‘Israel’ eager to mediate ceasefire in Sudan: What are the reasons?

Apr 28 2023

Source: Al Mayadeen English

By Ahmad Karakira 

The Israeli occupation has several reasons to rush to mediate a ceasefire between the Sudanese army and the Rapid Support forces, the most important of which is establishing its presence in yet another African country bordering the strategic Red Sea.

‘Israel’ eager to mediate ceasefire in Sudan: What are the reasons?

A few days ago, three Israeli occupation Foreign Ministry officials told Axios that “Israel” has offered to host both parties involved in the conflict in Sudan in an effort to reach a cease-fire agreement.

The proposal was handed to Army Chief General Abdel Fattah Al-Burhan and Rapid Support Forces (RSF) head General Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo, known as Hemedti, as Israeli occupation Foreign Minister Eli Cohen and director general of the Israeli occupation’s Foreign Ministry Ronen Levy remained in direct contact with both Sudanese generals.

According to Cohen and Levy, both Sudanese generals gave the impression that they were considering the proposal in a positive light, adding that US President Joe Biden’s administration was consulted and informed. 

“Since the fighting started in Sudan, Israel has been working in different channels in order to reach a ceasefire. The progress we have made with the two parties is very encouraging. If there will be a way that Israel could help in stopping the war and the violence in Sudan we will be very happy to do it,” Cohen told Axios in a statement.

Read more: No end to war until Al-Burhan surrenders: RSF advisor to Al Mayadeen

Normalization with ‘Israel’ jeopardized by Sudan fighting: Axios

Another report by Axios revealed that the Israeli occupation fears that the ongoing clashes will hinder the formation of a prospected Israeli-allied civilian government, which would jeopardize the normalization agreement between Sudan and the Israeli occupation. 

According to the report, “Israel” has built strong relationships with both Al-Burhan and Dagalo. Before clashes ensued, Israeli officials said they were actively following up on the process of appointing a civilian-led government in Sudan.

During his visit to Khartoum in February, Cohen urged Al-Burhan to proceed with restoring civilian rule, emphasizing that it will be challenging to secure a peace agreement without it, Axios mentioned.

The news website cited Israeli sources as saying that the Israeli occupation Foreign Ministry has been in contact with Al-Burhan over the normalization process, while Dagalo and Mossad have met and discussed “security” and “counterterrorism issues”.

Israeli officials were certain of an agreement to appoint a civilian government in the upcoming days, Axios indicated. However, what transpired was fierce fighting that spread over multiple cities in the country.

The White House has also pushed Israelis to mediate a ceasefire deal between the fighting generals, the report revealed.

But why is “Israel” in a rush to complete the normalization process with Sudan?

Flashback

It all started in 2016 when the Israeli occupation urged the US to allow it to infiltrate into Sudan after the North African country severed diplomatic ties with the Islamic Republic of Iran. Following Saudi Arabia’s lead, Sudan cut diplomatic ties with Iran after the storming of the Saudi Arabian Embassy in Tehran and the consulate building in the city of Mashhad.

In August 2017, then-Sudanese Minister for Investment, Mubarak Fadel Al-Mahdi, spoke for the first time about normalization with the Israeli occupation during an interview with the Sudania24 TV station.

And when General Abdel Fattah Al-Burhan came to power after the resignation of Omar Al-Bashir, he met in February 2020 with Israeli occupation Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu in Uganda.

Consequently, Khartoum was removed from the US blacklist in December 2020 after 27 years of imposed sanctions.

In January 2021, Sudan formally agreed to normalize relations with “Israel” in a quid pro quo for the United States to remove it from its list of so-called “state sponsors of terrorism”, but ties were never formalized. In April of that year, the North African nation approved a bill abolishing a 1958 boycott of the Israeli occupation.

Finally, Sudan and “Israel” said in February that they agreed to move towards normalizing relations during the first official visit of Israeli occupation Foreign Minister Eli Cohen to Khartoum.

Sudan; a route to transfer arms to Palestinian Resistance

One of the several reasons that the Israeli occupation is racing against time to complete the normalization process with Sudan is to make sure that the North African country does not again become a route to transfer arms to the Palestinian Resistance in the Gaza Strip.

Before severing ties with Iran, Al-Bashir’s administration reportedly supported the Hamas movement politically and allowed it to open an office in Sudan. The Israeli occupation had previously accused Sudan of allowing the passage of arms from several countries to Gaza via its territory.

However, with the regime change in Egypt and the rise of General Abdel Fattah Al-Sisi as President, the latter ordered the destruction of tunnels between his country and Gaza, through which the Palestinian Resistance reportedly used to receive arms.

In March 2009, the Israeli occupation even targeted a 17-truck convoy in eastern Sudan that reportedly carried weapons to Gaza, and also targeted an arms factory in Khartoum in October 2012.

In March 2014, the Israeli occupation’s navy said it seized a ship loaded with weapons in the Red Sea between Sudan and Eritrea that was allegedly en route from Iran to Gaza.

To further dive into the reason for “Israel’s” eagerness to mediate a ceasefire in Sudan and consequently complete a peace agreement with the North African nation, one should tackle the history of relations between the two sides.

History of Sudanese-Israeli relations

In his book “Israel” And Relations With The Islamic World, Jihad Odeh said that “Israel’s” ties with Sudan began before the latter gained its independence from British occupation in 1956, when an Israeli trade mission comprising 50 people settled in Khartoum in 1951 to buy Sudanese products and goods and send them to “Israel” via Cape Town, South Africa, to avoid anti-smuggling measures taken by the Egyptian authorities in the Suez Port and Port Said.

The book mentioned that Israeli planes often landed at Khartoum airport to refuel and continue their flights, which prompted the Secretary-General of the Arab League at the time to send a memorandum to the British government in February 1951 to inquire about the matter.

Britain, which was ruling Sudan in partnership with Egypt, replied that Israeli planes had the right to use Khartoum Airport under the pretext that Britain and Sudan are not at war with “Israel.”

It was during the era of Abdullah Khalil’s government that the first Israeli intelligence envoy arrived in Sudan, with the consent of the Sudanese government, Odeh revealed in his book.

And as a result of contacts that began in 1954 between Sudanese politicians and “Israel”, a Sudanese figure accompanied by a Sudanese journalist met in a London hotel with a young diplomat working in the Israeli occupation’s embassy in Britain named Mordechai Gazit.

The author said that Sadiq Al-Mahdi, the head of the Umma Party, was in contact with Mossad in 1954, and met along with Mohammad Ahmad Omar, editor-in-Chief of the Nile Newspaper and spokesperson for the Umma Party, with Gazit. 

According to Odeh, the goal of Sudan at that time was to seek the help of “Israel” to win Jewish public opinion in the West to obtain independence, while Gazit wanted to establish commercial relations Between Sudan and “Israel” to reduce the intensity of Arab isolation.

Contacts and meetings between Israeli and Sudanese politicians continued after the latter’s independence in 1956, when then-Israeli Prime Minister Golda Meir met with then-head of the Sudanese government Abdullah Khalil in the summer of 1957.

In those discussions between Meir and Khalil, it was agreed to send Israeli agricultural experts and civilian and military advisors to Sudan. It was also agreed that Sudan would allow EL AL planes to land and refuel on their way to South Africa, and that the Mossad would be allowed to build a station in the North African country.

Al Haya newspaper noted that the Mossad was able to establish its station again in Khartoum in 1983 during the era of then-Sudanese President Jaafar Nimeiry after the latter met with Menachem Begin’s Security Minister, Ariel Sharon.

Nimeiry revealed that he began his contacts with “Israel” in 1965 when he was an officer participating in a course on cooperation between Sudan and the US, where he established contacts with Israeli personalities who later visited Sudan in unannounced secret visits, Odeh mentioned in his book. However, when he took power in May 1969, Nimeiry followed Egypt’s footsteps against the Israeli occupation.

Nevertheless, Israeli ties with Nimeiry’s regime re-resurfaced after the Camp David Accords, which he supported, leading Mossad to rebuild its mission in Sudan.

Why Africa and Sudan?

In his book, The Israeli Foreign Policy Toward Africa: The Sudan Case, Amer Khalil Ahmed Amer pointed out that “Israel” has adopted an approach that relies on closer relations with countries surrounding Arab states, and this is evident in the strong relations with these countries at all levels, especially in the field of military and security cooperation, hidden under the cover of trade and economic relations.

In parallel with the expertise that the Israeli occupation provides to these countries, Amer continued, it has gained a foothold in military bases that oversee Arab countries, which represents a clear threat to Arab national security in general.

The occupation can threaten Arab water security and navigation in the Red Sea, due to the advanced position that it gained from establishing strong relations with Eritrea, the author pointed out.

Amer noted that the attempt to control the Red Sea is one of the most important strategic goals of “Israel” in the African continent, adding that the occupation began to establish a presence on the Red Sea in order to use it to achieve its military, economic, and political interests.

To achieve this goal, “Israel” strengthened its relations with Ethiopia in the late sixties and Eritrea after its independence from Ethiopia in 1991; it also built bases in Ethiopia after Moshe Dayan’s visit in 1965.

In addition to its military bases on the Eritrean islands, especially near Bab Al-Mandab, “Israel” built two military bases in Ethiopia near the border between Eritrea and Sudan.

According to Amer, this expansion in the Red Sea region gave “Israel” a strategic depth in Bab Al-Mandab to monitor any Arab military activity in the region.

It is noteworthy that “Israel” has military and intelligence bases for espionage and monitoring on a number of Eritrean islands, including Dahlak, Haleb, and Marsa Fatma, which are located at the southern entrance to the Red Sea, in addition to Zubair Island, which is only 22 km from Yemen, and houses a communications network and radar equipment.

The Israeli presence on these islands also includes special forces, paratrooper units, and airborne forces equipped with modern helicopters and Dolphin-class submarines. Through these bases, “Israel” threatens Yemen’s national security, where it can monitor it and spy on it smoothly, Amer argued.

During his visit to “Israel” in 1996, then-Eritrean President Isaias Afwerki signed an agreement to enhance security and military cooperation that included, in one of its clauses, an Israeli pledge to support Eritrea to confront any attempts by any force to control its strategic islands located at the southern entrance to the Red Sea, and to allow a limited military presence in these islands.

