Delivering a ‘True Promise’: an insider account of Iran’s strikes on Israel

MAY 3, 2024

Source

Iranian firebrand MP Mahmoud Nabavian reveals the calculated strategy, diplomatic intrigue, and bold military prowess that showcased Tehran’s 13 April missile strikes on Israel.

The Cradle

Following the strategic success of Iran’s ‘True Promise’ retaliatory drone and missile operation in response to last month’s Israeli bombing of the Iranian consulate in Damascus, The Cradle presents an exclusive insider‘s narrative provided by Iranian Member of Parliament Mahmoud Nabavian, a principalist who won the most votes in Tehran during the country’s March elections. 

His account of the retaliatory strikes against the occupation state offers unparalleled insights into the 13–14 April events. With access to military sources, Nabavian’s testimony serves as the most detailed view to date by an Iranian government official on Iran’s response, one that has sorely exposed the vulnerabilities of Israel’s air defense systems. 

In a closed Telegram posting, Nabavian explained that Israel’s “cowardly” attack, which led to the martyrdom of prominent leaders in Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), occurred “on our soil” – a reference to the Iranian diplomatic mission in Damascus: 

“As the Imam [Ali Khamenei] said, the enemies made a mistake.” Iran’s full-on retaliatory strikes, he thus maintains, were justified and legal under Article 51 of the UN Charter.

Below is a transcript (edited for length) from Nabavian’s important revelations about Iran’s military strikes on Israel and the flurry of international deal-making attempts that preceded them:

Two hours after the attack on the consulate in Damascus, the Iranian National Security Council convened and affirmed the inevitability of a response and gave a 10-day deadline to take the necessary diplomatic measures and for the armed forces to prepare their plan to respond.

Diplomatically, the first step was to go to the Security Council, even though we knew that this would be futile. But it was necessary to file a complaint about the attack on our land, assert our natural right to self-defense, and request a Security Council session. Because we are not members of the Council, we had to talk to member states to request that the session be held. 

China, Russia, and Algeria agreed. Russia submitted the request, and the session was held, but the US, Germany, Britain, and France did not allow a statement to be issued condemning Israel. The heads of our missions abroad were also active in informing the concerned countries that we would respond to the Zionist entity.

Due to these pressures, Israel denied it had attacked a diplomatic building and that those who were targeted were not diplomats. The consulate building, four of its five floors, were purchased 45 years ago and were designated for diplomatic work. It was indeed a diplomatic building.

After we assured the international community of our right to respond, some countries, such as the US, Germany, England, France, Canada, and Egypt, tried to convince us not to do so, and they confirmed their readiness to meet Iran’s requests. For example, some of these countries that were not previously willing to grant entry visas to our diplomats or officials suddenly decided to do so immediately.

When the US realized that we were serious, it sent a threat that if the response was launched from Iranian territory, it might attack Iran. Our response was that the US is not among our targets, but if it decides to involve itself in defense of Israel, we will respond by targeting it as well, and as you know, there are many American bases around us. 

Despite this, the US, Britain, France, and Germany insisted on the same message, yet our answer was that Israel crossed a red line. Then, they said, if we must respond, let it be from outside Iranian territory.

Why did they insist that the strike not be from inside Iran? Because for a long time, they have been assassinating our nuclear scientists and carrying out sabotage operations at the Natanz nuclear reactor. In the last six months alone, they have assassinated 18 members of our armed forces, and we have always responded through our allies [in the Axis of Resistance], but if we did that this time, we would lose face.

If Lebanese Hezbollah had responded to Israel, it could have bombed Beirut, and western powers would have seized upon this to say, ‘If this is a war between Iran and Israel, why did Hezbollah involve itself in it?’ They would also hold it responsible for the subsequent unrest in Lebanon.

Therefore, the insistence that the Iranian response should be through Iran’s allies was meant to distort Hezbollah’s reputation and unleash Israel to target it and other resistance forces in the region and to portray them as mercenaries of Iran. We read these western intentions well, and accordingly, the decision was taken to respond from within Iranian territory.

On the night of Eid al-Fitr, a meeting was held with the heads of diplomatic missions of the countries of the region, and we informed them that we are keen on good neighborliness, but if the US uses any of your countries to carry out action against us, we will strike the US bases on your lands.

This message was conveyed to Washington, and they realized that Iran was serious. They asked us to exercise restraint. The US, Germany, England, France, and Canada – these countries that support brutality and crime in the world and provide the weapons with which the people of Gaza are bombed – ask us to exercise restraint. 

[UK Foreign Secretary] David Cameron called the night after the Iranian attack and said he couldn’t sleep last night. This is the malicious British foreign secretary. Why? Because we sent 300 drones and missiles over the heads of the Israelis. The Iranian official who spoke to him said, ‘For six months, rockets have been falling on the people of Gaza, and you slept well every night.’ This is the same malicious Britain that encouraged the US to launch attacks on Yemen.

The important thing is coordination at all levels before responding, politically, diplomatically, and in the media. After the Leader [Ali Khamenei] affirmed in his Eid al-Fitr sermon that we will certainly discipline the enemy, messages came to us requesting that the response be proportionate and not forceful. 

Our answer was clear: that first, we would definitely strike Israel; second, that the attack would be direct from Iranian territory; and third, that the National Security Council decided that the response would be a deterrent.

Meanwhile, Azerbaijan informed us that it had information that we would bomb the Israeli embassy in Baku, and they asked us not to carry out any action on their territory. I think this was a message that they could turn a blind eye to striking Israeli targets in a neighboring country, but we were already aware of that. 

The messages we received were not limited to the US and European countries, but we also received messages from some countries in the region. We tried to take advantage of the matter to reach a ceasefire in Gaza, and we told everyone that this might be a solution to the problem. 

They asked us whether a ceasefire in Gaza meant that we would refrain from responding. We answered that we would strike Israel in any case, but perhaps a decision like this would help reduce the severity of the attack. They asked that we give them a few days.

We asked our military forces to postpone the response for 24 hours and gave the countries of the world the opportunity to adhere to their obligations stipulated in international laws and for Israel to pledge not to attack Iranian forces and interests in the region and the world.

Regarding the Iranian request to conclude a permanent, complete, and immediate truce in the Gaza Strip: US President Joe Biden sent a message stating that he would work to achieve it himself, but he set a malicious condition, which is that the Palestinian resistance releases all Israeli prisoners in exchange for Israel releasing 900 Palestinian prisoners, after which the implementation of the truce begins. 

Of course, Hamas did not agree to the matter, and this was the correct decision. We understood that they [the Americans] are not serious about reaching a truce and that they are only looking to achieve their malign goals.

Everyone realized that we would attack Israel. The US, France, Britain, and even Italy harnessed all their military capabilities in Qatar, alongside the UAE, Saudi Arabia, and Jordan. 

They equipped six missile launchers in the region’s waters with a range of between 2,000 and 3,000 kilometers. They harnessed all modern satellites and radars, moved 103 aircraft into the region’s airspace to strike our missiles, and placed all air defense systems under unified command under the supervision of the US to confront Iranian missiles in several stages. 

That is, if the Iranian missiles were able to pass any defense line, they would be targeted and shot down in the next.

What is interesting is that the German foreign minister, 24 hours before the Iranian operation was carried out, called us and was pleading that we not target Israel from inside Iranian territory. He said that our missiles would not be able to pass the obstacles and defense lines that they had prepared to intercept our missiles and that the US was using 70 drones in Iraq for that, and it would increase the number to 700.

They were monitoring the movements of our soldiers, missiles, and drones, and they believed that none of the Iranian missiles would reach Israel. They were confident that the missiles would not be able to penetrate air defense systems. 

At the Turkish Incirlik base, which includes 5,000 soldiers, a large number of AWACS planes and 15 jamming planes were harnessed to repel our attack.

As such, they were astonished at how Iran was able to evade the huge layers of defense they had activated, and what surprised them even more was that it took five and a half to seven hours for the drones to reach the Zionist entity, and their speed was not great, which meant that they were easy to shoot down.

Twenty-four hours before the operation, Washington sent a firm message stating that if we decided to attack Israel from our territory, they will respond militarily against Iran. This time, they did not talk about possibilities but rather said that they would definitely attack Iranian territory. Our answer was decisive, that we will definitely strike Israel from within our territories, and if you commit any mistake, we will target all your bases in the region.

We informed Saudi Arabia and the countries of the region that if Iranian territory is targeted from within your territory, we will definitely respond. Saudi Arabia announced that it would not allow any operation against Iran to be carried out from its territory, and the authorities in Cyprus also informed us of a similar message.

We knew that the Iraqi and Jordanian airspace was completely under US control. We thought about the Israeli targets that we were going to hit, and we faced two obstacles: the first was that their air defenses were very strong, and we had to find a way for our drones and missiles to pass them, and the second was not to take action that will lead to us being condemned. 

The decision was to strike two military targets: the first was the [Nevatim] airport from which the F-35 plane that bombed the Iranian consulate took off, and the second was an Israeli intelligence center in the Golan. By coincidence, the fighter jet that targeted the consulate fired its missiles from above this intelligence headquarters.

Our drones, numbering about 130, were launched, the majority of which belonged to us, and between two and three were sent by our allied forces. We also launched missiles carrying explosive warheads, a large number of which deflected the air defenses from their path. 

I will not talk much about the number of hits we targeted, but out of 17 missiles, 15 hit their targets, meaning 89 percent. The whole west was there, and we delivered an important message to the world.

In the aftermath of the operation, 15 countries contacted and said that they were seeking a ceasefire in Gaza and asked Israel not to respond. 

The British and German foreign ministers contacted us and said that international law does not include the term “punishment.” We answered them: If that does not exist in international law, why did you propose punishing Hamas after 7 October? The calls continued to ask whether we would attack Israel again. We said that if we were attacked, we would respond tenfold.

The countries of the region have now understood Iran’s capabilities and it seems that they will seek to significantly improve their relations with Iran. The Israelis realized that when the spirit of despair takes hold, as Ben Gurion says, ‘we will begin to fall down the slope that leads to the abyss,’ and this has become clear to the world. 

As the master of the resistance [Hezbollah’s Hassan Nasrallah] expresses, ‘Israel is weaker than a spider’s web,’ and, God willing, this operation will be a deterrent against the assassinations that were occurring against us. Now, this is the only thing that Israel can do, and we must be more vigilant, and we must instill hope in the peoples of the region and not care about the rulers.

Mahmoud Nabavian’s account not only exposes the meticulous planning behind the Islamic Republic’s response but also reveals a resolve to defend sovereignty and impose a credible deterrence against future violations – at all costs. 

Tehran’s military response should be interpreted beyond the current regional war centered on Gaza and signals a broad recalibration of power dynamics in West Asia. As western and neighboring states assess the implications of Iran’s new assertive military posture, alliances, and strategies will require careful reconsideration.

The views expressed in this article do not necessarily reflect those of The Cradle.

The enemy within: Arab states that trade with Israel

JAN 31, 2024

West Asian exports to Israel have skyrocketed since 2020. These are the Arab and Muslim governments that put goods on Israeli shelves, despite their public stances supporting Gaza.

Photo Credit: The Cradle

Mohamad Hasan Sweidan

Israeli import data reveals that a number of Arab countries play a significant role in buoying the occupation state’s trade volume, despite attempts by other regional nations to weaken Israel’s economy. 

Since this decade’s onset, Israeli ports have been teeming with the arrival of goods from across the region. Each shipment not only boosts the occupation state’s economy, but also weaves a narrative that goes beyond trade statistics as these economic interactions carry a hidden stream of political significance.

Although not an Arab country, Turkiye was the first Muslim state to establish diplomatic relations with Tel Aviv, and today leads the pack of West Asian states boosting Israeli imports. In 2020 alone, the value of Turkish exports spiked to $5.7 billion, constituting 6.2 percent of total Israeli imports that year. 

Iron and steel ($1.06 billion), plastics ($464.67 million), electrical and electronic equipment ($346.83  million), vehicles ($331.48  million), machinery ($298.89 million), metals ($261.66 million),  and building materials ($188.39 million) form the cornerstone of Turkish exports to the Zionist entity. 

In second place is the UAE, which normalized ties with Tel Aviv as part of the US-brokered Abraham Accords in 2020, and was the first Arab state to sign a free-trade agreement (2022) with Israel as part of a plan to boost mutual trade to $10 billion annually. The Persian Gulf state’s exports were valued at $1.89 billion in 2022, accounting for 2.1 percent of all Israeli imports. 

Particularly intriguing is the 1543 percent surge in the value of Emirati exports to Israel since the normalization agreement. Noteworthy export categories include precious metals and stones ($525.32 million), iron and steel ($483.95 million), electrical and electronic equipment ($210.71 million), and oil ($94.55 million).

Business as usual 

Taking third place is Jordan, whose exports to Israel in 2022 reached $469.25 million, a massive 489 percent increase from 2018. Key export categories from the Hashemite Kingdom include plastics ($135.2 million), electrical and electronic equipment ($127.93 million), and iron and steel ($74.35 million).

As for Egypt, the first Arab state to make peace with and recognize Israel, its 2022 exports to the occupation state amounted to $179.31 million. Notable export categories include inorganic chemicals, precious metals compounds ($61.15 million), building materials ($14.26 million), foodstuffs ($12.78 million), and plastics ($11.32 million).

Surprisingly, in fifth place is Algeria, with Israel-bound exports reaching $21.38 million in 2022, the majority of which are inorganic chemicals, precious metals compounds, and isotopes. The revelation of trade relations between Algeria and Israel by the UN database raises questions about Algeria’s long-held stance against normalization, including its criminalization two years ago.

Morocco stands in sixth place, with exports to Israel amounting to $17.92 million in 2022, predominantly composed of foodstuffs. Rabat resumed diplomatic and trade relations with Israel as part of the 2020 accords. 

Finally, Bahrain’s exports to Israel in 2022 reached $10.58 million, reflecting an astounding 12,083 percent increase from 2020, the year of the normalization agreement between Manama and Tel Aviv. Key exports include aluminum ($8.78 million) and iron and steel ($2.62 million).

As such, the combined exports of West Asian countries to Israel surged by $4,359.530,000 between 2020 and 2022, marking an increase of almost 111 percent.

Israeli Energy Imports

Israel depends heavily on oil and natural gas for its power generation, with these sources constituting 80 percent of its total energy supply. It is a net exporter of natural gas, having sent 9.4 billion cubic meters abroad in 2022, with 6.5 billion cubic meters going to Egypt and 2.9 billion cubic meters to Jordan.

In contrast, Israel imports all its oil supply, and consumes approximately 220 thousand barrels per day. Of this, 62 percent comes from two Muslim-majority countries, namely Kazakhstan (93 thousand barrels) and Azerbaijan (45 thousand barrels). The remainder is sourced from West African countries, including Gabon, Nigeria, and Angola, in addition to Brazil, and an undisclosed amount is transported illegally from Iraqi Kurdistan.

To facilitate the import of most of Israel’s oil, the Turkish port of Ceyhan in southeastern Turkiye plays a crucial role. It serves as a loading point for oil tankers carrying crude from Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan through the Caspian Sea via the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline. Tankers also transport oil from Iraqi Kurdistan along the eastern Mediterranean Sea to the ports of Haifa and Ashkelon.

Oil tankers arrive in the occupied state via two main seaports: the aforementioned Ashkelon, equipped with 22 tanks holding 11 million barrels, and Eilat in the south, with 16 large oil tanks capable of holding about 1.4 million cubic meters of oil. The latter has seen an 85 percent fall in activity amid increased naval operations executed by Yemen’s Ansarallah-aligned forces in the Red Sea against vessels bound for Israel.

Approximately 180,000 barrels per day reach Ashkelon, from where internal pipelines transport the oil to the ports of Ashdod and Haifa. Both ports have oil refineries with capacities of 100,000 and 197,000 barrels per day, respectively. Additionally, a pipeline connects Ashkelon and Eilat, traversing the Negev desert with a capacity of 1.2 million barrels per day.

Despite the growing tensions and sharp rhetoric by some regional states toward Israel since its military assault on the Gaza Strip commenced, trade activity remains largely uninterrupted. Turkiye, despite calling Israel a “terrorist” state, contributes heavily to Israel’s economic well-being by helping Tel Aviv circumvent the Yemeni blockade, increasing its overall exports to Israel, and playing a pivotal role in oil transportation. 

Despite the war on Gaza, Turkish exports grew from 319.5 million dollars in November 2023 to 430.6 million dollars in December — higher even than the 408.3 million dollars exported in July, prior to the 7 October Al-Aqsa Flood operation.

Exports to Israel from the UAE, Jordan, Egypt, and Morocco are hardly surprising: these are the Arab states most vested in championing regional policies that serve the interests of the occupation state. The more surprising connection, however, is the trade relations — however minimal — between Algeria and Israel. 

To understand the true positions of states means to skip over the official rhetoric and examine the economic ties that politics often conceals.

The views expressed in this article do not necessarily reflect those of The Cradle.

War of Economic Corridors: the India-Mideast-Europe ploy

SEP 25, 2023

Photo Credit: The Cradle

The India-Middle East-Europe transportation corridor may be the talk of the town, but it will likely go the way of the last three Asia-to-Europe connectivity projects touted by the west – to the dustbin. Here’s why.

Pepe Escobar

The India-Middle East-Europe Economic Corridor (IMEC) is a massive public diplomacy op launched at the recent G20 summit in New Delhi, complete with a memorandum of understanding signed on 9 September. 

Players include the US, India, UAE, Saudi Arabia, and the EU, with a special role for the latter’s top three powers Germany, France, and Italy. It’s a multimodal railway project, coupled with trans-shipments and with ancillary digital and electricity roads extending to Jordan and Israel. 

If this walks and talks like the collective west’s very late response to China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), launched 10 years ago and celebrating a Belt and Road Forum in Beijing next month, that’s because it is. And yes, it is, above all, yet another American project to bypass China, to be claimed for crude electoral purposes as a meager foreign policy “success.”  

No one among the Global Majority remembers that the Americans came up with their own Silk Road plan way back in 2010. The concept came from the State Department’s Kurt Campbell and was sold by then-Secretary Hillary Clinton as her idea. History is implacable, it came down to nought.  

And no one among the Global Majority remembers the New Silk Road plan peddled by Poland, Ukraine, Azerbaijan, and Georgia in the early 2010s, complete with four troublesome trans-shipments in the Black Sea and the Caspian. History is implacable, this too came down to nought.   

In fact, very few among the Global Majority remember the $40 trillion US-sponsored Build Back Better World (BBBW, or B3W) global plan rolled out with great fanfare just two summers ago, focusing on “climate, health and health security, digital technology, and gender equity and equality.” 

A year later, at a G7 meeting, B3W had already shrunk to a $600 billion infrastructure-and-investment project. Of course, nothing was built. History really is implacable, it came down to nought. 

The same fate awaits IMEC, for a number of very specific reasons.

Map of The India-Middle East-Europe Economic Corridor (IMEC)

Pivoting to a black void 

The whole IMEC rationale rests on what writer and former Ambassador M.K. Bhadrakumar deliciously described as “conjuring up the Abraham Accords by the incantation of a Saudi-Israeli tango.”

