمر الواقع والاعتراف بموازين القوى السائدة حالياً في الميدان السوري، خاصة أنها هي التي كانت قد سلمت هذه المنطقة للمسلحين، وبالتالي فهي التي تتحمّل المسؤولية الكاملة عن التغيّرات التي طرأت على الوضع في هذا الشريط!

ونحن نؤكد أنّ قادة «إسرائيل» العسكريين والسياسيين قد ذاقوا طعم كأس الهزيمة المرة، عندما أصدر رئيس الأركان المشتركة للجيوش الأميركية، الجنرال جوزيف دونفورد Joseph Dunford، أوامره لنظيره الإسرائيلي إيزنكوت، خلال زيارته الأخيرة الى واشنطن، بعدم القيام بأية استفزازات عسكرية قد تؤدي الى إلحاق الضرر بالتوجّهات الأميركية الخاصة بسورية، أيّ أنه أصدر له أمراً بالتزام ما يصدر له من أوامر أميركية فقط.

من هنا، فإنّ عملية التسلل الجوي، التي نفذها التشكيل الجوي الإسرائيلي عبر الأجواء الأردنية ليلة 16/7/2018، وقام بمحاولة قصف بعض المنشآت العسكرية السورية شمال مطار النيرب، لم تكن إلا محاولة إسرائيلية فاشلة لذرّ الرماد في عيون سكان «إسرائيل» أنفسهم، وذلك لأنّ من أصدر الأوامر بتنفيذ الغارة هو نفسه الذي تسلم أمر العمليات الأميركي بعدم التحرّك ضدّ الجيش السوري، خلال هجومه الحالي في أرياف درعا والقنيطرة والذي سيكون من بين أهدافه السيطرة على معبر القنيطرة بين الجولان المحتلّ والمحرّر، كما أبلغ دانفورد نظيره الإسرائيلي.

لذا، فإنّ الضعف الذي لاحظه المراقبون والمشرّعون الأميركيون، قبل أيّ جهة أخرى، على رئيسهم خلال المؤتمر الصحافي الذي أعقب القمة، لم يأتِ من فراغ وإنما كان نتيجة منطقية لفشل المشروع الأميركي، ليس فقط في سورية وإنما على الصعيد الإقليمي والدولي، والذي شرع الأميركي بالاعتراف به وترجمته إلى وقائع على الأرض حتى قبل انعقاد القمة.

وذلك بعد أن أكملت وزارة الحرب الأميركية سحب قواتها وتجهيزاتها العسكرية من قواعدهم في مناطق شمال شرق سورية، التي يُقال إنها تحت سيطرة الأكراد، والإبقاء على عدد قليل جداً من «المستشارين» الذين سيتمّ سحبهم تدريجياً وفِي تطابق زمني مع عودة سيطرة الدولة السورية على تلك المناطق. وما الاتصالات الدائرة حالياً بين الحكومة السورية وجهات كردية بعينها في شمال شرق البلاد لترتيب عملية إعادة سيطرة الدولة، تدريجياً، على هذه المناطق إلا خير دليل على ذلك.

أيّ أنّ على الطرف الأميركي أن يجد نفسه مرغماً على الاعتراف بهزيمة مشروعه واضطراره الى وقف عبث كافة أدواته المحلية والإقليمية في الشأن السوري، بما في ذلك الإسرائيلي والأردني والسعودي والخليجي وغيرهم.

فها هو محمد بن سلمان، الذي كان يهدّد بنقل الحرب الى العمق الإيراني، صامتاً صمت القبور على الرغم من أنّ إيران قد نقلت الحرب الى العمق «الإسرائيلي» فيما هي تواصل صمودها في وجه التهديدات والحصار الأميركيين.

وها هو ملك الأردن، الذي كان يتبجّح بأنّ جيشه قادر على الوصول الى دمشق خلال أربع وعشرين ساعة، يهرب الى واشنطن ويغيب عن السمع والنظر منذ أكثر من شهر، وهو يتفرّج عاجزاً على سيطرة الجيش العربي السوري على الحدود الأردنية السورية، بما فيها معبر نصيب بين البلدين، ويقبر أحلامه المريضة التي كانت تراوده حول إمكانية استعادة «مملكة فيصل الهاشمية» التي أقامها المحتلّ البريطاني الفرنسي في عشرينيات القرن الماضي في سورية.

وها هو أردوغان يرغم على تحويل التفاهمات التي تمّ التوصل إليها في أستانة، مع كلّ من سورية وإيران، الى اتفاقيات رسمية ودون الإعلان عن ذلك، كما الموافقة على دخول الجيش السوري الى محافظة إدلب وإعادة انتشاره فيها، بالتزامن مع إعادة سيطرة هذا الجيش المنتصر على المناطق الخاضعة لسيطرة الكرد في شمال شرق سورية، وذلك لضمان ضبط الحدود بين البلدين ومن أجل الحفاظ على مصالح كلّ منهما، طبقاً لاتفاق أضنه، الموقع بين الدولتين عام 1999. ومن نافل القول طبعاً إنّ انسحاب القوات التركية من مناطق شمال غرب سورية لم يعد إلا تحصيل حاصل. وهو الأمر الذي سيتمّ تثبيته وتأكيده في القمة الثلاثية التي ستنعقد في طهران أواخر الشهر الحالي بين رؤساء كلّ من إيران وروسيا وتركيا.

اما «الإسرائيلي» فهو غارق في أزمته الاستراتيجية، الناجمة عن عجزه عن مواجهة قوات حلف المقاومة، على جبهتين في الشمال والجنوب، أيّ على جبهة قطاع غزة وعلى الجبهة السورية اللبنانية، وذلك في أية حرب قد ينزلق اليها اذا ارتكب أيّ حماقة على أيّ من هاتين الجبهتين. وهو العاجز تماماً عن مواجهة طائرات «ف 1» الفلسطينية الطائرات الورقية التي تنطلق من قطاع غزة والتي يطالب بتضمين وقفها في أيّ اتفاق تهدئة يتمّ التوصل اليه مع فصائل المقاومة الفلسطينية في قطاع غزة.

الأمر لنا من جبل عامل والجولان الى النقب وتيران.

بعدنا طيّبين قولوا الله.

Related Videos

Related Articles

Advertisements

BASIC LAW OF THE JUNGLE

South front

05.07.2018

Basic Law of the Jungle

Written by Evegny Satanovsky; Originally appeared at VPK, translated by AlexD exclusively for SouthFront

This article was released by VPK on June 26, 2018

Work on the Syrian Constitution Should be Preceded by an agreement of Moscow and Tehran with Ankara and Washington

Government forces, having freed the Damascus suburbs from militants, begin cleaning the southern provinces of Syria, which is a zone of US interest. The latter continue to support the Islamists on the border with Jordan, trying to stop pro-Iranian Shi’ites on the border with Iraq, using the UN structures in Geneva to their advantage.

The US is concerned about reports of increased activity of the Syrian Armed Forces within the de-escalation zone in the south-west, the agreement on the establishment of which was reached between the US, Russia and Jordan in Hamburg on July 7, 2017. It came into force on July 9, 2017 in accordance with the truce in the provinces of Deraa, Quneitra and as-Suwayda. Above all, the US has no tools of influence on this situation. They are not in any condition to influence it by force; there are no American forces or allied formations in the area.