Sudan; a power to the Arab world

According to Amer, Israeli estimates since the beginning of Sudan’s independence indicated that this country should not be allowed to become a force added to the power of the Arab world, because if invested in stable conditions, its resources will make it a threatening force.

During the 1967 War, Sudan became a base for training and sheltering the Egyptian Air Force and ground forces. It also sent its forces to the Canal region during the War of Attrition between 1968 and 1970, as well as during the 1973 October War.

It is noteworthy that following the 1967 Six Day War, Khartoum hosted the Arab League summit held from 29 August to 1 September 1967. There, Arab leaders declared the three no’s: “no peace with Israel, no recognition of Israel, no negotiations with Israel.”

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The ICC’s Legal Acrobatics: from Darfur to Donbasselated Stories

 March 29, 2023

Source: Al Mayadeen English

By Sammy Ismail 

A review of Mahmood Mamdani’s “The International Criminal Court’s Case Against The President of Sudan: A Critical Look” (2009): comparing the ICC’s indictment of Omar El Bashir with that of President Putin.

The ICC’s Legal Acrobatics: from Darfur to Donbass

“Against those who substitute moral certainty for knowledge, and who feel virtuous even when acting on the basis of total ignorance.” (M. Mamdani, Saviors and Survivors: Darfur, Politics, and the Global War on Terror, 2009)

The recent legal complications between Russia and the ICC, which have resulted in mutual arrest warrants, are eerily reminiscent of the ICC’s case against Sudanese President Omar el Bashir in 2008, which evokes similar legal complications: such that neither El Bashir nor President Putin are nationals of states party to the Rome Statute nor are the crimes they were accused of committing on the territory of a state party to the Rome Statute. The ICC, according to its founding treaty: the Rome Statute, doesn’t have jurisdiction for indicting either person, yet the ICC, which is principally a technocratic apolitical international organization, acted as a front line for the US in isolating its enemies. 

“The decisions of the ICC have no significance for our country, including from a legal point of view,” Russian Foreign Ministry spokeswoman Maria Zakharova said after the International Criminal Court’s Pre-Trial Chamber II issued an arrest warrant for President Putin and Presidential Commissioner for Children’s Rights Maria Lvova-Belova. 

In “The International Criminal Court’s Case Against The President of Sudan: A Critical Look” (2009), Mahmood Mamdani argues that the ICC was politicized to suit the interests of Western actors by filing an arrest warrant against Omar el Bashir, such that the indictment of Omar el Bashir was built on a sketchy legal basis. 

In 2019, Omar El Bashir was eventually ousted in a military coup ending his three-decade-long streak of iron-grip rule over Sudan. He was then sentenced to two years in prison for charges of corruption by the newly formed government which refused to turn him in to the ICC. The case of El Bashir was swiftly contained with minimal implications to geopolitics in the Middle East to the US interests: One ‘pariah‘ regime accused of bloodshed within Sudan was replaced by an internationally recognized regime involved in bloodshed in Yemen

Despite the swift containment of El Bashir, the significance of Mamdani’s argument holds. If anything,  Mamdani’s argument stands as even more relevant when looking at Putin’s case. The indictment of Putin is incomparably consequential compared to the indictment of El Bashir. 

The International Criminal Court 

The mandate of the ICC is expressed by the Rome Statute of 1998 :

  • Only individuals are liable for indictment. As opposed to its sister organization, the International Court of Justice, whose mandate presumes a legal personality of states, the ICC can only indict “natural persons” as expressed in article 25. The ICC cannot prosecute states only individuals.
  • The jurisdiction of the court, as expressed by Article 5, is restricted to the “most serious crimes of concern for the international community” i.e. mass atrocity crimes which expressly include: Genocide (article 6), Crimes against Humanity (article 7), War Crimes (article 8), Crime of Aggression (article 9).  
  • As a precondition for prosecuting an individual accused of committing a mass atrocity, the court can have no jurisdiction over the case unless the alleged criminal is either a national of a state party to the Rome Statute or they had committed the alleged mass atrocity on the territory of a state which is a party to the Rome Statute, as expressed by article 12. 
  • Typically, cases studied by the ICC are not autonomously-initiated, rather they are administered following referrals: either by a state party to the Rome Statue or more recently through a referral by the Security Council (as was the case with Omar el Bashir) or following an investigation conducted by the Prosecutor after getting authorization from the Pre-Trial chamber (as was the case with President Putin). 

Revisiting the Case of Omar El Bashir in the Geopolitical Context of the War on Terror

The indictment of Omar El Bashir by the ICC was a landmark event in the practice of international law and international organizations. It set precedence by issuing an arrest warrant for not just any “natural person” but a president of a sovereign state. Furthermore, it manifested a very blatant case of the politicization of justice by coopting an international court for furthering geopolitical interests. 

The prosecution of Omar El Bashir had happened in the context of the ferocious so-called “War on Terror” waged by George Bush on the nations of West Asia. As revealed by General Wesley Clark, Sudan was fourth on the list of the Seven-Country grand strategy devised by the US following the terrorist attacks of 9/11. After the US invasion of Afghanistan in 2001, the US invasion of Iraq in 2003, and the failed Israeli invasion of Lebanon in 2006, Bush was in the last year of his second term and he was still 5 countries short of fulfilling the grand strategy.        

In addition to Western diplomats with actual interests at stake, many civil society groups were very excited about the indictment of El Bashir. Most notorious were the groups that fell under the “Save Darfur” campaign. The campaign has since been irrelevant, but it’s very much comparable to other pertinent campaigns promoting “democracy” and “human rights” like Free Iran or SOS Cuba

Mamdani extensively tackles the drives and dynamics of the human-rights-activism phenomena of the “Save Darfur” campaign in his book “Saviors and Survivors: Darfur, Politics, and the War on Terror” which was published in the same year as his article critiquing the ICC. Despite having been largely dismissed by many of the “Save Darfur” human rights activists as an apologia for El Bashir’s crimes, Mamdani doesn’t argue for el Bashir’s innocence; Mamdani’s article “The International Criminal Court’s Case Against The President of Sudan: A Critical Look” (2009) essentially serves as an ideographic critique of the ICC through the case study of the former Sudanese President.

Framed in the literature on the ontology of international organizations, Mamdani argues that the ICC serves more as a tool rather than an actor in international affairs (I. Hurd, International Organizations: Politics, Law, Practice, Ch2, 2014). The ICC which is typically presented to be uniquely technocratic and apolitical in contrast to other international organizations, actively partook in a geopolitical strategy to take down the enemies of the US.  

Mamdani’s Argument on the Politicization of the ICC

In “The International Criminal Court’s Case Against The President of Sudan: A Critical Look” (2009) Mamdani argues that the politicization of the indictment of Omar El Bashir was evidenced by (1) the historical revisionism in approaching the crisis in Darfur (2) the skimpy investigation and representation of evidence, but most importantly (3) the legal process for the ICC’s indictment of El Bashir. 

El-Bashir was the first president to be indicted by the ICC. Despite being legally consistent with the Rome Statute, the indictment was a novel event in the history of the ICC. Despite standing as the personification of the Sudanese state, El-Bashir was ultimately a “natural person” liable for prosecution by the ICC in theory. However, his indictment was a landmark event in the practice of international law: partly because it was unprecedented but also because it was a clear case of mobilizing the ICC for geopolitical ends. 

Most evidently, the politicization of the case manifested in the double standards exhibited by the ICC; Mamdani points out that El Bashir was prosecuted by the ICC for manning a violent counter-insurgency campaign in Sudan (which was classified as genocide in reference to article 6 of the Rome Statute), less than a decade from the cross-Atlantic invasions which Bush waged against Afghanistan and Iraq (which classify as Crimes Against Humanity per article 7, War Crimes per article 8, and Crimes of Aggression per article 9 of the Rome Statute) without being subject to indictment by the ICC. 

Read more: The Darfur the West Isn’t Recognizing as It Moralizes About the Region 

Furthermore, El-Bashir was indicted for the crime of genocide, which is specified under article 6 of the Rome Statute as a mass atrocity crime that falls under the jurisdiction of the ICC. In his article, Mandami problematizes the arbitrariness of the prospect of genocide. The distinction between a legitimate counter-insurgency campaign and an international-community-shaking mass atrocity such as genocide is manipulated by political semantics. There is no clear distinction between the two. Objectively, one event can be categorized as either. There is no death-count threshold that separates the two in international law. A counter-insurgency can result in more deaths than genocide. The distinction, as stipulated by the definition of genocide adopted in article 6 of the Rome Statute, is conditioned upon the “intentions” of the perpetrator. 

Rome Statute

Article 6 For the purpose of this Statute, “genocide” means any act committed with the intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial, or religious group    

The vagueness of some prospects of the Rome Statute, its susceptibility to the politics of semantic manipulation, and the ICC’s potential for infringing on the sovereignty of governments has led many States to refrain from ratifying the statute: Sudan being one of them in addition to Russia, the US, Ukraine, and many others. The ICC, whose jurisdiction is fundamentally preconditioned on the ratification of the Rome Statute, has acted despite this under the moral pretext of responsibility to protect human lives which suspiciously coincided with the geopolitical interests of the US: by targeting those who are hostile to the US and sparing the US and their allies. For example, El Bashir was indicted for cracking down on insurgents in Sudan, but King Mohammad of Morocco wasn’t for the violent suppression of the Sahrawi people nor was Crown Prince Mohammad Bin Salman for slaughtering and starving Yemenis nor was Yehud Olmert for attempting to invade Lebanon. The ICC, after all, is mobilized according to what is of “concern” to the “international community”. 

Rome Statute

Article 5 The jurisdiction of the Court shall be limited to the most serious crimes of concern to the international community as a whole.   