This tango is Dead On Arrival; even the ghost of Piazzolla can’t revive it. For starters, one of the principals – Saudi Crown Prince Mohammad bin Salman – has made it clear that Riyadh’s priorities are a new, energized Chinese-brokered relationship with Iran, with Turkiye, and with Syria after its return to the Arab League. 

Moreover, both Riyadh and its Emirati IMEC partner share immense trade, commerce, and energy interests with China, so they’re not going to do anything to upset Beijing.

At face value, IMEC proposes a joint drive by G7 and BRICS 11 nations. That’s the western method of seducing eternally-hedging India under Modi and US-allied Saudi Arabia and the UAE to its agenda. 

Its real intention, however, is not only to undermine BRI, but also the International North-South Transportation Corridor (INTSC), in which India is a major player alongside Russia and Iran.  

The game is quite crude and really quite obvious: a transportation corridor conceived to bypass the top three vectors of real Eurasia integration – and BRICS members China, Russia, and Iran – by dangling an enticing Divide and Rule carrot that promises Things That Cannot Be Delivered. 

The American neoliberal obsession at this stage of the New Great Game is, as always, all about Israel. Their goal is to make Haifa port viable and turn it into a key transportation hub between West Asia and Europe. Everything else is subordinated to this Israeli imperative. 

IMEC, in principle, will transit across West Asia to link India to Eastern and Western Europe – selling the fiction that India is a Global Pivot state and a Convergence of Civilizations. 

Nonsense. While India’s great dream is to become a pivot state, its best shot would be via the already up-and-running INTSC, which could open markets to New Delhi from Central Asia to the Caucasus. Otherwise, as a Global Pivot state, Russia is way ahead of India diplomatically, and China is way ahead in trade and connectivity. 

Comparisons between IMEC and the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) are futile. IMEC is a joke compared to this BRI flagship project: the $57.7 billion plan to build a railway over 3,000 km long linking Kashgar in Xinjiang to Gwadar in the Arabian Sea, which will connect to other overland BRI corridors heading toward Iran and Turkiye. 

This is a matter of national security for China. So bets can be made that the leadership in Beijing will have some discreet and serious conversations with the current fifth-columnists in power in Islamabad, before or during the Belt and Road Forum, to remind them of the relevant geostrategic, geoeconomic, and investment Facts.

So, what’s left for Indian trade in all of this? Not much. They already use the Suez Canal, a direct, tested route. There’s no incentive to even start contemplating being stuck in black voids across the vast desert expanses surrounding the Persian Gulf. 

One glaring problem, for example, is that almost 1,100 km of tracks are “missing” from the railway from Fujairah in the UAE to Haifa, 745 km “missing” from Jebel Ali in Dubai to Haifa, and 630 km “missing” from the railway from Abu Dhabi to Haifa. 

When all the missing links are added up, there’s over 3,000 km of railway still to be built. The Chinese, of course, can do this for breakfast and on a dime, but they are not part of this game. And there’s no evidence the IMEC gang plans to invite them. 

All eyes on Syunik 

In the War of Transportation Corridors charted in detail for The Cradle in June 2022, it becomes clear that intentions rarely meet reality. These grand projects are all about logistics, logistics, logistics – of course, intertwined with the three other key pillars: energy and energy resources, labor and manufacturing, and market/trade rules. 

Let’s examine a Central Asian example. Russia and three Central Asian “stans” – Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan – are launching a multimodal Southern Transportation Corridor which will bypass Kazakhstan. 

Why? After all, Kazakhstan, alongside Russia, is a key member of both the Eurasia Economic Union (EAEU) and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO). 

The reason is because this new corridor solves two key problems for Russia that arose with the west’s sanctions hysteria. It bypasses the Kazakh border, where everything going to Russia is scrutinized in excruciating detail. And a significant part of the cargo may now be transferred to the Russian port of Astrakhan in the Caspian. 

So Astana, which under western pressure has played a risky hedging game on Russia, may end up losing the status of a full-fledged transport hub in Central Asia and the Caspian Sea region. Kazakhstan is also part of BRI; the Chinese are already very much interested in the potential of this new corridor.    

In the Caucasus, the story is even more complex, and once again, it’s all about Divide and Rule. 

Two months ago, Russia, Iran, and Azerbaijan committed to building a single railway from Iran and its ports in the Persian Gulf through Azerbaijan, to be linked to the Russian-Eastern Europe railway system. 

This is a railway project on the scale of the Trans-Siberian – to connect Eastern Europe with Eastern Africa and South Asia, bypassing the Suez Canal and European ports. The INSTC on steroids, in fact. 

Guess what happened next? A provocation in Nagorno-Karabakh, with the deadly potential of involving not only Armenia and Azerbaijan but also Iran and Turkiye. 

Tehran has been crystal clear on its red lines: it will never allow a defeat of Armenia, with direct participation from Turkiye, which fully supports Azerbaijan.

Add to the incendiary mix are joint military exercises with the US in Armenia – which happens to be a member of the Russian-led CSTO – cast, for public consumption, as one of those seemingly innocent “partnership” NATO programs. 

This all spells out an IMEC subplot bound to undermine INTSC. Both Russia and Iran are fully aware of the former’s endemic weaknesses: political trouble between several participants, those “missing links” of track, and all important infrastructure still to be built. 

Turkish Sultan Recep Tayyip Erdogan, for his part, will never give up the Zangezur corridor across Syunik, the south Armenian province, which was envisaged by the 2020 armistice, linking Azerbaijan to Turkiye via the Azeri enclave of Nakhitchevan – that will run through Armenian territory.

Baku did threaten to attack southern Armenia if the Zangezur corridor was not facilitated by Yerevan. So Syunik is the next big unresolved deal in this riddle. Tehran, it must be noted, will go no holds barred to prevent a Turkish-Israeli-NATO corridor cutting Iran off from Armenia, Georgia, the Black Sea, and Russia. That would be the reality if this NATO-tinted coalition grabs Syunik. 

Today, Erdogan and Azerbaijan’s President Ilham Aliyev meet in the Nakhchivan enclave between Turkiye, Armenia, and Iran to start a gas pipeline and open a military production complex.   

The Sultan knows that Zangezur may finally allow Turkiye to be linked to China via a corridor that will transit the Turkic world, in Azerbaijan and the Caspian. This would also allow the collective west to go even bolder on Divide and Rule against Russia and Iran. 

Is the IMEC another far-fetched western fantasy? The place to watch is Syunik.

The views expressed in this article do not necessarily reflect those of The Cradle.

• B3W
• BBBW

Moscow summons Armenian envoy, gives him a ‘tough presentation’

Sept 9, 2023

Source: Agencies

Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan (L) and Russian President Vladimir Putin (Center) during the CSTO summit welcoming ceremony in Yerevan, Armenia, on November 23, 2022. (AFP)

By Al Mayadeen English

Russia protested a number of issues to the Armenian ambassador, including Yerevan’s announcement of hosting joint military drills with the US next week.

The Russian Foreign Ministry summoned Armenia’s ambassador to Moscow on Friday to protest Yerevan’s recent “unfriendly steps,” including its announcement of joint exercises with the United States.

Armenia announced this week that it would be hosting joint war games with US forces, dubbed “Eagle Partner 2023,” between September 11-20, alleging that this step is part of the country’s preparation to partake in international peacekeeping missions.

“The Armenian leadership had in recent days taken a series of unfriendly steps,” the Russian ministry said in a statement.

Russia also conveyed its objection to a trip made to Kiev recently by Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan’s wife.

Yerevan recently increased its criticism of Russia’s peacekeeping role in Nagorno Karabakh, a region disputed between the country and Azerbaijan, claiming that the mission has failed to fulfill its task of protecting civilians and ensuring their freedom of passage through the key corridor in Azerbaijani-controlled areas in Karabakh.

A clash between Azerbaijan and Armenia in 2020, which lasted for six weeks and saw the death of over 6,500 troops from both sides, ended with a ceasefire accord sponsored by Russia. Moscow sent 2,000 peacekeepers to monitor the truce, but tensions remain despite a ceasefire deal.

Read more: Azerbaijan re-blocks crucial road into Nagorno-Karabakh

Precarious situation at border

Armenia’s envoy received a “tough presentation,” said the Russian ministry, but stressed that both countries “remain allies and all agreements on developing the strengthening of the partnership will be fulfilled.”

The Armenian Defense Ministry issued a statement on Friday, underscoring the precarious situation prevailing at the border with Azerbaijan due to the apparent buildup of Azerbaijani military forces, which in response prompted the Armenian Armed Forces to take measures aimed at maintaining stability and deterring potential provocations.

Meanwhile, the Azerbaijani Defense Ministry said on the same day that Yerevan was using combat drones to target Azerbaijani positions within the Kalbajar District, which led to the injury of two of the country’s soldiers. Correspondingly, Armenia accused Baku of launching artillery attacks on Armenian positions along the border, resulting in the killing of three Armenian soldiers and the injury of two more.

The Azerbaijani-Armenian conflict has been largely centered around the disputed region of Nagorno-Karabakh, which is an internationally recognized part of Azerbaijan populated mostly by ethnic Armenians that has been a source of conflict between the two Caucasus neighbors dating back to the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991.

Read more: EU plans to tap into Azerbaijani gas to replace Russian might end soon

This recent escalation follows a recurring pattern of periodic exchanges of fire along the border between the two neighboring rivals. The most significant flare-up in hostilities took place on September 12, 2022, leaving regional observers wary of a possible repeat of such confrontations.

Despite occasional talks on a peace agreement to resolve disputes and normalize relations, tensions remain high and border clashes are common. In two days of fighting in September of last year, around 300 soldiers were killed on both sides.

Read more: Tehran: Not be silent on Israeli plots from inside Azerbaijan

Self sabotage: Why is Russia excluding Iran in the South Caucasus?

JUL 21, 2023

Russia’s exclusion of Iran from critical ‘tables’ in the South Caucasus has been detrimental for both states, allowing the NATO-aligned Israeli-Turkish-Azerbaijani axis to undermine their national security interests and snatch the regional advantage.

Yeghia Tashjian

The shift in the South Caucasus’ balance of power after the 10 November, 2020 Nagorno-Karabakh ceasefire has led to an unfavorable situation not only for Armenia but also for Iran. 

Despite Tehran’s proactive engagement in the region, Iranian experts and politicians have expressed frustration over their concerns being disregarded by the Russians who have a peacekeeping presence there as a result of the Nagorno-Karabakh ceasefire agreement. 

Some observers have gone as far as publicly criticizing Moscow for working against Iranian interests by collaborating closely with Turkiye while overlooking the encroaching Israeli threat. Consequently, there have been calls for a replication of the joint Russian-Iranian cooperation experience seen in Syria to prevent a “great catastrophe” in the South Caucasus. 

Russia and Iran: Diverging Interests in the South Caucasus?

In his article “Russia and Iran Diverge in the South Caucasus,” Iranian South Caucasus expert Vali Kaleji argued that despite Tehran and Moscow’s similar perspective on the conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan, the two have diverged when it comes to the highly-contentious “Zangezur Corridor,” its impact on the Armenian-Iranian border, and Israel’s relations with Azerbaijan. 

Moreover, following the war in Ukraine, Russia has distanced itself from developments in the region, leaving Armenia alone to face the Turkish-Azerbaijani-Israeli axis. This situation has created a security and strategic dilemma for Iran along its entire northwestern border.

According to Kaleji, there are three key points of contention between Tehran and Moscow. First, is Iran’s reservations over the fifth paragraph of the trilateral statement, which calls for the establishment of peacekeeping forces and a Russian-Turkish joint monitoring center in Aghdam. Iran did not participate in this mission, while Turkiye, not explicitly mentioned in the agreement, signed a memorandum of understanding with Moscow to establish the joint center. Iran’s exclusion from these decisions, despite Tehran’s national security concerns being directly impacted by the Nagorno-Karabakh war, demonstrated “Russia’s preparedness to disregard Iranian interests” in the region.

Second, there is a disturbing ambiguity from the Kremlin over the establishment of the highly sensitive Zangezur Corridor project. Baku aims to establish an uninterrupted and extraterritorial connection between Azerbaijan proper and the Nakhichevan exclave. Russia’s position on this project remains unclear, with some high-ranking officials disregarding the term “corridor” while others support its establishment. 

Both Iran and Armenia remain skeptical about Russia’s ultimate objective in controlling these routes and granting them a particular status. Iran’s concerns arise from the fact that Azerbaijan intends to sever the Armenian-Iranian border, effectively isolating Iran, and potentially bringing NATO to Iran’s northern border. Azerbaijan’s President Ilham Aliyev has even threatened to use force if Yerevan does not provide the desired corridor. 

Third, is Moscow’s passive stance toward Israel’s role in the region, which has raised serious concerns in Tehran. Kaleji argues that while Iran is deeply worried about Israeli military and intelligence infiltration into the region, including the threat posed by Israeli drones targeting Iranian nuclear facilities and assassinating scientists, Moscow has turned a blind eye. 

Moreover, “Russia has adopted an approach to Israel’s presence in the South Caucasus that is similar to that in Syria, which is definitely not favorable to Tehran,” argues the Iranian expert. 

Moscow’s motivations and Iran’s interests

In contrast, Dr. Ehsan Movahedian, a professor of international relations at Tehran’s ATU University, believes that Russia has no intention of allowing Iran to exert influence in the Caucasus and Central Asia.

Instead, he argues, Russia prefers to interact exclusively with Turkiye in these regions. Movahedian tells The Cradle that Russia’s motivation stems from its need for Ankara to bypass western sanctions, facilitate energy sales, and secure access to the Mediterranean Sea following the Ukraine war.

But Russia’s stance jeopardizes Iran’s interests, particularly in the Caucasus, where NATO and Israel have already established a presence, leading to security, political, and cultural challenges for both Russia and Iran.

According to Movahedian, Russia has badly miscalculated, failing to recognize that the South Caucasus situation has worsened significantly due to the Kremlin’s preoccupation with the Ukraine war and the opportunity this has presented for western interference in the region.

Taking advantage of this power vacuum, Turkiye has been advancing the interests of both NATO and Israel in the South Caucasus. Therefore, any time the Russians prioritize only their own ambitions in the South Caucasus, and exclude Iran from major decisions, Moscow’s own position and influence in the region will ultimately diminish.  

Movahedian also highlights the ongoing blockade on the Lachin corridor as a sign of Russia’s weakness. He questions how Moscow, unable to unblock the Lachin corridor, can guarantee the safety of trade routes in the region, specifically in Syunik, as mentioned in the trilateral statement. If the Russians cannot safeguard these most basic routes, how then can they prevent Turkiye and NATO from taking control of major trade corridors – a fact recognized in Tehran, but apparently not in Moscow.

Warning to Moscow: Ineffective foreign policy in South Caucasus

In a recent 12 July article, Ali Akbar Velayati, former Iranian Minister of Foreign Affairs, expressed concern and issued a warning to Moscow regarding its ineffective foreign policy in the South Caucasus.

Velayati questions the actual intentions of Azerbaijan and Turkiye, be it to establish a transit route through Armenia for trade, gas, and electricity exchange, or, in fact, to violate Armenia’s sovereignty and cut off the Iranian-Azerbaijani border.

He argues that the evidence now shows that their ultimate ambition is to divide Armenia into two parts, sever the historical link between Iran and Armenia, which dates back to the Achaemenid and Parthian Empires, and limit Iran’s connection to the outside world, North Caucasus, Russia, and Europe. The veteran Iranian diplomat further warns:

“The strong suspicion is that the dismantling of the connection between Istanbul and Xinjiang rather than the establishment of a fictional world called pan-Turkism, given the scope of Turkiye’s contacts with NATO, will lead to the formation of a strip that will encircle Iran from the north and Russia on the south and expand NATO’s influence in the region.”

Consolidation of the Israeli-Turkish-Azerbaijani axis

These concerns raised by Iranian experts and politicians reflect Tehran’s growing unease with the situation in the South Caucasus. They recognize that Iran alone cannot contain the Israeli, Turkish, and NATO infiltration into the region and therefore emphasize the importance of Russia stepping up and drawing some red lines. 

Russia’s focus, they point out, has shifted away from the South Caucasus – due to its distraction with Ukraine – while strengthening economic relations and transport transit with Turkiye and Azerbaijan through the International North-South Transport Corridor (INSTC).

As a result of this political vacuum, an Israeli-Turkish-Azerbaijani axis is being consolidated in the region, which has “made Iran extremely worried about geopolitical changes, the balance of power and changing international borders in the region,” says Kaleji. 

When Iran planned military drills on its northern border with Azerbaijan, Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov expressed his country’s opposition to the military exercise. According to Iranian experts, the Russians were concerned that the Iranian drills and Tehran’s involvement in the Armenian-Azerbaijani conflict would further complicate the region. 

Reversing the balance of power

Despite the challenges, Iranian experts and politicians have called on Russia to replicate their joint cooperation experience in Syria by training Armenian soldiers in the South Caucasus. If Russia continues on its current trajectory of disregarding critical South Caucasus developments, some Iranians warn that Tehran may be forced to take action to shake up Moscow, such as obstructing its access to the Persian Gulf.

To secure their national interests and prevent a potential catastrophe in Nagorno-Karabakh that could spill over into neighboring regions, both Tehran and Moscow need to coordinate with Yerevan, even if they mistrust the current Armenian authorities at the helm. 

If the Turkish-Azerbaijani-Israeli project succeeds in Nagorno-Karabakh, it may be too late for Moscow and Tehran to reverse the regional balance of power. Yerevan could directly accuse Moscow of abandoning its obligations and potentially shifting toward the west, putting both Moscow and Tehran in politically difficult positions. 

To prevent such a scenario, Moscow must prioritize unblocking the Lachin corridor, ensure the physical security of Armenians in the unrecognized republic, and take note of Iran’s national security concerns – which increasingly intersect with Moscow.

The views expressed in this article do not necessarily reflect those of The Cradle.

Deputy FMs of Turkey, Syria, Iran, Russia to Meet Next Week

March 8, 2023

Iran FM Hussein Amir Abdollahian in a joint press conference with his Turkish counterpart Mevlut Cavusoglu

Source: Agencies

The Islamic Republic of Iran warns all states to act intelligently towards the behavior of the fake Israeli regime and not to allow Zionists to set their feet in the Caucasus region, Iran Foreign Minister underlined.

Hussein Amir-Abdollahian made the remarks in a joint press conference with his Turkish counterpart Mevlut Cavusoglu on Wednesday.

Amir-Abdollahian expressed his sympathy and solidarity with the Turkish people and government over the recent deadly earthquake.

From the first hours of the earthquake, the Leader of the Islamic Revolution and the President issued strict orders for solidarity and help to the Muslim people of Turkey, he said, adding that the Red Crescent of Iran, the Army, and the IRGC entered the earthquake-affected areas, and offered services and provide accommodation, and medical assistance.