To act through the al-Tanf base with forces of trained militants, moving them to the south is futile. From a military point of view, such a raid and exit from the security zone of 55 kilometres from the aforementioned base is fraught with air strikes. Even more so, to go into such a campaign large formations are needed. From a political point of view, the lunge there of pro-American forces will make them allies of the jihadists, who form the backbone of the resistance in the southern de-escalation zone. The Americans cannot deliver air strikes on the advancing government forces on a permanent basis, and they cannot disrupt the offensive with their strikes. Plus it is fraught with direct clashes with Russian air defence forces.

The US can try to influence the situation through the Jordanian and Israeli facilities, which have influence among the rebels in southern Syria. But Tel Aviv has signed an agreement with Moscow on “non-interference”, and Amman has serious problems within the country due to unpopular economic reforms, so it does not want to actively intervene in the situation. So Washington has one lever – Ankara’s stimulation to block the implementation of the scheme “withdrawal of militants in exchange for security” in the south of Syria, which was previously used in East Ghouta and Aleppo.

Americans curtsey to the Turks in connection with the agreements on Manbij and the transfer of two F-35 fighters to them, contrary to the demands of Congress, have, among other things, this goal. They promise the Turks future incorporation as the main US ally in Syria in exchange for Ankara blocking any agreements between the part of the opposition in the south they controlled with Damascus, which will make the refusal of any agreements with Assad and other rebel groups automatic. But Ankara does not believe Washington fully; the manoeuvres on their rapprochement are just going on. The same applies to the Manbij theme and the disarmament of the Kurds.

Ankara demands their mandatory disarmament. They, no matter how they are tied to the support of the US, will not go for it, but the Americans do not have enough forces to the coercive disarmament of the Kurdish troops. In addition, for Washington, this will mean the designation of a break with the Kurds as potential allies at a time when the alliance with the Turks is not fully formed. The United States control of the Sunnis beyond the Euphrates is a big question as well.

Thus, relations between the US and Turkey, according to the analytical agency Startfor, will deteriorate. Erdogan used the anti-American attitude of the Turks to gain electoral advantages from the Nationalists. Sharp anti-Western and anti-American rhetoric has become commonplace in Turkey during the election period, complicating the already tense relations between Ankara, the US and the EU. Nevertheless, we can assume that in case of a hard mindset in Washington on Ankara’s conversion into a key partner in Syria, Erdogan will swing the US side after the elections.

There is an economic reason for this. The Turkish economy is experiencing difficulties and the unstable national currency makes Turkey vulnerable to pressure. Especially since the US remains its main supplier of weapons, because Ankara does not want to depend on Russia nor on China in the field of military-technical cooperation.

The Kurds will be Betrayed Again

In Abu Kamal and its environs, there are periodic battles between government forces and supporters of ISIS (banned in Russia) since June 8, which were squeezed out of Iraq by Shi’ite groups of al-Hashd al-Shaabi, trying to connect with the Syrian troops in the area of this strategic town and close a single arc of control. On June 18, the formation of the coalition “Forces of Democratic Syria” (SDS), the backbone of which are the Kurds, knocked out the terrorists from the Al-Dashisha area in the south-east in the province of al-Hasakah. The SDS reported in a communiqué that Al-Dashisha was a major outpost of ISIS terrorists.

The Iraqi Air forces played the main role in the preparation of the progress of the Kurds. They did this in coordination with the US forces, which served as goal spotters. The Americans are trying, on the one hand, to ensure the liberation of al-Hasakah by Kurdish forces up to the border with Iraq and, at the same time to restrain the movement of pro-Iranian groups in the area of Abu Kamal. Last Saturday, the town of Tel Shair was liberated from ISIS. In the neighbouring province of Deir ez-Zor, terrorists are holding three districts, Hajin, Ash Sha’fah and As Susah. In total, less than three percent of Syrian territory remains under their control in the provinces of Raqqa, Deir ez-Zor and al-Hasakah after the defeat of the main ISIS forces in the autumn of 2017.

The question of who will take control of the maximum area beyond the Euphrates, and especially in Deir ez-Zor and al-Hasakah. Iraqi government troops al-Hashd al-Shaabi accused the United States of shelling its positions on the border with Syria and the death of 22 soldiers. The Americans denied this, although in fact the incident took place. At the same time, the US is interested in further coordination efforts with Baghdad, and the strike was in the nature of a warning to the Shi’ites about the need to contain offensive fervour, which is unlikely to affect them. The Americans clearly do not have enough real forces “on the ground” to complete this operation. And if Baghdad reduces air support as a result of the current incident, the situation for the SDS could worsen even more. We will note that the Kurds from the “Democratic Union” (DS) party continue to fight on the side of the coalition, despite all the advances of the US with Turkey on Manbij. This means that the leadership of the DS either received guarantees of immunity from Washington, or is confident that beyond Manbij on the other side of the Euphrates, the Americans will not let the Turks in. And all the talk from the Kurds about their readiness for a dialogue with Damascus, which rang after the reports about the agreement between the US and Turkey on Manbij, ceased.

So far, apparently, there is no clarity in Ankara. Hence the statement of the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Turkey on the inviolability of the deal with Moscow on the S-400. Such rhetoric always arises in response to the actions of the US Congress to block the supply of weapons to Turkey. The position of the Americans is currently risky – they will have to choose, and there is every reason to believe that the choice will not be in favour of the Kurds, they will once again be betrayed in favour of global American interests in Syria.

The Geneva Meeting of the Guarantors

High-ranking representatives of the guarantor countries of the truce in Syria (Russia, Iran, Turkey) held consultations on the formation of the Syrian Constitutional Committee in Geneva at the invitation of the UN Secretary-General’s Special Envoy for Syria Staffan de Mistura. From Russia, Aleksandr Lavrentiev, the President’s Special Envoy of the Syrian Settlement, and the Vice-Minister of Foreign Affairs Sergey Veshinin attended the round, from Iran and Turkey Deputy Foreign Ministers Hossein Jaberi Ansari and Sedat Onal respectively.

The successful meetings, including with the Syrian opposition, were devoted to drawing up a list of candidates for the Committee. They agreed to meet in Geneva in three weeks to continue discussions. The results of the meeting are still intermediate, the parties used it to fix the positions at the current stage. As for the Constitutional Committee, the legitimacy of the future basic law from the point of view of the international community will depend on the representation of various segments of the Syrian society in it.

The very agreement on the formation of the Committee was reached by the results of the Syrian National Dialogue Congress held in Sochi on January 30. This structure, together with Staffan de Mistura, will prepare proposals for the elaboration of the country’s constitution. There should be 150 people as candidates. One hundred of them should represent the government and internal (moderate) opposition and fifty should be candidates from the external opposition.

Official Damascus gave the special envoy its list. Representatives of a number of opposition groups participating in the Congress in Sochi sent their own version of the document to the guarantor countries on June 15 (the “Moscow” platform, the “Tomorrow of Syria” movement). The Syrian negotiating Committee has not done so. That is, there is no desire for internal and external opposition, if we are to understand this term as not “Moscow” or pro-Iranian groups, but real opponents of Damascus, to participate in the work of this body and create it. This demonstrated the position of the main sponsors of the opposition in the person of the KSA, Turkey, Qatar and Jordan, not to mention the US and its western allies.

While the opposition does not want to engage in a dialogue with Damascus, exposing a lot of impossible conditions like the departure of Bashar al-Assad and the withdrawal of Iranian forces. In this regard, there are two options for moving forward. The first, the definitive completion of elimination of the strongholds of the irreconcilable resistance in central and southern Syria at least to the Euphrates. As long as there are pockets of resistance on this territory, and ISIS troops operate from Palmyra to the Euphrates, it is pointless to talk about negotiations with the opposition. The second, the independent formation of a committee of representatives of the agreement-capable part of the opposition, reconciled tribes and the Kurds agreeable to Damascus. However, this option is bad due to the limited representation of all segments of the Syrian society and will quickly exhaust itself.