Briefly, Mamdani’s argument can be formalized as follows: 

  • (P1) Sudan didn’t ratify the Rome Statute
  • (P2) thus, the ICC doesn’t have jurisdiction over the alleged crimes committed by El Bashir in Darfur
  • (P3) the ICC’s arrest warrant is devoid of a legal basis (or at least is founded on a shaky legal basis)
  • (C) Therefore, acknowledging the geopolitical context, the indictment of El Bashir is a case of politicized justice

Counter-argument to Mamdani 

Many have refuted Mamdani’s argument for the illegal nature of the ICC’s indictment by referring to Chapter VII of the UN charter. Sudan isn’t party to the Rome Statute but they are party to the United Nations. The conflict in Darfur was referred by the Security Council to the International Criminal Court through Resolution 1593 of the SC as per article 13 (b) of the Rome Statute. The ICC in itself might not have jurisdiction over Sudan, but the Security Council does. The Council also has the liberty to decide on whatever measure it sees fit to deal with a given situation. The SC which had jurisdiction over Darfur granted the ICC jurisdiction by extension through the referral expressed in Resolution 1593.  

UN Charter: Chapter VII

Article 39 The Security Council shall determine the existence of any threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression and shall make recommendations, or decide what measures shall be taken.

Article 41 The Security Council may decide what measures not involving the use of armed force are to be employed to give effect to its decisions, and it may call upon the Members of the United Nations to apply such measures.

Despite refuting the part about legality, Mamdani’s critique of the ICC, as being subject to politicization for furthering western geopolitical interests, stands. The reason why similar security council resolutions for referral to the ICC have not been posited against Bush for committing comparable and even worse “mass atrocities” in Afghanistan and Iraq or Obama for crimes in Libya and Syria or Olmert for crimes in Lebanon and Palestine is political. The ICC despite being presented as technocratic and apolitical is molded by the power relations of international politics.   

The West’s Game of Legal Acrobatics with Russia

The ICC’s jurisdiction encompasses states which are party to the Rome Statute  

Neither Russia nor Ukraine are parties to the Rome Statute. Russia and Ukraine signed the statute in 2000 but neither ratified it (they didn’t pass it in their respective national parliaments). Russia even withdrew its signature from the statute in 2016 after the legal fiasco of the ICC with Omar Al Bashir.

Thus, neither of the alleged “criminals” (Putin nor Belova) are nationals of a state which is a party to the Rome Statute nor are the alleged “crimes” done on the territory of a state (Russia nor Ukraine) which is a party to the Rome Statute. 

Legally, the ICC doesn’t have jurisdiction over any potential crime that might happen during the military conflict in Ukraine. Unless the alleged criminal is a national of a state which has ratified the statute. If the ICC finds the war in Ukraine a hotspot for “serious crimes of concern to the international community,” the only individuals they have jurisdiction for prosecuting would be PolishGermanBritish, or  French  “natural persons” involved in alleged crimes (or any other individual who is a national of a state which has ratified the Rome Statute). 

referral to the ICC was done by the ICC Prosecutor 

Furthermore, referral to the ICC was done by the Prosecutor’s investigation, as per article 13 (c) of the Rome statute which wasn’t ratified by Russia or Ukraine. Consequently, the Pre-Trial Chamber II issued an arrest warrant for President Putin and Commissioner Maria Belova. 

Contrary to the case of El Bashir, the ICC’s arrest warrant wasn’t legitimized through extending jurisdiction from a security council resolution. The activation of the ICC was solely based on the Rome Statute. Extending legitimacy for the Rome Statute from the UN charter by a security council resolution as was the case with El Bashir can’t possibly happen such that Russia holds a permanent seat in the Security Council and enjoys veto power against any resolution. 

the pretext for the arrest warrants is the transfer of children from a war zone  

The ICC’s lack of jurisdiction isn’t the only sketchy prospect about the ICC’s case against Putin and Belova. The alleged crime that the two Russian officials were accused of is very peculiar: the forcible displacement of Ukrainian children from Donbass to the Russian Federation, as per article 6(e) of the Rome Statute). 

The ICC’s choice of allegation is very comical in light of the coverage of the war in Ukraine by western media; Putin was accused of unjustifiably invading Ukraine, killing civilians, torture, and a plethora of other crimes which were popularly broadcasted by western media with the onset of the Russian special military operation. 

The Rome Statute abounds with specific crimes which correspond to the narratives of western media about Putin, yet the ICC Prosecutor opted for the most ambiguous to indict Putin for: “Genocide” by the forcible transfer of children.

Rome Statute

Article 6 for the purpose of this Statute, “genocide” means any of the following acts committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group, as such: 

(e)  Forcibly transferring children of the group to another group. 

Even if were to assume that the ICC has jurisdiction over the situation in Ukraine, the alleged crime for which Putin and Belova are being indicted can be problematized on different levels. The transfer of children from Ukraine to Russia doesn’t imply genocide; as expressed by the Statute genocide is defined according to the intentions of the perpetrator.

Putin never expressed intentions to “destroy, in whole or in part” the Ukranian national group. There was no explicit intention of genocide. Furthermore, there are no implicit intentions of genocide that can be stipulated from Putin’s actions. The military operation is in line with its declared objectives of deterring NATO expansion and protecting the Donbass population neither of which can be identified as “genocide”. It’s not clear that the children transferred to the Russian Federation were “forcibly” transferred nor is it clear that the children who were transferred are Ukrainian and not Russian. The population residing in the Ukrainian territories of Donbass are predominantly Russians who have been systematically prosecuted by the Kiev regime since the 2014 coup.    

The pretext for Putin’s arrest is very comical when acknowledging the geopolitics and the legal semantics underlying the ICC’s indictment. One can argue that many school bus drivers are worse genocidal criminals than Putin. 

The US wants the ICC to indict Putin but doesn’t want to provide them with the necessary evidence 

More comical is the US policy towards the indictment. The confusion of the US bureaucracy before and after the ICC’s arrest warrant against Putin is representative of US arrogance: wanting to have their cake and eat it too. The Biden administration, in the final days of its first and seemingly last term, has grown restless to score a swift geopolitical victory by diplomatically isolating Putin: a restlessness that is comparable to that of Bush’s in 2009. 

The White House’s excitement to cooperate with the ICC to isolate Putin was quickly met with concern from other bureaucratic institutions in the US which anticipated a potential backfire from fraternizing with the ICC. 

Back in early March, the New York Times reported that the US Department of Defense opposes Biden’s initiative to hand over evidence that allegedly incriminates Russia for committing ‘war crimes’ in Ukraine to the ICC. The report claimed top-ranking officials in the US military are attempting to stifle the ICC-US cooperation through the provision of evidence in fear of setting a dangerous precedent that might expose the US to similar measures. 

The United States has long avoided the ICC out of concern that the tribunal would go after US officials accused of war crimes. However, back in December, Congress modified the legal restrictions on cooperating with the Court strictly to allow sharing of information on Ukraine in an effort to prosecute Russian individuals. 

Read more: WH to lose moral high grounds in Kiev over Pentagon-ICC complications

The evidence for the arrest warrant is still ambiguous. The Prosecution conducted an investigation and presented it to the Pre-Trial chamber which deemed it reasonable enough to proceed with court proceedings.   

The ICC’s arrest warrant expressed that “there are reasonable grounds to believe that Mr. Putin bears individual criminal responsibility” however it’s still not clear whether the evidence on which the Prosecution based their investigation was acquired from the White House. It’s also still not clear what type of evidence it was or if it was sufficient evidence for indicting Putin for genocide. What’s clear however is how international law can be stretched and spun in favor of some against others.       

In brief, regardless of the lack of jurisdiction, the ICC’s case against Putin is still not clearly justified in terms of evidence. The only detectable basis for the ICC’s arrest warrant is the advertised virtuous indignation and moral high grounds of the West. 

Perhaps President Biden’s comment on the situation best captures the oxymoronic confusion and legal acrobatics underlying the ICC’s arrest warrant against Putin. “I think it’s justified, but the question is, it’s not recognized internationally by us, either. But I think it makes a very strong point. Putin clearly committed war crimes”

Russia & NATO

As the Draconian Western-led sanctions on Russia exacerbate the economic crisis worldwide, and as Russian troops gain more ground despite the influx of military aid into Ukraine, exposing US direct involvement in bio-labs spread across Eastern Europe and the insurgence of neo-Nazi groups… How will things unfold?

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Hamas’ return ticket to Damascus won’t come cheap

The Palestinian resistance movement’s complicated relationship with Syria is headed for a reset, but it won’t be on their terms.

July 06 2022

Photo Credit: The Cradle

Despite excited media reports of a Hamas-Syria rapprochement, nothing is finalized: the Palestinian resistance movement has much more to prove still.

By The Cradle’s Palestine Correspondent

On 21 June, two unnamed Hamas sources told Reuters that the Palestinian resistance movement had decided to restore ties with Damascus following a decade-long rift after Hamas expressed support for the Syrian opposition.

The news caused a row, and it seems that this may have been the purpose behind its leak.

Shortly after the report, dozens of websites, satellite channels and media commentators in Turkey, Qatar, and the UK who are sympathetic to the Muslim Brotherhood – the political Islamist group to which Hamas belongs ideologically – distanced themselves from Hamas, which has neither confirmed nor denied the reports.

However, comments made by the head of the Political Bureau of Hamas, Ismail Haniyeh, has added credence to these claims.

In a speech before the National Islamic Conference in Beirut, on 25 June, Haniyeh said, “The time has come after ten years to make historic reconciliations in the Islamic nation.”

“What is happening in the region today is very dangerous as Israel is paving the way through military and security alliances to fight Iran, Hezbollah and Hamas,” he added.

So how accurate are the reports about “high-profile” secret meetings between Hamas and the Syrians? Is there a relationship between Haniyeh’s visit to Beirut and the timing of these revelations?

The heavy legacy of Khaled Meshaal

When Hamas left Syria over a decade ago, the office of Khaled Meshaal, who was the head of the movement’s Political Bureau at the time, justified the decision as stemming from “moral premises.”

They contended that the Hamas movement stands with the people in deciding who will rule them, saying “even if the ruler supports our right, we will not support his falsehood.” This reverberated within the movement, and the majority of its popular base supported “Syrian revolution” in the face of “the regime that is slaughtering its people.”

That was back in 2011, when the so-called Arab Spring helped sweep the Muslim Brotherhood (MB or Ikhwan) and its affiliates into power in Egypt and Tunisia, and paved the way for the MB-aligned Syrian armed opposition to take control of the outskirts of Damascus. .

But only four years later (2015), the picture was completely reversed: Egypt’s Mohammed Morsi was ousted in a Gulf-backed military coup; Tunisian President Kais Saied turned against the Brotherhood’s Ennahda party and removed it completely from the political scene. And Damascus gradually regained control over the vital parts of Syria.