“Today we had important talks about the importance of developing economic and trade relations,” Amir-Abdollahian said, adding that in the past years, Iran-Turkey trade volume has witnessed an increase due to the will of the leaders of the two countries.

“One of our main concerns is environmental and water issues, and we agree on the importance of continued access of Iran and the people of the western regions of the country to the Aras River,” he also noted.

“When it comes to regional transportation corridors, including the corridors between Iran and Turkey, we emphasize regional partnership instead of the regional competition,” he also said.

Iran, Turkey entitled to defend themselves against terrorists

Referring to the high-level security cooperation between Iran and Turkey regarding the issue of the fight against terrorism, Amir-Abdollahian said, adding, “We consider Turkey’s security as our security.”

Terrorists based in Iraq’s Kurdistan region and ISIL terrorists based in Afghanistan are among common concerns of Tehran and Ankara, he stressed.

Under international law, Iran and Turkey reserve the right to defend against any terrorist act or group, he noted.

Zionists serious threat to regional peace, stability

Amir-Abdollahian also reiterated Tehran’s position about Zionists’ presence in the Caucasus region, saying, “We consider the presence of Zionists in the region as a serious threat to the peace and stability of the region.”

The Islamic Republic of Iran warns all parties to act intelligently towards the behavior of the fake Israeli regime and prevent  Zionists from setting their feet on the region, he underlined.

Referring to the recent agreement reached between Ankara and Baghdad, he said that Iran welcomes participation in any quadrilateral meeting of Iran, Russia, Turkey, and Syria.

“We also reached a consensus on holding the tripartite meeting between Iran, Turkey, and the Republic of Azerbaijan,” he also added.

Deputy FMs of Turkey, Syria, Iran, Russia to meet next week

Cavusoglu, for his part, said that his Iranian counterpart Amir-Abdollahian wanted to join the talks between Turkey, Syria, and Russia, and Turkey happily agreed.

“Astana is the only surviving format (to address) Syria anyway. Now we are planning a meeting between the four foreign ministers,” Cavusoglu added.

“Russia offered to host a preliminary meeting for the preparations of this four-way meeting. This meeting will be held at the level of deputy ministers next week in Moscow,” he also said.

Elsewhere in his remarks, the Turkish diplomat thanked Iran and its people for their continuous support for the quake-hit people of Turkey.

After the earthquakes in Turkey, Iran acted quickly by sending tents, relief teams, and setting up field hospitals, he said.

Denmark Disregards Human Rights Standards in Shameless Cahoots with Israel

February 20, 2023

Denmark’s Defense Minister Jakob Ellemann-Jensen. (Photo: News Oresund, via Wikimedia Commons)

– Sophia Wright is an experienced Activist skilled in Nonprofit Organizations, Strategic Planning, Leadership, Community Development, and Team Management, with a demonstrated history of working in the civic & social organization industry. She contributed this article to The Palestine Chronicle.

By Sophia Wright

Denmark was in the midst of receiving its last artillery systems. Strangely, as the order was about to be completed, Defense Minister Jakob Ellemann-Jensen and Finance minister Nicolai Wammen decided to send all of their artillery to Ukraine and purchase an alternative artillery system, called the Atmos 2000 from Elbit Systems, Israel. 

Poor management of military programs? Yes. But there’s much worse. The knee-jerk decision strongly implies that Denmark no longer upholds international standards or basic human rights, by finally entering into business with one of the shadiest companies in the world. 

The Previous Government’s Rejection

 When Denmark chose its howitzers in 2015, they were, as is customary, selected at the end of a rigorous process that carefully considered all aspects, technical and other. In the shortlist remained the Korean K9, the Israeli Atmos 2000, and the French Caesar. The last was ultimately selected after the K9 was excluded, due to its slow and cumbersome design. The only remaining competitor was the Atmos, which had satisfactory specs, but also carried a scent of brimstone with it.  

Back then, ethical considerations still apparently mattered to the Danish government. Elbit Systems is the main provider of weapons used in the Israeli strikes on the Gaza civilian population, in the West Bank and in Lebanon. Thousands of civilians have died from their equipment and the Israeli army continues to use it to this day, regardless of the accusations of war crimes from around the world. It was again used last August, in a two-day Israeli operation, which left 36 civilians dead and 350 wounded. Finally, it supplies numerous anti-democratic governments around the world, such as Azerbaijan and Uganda. 

But just after the decision to reject the howitzers from such a nefarious provider, an early hint of what was to come should have worried international observers: in 2017, Denmark discreetly purchased Israeli equipment for the first time, overriding the ethical considerations that had been the framework of defense acquisitions until then. 

Despite this discreet inauguration of defense relations, it had nonetheless been spotted by Information reporter Sebastian Gjerding.

“Via a subsidiary, the controversial Israeli arms giant Elbit has succeeded in landing a million dollar order with the Danish defense […] Elbit in particular is a controversial choice,” Gjerding wrote. 

“The UN human rights rapporteur for the occupied Palestinian territories has called for a boycott of the company, and several Danish pension funds and investors have blacklisted them.” 

Encouraged by the lack of outcry, either domestic or international, the Danish government assumed it could now throw its duty to protect human rights and uphold ethical leadership overboard. 

Nothing has Changed, Except What Actually Matters 

The Danish military invokes delays in deliveries. That may be true, but it’s also true for all weapons providers these days. Fulfilling NATO obligations to equip the first land forces brigade is hardly an excuse, as the French howitzer deliveries were on the verge of being finalized. 

This motive is therefore unlikely to be genuine. Their current supplier is currently upgrading the artillery system, which accounts for some of the delays, but so is Elbit. A late but sudden realization that the Atmos is far better suited to defend the homeland? Doubtful: Danish officials themselves acknowledge that both systems have similar capacities.  

In fact, only three things have changed since the initial decision: more Palestinian blood has been shed in suspected Israeli war crimes, first; and the government has changed, second. Current Defense minister, Jakob Ellemann-Jensen (Venstre), is quoted by DR reporter East Meesenburg as “having no problems with the Israeli deal”.

 “I completely agree that someone has a fear of touch in relation to the fact that it is an Israeli company. The government does not have that. This is about it being delivered quickly by someone who has proper equipment”.  

Finally, light has since been shed on the unethical practices of Elbit Systems when it comes to weapon sales. 

It now appears clear that ethical considerations are far lower on the list of this government than that of the last one, which had had the decency to avoid enriching a military provider covered in accusations of corruption (the last corruption-based arrest related to Elbit dealings goes back less than 2 months, in Zambia, and there’s hardly a year that goes by without a new scandal hitting the headlines) and which steadily enables war crimes. Previously, in March of 2022, Elbit Systems was banned from Australia’s future fund, due to allegations that the Israeli manufacturer produced illegal cluster munitions. 

Elbit Systems Acquiring Respectability Thanks to Denmark 

Atmos 2000 has mainly been purchased by non-democratic governments and States which see little value in providing ethical leadership, namely Uganda (whose army commits as many atrocities as the rebels), Thailand (whose authoritarianism is on the rise) and Azerbaijan, who showed its true colors in 2022. Azerbaijan has furthered the suffering of the Armenian people, which has already endured its own genocide, no less, by firing the Atmos 2000 on the civilian population during the Karabakh conflict, furthering a decade-old conflict that has seen hundreds of ethnic Armenians die in the Nagorno-Karabach region. The latest episode of this conflict was notoriously under-reported, as the European Union depends on gas that transits through that area. 

Until now, Elbit Systems suffered an ominous reputation, as the supplier for Azerbaijani tyrant Ilham Aliyev, Ugandan dictator Yoweri Museveni, and of course, its own domestic operations in Gaza. By publicizing its recent sale to Queen Margaret of Denmark, sanctioned by democratically elected PM Mette Frederiksen and duly nominated defense minister Jakob Ellemann-Jensen; they can hope to obtain a degree of respectability they could never have dreamt of, at the direct expense of Denmark.            

Denmark will be used by Elbit as an ethical voucher to improve its image at the expense of the Danish government and people’s reputation. It will be very interesting to see how the Danish government manages to explain how it can bravely take the side of the oppressed Ukrainian people, in a high-profile conflict, but then side with Azerbaijan crushing Armenia, or Israel firing artillery shells against Palestinians, by purchasing their blood-soaked and overpriced equipment.  

Until now, Denmark had been amongst the most virtuous nations in Europe and the world, when it came to ethical considerations and the defense of democratic values. But corruption never lets up and, if Israeli death merchants failed to convince the last Danish government to override ethical imperatives, they tried again once the next decision-makers were in place. This time, they seem to have succeeded.

Iran on the Erdogan – Assad Rapprochement Path, Meaning and Timing

 FEBRUARY 6, 2023

It seems clear that the entry of Iran into the line came at the request of Damascus, which thus wanted to balance the Iranian role with the information that constantly talks about common and intertwined personal and official interests between Presidents Putin and Erdogan.

The following is the English translation from Arabic of the latest article by Turkish career journalist Husni Mahali he published on 2nd Feb 2023 on Al-Mayadeen news site Al-Mayadeen Net:

Two days after President Erdogan’s statements, in which he said, “Let Turkey, Iran, and Syria meet to discuss possibilities for a final solution,” Russian Foreign Minister Lavrov said, in the press conference, with his Egyptian counterpart, Sameh Shoukry, in Moscow, “Today, an agreement has been reached aimed at Iran’s participation in the process of settling and normalizing relations between neighboring Turkey and Syria.

This means Cairo’s approval, perhaps on behalf of other Arab countries, of the Iranian role. This was recognized, the day before yesterday, by Ibrahim Kalin, Erdogan’s spokesman, when he said, “We will be happy with Iran’s contribution to the mediation efforts with Damascus because Tehran is an important player in the Syrian crisis from the beginning.”

Minister Lavrov’s words came after a series of contacts and visits by his Iranian counterpart, Hussein Abdollahian, to Beirut, Damascus, and Moscow, followed by the visit of the Foreign Minister of Qatar, Ankara’s ally, to Tehran, days after the Abu Dhabi summit, in which the leaders of a number of Arab countries, including Qatar and Egypt, participated. This explains Minister Lavrov’s taking advantage of Minister Shukri’s visit to Moscow to talk in his presence about Iran’s involvement in the mediation efforts between Erdogan and President Assad.

It seems clear that Iran’s entry into the line came at the request of Damascus, which thus wanted to balance the Iranian role with the information that constantly talks about common and intertwined personal and official interests between Presidents Putin and Erdogan, which was reason enough for Moscow not to put pressure on Ankara on the issue of Idlib and the Syrian north. in general, but succeeded in persuading Ankara to seek rapprochement with Damascus.

There is much talk in the Turkish media about Russian financial support for Erdogan, to help him win the upcoming elections, which are crucial for Erdogan, Turkey, and Russia as well.

It has become clear that Turkey, before and after these elections, will witness interesting developments related to Erdogan’s foreign calculations, which will have direct and indirect repercussions on the internal situation. The Syrian crisis comes at the forefront of these calculations, and the reason for this is the problem of the Syrians in Turkey, which will be an important electoral material that the opposition will use against Erdogan.

It has also become clear that he, that is, Erdogan will make the minimum concessions required of him to ensure his meeting with President Assad before these elections, and his chances are still few, according to all independent opinion polls, especially after the “Nation Alliance” announced its electoral project that includes 2,300 items aimed to fix everything Erdogan destroyed during his 20 years of rule.

Among these concessions was his acceptance of Iran’s entry into the line of rapprochement between him and President Assad at this time, when Tel Aviv, Washington, Western countries, and its other allies are conspiring against Iran, which was attacked by unknown drones that targeted a military complex in the city of Isfahan.

In parallel, tension appears between Baku and Tehran due to the armed attack on the Azerbaijani embassy in Iran and the killing of one of the embassy guards. This is what some nationalist circles in Turkey and Azerbaijan exploited to launch a hostile campaign against Tehran, which they have been doing for a long time due to Iranian support for Syria in the years of the so-called “Arab Spring”.

https://syrianews.cc/in-erdoganstan-opposition-leader-kilicdaroglu-prosecuted-for-insluting-the-sultan/embed/#?secret=x8tmRrjjFE#?secret=Q3L1pc6s4C

On Tuesday, the leader of the National Movement Party, Devlet Bahchali, who is an ally of President Erdogan, said, “Azerbaijan is a state and nation of Turkish origin, the same as South Azerbaijan,” meaning northwestern Iran. This Turkish nationalist provocation is accompanied by a similar provocation and escalation from the nationalist circles in Azerbaijan, which has established and developed in recent years intertwined military and intelligence relations with “Tel Aviv”, which has established a number of espionage bases near the Azerbaijani border with Iran, which is what it did in the Kurdistan region of Iraq, especially in areas under the rule of Masoud Barzani

At a time when the Jewish lobby controls most of the Azerbaijani media, which is waging a hostile and violent campaign against Iran, which coincided with the visit of Egyptian President Abdel Fattah El-Sisi to Azerbaijan, and a day later to Armenia, the two neighbors of Tehran.

Minister Lavrov’s talk about an “agreement” on Iran joining the Russian mediation between Assad and Erdogan seems clear that it came in support of the Astana process, but this time with Egyptian and Gulf approval, which may be reflected in support for the Egyptian-Turkish reconciliation path, that is, of course, if the Gulf capitals are sincere in their desire to return things to normal with Damascus.

It is not clear what practical positions the aforementioned capitals will take towards Iran entering the rapprochement line, which, if achieved, will undoubtedly be with the consent of the Gulf, which Erdogan hopes to support him financially, politically, and psychologically on the eve of the elections that will be on May 14.

Everyone knows that Erdogan was and still needs significant financial support from abroad, just as he needs media materials to help him gain more support, which will be achieved by meeting President Assad and announcing together their agreement to return Syrian refugees to their country. It is the issue that, if Erdogan succeeds in it, he will pull the rug out from under the feet of the opposition, which holds him responsible for the refugees and the entire Syrian crisis.

And while waiting for the American, Israeli, and European reaction to Iran’s entry into the mediation line between Erdogan and Assad, which is a victory for Iranian diplomacy at this particular time, everyone is waiting for President Erdogan to take practical and quick moves to resolve the issue of rapprochement before he is exposed to any external pressure, and the situation east of the Euphrates will be one of the most important elements of these pressures, since the rapprochement between Ankara and Damascus will aim, first or second, at joint action against the Kurdish “SDF” and “People’s Protection Units”.

This will be the biggest challenge for Erdogan and before Assad, especially if the Americans think about confronting Russian plans through Turkey, Syria, Iran, and perhaps Iraq as well. This may lead to a real and serious crisis in the relationship between Ankara and Washington, and it has enough reasons for such a crisis, as Turkey is a member of NATO which has many of its bases on its soil.

Ultimately, the bet remains on the success of Russian diplomacy in persuading Egypt, Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Qatar (Erdogan’s ally) of the necessity of urgency in achieving the Turkish-Syrian rapprochement, and by completing it, Erdogan’s reconciliations with Cairo, Abu Dhabi, and Riyadh will acquire practical importance from which everyone will benefit.

And without it being clear how Tel Aviv will respond to these Russian moves, which Washington will obstruct by various means, and its biggest weapon for that is the Syrian Kurds with their extensions in Turkey, Iraq, and Iran. They are Tel Aviv’s weapon also until the Gulf regimes convince Netanyahu and his allies in the terrorist government that the war is no longer in their interest and that the Palestinian youth generation, after the events in Jenin and the heroic Al Quds (Jerusalem) operation, is not the generation that will surrender to the conspirators against it internally, regionally and internationally, as long as there are those who stand and will stand by its side among the honorable people of the nation, and everyone knows them and they are the true source of terror for the Zionist entity and its allies in the region!

---

Syria News is a collaborative effort by two authors only, we end up most of the months paying from our pockets to maintain the site’s presence online, if you like our work and want us to remain online you can help by chipping in a couple of Euros/ Dollars or any other currency so we can meet our site’s costs.

Related Stories

• Earthquakes that have hit the world since yesterday
• Iranian aid planes arrive at Damascus airport
• Total death toll of earthquake exceeds 4,000 in Syria, Turkey
• إيران على خط المصالحة بين إردوغان والأسد.. المعنى والتوقيت
• Natural Disaster in Syria: 237 Killed, 639 Injured in Major Earthquakes

محاضر من «أستانا 18»: الحلّ السوري بعيد وتركيا لن تنسحب | تقاطع مصالح تركي ــ روسي ــ إيراني ضدّ «قسد»

الجمعة 25 تشرين الثاني 2022

موقفا الدولتين يبدوان اليوم أقلّ حدّة، وهو ما يمكن أن يُعزى إلى أسباب مختلفة خاصّة بكلّ من الدولتَين (ا ف ب)

حسين الأمين  

تُظهر المواقف الإيرانية والروسية من التهديد التركي المتجدّد بعملية عسكرية برّية في سوريا، نوعاً من الليونة التي يمكن تفسيرها بجملة ظروف مستجدّة، جعلت الأطراف الثلاثة الضامنة لـ«مسار أستانا» متقاطِعةً عند العداء للقوّات الكردية في الشمال السوري. ليونةٌ لم تكن إلى ما قبل أشهر حاضِرة كما اليوم، وفق ما تُظهره وثائق سرّية عائدة إلى الجولة ما قبل الأخيرة من اجتماعات «أستانا»، اطّلعت عليها «الأخبار»، يسجّل فيها الروس والإيرانيون حزماً حيال أيّ عملية تركية من النوع المذكور، لم تَعُد مستبعدة، في ظلّ شبه تقبّل موسكو وطهران للمحاججات التركية، ودخول الاتصالات مرحلة الحديث عن حدود التوغّل والأثمان السياسية المطلوبة لقاءه

تحت سطح الهدوء الذي عاشه الميدان السوري طوال الشهور السابقة، كانت تعتمل عوامل ضاغطة عديدة على أكثر من طرف فاعل في الملفّ، يبدو أن بعضها وصل اليوم إلى لحظة الانفجار. هذا ما ينطبق مثلاً على الهجمات الجوّية التي تنفّذها تركيا ضدّ «قوات سوريا الديمقراطية» في شمال سوريا تحت عنوان عملية «المخلب – السيف»، والتلويح باقتراب لحظة وقوع العملية البرّية، والتي سيسيطر خلالها الجيش التركي على مزيد من الأراضي السورية الحدودية. ولطالما كانت هذه الخطوة محطّ تداول طوال الفترة الماضية، خصوصاً في جولة محادثات أستانا التي عُقدت في حزيران الماضي، وتالِيَتها التي التأمت قبل يومَين على وقْع القصف التركي على مواقع «قسد»، على مسمع ومرأى من القوات الروسية والأميركية المنتشرة في المنطقة. وبينما لا تزال روسيا على موقفها المعلَن الرافض للتحرّك البرّي التركي ـــ مع بروز تبدّلات ملحوظة في الميدان لناحية السماح للطائرات التركية باختراق «المجال الجوّي الروسي» في سوريا ـــ تُبدي إيران هذه الأيام تفهّماً أكبر لهذا التحرّك.