Obviously, the topic of the constitution is far ahead in time. Moscow is pedaling this process to demonstrate the final phase of its mission in Syria and set a precedent for resolving local conflicts as opposed to the American model in Iraq or the French model in Libya. However, the parties to the conflict and most of their sponsors do not want to deal with the constitution.

The constitution and the global Geneva negotiations format are not yet ready. Nine meetings were held in Astana, the tenth with be held in late July, early August in Sochi, and the 11th and 12th, perhaps, again in Kazakhstan. At the same time, it is too early to talk about holding a new Congress of the Syrian National Dialogue, and this in itself indicates contradictions. In Geneva, the main point of divergence of positions between Moscow and Tehran, on the one hand and Ankara, on the other became obvious. Negotiations on Syria in Astana will not make sense in the event of the Syrian Army offensive in the province of Idlib, which is one of the de-escalation zones, Foreign Minister Mevlüt Çavuşoğlu told NTV, because in this development of events “there will be no sense in Turkey’s cooperation with Iran and Russia”.

Moscow’s position is obvious – it requires Ankara to separate the opposition in Idlib with the elimination of Jabhat al-Nusra supporters. Ankara plans to put these groups under the control both through reconciliation and through the absorption of their groups by pro-Turkish opposition groups. In this case, a non-agreement-capable opposition group remains in Idlib, making any attempts of creating a constitution impossible. Even more so, in Ankara’s plans for Syria there is no desire to conduct a dialogue with Damascus about the future political architecture of this country.

Moscow calls on groups of moderates to go not just to reconciliation with Damascus in the south of Syria, but also to take an active part in the destruction of the remaining ISIS and Jabhat al-Nusra troops there. Turkey has its own point of view on this issue. Only if Moscow can guarantee that the SAS troops will remain legally in the south of Syria, and will not take any military action in Idlib, agreeing that this province is a zone of strategic interest and influence solely to Ankara, the latter are willing to somehow participate in operations against the “irreconcilables”. There is little doubt that after Erdogan’s victory in the presidential elections, he will not soften this position.

White Helmets Again in the Arsenal

The US State Department on May 4 announced the termination of the allocation of funds to the White Helmets, but on June 14 announced the continuation of the programme of financing this organisation. It is planned to allocate 6.6 million dollars to this end. The US has supported the White Helmets since 2013. During this time, the American authorities have provided them with more than 33 million dollars. The White Helmets have repeatedly made statements that the Syrian government forces’ aircraft strike civilians areas. The parties will ultimately remain with their own: Moscow will deny any data that are obtained with the use of White Helmets, and the West will take the opposite position. It is important that the US security forces persuaded the administration and personally President Donald Trump to leave the funding of this NGO in their charge. Earlier, the Americans tried to shift the financing of this structure to the British and the KSA intelligence services, this was as ordered by Trump himself. But something has changed, most likely the security forces realised that Riyadh will not be able to control the process in the right direction for the US. In addition, this fact made the Helmets’ activities more vulnerable from the point of view of their connection with Jabhat al-Nusra.

In this situation the CIA was able to convince Trump that the White Helmets should be kept under their control. Fortunately, a military operation is expected to eliminate the de-escalation zone in the south of the country, and among the few options for influencing the situation in the right direction for the US remains another staging of “the use of chemical weapons by Damascus.” The conditions for this were created last year, when in southern Syria Jordanian experts collect “biological materials”. Thus, provocations with accusations of Damascus of using chemical weapons and “respect for human rights” remaining in Washington’s arsenal on the Syrian track and will be used in the near future.

This article is based on material from the Middle East Institute expert Yu. Schelgovin.

SYRIAN WAR REPORT – JUNE 26, 2018: SYRIAN ARMY LIBERATED LAJAT DISTRICT IN DARAA PROVINCE

South Front

The Syrian Arab Army (SAA), the Tiger Forces and their allies have reportedly established full control of the district of Lajat in the province of Daraa. According to pro-government sources, militants in the area have mostly surrendered to government troops.

Additionally, the SAA and its allies liberated the village of Mleha al-‘Atsh and captured the center of Busr al-Harir.

If all these reports are confirmed, government forces have liberated about 400km2 since the start of clashes in northeastern Daraa last week.

On June 25, the Russian Defense Ministry released a statement saying that Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (formerly Jabhat al-Nusra) had carried out a large attack on government positions in the province. The attack was repelled and 70 militants were killed.

This attack likely was an attempt to sabotage the SAA progress in Lajat.

On June 26, Israel reportedly carried out a new missile strike on Syria targeting the Damascus International Airport.

According to pro-government sources, at least two missiles fell in near the airport. Pro-Israeli sources claim that the strike hit an Iranian cargo plane inside the airport.

Local sources say that Syrian air defense systems were employed. However, it is unclear if some missiles were intercepted.

An alleged pro-government partisan group, the Popular Resistance in Manbij, has announced the start of preparations for an uprising against foreign occupiers – i.e. forces of the US, France and Turkey – aiming to divide Syria.

In April, a similar group, entitled “the Popular Resistance in al-Hasakah”, appeared in eastern Syria. This group also threatened the US-led coalition and its proxies with attacks. However, no notable attacks have been carried out so far.

In any case, appearance of such groups show that far from everyone in northeastern Syria like the US-led coalition.

Related News

كمينٌ نصبه قاسم سليماني

يونيو 5, 2018

ناصر قنديل

– تدعو مصادر على صلة وثيقة بمجريات الحرب في سورية إلى تذكّر كيفية مقايضة الحملة العسكرية التي نظمها الرئيس الأميركي السابق باراك اوباما على سورية بالحل السياسي للسلاح الكيميائي لسورية، وتقول كان هذا الكمين الاستراتيجي الثاني الذي نُصب للأميركيين، وتعود فكرته للرئيس السوري بشار الأسد الذي استبق الحملة بإبلاغ الرئيس الروسي فلاديمير بوتين أنه يضع بين يديه التوظيف التفاوضي لحل سياسي يُنهي السلاح الكيميائي لسورية، لاستخدامه في لحظة احتدام خطر تدخّل أميركي واسع النطاق عسكرياً. بعدما كان الكمين الأول بما عُرف ببيان جنيف واحد من صناعة وزير الخارجية الروسية سيرغي لافروف وينصّ على كلام غامض عن حل سياسي وهيئة حكم انتقالية لإلهاء الأميركيين عن فكرة التدخّل العسكري، بعدما تكفل الفيتو الروسي الصيني بحرمانهم من التغطية الأممية، لحين تصير روسيا جاهزة لمثل هذا التدخل.

– مع التموضع الروسي في سورية، كان السؤال الاستراتيجي هو كيف يمكن الحؤول دون تحول تموضع عسكري روسي وأميركي متقابلين سبباً لتقسيم سورية وتكرار النموذج الكوري فيها، خصوصاً بوجود أطماع تركية وإسرائيلية باقتطاع بعض من الجغرافيا السورية تحت شعار الحزام الأمني، يُضاف إليهما وجود تطلع كردي لكيان منفصل. تقول المصادر إن السؤال كان على طاولة الاجتماع الذي سبق التموضع الروسي وضمّ الرئيس بوتين والجنرال قاسم سليماني، وكان الجواب الذي صاغه سليماني يرتكز على فكرة الكمين الاستراتيجي النوعي الذي سيتوقف عليه تغيير وجهة الحرب ورسم نتائجها.