In the wider region, the regime of Omar Al-Bashir fell in Sudan, and the Muslim Brotherhood’s influence in Libya, Yemen, Jordan and Kuwait was severely diminished.

New leadership, a new direction

It was inevitable that these significant region-wide changes would also transform Hamas’ leadership to reflect the new political scene. In 2017, Ismail Haniyeh was appointed head of the Political Bureau, while that same year, Yahya Al-Sinwar, who was released from Israeli prisons in 2011, became the leader of the movement in Gaza.

Seen as a hawk, Sinwar relies on the absolute support of the movement’s military arm, the Al-Qassam Brigades, and as such, introduced a new political approach to Hamas’ regional relations.

Although Sinwar’s first move was to reorganize relations with Cairo after a four-year estrangement, by far his most important change was to revive Hamas’ relations with the Axis of Resistance, making it the movement’s top foreign policy priority.

Within a few years, the Hamas leader in Gaza had re-established full relations with Iran and Hezbollah, but its return to Damascus still remains the biggest obstacle.

In order to thaw the ice with Syria, Iran mediated first, followed by Hezbollah, Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ), and more recently, the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP). This deadlock was not broken until after the Hamas operation “Sword of Jerusalem” in May 2021.

Testing the waters

In that same month, Syrian President Bashar Al-Assad responded to a greeting from Al Qassam Brigades, conveyed by the Secretary General of PIJ Ziad Al-Nakhaleh, with a corresponding greeting. After that, contacts began to increase between Syrian officials and Hamas leaders.

Syrian sources informed The Cradle that a year ago it was decided to “reduce security measures against a number of Hamas members in Syria, release a number of detainees, and reveal the fate of other missing persons.”

But that didn’t achieve normalcy between Syria and Hamas either. There are those within the latter, it appears, who continue to sabotage progress made with Damascus.

To understand the dynamics of this particular relationship – present and its future – it is necessary to review its stages throughout the years.

From Amman to Damascus

Hamas began paving the way for its relationship with Syria in the early 1990s through visits made by its official Musa Abu Marzouk. In 1992, Mustafa Al-Ledawi was appointed as the head of an unofficial office for the Hamas in Damascus.

The great leap occurred with the visit of the founder of Hamas, the late Sheikh Ahmed Yassin, to Damascus in 1998. This official visit, and the warm reception accorded Yassin, constituted a huge breakthrough in relations, after which the late President Hafez Al-Assad authorized Hamas’ official presence in Syria, providing it with political and security facilities and logistical and material support.

Despite previous bad blood between Damascus and the Syrian Muslim Brotherhood, notably in regard to the Hama massacre in 1982, there were several prudent reasons for the Syrian government and Hamas to collaborate.

One reason can be traced to the rivalry between Hafez Assad and the late Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) Chairman Yasser Arafat, who sided with the late Iraqi President Saddam Hussein in the Gulf War (1990–91) after Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait on 2 August, 1990.

On 21 November, 1999, a plane carrying Hamas’ then-political bureau chief Khaled Meshaal landed at Damascus airport, after being expelled from Jordan and refused a reception by many Arab capitals.

Since then, a number of political bureau members relocated to Damascus, and Hamas’ activities in Syria intensified. Between 2000 and 2010, the relationship further strengthened over several events, including the 2003 US invasion of Iraq, the 2005 withdrawal of the Syrian army from Lebanon, the 2006 July war between Israel and Hezbollah, and most importantly, the Israeli aggression against Gaza in 2008.

Syrian support

Hamas official Mahmoud Al-Zahar, who was interviewed by The Cradle in Gaza, talks about an important detail that the media did not mention at the time. When Hamas formed its first government in Gaza in 2007, in which Zahar was foreign minister, “Syria was the only Arab country that recognized the diplomatic red passport issued from Gaza.”

Zahar says: “The Syrian leadership gave us everything. On my first visit to Damascus, we were able to solve the problem of hundreds of Palestinian refugees stuck on the Syrian-Iraqi borders, and Syria adopted the Palestinian calling code (+970), and expressed its willingness to provide support to the elected Palestinian government. For that, it faced an Arab, international, and American war.”

Today, Zahar is the designated official tasked by Sinwar to revive the relationship with Damascus. This was confirmed by sources in Hamas, who said that he traveled to Mecca for the Hajj pilgrimage, and may head from there to Damascus.

These details are meaningful: it means Egypt is spared the censure of allowing Zahar to travel to Syria, and would avoid an awkward situation for Cairo in front of the US, Israelis and Gulf Arabs.

From Damascus to Doha and Ankara

The Syrian crisis that erupted in March 2011 put Hamas in a unique bind of its own making. Fellow Palestinian Islamists in PIJ, for example, did not take a radical position on the “revolution” from 2011 to 2017, and were content with maintaining their offices in Damascus, although its political and military leadership relocated to Beirut due to deteriorating security conditions.

On the other hand, Hamas issued its first statement regarding the Syrian crisis on 2 April, 2011, in which it affirmed its support for the Syrian people and leadership, and considered that “Syria’s internal affairs concern the brothers in Syria… We hope to overcome the current circumstances in order to achieve the aspirations of the Syrian people, and preserve Syria’s stability and its internal cohesion, and strengthening its role in the line of confrontation and opposition.”

This wishy-washy statement did not hide the hostile stance of the movement’s members and elites, who all adopted the anti-Syrian narrative. On 5 November, 2011, the Syrian security forces stormed the offices of Hamas, confiscated its assets, and shuttered them.

In early 2012, Meshaal traveled to Doha, Qatar, before holding a scheduled meeting with Bashar Al-Assad. Hamas declared that the meeting “will not be useful.”

Hamas and the opposition

On 8 December, 2012, the movement burned bridges with Damascus when Meshaal and Haniyeh raised the flag of the “Syrian revolution” during a celebration marking the movement’s launch in the Gaza Strip in front of tens of thousands of their supporters.

In a parade held during the celebration, a number of members of the Al-Qassam Brigades wore the opposition flag on their backs.

The Syrian government’s reaction was no less restrained. Assad accused Hamas of actively participating in the war against the Syrian state by supporting Al Qaeda’s Syrian affiliate Jabhat Al-Nusra, and by providing instructions to opposition factions on ways to dig tunnels and fortify them to withstand aerial bombardment.

Other opposition militant groups such as Bait Al-Maqdis, Faylaq Al-Rahman and Army of Huda announced that they were affiliated with Hamas.

Once an Ikhwani, always an Ikhwani

In 2016, Assad said in an interview with Syrian newspaper Al-Watan: “We supported Hamas not because they are Muslim Brotherhood, but rather we supported them on the grounds that they are resistance. In the end, it was proven that the Ikhwani (member of Muslim Brotherhood) is Ikhwani wherever he puts himself, and from the inside remains a terrorist and hypocrite.”

All this may seem a thing of the past, but it still affects the formation of a new relationship between the two parties, especially after the return of turncoat Meshaal and his team a year ago to important leadership positions in Hamas.

Although the majority of the movement’s leadership has changed, the old legacy of Meshaal still weighs heavily on everyone, especially in Damascus. There are many in Syria who still warn the “wound is open;” that Hamas has not yet closed it, but rather wants a “free return.”

Understanding Hamas’ structure

Before explaining Hamas’ recent decision to restore ties with Syria, it is necessary to know how the movement is run to ensure representation and accountability. Hamas has a Shura Council of 15 members, chosen in elections in which cadres of certain organizational ranks participate.

These cadres choose their representatives in the local advisory councils from different regions (West Bank, Gaza, Jerusalem, territories occupied in 1948, and prisons). As for members of Hamas’ base, they elect their representatives in the General Consultative Council, which in turn elects the Political Bureau.

Despite this ‘healthy democracy,’ the position on Syria produced two contradictory currents:

The first current is led by Meshaal, who was head of the Political Bureau until 2017. It includes Ahmed Youssef, a former adviser to Haniyeh, and Nayef Rajoub, one of the most prominent leaders of Hamas in the West Bank.

The second current has no specific leader, but Zahar was the public face before Sinwar joined him.

Between these two viewpoints, Ismail Haniyeh and Musa Abu Marzouk maintain a state of ‘pragmatism’ by taking a middle position between the Qatar-Turkey axis and the Axis of Resistance.

Although the decision to leave Syria was taken with the full approval of the members of the Shura Council and members of the Political Bureau, the entire burden of the decision was placed on Meshaal. The man, who was a personal friend of Assad and Secretary General of Hezbollah Hassan Nasrallah, became blacklisted by the Axis of Resistance.

Meshaal’s influence

All prior efforts to restore relations between Hamas and Syria were a “waste of time” as long as Meshaal was at the helm of the movement. This was not only the opinion of the Syrians, but of many Iranians as well.

In 2015, for example, when there were media reports about efforts to restore Hamas-Syrian relations, the Iranian Tabnak website (supervised by General Mohsen Rezaei, a leader in the Revolutionary Guards and currently one of the advisors to Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei) launched a scathing attack against Meshaal.

At that time, Meshaal had refused to visit Tehran if he was not received at the highest levels – that is – to meet specifically with Khamenei. The Tabnak website wrote: “Meshaal and the Hamas leaders lined up two years ago on the side of the international terrorists in Syria… They are now setting conditions for the restoration of relations between Hamas and Iran as if Iran did not have any conditions.”

Since that time, Meshaal and his team have remained staunchly reluctant to even talk about restoring relations with Damascus. In addition to their loyalty (to some extent) to Turkey and Qatar, they were aware that reviving relations would weaken their organizational position within Hamas, and contribute to increasing the influence of their rivals.

On the other hand, these rivals remained weak until 2017, as Meshaal managed to marginalize Mahmoud Al-Zahar who did not receive any influential positions.

Re-joining the Resistance Axis

The formation of the new Political Bureau meant there were now a large number of officials who were not involved in any public positions on the Syrian crisis – such as Sinwar, Saleh Al-Arouri, and Osama Hamdan, who maintained a balanced relationship with all parties.

Zahar told The Cradle that Sinwar was “convinced” of his theses about the shape of the “last battle with Israel.” He added: “I spoke with Abu Ibrahim (Sinwar) for a long time about restoring the bond with the components of the nation that have hostility to Israel, specifically Hezbollah, Syria and Iran, and this is the pillar of Hamas’ foreign policy in the future.”