في وثائق سرّية حصلت عليها «الأخبار»، تتكشّف المواقف غير المعلَنة وبعض خلفيّاتها، للدول الفاعلة في الملفّ السوري، وذلك على ألسنة مسؤولي هذا الملفّ في كلّ منها، في محادثات ثنائية خاصة، من أيّ عملية عسكرية تركية جديدة في سوريا. ففي حزيران الماضي، انعقدت في العاصمة الكازاخية نور سلطان الجولة الـ18 من «مسار أستانا» التفاوضي، عندما كان الميدان يعيش هدوءاً نسبياً، باستثناء بعض التوتّر بين تركيا والفصائل المسلّحة الموالية لها من جهة، و«قسد» من جهة أخرى، وفي وقت كانت فيه أنقرة تلوّح بنيّتها شنّ عملية عسكرية في ريف حلب الشمالي، وتحديداً على محور عين العرب – منبج – تل رفعت. ممثّل تركيا في «أستانا» حينها، ومسؤول الشؤون السورية في الخارجية التركية، سلجوق أونال، أشار إلى أن «بعض الدول تُعارض العملية، لكنّ هذه الدول في الوقت عينه تتفهّم المخاوف الأمنية لتركيا»، مُدافِعاً بأنه يتوجّب «على تركيا أن تقوم بهذه العملية بسبب مخاطر الإرهاب والانفصاليين، وهذا ما لا تحتمله». وانتقد أونال موقف موسكو، معتبراً أن «ما يقوله الروس بأن العملية ستزعزع استقرار سوريا غير صحيح، لأن لا استقرار أصلاً في سوريا، كما ليس هنالك من ستاتيكو حقيقي ستزعزعه هذه العملية. لا بل إن العملية ستمنع زعزعة الاستقرار بسبب الأجندة الإرهابية والانفصالية لـ»PKK» (حزب العمال الكردستاني)». واستعرض أونال، في حديث خاصّ مع دبلوماسيين، مسار الهجمات العسكرية التي نفّذتها تركيا سابقاً في سوريا، حيث إن «شركاءنا (روسيا وإيران) اعترضوا سابقاً على عملية نبع السلام، ثمّ ما لبثوا أن رفعوا العوائق من أمام تركيا»، في إشارة إلى قبولهم الوقائع التي فرضتْها تلك الهجمات. وافترض أن «الروس ربّما يَعتبرون أن طرد القوات الكردية (من المناطق الحدودية) سيدفعها باتجاه المناطق السورية الداخلية، وهذا قد يجدّد النزاع»، مبيّناً أنه «في هذه الحالة، هُم (الأكراد) سيهاجمون الجيش السوري وليس تركيا». وختم المسؤول التركي حديثه بالتأكيد أن «المسار السياسي بطيء (…) أستانا يبقى المسار الوحيد الذي لا يزال على قيد الحياة»، مشيراً إلى أنه «سبق أن أنشئت المجموعة المصغّرة حول سوريا وانتهت، وكذلك انتهى مسار جنيف».

يَظهر أن مصلحة الدول الثلاث الضامنة لـ«مسار أستانا» تلتقي عند العداء للقوات الكردية في الشمال السوري

وفي وثيقة أخرى، تحدّث سفير تركيا لدى روسيا، محمد سامسار، في اجتماع خاص داخل مكتبه عُقد في تموز الفائت، حول العملية العسكرية المرتقبة، قائلاً إنه «بالنسبة إلى تركيا، فإنه لا أطماع لديها في سوريا، وهدف أنقرة كان ولا يزال إبعاد المنظمات الإرهابية الكردية عن حدودها لمسافة 30 كم على الأقل، وهو الأمر الذي كان الأميركيون قد وافقوا عليه، وأيضاً الروس، الذين كانوا قد تعهّدوا بالمساعدة على تحقيقه منذ عام 2019، دون أن ينجحوا حتى الآن، ما دفع القيادة التركية أخيراً للإعلان عن عملية عسكرية قد تكون قريبة لتحقيق الهدف المذكور، بالرغم من معارضة موسكو وواشنطن، التي تقوم بحماية بعض الفصائل الإرهابية شرق الفرات». من جهة أخرى، استبعد سامسار «إمكانية التوصّل إلى حلول في المدى المنظور، خاصة في ظلّ توتر العلاقات بين موسكو من جهة، وواشنطن والغرب من جهة أخرى»، لافتاً إلى أن «الوضع السوري في غاية التعقيد، مع وجود دول كثيرة تتصارع على الأرض السورية لحفظ مصالحها المتعارضة في كثير من الأحيان»، مُهاجِماً «الدور الإيراني الطامح إلى بقاء طويل الأمد في سوريا، ومحاولة إحداث تغيير ديمغرافي في بعض المناطق السورية، ومنها دمشق العاصمة، وذلك خدمة لأهداف بعيدة المدى تؤذي الشعب السوري بلا شكّ، وتهدّد بشدّة وحدة البلاد واستقرارها على المدى البعيد».

بدوره، رأى المبعوث الروسي الخاص إلى سوريا، ألكسندر لافرنتييف، أنه «سيكون من الخطير إن أقامت تركيا منطقة عازلة، وهذه ستخلق تهديدات جديدة»، لافتاً إلى «(أننا) نصحنا العراقيين وجيران سوريا، أن يتواصلوا مع إيران والدول العربية لمطالبة تركيا بشكل جماعي بعدم تنفيذ عمليّتها». وأشار لافرنتييف إلى أن «تركيا دائماً تؤكّد أنها لا تريد تقسيم سوريا، وأنها مع المحافظة على وحدة وسيادة سوريا، لكنهم يضيفون أنهم سيتركون سوريا عندما تسمح لهم الظروف بذلك، وهذا لا يبدو لنا مشجّعاً. إذا دخلَت لن تنسحب»، مشدّداً على أنه «من الضروري أن نعمل معاً، وأن لا نترك ذلك يحدث (…) (تركيا تريد) احتلال أراضي سوريا، وتشكيل حكومة موالية لها». ولدى سؤاله عن الانتشار الميداني الروسي في سوريا، مع احتدام الحرب في أوكرانيا، أكد «(أننا) لن ننسحب من سوريا. أجرينا إعادة انتشار لقوّاتنا، بسبب بعض الصعوبات اللوجستية المتأتّية من تركيا». وختم حديثه بالقول إن «علينا أن نعيش مع نزاع طويل الأمد» في سوريا. من جهته، رأى مساعد وزير الخارجية الإيراني، علي أصغر حاجي، أن «كلّ ما يحدث متأثّر بالحرب الأوكرانية، التي تُضاعف من خطورة الحالة في الشرق الأوسط»، معتبراً أن «ما تقوم به روسيا في أوكرانيا، تحاول تركيا مقابلته في سوريا»، في إشارة إلى المخاوف الأمنية الروسية في أوكرانيا، والتي دفعتْ موسكو إلى تنفيذ عمليتها العسكرية هناك. وأضاف حاجي: «نقول لأصدقائنا الأتراك إن مخاوفكم الأمنية لا يمكن حلّها بالوسائل العسكرية، وإلّا لكانت حُلّت مُسبقاً. نقول لهم، ساعدوا الجيش السوري للانتشار على الحدود تطبيقاً للاتفاقيات بينكما». أما ممثّل الأمم المتحدة في محادثات أستانا، مدير مكتب المبعوث الدولي الخاص إلى سوريا غير بيدرسون، روبرت دان، فرأى أن «كلّ الأطراف حقّقت أكثر ما تستطيعه»، متابعاً أن «اليوم هنالك تركيا، ينبغي انتظار ردّة فعل الأطراف الباقين على عمليّتها العسكرية، وما سينشأ عنها».

وعلى رغم الحزم الذي تتّسم به المواقف الإيرانية والروسية حيال العملية العسكرية التركية في سوريا، وفق ما تُظهره الوثائق، إلّا أن هذه المواقف تبدو اليوم أقلّ حدّة، وهو ما يمكن أن يُعزى إلى أسباب مختلفة خاصّة بكلّ من الدولتَين. بالنسبة إلى روسيا، فإن التعاون الروسي – التركي بلغ أوْجه خلال الأشهر الأخيرة مع احتدام الحرب في أوكرانيا، في ظلّ موقف أنقرة الذي حافظ على حياده نوعاً ما. وإذ تُدرك روسيا أن تركيا اليوم هي أحد معابرها الأساسية إلى العالم في ظلّ الحصار الغربي المستمرّ على الأولى، فإن الدولتَين تُظهران تعاوناً واسعاً في منطقة القوقاز، أسفر حتى اليوم عن تجنُّب أزمات كبرى، وربّما معارك متجدّدة، وخصوصاً بين أرمينيا وأذربيجان. والأهمّ من كلّ ما سبق، سياقان مغايران للتعاون: الأوّل متعلّق باتفاقية تصدير الحبوب من الموانئ الأوكرانية عبر البحر الأسود إلى تركيا ثمّ البحر الأبيض المتوسط؛ والثاني متّصل بتصدير الغاز الروسي، حيث اتفق الرئيسان الروسي والتركي، الشهر الماضي، على البدء بإنشاء مركز لتوزيع الغاز الروسي من تركيا إلى دول جنوب وشرق أوروبا، عبر أنابيب ناقلة تمرّ من البحر الأسود وعبر الأراضي التركية. وانطلاقاً ممّا سبق، تبدو مفهومةً المرونة التي طرأت على موقف موسكو، والتي تُعزّزها أيضاً المُحاججة التركية بأن الظروف التي دفعت روسيا إلى تنفيذ عملية عسكرية في أوكرانيا، تنطبق إلى حدّ بعيد على تلك القائمة عند الحدود السورية – التركية، وبالتالي فإن ما شرّعته روسيا لنفسها، لا بدّ أن تشرّعه لشريكتها تركيا.
أمّا بالنسبة إلى إيران، التي تعاني اليوم اضطرابات داخلية، فهي تتّهم الأحزاب الكردية – الإيرانية المعارِضة المتمركزة في إقليم كردستان شمالي العراق، بالمسؤولية عن إرسال وتدريب وتجهيز مجموعات مسلّحة لتنفيذ أعمال «إرهابية» على أراضيها. وهي استجابت سريعاً لهذا التهديد باستهداف مواقع تلك الأحزاب، ملوّحةً أيضاً بإمكانية شنّ عملية عسكرية برّية لإبعادها عن الحدود. ومن هنا، يُحاجج «الديبلوماسيون الأتراك، أمام نظرائهم الإيرانيين، وكذلك أمام نظرائهم في دول المنطقة، بسياق تشكُّل الموقف الإيراني المستجدّ تجاه الأحزاب الكردية المسلّحة، ويقارنونه بالموقف التركي السابق والحالي، للقول إن عمليات بلادهم العسكرية السابقة والمرتقَبة في سوريا شرعيّة ومبرّرة، ولا يجب الاعتراض عليها، خصوصاً من قِبَل الإيرانيين»، بحسب ما تَكشفه مصادر ديبلوماسية إقليمية. وفي مقابل هذه المحاججة، يُبدي المسؤولون الإيرانيون تفهّماً للمخاوف الأمنية التركية، إلّا أنهم «يحثّون نظراءهم الأتراك على التعاون مع الحكومة السورية، لضمان انتشار الجيش السوري على الحدود بين البلدين، ومنْع وقوع عمليات أمنية أو عسكرية داخل الأراضي التركية، كما ذلك الذي تسعى إليه طهران مع بغداد»، والذي تجلّت أولى ثماره في إعلان الحكومة العراقية نشْر قوّاتها على الحدود بين إيران وإقليم كردستان.

هكذا، يَظهر أن مصلحة الدول الثلاث الضامنة لـ«مسار أستانا» تلتقي عند العداء للقوات الكردية في الشمال السوري. فهذه الأخيرة وضعت كامل بيضها في السلّة الأميركية، ما يزعج الروس إلى حدّ بعيد، واشتبكت مع تركيا التي تحافظ على موقفها العدائي منها، وفشلت في إنجاح أيّ محاولة حوارية مع دمشق، وذهبت إلى حدّ الاشتباك مع القوات السورية غير مرّة، كما تناقض بتحالفها الوثيق مع الأميركيين الموقف الإيراني المُساند لدمشق، فضلاً عن كوْن نظرائها في أربيل باتوا يشكّلون تهديداً متزايداً للأمن القومي الإيراني. لكن كلّ ما سبق لا يعني أن هذه الأطراف اتّفقت تماماً على السماح بتنفيذ عملية عسكرية تركية جديدة في سوريا، بل يبدو أن ما جرى حتى الآن هو إبداء تفهّم متزايد للمخاوف التركية، في وقت تتسارع فيه الاتصالات البينيّة لرسم حدود الطموح التركي، والتوافق على التفاصيل الميدانية والأثمان السياسية.

من ملف : روسيا – تركيا – إيران: تقاطع ضدّ «قسد»

فيديوات ذات صلة

مقالات ذات صلة

• شي بينغ أول الأسبوع المقبل في الرياض… وثلاث قمم للصين… سعودية وخليجية وعربية فيصل كرامي يملأ فراغ طرابلس… وحيدر ناصر نائباً: مستقلّ مع سلاح المقاومة جلسة الانتخاب مكانك راوح… وحزب الله متمسك بفرنجية ولم يقفل باب البحث مع باسيل
• مبروك طرابلس… مبروك فيصل كرامي
• واشنطن قلقة من التصعيد التركي شمال سورية والعراق
• واشنطن: الضربات الجوية التركية في سوريا تهدّد سلامة جنودنا
• أميركا ترفع الغطاء عن «قسد»: تركيا نحو عملية برّية
• مثلّث منبج – عين العرب – تل رفعت في المهداف: أنقرة تستنفر جماعاتها
• المجر تؤجّل دعم عضوية فنلندا والسويد بالناتو إلى العام المقبل

Iran Arrests 26 Terrorists in Shiraz Attack

November 7, 2022

Source: Agencies

The Ministry of Intelligence of the Islamic Republic of Iran has announced that 26 Takfiri terrorists have been arrested so far and that the main coordinator of the Shahcheragh terror attack is an Azerbaijani national.

The ministry issued its second statement on the recent terrorist attack at the Shahcheragh holy shrine in Shiraz, Fars Province, noting that officers and intelligence experts of the ministry continued their all-out efforts to identify and arrest the culprits of the attack through one of the most sophisticated operations.

The investigations have led to the identification of perpetrators behind the terrorist attack.

Moreover, some other Takfiri terrorists who have entered the country to carry out similar attacks have been arrested.

All arrested people are non-Iranian nationals from the Azerbaijan Republic, Tajikistan, and Afghanistan.

The main element and coordinator of the terrorist operation is an Azerbaijani national, who had flown from Heydar Aliyev International Airport in Baku and landed at Imam Khomeini Airport near Tehran.

The person introduced himself as a coordinator and connected to Daesh elements in Afghanistan.

In Shiraz, there were also an Afghan coordinator called Abu Basir and a Tajik terrorist named Abu Ayesha, who committed the crime at Shahcheragh.

The terrorists were hunted and arrested in different provinces of Fars, Tehran, Alborz, Qom, Kerman, and Razavi Khorasan, other Takfiris were arrested near border areas when they were trying to escape.

Certain anti-Iran media outlets attempted to portray Iranian intelligence forces as the culprits of the terrorist attack in Shiraz, but it is worth mentioning that the Takfiris used the unrest and riots in the Islamic country to pursue their agenda, as some of the terrorists acknowledged that the extremists were invited to conduct attacks following the protests erupted in Iran.

Those, who attributed the terrorist attack to the Iranian intelligence society, played a complementary role in supporting Daesh and creating psychological warfare.

• Tehran: ’Ghaem 100’ Satellite Carrier Launch Shows National Authority
• Iran, Syria Sign MoU On Political, Diplomatic Cooperation
• Iranians attend huge funeral for victims of terror attack in Shiraz
• Iran: Multiple deaths, injuries in a terrorist attack on a shrine
• Why Western regimes are complicit in Daesh carnage at popular Iran shrine

Why India is arming Armenia against Azerbaijan

Trade routes and national security interests in the South Caucasus are central to New Delhi’s decision to arm Armenia

October 15 2022

Photo Credit: The Cradle

By Yeghia Tashjian

After the 2020 Nagorno-Karabakh war and the shift in the South Caucasus balance of power toward Turkey, India has expressed concern that its vision to connect Europe and Russia to its Indian ports through the International North-South Transport Corridor (INSTC) could be jeopardized.

From New Delhi’s perspective, the increase of Turkish influence in the region is particularly troublesome given its arch-enemy Pakistan’s excellent ties with Ankara, and Islamabad’s support of Baku during the Nagarno-Karabakh war.

It was within this context that India joined Iran to send harsh diplomatic messages to Azerbaijan during the conflict. On several occasions, New Delhi called on Baku to pull back its forces from Armenia “immediately” and refrain from further provocation.

These concerns became all the more pressing when following its victory in the war, Azerbaijan launched an incursion on Armenia’s sovereign territory in May 2021 – and again in September 2022 – by attacking Armenian bordering villages killing more than 200 soldiers and civilians.

When Baku launched the September attack, Arindam Bagchi, the spokesperson of India’s Ministry of External Affairs, weighed in, urging “peace and stability in the South Caucasus region” as vital from a “regional security perspective.”

Similarly, on 15 September, after Azerbaijan’s attack on Armenia, India’s representative to the UNSC meeting called on the “aggressor to immediately cease hostilities.”

India fills the Russian vacuum

The reason behind India’s unease over continued instability in the region is largely over fears that it may threaten the security of the INSTC, where both India and Iran are encouraging Armenia to play an important role connecting the Persian Gulf to the Black Sea.

Concerned that the budding Turkish-Azerbaijani-Pakistani axis would endanger its grand connectivity project and become more assertive in other regions such as Kashmir, India stepped in to fill the void left by Russia’s Ukraine-distraction to secure its regional geopolitical and geo-economic interests by striking an arms trade with Yerevan.

While Armenia had shown interest in Indian military hardware prior to the 2020 Nagarno-Karabakh war, it was only in that year that Yerevan stepped up to sign a $40 million arms deal with New Delhi for the supply of four SWATHI weapons detection radars.

The radar system has been designed to the specifications of the Indian Army: to track incoming artillery shells, mortars, and rockets and provide pinpoint locations of enemy launchers and positions.

Since June 2022, rumors had swirled that Armenia was quietly negotiating the purchase of Indian drones, anti-drone air defense systems, and rocket launchers. The speculation was confirmed in late September when Indian media reported that New Delhi will be exporting missiles, rockets, ammunition, anti-tank missiles (ATGM), and the indigenous Pinaka multi-barrel rocket launcher (MBRL) system to Armenia.

These weapons alone are not sufficient to boost Armenia’s defense capabilities: both the Pinaka MBRL system and the ATGM are unable to combat the Turkish or Israeli-made drones in Baku’s arsenal, as Armenia lacks proper air defense mechanisms.

Indian military experts and former generals argue that the Pinaka alone is not sufficient as Armenia needs “BrahMos” and “Akash” missiles to “break the opponents’ teeth.”