– تأسست الحركة الروسية الإيرانية على القناعة المشتركة بأن استعادة الدولة السورية لعافيتها وجغرافيتها الموحّدة تحت سيادة جيشها ورئيسها يشكل النصر الاستراتيجي المنشود، من جهة، وأن التسليم التركي والكردي بقبول هذه الحقيقة يتوقفان على التسليم الأميركي الذي يتوقف بدوره على التسليم الإسرائيلي، من جهة مقابلة. وأنه خلافاً لما قد يبدو من حجم الانتشار الأميركي وتوزّعه بين المناطق السورية بأولوية الشمال على الجنوب، فإن جنوب سورية حيث أمن «إسرائيل» هو ما سيقرّر، وأن الدفع بما يتكفّل بإثارة القلق على الأمن الإسرائيلي وحده سيتكفل بجعل روسيا مقصداً لطلب الضمانات التي ستكون تحت عنوان الدعوة للتسليم بالدولة السورية السيّدة والموحّدة في ظلّ رئيسها وجيشها، وأن إثارة القلق الإسرائيلي إلى حدّ الذعر مهمة إيران وحزب الله، وإثبات لا جدوى التعامل الإسرائيلي عسكرياً مع هذا الذعر، مهمة إيران وحزب الله والجيش السوري بعد تحسين دفاعاته الجوية برعاية روسية، حتى يصير المطلب الإسرائيلي التسريع بتسلّم الجيش السوري للحدود الجنوبية، حتى لو تمّت المقايضة بين عدم وجود انتشار لإيران وحزب الله في المنطقة بطلب تفكيك القاعدة الأميركية في التنف، التي تولّى الروس بلسان وزير خارجيتهم جعلها مصدر الشرّ الدائم في سورية. وهم يعلمون أنها أعرق وأخطر القواعد الأميركية لإمساكها بطريق دمشق بغداد التي تشكّل جوهر الحركة الاستراتيجية لإيران في المنطقة.

– أميركا و»إسرائيل» بين خيارين اليوم، خوض حرب أو قبول تسوية. حرب ميؤوس من الفوز بها وسرعان ما ستنزلق نحو تهديد العمق الإسرائيلي والمواجهات على التخوم. والتجربة الأخيرة لليلة الصواريخ تحكي الكثير. أو ارتضاء تسوية تضمن التسليم بوحدة وسيادة الدولة السورية بجيشها ورئيسها، انطلاقاً من الجنوب، بنموذج سيتكرّر شمالاً، تحت عنوان مقايضة القواعد الأميركية بعدم انتشار قوى المقاومة في المناطق التي سيخليها الأميركيون والجماعات المسلحة التي تتلقى الدعم منهم. والخيار هنا يشبه خيار المسلحين المحدود تفاوضياً بانتقاء لون الباصات التي سيرحلون عليها، أو التسمية التي سينضوي من يبقى منهم عبرها تحت عباءة الجيش السوري، بلجان محلية أو دفاع شعبي.

– ستكون للسعوديين والإسرائيليين ومعهم بعض رموز المعارضة فرصة الاحتفال بالتسوية، كما احتفلوا بالحلّ السياسي للسلاح الكيميائي السوري، وهم يعلمون أن آخر فرصهم قد ضاعت في سورية.

Related videos

Related articles

الأميركيون يبحثون عن بديل للجنوب السوري

يونيو 4, 2018

د. وفيق إبراهيم

يُطلق حكام الخليج علامات استفهام حول الموافقة الأميركية والإسرائيلية والأردنية حول انسحاب محتمل لقواتهم من المناطق الحدودية في الجنوب السوري.

ويجهلون أنّ الحرب موازين قوى بدأت ترجَح بوضوح لمصلحة الجيش السوري وحلفائه منذ تحرير أرياف الغوطة الشرقية والغربية المؤدية «طبيعياً» إلى درعا وصولاً إلى الأردن من جهة، ومن القنيطرة إلى أسفل الجولان السوري المحتل، من جهة ثانية، ومن بادية الشام إلى قاعدة التنف الأميركية التي تؤمّن نقطة التقاء بين الأردن وسورية والعراق من جهة ثالثة..

الحرب إذاً أولها معارك وآخرها سياسة، إلاّ عند الأغبياء الذين يريدون من الآخرين أن يخوضوا معاركهم مكتفين بنشر المال ومتوقعين نتائج سياسية لمصلحتهم.

لذلك تنعقد المفاوضات الثلاثية في عمّان بين روسيا وأميركا والأردن لتأمين انتشار هادئ للجيش السوري في المناطق مع محاولات فاشلة سلفاً لتأمين مصالح نسبية للطرفين الأميركي والأردني.

يجب هنا الإقرار بأنّ التحالف السوري ـ الإيراني أثبت عمقه الاستراتيجي بعد الألاعيب الأميركية ـ الإسرائيلية لتصديعه، كاشفاً أنّ اهتمامات طهران متركّزة حول استرداد الدولة السورية سيادتها وتعزيز مناعتها. وهذا لا يكون إلاّ بنشر قواتها، خصوصاً عند النقاط الحدودية ما يكشف أنّ المسؤولين الإيرانيين يعرفون بدقة أنّ مجابهة النفوذ الأميركي ـ الإسرائيلي تتطلب أولاً إعادة بناء الدولة السورية.. وهذا واضح من الخطة الأميركية المستمرّة منذ ست سنوات لتدميرها وتفتيتها ولا تزال تحاول بسرابيل جديدة..

روسيا بدورها تعرف أنّ عودتها إلى نظام إنتاج القرار العالمي.. تتطلّب «سورية» قوية بنظام أسدي متمكّن أثبت جدارته بالتعامل مع كلّ أنواع التطورات على أساس استشراف عميق لتطورات الأوضاع، اكتسبها من خبرات تاريخية.

ينعقد إذاً لقاء عمّان وسط قبول إسرائيلي بالإكراه بانتشار الجيش السوري عند حدود «جولانه المحتلّ» إلى جانب الشرطتين العسكريتين الروسية والسورية، في أنحاء درعا، ووقف كلّ أدوار المخابرات الأردنية العاملة بين عشائر المنطقة تمويلاً وتدريباً وتسليحاً.

ماذا تعني هذه المواقفات، لا يمكن تفسيرها إلا باضطرار المحور الإسرائيلي ـ الأردني للتخلي عن كلّ أنواع المعارضات في منطقة درعا.. لأنّ انتشار الجيش على الحدود جنوباً وتطويقه مناطق المعارضة شرقاً وشمالاً وغرباً.. إنما ينهي وضعها من دون قتال وإطلاق نار.. وذلك بسبب القطع المرتقب لخطوط تموينها وتذخيرها وتسليحها.. لعلَّ أهالي درعا هم مستعدّون للفتك بهذا الإرهاب الجاثم على صدورهم بذرائع لم تعد تنطلي على أحد.

هناك قرائن تثبت أنّ حكام الأردن هم أكثر المرحّبين بالاتفاق المرتقب على جنوب سورية.

وذلك لأسباب داخلية ترتبط بانهيار النظام الاقتصادي الأردني.. وما الاضطرابات الشعبية المحتجة على الضرائب ورفع أسعار المحروقات إلا بداية انتفاضات شعبية، قد يكون مداها عميقاً في النظام السياسي الأردني، خصوصاً أنها اندلعت على الرغم من الخدمات العسكرية والتنظيمية والسياسية التي يوفرها نظام عبدالله الثاني لكلّ أنواع الإرهاب في جنوب سورية.. فلماذا تقطع السعودية والإمارات المساعدات عن عمان التي عكست مصالح الأميركيين والخليجيين بدقة.