Nevertheless, Zahar believes that Damascus “will refuse to deal with the movement’s leadership, which took the lead during the war.” But it is likely that the Syrians will accept to deal with him personally, which he will seek during his forthcoming visit.

What’s Next?

Well-informed sources in Hamas revealed to The Cradle that the movement’s Political Bureau met this month and made the decision to return to Syria, despite Meshaal’s objection.

The resolution has two aims: first, to build a resistance front in the “ring countries” surrounding Palestine; and second, to establish a maritime line of communication between Gaza and the port of Latakia, in Syria.

The sources also revealed that Jamil Mezher, who was recently elected deputy secretary general of the PFLP, conveyed a message from Sinwar to the Syrian leadership calling for the restoration of relations between the two parties.

After his visit to Damascus, Mezher met with Haniyeh in Beirut to discuss the results. Haniyeh also met Nasrallah, as well as Ziad Al-Nakhaleh in an expanded meeting of the leaderships of Hamas and the PIJ in the Lebanese capital. All these events took place in one week.

According to Hamas sources, Haniyeh informed Nasrallah that the movement has unanimously taken an official decision to restore relations with Damascus. The two sides also discussed the demarcation of the maritime border between Lebanon and Israel.

The sources confirm that “Hamas is ready to simultaneously target gas-stealing platforms from the Gaza sea, in the event that Hezbollah targets an exploration and extraction vessel in the Karish field.”

Hamas sources, as well as an informed Syrian source, however, deny holding any recent new meetings between the two parties. The Syrian source reveals that meetings sponsored by Islamic Jihad were held last year.

What does Syria stand to gain?

On the other hand, Damascus has its reasons for postponing the return of this relationship. Of course, internal reasons can be overlooked if Bashar Al-Assad himself makes the decision.

But it is the current regional situation and the re-formation of alliances that worries the Syrian leadership the most.

It is true that Assad the son, like his father, has learned the ropes in dealing with the MB, but now he has no need for a new headache caused by the return of Hamas. There is no great benefit from this return except in one case: the normalization of Syrian relations with Turkey, Qatar, or both.

On Syria’s terms

Only in this scenario, can bridges be re-built with Hamas. But the conditions for this are currently immature, as this normalization will be at the expense of Syria’s relationship with its ally Russia, whether in the issue of gas supplies to Europe or stopping the military operation that Ankara is threatening against Kurdish terrorists in northern Syria.

Syria, which has already improved its relations with the UAE, and is currently working to improve its relations with Saudi Arabia and Jordan, will not include a “losing card” in its stack of cards now.

It will also not compete with Egypt over a file – the relationship with Hamas – which Cairo considers its monopoly in the region.

Also, Damascus is not in the midst of a clash of any kind with the Palestinian Authority and the Fatah movement, which took advantage of the exit of Hamas to consolidate their position in the Syrian capital and improve their relationship with Assad.

However, when news broke about the possible resumption of Hamas-Syrian relations, this time Damascus did not launch an attack on the movement and did not comment negatively on the news of the rapprochement and the restoration of the relations – as it did previously.

There is no doubt that the battle of the “Sword of Jerusalem” and the presence of a new leadership in Hamas’ Political Bureau has thawed the ice significantly. But the answer to when full rapprochement will be achieved is a decision likely to be made between Assad and Nasrallah.

The views expressed in this article do not necessarily reflect those of The Cradle.

السيناريوات المتوقعة للتواجد الإماراتي في اليمن

الجمعة 19 11 2021

باريس _ نضال حمادة

عندما نتحدّث عن الاستراتيجية الإماراتية حالياً في اليمن لا يمكن أن نفصلها عن استراتيجية روسيا في الكثير من مفاصلها، خصوصاً تلك التي تتعلق بصراع النفوذ مع السعودية أو في موضوع المنافذ البحرية التي يتحكم اليمن بها عبر شواطئه الطويلة.

لكن على عكس روسيا تعتبر الإمارات الحرب في اليمن مصيرية لوجودها ككيان ودولة بعد مغامرتها اليمنية واحتلالها لجزر ومدن في اليمن.

في العام 2019 حاولت الإمارات تخفيف وطأة أعمالها عبر الإعلان عن انسحاب قواتها من اليمن لكن على أرض الواقع ما زالت تلك القوات متواجدة.

هامش المناورة الإماراتي في اليمن أضيق من الهامش السعودي لذلك لجأت الإمارات الى تعزيز علاقاتها مع إيران التي شهدنا آخرها مشروع الممر الاستراتيجي للتجارة الإماراتية عبر الأراضي الإيرانية الى تركيا وأوروبا.

أيضاً عززت الإمارات العلاقة مع روسيا وطبعت مع سورية لإرضاء الروسي والإيراني.

عرضت الإمارات على روسيا إقامة قاعدة عسكرية في سقطرى او في عدن لكن الروس رفضوا.

في الواقع روسيا تريد قاعدة على باب المندب لكن تريدها من حكومة يمنية مستقرة ومتمكنة.

في تلك الفترة كانت إيران تعيد العلاقة بين أنصار الله وموسكو بعد سنتين قطيعة بسبب قتل علي صالح.

كانت روسيا الوسيط بين صالح والأنصار حيث استقبلت السفارة الروسية اجتماعات التنسيق بين الطرفين، وعند مقتل صالح غضبت موسكو وقطعت علاقاتها مع أنصار الله حتى العالم 2019 عندما نجحت إيران بإعادة حبل التواصل بين الطرفين.

 تزامناً مع العرض الإماراتي كانت موسكو أنجزت اتفاقاً سرياً مع عمر البشير لإنشاء قاعدة عسكرية روسية في بور سودان على البحر الأحمر.

أسقطت أميركا عمر البشير بسبب هذا الاتفاق السري

 وساهمت الإمارات بسقوطه حتى لا يفقدها التأثير على موسكو

في الواقع الاستراتيجية الإماراتية وسيناريوات هذه الاستراتيجية تقوم على أمرين:

1 –  استرضاء إيران.

2 – استرضاء روسيا.

يظهر هذا في التقارب الإماراتي مع سورية القاسم المشترك الكبير بين موسكو وطهران.

 كما ظهرت في الآونة الأخيرة استراتيجية تلبية مطالب أنصار الله الحوثيين كما شهدنا في انسحابات الساحل الغربي.

لا يمكن تصوّر هذا الانسحاب إلا ضمن سياسة استرضاء الحوثيين كون الساحل الغربي يشكل العمود الأساس لكلّ استراتيجية أبو ظبي على موانئ البحر الأحمر

ما حصل استسلام بكلّ المقاييس…

 قبل يومين أعلنت قوات طارق صالح ذات الولاء الإماراتي المنسحبة الى شبوة أنها لن تشارك في معارك مأرب.

لا يمكن فصل هذا الإعلان عن استراتيجية تلبية مطالب صنعاء.

سوف نشهد في الفترة المقبلة تلبية مطالب وتراجعات في جبهات متعددة.

ليس لدى الإمارات خيار إلا التراجع…

فيديوات ذات صلة

مقالات ذات صلة

من هو عبد الفتاح البرهان وما دوره في حرب اليمن واتفاق التطبيع؟

2021, 25 , تشرين اول

المصدر: الميادين نت

عبد الفتاح البرهان، القائد العسكري في السودان، يتردّد اسمه اليوم مع إعلانه حلَّ المجلس السيادي والحكومة، وفرضه حالة الطوارئ في البلاد. فمن هو؟ وما هي المناصب التي تقلّدها في حياته السياسية؟

'سنحرص على تنفيذ الاتفاق'
عبد الفتاح البرهان

يجسّد الفريق أول ركن عبد الفتاح البرهان، الذي أعلن اليوم الإثنين حلّ المؤسسات الانتقالية وحالة الطوارئ في السودان، عودةَ الحكم العسكري، وسط ترحيب من البعض، ورفض مطلق من آخرين ندّدوا بما وصفوه بأنه “انقلاب”.

ظهر البرهان اليوم الإثنين، عبر شاشة التلفزيون، في بزّته العسكرية. وأعلن، في نبرة حازمة، أنه يريد “تصحيح الثورة” التي أطاحت عمر البشير عام 2019. وأكّد إعفاء الوزراء ووكلاء الوزراء من مهماتهم، علماً بأن جزءاً كبيراً من هؤلاء اعتُقلوا منذ الفجر على أيدي قوى عسكرية.

في الشارع، يهتف متظاهرون ضده منذ أيام، رافضين “حكم العسكر”، لكن آخرين يطالبون بحكومة عسكرية، ويعتبرون أن الجيش هو المنقذ الذي سيحل كل مشاكل البلاد الاقتصادية والسياسية.

قبل إطاحة البشير، أدّى البرهان دوراً رئيساً بعيداً عن الأضواء في مشاركة السودان في التحالف العسكري الذي تقوده السعودية ضد اليمن، ثم أصبح في دائرة الضوء حين تولى قيادة المجلس العسكريّ الانتقالي في أعقاب إطاحة الرئيس السابق عمر البشير على يد الجيش، في 11 نيسان/أبريل 2019، في إثر تظاهرات حاشدة استمرت خمسة أشهر.

في 12 نيسان/أبريل، أدّى البرهان اليمين رئيساً للمجلس العسكري، الذي تولّى السلطة بعد البشير. تقلّد البرهان منصبه بعد أن تنازل الفريق أول ركن عوض بن عوف عن رئاسة المجلس العسكري بعد أقل من 24 ساعة من تسلّمه السلطة، تحت ضغط الشارع الذي كان ينظر إلى ابن عوف على أنه من داخل النظام، وحليف مقرّب من الرئيس السابق.

من الظلّ إلى المنصب الأول

تحوّل البرهان من شخصية تعمل في الظل إلى رئيس للبلاد بحكم الأمر الواقع. وقال عنه في حينه ضابطٌ في الجيش، طلب عدم الكشف عن هويته، إنه “ضابط رفيع المستوى في القوات المسلحة.. لم يكن يوماً تحت الأضواء كما هي الحال بالنسبة إلى ابن عوف (الذي كان وزيراً للدفاع) والفريق أول ركن كمال عبد المعروف (الذي كان رئيس أركان الجيش)”.