“In war, hammers aren’t the right way ahead to kill flies. One must carry out a threat assessment, after which the correct weapons can be chosen. A ‘transparent’ battlefield allows wise choices to be made. An Indian assessment team could identify the real battlefield problems and then suggest what India could provide at a reasonable cost.”

Defense against drones

This argument correctly assesses the outcome of the 2020 war in which Turkish Bayraktar drones decimated entire Armenian tank columns and rocket launchers, as Yerevan lacked an air defense system to hinder the drone attacks.

These experts argue that Armenia should therefore seek to purchase India’s indigenous “Akash” missile system, a surface-to-air system has been proven to successfully intercept drones and aircraft, which would enhance Armenia’s immunity against future drone operations.

Nevertheless, such improvements would still not be enough to significantly alter the regional balance of power.

Furthermore, Israel, a country heavily invested in Indian defense capabilities, may also have a say in some of these arms exports. Tel Aviv’s close relationship with Azerbaijan to counter Iran in the South Caucasus may ultimately prevent or restrict the sale of heavy weapons to Armenia.

What’s behind the arms deal?

After the 2020 war, Armenia became politically and economically isolated in the region. Yerevan’s failure to seize the opportunity presented by China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) – largely due to poor infrastructure – left out a major Asian power that could have invested heavily, both politically and economically, in the country. 

Instead, in India, Yerevan has found a means to diversify its economic and political ties – a prudent move, as India views Beijing’s BRI initiative as a rival project to its INSTC.

On another front, Beijing is also advancing its Middle Corridor (also known as the Trans-Caspian International Transport Route, or TITR), connecting mainland China with Central Asia via Kazakhstan, and then onto Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Turkey, before heading to Europe. This corridor is also crucial for Europe as it bypasses Russia.

The importance of this corridor became significant as Azerbaijan and Turkey began pressuring Armenia to give up its southern border with Iran and establish the strategic Zangezur Corridor where Azerbaijan would be directly linked to Turkey.

This alarmed both Iran and India, who realized that their mutual geo-economic interests would be threatened along their north-south trade routes.

For this reason, Tehran and New Delhi began to actively urge Yerevan’s participation in the INSTC and the Iranian-backed Black Sea – Persian Gulf Transport Corridor initiatives. Among the benefits of joining the INSTC, Armenia will have transport access to the Iranian Chabahar Port, the Persian Gulf, and Indian markets.

Beyond business

Geopolitical considerations also factor into India’s growing presence in the region. Pranab Dhal Samanra opined in India’s Economic Times that New Delhi cannot ignore the dangerous adventures of the “three Brothers” (Azerbaijan, Turkey, and Pakistan) in Armenia and elsewhere.

The author argues that Turkey and Azerbaijan have always supported Pakistan against India over the issue of Kashmir, and in return, Pakistan has fully-backed Azerbaijan in its war with Armenia over Nagorno-Karabakh.

According to Samanra, if this axis is cemented in the South Caucasus it will move southwards and the “three brothers” will act jointly in other theaters – including ‘Pakistan-occupied Kashmir’ – given their “existing political understanding on the subject.”

India is also concerned that Pakistan may bring China into this axis, which will undermine India’s national security. Hence, it is in “India’s interest that Armenia puts up a stand and not be trampled upon because of a power vacuum (in South Caucasus) caused by Russia’s preoccupation in Ukraine.”

Countering Baku or proxy against Pakistan?

Both India and Armenia stand to benefit from these arms deals. If the Indian weapons prove effective in battle, it could boost India’s prestige in the global defense industry and increase interest by other states to procure arms from New Delhi.

Moreover, by arming Armenia, India can use the country as a deterrent force against the emerging Turkish-Azerbaijani-Pakistani axis. Aside from Afghanistan, Armenia will be the first near-abroad counterweight against Islamabad’s activities deemed to pose a threat to India’s security interests.

By strengthening its current ties with New Delhi, Armenia can become a strategically significant partner for India, where the latter can establish commercial and defense hubs for joint Armenian-Iranian-Indian goods to be exported to Russia and Europe.

Armenia, firmly embedded within Russia’s sphere of influence, will serve as an additional advantage for India, as this flourishing partnership would further boost India’s north-south economic corridor in the South Caucasus.

The views expressed in this article do not necessarily reflect those of The Cradle.

Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov’s article on cooperation in the Caspian Region

September 20, 2022

The Caspian – a unique region of neighbourliness

On June 29, 2022, Ashgabat hosted an important international event, the 6th Caspian Summit, and I believe it is important to consider the role and place of the Caspian Region in the fairer, more democratic and sustainable multi-polar system that is taking shape today.

The importance of the Caspian Region for the Russian Federation is determined by its strategic location in the centre of Eurasia, at the crossroads of its transport and energy routes, the presence of a huge amount of mineral and biological resources and the intertwining of the local cultures that coexist here.

Russia’s vital interests include durable peace, stability and security in the Caspian Region, sustainable development based on neighbourliness, trust and cooperation of the coastal states, and the use of its economic, including transit, potential to the mutual benefit of the coastal states. A key task is to ensure the rational use of natural resources in the region, protect and preserve the environment of this unique body of water, and guarantee ecological and transport security in its basin. With these aims in mind, Russia advocates the systemic, comprehensive development of cooperation among the five nations and the gradual institutionalisation of this process. We are doing much to expand ties with our neighbours in all areas.

We believe all Caspian issues should be resolved solely by consensus of the five coastal states. Extra-regional forces should not be allowed to exert a negative influence.

Despite the ancient history of the region, the current system of cooperation has taken shape there relatively recently. After the Soviet Union’s disintegration, the number of Caspian states increased from two to five. For this reason, joint administration of the Caspian Sea via constructive cooperation moved to the fore in the early 1990s.

In October 1992, the heads of state and government of the Caspian states met in Tehran to discuss the possibility of establishing a Caspian Economic Cooperation Organisation. The participants reviewed prospects for setting up such entities as a Caspian interstate oil company, Caspian interstate bank of economic cooperation, Caspian development bank, a centre for Caspian economic and political studies, and a centre for the studies of Caspian bio resources.

These initiatives were not translated into reality for several reasons, including the unregulated legal status of the Caspian Sea. In the process the five Caspian states – Azerbaijan, Iran, Kazakhstan, Russia and Turkmenistan – agreed on the need to draft principles and rules and create special cooperative bodies and institutions in the region. I would like to emphasise that the five-member cooperation format took shape naturally by virtue of political and geographical factors and the need to jointly manage the unique Caspian Sea.

The 5th Caspian Summit in Aktau (Kazakhstan) in 2018 marked a very important step, with participants signing a Convention on the Legal Status of the Caspian Sea, a kind of a Caspian constitution. This document is based on the consent of the sides (recorded in the preamble) to observe several principles: sovereign rights to the Caspian Sea and its resources belong to them alone; they are responsible to current and future generations for preserving the region and promoting its sustainable development, and they have exclusive authority to settle Caspian Sea issues.

I would like to emphasise 17 principles governing the activities of the sides (Article 3 of the Convention). In effect, they boil down to the code of conduct in the region and help preserve it as an area of peace, neighbourly relations and cooperation. These principles are comprehensive and embrace both universally recognised standards of international law, including respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of states and rules for practical cooperation between partners.

The sides have adopted a large number of security provisions, some of which are of particular importance. Thus, they pledged to prevent the presence of armed forces of third countries in the Caspian Sea, to refrain from prejudicing each other’s security and to implement military confidence building measures.

The negotiations over the convention lasted for over 20 years and were eventually crowned with a diplomatic compromise based on the verified balance of interests. Speedy ratification of the convention by the sides is in the best interests of regional stability and steady progress.

It goes without saying that the five Caspian nations are not going to fence themselves off from the outside world, especially in the economic sphere. However, we and our partners are firmly committed to the position that outside interference in our affairs is unacceptable.

This means that interaction with players outside the region can occur only with the approval of all five members for the purposes of addressing pressing issues facing the Caspian. Examples include initiatives that are implemented jointly with UN agencies (the UN Human Settlements Programme project titled “Urbanisation and Climate Change Adaptation in the Caspian Sea region,” the UN Environment Programme and the UN Development Programme project on combating pollution of the Caspian Sea with marine litter and plastic waste).

Sectoral cooperation is making progress alongside the efforts to draft and adopt the convention and is being consistently codified in international treaties, such as the Framework Convention for the Protection of the Marine Environment of the Caspian Sea, the Agreement on Security Cooperation in the Caspian Sea, and cooperation agreements in other areas ranging from transport and logistics to emergency relief.

The five leaders’ personal contribution to Caspian cooperation can hardly be overstated. Each summit has helped expand and deepen interaction. During the most recent sixth summit, the principles underlying the activities of the five nations were confirmed and thus became political commitments, which fully ensures that they will guide our practical activities.

In Ashgabat, the heads of state reviewed cooperation priorities, including the efforts to tap the Caspian Sea’s transport, energy and resource potential and to ensure environmental safety and cooperation in tourism and culture. The prospects for industrial cooperation and project activities in the high-tech industry were discussed in detail. A number of highly constructive initiatives have been put forward, in particular, President of Kazakhstan Tokayev’s proposal to create a Caspian food “hub” and President of Turkmenistan Berdimuhamedov’s idea to set up a Business Cooperation Council.

An important achievement was the agreement to create a permanent facility for holding five-nation foreign ministers’ meetings in order to discuss development issues and improve the partnership of the Caspian countries, develop coordinated measures for implementing decisions, and draft the agenda and list of final documents for the summits. The ministers will coordinate interaction within the five-nation sector-specific mechanisms.

Thus, we can safely assume that Caspian cooperation is going at a fast clip and breaking new ground. Clearly, far from all issues facing the Caspian countries have been resolved. Some require additional political and diplomatic efforts, such as approving the draft Agreement on methodology for establishing straight baselines in the Caspian Sea which, once adopted by the parties, will make it possible to complete the delimitation of water areas.

In addition, it is important to speed up the process of approving five-nation draft documents in a number of key areas of intersectoral cooperation, such as maritime transport, search and rescue, navigation safety, marine scientific research, combating poaching and the drug threat. Further consolidation of efforts to prevent sanitary and epidemiological emergencies and to respond to outbreaks of infectious diseases is greatly needed. Discussions on the Tehran Convention Secretariat’s rules of procedure are ongoing.

In the economic area it is important to keep up efforts to achieve the balanced use of Caspian energy and transit capacities, which requires consideration of all the countries’ interests and environmental security factors. Our region has every chance to become one of Eurasia’s biggest hubs for multi-modal transcontinental shipments, primarily by tapping the potential of the North-South international transport corridor.

Expanding cooperation between regions of the five countries will facilitate Caspian interaction. Cultural cooperation and the development of tourism, including cruise routes, are other promising avenues.

The institualisation of five-nation cooperation should remain at the centre of attention. This process is making headway – regular meetings of the leaders of the Caspian states have already become a tradition.

The Caspian Economic Forum at the heads of government level has become an important format. Its first meeting took place at the initiative of Turkmenistan in 2019. In October 2022, Moscow will host its second forum. We hope it will provide a fresh impetus to the trade and economic aspects of Caspian cooperation.

The institution of the Conference of the Parties to the Tehran Convention is up and running. The commission for the preservation and rational use of aquatic biological resources and management of their common reserves holds sessions every year. The Coordination Committee for Hydrometeorology of the Caspian Sea meets as well. There are agreements on mechanisms for regular ministerial meetings, including the afore-mentioned meetings of foreign ministers as well as their transport and economic counterparts. The high-level working group of deputy foreign ministers/special envoys of the Caspian states is in operation. It was established following the 5th Caspian Summit. I would like to emphasise that all five-nation issues are resolved by consensus.

To make existing structures and mechanisms more efficient, it makes sense to turn them into a uniform regional system. At the current stage, the formation of a flexible five-nation forum – the Caspian Council – seems to be the best way of achieving this. The proposed council should function without a secretariat or other bureaucratic add-ons. The five Caspian countries studied this idea at the expert level and Russia proposed it at the 6th Caspian Summit. We agree with President of Kazakhstan Kassym-Jomart Tokayev who supported our initiative. He said the Caspian Sea was ready for new steps on institutionalising five-way cooperation.

We have consistently held that the efforts of the five nations to promote the sustainable development of the Caspian Region help maintain stability throughout Greater Eurasia and fuse the creative potential of the states and their integration associations in our common Eurasian home. Russia seeks to continue working closely with its Caspian partners to achieve these and other ambitious goals in accordance with the principles of the Convention on the Legal Status of the Caspian Sea.

Deaths, injuries in renewed clashes between Azerbaijan, Armenia

September 13, 2022 08:37

Source: Agencies

By Al Mayadeen English 

The decades-old hostilities over the disputed area of Nagorno-Karabakh are back as they were instigated by Azerbaijan.

An Armenian soldier firing artillery during the ongoing fighting between Armenian and Azerbaijani forces over Nagorno-Karabakh (AFP)

Russian news media reported that clashes between Azerbaijani and Armenian troops started early Tuesday, resuming decades-old hostilities over the disputed region of Nagorno-Karabakh.

Azerbaijani soldiers advanced along various areas of the border, according to Aram Torosyan, spokesman for the Armenian Defense Ministry.

“The enemy continues to use artillery, mortars, drones, and large-caliber small arms. Attacks are being made on both military facilities and civilian infrastructure facilities. In some areas, Azerbaijani units have taken actions to advance positions. Positional battles continue. The Armenian Armed Forces give a proportionate response and carry out their combat tasks in full,” Torosyan said.

Read next: Armenia, Azerbaijan agree to further collaborate on peace treaty work

According to Torosyan, Armenian servicemen were killed and others were injured in an armed encounter near the border with Azerbaijan. “There are dead and wounded on the Armenian side. The data is being specified,” Torosyan said.

He said Azerbaijani troops were also delivering strikes at civilian infrastructure facilities.

Earlier, both sides exchanged blame, with Yerevan accusing the Azerbaijani military of shelling the territory of Armenia late on Monday using artillery and drones. On its part, Baku said the Armenian military fired at the positions of the Azerbaijani troops on the border, resulting in a clash. The Azerbaijani Defense Ministry also reported losses in its ranks.

The Armenian government said it will invoke a cooperation agreement with Russia and appeal to a Russia-led security bloc, the Collective Security Treaty Organization, and the United Nations Security Council, according to Interfax.

Armenia speaks to Russia, Frace, the US

Following the eruption of clashes, Armenia contacted Russia, France, and the US and briefed them on the ongoing situation. 

Armenian Foreign Minister Ararat Mirzoyan informed Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov about the situation on the border with Azerbaijan, according to an Armenian Foreign Ministry statement.

“Armenian Foreign Minister Ararat Mirzoyan on September 13 informed Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov about the situation,” according to the statement, which also states “Azerbaijani aggression.”

In addition to Russian President Vladimir Putin, Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan spoke by phone with US Secretary of State Antony Blinken about the situation on the border with Azerbaijan, according to a statement by the Armenian government.

“The prime minister presented the details of the aggression committed by Azerbaijan against the sovereign territory of Armenia. Pashinyan said that in connection with these actions, the decision was made to formally appeal to the Russian Federation in order to implement the provisions of the Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation, and Mutual Assistance, as well as to the CSTO and the UN Security Council. In this context, he expressed hope for a proportionate response from the international community,” the statement said.

Read next: Armenia to withdraw its soldiers from Nagorno-Karabakh by September

According to the Armenian cabinet, Blinken “expressed the American side’s deep concern about the situation, considered it unacceptable to further aggravate the situation, and declared the US readiness to make efforts to stabilize the situation.”

However, an Azerbaijani statement claimed that Armenian forces conducted intelligence activities on its border, transferred weaponry into the area, and performed mining operations on Monday night, thus using the pretext of conducting operations that are “strictly local in nature and aimed at military targets” to justify the attacks.

Armenia’s Defense Ministry responded, “Intensive shooting is continuing – started as a result of a large-scale provocation by the Azerbaijani side. Armenia’s armed forces have launched a proportionate response.”

Tensions erupt over Karabakh

Clashes erupt every now and then between both sides despite a Russian-backed ceasefire agreement. Last month, tensions erupted over Nagorno-Karabakh as three soldiers were killed and Azerbaijan said it had taken control of several strategic heights in the disputed region.

Armenia and Azerbaijan fought two conflicts over Azerbaijan’s Armenian-populated area of Nagorno-Karabakh, one in 2020 and one in the 1990s.

Six weeks of violence in the autumn of 2020 claimed over 6,500 lives and ended with a ceasefire accord sponsored by Russia. Russia sent 2,000 peacekeepers to monitor the truce, but tensions remain despite a ceasefire deal.

Related Stories

• Armenia to withdraw its soldiers from Nagorno-Karabakh by September
• Armenia, Azerbaijan FMs hold first bilateral talks
• Opposition in Armenia protests Karabakh concessions

Going to Samarkand

July 31, 2022

By Pepe Escobar, posted with the author’s permission and widely cross-posted

The SCO and other pan-Eurasian organizations play a completely different – respectful, consensual – ball game. And that’s why they are catching the full attention of most of the Global South.

The meeting of the SCO Ministerial Council  in Tashkent this past Friday involved some very serious business. That was the key preparatory reunion previous to the SCO summit in mid-September in fabled Samarkand, where the SCO will release a much-awaited “Declaration of Samarkand”.

What happened in Tashkent was predictably unreported across the collective West and still not digested across great swathes of the East.

So once again it’s up to Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov to cut to the chase. The world’s foremost diplomat – amidst the tragic drama of the American-concocted Era of Non-Diplomacy, Threats and Sanctions – has singled out the two overlapping main themes propelling the SCO as one of the key organizations on the path towards Eurasia integration.

1. Interconnectivity and “the creation of efficient transport corridors”. The War of Economic Corridors is one of the key features of the 21st
2. Drawing “the roadmap for the gradual increase in the share of national currencies in mutual settlements.”

Yet it was in the Q@A session that Lavrov for all practical purposes detailed all the major trends in the current, incandescent state of international relations. These are the key takeaways.

How comfortable are you with the US dollar?

Africa: “We agreed that we will submit to the leaders for consideration proposals on specific actions to switch to settlements in national currencies. I think that everyone will now think about it. Africa already has a similar experience: common currencies in some sub-regional structures, which, nevertheless, by and large, are pegged to Western ones. From 2023, a continental free trade zone will start functioning on the African continent. A logical step would be to reinforce it with currency agreements.”

Belarus – and many others – eager to join the SCO: “There is a broad consensus on the Belarusian candidacy (…) I felt it today. There are a number of contenders for the status of observer, dialogue partner. Some Arab countries show such interest, as do Armenia, Azerbaijan and a number of Asian states.”

Grain diplomacy: “In regard to the issue of Russian grain, it was the American sanctions that did not allow the full implementation of the signed contracts due to the restrictions imposed: Russian ships are prohibited from entering a number of ports, there is a ban on foreign ships entering Russian ports to pick up export cargo, and insurance rates have gone up (…) Financial chains are also interrupted by illegitimate US and EU sanctions. In particular, Rosselkhozbank, through which all the main settlements for food exports pass, was one of the first to be included in the sanctions list. UN Secretary General A. Guterres has committed to removing these barriers to addressing the global food crisis. Let’s see.”