قد يكون الأردنيون توصلوا إلى قناعة راسخة تؤكد أنّ أموال التسوّل المتعلقة بالتبعية السياسية لا تُطعِم شعباً. وهي رهن الذي يدفعها.. فإذا ما تضايق ولو لمرة واحدة فقد يقلّصها أو يقطعها دفعة واحدة. هذا ما يشجّع الأردن على المطالبة بفتح حدود سورية معه لتحسين التبادلات الاقتصادية من جهة وتشجيع مليون سوري نازح إليه، للعودة إلى مناطقهم وتخفيف الضغط الاقتصادي على عمّان. فتتأمّن بذلك موارد دائمة وتنخفض معدلات البطالة التي لا تنفك ترتفع. علماً أنّ الشعب في الأردن وسورية واحد في المنبت والتاريخ والجغرافيا والاقتصاد.. فكما أنّ هناك حوراناً سورية، فهناك «حوران أردني» اقتطعه المحتلّ البريطاني وألحقه بدولة الهاشميين. لكن العلاقات بين عشائر المنطقتين متواصلة هناك. إذاً موافقة إسرائيلية على خطة جنوب سورية. سببها محاولة «إسرائيل» الاحتماء من الأدوار المستقبلية للمقاومات. وهناك أيضاً ترحيب أردني حارّ للأسباب الاقتصادية والاضطرابات الشعبية، إلى جانب سبب كامن.. يخشاه دائماً الهاشميون، له علاقة بنغمات إسرائيلية خليجية حول تحويل الأردن وطناً بديلاً للفلسطينيين مع قسم بسيط من الضفة الغربية التي تصرّ «إسرائيل» على تسميتها «بيهودا او السامرة». وهذا يعني إضافة تبرير تاريخي «مزعوم» للاستيلاء على القسم الأكبر منها.. وهي المعروفة تاريخياً بأنها أراضي «كنعان» والفلسطينيين المنحدرين منهم.

لكن ماذا يحمل الأميركيون لمفاوضات عمّان وهم الطرف الأكثر تأثيراً؟

الدولة الأميركية عظمى، لكنها براغماتية وقارئة بعمق لموازين القوى على غير الطريقة البدوية. فواشنطن تعرف أنّ الجيش السوري تمكّن من «إنقاذ معظم سورية» بوحدته أولاً وتحالفات دولته ثانياً. لأنّ انهيار الجيش كان سيؤدّي إلى انهيار الدولة، فكيف تقاتل التحالفات؟

لذلك فإنّ الأميركيين عندما يشعرون بتراجع مشروعهم السوري، كما يحدث حالياً، يبحثون عن آليات جديدة للاستمرار تؤدّي إلى استمرار مخططهم بأساليب جديدة.

بالاستناد إلى ما سبق، يتبيّن أنّ الهدف الأميركي من قاعدة التنف ذو شقين: الأول قطع الطريق السورية مع الأردن والعراق. أما الثاني فهو الإشراف على التحرك العسكري للمنظمات الإرهابية. وإذا كان الجزء الثاني يتراجع مع الهزائم، فإنّ القسم الأول استراتيجي بعمق لأنّ الحدود المفتوحة بين سورية والعراق، تنعش البلدين اقتصادياً وتعزّز وضعيهما عسكرياً وإقليمياً على حساب الأدوار السعودية والتركية والإسرائيلية.

فتفتقت عبقرية الأميركيين عن البدء ببناء قاعدة «تنف» جديدة داخل الأراضي العراقية بمواجهة جغرافية مع القاعدة الحالية وغير بعيدة عنها. أيّ أنّ بوسعها أداء وظيفة قطع الطريق بين سورية والعراق. وهذا يعني وجود استعداد أميركي للتخلّي عن قاعدة «التنف»، لكن ما هو المقابل؟

مفاوضات عمّان لن تخلو من الحدّة.. لأنّ الأميركيين يصرّون على ما يشبه «المقايضة» بين غرب سوري على مقربة من الحدود الشمالية لسورية وحتى الحدود الجنوبية من الجولان وحتى دير الزور. أما المقابل الذي تريده واشنطن فهو مشروع كردي أميركي شرق الفرات حتى مشارف الاحتلال التركي في الشمال، حيث يحاول الأميركيون عقد اتفاقات ثنائية مع الأتراك في منبج.

وبذلك يحافظ الأميركيون على مشروعهم من زاويتين: تفتيت سورية بين «دولة» وكرد ضمن المشروع الأميركي وتركي بواسطة الاحتلال العسكري التركي المتغطي «بجيش حر مزعوم» ومنظمات تركمانية أكثر شبهة وإخوان مسلمين تناثروا كورق الخريف الذابل.

لهذه الأسباب، كان وزير الخارجية السوري المعلم شديد الوضوح لجهة مشروع الدولة السورية:

أولاً الإصرار على تحرير كلّ منطقة سورية محتلة، ودعوة الكرد للتفاوض مع الدولة السورية، وإلا فإنها قد تلجأ إلى قتالهم.

ثانياً إفهام الأميركيين أنّ المساومات ممنوعة.

ثالثاً، إعلان صمود التحالف الاستراتيجي مع إيران غير القابل للاهتزاز بأيّ نوع من التحريض الخليجي، الإسرائيلي والأميركي، لأنه تحالف استراتيجي مستمرّ عسكرياً وسياسياً واقتصادياً.

رابعاً، التمسك بالدور الروسي الاستراتيجي الموازن للبربرية الأميركية.

خامساً: إفهام تركيا أنّ أوان المناطق السورية التي تحتلها لم يَعُد بعيداً.

وأخيراً، فإنّ المعلم أفهم في رسالة منه إلى اللبنانيين أنّ سورية هي الحضن الوحيد القادر على التعاون معهم، بما يفيد الدولتين خصوصاً أنّ الحدود مع الأردن والعراق قاب قوسين أو أدنى من التشغيل، وهذا يعني العودة التدريجية إلى الازدهار.

بأيّ حال، لن يكون لقاء الأردن سهلاً، كما يتوهّم البعض.. فقد يشهد تصعيداً وتراجعاً تبعاً لموازنات القوى المحلية والاستراتيجية. لكن الأكيد هو أنّ سورية عادت رقماً صعباً في صراع الأمم على امتلاك وسائل القوة.

White Helmets Show

 12.05.2018

White Helmets Show

Illustrative image: White Helmets members

Written by Evgeny Satanovsky; Originally appeared at VPK, translated by AlexD exclusively for SouthFront

Reputational risks are passed onto Britain and France

Contradictory statements from the US leadership on the situation of “defeated” Islamists in Syria and Iraq compel experts to question the real state of ISIS, al Qaida and other not so well known groups. It is also interesting what the termination of US funding of the White Helmets means after the failure of the East Ghouta provocation with Damascus being accused of chemical weapons use.

With the return of Islamists on the battlefield of the SAR, the Kurds in Syria returned to the Euphrates valley. The situation in the de-escalation zones in the south of the country and in Idlib merits special attention, as well as the financial position of the Islamist groups. Y. Schelgovin of the Middle East Institute provided materials for this article.

Movements of the Kurds

Kurdish forces of the Forces of the Democratic Syria (FDS) began to return from the north-west of the SAR to the Euphrates valley for the continuation of the struggle against ISIS. Colonel Ryan Dillon of the US Army, spokesperson for the “Unwavering Determination” command centre, made the announcement, which is carried out in Iraq and Syria by the coalition headed by the United States. At the beginning of March the Pentagon admitted that ground operations against ISIS were stopped in February, since a part of Kurdish forces from the FDS were directed to the Euphrates valley to fight Turkish forces in the north-west, in Afrin.