في آب/أغسطس 2019، وبعد عنف في الشارع ومفاوضات مع “ائتلاف قوى الحرية والتغيير”، الذي قاد الاحتجاجات الشعبية، وقّع المجلس العسكري اتفاقاً مع الائتلاف عُرِف بـ”الوثيقة الدستورية”، نصّ على مرحلة انتقالية يتقاسم خلالها المدنيون والعسكريون السلطة لقيادة البلاد نحو انتخابات وحكم مدني.

ترأّس البرهان، بموجب هذا الاتفاق، مجلسَ السيادة الذي كُلِّف الإشرافَ على إدارة المرحلة الانتقالية. ويتكوّن مجلس السيادة من 11 شخصاً: خمسة عسكريين يختارهم المجلس الانتقالي، وخمسة مدنيين يختارهم “تحالف قوى التغيير”، بالإضافة إلى مدني يتفق الجانبان على اختياره.

بعد سنتين من المرحلة الانتقالية، بات البرهان معتاداً على الأضواء، وبات يتصرف ويعامَل على أنه رئيس دولة، فلقد تلقى، الأربعاء الماضي، دعوةً إلى المشاركة في قمة بشأن ليبيا ستُعقَد في باريس في منتصف تشرين الثاني/نوفمبر. وهو يستقبل بانتظام المسؤولين والمبعوثين الأجانب الذين يزورون السودان.

يظهر، بصورة عامة، في بزّته العسكرية مع أوسمته، وغالباً برفقة نائب رئيس مجلس السيادة محمد حمدان دقلو، المعروف بـ “حميدتي”، وهو قائد قوات الدعم السريع المتهمة بقمع انتفاضة عام 2019.

علاقات بالخارج

خلال المفاوضات بين الجيش والمحتجين بشأن تركيبة الحكم، قام البرهان بزيارات لمصر والإمارات والسعودية. والأخيرتان من أبرز المانحين للسودان.

أمضى البرهان فترة من حياته المهنية ملحقاً عسكرياً لدى بكين. ويقول الضابط السوداني عن البرهان إنه “ضابط كبير يعرف كيف يقود قواته”، مضيفاً “ليست لديه ميول سياسية، إنه عسكري”.

وُلد البرهان عام 1960 في قرية قندتو شماليّ الخرطوم، ودرس في الكلية الحربية، ولاحقاً في مصر والأردن. وهو متزوج وأب لثلاثة أبناء. وكان قائداً لسلاح البر، قبل أن يعيّنه البشير في منصب المفتّش العام للجيش.

حرب اليمن

يشير محلّلون ووسائل إعلام سودانية إلى أن البرهان تولّى عملية تنسيق إرسال جنود سودانيين إلى اليمن في إطار “التحالف السعودي” في الحرب ضدّه.

أرسل البشير قوات سودانية إلى اليمن عام 2015 في إطار تحوّل رئيسي في السياسة الخارجية، شهد تخلّي الخرطوم عن علاقاتها المستمرة منذ عقود بإيران، عبر الانضمام إلى “التحالف” الذي تقوده الرياض.

وتقول ويلو بيردج، مؤلفة كتاب “الانتفاضات المدنية في السودان الحديث”، وأستاذة التاريخ في جامعة نيوكاسل، إن البرهان عمل عن كثب مع قوات الدعم السريع، بموجب تولّيه الملف اليمني، من دون أن تستبعد أن يكون دعم هذه المجموعة ساهم في إيصاله إلى السلطة.

عبد الفتاح البرهان و”إسرائيل”

أشارت وسائل إعلام إسرائيلية اليوم إلى أن التطورات في السودان “تمثل سبباً في قلق إسرائيل وإدارة جو بايدن، على حدّ سواء”، معلِّلة ذلك بأنه يعود إلى ترسيخ اتفاق التطبيع مع الخرطوم. 

وقالت إن “استمرار الاحتجاجات سيصعّب دفع عملية التطبيع قُدُماً في السودان، ويجب الأخذ في الحسبان أن رئيس حكومة السودان عبد الله حمدوك لم يكن هو من دفع إلى تطبيع العلاقات بإسرائيل، بل كانت القيادة العسكرية برئاسة عبد الفتاح البرهان”.

وفي السياق نفسه، انتقد مصدر إسرائيلي موقف واشنطن مما يجري في السودان، وقال لصحيفة “إسرائيل هيوم” إنه “في الوضع الحالي يفضّل دعم الجيش وقائده رئيس المجلس الانتقالي عبد الفتاح البرهان، لا رئيس الحكومة عبد الله حمدوك”.

يُشار، في هذا السياق، إلى أن البرهان قال، رداً على علاقته بـ “إسرائيل”، إنّ “لا عداء بين السودان وأيّ طائفة أو دين أو جهة”.

وأرجع عبد الفتاح البرهان توقيع حكومته اتفاقات “أبراهام” مع الولايات المتحدة و”إسرائيل” إلى “اقتناع الحكومة بأهمية نشر قيم التسامح والتعايش بين الشعوب، في مختلف أديانهم وأعراقهم”، بحسب الإذاعة الإسرائيلية.

وكان الرئيس الأميركي السابق دونالد ترامب أعلن، في تشرين الأول/أكتوبر الماضي، توصُّل السودان و”إسرائيل” إلى اتفاق من أجل تطبيع العلاقات بينهما.

وأدّت السعودية دوراً في دفع عملية التطبيع بين السودان و”إسرائيل”، عبر دفعها 335 مليون دولار إلى الولايات المتحدة من أجل تسريع تطبيع العلاقات بين الخرطوم و”تل أبيب”، بحسب ما ذكرت “ميدل إيست مونيتور”.

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One ‘NO’ Instead of Three! Sudanese Against Normalization

One ‘NO’ Instead of Three! Sudanese Against Normalization

By Zeinab Abdallah

Beirut – News would read that Egypt and Jordan were the first to normalize ties with the enemy of the Arab and Muslim nation, and were then followed by the United Arab Emirates, Bahrain and Sudan.

No! It is not the right way to report this particular ‘achievement’. It was the regime in each of Egypt, Jordan, the UAE, Bahrain and Sudan that started cozying up with the occupying regime. When it comes to peoples, they are not the same as their governors.

Peoples are usually blamed for what their rulers commit. However, it is certain for those who refuse to submit that they are capable of making the change despite the ruler’s will. Those people who reject humiliation and submission are ready to clean up the dirt they were forced to be covered with, and reverse the conspiracies made by their heads of states.

Those same peoples are ready to pay their lives for the freedom of Palestine. They are motivated by Muslim’s first Qibla, the holy al-Aqsa Mosque.

Commenting on the Sudanese regime’s normalization with the ‘Israeli’ entity, Deputy Head of [Reform] al-Islah Now Party, and former Sudanese minister Hassan Rizk emphasized that Sudan has been backing the Palestinian cause since 1948, had fought next to the Palestinians and Arabs in all their wars.

It was Sudan that unified the nation and raised the three No’s against peace, recognition and negotiations with ‘Israel’, he added. His comment comes in reference to the fourth Arab League summit that was held in Khartoum on August 29, 1967.

The summit took place in wake of the Arab defeat against the Zionist military in the same year, and it came up with the famous Khartoum Resolution that provides three No’s: No peace with ‘Israel’, no recognition of ‘Israel,’ and no negotiations with ‘Israel’ unless everybody’s right is returned.

Rizk referred to this event as historic and made by great leaders such as al-Mahjoub and al-Azhari, however, he explained: “After 72 years of steadfastness and challenge, there came weak leaders who wasted the cause, followed the collaborators and the colonials, and sold the al-Aqsa Mosque, Palestine, and the nation’s dignity.”

Adding that the normalizers will remain with the Arab nation’s betrayers, the former minister stressed that the Sudanese people won’t abandon their principles, but will definitely abandon their betrayers: “We will keep defending Palestine, its lands, and people, and we will be the first to liberate and enter the al-Aqsa Mosque at the end of the day.”

Mr. Rizk made clear that there isn’t any advantage from normalizing ties with the Zionist enemy, explaining that it was tried previously by other Arab and Muslim nations which didn’t achieve anything. “After Camp David, we lost the African nations that were supporting Palestine and boycotting the occupation entity. Those countries normalized ties and became markets for the enemy.”

The Sudanese minister elaborated on the repercussions of the normalization harming those who were stuck in its mud, recalling how Egypt has lost its agriculture, health, security and leadership, and how the Palestinians have lost their unity, arms, and a lot of lands, not to mention their loss of al-Quds, the construction of settlements, razing their houses, and killing and detaining their women and children.

Rizk underscored that the lack of advantage is also applied for Jordan, Mauritania, Central Africa, Eritrea, and South Sudan… among the many countries that normalized ties with the occupation entity. He then added that the ‘Israelis’ are cheap and don’t pay for the favors made for them.

For his part, member of the General Secretariat of the Arab and Islamic Gathering in Support of the Choice of Resistance, and Sudan branch coordinator, Mr. Idriss Abdul Qadir Ayess stressed that Sudan didn’t stop being the reservoir for anti-Zionist enemy rallies, noting, however, that the ruling regime has stabbed the people in  the back, fallen in the arms of the Gulf states and operated upon their orders. He then outlined that this is rejected by the people although the stance of the transitional government has affected a noticeable part of the people.

Therefore, the Islamic researcher and political activist says: “We find that the Sudanese people today are divided due to the crumpling economy. Most of them believe that it is due to the American blockade and sanctions against the nation; however, they still believe that the Palestinian cause is the main reason to resist normalization.”

Mr. Ayess added that most of the Sudanese people are resisting and rejecting normalization, citing the general gatherings made against normalization and the people’s rejection and embarrassment of this step as an example.

Commenting on the country’s opposition groups, the Sudanese political activist considered that the “Islah” Party is unheard among the people because its symbols have participated in Omar al-Bashir’s government, explaining why they are not listened to by the people.

Relatively, he noted that the anti-normalization individuals today are working strongly to make the government retreat its step through media, popular, and legal pressure. He then reiterated that the people of Sudan won’t submit to the regime’s normalization, will reject it in all means, won’t abandon Palestine and the holy al-Aqsa Mosque.