Taiwan: “We do not discuss this with our Chinese colleague. Russia’s position on having only one China remains unchanged. The United States periodically confirms the same line in words, but in practice their ‘deeds’ do not always coincide with words. We have no problem upholding the principle of Chinese sovereignty.”

Should the SCO abandon the US dollar? “Each SCO country must decide for itself how comfortable it feels to rely on the dollar, taking into account the absolute unreliability of this currency for possible abuses. The Americans have used this more than once in relation to a number of states.”

Why the SCO matters: “There are no leaders and followers in the SCO. There are no situations in the organization like in NATO, when the US and its closest allies impose one line or another on all other members of the alliance. In the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, the situation that we are currently seeing in the EU does not arise: sovereign countries are literally being ‘knocked out’, demanding that they either stop buying gas or reduce its consumption in violation of national plans and interests.”

Lavrov was also keen to stress how “other structures in the Eurasian space, for example, the EAEU and BRICS, are based and operate on the same principles” of the SCO. And he referred to the crucial cooperation with the 10 member-nations of ASEAN.

Thus he set the stage for the clincher: “All these processes, in interconnection, help to form the Greater Eurasian Partnership, which President Vladimir Putin has repeatedly spoken about. We see in them a benefit for the entire population of the Eurasian continent.”

Those Afghan and Arab lives

The real big story of the Raging Twenties  is how the special military operation (SMO) in Ukraine de facto kick-started “all these processes”, as Lavrov mentioned, simultaneously leading towards inexorable Eurasia integration.

Once again he had to recall two basic facts that continue to escape any serious analysis across the collective West:

Fact 1: “All our proposals for their removal [referring to NATO-expansion assets] on the basis of the principle of mutual respect for security interests were ignored by the US, the EU, and NATO.”

Fact 2: “When the Russian language was banned in Ukraine, and the Ukrainian government promoted neo-Nazi theories and practices, the West did not oppose, but, on the contrary, encouraged the actions of the Kyiv regime and admired Ukraine as a ‘stronghold of democracy.’ Western countries supplied the Kyiv regime with weapons and planned the construction of naval bases on Ukrainian territory. All these actions were openly aimed at containing the Russian Federation. We have been warning for 10 years that this is unacceptable.”

It’s also fitting that Lavrov would once again put Afghanistan, Iraq and Libya in context: “Let us recall the example of Afghanistan, when even wedding ceremonies were subjected to air strikes, or Iraq and Libya, where statehood was completely destroyed, and many human lives were sacrificed. When states that easily pursued such a policy are now making a fuss about Ukraine, I can conclude that the lives of Afghans and Arabs mean nothing to Western governments. It’s unfortunate. Double standards, these racist and colonial instincts must be eliminated.”

Putin, Lavrov, Patrushev, Madvedev have all been stressing lately the racist, neocolonial character of the NATOstan matrix. The SCO and other pan-Eurasian organizations play a completely different – respectful, consensual – ball game. And that’s why they are catching the full attention of most of the Global South. Next stop: Samarkand.

Major news day for Russia: In conclusion of his working visit to Iran, Vladimir Putin answered questions from the media.

July 20, 2022

In conclusion of his working visit to Iran, Vladimir Putin answered questions from the media.

Question: Mr President, some would think the world has forgotten about Syria amid the numerous issues on the international agenda. But we have seen today that this is not so.

We would like to hear your views on the situation on the ground in Syria. A great deal has been said today about points of contact, but there are many differences as well. Have you discussed or coordinated any fundamentally new solutions today? I am referring primarily to these differences.

President of Russia Vladimir Putin: What I would like to begin with is not the differences but the fundamental issues that allow us to work and continue our efforts in the trilateral format. All of us believe that it I necessary to guarantee the territorial integrity of the Syrian Arab Republic and to eliminate all sorts of terrorists, which I will not enumerate here. This is the fundamental and the most important thing, as we have pointed out again in our joint statement. I believe that this is very important.

Yes, there are certain differences, which is obvious, but all of us support the constitutional process. Thanks to our efforts, we have brought together various conflicting parties at one negotiating platform, including the opposition and the official authorities of the Syrian Arab Republic, experts and representatives of public organisations, as well as the UN. I believe this is extremely important. This is the first point.

The second. Humanitarian aid is being provided to Syria, for which there is particularly great demand today, because the sanctions imposed on Syria and the Syrian people have produced a deplorable result: nearly 90 percent of people in Syria are living below the poverty line. The situation in Syria is extremely serious.

Of course, it would be unfair to give priority attention to certain groups, to politicise humanitarian aid.

Third. There are different approaches to organising humanitarian aid. We have always believed that it should be organised in full compliance with international humanitarian law. This means that all humanitarian aid must be provided through the official Syrian authorities, through Damascus. However, we have agreed to extend the existing procedure for six months, including for deliveries to the Idlib zone, so as to have more time for coordinating our positions.

There is some disagreement about what is happening in Northern Syria. Incidentally, we also have some common ground here: all of us believe that US troops should leave this area. This is the first point. And they should stop looting the Syrian state, the Syrian people, taking their oil illegally. But there is disagreement about how to organise and stabilise the situation in that region. As you know, Russian-Turkish observation convoys are working there together.

However, in our view, in order to ensure a long-term, stable situation there it is necessary to transfer the entire territory under the control of the official authorities in Damascus, under the control of the Armed Forces of the Syrian Arab Republic, and then it will be possible to hold a dialogue with those who are responsible – in this case the official Syrian authorities. I believe it would greatly stabilise the situation there.

But in general, it is work in progress. As I have said many times and would like to stress once again, the work of this tripartite group – Russia, Turkiye and Iran – this joint effort to search for compromises and find these compromises has led to the fact that over 90% of Syria is now under official government control and, as we say in such cases, we have broken the back of international terrorism there. This is a great result of this joint work.

Question: Mr President, you had three one-on-one meetings today, first with Mr Raisi, then with Mr Khamenei, and then with Mr Erdogan, and there were no news conferences after these meetings. All we know is the topic you were discussing, the official part.

In particular, you said that you discussed the grain issue with your Turkish counterpart, the issue of supplying Russian and Ukrainian grain to international markets. Could you tell us some more about that, please?

Vladimir Putin: There are no secrets here; in fact, almost everything is known. There are some subtleties; maybe I do not always have time to follow what is happening in the information field. I will tell you how I see it.

First, what was the highlight of the three meetings? At each meeting, there were issues that could be considered central to a particular bilateral meeting.

For example, as I said at the news conference, in my press statement, the main theme at the meeting with the Spiritual Leader of Iran was strategic issues, including developments in the region. This is natural, as it is the sphere of his activity. It was very important for me to hear his opinion, his assessment. I have to say that we have very similar views with Iran on many aspects. So, it was very important and very useful.

As for my meeting with President Raisi, we discussed primarily economic matters. I would like to note that Russian-Iranian trade has grown by 40 percent over the past six months. This is a very good indicator.

There are promising spheres for our cooperation, and there is a great variety of them, like infrastructure development. You may know that a deputy prime minister of the Russian Government chairs a group that is responsible for developing relations in the South Caucasus, including infrastructure projects in the South Caucasus, that is, in Azerbaijan, Armenia and Russia. A great deal can be achieved in this sphere in cooperation with Iran.

As you know, the first pilot train is travelling along the North-South Railway line. It is a short route to ports in the south of Iran, which further leads to the Persian Gulf and India.

There is a practical project: the Rasht-Astara railway is a short 146-kilometre line across Iran. Azerbaijan is interested in its construction. I recently met with President Aliyev during the Caspian Summit, and we discussed this matter. Iran is interested in this as well, as our Iranian partners have told us just now. Russia is interested in this, because it will connect Russia’s northern region, St Petersburg, directly to the Persian Gulf. It is a very interesting and promising project. The task now is to build this line, which is only 146 kilometres. Russia is ready to do this.

We need to coordinate the conditions of this construction project. We have discussed its general outlines with our Iranian partners and friends, and we have coordinated it with Azerbaijan. I hope we will get down to business now. And then, it will be an interesting job for us. It actually amounts to exporting the services of Russian Railways (RZD). This is one of the relevant examples.

There are other spheres. There are security issues relevant to Iran’s nuclear programme. It was very important for us to understand the sentiments of the Iranian party regarding this work. It also involves Russia, which is contributing to the joint efforts aimed at relaunching interaction between Iran and the IAEA. I will not speak about this now, but Russia is playing a considerable role in this.

The grain issue. It is what we discussed with the President of Turkiye. I have already said that the Republic of Turkiye and personally President Erdogan have done a great deal to facilitate the agreement on Ukrainian grain exports. But initially we suggested that it should be adopted as a package, that is, we would facilitate the Ukrainian grain exports provided all the restrictions on the potential exports of Russian grain are lifted. This is what we initially agreed upon with international organisations. They pledged to formulate this as a package solution. Nobody has so far raised any objections, including our American partners. We will see what comes of it in the near future.

As you know, the Americans have actually lifted restrictions, for example, on the delivery of Russian fertilisers to the global market. I hope this will also happen with regard to the export of Russian grain if they really want to improve the situation on the global food markets. As I have said, we are ready to do this right now. We can export 30 million tonnes of grain, and our export potential based on this year’s harvest will be 50 million tonnes.

Question: Mr President, a serious energy crisis is developing in Europe, which is discussing the possibility of Gazprom cutting off gas deliveries. The company has allegedly issued an official notification to one of its German clients, citing force majeure circumstances.

Are there grounds for accusing Russia of causing this energy crisis? Will Gazprom continue to honour its obligations

Vladimir Putin: First of all, Gazprom has always honoured, and will continue to honour its commitments.

There are no grounds at all for the attempts by our partners to shift or try to shift the blame for their own mistakes on Russia and Gazprom.

What is the situation with energy deliveries? In 2020, in the first half of 2020, gas cost 100 euros per 1,000 cubic metres in Europe. The price rose to 250 euros in the first half of 2021. Today it is 1,700 euros per 1,000 cubic metres of gas.

What is happening? I have spoken about this on numerous occasions, and I do not know if we should go into detail regarding the energy policies of European countries, which underrate the importance of traditional sources of energy and have put money on non-traditional energy sources. They are big experts on non-traditional relations, and they have also decided to make a bid for non-traditional energy sources like the sun and wind.

Last winter was long, there wasno wind, and that did it. Investment in the fixed assets of traditional energy producers has decreased because of previous political decisions: banks do not finance them, insurance companies do not insure them, local governments do not allocate land plots for new projects, and pipeline and other forms of transportation are not developing. This is a result of many years, probably a decade of this policy. This is the root cause of price hikes rather than any actions by Russia or Gazprom.

What is going on today? Until recently, we supplied gas to Europe without Turkiye: we supplied around 30 billion cubic metres a year to Turkiye, and 170 billion to Europe, 55 billion via Nord Stream 1, and, if memory serves me, 33 billion were supplied via Yamal-Europe, via the two strings that run through Ukraine. About 12 billion were delivered to Europe through Turkiye via TurkStream.

Ukraine suddenly announced that it was going to close one of the two routes on its territory. Allegedly because the gas pumping station is not under its control but on the territory of the Lugansk People’s Republic. But it found itself under the control of the Lugansk People’s Republic several months before, and they closed it just recently without any grounds. Everything was functioning normally there, no one interfered. In my opinion, they closed it simply for political reasons.

What happened next? Poland imposed sanctions on Yamal-Europe, which supplied 33 billion cubic metres of gas. They used to take 34, I think, 33–34 million cubic metres a day from us. They shut it down completely. But then we saw that they turned on the Yamal-Europe pipeline in reverse mode, and they started taking about 32 million a day from Germany. Where is the gas from Germany coming from? It is our Russian gas. Why from Germany? Because it turned out to be cheaper for the Poles. They used to get it from us at a very high price, closer to the market price, whereas Germany gets it from us 3–4 times cheaper than the market price under long-term contracts.

It is profitable for German companies to sell it to the Poles at a small premium. It is profitable for the Poles to buy it because it is cheaper than to buy it directly from us. But the volume of gas in the European market has decreased, and the total market price has gone up. Who has won? All Europeans only lost. This is the second point: Yamal-Europe.

So, first one of the routes in Ukraine was shut down, then Yamal-Europe was shut down, now Nord Stream 1, which is one of the main routes – we pump 55 billion cubic metres a year through it. There are five Siemens gas compressor stations working there, and one is on standby. One compressor had to be sent out for repairs. A repaired compressor was supposed to come from Canada, from the Siemens plant in Canada, to replace it. But it ended up under sanctions in Canada. So, one pumping station, just one piece of equipment was out of order because of scheduled maintenance work and it has not been returned from Canada.

Now we are being told that the unit will be delivered from Canada soon, but Gazprom does not have any official documents yet. We must certainly obtain them, because this is our property, it is the property of Gazprom. Gazprom should receive not only the hardware, not only the gas pumping unit, but also the accompanying documents, both legal and technical documentation. We must be able to see what Gazprom is taking – the turbine’s current condition as well as its legal status, whether it is under sanctions or not, what we can do with it, or maybe they are taking it back tomorrow. But that is not all.

The problem is that at the end of July, on July 26, I think – we can ask Gazprom – another turbine should be sent for routine maintenance, for repairs. And where will we get a replacement from? We do not know.

One more turbine is actually out of order because of some crumbling of its internal liner. Siemens has confirmed this. That leaves two operational units, which are pumping 60 million per day. So, if one more is delivered, fine, we will have two in operation. But if it is not, only one will be left, and it will pump only 30 million cubic meters per day. You can count how much time it will take to pump the rest. How is this Gazprom’s responsibility? What does Gazprom even have to do with this? They have cut off one route, then another, and sanctioned this gas pumping equipment. Gazprom is ready to pump as much gas as necessary. But they have shut everything down.

And they have fallen into the same trap with the import of oil and petroleum products. We hear all sorts of crazy ideas about capping the volume of Russian oil imports or the price of Russian oil. This is going to lead to the same situation as with gas. The result (I am surprised to hear people with university degrees saying this) will be the same – rising prices. Oil prices will spiral.

As for gas, there is another route we are ready to open, which is Nord Stream 2. It is ready to be launched, but they are not launching it. There are problems here as well, I discussed them with the Chancellor about six or maybe eight weeks ago. I raised this issue; I said that Gazprom had reserved the capacity, and that this capacity needed to be used, and it cannot be suspended in mid-air indefinitely.

The answer was that there were other issues on the agenda, more important things, so it is difficult for them to deal with this right now. But I had to warn them that then we would have to redirect half of the volume intended for Nord Stream for domestic consumption and processing. I raised this issue at the request of Gazprom, and Gazprom has actually already done it. Therefore, even if we launch Nord Stream 2 tomorrow, it will not pump 55 billion cubic meters, but exactly half that amount. And given that we are already halfway through this year, it would be just a quarter. Such is the supply situation.

But – I said this at the beginning of my answer to your question and I want to end with this – Gazprom has always fulfilled and will always fulfil all of its obligations, as long as, of course, anyone needs it. First, they themselves close everything, and then they look for someone to blame – it would be comical if it were not so sad.

Question: You spoke with Mr Erdogan today. He has repeatedly stated his readiness to arrange talks between you and Vladimir Zelensky. Has this issue surfaced today? Are you ready to meet with the President of Ukraine?

Vladimir Putin: President Erdogan is making a lot of efforts to create the necessary conditions for normalising the situation. It was during our talks in Istanbul that we actually reached an agreement, and it only remained to initial it. But, as you know, after that, when our troops, in order to create the right conditions, withdrew from central Ukraine, from Kiev, the Kiev authorities backed off on those agreements. These were agreements that had actually been achieved. So, you see that the final result depends, of course, not on intermediaries, but on the parties’ commitment to fulfil the agreements reached. And we can see today that the Kiev authorities have no interest in that.

As for Turkiye’s efforts, as well as other countries’ proposals – Saudi Arabia has offered its mediation services, and the United Arab Emirates, and they do have such capabilities – we are grateful to all our friends who are interested in resolving this crisis for providing their opportunities. Even their willingness to make some contribution to this noble cause is worth a lot. We are deeply grateful for that.

Iran in South Caucasus: Turning losses into wins

Determined not to be cut out of the South Caucasus, Iran is forging strategic ties with both Baku and Yerevan

July 11 2022

Photo Credit: The Cradle

By Yeghia Tashjian

Azerbaijan’s President Ilham Aliyev and Iranian President Ebrahim Raisi have averted conflict through geo-economic compromise

At the end of the 2020 Nagorno-Karabakh war – which Azerbaijan won with Turkish support and Russian diplomacy – Iran was widely seen by analysts as the conflict’s biggest loser, in terms of its regional strategic interests.

Without wasting much time, however, Tehran flipped those fortunes by very proactively engaging its soft power in the South Caucasus to advance its geo-economic interests. This is arguably due to Iran’s concerns over Turkish-Azerbaijani expansionist designs in the region.

In the main, Iran has sought to revitalize its relations with Azerbaijan to mitigate Turkey’s push for control over the Zangezur Corridor, a strategic transportation route bypassing Armenian territory close to the Iranian border.

The corridor’s opening is said to be dependent upon the development of a comprehensive Armenian-Azerbaijani agreement. In this regard, Tehran is engaging with both countries simultaneously, and in doing so has helped reduce Baku’s political pressure on Yerevan.

Resetting relations with Azerbaijan

On March 11, 2022, Azerbaijan and Iran signed an agreement to establish new railway, highway, and energy supply lines connecting the southern territories of the disputed Karabakh region (captured by Azerbaijan) to the Azerbaijani Nakhichevan exclave.

According to the agreement, the new highway will be 55 km long and will pass through northern Iran, eventually connecting to Nakhichevan. In addition to the highway, two railway bridges and a road bridge will be constructed over the bordering Arax River.

Iranian political analyst Vali Kaleji says these projects have geo-economic significance for both Azerbaijan and Iran.

For Baku, the construction of this highway is essential for several reasons. First, it is a continuation of an already existing highway in Azerbaijan and will draw investment into the southern regions of Karabakh currently under the control of Baku.

Second, the 55-km highway through Iran will offer an alternative to the Zangezur corridor that Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev was pushing for after the trilateral statement, which put an end to hostilities – for now – between Baku and Yerevan.

Despite the fact that the trilateral statement called for the opening of trade routes and communication, it did not mention anything about a ‘corridor.’ President Aliyev has largely promoted the Zangezur Corridor idea for domestic consumption while adding political pressure on Armenia to sign a peace treaty over Nagorno-Karabakh.

To date, Russia, Armenia and Iran have disregarded Baku’s Zangezur Corridor claims.

Peacekeeping policies

To prevent another war between Baku and Yerevan, Tehran came up with an alternative solution by providing this alternative route that will lift some pressure from Armenia’s shoulders, as Azerbaijan was threatening to gain the corridor by any means necessary.