The general staff of the Turkish forces announced on January 20 the beginning of the operation “Olive Branch” against Kurdish units of the “People’s Self-Defence Forces” (member of the FDS) and the “Democratic Union Party” in Afrin, where around 1.5 million Kurds and refugees from other parts of Syria lived. Ankara considers these organisations as terrorists. The Turkish troops entered Afrin on March 18 ousted Kurdish units from there, and on March 24 the General Staff announced the control over the entire area. Washington has repeatedly expressed “concern” about Turkey’s actions in Afrin, stressing that they divert attention from the fight against ISIS.

The Turks did not dare to continue squeezing the Kurds from northern Syria. They did not dig in Manbij, where American and French militaries were deployed, but in Tell Rifft. The latter refers to government forces and their allies, Russia and Iran. President Erdogan completed the military operation in Afrin with concessions to Moscow and Tehran in facilitating the evacuation of militants from East Ghouta. “Olive Branch” started on the background of the early parliamentary and presidential elections announcement. He decided to play the nationalists, having carried out in Afrin “a small victorious war”, but it began to stall.

Apart from Moscow, the Americans won this one. The outflow of Kurds to Manbij and before that to Afrin, created a power vacuum in the east of the Euphrates. The United States did not have time to form a Sunni power structure there, and the return of the Kurds to the area is due to the fact that they need to restrain the possible expansion of Damascus into the region, and not the fight against ISIS. Moreover it was noted in Washington that on the border with Iraq, the Iraqi Air Force and the pro-Iranian units “al Hashd al Shaabi” began to work. Fortunately, the Kurds also left the border areas, which was used by pro-Iranian groups from the Iraqi direction.

Iraq will continue to pursue ISIS militants and carry out air strikes against them in Syria, but is not going to interfere in its internal affairs. This was stated by Prime Minister Haider al-Abadi at a press conference in Baghdad. On April 19 the Air Force carried out a series of strikes on militants’ targets on the Syrian-Iraqi border on his orders. The operation was carried out in coordination with Damascus in turn, in coordination with Iran and Russia. The targets were terrorists in the vicinity of the Iraqi border, the city of Abu Kamal. The strengthening of cooperation on cleaning up the border areas of Syria and Iraq from ISIS supporters worries the United States. Hence, the intensification of efforts to return the Kurdish troops to the region. This may revive the Sunni-Kurdish confrontation, but in Syria, the Americans do not have an alternative to the Kurds as “boots on the ground”. This dictates the need for renewed efforts by Moscow and Tehran after the elections in Turkey to encourage Erdogan to move to the Manbij or other Kurdish-controlled areas in Northern Syria.

Reconciliation in idlib

Banned in Russia Jabhat al-Nusra and Syrian opposition armed groups reached an agreement on the ceasefire on the territory of the province of Idlib. As the television channel al Mayadeen reported, the truce was declared after the internecine strife, which lasted more than two months. According to the TV channel, during the clashes and attacks, there were about a thousand militants killed and about three thousand wounded. The military operations covered a number of areas in Aleppo and Hama provinces. The head of Jabhat al-Nusra, Abu Mohammed al-Julani, agreed to the ceasefire, as his fighters suffered the greatest losses, more than 750 people. Jabhat al-Nusra’s opponents, united in the coalition Jabhat Tahrir Surya, provided military support to Turkey. The truce was violated several times through explosions in Idlib (320 kilometers from Damascus). Field commanders were lost in these diversions.

UN agencies helping civilians are alarmed by the deterioration of the humanitarian situation in the province. This region borders with Turkey in the north-west of the SAR and has been in the hands of armed groups since 2014 and remains their main foothold. On April 25, the assistant to the UN Secretary General for Humanitarian Affairs Ursula Mueller said at a meeting of the Security Council that since December 2017, almost 400 thousand people from other parts of Syria, who had come under the control of the government, has moved to Idlib along with the militants. In March-April, tens of thousands of migrants from East Ghouta and East Calamun joined them.

The current flare up of infighting characterises the intensification of the confrontation between pro-Turkish and pro-Saudi groups in Idlib. It takes place against the backdrop of the actions that the Saudis have been carrying out in the last two years to take over the entire segment of the resistance there. The split in the largest pro-Turkish group “Ahrar al-Sham” before the first round of talks in Astana testified to that. This was caused by personnel confusion among Turkish security forces after the attempted military coup and the weakening of funding from the Syrian opposition from their part. After the coup, the whole system of curators in Turkey’s security agencies, which specialised in this, was eliminated.

This topic has been on the central themes of discussions in recent months of the “troika”. The essence of the issue is Ankara’s desire to monopolise the right to control this region while preserving the dominance of pro-Turkish opposition groups and the de-escalation zone. Moscow and Tehran’s conditions are that the strongholds of Jabhat al-Nusra and affiliated groups must be neutralised. It is not only about the elimination of the not-capable-of-agreement-with militants of the jihadist character as well as the aligning of the Saudi factor in the Syrian conflict, both militarily and politically, taking into account Riyadh’s attempts to unite all the armed opposition under its command for full participation of the Geneva negotiating format.

Moscow and Tehran are trying to narrow the circle of really influential forces in the Syrian peace settlement, which makes this process viable. Ankara had to be pushed to solve the problem of pro-Saudi jihadists in Idlib, including military operations against pro-Turkish groups that formed an alliance with Jabhat al-Nusra. Interaction with the Turks in the evacuation of fighters from East Ghouta has become a point of reference. Ankara began to build up its combat potential in Idlib by evacuating over there forces loyal to them from East Ghouta. The Saudis do the same, who preferred to preserve the combat potential of Jabhat al-Nusra in East Ghouta, East Calamun, and now in Homs, agreeing to evacuate them to Idlib.

The main confrontation centre is concentrated there, and the current truce should be regarded as a respite for the sides to accumulate forces and means before the decisive confrontation. Moscow’s challenge is to stimulate this process in all possible ways and, if necessary, to help with purely military tools. In case of the establishment of Turkish dominance in Idlib, one should expect a burst from the Islamists of groups under their control to the north in the area of Kurdish activity, which hits the US efforts. In the meantime, it is necessary to achieve the elimination of pro-Saudi strongholds in Syria.

Careful Amman

The Jordanians carry out consultations with Damascus on the situation in the south of Syria since March. There were direct meetings between the head of Syrian intelligence services Ali Mamluk and his Jordanian counterpart Adnan al-Jundi in early April. At the time of events taking place in East Ghouta, at the end of which, Amman understood that the issue of the southern zone of de-escalation will be next. The transfer of the military centre of the government forces and their allies to the southern suburbs of Damascus and Homs, where, according to some data, General Suhail’s Tigers were transferred, pays attention to the final cleansing of the capital region and to the consultation results with the Jordanians.

Amman is concerned about the displacement of militants into Jordanian territory and the deterioration of relations with local tribes on both sides of the Syrian-Jordanian border. The Americans are concerned about saving their zone in Al-Tanf. The Jordanians in consultations with Russia received guarantees in coordination with Amman with the bilateral contracts about the Syrian government forces’ actions in the south of the country. As for the United States, they tried to push their issue to Russia through the Jordanians and it is unlikely that they will remain soothed. The Americans’ stay in Al-Tanf for Moscow is a matter of principle, and it is not ready to compromise.