“The people will strongly operate to put the government in front of two choices. The first is that the government retreats its heinous step, and the other is to topple it,” he added.

Between the two choices stand the only “NO” that sums up the ultimate rejection of any relationship with the occupier of Palestine. There is no need to three No’s! Only one “NO for normalization” is sufficient to save the nation from this disappointment and unite it behind the first and last cause: Palestine!

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Hundreds of Sudanese Troops Enter Saudi Arabia Heading to Yemen: Report

Hundreds of Sudanese Troops Enter Saudi Arabia Heading to Yemen: Report

By Staff, Agencies

Hundreds of Sudanese forces have reportedly entered Saudi Arabia en route to Yemen contrary to an earlier announcement by the North African country about a drawdown of its personnel in the bloody Saudi war on the poorest Arabian Peninsula nation.

Citing private Saudi sources, the Middle East Eye news portal [MEE] reported on Friday that 1,018 Sudanese army officers and soldiers arrived in Saudi Arabia by boat on September 22 after passing through passport control in the southwestern city of Jizan.

Two Sudanese planes also carried Sudanese military personnel from Khartoum to Saudi Arabia’s Najran airport the day before, according to one of the sources, who was speaking on condition of anonymity.

The first plane held 123 passengers and the second 128, the source said, adding that both planes later departed for Khartoum.

“The planes brought Sudanese officers and soldiers to take part in Operation Restoring Hope,” the source said, using the name that Saudi Arabia gave to its devastating military aggression against Yemen.

The fresh deployment came despite an announcement by the Sudanese military in January that it was winding down its presence in Yemen from around 5,000 mercenaries to a “minor” group of some 650.

Brigadier General Jamal Adam, a spokesman for the Rapid Support Forces [RSF] paramilitary, told Turkey’s Anadolu news agency that the Sudanese forces present in Yemen “were operating within two sections, the [United Arab] Emirates sector inside Aden, and the Saudi sector that extends on the Saudi-Yemeni border.”

In December 2019, Sudanese Prime Minister Abdalla Hamdok said the number of the Sudanese mercenaries had been reduced to 5,000 from 15,000.

He said his government had “inherited” the deployment in Yemen from Sudan’s former president, Omar Hassan al-Bashir, who was ousted following a popular uprising against his rule in April 2019.

Earlier reports said child soldiers from Sudan’s Darfur have been fighting on behalf of Saudi Arabia and its allies in the frontline of the Yemen war, with money being their only motive.

أفريقيا… حيث تتقدّم‎ ‎‏«إسرائيل» يتراجع العرب‎ ‎السودان نموذج: التصويب والاصطياد

د. عدنان منصور

بعد قيام دولة الاحتلال “الإسرائيلي” في فلسطين، عام 1948، لم يغب عن استراتيجية “إسرائيل”، العمل على احتواء دول عربية، تشكل أهمية كبيرة للأمن القومي العربي، ومنها مصر وسورية والأردن والعراق والسودان.

اذ إن تطلّعات “إسرائيل” الى احتواء السودان، تعود الى الخمسينيات من القرن الماضي. ففي عام 1951، وقبل استقلال السودان وانفصاله عن مصر عام 1956، أرسلت تل أبيب بعثة “إسرائيلية” تجارية الى الخرطوم، مؤلفة من خمسين شخصاً، وذلك لشراء منتوجات سودانية وتصديرها الى “إسرائيل”. ما مهّد في ما بعد للتواصل مع أحزاب وتنظيمات سياسية سودانية مختلفة.

وبالفعل، جرى أول لقاء سري في لندن عام 1954، بين حزب الأمة الاسلامي، برئاسة زعيمه الصديق المهدي، ووفد ضمّ مسؤولين إسرائيليين، لبحث ما يمكن أن تقدمه “إسرائيل” لدعم استقلال السودان، ومواجهة النفوذ المصري.

السبب الذي دفع بالصديق المهدي ليمدّ الجسور مع “إسرائيل”، والتواصل معها، هو نزعته الانفصالية عن مصر، وتطلعه الى السلطة، خاصة بعد فشل حزبه في الانتخابات النيابية التي جرت عام 1953، والتي أسفرت عن انتصار كاسح للحزب الوطني الاتحادي الذي يتزعّمه إسماعيل الأزهري، الذي كان مؤيداّ لوحدة وادي النيل، والذي شغل منصب رئيس الوزراء بين عامي 1954 و1956 لحين استقلال السودان في الأول من كانون الثاني 1956 .

بعد اللقاء الأول للصديق المهدي مع الإسرائيليين، توسّعت شبكة العلاقات بين الطرفين، اذ إنه في عام 1955، جرى لقاء سري آخر في العاصمة القبرصية نيقوسيا، جمع مسؤولين إسرائيليين، مع السياسي السوداني، محمد أحمد عمر، مهندس العلاقات بين الطرفين، وأحد أبرز أعضاء الوفد الذي رأسه الصديق المهدي في اجتماع لندن، في العام السابق.

في ما بعد، توسّعت مروحة العلاقات السودانية _ الإسرائيلية، لتشمل أحزاباً سودانية، وحركات انفصالية منتشرة في جنوب السودان.

إسماعيل الأزهري، كان احد ابرز المنادين بوحدة وادي النيل. إلا أنّ الرأي العام السوداني بدأ يميل للاستقلال، وكذلك غالبية أعضاء حزب الاتحاد الوطني، الذين كانوا يشكلون الأكثرية داخل البرلمان، مما دفع بأعضاء المجلس للتصويت على استقلال السودان يوم 19 كانون الأول 1955، والذي أصبح نافذاً يوم 1 كانون الثاني عام 1956.

بعد سنتين من استقلال السودان، في عام 1958، قاد الفريق ابراهيم عبود أول انقلاب عسكري، حيث تسلّم السلطة إثر ذلك، من رئيس الوزراء آنذاك، عبدالله خليل، وبقي فيها حتى عام 1964، بعد ان أطاحت به ثورة شعبية.

إبراهيم عبود اتخذ قرارات بوقف العمل بالدستور، وحلّ البرلمان، وإلغاء الاحزاب، ثم عمل على أسلمة جنوب السودان وتعريبه، ودمج شماله بجنوبه، وحظر التبشير وطرد المبشرين، ولم يندفع للعلاقة مع “إسرائيل”، وظل على مسافة بعيدة منها، وهو الذي كان مؤيداً من قبل أكبر مجموعتين دينيتين: واحدة يرأسها عبد الرحمن المهدي زعيم حزب الأنصار، والأخرى، سر الختم خليفة، زعيم طائفة الختميّة. أدى الوضع السائد ايام إبراهيم عبود، الى تدويل قضية جنوب السودان، بضغط من الفاتيكان، وبعض الدول الغربية. في الوقت الذي بدأ فيه قادة التمرد في الجنوب، عملياتهم العسكرية، ضد السلطة المركزية في الخرطوم، متخذين من دول الجوار، منطلقاً، وقواعد تدريب، ومقار لهم، ولهجماتهم العسكرية ضد الجيش السوداني.

كان إبراهيم عبود يرمي الى دمج السودان وتوحيده ثقافياً واجتماعياً، بغية ترسيخ هوية سودانية موحدة في ما بعد، الا ان محاولاته لم تسفر عن النتيجة التي كان يتوخاها، بسبب اشتداد الصراع وحدّته في الداخل، بالإضافة الى تدخل دول الغرب في الشأن السوداني، وسياساتها الداعمة لقوى الانفصال في الجنوب.

بعد سقوط حكم إبراهيم عبود، عاد إسماعيل الازهري الى ساحة الحكم من جديد، ليتولى رئاسة مجلس السيادة، بين عامي 1964 و 1969، قبل ان يطيح به انقلاب عسكري قاده جعفر النميري عام 1969.

في عهد إسماعيل الأزهري، قويت العلاقات مع مصر، وتمّ الاتفاق معها على مواجهة العدوان الإسرائيلي عام 1967، في الوقت الذي كانت فيه “إسرائيل”، تجري اتصالات مع الحركات الانفصالية في جنوب السودان، وتقدم لها مختلف وسائل الدعم المادي والعسكري واللوجستي.

بعد حرب حزيران 1967، قالت غولدا مائير، بشكل صريح، إنّ إضعاف العراق والسودان، يتطلب إثارة النعرات الطائفية فيهما، لينال من وحدة البلدين، ومن أجل كشف العمق الاستراتيجي لدول المواجهة، وجعله مزعزعاً في اي مواجهة مقبلة مع “إسرائيل”.

شهد السودان منعطفاً جديداً، مع وصول جعفر النميري الى الحكم، اثر انقلاب عسكري قام به عام 1969، اذ أعطى جنوب السودان الحكم الذاتي، وحل الأحزاب باستثناء الحزب الشيوعي. الا انه بعد محاولة هذا الأخير القيام بانقلاب عسكري عام 1971، تمت ملاحقة أعضائه، وإعدام زعيمه عبد الخالق محجوب.

بعد مفاوضات مع الجنوبيين، وقع اتفاق اديس ابابا عام 1972، حيث نعم السودان بالسلام لمدة احد عشر عاماً، لتنفجر الحرب مجدداً بين الشمال والجنوب، بعد اتهام الجنوب للنميري بعدم احترامه لبنود الاتفاق، لجهة اللغة والدين والقومية لجنوب السودان.

شكلت فترة حكم النميري، محطة للقاءات سرية سودانية إسرائيلية، تحت ضغط أميركي، للسماح بهجرة يهود الفلاشا في إثيوبيا الى “إسرائيل” عبر السودان. في هذه الأثناء استطاعت “إسرائيل” ان تتغلغل في الداخل السوداني، وتتواصل بشكل مباشر مع حركات الجنوب.

بدأت موجات هجرة الفلاشا الى “إسرائيل”، اعتباراً من عام 1977، وكانت موجات قليلة العدد. الا انها نشطت بشكل كبير عام 1984، حيث تم نقل 12000 إثيوبياً من الفلاشا، عبر جسر جوي، اتخذ من الأراضي السودانية، محطة لإتمام العملية، التي تمّت بسرية مطلقة، والتي تمّ كشف النقاب عنها، بعد فترة من وصول الفلاشا الى “إسرائيل”، من قبل نشرة “نكوداه”، وهي إحدى نشرات المستوطنين اليهود في الضفة الغربية. وبعد ذلك تناقلتها وسائل الإعلام العالمية بشكل واسع. وقد عرفت هذه العملية، بعملية موسى، حيث بلغت تكلفتها مئة مليون دولار، ساهمت الولايات المتحدة بخمسة عشر ألف دولار، والباقي قامت بتغطيته جماعات يهودية أميركية.