Moreover, Baku is also concerned that if the Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan’s government falls and the opposition comes to power, the successive government will not provide any corridor to Azerbaijan through the Armenian territories. Hence, as Keleji noted, “Baku is deliberately pursuing another option should the Zangezur Corridor not come to fruition.”

Finally, Azerbaijan will establish a link with Nakhichevan through Iran, providing additional Iranian leverage over Baku in the future.

Iranian interests

Iran, in turn, has its own considerations for allowing the construction of a highway and railway across its territory that would connect Azerbaijan proper to Nakhchivan.

In reaction to the expansionist narrative pushed by Azerbaijan over the Zangezur Corridor and Azerbaijani incursions into bordering villages in Syunik (southern Armenia), Iran drew its red lines and its Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) threatened to use military force if necessary to prevent any territorial change in its 44 km border with Armenia.

As such, Tehran sees the construction of a new highway and railway line via Iran as an appropriate alternative to the Zangezur corridor that will alleviate the military pressure on southern Armenia.

For this reason, Ahmad Kazemi, an Iranian expert on the South Caucasus region, in his article “Baku’s reconciliation with geopolitical realities” wrote that Baku is pushing a “fake Zangezur corridor” to appease Turkey, Israel, NATO while following pan-Turkic dreams.

It was only last year that Aliyev declared: “The corridor that is going to pass through here is going to unite the whole Turkic world.”

For Kazemi, this “Turanic corridor” will go against the interests of Iran, Russia, and China. It is therefore inevitable that these three states will not allow geopolitical changes on Armenia’s southern borders.

Isolating Iran

Meanwhile, with the ongoing war in Ukraine, Moscow has focused its attention on the importance of the North-South trade route. According to Kaleji, strengthening this transit route will aid in countering the tightening economic sanctions and transit restrictions imposed on Russia by the west.

In this regard, the Iranian Roads and Urban Development Minister Rostam Qasemi visited Moscow on 30 April to sign a comprehensive agreement on cooperation in the field of transportation. Both countries agreed to accelerate the construction of Azerbaijani-Iranian railway to connect Moscow to the strategic Persian Gulf – a security concern of western powers since the Cold War era.

In February, during an Iranian-Armenian conference held in Yerevan, an Iranian diplomatic source told The Cradle that “Iran will take all the necessary measures to prevent the loss of the strategic Armenian-Iranian border and will do all it can to prevent a new war.

Tehran realizes that any such loss will further increase Turkish influence in the region and that Iran was an indirect target of the 2020 war in Karabakh, with the aim of isolating Iran regionally.

Within this context, the Iranian-Armenian railway line from Meghri, Armenia’s Syunik province, could have been an alternative route connecting Iran to Russia, but it suffers from high costs and has not seen any progress since 2009.

Armenia’s poor infrastructure, its conflict over Nagorno-Karabakh with Azerbaijan, and its slow progress in the construction of the North-South highway (over the past twelve years, it has implemented only five percent of the 556-kilometer highway connecting Georgia with Iran) has further isolated and slowed down Armenia’s participation in the regional economic project.

Armenia’s gateway to Asia

However, over the past four months, Iran and India have been pushing Armenia to take crucial steps to reinvigorate the north-south transport project. As a result, important meetings between Iranian and Armenian officials have been organized to address trade, transit, and energy issues.

On 2 March, leading a high-ranking delegation of trade officials and private entrepreneurs, Iranian Minister of Industry, Mining, and Trade, Reza Fatemi-Amin paid a visit to Armenia as part of Tehran’s efforts to strengthen trade ties with its neighbors.

This was the first visit to Armenia by senior Iranian officials since President Ebrahim Raisi took office in August 2021. Accompanying the delegation were the CEOs of 35 Iranian private companies.

The Iranian side stated that Tehran attaches great importance not only to the development of economic relations with Armenia but also considers it as a “gateway” to the markets of Russia and other Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU) member countries.

For the rail connection, Miad Salehi, head of the Islamic Republic of Iran Railways, pointed to three possibilities for rail transit between Iran and Armenia. The first two rail connections are:

• The Jolfa-Nakhchivan-Yerevan.
• The Jolfa-Nurduz (in Iran) and Yerevan-Nurduz (in Armenia) railroads, which were agreed upon seven years ago though not realized.

Iran has also proposed a multi-modal transit route from Yerevan to Jolfa by road, and then southward to the port of Bandar Abbas by rail, essentially opening the gates of Asian markets for Armenia.

Iran hasn’t been pushed out of the South Caucasus  

After the trilateral statement in 2020, Iran felt isolated from the South Caucasus, though its absence did not last long. Following the election of President Raisi, Tehran adopted a proactive balanced foreign policy in its neighborhood to secure its primary geo-economic interests.

The Iranians have realized that the Zangezur Corridor poses a threat to their national security as it bypasses Iranian territory and prevents Iran from gaining transit fees from Azerbaijani trucks. But it also threatens to reshape the strategic international borders between Iran and Armenia to the benefit of Turkey, Azerbaijan, and by extension, their mutual ally, Israel.

Tehran recognizes that were Azerbaijan to succeed in imposing the Zangzur Corridor on Yerevan, Baku could connect to Turkey, Israel, and the European Union by land. Crucially, Iran also interprets this as an expanding presence of Israel and NATO on its borders.

During his Caucasian tour this month, Iran’s national security chief, Rear Admiral Ali Shamkhani, held talks in Yerevan with his Armenian counterpart and Prime Minister Pashinyan, where he stressed that Tehran was against any actions leading to a geopolitical change in the region.

Rather than accepting a lesser role, Iran has successfully deployed its economic soft power to recalibrate the field and increase its leverage over Azerbaijan. On one hand, Tehran fostered the construction of a railway with Azerbaijan to connect with Russia; on the other hand, it strengthened its trade, energy, and communication projects with Baku’s archenemy, Armenia.

For now, though, Iran’s engagement with Azerbaijan over the alternative corridor has lifted the military and political pressure on Armenia, thus preventing another war near its northern borders.

Iran’s dialogue with both countries has – for now – arguably lifted Azerbaijan’s military and political pressure on Armenia, safeguarded its national interests, and prevented another war near its northern borders.

The views expressed in this article do not necessarily reflect those of The Cradle.

موسكو تقترب من إعلان النصر وواشنطن تتقهقر الى النقب…!

 الأربعاء 30 آذار 2022

محمد صادق الحسيني

تتسارع الخطى باتجاه إنجاز المهمة الروسية الخاصة في مسرح العمليات في أوكرانيا، بعد نجاح العملية استراتيجياً منذ عبور أول دبابة روسية الحدود باتجاه الدونباس او حوض الدون.

ومن يتابع بدقة كياسة موقف الرئيس الروسي وهو يلاعب مخلب الأطلسيين المراوغ المدعو أردوغان، الذي لم يتغيّر ولن يتغيّر في لعب دور الخادم الإقليمي الأمين لمصالح الأميركان وباعتباره حارس مرمى الناتو الجنوبي، يستطيع القطع بأنّ التخطيط للعملية كان محكماً.

 منذ الأيام الأولى للعملية العسكرية وهو مكلف بدور «الوساطة» بين ما تبقى من سلطات كييف لدى مالكها الأطلسي وبين موسكو التي تتقدّم بخطى ثابتة لإنجاز المهمة حسب الخطة المرسومة.

ولأنّ الأميركي المهزوم على كلّ البوابات المقاومة وعلى أسوار عواصمنا، يتوقع تسارع حركة النهضة الفلسطينية العربية على مشارف شهر رمضان المبارك، وما المؤشرات الخطيرة التي ظهرت من بئر السبع والخضيرة لعمليات نوعية فريدة من نوعها ولم يتبناها أحد إلا «مقبّلات» رمضان وما بعده كما يقول الراسخون في العلم، ولأنّ مفاوضات فيينا جوبهت بالصلابة الإيرانية المتوقعة، ولأنّ اقتحام أسد الشام عرينهم في لحظة ارتباك أميركي صهيوني شديد، فإنّ إدارة بايدن المضطربة والفاقدة للبوصلة والتي عمل اتجاه الرياح العالمية على غير إرادتها، فإنها باتت مضطرة للاعتراف قريباً بالهزيمة في أوكرانيا، من أجل الانتقال الى نسخة صيدلانية جديدة لها في كلّ من فلسطين وآسيا الوسطى والقوقاز.

لذلك هرولت الى فلسطين وهي تنسحب من أوكرانيا متقهقرة، محاولة الظهور بمظهر المنتصر لصالح اليهودي المرتعد خوفاً هذه المرة من الضفة المتراكمة غضباً ومن أراض الـ ٤٨ المتزايدة ثورة، بالإضافة الى غزة بسيفها المسلول، ولبنان المدجّج بالأسلحة الدقيقة والكاسرة للتوازن، فكان أن أشهرت مشروعها المزعوم والذي ستروّج له كثيراً:

«ناتو عربي ضدّ إيران»، وإظهاره وكأنه لحماية الأمن القومي العربي من الاجتياح الإيراني، خاصة إذا ما اضطرت للرضوخ لمطالب طهران بالتوقيع على اتفاق فيينا متجدّد…

فيما هي تقصد «تدافُع المهزومين أمام المقاومة الصاعدة»،

وما اختيارها لبئر السبع مكاناً للمتهالكين، إلا دلالة على ما نقول.

في هذه الأثناء، ولأنها تخاف سقوط العرش الأردني ومديرية رام الله الفلسطينية، بسبب خِسة اليهود وأطماعهم التي لا تجد لها حدوداً، فإنها مضطرة أيضاً لإعادة شدّ العصب في هاتين القوتين من النظام العربي الرسمي المتهافت خوفاً من ثورة قومية عربية تتدافع شرارتها من الداخل الفلسطيني ومن كلّ من سورية والعراق مع مظلة إيرانية دافعة للتغيير في حال قيام الثورة العربية على غرار ما حصل بعد العام ١٩٦٧ في عمّان يوم تجمّعت عوامل النهضة العربية وتبلورت معركة الكرامة الشهيرة .

 من جهة أخرى وهي تقاتل قتالاً تراجعياً وتنسحب القهقرى من أوكرانيا، ستحاول أيضاً تفجير آسيا الوسطى والقوقاز من جديد، موكلة الأمر لحارسها الأمين أردوغان ليتولى إثارة الاضطرابات في كلّ من اذربيجان التي بدأت تخاف واشنطن من قيادته التي بدأت تميل لموسكو ولطهران رويداً رويداً، ومن ثم في اوزباكستان وقرغيزستان وتركمانستان وسائر دول المنطقة على شاكلة ما فعلته في كازاخستان من قبل، في محاولة لخلق «نواتاة» ثورات ملوّنة جديدة، تعويضاً عن فشلها السابق هناك، وتشغيلاً لذراعها الجنوبي الطوراني المترنح في أنقرة لعلّ ذلك يضبط دقات ساعته على توقيت تل أبيب أكثر فأكثر.

من هنا يمكن تلخيص الموقف العام لما يجري من تداعيات هزيمة الأطلسي في أوكرانيا، بأنّ أولى ارتداداته ستكون في منطقتنا بنضوج أجواء انتفاضة فلسطينية، وتحوّل عربي قومي لصالح قوى الممانعة والمقاومة والتغيير، وتلاحم هاتين القضيتين بقصة التحوّل الكبير التي ترتعد منه الرياض وتتجنّب تحمّل أكلافه واشنطن لوحدها، ألا وهو الانتصار اليمني الكبير، وهو ما يمكن ان يشكل بمثابة الضربة القاصمة لاستراتيجية واشنطن في القتال بالوكالة، ايّ خسارة الكيانين السعودي والإماراتي ومعهما في الطريق طغمة المنامة، وهي خسارة ستكون هذه المرة أقوى من خسارتها لألوية جيوشها المسماة بداعش والنصرة في بلاد الشام والرافدين .

من الآن الى ذلك الحين، دعونا نتابع بصمات بوتين في صناعة العالم الجديد من خاصرة روسيا الصغرى أو ما بات يُعرف حديثاً بأوكرانيا!

بعدنا طيبين قولوا الله…

فيديوات متعلقة

مقالات متعلقة

• فلسطين تُحيي يوم الأرض: عمليّة ثالثة و11 قتيلاً في 8 أيام… وكل التطبيع لن يجلب أمناً / أوكرانيا تقدّم عرضاً تفاوضياً بإيعاز أوروبيّ مرفق بطلب تمديد مهلة معادلة الروبل والغاز / الملاحقة الدوليّة لسلامة تُحرج القضاء والسياسة… وميقاتي يفشل بمحاولة «التعويم عبر الثقة» /
• مقتل خمسة إسرائيليين في عملية فدائية بتل أبيب
• مسؤولون أمنيّون إسرائيليّون: «الشاباك» فاشل!
• أجهزة أمن العدو تستعد لتصعيد الأوضاع في فلسطين المحتلة
• مادّة «تجميلية» للسلطة… وفرصة لخصومها: نتائج الانتخابات المحلّية في الميزان
• دول عربية طلبت شراء منظومات صاروخية من “إسرائيل”
• نعم ليكن الشعار الانتخابي منع تغيير هوية لبنان الوطنية المقاوِمة
• المشاط: العام الثامن للحرب سيكون مليئاً بالمفاجآت إذا لم يعقل الأعداء
• اليمن… أيّ معادلة ستفرضها ظروف الحرب!؟

Israeli espionage network foiled by Iranian intelligence

Iranian intelligence announced the busting of a spy network on the same day as the IRGC launched retaliatory strikes on a Mossad base in Erbil, Iraq

March 13 2022

ByNews Desk

Iran has foiled a cyber espionage network linked to the Israeli Mossad in the northwestern province of Iranian Azerbaijan, Iranian intelligence announced on 13 March.

This announcement comes on the same day that the IRGC launched more than 10 ballistic missiles at a Mossad base in Erbil, Iraq in retaliation for the murder of two IRGC officers in Syria by the Israeli Air Force (IAF) a few days prior.

The Israeli espionage network was attempting to carry out acts of sabotage in Iran, according to the Director General of Intelligence for the West Azerbaijan region.

Iranian officials have warned about Israeli-linked spy activity in the Azerbaijan region, but that the situation is closely monitored and fully under control.

Border Guard Commander Ahmed Ali Goudarzi has stated that despite the situation in the northwest being safe, Iran has warned its neighbors about Israeli spy rings and the presence of takfiri militant groups on the borders of the northwest.

Iran has also warned the state of Azerbaijan about their relationship with Israel, with Iranian Foreign Minister Hossein Amir Abdollahian stressing that such a relationship between Baku and Tel Aviv offers no benefit to Azerbaijan and that Iran will not tolerate Israeli presence on its borders.

The dismantling of an Israeli spy network and the retaliatory strike against a Mossad base in Erbil demonstrates Iran’s seriousness towards the presence of Israeli activity within its own borders and in neighboring countries.

Al Mayadeen reported that the Iranian missile strike on the Mossad base in Erbil led to the deaths of four Israeli officers and the injury of seven, with four of those in critical condition.

Israeli forces were on high alert for several days after Iran vowed revenge for the death of two IRGC officers in Syria, unsure of where or when the retaliation would take place.

Related Videos

مواطن الضعف الغربيّ في المواجهة في أوكرانيا

 العميد د. أمين محمد حطيط

عندما خسر الغرب حربه الكونية على سورية وعجز عن تفكيكها لإعادة تركيبها بما يناسب المشروع الصهيوأميركي الذي يخدم نظرية الأحادية القطبية العالمية بقيادة أميركا، اتجه الى اعتماد استراتيجية بديلة تقضي بإطالة أمد الصراع في سورية لمنعها من استثمار إنجازاتها والحؤول دون عودتها الى حياتها الطبيعية من غير مسّ بوحدة أراضيها وسيادتها التامة عليها، وتوجيه ضربة استراتيجية كبرى لروسيا لمنعها من استثمار الإنجاز في سورية وحرمانها من موقعها في العلاقات الدولية والحؤول دون اكتمال ظروف تشكل نظام عالمي جديد قائم على التعددية في الأقطاب والتحالفات والتفاهمات والمجموعات الدولية الاستراتيجية.

لقد انصرف الغرب منذ العام 2019 ـ تاريخ تأكد هزيمته في سورية الى وضع الخطط الهادفة لتحقيق ما يريد في الميدان الشرق أوسطي وعلى الحدود مع روسيا لمحاصرتها ثم إسقاطها وشطبها من المعادلة الدولية وكانت استراتيجية الاحتواء والتطويق هي المسلك المفتوح أمام الغرب بقيادة أميركية لتحقيق الغرض، ولهذا كانت عملية أذربيجان ضدّ أرمينيا حليفة روسيا وكان مشروع الثورة الملونة في كازاخستان ضدّ النظام الموالي لموسكو والمنتظم معها في منظمة الأمن الجماعي، ثم كانت السلوكيات الأخطر والأدهى من حيث الاستفزاز والاستدراج في أوكرانيا التي تحوّلت بشكل واضح الى رأس رمح في الخاصرة لا بل في القلب الروسي.

فهمت روسيا مبكراً وعميقاً ما يخطط لها وقرأت جيداً أهداف الغرب بقيادة أميركية ضدّها ولم تهمل العبارات الغربية التي تتضمّن علانية او ضمناً مفهوم العداء الغربي لروسيا سواء في ذلك على صعيد الناتو أو على صعيد دول الغرب الكبرى التي جاهرت بأنّ «روسيا عدو»، لكنها التزمت في الردّ أقصى درجات ضبط النفس وابتلاع المشاعر السلبية مع الاستمرار في تطوير العلاقات الاقتصادية التي فيها مصالح للطرفين بشكل متبادل وشبه متوازن لا بل فيها أرجحية لصالح روسيا. لكنها في الوقت ذاته اتجهت الى بناء المجموعة الاستراتيجية الدولية التي تتقاطع مع أطرافها في السعي لإقامة التوازن الدولي والنظام التعددي على أنقاض النظام العالمي الأحادي الذي تعمل أميركا لإرسائه وتثبيته، فكان التطوير الهامّ للعلاقة مع الصين وايران وإقامة المثلث الاستراتيجي المناهض للهيمنة والسيطرة الغربية على العالم المثلث الذي شكل إنجازاً استراتيجياً للدول الثلاث أرفدته روسيا بإنجازها في أذربيجان وكازاخستان حيث أفشلت مهمة تطويقها من الجنوب والجنوب الغربي وراكمت به انتصاراتها الى جانب محور المقاومة في سورية.

بيد انّ الغرب بقيادة أميركية وبوقوفه على ما تقدّم، شعر باختلال في المشهد الدولي والاستراتيجي لصالح روسيا وحلفائها وقرّر جرّ روسيا الى ميدان يستنزفها فيه لسنوات تنتهي بشطب روسيا من المعادلة الدولية، ولما كان الطوق الأميركي كسر في أذربيجان وكازاخستان، وانّ الميدان السوري مهما تعاظم أمره لا يشكل مدخلاً كافياً لإدارة حرب استنزاف ضدّ روسيا حتى ولو نجح الأمر في ان تكون العمليات فيه كافية لاستنزاف سورية وفقاً للتقدير الغربي فقد وقع الاختيار على أوكرانيا لتكون ميدان الاستنزاف القاتل لروسيا، استنزاف تنفذه قوى عسكرية وشبه عسكرية وميليشيات وجماعات إرهابية لا تتضمّن مباشرة في صفوفها قطعات من الجيوش النظامية الغربية المنضوية او غير المنضوية في الـناتو، استنزاف تخدمه وتواكبه حرب شاملة يشنها الغرب على روسيا من كلّ الأبواب السياسية والاقتصادية والفكرية والاجتماعية والرياضية، حرب تشمل كلّ شيء باستثناء العمل العسكري القتالي المباشر الذي تقوم به الجيوش النظامية.

لقد رأى الغرب في ساحة المعركة في أوكرانيا منفذه الأخير لتعويض ما فاته او ما خسره او تعذر عليه تحقيقه في مواجهة أعدائه في العقود الثلاثة الماضية، وخاصة في العقد الأخير الذي تبلورت فيه أكثر وجوه خسائر الغرب وتقدّم خصومه، ولذلك كانت أميركا ملحة ومُصرّة على تفجير الوضع بوجه روسيا واستدراجها الى الميدان الأوكراني، حتى أنها وصلت الى درجة وضع الخطط التنفيذية لاجتياح إقليم الدونباس وشبه جزيرة القرم التي ضمّتها روسيا اليها قبل ٨ سنوات وصولاً الى الاستعداد للتحرّش بروسيا داخل أراضيها.

في مواجهة الإصرار الغربي قرّرت روسيا الدفاع لثني الغرب عن خطته بكلّ السبل، بدءاً بالتمسك باتفاقيتي مينسك ١ و ٢ اللتين تضمنان أمن السكان في إقليم دونباس، ثم بتحشيد ١٠٠ ألف عسكري على الحدود لإظهار القوة وحمل الخصم على التراجع، ثم كشف أسرار السلوكيات الغربية العدائية ضدّ روسيا والسكان من أصل روسي، إلا أنّ كلّ ذلك لم ينجح في ثني الغرب عن خطته العدائية وإصراره على جرّ روسيا الى حرب استنزاف وتدمير شاملة، حيث اضطرت روسيا إليها في نهاية المطاف فحرّكت قواتها غرباً تحت عنوان «عملية عسكرية خاصة» لحماية الأمن القومي الروسي وأمن الأشخاص الروس عبر الحدود،

والآن وبعد أسبوعين من انطلاق العملية التي ظنّ الغرب في البدء وبخاصة أميركا انه نجح في استدراج موسكو اليها، وانّ الفخ أطبق على الدب الروسي وفقاً لما يشتهي الغرب، بعد أسبوعين من العمليات العسكرية يتبيّن للغرب سوء تقديره ويكتشف انّ الفخ المزعوم لا فعالية له بالشكل المرتجى، لا بل انّ الآثار السلبية للمواجهة القائمة تطال الغرب عامة وأوروبا خاصة بأضرار تفوق ما كانوا يتوقعون إنزاله بروسيا، وتنكشف مواطن الضعف الغربي في أكثر من عنوان نذكر منها:

أولاً: خشية الناتو بقيادة أميركا من المواجهة العسكرية المباشرة مع الجيش الروسي ما حمل الناتو على تجنب التدخل المباشر والإعلان صباح مساء انّ أوكرانيا ليست جزءاً من الناتو الذي هو «حلف دفاعي لا يبادر الى هجوم» بزعمهم، وهم في الحقيقة يخشون مواجهة القوة النووية الثانية في العالم، وكان للإنذار الروسي بعد تجهيز قوات الردع الاستراتيجي أثره الكافي في هذا المجال،

ثانياً: الارتداد السلبي للحرب الاقتصادية علي الغرب وخاصة أوروبا في مجال الطاقة وظهور وهن الاقتصاد الأوروبي المعتمد علي الغاز والنفط الروسي ما جعل الحرب الاقتصادية ذات مفعول بالغ التأثير على أوروبا ما ينذر بسقوط الاقتصاد الأوروبي لا بل بتدميره في بضعة شهور لا تتعدّى الستة ان لم يوجد حلّ لأزمة الطاقة ولا يبدو انّ في الأفق حلاً.

ثالثاً العجز عن تنظيم مقاومة وطنية أوكرانية فاعلة والاضطرار الى الاستعانة بمرتزقة الخارج ما سيحول البوابة الشرقية لأوروبا ومن أوكرانيا بالذات الى مجمع للإرهاب العالمي ما سيرتدّ أيضاً على الامن الأوربي بوجهيه القومي والفردي وينعكس سلباً على دورة الحياة الاقتصادية والاجتماعية بشكل خاص.

رابعاً: تفلت روسيا من مكامن استهدافها بحرب الاستنزاف، ما يجعل الغرب يتحمّل من أعباء هذه الحرب مع طول المدة فوق ما يتحمّله المستهدف خاصة أننا نسجل لروسيا تعاملها الذكي مع الموضوع كما يلي:

ـ اعتمادها استراتيجية الضغط المتدرّج الصاعد بدل استراتيجية السيطرة والاحتلال،

ـ استعمالها قدراً لا يتجاوز ١/١٣ من مجمل قدراتها العسكرية بحيث تغدو العمليات العسكرية في أوكرانيا بمثابة مناورات بسيطة تسطيع القيادة إبدال القوى فيها شهرياً او مرة في الشهرين.

ـ تجنب الدخول الكثيف الى المدن وخوض حرب الشوارع.

ـ تجنب الانتشار والانفلاش العسكري الواسع الذي يتيح للإرهاب فرص الاستهداف السهل.

ـ الأداء الإنساني الراقي مع السكان المدنيين وتجنّب المسّ بهم ما يقلبهم الى خانة العداء.

ـ الاعتماد المكثف علي أسلحة عالية الدقة في تدمير الأهداف العسكرية والاستراتيجية دون المسّ بالسكان والتقيّد المتقن بقاعدة التناسب والضرورة المعتمدة في القانون الدولي الإنساني.

ـ وأخيراً عدم العمل تحت ضغط الوقت لا بل استعمال المناورة المتقلبة بين الشدة والاسترخاء وفتح الممرات الإنسانية لتحييد السكان وخدمة لاستراتيجية الضغط.

لكلّ ما تقدّم نستطيع القول بأنّ روسيا عرفت متى تطلق عمليتها لتجعلها عملاً عسكرياً استباقياً في معرض الدفاع وعرفت كيف تتملص من فخاخ العدو وعرفت كيف تناور في الميدان وعلى المسرح الاستراتيجي العام، وبالتالي عرفت كيف تستعمل أوراقها لتكتب نصرها بقدم ثابتة ونفس واثقة بقدراتها.

*أستاذ جامعي ـ باحث استراتيجي

فيديوات متعلقة

مقالات متعلقة

• وزيرة فرنسية: لا نستطيع الاستغناء عن الغاز الروسي
• موسكو تخوض معركة حياة أو موت
• لقاء أنطاليا لا يحمل خرقاً: موسكو في «معركة حياة أو موت»
• فشل مفاوضات أنطاليا بين لافروف وكوليبا… وتقدّم روسيّ كبير في محيط كييف / الحكومة الروسيّة لقرارات تغيّر طبيعة النظام الاقتصاديّ والماليّ 
• واشنطن: بيونغ يانغ اختبرت أكبر منظومة صواريخ باليستية عابرة للقارات
• موسكو وكييف تبديان استعدادهما للتعاون مع «الطاقة الذرية»
• رئيس الوزراء المجريّ: الاتحاد الأوروبي لن يفرض عقوبات على الغاز أو النفط الروسي

قبل تدخلها في أوكرانيا.. كيف واجهت موسكو تطويق واشنطن والناتو لحدودها؟

2022 السبت 25 شباط

المصدر: الميادين.نت

بتول رحال 

العملية العسكرية الروسية في أوكرانيا ليست الأولى من نوعها. فقبل ذلك، قامت موسكو بالتدخل في بلدانٍ مجاورة لها، ضد وجود الولايات المتحدة والناتو وتأثيرهما فيها.

لا تتوانى روسيا عن حماية حدودها ومجالها الحيوي أمام أي مخاطر تواجهها

“هل يجب علينا أن ننظر، مكتوفي الأيدي وغير مبالين، إلى مختلف النزاعات الداخلية في بعض الدول، وإلى فظائع الأنظمة الاستبدادية والطغاة وانتشار أسلحة الدمار الشامل؟ هل نستطيع النظر مكتوفي الأيدي إلى ما يجري؟ سأحاول الإجابة عن هذا السؤال، بالطبع، لا ينبغي لنا النظر مكتوفي الأيدي”. 

(الرئيس الروسي فلاديمير بوتين في مؤتمر ميونيخ، في الـ10 من شباط/فبراير 2007)

تضمّن هذا الخطاب الشهير للرئيس الروسي، فلاديمير بوتين، آنذاك، انتقاداتٍ لاذعةً للولايات المتّحدة، ودول الغرب، وخصوصاً دول حلف شمال الأطلسي، التي “تسعى لتمدد الحلف نحو حدود روسيا، على الرغم من الوعود التي قدّمها الناتو سابقاً إلى موسكو”، وفق بوتين.

بمقارنة خطاب بوتين قبل 15 عاماً، مع خطابه الذي ألقاه قبيل بدء العملية العسكرية الروسية في دونباس، والذّي أكّد خلاله أنّ المواجهة بين روسيا والقوى القومية المتطرفة في أوكرانيا “لا مفر منها”، وأنّه “لن يسمح لأوكرانيا بامتلاك أسلحة نووية”، نرى أنّ روسيا ما زالت متمسكّةً بموقفها في مواجهة أي تهديدٍ أو تأثيرٍ للولايات المتحدة وحلف الناتو، وخصوصاً في البلدان الواقعة عند حدودها، ولاسيما أنّ هذه ليست المرّة الأولى التي تتدخّل فيها موسكو، أمنياً أو سياسياً، في بلدان مجاورة لها، في وقت لم تتراجع واشنطن ودول الناتو أيضاً عن تطويق روسيا.  

التدخل العسكري الروسي في جورجيا

في السابع من آب/أغسطس 2008، اندلع نزاعٌ مسلّح في جمهورية أوسيتيا الجنوبية، المعترف بها جزئياً في جنوبي القوقاز، وذلك بعد أن شنّت جورجيا هجوماً عنيفاً على عاصمة أوسيتيا الجنوبية، تسخينفالي، وحاولت فرض السيطرة على الجمهورية باعتبارها جزءاً من أراضيها.

بعدها بيومٍ واحد، في الثامن من آب/أغسطس، أعلن الرئيس الروسي آنذاك، ديمتري مدفيديف، إطلاق “عملية عسكرية لتطبيق السلام” في منطقة النزاع – في أوسيتيا وأبخازيا على البحر الأسود -، اختُتمت في الـ12 من آب/أغسطس، بطرد القوات الجورجية من أراضي أوسيتيا الجنوبية وجمهورية أبخازيا، المعترف بها جزئياً أيضاً، وسيطرة الجيش الروسي على عدد من البلدات والمدن الجورجية، وأيضاً باعتراف موسكو بهما دولتين مستقلتين. 

حينذاك، تعهّد الرئيس الروسي، ديمتري مدفيديف، “احترام حياة المواطنين الروس وكرامتهم أينما وُجدوا”، إذ إنّ أوسيتيا وأبخازيا، يتكلّم معظم السكان فيهما الروسية، ويحملون جواز سفرٍ روسياً. بعد ذلك، قام مدفيديف، في الـ16 من آب/أغسطس، مع رئيسي أوسيتيا الجنوبية وأبخازيا والرئيس الجورجي، ميخائيل ساكاشفيلي، بالتوقيع على خطة لتسوية النزاع.

وبشأن سبب قيام جورجيا بهذه الخطوة ضدّ أوسيتيا الجنوبية، أوضح فلاديمير بوتين، الذي كان رئيساً للوزراء آنذاك، أن “مستشارين عسكريين أميركيين شاركوا في الصراع الذي اندلع في جورجيا”، مشيراً إلى أنّ “روسيا وجدت علامات على أن مواطنيين أميركيين كانوا في منطقة العمليات العسكرية في البلاد”.

يُشار إلى أنّ هذه الأحداث اندلعت بعد أشهرٍ قليلة من تعهّد حلف “الناتو” رسمياً، في قمة  بوخارست، في نيسان/أبريل 2008، منحَ كل من جورجيا وأوكرانيا العضوية فيه، عندما “تتوافقان مع معايير الحلف”.

استعادة روسيا شبه جزيرة القرم

بعد أحداث جورجيا بعدة أعوام، أُطيح الرئيس الأوكراني، الحليف لروسيا، فيكتور يانوكوفيتش، في الـ21 من شباط/فبراير 2014، عقب موجة احتجاجات شهدتها العاصمة كييف، عُرفت بحركة “الميدان الأوروبي”، بسبب تعليق الأخير التوقيع على اتفاقية شراكة تجارية مع الاتحاد الأوروبي.

إلا أنّ هناك مَن رفض هذه التحركات ووصفها بـ”الانقلاب”، وبدأت احتجاجات في المناطق الشرقية والجنوبية من أوكرانيا، طلباً لعلاقات أوثق بروسيا، بينما تعدَّدت التظاهرات في شبه جزيرة القرم من أجل فكّ الارتباط بأوكرانيا والالتحاق بالاتحاد الروسي.

لم تغضّ روسيا الطرف عن طلب مواطني القرم، بل سارعت إلى تنفيذه، لتعلن انضمام الإقليم إلى أراضيها في الـ18 من آذار/مارس بعد أن قامت قوات موالية لها بالسيطرة على شبه الجزيرة، وعقب استفتاء أجرته القرم، أيّد 96% من المشاركين فيه هذا الانضمام.

روسيا تدعم لوكاشينكو في احتجاجات عام 2020

أمّا في بيلاروسيا، فقامت روسيا بدعم الرئيس البيلاروسي ألكسندر لوكاشنكو، في مواجهته  للاحتجاجات غير المسبوقة، التي نددت بإعادة انتخابه  في التاسع من آب/أغسطس 2020، وذلك عن طريق إقرارها بشرعية الانتخابات الرئاسية في البلاد، مبديةًً استعدادها لتقديم المساعدة العسكرية أو غيرها من المساعدات لتطبيق القانون، على لسان رئيسها فلاديمير بوتين.  

وذكرت صحيفة “نيويورك تايمز”، في تقرير تعليقاً على كلام الرئيس الروسي، أن تحذير بوتين من أن روسيا يمكن أن تتدخل لاستعادة النظام، يشير إلى “الدعم الكامل للوكاشينكو بقدر أقل من إرساله رسالة إلى الغرب، مفادها: إذا واصلتَ الضغط على بيلاروسيا، فسيكون لديك أوكرانيا أخرى بين يديك”.

حينها، اتهم لوكاشينكو الدول الغربية بالتدخل المباشر في الوضع في البلاد. أمّا وزير الدفاع الروسي، سيرغي شويغو، فوصف الاحتجاجات التي شهدتها البلاد بـ “الثورة الملوَّنة” التي تقدّم الولايات المتحدة مساعدةً تقنية إليها، عبر تأجيج التوترات، مؤكّداً أنّه كان للثورة الملونة عدة أهداف، من بينها “تعطيل تكامل دولة الاتحاد مع روسيا، وتخريب العلاقات بين موسكو ومينسك”.

يُذكَر أن تلك الاحتجاجات حدثت في وقت كان حلف شمال الأطلسي يعمل على تحسين بنيته التحتية العسكرية، وتخزين المواد والوسائل التقنية والأسلحة والمعدات العسكرية بالقرب من حدود الاتحاد الروسي. 

إدخال قوات حفظ السلام الروسية لكازاخستان

على الخطى نفسها، سارت روسيا في كازاخستان، التي شهدت في مطلع العام الحالي موجة احتجاجات بدأت بمطالب اقتصادية، تحولت إلى اشتباكات عنيفة بين المتظاهرين وقوات الأمن في عدد من المدن، بينها ألما آتا كبرى مدن البلاد. 

قامت موسكو، مع تصاعد الاحتجاجات في كازاخستان، بإدخال قوات حفظ السلام الروسية، العاملة ضمن مهمة منظمة معاهدة الأمن الجماعي، للبلاد، تلبيةً لطلبٍ من الرئيس الكازاخي، جومارت توكاييف، من أجل تنفيذ المهمات الموكلة إليها بشأن حماية المنشآت الحيوية والبنية التحتية الرئيسة هناك.

وخرجت قوات حفظ السلام الروسية بعدها بأسبوع عقب انتهاء مهماتها، وإعلان السلطات إنهاء عملية “مكافحة الإرهاب” في ألما آتا ومنطقتين في جنوبي البلاد، الأمر الذي وصفه توكاييف بأنّه “نجاة من عملية انقلاب”.

وتبيّن بعد ذلك أنّ “المظاهرات في كازاخستان مُعَدّة مسبقاً لزعزعة استقرار الوضع في البلاد، وأن منظّميها تلقوا دعماً من الخارج”، وفق رئيس اللجنة التنفيذية لرابطة الدول المستقلة، سيرغي ليبيديف. وهو ما تدخّلت روسيا ودول منظمة الأمن الجماعي، بحسب بوتين، من أجل إيقافه. 

وبحسب الرئيس البيلاروسي، ألكسندر لوكاشنكو، فإنّ التدخّل حدث لأنّه “لا يمكن التخلي عن كازاخستان كهدية، مثل أوكرانيا، إلى أميركا وحلف شمال الأطلسي”.

اتّخذت روسيا، منذ زمن، قرار مواجهة الأحادية الأميركية، ووضعٍ حدّ لتوسّع الناتو، وهي من أجل ذلك لا تتوانى عن حماية حدودها ومجالها الحيوي أمام أي مخاطر تواجهها، إن كان من خلال تشكيل التحالفات العسكرية والسياسية، مثل معاهدة الأمن الجماعي، أو توقيع المعاهدات الأمنية مع جيرانها من الدول، مثل الاتفاقية التي تمّ الإعلان عنها مؤخراً بين روسيا وأذربيجان، أو من خلال العمليات العسكرية كالتي تحدث الآن في أوكرانيا، وحدثت سابقاً في عدد من الدول. 

فيديوات متعلقة

مقالات متعلقة

• أوكرانيا وحيدةً: نريد التفاوض
• الصدمة الروسية آتت مفعولها: أوكرانيا تعرض التفاوض
• موسكو تتطلّع إلى ما بعد الحرب: نحو إحياء مشروع «نوفوروسيا»؟
• واشنطن تفرض عقوبات على بوتين ولافروف… وموسكو «تسخر»
• الأسعار إلى ارتفاع: نفط وقمح وذرة وزيوت
• بولندا ورومانيا تفتحان حدودهما أمام اللبنانيين في أوكرانيا
• «الغرب» يحرم الروس من سيّاراته
• روسيا: نحاول منع حرب شاملة.. وبوتين: لا ننوي الإضرار بالنظام العالمي