Abdel Bari Atwan, editor of the Rai al-Youm newspaper, writes that during Secretary of State Mike Pompeo’s visit to the Middle East, he urged King Adbullah II to bring a military contingent to the south of Syria, in the province of Deraa and Quneitra to counter Assad’s return to control of these territories. In his opinion, Amman is not interested in carrying out such an operation in order not to enter into confrontation with Damascus and Tehran. So far, the Jordanian government is silent about John Bolton’s initiative to create an Arab peacekeeping force in Syria. There is no great activity on this subject and other “invitations”.

At the same time, Amman is completely dependent for electric power generation on the KSA, which on the eve of the hot season removes all questions regarding the dissatisfaction with Riyadh’s position in one way or another. It is impossible to speak negatively about the willingness of the Jordanians to enter the military contingent in Syria. Such plans were worked out a year ago after receiving approval during Donald Trump’s visit to Riyadh on May 21. At that time, there was a question about the participation of Jordanians in the arrangement aimed at creating security zones on the Syrian side of the border. They were especially important for Americans, as they should prevent the creation of a Shi’ite Crescent from Tehran to Beirut.

The army’s Chief of Staff, Mahmoud Frehat and Adnan al-Jundi drew up the Jordanian participation plan. It was supposed to strengthen the Jordanian forces on the border by two battalions of Special Forces, who together with operatives of the Kingdom’s General Intelligence Directorate were to train the resistance forces and later enter the Syrian border territories. It was about the Free Syrian Army (FSA), the “Omari” and “Revolutionary Commando Army” (RCA) brigades, with their subsequent transfer to the Syrian border. Some of these forces are now present in the de-escalation zone in the south. According to those plans, the Jordanians also intended to arm the Druze militia on both sides of the border, which was partially done.

The question of direct Jordanian military intervention in the south of Syria can be considered exhausted. This past year, Amman was convinced of the unreliability of the United States guarantees and it does not want to face alone the pro-Iranian militias and the Russian Air Force. The Americans are not ready to participate directly in such a plan. Now we are talking about dividing the pro-Jordanian and non-permanent resistance groups in the course of the upcoming operation by the government forces in southern Syria, and not about the preparation of the intervention. A plan of interaction with Amman is planned, following the example of Ankara, which will imply the voluntary evacuation of pro-Jordanian groups from the combat zones and the use of local truces.

The Economy of Banditry

The NGO “White Helmets” is an instrument of influence of intelligence services on the situation. According to CBS, the US State Department has stopped allocating funds to them. The “White Helmets” have repeatedly made statements that the SAR Air Force strikes civilians areas. The NGO disseminated reports of chemical weapons use in the Syrian city of Duma on April 7. Representatives of the Russian Centre for Reconciliation of the Warring Parties on April 9 conducted a survey of Duma, but found no trace of a chemical attack. It can, however, be assumed that the conclusions of the OPCW will be ambiguous for the Russian Federation. We are talking about exhuming the “victims”, which means that international experts know who and where to exhume. They got a lead on the target.

The OPCW experts’ trip to the event’s site was a predictable demand of the Russian Federation, and in this case the necessary preparations were made prudently. The alternate version of events has been prepared: “victims”, in which doses of homemade sarin have been introduced in advance, will “confirm” the accusations of Western countries. When the exhumation will take place it is planned to take samples for research, and not to conduct a medical examination of causes of death. This will make it possible to talk about their death from “chemical weapons”.

The termination of the US funding of the “While Helmets” is not caused by the abundance of fraud in their communications from Syria, which are directed by the Americans and the British to secure the propaganda of operations in Syria. In the near future, the same schemes will be played out in the south of the country. Samples of biomaterials of “victims” from there, collected in March-April by Jordanian “experts” and transferred to Amman, will coincide with the results of the examination of similar samples of the OPCW mission in East Ghouta.

As for the appropriations for the “White Helmets”, it is a change of their main sponsor. Their subsidy will be transferred to the British and the French, including the British MI6. That is, the financing of the “White Helmets” will go to the special services, not the State Department, which was risky for their reputation.

Dark Day of Al Qaida

It is impossible to give reliable figures to describe the economy of ISIS, but from 80 to 90 percent of the budget, this quasi-state collected from the control of hydrocarbon exports, taxes on the use of roads, water and irrigation systems. Looting of cultural and banking assets is a one-time factor.

ISIS spent up to 90 percent of its budget, according to the minimum estimates, about 700 to 800 million dollars annually during the heyday in 2014-2016 to maintain the combat potential and attract foreign fighters. The total budget of payments to the local Islamists in this case was 15 to 20 million per month. Now ordinary ISIS militants are paid about 100 to 150 dollars a month. Commanders receive slightly more. The total number of ISIS supporters in Syria and Iraq is estimated by experts at about 3000 active bayonets, which gives spending on the maintenance of these units of about half a million dollars a month.

If we roughly take other related monthly expenses and strongly inflate them, we will get, with a reserve, one million dollars. Most likely, these figures are less, because ISIS has no permanent sources of income in Iraq and Syria. It does not control oil fields, pipelines, logistics routes or irrigation facilities. They will not extort money from the Sunni tribes, on whose territory ISIS is deployed along the perimeter of the Syrian-Iraqi border to the East of the Euphrates and in the provinces of Anbar and Ninawa, so as to not risk losing the trust of the local population, without whom the physical existence of ISIS will not last more than a month or two. Rather, the Islamist command pays the sheikhs for their loyalty and food supplies. Talking about donations to fully preserve the combat potential of ISIS is pointless. This amount is so small that it is not worth mentioning. Fortunately, with the defeat of ISIS, donations have decreased.

The same applies to al Qaida. Its leadership refused to centrally fund the branches a decade ago, when Osama bin Laden was alive. This was due to a number of factors, the main being, the understanding in Riyadh that for such spending, the KSA budget will not allow. Private donations also began to decline, and the size of the theft of funds on the way from the Gulf to the branches reached one-third. As a consequence, the KSA’s General Intelligence Directorate (GID) was forced to focus its efforts on Iraq following the fall of Saddam Hussein’s regime. The financing of Chechnya, Bosnia, Yemen and the Maghred has stopped. This was evident in Chechnya, where al Qaida has ceased to receive volunteers and money since about 2006-2007.

After the failure in Iraq, where local Sunnis and Baathists pushed out Al Qaida, the focus shifted to Syria. There a different algorithm was used. The group Jabhat al-Nusra was created, which was staffed not by political commissars of al Qaida (where they distributed the money earlier and led the fighting in various points of application of these efforts), but staff officers of the GID and Special Forces of the KSA. There is no central assignation for al Qaida at this time. We have not heard of Pakistan’s (by location) leadership led by Ayman al-Zawahiri for a long time. Only branches working on essential areas for Riyadh are funded. These are Syria and Yemen. The GID are in charge of their operations. Al Qaida in the Maghreb as a centralised structure has not existed for about 10 years. There is a conglomerate of groups with an Islamist topping and distribution of roles in the criminal business, from drug smuggling to illegal migration. This is where their total budget exceeds one hundred million dollars.

SYRIAN KURDISTAN: FROM “OLIVE BRANCH” TO “FALLEN STATE”

South Front

26.04.2018

Syrian Kurdistan: From "Olive Branch" to "Fallen State"

Kurdish fighters raise flag of PKK leader in centre of Raqqa

Written by Maksim Alexandrov; Originally appeared on warsonline.info; Translated by AlexD exclusively for SouthFront

Not long ago in Washington at the Institute of National Strategic Studies of the National Defence University the round table on “The Multimodal Threats in the Kurdish Region” took place, a continuation of the “NATO and Regional Military and Political Alliance in 2018” Council.