في عهد عمر البشير الذي جاء الى السلطة بعد الإطاحة بنظام جعفر النميري عام 1989، وحتى انفصال الجنوب عن الشمال عام 2011، قامت “إسرائيل” بدور فاعل في دعم انفصال جنوب السودان، والعمل على إنهاك الدولة السودانية في الصراع المسلح، التي قبلت بعد ذلك بالانفصال ظناً منها، أنه سينهي الحرب الأهلية في السودان.

“إسرائيل” التي لعبت على الوتر الديني مع الحركات الانفصالية، لا سيما أحزاب الجنوب، ومنها الحركة الشعبية لتحرير السودان بقيادة جون غارانغ، نسقت بشكل كامل معه، وهي تدفع بكل قوة باتجاه انفصال الجنوب السوداني عن شماله. مقدّمة دعماً طبياً وغذائياً، كما أرسلت أطباء الى الجنوب، ووفرت الدعم السياسيّ والعسكريّ واللوجستي للقادة الجنوبيين، والذي توسّع كثيراً وتعزز بعد إرسال طائرات عسكرية إسرائيلية، كانت تسقط معدات الاسلحة على معسكرات الجنوب.

“إسرائيل” التي ركّزت على الانفصال، كانت وراء سقوط طائرة جون غارانغ، بعدما شعرت انه يميل الى وحدة السودان.

اهتمام “إسرائيل” بتقسيم السودان، عبر عنه لاحقا، أبراهام (أفي) موشي ديختر ، عضو الكنيست عن حزب كاديما عام 2005، رئيس جهاز الشاباك بين عامي 2000 و 2005، وزير الأمن الإسرائيلي بين عامي 2006 و 2009، في محاضرة له عام 2008، جاء فيها: “انّ اهتمام إسرائيل بالسودان، هو كونه بموارده ومساحته الشاسعة، وعدد سكانه، محتمل أن يصبح قوة مضاعفة الى قوة العالم العربي. لأن موارده اذا ما استثمرت في ظل أوضاع مستقرة ستجعل منه قوة، يُحسب لها الف حساب!”.

لم تتوقف “إسرائيل” عن تدخلها في جنوب السودان، وانما نسجت علاقات مع العديد من الفصائل المسلحة في اكثر من اقليم سوداني، لا سيما في دارفور، لدفعه الى الانفصال. وهذا ما اشار اليه ديختر ايضاً في محاضرة نشرتها الصحف الإسرائيلية في تشرين الأول من عام 2008 جاء فيها: “الاستراتيجية التي نفذناها في جنوب السودان، نجحت في تغيير اتجاه السودان نحو التأزم والانقسام. وستنتهي الصراعات بتقسيمه الى كيانات عدة. انّ قدراً كبيراً تحقق في الجنوب، ولدينا فرصة لتحقيقه في دارفور”.

مؤسس حركة جنوب السودان، كشف لاحقاً عن دور “إسرائيل” في انفصال جنوب السودان، معتبرا انها وضعت الحجر الأساس لانفصاله.

الى جانب الدور الإسرائيلي، كان هناك على الساحة السودانية، غزل من قبل أكثر من فريق سوداني باتجاه “إسرائيل”. ففي مؤتمر الحوار الوطني السوداني عام 2014، أثير موضوع العلاقات مع “إسرائيل”، من قبل حزب المستقلين، من اجل التطبيع معها، تمهيداً لتحسين العلاقات الخارجية باتجاه الولايات المتحدة. هناك أصوات سودانية رسمية اخرى كانت تعلو بين الفينة والاخرى، تدعو الى التطبيع مع العدو، منها تصريح وزير الخارجية السودانية الأسبق ابراهيم غندور، قال فيه، إن بلاده لا مانع لديها لبحث إمكانية التطبيع مع “إسرائيل”. كما انّ مستشار عمر البشير، مصطفى عثمان إسماعيل، أبدى عن رغبة بلاده للتعاون مع واشنطن وتطبيع العلاقات مع “إسرائيل”.

لقد تهافت العديد من المسؤولين السودانيين، وقادة أحزاب سودانية، للإعلان عن رغبتهم في تطبيع العلاقات. حيث توالت اللقاءات، وكان من بينها لقاء اسطنبول عام 2017 الذي ضمّ مبعوثاً إسرائيلياً، ومسؤولين سودانيين، وفقاً لما كشفته القناة العاشرة الإسرائيلية.

دفء العلاقات السودانية _ الإسرائيلية في السنوات الأخيرة، حمل رئيس مجلس السيادة السوداني، عبد الفتاح البرهان، الى عقد اجتماع يوم 3 شباط الماضي، مع رئيس وزراء العدو نتنياهو في أوغندا، مما شكل منعطفاً، وصدمة ودهشة للسودانيين. إذ ما أدركه الرئيس المصري الراحل جمال عبد الناصر، من أهمية السودان للأمن القومي العربي، عجز عن إدراكه المسؤولون السودانيون الجدد، وهم يهرولون ويزحفون على بطونهم، للتطبيع علناً مع العدو الإسرائيلي، من دون ان يدركوا خطورة وتداعيات هذا التطبيع على بلدهم وأمنهم ووحدة أرضهم، والأمن القومي العربي.

عبد الفتاح برهان، اعتبر اللقاء مع نتنياهو، إنجازاً لبلاده (!)، مدّعياً ان لـ “إسرائيل” دوراً كبيراً في إقناع الولايات المتحدة بإزالة اسم السودان عن لائحة الإرهاب، ليلاقيه نتنياهو بقوله، انّ فريقاً “إسرائيلياً” سيضع خطة لتوسيع رقعة التعاون بين البلدين!

خطوات السودان اللاحقة، سمحت للطائرات الإسرائيلية، بعبور أجوائه، ليتبع ذلك هبوط أول طائرة إسرائيلية في مطار الخرطوم.

مما لا شك فيه، ان تطبيع السودان لعلاقاته مع “إسرائيل”، سيوسع تحرك الاخيرة في القرن والوسط الأفريقي، حيث لـ “إسرائيل” اليوم علاقات متجذرة على مختلف الصعد وفي المجالات كافة، لا سيما العسكرية مع إثيوبيا واريتريا التي يوجد فيها قواعد عسكرية للعدو. ففي اريتريا يوجد أكثر من خمسمئة خبير وفني. كما لـ “إسرائيل” في تشاد قواعد عسكرية عدة، بالإضافة الى علاقات متينة متنوّعة مع أوغندا وكينيا اللتين دعمتا انفصال جنوب السودان وفصائله المسلحة، ما عزز الحضور والنفوذ السياسي والإعلامي والأمني والاقتصادي والتجاري والمالي والتكنولوجي لـ “إسرائيل” في دول الفارة الأفريقية، في الوقت الذي يتراجع فيه الحضور العربي، وبالذات الحضور المصري الذي كان في زمن عبد الناصر قوياً، فاعلاً ووهاجاً.

هل يدرك اليوم، عبد الفتاح برهان، ومجلس السيادة السوداني، والمسؤولون السودانيون، خطورة التطبيع مع العدو؟! وهل يعلم البرهان، ان التطبيع لن يوفر مستقبلاً للسودان، الأمن والرخاء والاستقرار، والأهمّ من كلّ ذلك وحدة ما تبقى من الأراضي السودانية؟!

إن العدو الإسرائيلي لن يكتفي بالتطبيع، ولا يريد علاقات سليمة، بل سيظل يركز انظاره ويواصل تآمره على تفتيت السودان، حتى لا تقوم له قائمة. وما الأحداث التي تجري في دارفور وغيرها، وتصريحات الإسرائيليين حيال مستقبل السودان، إلا لتصبّ في اتجاه التقسيم وإنشاء الكيانات الضعيفة. حيث ستظلّ اليد الإسرائيلية طويلة ووراء كل المصائب والويلات التي تشهدها أمتنا.

فمتى نتعلم من وقائع الأحداث، وما تبيّته “إسرائيل” لنا من سياسات مدمّرة لنتعظ؟!

للأسف الشديد، حيث يتقدّم العدو الإسرائيلي، في الدول الأفريقية، وعلى مستوى القارة كلها، ينحسر الوجود العربي شيئاً فشيئاً، ويتراجع دوره وينحسر، لا سيما بصورة خاصة، تراجع الدور المصري بشكل لافت ومحبط، الذي كان في الخمسينيات والستينيات والسبعينيات من القرن الماضي مؤثراً، قوياً ومتألقاً، في عهد الزعامة الناصرية، ومندفعاً بكلّ قواه، في مواجهة المدّ الإسرائيلي، وتضييق الخناق عليه.

*وزير الخارجية والمغتربين الأسبق

Sudan to Hand over Omar Al-Bashir for Genocide Trial

Sudan to Hand over Omar Al-Bashir for Genocide Trial

By Staff, Agencies

Sudan’s transitional authorities agreed to hand over ousted autocrat Omar al-Bashir to the International Criminal Court to face trial on charges of war crimes and genocide, a top Sudanese official said Tuesday, in a deal with rebels to surrender all those wanted in connection with the Darfur conflict.

For a decade after his indictment, al-Bashir confounded the court based in The Hague, Netherlands. He not only was out of reach during his 30 years in power in Khartoum, but he also traveled abroad frequently to visit friendly leaders without fear of arrest.

Bashir even attended the 2018 World Cup in Russia, where he kicked a soccer ball playfully during an airport welcome ceremony and watched matches from luxury seating.

The military overthrew al-Bashir in April 2019 amid massive public protests of his rule, and he has been jailed in Khartoum since then. Military leaders initially ruled out surrendering him to The Hague, saying he would be tried at home.

But the joint military-civilian Sovereign Council that has ruled Sudan since last summer has agreed with rebel groups in Darfur to hand over those wanted by the ICC to face justice in The Hague, according to Mohammed Hassan al-Taishi, a member of the council and a government negotiator.

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