The organisers of the meeting, taking place on April 9 to 11, were the Institute of National Strategic Studies, the Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA), the intelligence community and the commanders of the Special Forces of the US. The main agenda of the event was focused on clarifying the conceptual and analytical foundations of American policy in the framework of topical issues of the “Kurdish question”, the problem of improving the coordination of regional allies, as well as military and political modeling of crisis systems that fall under the topology of “fallen state”.

“Today, the USA, as never before, is faced with the destructive position of the Syrian regime and its allies, the Russian Federation and Iran. We met qualitatively new challenges and hybrid threats to freedom and democracy in Syria (SAR)”, with these words the special representative of the Department of Military and Political Modeling began his presentation, specialist in the field of pre-emptive analysis and the Greater Middle East of the Agency for the reduction of military threats Ray Ross.

During the discussion, experts highlighted the most complex structure of the problems that cause the revision of operational resources, and as a consequence, reducing operational sustainability and “window of response” to the crisis situations. First, such challenges include the issue of harmonisation of positions and approaches.

As an empirical base, analysts cite examples of the destructive positions of the Turkish Republic regarding the “united Kurdish space”, the inconsistent/punctual nature of the work of the UK, France and Germany in providing and preparing the Kurdish militia after the October operations in Iraq’s Kirkuk. During the meeting, the coalition failed to ensure prompt withdrawal of 140 Bundeswehr instructors and 30 specialist of the Special Aviation Service of the British Armed Forces.

Second, comes the imbalance of the asymmetric military and political education within the framework of the international coalition. The fragmentation of Kurdish troops and militia (YPG) during the events related to the referendum on the independence of Iraqi Kurdistan and the subsequent military and political crisis, the split of the Peshmerga and other Kurdish armed groups controlled by Erbil; the growth in popularity of the Movement for Change or “Goran”, are a ready counter-rally against ex-President Massod Barzani’s block, the “Democratic Party of Kurdistan” and the “Patriotic Union of Kurdistan”.

As a result, there is a curtailment of the potential of “Kurdish National Councils” in the Syrian Kurdish Supreme Council, in other words, the growing influence of the Democratic Union Party of Salih Muslim, supporter of the autonomy within the SAR, and the national Councils of Western Kurdistan, which may cause a potential strengthening of Moscow’s and Iran’s positions in the region.

The disagreements between the Kurdish and Arab (Sunni, 23 movements) ethnic and religious components are, in particular the revolt of the Arabs in Syria’s Raqqa, armed conflicts within “independent” groups in North-Eastern Syria, caused by both “humanitarian” and military-political aspects, systemic shortcomings of the previous presidential administration to unite the projects of the “Kurdish Zone”, “Syrian Democratic Forces” and the “Free Syrian Army”.

The data formed the need for duplication of “territorial formations” by independent structures, the creation of Kurdish security forces that are not included in the YPG during the last year. Along with this, it allowed partial substitution and assumption of the contingents of the Arab countries in the area of responsibility of the Alliance. Preliminary rounds of talks with Egypt, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates are now been held.

“The newly formed security forces, along with the implementation of substitution approaches are certainly a guarantee for stability and security in the North-East of Syria”, stated Ray Ross.

Third, the current problems required operational support for the concept “Balance of deterrence and engagement”, as described in previous submissions.

Thus, according to analysts, the greatest actual problems are:

  1. Security in the North East of Syria;
  2. Containment of Ankara;
  3. Exclusion of the growing influence of Damascus, Moscow and Tehran;
  4. Revision of the allies system, accompanied by a “balance of deterrence and engagement”.

Thus, the methods to achieve a “balance of deterrence and engagement” through the support and expansion of special measures aimed at the integration of non-system actors of the military and political process are of greatest interest. “We conduct constant monitoring of the military-political process and its dynamics. It has already been six months that we monitor the escalation of the conflict in the north of Syria, which we repeatedly inform our allies, Turkey and other countries. Today within the framework of the modeling, we understand the need to involve all parties in the settlement process. Potentially, it may include the Kurdish Workers’ Party and the Democratic Union”, said the representative of DTRA.

According to data received from the source “occupying a high position” in the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) since November 2017, personnel changes have begun, accompanied by an intra-party conflict. With the beginning of the Turkish operation “Olive Branch” the group “Will to Freedom” stood out, actively cooperating with the YPG troops, coordinated with the United States and its allies. The unit, numbering up to 5000 personnel, advocates for the change of the party’s leadership course and the formation of the “common Kurdish space”. “However, we must work to ensure that this organisation does not engage in destructive activities on Turkish territories”.

In addition, in the ranks of the PKK, according to intelligence, in December last year a “right-oriented core” was formed, which began the extradition of previously left in Afrin intra-party opponents of the “new forces” with Salih Muslim. “The United States have actively watched this process, today we have a unique opportunity to unite these PKK platforms into a new, powerful force that can affect the entire region. These processes are very complex, but positive for national security”, commented Ray Ross.

During the talks held at the end of December 2017, between the “new forces” and the Democratic Union Party, the parties could not agree on “extradition”, but agreements were reached in exchange for the deployment of seven training camps in North Africa in exchange for full support from the “right forces” in the PKK.

The personnel trained at these facilities were intended for deployment on the neighbouring Turkish territory. However the Turkish side took these processes as a strengthening, an attempt to unite the Kurdish Workers’ Party and on January 20 launched the army operation “Olive Branch”, which ended with the capture of the city of Afrin and the division of the canton into Turkish and Syrian-Russian areas of responsibility.

During the Turkish operation, with the support of the US, talks were held between the YPG and the Afrin security forces on the limited material and technical support, as well as sending a number of volunteer units subordinate to the military council of Manbij. Also, the “special contact mission” guaranteed full support in the case of coordination of the Afrin security forces, the dissolution of the HPX battalion and the “Desert Scorpion” brigade.

De facto, this process should be seen as providing an alternative resource base, aimed at the involvement of the security forces and councils of Afrin in the structure of the YPG and the expansion of cooperation with the International coalition, i.e. the removal of Iran and Russia from the northern province of Aleppo. However, cooperation between Moscow, Tehran and Ankara did not allow the formalisation of this union.

At the same time, analysts noted that the division, the failure of “involvement”, allowed to restore the balance of forces in the “Kurdish zone”, since after the military and political crisis caused by the “collapse” of Iraqi Kurdistan and the departure of Masoud Barzani as President, the “Democratic Union Party” significantly strengthened its position, “threatening the integrity of the Syrian Kurdistan”. However, after the division of Afrin, its potential, through natural processes, decreased, opening up new opportunities for the American side and the security forces that were created.

Thus, turning to the conclusions, we can say that the American side is now involved in the processes of operationalization of the concept of “containment and engagement”, considering factor projects of unification of multidirectional forces through the chaos of existing crisis systems and territorial associations. The growing military presence in the area of Al-Tanf, and the disparate information of the transfer of Arab-Kurdish troops to the area, could potentially mean the unification of the YPG, the security forces and the new Syrian Army into a single structure.

With the completion of operation “Olive Branch”, an extensive media company was launched to discredit the positions of Moscow, Tehran and Damascus in resolving the “Kurdish issue”.

In mid-March 2018 in north-eastern Syria, a “Syrian popular Resistance” was formed, advocating the liberation from occupation by a coalition led by the United States.

On April 15, 2018, the Department of Military and Political Modeling of the US agency for reducing military threats adopted the programme of development of the north-east of Syria, labelling this territory as “fallen state”.

%d bloggers like this: