Yemeni Ansarullah’s and Oman’s envoys will head to Saudi Arabia on Thursday night to try to negotiate a permanent ceasefire with Saudi officials to end the war on Yemen, two people involved in the talks said.
Ansarullah officials will travel to Riyadh with the Omani mediators, who landed in Sanaa on Thursday, the sources said.
The Saudi government and an Ansarullah spokesman did not immediately respond to requests for comment.
The trip will be the first official visit by Ansarullah officials to the Kingdom since the war on Yemen started in 2015.
The first round of the Oman-mediated consultations between Riyadh and Sanaa, which are running in parallel to UN peace efforts, was held in April when Saudi envoys visited Sanaa.
The war on Yemen has killed hundreds of thousands and left 80 percent of Yemen’s population dependent on humanitarian aid.
The Omani plane is expected to fly from Sanaa to Riyadh on Thursday night, the people said.
Sources speaking on condition of anonymity have told Reuters that the Saudi talks with Ansarullah are focused on a full reopening of ports and Sanaa airport, payment of wages for public servants from oil revenues, rebuilding efforts, and a timeline for foreign forces to quit Yemen.
The peace initiatives have gained momentum since Saudi Arabia and Iran agreed to re-establish ties in a deal brokered by China. A permanent ceasefire in Yemen would mark a milestone in stabilizing the Middle East.
The BRICS revealed its geopolitical priorities when it added three Persian Gulf states to its once exclusive roster of members. Iran, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE have been strategically included to put an end to the petrodollar.
The leitmotif of the BRICS Summit meeting in Johannesburg on 22-24 August has been, expectedly, the expansion of the group to include six more member states. While this itself is a stand-alone event, in reality, it dovetails nicely into the group’s core agenda of global multipolarity and the creation of a fairer international trade and finance architecture that is crucial to economic growth.
The Johannesburg II Declaration adopted at the end of the summit modestly mentions toward the very end of the document that the addition of six more members stemmed out of a “consensus on the guiding principles, standards, criteria and procedures of the BRICS expansion process.”
However, the list of six countries – Argentina, Egypt, Ethiopia, Iran, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE – also gives away some other important clues. For starters, this BRICS consensus is anchored in a profound Russian-Chinese understanding. Also, the BRICS is declaring itself to be a non-western grouping. There is no question that BRICS ascribes the highest importance to Africa and the Persian Gulf region, with Egypt and Ethiopia, the two ancient civilization-states, as the “lynchpin.”
Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov later disclosed that the “consensus” was reached through some “lively discussions” and some serious considerations:
“The weight, prominence and importance of the candidates and their international standing were the primary factors for us. It is our shared view that we must recruit like-minded countries into our ranks that believe in a multipolar world order and the need for more democracy and justice in international relations. We need those who champion a bigger role for the Global South in global governance. Six countries whose accession was announced today fully meet these criteria.”
The BRICS expansion process was thought to be very controversial, but the unity of the group held nicely. The mother of all surprises has been India’s shift to a proactive role, belying all western predictions. This creates a new ambiance for the India-China relationship, as President Xi Jinping and Prime Minister Narendra Modi indeed broke the ice.
With so much focus on West Asia and Africa, Brazil may have seemed like an outlier, but Argentina’s inclusion calmed Brazil’s sense of unease; China sought Ethiopia’s inclusion; Russia wanted Egypt’s inclusion. India, too was gratified that it enjoys historically friendly and close relations with all six newcomers.
Credit for this may need to go to Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov, whose diplomatic skill and sheer perseverance put together the algorithm behind the BRICS expansion.
Lavrov has visited Pretoria no less than four times after Russia’s special military operations [SMO] began in February last year. To be sure, the Kremlin’s hearts and minds machine was steaming ahead: South Africa hosted a joint military exercise with Russia on the first anniversary of the SMO, and President Cyril Ramaphosa visited Moscow twice this year. Simply put, he held President Vladimir Putin’s hands as Russia asserted its “non-isolation.” The BRICS summit’s outcome bears testimony to it.
Unravelling of the petrodollar
But what truly stands out in the BRICS expansion is the preponderance of member states from the Persian Gulf region — Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Iran.
So, what has been the game plan in bringing on board three of the world’s most important energy superpowers? Putin has voiced more than once the Russian assessment that for a long time to come, the world economy, including the western economies, cannot do without hydrocarbons as a major source of energy to run efficient, cost-effective means of production.
Russia and Saudi Arabia alone account for a quarter of the world’s oil production. Russia and Iran hold the world’s first and second-largest gas reserves in the world.
If the Ukraine war has shown anything, it is that countries rich in commodities cannot be browbeaten. The issue here is about the willingness and space that these resource-rich states enjoyed to exercise their strategic autonomy. The Cold War era didn’t allow for any space. But the co-relation of forces has dramatically changed, especially as the post-Cold War “unipolar moment” has vanished.
Saudi Arabia and the UAE exemplify this best. Having been close US allies for decades, they are now diversifying their external relations, including with China and Russia, whom Washington regards as sworn enemies. Iran, too, under the burden of extreme US and EU sanctions, today boasts a strategic partnership with both Moscow and Beijing.
The salience here is that these three oil-producing countries are also open to trading oil in non-dollar currencies. What the US did to Russia last year by seizing its hundreds of billions of dollar reserves sent shock waves all across the so-called petrodollar states of the Persian Gulf and beyond.
Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov expressed satisfaction a few weeks ago that the process of de-dollarization in the global economy “is going relentlessly. The use of national currencies has already become a reality now, a reality growing at a global scale. Not merely countries facing sanction restrictions but also the ones not facing them are resorting to this practice – they understand the benefits of this regime in the foreign economic [activity].”
In fact, in July, “non-sanctioned” India and the UAE signed an agreement to settle trade in rupees instead of dollars, boosting India’s efforts to cut transaction costs by eliminating dollar conversions. One needs only to know that India-UAE bilateral trade last year was a whopping $84.5 billion. The first transactions between the two countries under the new agreement, including in oil and gold, have already commenced.
All indications are that the possible creation of a single BRICS currency figured in the discussions in Johannesburg. Putin made a reference to it in his media statement, saying: “I believe that a single settlement currency definitely deserves our attention. This is a complex issue, but we have to move towards resolving it in one way or another.”
There is every likelihood that this complex discussion will advance through the next two BRICS summits in 2024 and 2025 under the presidency of Russia and Brazil, respectively, two member states that are supportive of the idea of a common currency.
In sum, with the induction of the three major oil-producing nations of the Persian Gulf, BRICS 2023 will mark the beginning of the petrodollar’s unraveling. This is a huge step toward a multipolar world. The new settlement mechanisms, common currency, et al, will steadily dethrone the dollar, liberating the world economy from the clutches of the US Federal Reserve.
Fortifying the Global South
The rationale behind the induction of the three West Asian oil states — along with Egypt and Ethiopia — can also be assessed in terms of the imperatives of regional connectivity with the African continent, which Russia and China regard as being on the cusp of a historic economic transformation. By 2050, manufacturing spending alone is projected to reach $1 trillion in Africa, offering tremendous opportunities for global businesses.
But effective intra-African integration will be critical to the continent’s economic transformation. Russia hopes to connect the Persian Gulf region to the International North–South Transport Corridor, a 7,200-km-long multi-mode network of ship, rail, and road route for moving freight, and extend it further beyond to the African market.
Moscow is discussing with Cairo the establishment of a special economic zone in the vicinity of the Suez Canal. Saudi Arabia is expanding a sweeping railway network connecting the north and south. A string of new ports is being planned along the Saudi and Emirati coastline.
In the final analysis, the big question is whether what took place in Johannesburg is the expansion of BRICS as a “stand-alone” event. Certainly, the overnight appearance of six important states under its canopy – who will assume full BRICS membership from 1 January, 2024 – short-circuited all procedural, protracted procedures as is customary in the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) or the European Union.
The sense of urgency is palpable. No questions asked; no interrogation ensued; no compliance report expected from the new hand-picked member states. The countries, each a regional power with its own credentials, simply walked into a red carpet welcome.
To be sure, much confabulation and quiet discussions between Russia and China paved the way. Russians are superb in distinguishing tactics from strategy, and in this case, they happen to blend with the world order that Moscow has been espousing.
Taken together with the profound reform of trade and payments that is already in the works, what is happening is no less than the replacement of the international trading system that has been governed exclusively by the west for the past few centuries with the objective of transferring wealth from the rest of the world to their manicured “garden.” Unless the collective west shows the sagacity to adjust to new realities, weeds may soon start taking over its “garden” and turn it into a jungle. Europe’s economic recovery is going to be challenging.
Turbulent times ahead
In sum, the historical significance of the BRICS expansion needs to be weighed in the following terms: First, Iran and two erstwhile US regional allies, Saudi Arabia and the UAE, get much-needed space to negotiate an equal relationship with Washington based on mutual respect and benefit. Make no mistake, they are in a mood to capitalize on it.
Second, the western dominance of West Asia is ending, in a historical sense, heralding a profound shift in the regional order. The process that China kickstarted – with quiet Russian support from behind the curtain – in mediating the Saudi-Iranian reconciliation will now advance toward its logical conclusion sooner rather than later.
This means that the west’s colonial mindset of “divide and rule” will have no takers anymore among regional states. Thus, what happened in Johannesburg would be consequential for Israel and Turkey as well.
Finally, most importantly, the de-dollarization process, which would have moved at a snail’s pace, will now accelerate. What Putin had warned when the Biden administration imposed the “sanctions from hell” against Russia — especially its ouster from the SWIFT payment system —namely, that there would be a very heavy price to pay by the United States, is coming true. The blowback is only beginning in the international financial and trading system.
The west simply cannot win in the looming confrontation with the Global Majority. And the transition can be addressed by Washington only through reconciliation with Moscow and Beijing, not an easy poison for the Americans to swallow.
That will have to begin with an end to the proxy war against Russia in Ukraine and a retreat or abandonment of the attempt to fuel tensions with China over Taiwan. On the other hand, any change of course in the US strategy away from its belligerent militarized policies will have long-term implications for the entire US-led western alliance system, while in the short term, impacting President Joe Biden’s re-election campaign, too. The humiliating defeat in the Ukraine war cannot be covered up any longer.
The times ahead will be turbulent as the old, self-centered, hegemonic western mindset won’t surrender easily. As for the entrenched interest groups in the US and Europe, their basic instinct will be to manufacture delaying tactics to stall the march of history. But it won’t work if BRICS stays the course.
The views expressed in this article do not necessarily reflect those of The Cradle.
ISIS attacks in Syria and Iraq have declined by 68 percent and 80 percent respectively, per the US military’s own admission. So why is Washington sending, with no legal basis, an additional 6,000 troops into a region that doesn’t want them there?
In a significant move that sent worrying ripples across West Asia, the US military has discreetly dispatched over 6,000 troops to the region, igniting tensions and triggering debates on regional stability. While the surge of forces into the Red Sea to counter Iran’s actions in the Persian Gulf has garnered attention, the deployment of a substantial US military presence into Iraq and Syria has largely gone under the radar.
On 7 August, a formidable contingent of over 3,000 US sailors and marines entered the Red Sea aboard two imposing warships. This maneuver has been widely interpreted as a response by the US Navy to the alleged seizure of approximately 20 internationally-flagged ships by Iran in the Persian Gulf over the past couple of years.
While the Islamic Republic claims to have seized the tankers under legitimate security grounds and accuses the US of breeding further instability with its troop deployment. Washington maintains that the move will work “to deter destabilizing activity and de-escalate regional tension.”
Weeks before, with much less fanfare, the US military also readied some 2,500 light-infantry troops for deployment to Iraq and Syria in mid-July. According to a report from a local New York media outlet, these soldiers, hailing from the 10th Mountain Division’s 2nd Brigade Combat Team, embarked on their mission after departing from the Fort Drum military base. Their mission, spanning nine months, is to actively engage in Operation Inherent Resolve (OIR), the ongoing US-led anti-ISIS operation across both Iraq and Syria.
Uncertain troop surge
US President Joe Biden’s administration has said that the US-led combat mission inside Iraq was supposed to have officially ended in December of 2021. In July of that same year, Baghdad and Washington agreed to a plan under which all US combat forces were to be withdrawn from the country by the end of the year. Despite this, combat units continue to be rotated into the country.
Officially, the stated number of US service members currently operating in Iraq is 2,500; there is an unknown number of mercenaries who work for private military contractors. Although it is unclear what proportion of the 2,500 were headed to Iraq and Syria respectively, there is a clear increase in troop presence in both West Asian states.
There have been allegations, initially surfacing in the Turkish newspaper Yeni Shafak, that the US will be deploying some 2,500 troops into north-eastern Syria in order to bolster the position of their local partners, the Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF).
As of yet, there has been no confirmation of such a large troop surge, which would constitute a colossal leap from the publicly-stated 900 US troops acknowledged to be illegally occupying Syrian territory.
The Iran-Russia-Syria axis
The Washington-based Institute for the Study of War recently published a report on an alleged Iranian-Russian-Syrian plan to force the US out of the country altogether, claiming that “this campaign poses a serious risk to US forces in Syria and US interests in the Middle East (West Asia).”
It is public knowledge that the US bolstered its forces inside Syria back in March, when it dispatched a squadron of A-10 attack aircraft following a series of lethal strikes against their forces. Washington has complained several times this year about the conduct of Russian fighter pilots in Syrian airspace, while doubling down on its legally groundless claim that US forces have the right to self-defense in sovereign states thousands of miles away. Despite these violations of international law, the US administration has made clear it has no intention of withdrawing from West Asia.
Underpinning the US’s occupation of a significant portion of Syrian territory and its troop presence in Iraq is OIR. Framed within the legal framework of the 1991 and 2002 Authorizations for Use of Military Force (AUMF), which previously served as the basis for the 2003 invasion of Iraq, OIR ostensibly targets ISIS.
However, Baghdad has repeatedly called for the withdrawal of US forces, most recently on 15 August, with Prime Minister Mohammed Shia al-Sudani stating that Iraq “no longer needs the presence of foreign combat forces on its soil.”
The 2023 justification for OIR also cites an Iraqi government request dating back to 2014 when ISIS was cutting a swathe through the country’s north. However, this reasoning sidesteps the Iraqi parliament’s 2020 vote demanding full US troop withdrawal, coupled with widespread street protests echoing the same call.
Beyond ISIS: OIR’s broader strategy
Drawing from data shared by the Combined Joint Task Force (CJTF) Commander Major-General Matthew McFarlane, there has been a remarkable decline in ISIS attacks. According to McFarlane, between January and April, there had been “a record of a 68 percent reduction in [ISIS] attacks when compared to the same period last year” inside Syria.
In Iraq, there has been an 80 percent decrease in ISIS attacks this year when compared with 2022. As the number of ISIS militant attacks are decreasing exponentially, it would make no sense for the US to increase its troop presence inside Iraq and Syria, unless it was for motives beyond the scope of OIR.
If the recent naval deployment to the Red Sea was openly retaliation for Iran’s naval activities in the Persian Gulf, then it would make sense that perceived Iranian threats to US interests in Iraq and Syria could merit a similar troop deployment increase.
Earlier this year, the current Pentagon Chief, Lloyd Austin, made a surprise visit to Baghdad, where he declared that US forces will remain inside Iraq and indicated that this decision is in line with the ongoing fight against ISIS.
Senior officials within the Biden administration, including Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (DASD) for the Middle East Dana Stroul, have explicitly discussed the need to counter Tehran’s influence in the region. This discourse intertwines with the broader context of OIR, raising suspicions that the operation serves as both a legal pretext and a veiled strategy to contest Iranian and Russian presence in the region.
Exploiting issues in the Gulf
To provide context, it is essential to revisit some recent events in northeastern Syria. Following clashes between the Syrian Arab Army (SAA), its allies, and US forces, the USS George H.W. Bush, an American aircraft carrier, was repositioned closer to Syria.
This move, explained Deputy Pentagon Press Secretary Sabrina Singh, was due to “increased attacks from [Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC)]-affiliated groups targeting our service members across Syria.”
In the Persian Gulf, tensions between Iran and the UAE over the ownership of the Abu Musa islands have provided an opportunity for the US to leverage divisions among neighboring states. While the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) and Russia advocate for dialogue, Iran maintains its stance on the islands’ non-negotiability. The IRGC’s naval maneuvers have further accentuated the potential for escalating tensions, as the US seeks to exploit discord between Iran and its neighbors.
On the Syrian front, there have also been indications that the al-Qaeda linked militant group, Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), which controls much of the Idlib province, may have signed a deal to unite themselves with the US-backed SDF that helps occupy north-eastern Syria.
According to Syrian opposition media outlet Syria TV, the US was supportive of the idea of an HTS-SDF union. If this is true, it could indicate that Washington is seeking to unite the three fronts that oppose the government in Damascus: the al-Tanf mercenaries, the SDF in north-eastern Syria, and HTS in Idlib.
US agenda in West Asia
There are now grounds for questioning the US claim that it is only operating 900 troops in Syria and 2,500 inside Iraq, especially with its new troop deployments. Moreover, by Washington’s own admission, the fight against ISIS has significantly decreased in scope.
This then begs the question, what is the legality of the recent US troop surge into West Asia, which is increasingly shaping up to be a force to confront Iran and Russia? If Washington’s real target is Tehran and Moscow, does the US government have any legal justification for its stationing of military personnel inside Iraq and Syria, placing US troops at risk over conflicts that have no congressional or popular domestic approval?
In order to counter an emerging multipolar order and its impact on West Asia, it appears that Washington’s agenda is now set on doubling down on its pre-existing regional objectives. With the advent of the Chinese-brokered rapprochement between Saudi Arabia and Iran, the heat has been on the US government to accomplish what the Biden administration views as a crowning achievement in the region: Israeli-Saudi normalization.
Short of this, to maintain the dominance of the collective west over the region, the immediate hurdle is overcoming the influences of Iran and Russia. This is why the occupation of roughly a third of Syrian territory by the US and its proxies, along with the imposition of deadly sanctions on Damascus, has become crucial in undermining the strength of its adversaries.
By keeping Syria divided and weakening the government of President Bashar al-Assad, the US is able to prevent the restoration of the Syrian state that now falls firmly under the Russian and Iranian spheres of influence.
Moreover, the recent tentative agreement between Washington and Tehran, which aimed to unlock billions in frozen Iranian assets in exchange for the release of five American prisoners, holds the potential to pave a path toward the revival of discussions to reinstate the 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA).
While the US’s ability to secure a renewed nuclear deal with the Islamic Republic could hypothetically create a conducive environment for Saudi-Israeli normalization, the looming specter of a potential Republican victory in the 2024 US elections may cast uncertainty over this prospect.
The use of sanctions, along with hostile intelligence measures and the deployment of troops closer to the Persian Gulf, all signal a US intent to prevent a further diminishment of their role in the region. In the wake of the Ukraine conflict, the White House’s capacity to exert its once-dominant presence in West Asia has encountered challenges, potentially prompting the current assertive stance by the US.
The views expressed in this article do not necessarily reflect those of The Cradle.
Saudi FM Faisal bin Farhan (L) and Iranian counterpart Hossein Amir Abdollahian (R).
In an interview with Qatar-based Al Jazeera network’s Arabic service on Wednesday, Jasem Mohamed al-Budaiwi, the secretary-general of the Persian Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), lauded the normalization of relations between Iran and Saudi Arabia, highlighting its positive impact on regional stability.
Budaiwi expressed the GCC’s willingness to engage in profound discussions with the Islamic Republic.
According to him, the entire Persian Gulf region has warmly welcomed the normalization process between Saudi Arabia and Iran, recognizing the potential of improved Riyadh-Tehran ties to bolster the region’s stability. The GCC’s secretary-general emphasized their readiness to conduct substantive talks with Iran, adhering to international conventions.
Addressing the pressing economic challenges faced by Arab countries in the Persian Gulf, Budaiwi regarded the economic issue as the “most significant and crucial challenge” for the coastal states. He mentioned ongoing efforts to foster economic integration, driven by a resolute determination among Persian Gulf leaders to achieve this goal.
On March 10, after a series of intensive negotiations facilitated by China, Iran and Saudi Arabia reached an agreement to restore diplomatic ties and reopen embassies, ending a seven-year period of severed relations. In a joint statement following the agreement, both nations emphasized the importance of respecting each other’s national sovereignty and refraining from interfering in internal affairs.
Saudi FM Faisal bin Farhan (L) shaking hand with Iranian counterpart Hossein AMir Abdollahian (R) after a landmark meeting in Beijing (April 6, 2023).
The agreement also called for the implementation of a security cooperation pact signed in April 2001 and another accord from May 1998, aimed at enhancing cooperation in economic, commercial, investment, technical, scientific, cultural, sports, and youth affairs.
A momentous development occurred on April 6 when Iranian Foreign Minister Hossein Amir-Abdollahian met with his Saudi counterpart, Prince Faisal bin Farhan Al Saud, marking the first such meeting in seven years. The ministers underscored the necessity of implementing the China-brokered agreement.
The restoration of diplomatic relations between Iran and Saudi Arabia marks a significant step towards fostering stability in the Persian Gulf region. The GCC’s commitment to holding profound talks with Iran reinforces the prospects of constructive dialogue and cooperation in the future, as the littoral states work collectively to address economic challenges and promote integration within the region.
In this Wednesday, Nov. 27, 2019, photo released by the Ministry of Presidential Affairs, Abu Dhabi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Zayed Al Nahyan, right, meets Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman in Abu Dhabi, United Arab Emirates. (AP)
The once close officials, MBS and MBZ, are head to head, competing over who has more influence and presence in the region.
Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman (MBS) convened a small group of local media in Riyadh for a rare off-the-record briefing in December and delivered a shocking message, according to the Wall Street Journal. During the meeting, MbS said that the UAE, Saudi Arabia’s longtime ally, had “stabbed us in the back,” he claimed. “They will see what I can do,” he told the group, according to people at the meeting.
A rift has developed between MBS and his former mentor, UAE President Sheikh Mohamed bin Zayed Al Nahyan (MBZ), reflecting the struggle for geopolitical and economic clout in the Middle East and global oil markets. That said, the two royals are now feuding over who calls the shots in a Middle East where the US is playing a deteriorating role, according to WSJ.
US officials are concerned that the Gulf competition will make it more difficult to form a coherent security alliance to confront Iran, end the eight-year war on Yemen, and expand Israeli normalization agreements with Arab nations. That said, the rivalry that the US was so determined to orchestrate took a wrong turn, and the latest developments are definitely not in its favor.
“These are two highly ambitious people who want to be key players in the region and the go-to players,” a senior Biden administration official said, adding that “On some level, they still collaborate. Now, neither seems comfortable with the other being on the same pedestal. On balance, it’s not helpful to us for them to be at each other’s throats.”
According to close sources, as per the WSJ, the once-close MBS and MBZ haven’t spoken in more than six months, people close to them said, and their private disputes have spilled out into the open. On that note, the UAE and Saudi Arabia have competing interests in Yemen, undermining efforts to reach a peace agreement in the country, while Emirati resentment of Saudi pressure to boost the global price of oil is causing new schisms in the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC).
Economic competitors
The UAE and KSA are both increasingly economic competitors.
In an effort to end the KSA’s economic reliance on oil, MBS is pushing companies to move their regional headquarters to Riyadh, the capital of Saudi Arabia, from UAE’s Dubai, which has become a tourist hub for Westerners.
He’s also initiating plans to establish digital hubs, attract more visitors, and build logistical hubs to contest the UAE’s status as the Middle East’s commercial powerhouse, according to the WSJ. MBS announced in March the establishment of a second national airline to compete with Dubai’s highly regarded Emirates.
In terms of soft power, the Saudi purchase of Newcastle United, England’s soccer club, in 2021, and investment in worldwide superstar players occurred at the same time as Manchester City, controlled by a senior member of Abu Dhabi’s ruling family, won the English and European soccer titles.
The Saudi rapprochement, deal with Iran
A UAE official, speaking for the government, said claims of strained relations were “categorically false and lack foundation,” and a Saudi official called the idea “simply not accurate.”
As mentioned in the WSJ report, the Saudi official added that “The UAE is a close regional partner of Saudi Arabia, and our policies converge on a wide range of issues of mutual interest,” adding that the two countries work together with other Gulf neighbors on political, security, and economic coordination.
The UAE official said their “strategic partnership is based on the same objectives and vision for regional prosperity, security, and stability.”
During his meeting with local media outlets, the Saudi leader stated that he had issued a list of requests to the UAE, according to the sources in the UAE, adding that MBS warned that if the smaller Gulf nation did not comply, Saudi Arabia was prepared to take harsh measures, similar to what it did against Qatar in 2017 when Riyadh broke diplomatic relations with it for more than three years and imposed an economic blockade with the support of Abu Dhabi. MBS warned, according to sources who were present, “It will be worse than what I did with Qatar.”
MBS’ step toward diplomacy, away from MBZ
Since the meeting in December, MBS took a step towards diplomacy and ended the political isolation imposed on him after the killing of journalist Jamal Khashoggi in 2018. He turned to China for assistance in mending Saudi Arabia’s relations with Iran and then coordinated Syria’s return to the Arab League, a process that the UAE had begun several years before, according to the WSJ.
MBS is also in talks with the US about formally recognizing “Israel,” which the UAE did in 2020. Moreover, the Crown Prince is also leading diplomatic efforts to quash violence in Sudan, where the UAE backs the opposing side.
MBZ privately criticized the Saudi ruler for his actions, accusing him of undermining ties between the two nations, critically pointing out MBS’ relationship with Russia and its oil policies and “risky moves,” in reference to the deal with Iran.
That said, the Emirati official skipped an Arab summit MBS called for, and also the Arab League’s vote in May to allow Syria back into the circle. On the other hand, MBS himself was absent when MBZ met with Arab leaders at a hastily arranged regional summit in the UAE in January.
“Tensions are rising between them, in part because MBS wants to step out from under MBZ’s shadow,” said Dina Esfandiary, a senior advisor at the International Crisis Group’s Middle East and North Africa Program, adding that “Things are going to get worse because both countries are getting more confident and assertive in their foreign policy.”
A deteriorating alliance
The Saudis and Emiratis have considered themselves the closest of allies, yet their relationship has been strained even before the United Arab Emirates achieved independence from Britain in 1971.
Sheikh Zayed al Nahyan, the UAE’s founding father, resented Saudi dominance of the Arabian peninsula, and then-Saudi King Faisal refused to acknowledge his Persian Gulf neighbor for years, seeking leverage in several territorial conflicts. The United Arab Emirates canceled plans for a unified Gulf central bank in 2009 due to its proposed site in Riyadh. There are still territorial conflicts between the two countries over oil-rich terrain.
With the simultaneous rise of MBZ and MBS, the two countries grew closer. When MBZ’s half-brother, President Sheikh Khalifa bin Zayed, had a crippling stroke in 2014, the Emirati monarch became de facto ruler of his country at the age of 54. When MBS’s father, King Salman, took power in 2015, MBZ began mentoring the young Saudi prince, who was just 29 years old at the time.
According to WSJ, the two men had never met before an overnight camping expedition in the vast Saudi desert. Sources that were present revealed that the outing was accompanied by trained falcons and a small entourage; the outing—roughly equal in Gulf tradition to a round of presidential golf—was a watershed moment in their friendship.
MBS sought advice from MBZ and employed some of the same banks and consultants that the Emiratis used for a similar strategy a decade earlier while developing a plan to change and open up his country. On that note, MBS and MBZ formed a foreign-policy alliance that launched the war on Yemen, assisted Egypt’s Abdel Fattah Al Sisi in a coup, armed Libyan militants in the country’s divided east, and boycotted Qatar.
OPEC competition, dispute
The schism erupted last October when OPEC agreed to cut output, surprising the Biden administration. The UAE agreed to the decrease but privately told US officials and the media that Saudi Arabia had forced them to do so, according to the WSJ.
The dynamic highlighted an ongoing dispute between Saudis and Emiratis over OPEC policy, which Riyadh has long dominated as the world’s top petroleum exporter, WSJ wrote, adding that the Emiratis have increased their oil-production capacity to more than four million barrels per day, with aspirations to exceed five million, but are only allowed to pump roughly three million under OPEC regulation, costing the country hundreds of billions of dollars in lost revenue.
On a more crucial point, the Emirati increase in oil production capacity presents the potential ability to move output up and down and with it global oil prices. Until recently, only Saudi Arabia wielded that sort of market power. Disagreements between the two officials are threatening to derail continuing negotiations to end the war on Yemen, which pits the Saudis, Emiratis, and a variety of Yemeni factions against the Yemeni Armed Forces.
The UAE signed a security agreement with the Saudi-backed Yemeni presidential leadership council in December, granting Abu Dhabi the authority to interfere in Yemen and the waters off its coast. Officials in Saudi Arabia saw it as a challenge to their Yemen strategy. In turn, Saudi Arabia had intentions to construct a pipeline that spreads from the kingdom to the Arabian Sea, through the Yemeni province of Hadramout. However, the plans were jeopardized by UAE-backed forces.
Biden could lose ambitions in Gulf
The rivalry between Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates has irritated the Biden administration, which wants friendly Gulf capitals like Riyadh and Abu Dhabi to help build a united front against Iran. On critical issues such as Ukraine and China, neither MBS nor MBZ is completely aligned with Washington.
On that note, in reference to the obvious new political dynamics in the region, US authorities are growing concerned about MBZ’s outreach to Beijing and Moscow, which, like MBS, has strengthened connections with them.
Biden and MBS
Biden took office promising to treat the kingdom as a pariah state in the aftermath of the Khashoggi assassination, which MBS has stated he did not order. Instead, in July 2022, Biden visited Saudi Arabia, helping to end his isolation.
Companies in the United States who were previously unwilling to engage with the kingdom are now reconsidering. This desire is anticipated to grow as a year-end deadline approaches for companies with Saudi government contracts to establish a base in Riyadh rather than flying in from Dubai.
The WSJ explains that according to those familiar with the case, the Biden administration arranged a meeting on May 7 between MBS and the Emirati president’s younger brother, Sheikh Tahnoun bin Zayed, who was once seen as a confidant of the Saudi crown prince. Tahnoun had been frozen out, making at least six trips to the kingdom without gaining a meeting with MBS until he received assistance from the US, according to the sources.
With regard to decisions concerning Yemen, MBS told his advisors “I don’t trust them anymore,” before telling them to keep policies as is.
Chinese President Xi Jinping next to Saudi Crown Prince and Prime Minister Mohammed bin Salman in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia on December 8, 2022 (Saudi Press Agency/AP)
The increasing economic growth opportunities between China and the Middle East pose a great threat to the US and its influence in the region in the coming decades.
After Chinese leader Xi Jinping visited Saudi Arabia in December to meet Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman, and later brokered a diplomatic breakthrough between Saudi Arabia and Iran, political flourishment was in its bloom state and so were business deals between China and the Middle East.
According to a report by The Wall Street Journal, state-owned oil giant Saudi Aramco intends to invest $3.6 billion in Hangzhou-based Rongsheng Petrochemical. Deals have also been signed such as a $5.6 billion investment into a joint venture with Human Horizons, a Chinese electric-vehicle company. An Abu Dhabi government-backed entity has bought a share valued at more than $730 million in NIO, another Chinese EV maker.
Following these deals, at the Arab-China Business Conference in Riyadh back in June, the head of Hong Kong’s stock exchange forecasted that the Middle East’s largest sovereign-wealth funds’ investments in China could amount to between $1 trillion and $2 trillion by 2030.
The increasing economic growth between China and the Middle East poses a great threat to the US as it attempts to control the oil-rich region in the coming decades. Chinese investment into the Middle East, or Saudi Arabia namely, is producing even more opportunities for ally-forming and political doorways.
It is worth mentioning that the Middle East has served as a better replacement or opportunity for Chinese firms cut off by the US.
Real-life examples
Nicolas Aguzin, the head of the Hong Kong stock exchange, stated that the sovereign-wealth funds only invest 1% to 2% of their assets in China currently, but believes that this will develop 10-fold.
Ethan Chan, chairman of Hong Kong-based asset manager ARTE Capital Group, said: “First, the relationship between the U.S. and the Gulf Cooperation Council has regressed, so they’re investing less into the U.S.,” adding: “Second, their allocation to China isn’t high enough.”
One sovereign-wealth fund that Chan works with is in the United Arab Emirates and invests around 7% of its entire stock in Chinese assets, which is a fifth of what it invests in the US. Chan expressed that doubling investments in China won’t be a problem.
Hong Kong-based artificial intelligence company blacklisted by the US, SenseTime, signed deals in Saudi Arabia this year in an effort to develop digital tourism and smart-city projects in the country.
Abu Dhabi’s sovereign-wealth fund Mubadala has been investing in Chinese artificial intelligence company 4Paradigm since 2021, according to S&P Global Market Intelligence. This March, the US added the company to its export control list.
More than networking
Chinese telecom mogul Huawei Technologies was at the forefront of the US-China tech battle around five years ago following accusations of violating sanctions on Iran, which sparked an effort by Canada to extradite the company’s CFO.
However, Huawei has been thriving in the Middle East, in addition to helping the UAE build the first 5G network in the Gulf region, per Jiawei Liu, the company’s chief executive in the UAE. The company has also signed agreements with Saudi Arabia’s state-owned telecoms company.
Hong Kong’s chief executive, John Lee, headed a delegation to Saudi Arabia in February and persuaded Aramco to sell shares on Hong Kong’s stock exchange.
Nonprofit government entity Dubai Chambers is launching an office in Hong Kong after setting one up in the neighboring mainland city of Shenzhen. It stated that it intends to expand Dubai’s presence in Asia and help Hong Kong companies learn more about Dubai and network there.
In an interview with the South China Morning Post, Saudi Minister of Communications and Information Technology Abdullah Al-Swaha said that Saudi Arabia intends to strengthen its engagement with Hong Kong, utilizing the city as a bridge to mainland China to stimulate its transformation under the Vision 2030 economic plan.
HR. 3099 was Introduced in the House of Representatives on May 5, 2023. This bill, known as the “Special Envoy for the Abraham Accords Act,” is the latest act by the United States in the service of Israel.
This bill establishes the position of Special Envoy for the Abraham Accords within the Department of State. For anyone who does not remember, the Abraham Accords are agreements to normalize relations between Israel and Arab states that do not recognize Israel. It is an anti-Palestinian accord more than anything. It should be named “a bill to guarantee that governments who go against the wishes of their people and are willing to turn their backs to the plight of the Palestinian people will be rewarded.”
The first four members of the Arab League to sign this accord were the United Arab Emirates, Bahrain, Morocco, and Sudan. The initial signing took place in the White House during the Trump administration, and it should be noted that President Trump and Prime Minister Netanyahu were the only heads of state present. The other countries sent their foreign ministers, ostensibly so as not to be seen signing this disgraceful agreement. It is worth noting that there was extensive widespread opposition to normalizing relations with Israel in all countries that signed the accords.
A US AMBASSADOR IN THE SERVICE OF ISRAEL
According to the bill’s text, the Special Envoy, who shall have the rank and status of ambassador, shall serve as the primary advisor to the U.S. government for expanding and strengthening the Abraham Accords. The duties of the Special Envoy include:
• Encouraging countries without diplomatic relations with Israel to establish formal diplomatic, economic, security, and people-to-people ties; • Expanding and strengthening existing relationships between Israel and Muslim-majority countries; and • Coordinating efforts across the U.S. government and engaging diplomatically with foreign governments, nongovernmental organizations, and other stakeholders to expand and strengthen the Abraham Accords.
The language in the bill demands that we ask why in the world is the U.S. government engaged in serving the interests of Israel so blatantly. Indeed, the U.S. will be selling arms to these countries, but a larger picture here is not being discussed, at least not enough. You have to hand it to Israel and even more to the Israeli lobby here in the U.S.: They got a superpower to work as Israel’s sales agent and pay for it. American taxpayers will now be paying additional millions of dollars to solicit – or rather bully – countries who have not yet established relations with Israel to do so. Is this the best use of American taxpayer dollars? Does this serve Americans in any way? The answer to both questions is “No!”
IMPORTANT NEWS
Needless to say, this bill was reported by the Israel press as another step in advancing the good relations between Israel and the United States. The Times of Israel reported that “the US House of Representatives overwhelmingly passed legislation mandating the Biden administration to appoint a special envoy for the Abraham Accords. The special envoy will encourage additional countries to follow the lead of the United Arab Emirates, Bahrain and Morocco, which normalized relations with Israel in 2020.”
If there was any doubt regarding the role the Anti-Palestinian, pro-apartheid lobby, AIPAC, played in passing this bill, Representative Ritchie Tores ensured it was set aside. In a tweet, Congressman 703748 thanked AIPAC for its role in passing the bill. He further said that the future belongs to peace and love, not BDS. In other words, the anti-Palestinian bill pushed down the throat of Americans by the Apartheid defending genocide supporting AIPAC will lead to a future of love and roses.
In contrast, the Palestinian call for freedom and justice is equivalent to a hate-filled future. Once again, anti-peace anti-Palestinian legislation is poorly masked with good intentions.
According to the Times of Israel piece, during his announcement of the administration’s decision to establish the new position, Secretary of State Anthony Blinken said, “Israel’s further integration in the region contributes to a more stable, a more secure and more prosperous region. That’s why President Biden has made it a cornerstone of his Middle East policy.”
“We will soon create a new position to further our diplomacy and engagement with governments and private sector, nongovernmental organizations, all working toward a more peaceful and a more connected region,” he added.
THE SAUDI CARD
Those who had expectations that the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia would join the accords suffered a blow when instead of opening an embassy in Tel-Aviv, Riadh reopened its embassy in Tehran. For Israel and especially for Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, having Saudi Arabia capitulate and sign the Abraham Accords would be the greatest of rewards. According to a piece in the Jerusalem Post quoting one of the sponsors of the Bill, Representative Mike Lawler, Republican of New York, “The addition of a special envoy will be critical for bringing Saudi Arabia into the accords.”
The warming of the relations between Riyadh and Teheran was ostensibly a result of Chinese intervention. At the same time, the U.S. was busy with more important things, like passing anti-Palestinian legislation. Now Israel has got President Biden nominating and paying for a full-fledged ambassador to try to bring Saudi Arabia back to fold, as it were.
The question is, of course, what is in it for the Saudis? Apparently, they want nuclear power plants, which Israel and the U.S. will never allow, but Teheran might be able to help them develop. Israel is seriously undermining the Arab and Muslim custodianship of the Holy Basin, which includes the Al-Aqsa Mosque, in a manner so egregious that the Saudis can no longer ignore it.
Still, one must not lose hope because Congress passed a bill, and President Biden will nominate an envoy. So, for now, the legislative and the executive branches are following the marching order of every Palestinian-hating, apartheid-loving, warmongering, racist lobby working for Israel. The two branches of the United States government are in sync as they serve Israel.
Israeli media suggest that the Saudi decision could be a response to the Israeli occupation escalation in the occupied West Bank this week.
Israeli media reported on Friday a “diplomatic embarrassment” in the French capital, Paris, after Saudi Arabia prevented two Israeli diplomats from entering an event attended by Saudi Crown Prince Mohammad bin Salman (MBS).
According to the Israeli news website Walla!, two Israeli occupation Foreign Ministry officials who were invited to the welcome event held by MBS as part of the presentation of Saudi Arabia’s candidacy to host the Expo 2030 conference discovered that their names had been removed from the list of invitees at the last minute and were not allowed to enter it, as per senior officials at the Israeli Foreign Ministry.
The Israeli website suggested that the Saudi decision to prevent the Israeli diplomats’ entry, even though they were officially invited a few days earlier, could be a response by Riyadh to the Israeli occupation government’s policy on the Palestinian issue and the escalation in the occupied West Bank this week.
It also added that the incident, even if it is only symbolic, indicates that the Saudis are still very sensitive to any gesture of normalization with the Israeli occupation.
This comes as French President Emmanuel Macron received on Friday MBS at the Elysee Palace on the sidelines of a two-day climate summit and the two sides exchanged views on international and regional developments.
Macron and MBS confirmed their joint adherence to security and stability in the Middle and Near East and expressed their intention to continue their joint efforts for a permanent de-escalation of tensions.
Paris also expressed its willingness to keep pace with Riyadh in strengthening its defense capabilities, and Macron reminded of the intention of French companies to continue to keep pace with Saudi Arabia in implementing its 2030 Vision.
At the end of the summit attended by some 40 leaders, Macron hailed a “complete consensus” to reform global financial institutions and make them “more efficient, fairer and better suited to the world of today.”
“We must start working now,” Macron said, announcing that Paris will host a follow-up meeting two years later on this “consensus” for better financial weapons to combat poverty and global warming.
The summit indicated that the nearly 80-year-old financial system is no longer suitable for facing 21st-century challenges.
In a speech, leftist Brazilian President Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva slammed international institutions, saying, “With this mechanism, the rich are always rich and the poor are always poor.”
The Palestinian resistance movement of Hamas’s politburo chief has affirmed that Israel is “living in its worst situation” ever, enumerating the reasons for the unprecedented decline in the Zionist entity’s status.
Ismail Haniyeh made the remarks in an exclusive interview with Iran’s English-language Press TV news network on Thursday, following a set of meetings with senior Iranian authorities, including Leader of the Islamic Revolution Ayatollah Seyyed Ali Khamenei.
He referred to the meetings as “fruitful,” noting, “There was a chance to talk in detail about all files…, particularly the Palestinian case and developments and our project against the Zionist enemy.”
The resistance leader went on to cite three indications of the uniquely dire situation that was being experienced by the occupying entity.
Firstly, he pointed to the “division” that had manifested itself within the Israeli society” that was giving rise to thousands-strong protests against Tel Aviv across the occupied territories every week, noting how some of the Israeli leaders had even come to warn about a “domestic war.”
“We didn’t use to hear such things from the Israelis.”
Secondly, Israel had come to be surrounded by resistance movements, ranging from the Gaza Strip to the holy occupied city of al-Quds to the 1948-present Israeli-occupied territories.
“The third one, there are concerns from the Israeli society about the future. There are polls inside Israel about national security. Sixty percent of the Israelis are concerned about their future. They cannot adapt themselves to the strategic challenges inside Israel.”
Five-day war on Gaza
Elsewhere in his remarks, Haniyeh offered a detailed account of how Gaza’s resistance factions managed to stage a united and successful response to Israel’s five-day-long war on the Gaza Strip in May, which ended in a humiliating defeat for Tel Aviv.
“The common room for operations, which includes all the Palestinian groups, had a meeting…to reply to this crime…There was coordination between Ezzedine al-Qassam Brigades and al-Quds Brigades,” he said, referring to the Gaza-based resistance factions’ armed wings.
“We in the Hamas movement, offered everything in order to achieve victory against our enemy. We provided all the infrastructures we have in our possession…we put everything at the disposal of our brothers in the Islamic Jihad,” he added.
“The resistance managed to defeat the enemy, and affirmed that the blood of the [resistance] leaders would not go to waste, and this enemy will pay all the price for its crimes, particularly when they assassinate the leaders of the resistance either in Jenin or in Gaza or in the West Bank.”
Israel dare not cross Gaza, Lebanon borders
The Hamas official recalled how Israel used to occupy Gaza until 2005 and used to be at the heart of Beirut in 1982.
“But today, the Israeli army cannot cross the Lebanese borders. The Israelis withdrew in 2005 after five wars against the Gaza Strip. But now, they cannot take any decision for any ground assault against Palestinians. It would be very costly for them,” he stated.
“When in 2014, the Israelis decided to go inside Gaza for maybe 1,000 meters or more than that, 72 soldiers of them were killed,” noted the Palestinian official.
“Israel doesn’t have the upper hand anymore. Even all their maneuvers are defensive, and not meant to reprise any attack against us,” he said, adding, “They are doing their best to see if they can confront any attack from the resistance.”
Meeting with Leader
Describing the contents of his meeting with Ayatollah Khamenei, Haniyeh said he concurred with the Leader’s description of the Gaza Strip as the “fortress of resistance.”
“This description is very precise today. Gaza is the strongest arm of the resistance, despite the fact that it is under a blockade,” the Palestinian official stated.
He noted how the resistance’s Operation Sword of al-Quds, which came as a response to Israel’s latest war on Gaza, struck “the heart of the Zionist occupation entity, and drew a very significant equation with the Israelis as well.”
“Therefore, the resistance in Palestine, in Gaza specifically, is the guard of all Palestine.”
Iran’s support for Palestine
Haniyeh voiced gratitude towards Iran for its “unconditional” support for Palestine, considering the Islamic Republic to be the greatest force behind the Palestinian resistance.
“The Islamic Republic has the biggest share in giving support and increasing the strength of this power [of the resistance].”
Tide changing against Israel in the West
The Hamas official said support had waned for Israel across Western states.
Israel was no longer the “spoiled child” for the United States or for the West, for that matter, he said.
He identified Tel Aviv as “this strong military machine that they (the Western states) needed to serve,” but said this was no longer the case anymore.
“The Western societies have actually become tired of the Israeli crimes and practices.”
Iran, Saudi Arabia detente
Israel, Haniyeh said, used to thrive on instability across the region, but instances of region-wide reconciliation, such as the ongoing detente between Iran and Saudi Arabia and Syria’s return to the Arab fold, heralded more regional stability that augured ill for Tel Aviv.
“In the last decade, the regional situation was very much fragile because of everything that has happened, whether within the countries or between two countries, whether it was the sectarian issues that happened, for example, Daesh that entered the region in a way that it had shifted the cards in the region…”
“This issue was a golden age for the Zionist entity, and, therefore, they were able to isolate the Palestinian cause.”
However, reconciliations such as the one between Iran and Saudi Arabia or the changing of the regional tide in favor of Syria, function as portents of regional stability that serve the resistance’s interests, but harm those of Israel.
“When the region is stable, when it is in a state of agreement, therefore, this would be in favor of the interest of Palestine and for the resistance of Palestine.”
Iran and Saudi Arabia’s rapprochement also flew directly in the face of the Israeli strategy of painting the Islamic Republic in a bad light.
“The second advantage is that it hits the strategy of the Israelis, through which they wanted to say that Iran is the enemy and Israel is the ally. This has failed. [The rapprochement has shown] that Iran is a brotherly nation in the region.”
Gen. Soleimani’s focal personality in invigorating resistance
Commenting on Iran’s former senior anti-terror commander, Lieutenant General Qassem Soleimani, who was assassinated in a US drone attack against Baghdad in early 2020, Haniyeh called him “a focal personality in the support of the resistance in Palestine,” and praised his pivotal role “in building the resistance in Palestine.”
“His assassination showed that the Americans had had enough of the [sheer] strength of Haj Qassem.”
Palestinians can defeat whatever Israel throws at them
Concluding his remarks, Haniyeh pointed to comments that have been made by such extremist figures as Israel’s so-called national security minister Itamar Ben-Gvir, who have been promoting unprecedented aggression against Palestinians.
“Do not bend the arm of the resistance. The Palestinian people can overcome everything that you are planning. Ben-Gvir would go to the trash bins of history. The Palestinian people have always defeated such personalities…They will not be able to do anything against the Palestinian people.”
Press TV’s website can also be accessed at the following alternate addresses:
The Saudi Foreign Minister Prince Faisal bin Farhan underscored Saturday the endeavor to restore the diplomatic relations between the Kingdom and the Islamic Republic, hoping that this development positively affects all the Muslim World.
In a joint press conference with his Iranian counterpart Hussein Amirabdollahian in Tehran, the Saudi top diplomat thanked the Iranian government and foreign ministry for enhancing and facilitating the restoration of the diplomatic ties between the two countries.
Bin Farhan also said that he would convey the Saudi King’s invitation to the Iranian President Ebrahim Raisi to visit Riyadh.
The joint press conference followed a meeting between the two foreign ministers in the context of the rapprochement of relations between Tehran and Riyadh.
During the meeting, Amirabdollahian and Bin Farhan reportedly discussed issues of bilateral importance, as well as regional developments.
The meeting is the third meeting between the foreign ministers of Iran and Saudi Arabia after Tehran and Riyadh resumed diplomatic relations in China-brokered talks between top security officials of the two countries in Beijing in March.
The two earlier meetings of the two foreign ministers took place in third countries while today’s meeting in Tehran is the first meeting of the top diplomats of Iran and Saudi Arabia in one of their capitals after seven years of no formal ties.
Iran and Saudi Arabia severed diplomatic relations in 2016 after angry protesters rushed into Saudi diplomatic missions in Tehran and Mashhad following Riyadh’s assassination of a prominent Shia cleric Nimr Baqir al-Nimr.
The US recognizes China’s influence and Iran’s dominance in West Asia, but its sluggish and ineffective responses not only hamper Washington’s ability to counterbalance the eastward shift but also inflicts damage on its dwindling reputation as a trusted partner.
In his keynote address on 4 May at a seminar organized by the Center for Near Eastern Studies in America, Jake Sullivan, the US National Security Adviser, shed light on Washington’s strategy towards the West Asia region.
Sullivan emphasized that the driving force behind US foreign policy in the foreseeable future, as articulated by President Joe Biden, is the intense competition for global influence among international powers – one that will shape the trajectory of US foreign policy for decades to come.
On the international stage, the US acknowledges China as its primary strategic rival. However, in the context of West Asia, the US maintains that Iran represents the most prominent threat to its interests in the region.
Iran, after all, has its own “Look to the East” strategy, involving enhanced ties across multiple fields with Russia and China. Amidst this deepening interconnectivity across Eurasia, the region is fast transforming into a hub for vital economic and geopolitical initiatives, placing mounting pressure on a Washington excluded from the party.
So, how exactly will the US navigate and respond to this multifaceted challenge in West Asia?
A five-point strategic approach
During his speech, Sullivan outlined the US’s strategic approach towards West Asia, highlighting five key points. First, is the forging of partnerships to strengthen Washington’s collaboration with regional states and foster closer ties.
But why this need when the US already has strong relations in the region? As the final report of the Munich Security Conference held in February stresses:
“The United States and Europe will have to rethink their approaches to development cooperation with countries in the Global South. They need to make their development models more attractive, as China offers an alternative model based on a narrative of solidarity and mutual benefits.”
Second, is the importance of securing deterrence, underscoring the need to deter threats and safeguard US interests; third, is prioritizing diplomatic options and de-escalation with the primary focus of countering Beijing. Sullivan’s fourth point concerns regional integration, and is most pertinent to this article:
“A more integrated, interconnected Middle East [West Asia] empowers our allies and partners, advances regional peace and prosperity, and reduces the resource demands on the United States in this region over the long term without sacrificing our fundamental interests or our involvement in the region.”
The fifth and final point revolves around the mandatory, yet selective, commitment to democratic values and human rights.
These five points illustrate Washington’s interest in recalibrating its West Asian strategies to align with its global challenges – not just the rise of major competitors, but equally, the collapse of the US-led order. A prime example following the Ukraine conflict, was the widespread resistance from the Global South to participate in western sanctions against Moscow.
Alarm bells rang across the Atlantic when that happened. Not only did these countries reject the sanctions demand, but they moved to strengthen their respective relations with China and Russia, pursuing diverse objectives while capitalizing on the growing competition between Washington, Beijing, and Moscow.
Disrupting China’s BRI with an American I2U2
The urgency to counter its competitors in West Asia has led to a US-led infrastructure initiative, which aims to establish a network of railways to connect Arab states (without traversing Iran) and to link Persian Gulf states to India’s ports.
The concept for this adventurous project was initially introduced during talks at the I2U2 forum last year, comprising the US, Israel, UAE, and India, whose focus was strategic infrastructure projects in West Asia. One notable proposal put forward by Israel at the meeting was the establishment of railways connecting the region.
Since its establishment in 2021, the forum’s objective has been to enhance India’s foothold in West Asia as a counterweight to China, as well as to promote economic normalization between Arab states and Israel.
If Washington’s inclusion of India in its grand plans is meant to rattle China’s West Asian designs, it may have already failed at the first hurdle. India is a principal partner in the International North South Transportation Corridor (INSTC), along with Iran and Russia, a project that is already operational, continues to expand, and is comfortably synergistic with China’s multi-trillion dollar Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) that seeks to connect entire continents.
Chart showing when West Asian and African states joined the Belt and Road Initiative
In early May, Sullivan visited Riyadh, where he held meetings with Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman (MbS), UAE National Security Adviser Tahnoun bin Zayed Al-Nahyan, and Indian National Security Adviser Ajit Duval.
The discussions aimed to advance the shared goal of creating a more secure, prosperous, and interconnected region, with a particular focus on the West Asian rail connectivity project and India’s involvement in it.
Washington realizes that to effectively counter China, it will need to provide regional states with competitive economic incentives and offer cooperation based on mutual benefit, not US diktats. Although this is an urgent foreign policy priority, the US is also aware that time is not on its side, given Beijing’s significant lead with the Belt and Road Initiative, in which West Asia plays a crucial role.
Therefore, to counter China’s influence, Washington is proposing a parallel project in the region, one that also involves connecting with the other Asian economic powerhouse capable of implementing it – India.
But is that altogether true? China, arguably, has the best infrastructure outside the developed world, whereas India still grapples with often highly-unsafe domestic transportation networks. Importantly, New Delhi remains excluded from some of Asia’s most important trade agreements, such as the western-led Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) and the Chinese-led Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP).
Consequently, having failed to prevent regional states from jumping on Beijing’s bandwagon, the US has belatedly begun to dangle half-baked competing projects to draw their interest.
Iran’s ‘Railway of Resistance’
But China’s continental infrastructure labyrinth is not Washington’s only regional obstacle. In the realm of West Asian competition, the proposed US project also finds itself pitted against Iran’s long-standing infrastructure endeavors.
The Iranians have been diligently working to connect the port of Imam Khomeini on the Persian Gulf, situated in Iran’s Khuzestan province, to Iraq, the Albu Kamal crossing on the Syrian border, and ultimately to the Mediterranean port of Latakia.
Tehran’s ambitious project, if realized, will attract the interest of various regional countries, with Saudi Arabia at the forefront due to its significant economic benefits and recent Chinese-brokered rapprochement.
In order to counter a project that would connect Iran in the Persian Gulf to the Mediterranean Sea that traverses four strategic West Asian states, Washington needed to introduce a parallel initiative, which had the potential to connect allied regional states through an alternative route.
Although Israel was not represented at the meeting in Riyadh to discuss the project, it was originally an Israeli proposal, and normalization with the kingdom remains an implicit yet clear objective. Economic connectivity between nations raises the costs of tensions and encourages the development of relations to safeguard shared economic interests. US sources have also affirmed that Israel’s absence from the project does not signify its exclusion in the future.
Ultimately, the project aims to prevent Iran from translating its military triumphs into economic ventures that bolster the growth of the countries and entities in the Axis of Resistance.
The Iran-Iraq and Syria railway linkage project constitutes a step towards connecting the allied nations and aligns with their economic aspirations. As such, for Washington, it becomes imperative to put forth projects that mitigate the region’s economic reliance beyond its sphere of influence, thus averting the consolidation of economic dependence.
Unreliable States of America
Past experiences demonstrate that relying on cooperation with projects proposed or sponsored by Washington usually proves to be futile. The examples are rife: despite signing the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) in 2016 – a proposed trade agreement between the US and 11 other Pacific Rim countries – the US withdrew from the deal in January 2017 and did not ratify it.
Similarly, negotiations on the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) between the US and the EU, initiated in 2013, remain unresolved.
More recently, although the US proposed a plan to transfer Egyptian gas and Jordanian electricity, via Syria, to energy-deficient Lebanon, Washington has become the project’s biggest obstacle, still refusing to approve sanctions waivers necessary for the flows to begin.
The US not only withdraws from economic projects but also reneges on initiatives that no longer serve its geopolitical interests. For example, despite Turkiye’s payment of $1.4 billion for F-35 fighter jets, Washington halted delivery when Ankara purchased S-400 missiles from Russia – without offering any compensation for the payments.
The US’ inconsistencies in the realm of economics and trade have not gone unnoticed and highlight a fundamental distinction between Beijing and Washington: while the former operates on the principle of cooperation for mutual benefit, the latter imparts “lessons” on the unreliability of keeping promises.
This diminishing trust in the US has also affected its diplomatic reputation. After decades of its one-sided policy on the Israel-Palestine issue, a poll conducted by YouGov in May found that most Palestinians favor mediation by Russia and China in potential negotiations with Israel, while 60 percent of respondents also said they did not trust the US to mediate in the conflict with the occupation state.
Cooperation trumps capitulation
Undoubtedly, China has skillfully outmaneuvered the US by advancing its global economic initiatives on the basis of mutual interest and benefit. In doing so, China has emerged as a formidable obstacle to western influence worldwide, challenging the western paradigm of “donor-receiver” with its own principle of “mutual benefit.”
West Asian nations increasingly view China as a robust economic partner. In parallel, Beijing has dramatically enhanced its diplomatic profile in the region, achieving notable success in its recent brokering of the Saudi-Iranian reconciliation deal.
With the unipolar era in fast decline – and “running out of time” – it is unlikely the US can sufficiently alter its modus operandi and entrenched foreign policy habits to accommodate the growing demands of states keen to advance their own interests. Certainly not without offering compelling incentives, massive financial investment, and rock-solid follow through. More likely than not, West Asia will continue to partner with nations that can deliver, and do not disturb their own national interests.
Hezbollah Deputy Secretary General Sheikh Naim Qassem
Hezbollah Deputy Secretary General Sheikh Naim Qassem stressed on Tuesday that the Resistance wargames sent a message of readiness and deterrence to the Zionist enemy.
In an interview with Al-Manar TV on Resistance and Liberation DAy, Sheikh Qassem indicated that the Resistance wanted to tell the Israeli enemy that the next battle will be in occupied Palestine.
“During the upcoming war, Zionists will not be able to sip coffee in Tel Aviv. The Israelis will see what they have not seen if they commit any folly”
Sheikh Qassem said that Hezbollah military drills displayed only a party of the Resistance arsenal, without showing the precision-guided missiles and much more.
His eminence reiterated that Hezbollah supports unifying the fronts against teh Zionst enemy, pointing out that Israelis must know that they can never violate the deterrence formulas maintained by the Resistance.
Sheikh Qassem indicated USA and ‘Israel’ acknowledge that Hezbollah Resistance has developed several classical weapons, including missiles and canons.
130 mm artillery developed by Hezbollah
Hezbollah Deputy Chief said that Resistance and Liberation Day is a national occasion, adding that those who exclude themselves from this pride are to be blamed.
Sheikh Qassem called for disregarding the remarks that oppose the path of resistance, adding that some of them had cooperated with the enemy during certain stages.
On the other hand, Sheikh Qassem pointed out that maintaining stability among Arab countries serve the Palestinian cause and the entire Ummah, adding that Hezbollah supports the Iranian-Saudi agreement.
His eminence noted that the Syrian President Bashar Assad has attended the Arab Summit with all his pro-resistance stances and after emerging victorious from a 13-year war.
Meanwhile, Hezbollah Deputy Secretary General indicated that the presidential deadlock in Lebanon is caused by the stubbornness of some political parties, calling for resorting the constitutional norms in order to elect a new president.
Sheikh Qassem added that the Free Patriotic Movement and Lebanese Forces intend to have a joint nomination without having a joint project.
The China-brokered Iran-Saudi deal marked a significant shift toward establishing Persian Gulf and regional stability, but is a major setback for Israelis who have cultivated Arab-Iranian divisions for years.
The recent rapprochement between regional arch-rivals Saudi Arabia and Iran has added a new layer to the already complicated geopolitical landscape in West Asia, especially as the kingdom was once touted to be the next major Arab state to normalize relations with Israel.
Signed in March, the Chinese-brokered agreement, which reestablishes diplomatic relations and reopens embassies in Riyadh and Tehran after a seven-year hiatus, is seen by many as a watershed moment that could potentially reduce bilateral animosity and ease tensions throughout the region.
However, the deal has caused great dismay in Tel Aviv and caught Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu off guard.
It is understandable why Israel is disappointed, as the prioritization of the Abraham Accords has been a cornerstone of Israeli foreign policy in recent years. The accords, initially involving Israel, the UAE, and Bahrain in 2021, was a major foreign policy victory for Netanyahu and part of a broader strategy to isolate Iran in the region.
And normalizing relations with Saudi Arabia, the most influential Arab state today, would have solidified Israel’s ambition to establish diplomatic ties with its Arab neighbors and further enhance its diplomatic influence in West Asia.
Regional stability: A setback for Israel
Consequently, the Saudi-Iran deal is viewed by many observers as a setback to Israel’s ambitions, with some analysts even perceiving it as a diplomatic victory for the Iranians. Importantly, Riyadh’s resumption of diplomatic ties with Tehran has shifted perceptions across the Arab region, creating conditions that make the Saudis joining the Abraham Accords less likely than ever.
Equally, the resetting of relations does not necessarily mean that Iran and Saudi Arabia are putting their differences aside. As Professor Shahram Akbarzadeh of the Middle East Studies Forum at Deakin University, explains to The Cradle, “It does mean that both countries realize that escalation of tensions and the prospects of all-out conflict would be detrimental for both.”
He emphasizes that “diplomatic ties ensure viable lines of communication to ensure the cold war between the two remains on ice.”
Matteo Colombo, a researcher at Clingendael’s Conflict Research Unit, concurs, saying that a major indirect consequence of the shift in the Saudi-Iranian relationship is that regional conflicts are likely to become less violent than in previous years.
Uncertain impact on Saudi-Israeli ties
The impact of the Saudi-Iran detente on Saudi-Israeli ties remains uncertain. Russell Lucas, a professor of international relations and domestic politics and culture of the Middle East at the University of Michigan, believes that while Iran-Saudi normalization does not directly impact Saudi-Israeli relations, one should not expect dramatic moves between Tel Aviv and Riyadh who will maintain mostly discreet ties.
Akbarzadeh argues that expecting a normalization of relations between Israel and Saudi Arabia was always going to be a challenging prospect. He highlights the deep sense of injury among Muslims and Arabs due to Israel’s continued occupation of Palestinian lands:
“How could Saudi Arabia overlook this sense of injustice and join the so-called Abraham Accords? … such a move would have delivered a major setback to Saudi’s self-image projection as the global champion of Islam.”
Dr. Mehran Kamrava, a professor of government studies at Georgetown University in Qatar, views Israel’s friendship with certain Arab states as purely instrumentalist, driven by the need to contain threats such as Iran. “A simple review of Israeli policies clarifies that Israel is among the biggest contributing factors to regional insecurity and tensions,” he tells The Cradle.
Arab reluctance to normalize
In fact, any prospects of further rapprochement between Israel and other Arab states, particularly Saudi Arabia, are complicated under the current far-right Israeli government. This may lead countries that were previously considering normalizing their relations with Tel Aviv to reevaluate their decisions.
While countries that have already normalized relations with Israel are unlikely to reverse the process, they may “apply the brakes at any time” on their joint initiatives in certain sectors, such as military collaboration.
Both Lucas and Akbarzadeh agree that one of the key effects of the Saudi-Iran rapprochement is the reluctance of Riyadh and other Arab states to be drawn into a confrontation with Iran on behalf of Israel. According to Lucas:
“Public opinion in the [Persian] Gulf registering concern about Israel’s right-wing government’s treatment of the Palestinians and fear of escalation has reached leaders in states like Saudi Arabia and the UAE.”
Therefore, the current developments suggest that Saudi Arabia and other Persian Gulf states now hold more leverage in their negotiations with Israel as a result of Riyadh’s deal with Tehran, giving them more license to shape their future dealings with Tel Aviv.
Saudi intent matters
Not all views are as rosy, however. Last month, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu said in a CNBC interview that the agreement between Saudi Arabia and Iran has very “little to do with Israel,” claiming that Saudi Arabia, “has no illusions about who their adversaries are and who their friends are in [West Asia].”
Nader Hashemi, director of the Center for Middle East Studies at the University of Denver, tells The Cradle that Netanyahu is actually right when he talks about Saudi Arabia’s orientation:
“Riyadh’s foreign policy is much more aligned with Israel while the recent reduction of tensions between Iran and Saudi Arabia are to be very temporary – rooted in trying to reduce tensions so that Saudi Arabia can invest in its long term plan of trying to enhance economic development, attract tourists, more foreign investment, and to expand its new policy of modernization under Crown Prince Mohammad bin Salman (MbS).”
Hashemi thinks that “behind the scenes, the Saudi crown prince and Netanyahu both have similar visions for the future of the Middle East [West Asia] rooted in blocking regional democratization, trying to contain Iran, and influence/expand the Abraham Accords between Israel and various Arab states.”
Furthermore, he predicts that “if Donald Trump or the Republicans take the White House, Saudi Arabia’s relations with Iran will go back to the period of 2017 when Saudi Arabia was very much supportive of Trump’s hawkish policy towards Iran.”
Israel’s miscalculation
But Netanyahu’s understanding of the shifting sands in Persian Gulf states – and his claims that Israel is “an indispensable partner for the Arab world in achieving security, prosperity, and peace” – may be oversimplified.
Kamrava, for example, observes that for a long time, Arab and Israeli policies toward Tehran have been guided by the assumption that Iran can be effectively marginalized and excluded from regional security arrangements:
“But the actual experience has shown that such an assumption is indeed incorrect. In fact, efforts to marginalize or exclude Iran only lead to further reactions from Iran. It is for this reason that first the UAE, and now Saudi Arabia, have changed course and have decided to engage with Iran,” he notes.
Tehran, on the other hand, “has consistently shown that it responds positively not to threats but to constructive engagement,” says Kamrava. So, “if a change in Iranian foreign policy is what regional states are after, then talking to Tehran is the best way of achieving that, rather than working to overthrow the entire Islamic Republic system, which is what Israel is advocating,” he explains.
Others concur. Israel would be mistaken to assume that hostility towards Iran is the defining dynamic in the region, as it has been for a significant part of the last decade, argues Matteo Colombo. This, he adds, “makes it more challenging for Tel Aviv to advocate for normalizing diplomatic relations with other countries in the region to contain Iran.”
The China factor
Hashemi offers another hypothesis for Saudi Arabia’s overriding strategy in its rapprochement with Iran. He believes that Riyadh’s latest moves may be viewed as a message to Washington: “Give us what we want in terms of weapon sales and security guarantees and new strategic vision arrangement that Saudi Arabia is demanding from the US for long-term commitments.”
If the US does not provide these guarantees, says Hashemi, “then Saudi Arabia may symbolically break from the US policy and start to engage with some US adversaries, including China.” He notes that these are very short calculations, as the Saudis are still closely engaged with the west.
But the Beijing-brokered Saudi-Iran detente has created great unease in Tel Aviv and Washington, where the deal is viewed as a loss of US diplomatic initiative and influence on the world stage.
While the agreement has received broad international support, generating optimism for its potential impact against the backdrop of rapidly developing multipolarity, uncertainties persist regarding its specific outcomes. There is a lack of information over of tangible incentives and guarantees from China in ensuring the deal’s success – even while there is confidence in the motivations and commitments of the parties involved.
In terms of impartial and honest mediation, China is regarded more favorably than the US due to its positive and established relationships with both Saudi Arabia and Iran, and its vested interests in maintaining peace and stability in the Persian Gulf, from which it derives much of its energy supplies.
Revealing that Hezbollah has been in constant contact with Palestinian resistance in Gaza, Secretary General Sayyed Hasan Nasrallah affirmed that the Lebanese resistance party “won’t hesitate to take actions as duty forces some moves.”
The Hezbollah leader concluded this statement by: “We’ll see,” in a clear threat to the Zionist entity and its premier Benjamin Netanyahu who has been in the last few days boasting of the brutal Israeli aggression on Gaza.
Sayyed Nasrallah remarks were during a ceremony marking the seventh martyrdom anniversary of Hezbollah senior commander Mustafa Badreddine – known with his nom du guerre “Sayyed Zulfiqar”.
His eminence hailed the Palestinian resistance for heroically confronting the Israeli aggression on Gaza, today on its fourth day.
In this context he stressed that the united stance of the resistance factions foiled the goals of the Israeli occupation which has been trying to single out the Islamic Jihad and to sow discord between resistance groups in Gaza.
Sayyed Nasrallah, meanwhile, described the Arab League (AL) invitation to Syria as an important step, calling on Lebanese government to restore ties with the Arab country.
On the local affairs, the Hezbollah S.G. said there have been positive developments in the issue of Lebanese presidential elections, but stressed that until a new president is elected the caretaker government must continue to assume its responsibilities.
“Sayyed Zulfiqar”
Talking about the occasion, Sayyed Nasrallah hailed “Sayyed Zulfiqar” as an insightful commander who had deep knowledge and strategic mind.
“Sayyed Zulfiar attained all honorable medals a resistance fighter could get. First, he obtained the medal of a fighter who was present in battlefields. Sayyed Zulfiqar also obtained the medal of an injured fighter and the medal of a prisoner. He took then the medal of a commander who secured achievements and victories. Finally, Sayyed Zulfiqar came by the most sublime medal, martyrdom.”
“Martyr Sayyed Zulfiqar and his companions, by their insight and mindful performance, managed to secure great achievements,” Sayyed Nasrallah addressed the ceremony in Beirut’s southern suburb (Dahiyeh).
“Sayyed Zulfiqar, who came up with the slogan of ‘United Banner Till Victory’, manifests, along with great martyr Hajj Qassem Suleimani, unity among powers in the Axis of Resistance,” the Hezbollah leader said, referring to the former commander of the Quds Force, of Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), who was martyred in a US strike near Baghdad airport in January 2020.
Full Support for Gaza
On the brutal Israeli aggression on Gaza, Sayyed Nasrallah said all know that ‘Israel’ is the one who initiated the attack by assassinating three senior Islamic Jihad commanders last Tuesday (May 9).
He lashed out at Israeli Premier Benjamin Netanyahu, saying his motives behind the offensive were to restore the Israeli deterrence and to find a way out of the internal impasse the Zionist entity have been observing for months.
“Netanyahu, through the aggression, seeks to restore the Israeli deterrence and to handle the split of the Israeli governmental coalition as well as to bolster his popularity.”
Image prepared by Al-Manar that displays quotes by Sayyed Nasrallah
Meanwhile, Sayyed Nasrallah stressed that the Islamic Jihad is in powerful position, voicing confidence that the resistance group is capable to rehabilitate its organizational structure despite the assassinations that targeted its senior commanders.
In this context, his eminence praised the Gaza-based group’s calm performance in the battle, stressing that the united stance of the resistance groups foiled the Israeli goals.
“The Islamic Jihad acted wisely in a way that confused the Israeli enemy. The resistance stance was united through the Joint Operations Room of the Resistance Factions.”
“Netanyahu has failed in his scheme to single out the Islamic Jihad and to sow discord between the Palestinian resistance factions.”
Sayyed Nasrallah revealed that Hezbollah leadership has been in contact with Palestinian resistance factions, voicing full readiness to offer all forms of support to Palestine.
“We are in constant contact with the Palestinian factions’ commanders. We keep a close eye on the situation and its developments thanks to our brothers. In addition, we offer, within certain limits, feasible assistance.”
“But, I must emphasize, when duty forces specific actions or scenarios on us, we won’t hesitate to take an action, God willing. I will stop by this sentence… and we’ll see!”
The video* below shows Sayyed Nasrallah addressing the Israeli aggression on Gaza:
Syria Back to the Arab League
Sayyed Nasrallah welcomed an invitation by the Arab League to Syria, saying the move is of high significance.
“Syria has neither changed its stance nor its strategy,” his eminence said, stressing: “We recall Sayyed Zulfiqar whenever Syria achieves a political or military victory.”
In this context, the Hezbollah leader called on the Lebanese government to follow suit of the Arab countries and restore ties with Syria.
“Lebanon is called to restore ties with Syria, what are we waiting for? Restoring ties serves Lebanon’s national interest.”
Meanwhile, Sayyed Nasrallah stressed that handling the issue of Syrian refugees requires dispatching Lebanese ministerial delegation to Damascus and a national stance that doesn’t yield to foreign pressures in this regard.
Lebanese Presidential Elections
He noted, on the other hand, that are positive developments in the Lebanese presidential elections. The Lebanese resistance leader said that Hezbollah has announced his nominee for the presidential post, stressing that his party has not imposed him on any Lebanese side.
Sayyed Nasrallah affirmed the need for the caretaker government to assume its responsibilities as long as no president is elected.
His eminence called, in this context, to utilize from the positive regional developments, referring to the rapprochement between Iran and Saudi Arabia.
Sayyed Nasrallah concluded his speech by renewing allegiance to martyr “Sayyed Zulfiqar” and other martyrs.
“We will follow the suit. We will stick to the resistance path.”
بالرغم من أن عمر العلاقة الاستراتيجية بين سورية وايران يقترب من نصف قرن، في ظل استقرار النظام السياسي في البلدين، والثوابت الاستراتيجية لكل منهما تجاه الصراعات الدولية والإقليمية، خصوصاً في مرحلة ما بعد ما بعد سقوط جدار برلين وانهيار وتفكك الاتحاد السوفياتي، وتسيّد أميركا على العالم بقطبية أحادية شديدة القسوة، وبصورة أخصّ بعد تحرير المقاومة لجنوب لبنان عام 2000. وكان جوهر الجامع المشترك الدائم الذي شكل قاعدة هذه العلاقة لا ينبع من مصالح سلطوية أو اقتصادية صرفة، بل من الثوابت الاستراتيجية المتمثلة بخيار المواجهة مع مشروع الهيمنة الأميركية والكيان الغاصب لفلسطين وتبني خيار المقاومة. والدليل أنه وقفت خلالها سورية بكل ثقلها الى جانب إيران، كانت خلال ثماني سنوات الحرب العراقية المدعومة أميركياً والممولة خليجياً على إيران، وكانت سورية تعمل ضد مصالحها الاقتصادية والسلطوية، وتحمّلت مخاطر شن حملات استهدفتها هدّدت استقرارها وأمنها سواء عبر من كان يشغلهم ويموّلهم النظام العراقي السابق أو عبر ما قام به بتمويل خليجي تنظيم الإخوان المسلمين طيلة فترة الثمانينيات، أو من خلال حروب الاستنزاف التي شنّها كيان الاحتلال، سواء من خلال حرب زحلة وأزمة الصواريخ عامي 1980 و1981 وصولاً للاجتياح الإسرائيلي للبنان الذي كان من ضمن أهدافه إخراج سورية من لبنان وتهديد دمشق عبر حدودها، وبالمقابل فإن وقفة إيران مع سورية خلال أحد عشر عاماً كانت عكس المصالح الاقتصادية والسلطوية للنظام الحاكم، وكانت أكلافها تكاد لا تحتمل، ومعلوم أن الاتفاق النووي الذي عرض على إيران بنسخته الأولى في بغداد عام 2012، كان ملبياً لمصالحها، لكنه كان مشروطاً باستعداد طهران للتفاوض حول سورية مع واشنطن بما يضمن انسحابها من موقفها الداعم لسورية، وعندما رفضت طار الاتفاق. وفي المرة التي وقع فيها الاتفاق عام 2015 ولم ينتج عنه تبدل في موقف إيران الداعم لسورية كانت النتيجة المتوقعة الانسحاب الأميركي من الاتفاق والعودة الى العقوبات الأميركية على إيران.
مفهوم المصالح وعلاقته بنصاعة العلاقات بين الدول حاضر في العلاقة السورية الإيرانية، لكنه حاضر لدى الدولتين بصفته استشرافاً للمصالح الاستراتيجية البعيدة المدى، التي تتقاطع عندها مصلحة النظام الحاكم مع مصلحة الكيان السياسي الوطني وتتقاطعان مع الأهداف السامية للشعوب العربية والإسلامية، وجوهرها الوطني لكل منهما هو الاستقلال، وجوهرها القومي والإقليمي هو المقاومة. وهذا النموذج الجديد للعلاقات الدولية، كان الأساس الذي تقدم معه كمثال تبعته العلاقات السورية الروسية باعتماده أساساً للتحالف. وقد أظهرت الأحداث المتلاحقة صحة وصواب هذا الخيار وهذا المفهوم، على مستوى الثلاثي السوري الإيراني الروسي، حيث نجحت المواجهة المشتركة تحت عنوان المعركة مع الإرهاب، بحماية الأمن القومي لروسيا وإيران عن بُعد عبر المشاركة الكاملة في الحرب ضد الإرهاب التي خاضتها سورية، كما نجح هذا المثال بإثبات وجود فرص حقيقية للفوز بسباق المواجهة مع مشروع الهيمنة الأميركية، الذي فرضت عليه تراجعات كبرى بفعل الثبات السوري والايراني خلال الحربين الأميركيتين على أفغانستان والعراق والحروب الإسرائيلية على لبنان وغزة، والثبات السوري الإيراني الروسي خلال الحرب على سورية بكل مراحلها ووجوهها، ومن رحم هذا الثبات بدأت ملامح ولادة العالم الجديد، كما بدأت ملامح الشرق الجديد تولد من رحم الثبات السوري الإيراني في حماية خيار المقاومة ورعايته وقيادة محوره في مواجهة كيان الاحتلال، الذي بدأت علامات الشيخوخة تظهر عليه، ومعها المزيد من الوهن والمزيد من الانقسامات، وفي قلب هذه التغييرات الدوليّة والإقليمية نهضت قوى المقاومة في العراق وفي اليمن، وتغير بفضل ثباتها وجه المنطقة. وجاء الاتفاق السعودي الإيراني من بكين، تعبيراً عن كل هذه التحولات، باعتباره التجسيد الأهم لمفهوم الاستقلال الاستراتيجي للمنطقة كما وصفه المسؤولون الصينيون، وبصفته تعبيراً عن توجه سعودي للتلاقي مع إيران من خارج علبة الخيارات الأميركية، وبعيداً عن حسابات الرضا والغضب الأميركيين، ومثله الانفتاح المتسارع للسعودية على سورية.
تأتي زيارة الرئيس الإيراني السيد إبراهيم رئيسي الى سورية هذه المرة، بعد سنوات من معادلة حكمت العلاقة السورية بكل من إيران والسعودية، كان عنوانها كل تحسّن سوري في ضفة يعني تأزماً في الضفة المقابلة، بحيث تعذر للوساطة الروسية عام 2017 النجاح بترميم العلاقة السعودية مع سورية دون أن تقبل سورية بشرط إضعاف علاقتها بإيران، وهو ما لم تقبل به سورية طبعاً، ولا طلبته روسيا بالتأكيد، لكن هذه هي المرة الأولى التي تبدو فيها العلاقة السورية بكل من إيران والسعودية موضوعاً للتساكن لا للعداء، رغم التنافس، بل ربما تمثل سورية الجسر العربي الذي تحتاجه السعودية للتحدّث مع حلفاء إيران من العرب وهم حلفاء سورية في الوقت نفسه، سواء في لبنان أو العراق او اليمن او فلسطين، ولهذا تبدو العلاقة السورية بكل من السعودية وإيران قابلة للتكامل مع بعد آخر قيد التشكل هو علاقتها بتركيا، ما يذكرنا بما سبق للرئيس السوري بشار الأسد أن نادى به من نظام إقليمي قائم على التشبيك الاقتصادي والأمني، تحت عنوان دول البحار الخمسة، ويبدو الشرق الجديد ترجمة لهذه الوصفة السورية، التي كلف رفضها من اللاعبين الرئيسيين في المنطقة شعوب المنطقة كلها أثماناً باهظة، وربما يوفر السير بها مزيداً من الأكلاف، وهنا يبدو مفهوم علاقات المصالح بين الدول القائم على الرؤى الاستراتيجية أكثر ثباتاً وأشد قوة من مفهوم المصالح التقليدي القائم على المصالح المباشرة والفورية سواء للاقتصاد او للمصالح السطلوية، والأهم أنه أكثر أخلاقية وأعلى مرتبة على الصعيدين الوطني والقومي، ومرتبطاً برفعة الشعوب وكرامتها.
بمعزل عن لغة التخاطب السلبي بين التيار الوطني الحر وتيار المردة على خلفية الموقف من ترشيح الوزير السابق سليمان فرنجية لرئاسة الجمهورية، وما قاله كل من فرنجية ورئيس التيار النائب جبران باسيل في هذا الإطار، الأكيد أن التيار يعارض انتخاب فرنجية وقد عبر عن هذا الموقف بقوة، وصولاً الى وضع علاقته وتفاهمه مع حزب الله على المحك على خلفية هذا الموقف، وهو لا يزال عند موقفه المعارض والرافض، وهذا حقه الطبيعي الدستوري والسياسي والنيابي. وبالمقابل يعرف التيار أن حليفه السابق الأقرب الذي يمثله حزب الله ماضٍ بدعم ترشيح فرنجية، ومعه حليفه الثابت حركة أمل ورئيسها رئيس المجلس النيابي نبيه بري، ومن حولهما نواب يزيدون عن العشرين نائباً، من مؤيدي ترشيح فرنجية أو من حلفاء ثنائي حزب الله وحركة أمل ومن طوائف مختلفة، والأكيد أن رفض التيار للسير بانتخاب فرنجية يمثل عقبة رئيسية في طريق وصوله أو قدرته على الحكم بالحد الأدنى، كما قال فرنجية نفسه، في إشارته الى ان تأمين الـ 65 صوتاً يبدو ممكناً لكن المسألة ليست في الانتخاب فقط بل بالقدرة على الحكم، خصوصاً أن أي تفكير بتفكيك الجبهة المسيحية المناوئة لانتخاب فرنجية يشير بوضوح الى أن التيار هو الجهة المطلوب أو المرغوب انضمامها لانتخاب فرنجية كي يستقيم الوضع مسيحياً.
البلد والتيار في منتصف الطريق نحو حقائق تتبلور بقوة أكثر يوماً بعد يوم، أولها وأهمها أن الاستقطاب الدولي والإقليمي الذي حكم المنطقة خلال عهد الرئيس ميشال عون وأدى الى تعطيل الكثير من فرص نجاحه وكان أحد الأسباب في فرض مسارات مالية لعبت دوراً في الانهيار، ومحوره الصراع المفتوح بين السعودية وإيران، لم يعد قائماً، وشيئاً فشيئاً وبسرعة يحل مكانه تقارب وتنسيق، ينطلق من أن المقاربة السعودية نحو إيران تأتي من خارج المظلة الأميركية التقليدية التي رافقت كل خطوات السياسة الخارجية السعودية تاريخياً، وأن وجود الصين كشريك ثالث في الاتفاق ليس شأناً بسيطاً. وها هي حرب اليمن توضع على سكة الحلحلة، والعلاقة السعودية السورية تسارع الخطى الإيجابية، والسعودية تبادر لإنهاء الأزمة مع حركة حماس، ما يجعل الخصومة السعودية مع حزب الله التي دفع التيار بعض أثمانها في طريق الزوال، وثاني هذه الحقائق أن المداخلة الدولية رئاسياً تبدو محصورة بفرنسا في ظل حذر أميركي من التصادم مع السعودية من جهة، ومن جهة مقابلة اهتمام فرنسي استثنائي لأسباب كثيرة بتحقيق إنجاز في السياسة الخارجية بحجم ما تتيحه الفرصة الرئاسية في لبنان، وضمان مصالح اقتصادية ليس أقلها قطاع النفط والغاز لشركة توتال، والمقاربة الفرنسية تبدو على خط تعزيز فرص انتخاب فرنجية بوضوح، كما لا يغيب عن التيار.
تبنّى التيار ورئيسه منذ إعلان رفضه لفرنجية وابتعاده عن الشراكة مع حزب الله في الملف الرئاسي، بالتزامن مع انسحاب الحزب التقدمي الاشتراكي من خيار ترشيح النائب ميشال معوض، إطلاق مسعى إنتاج معادلة لا فرنجية ولا معوض، نعم لمرشح ثالث، وفيما تبنى الاشتراكي ترشيح قائد الجيش العماد جوزف عون خياراً بديلاً أولاً رفضه التيار، لم يكن خافياً على التيار أن الاشتراكي كان يسعى مع القوات اللبنانية لصياغة مشتركة تحاكي ما قيل إنه تبنّ سعودي يدعم ترشيح قائد الجيش، وقد تكفل رئيس المجلس النيابي نبيه بري بتعطيل هذه الفرضية من موقع تبنيه لترشيح فرنجية وتحالفه مع حزب الله، مزيلاً عن كاهل التيار عبئاً ثقيلاً، عبر رفض ترشيح قائد الجيش دون تعديل الدستور الذي يبدو مستحيلاً. ومع نهاية هذه الفرضية انتقل الاشتراكي وسائر النواب المستقلين من حلفاء السعودية الى مرحلة جديدة عنوانها انتظار الموقف السعودي، الذي يبدو محسوماً أنه لن يصل الى دعم ترشيح فرنجية، على الأقل علناً، لكنه سيفتح الطريق لفرصة انتخابه عبر القول إن الأولوية هي لانتخاب الرئيس، وإن التوافق اللبناني هو الذي ينتج الرئيس الجديد، ولذلك لم ينجح مسعى البحث عن توافق كتلة وازنة على مرشح ثالث، يؤيده كل من التيار والاشتراكي والمستقلين، وكل يوم يبدو أن مثل هذه الفرضية تزداد ضعفاً وتراجعاً.
الخيارات تبدو بين فرضية اكتمال عقد الـ 65 صوتاً لصالح فرنجية وتوافر نصاب كاف لانتخابه، أو حدوث استعصاء في الغالبية اللازمة أو في النصاب المطلوب، فيستمر الفراغ إلى أجل طويل، وما يعلمه التيار ورئيسه هو أن التيار بعد التباعد الرئاسي مع حزب الله، لا يملك موازين القوى اللازمة التي تتيح له تحقيق ما لم يستطع تحقيقه في عهد الرئيس ميشال عون، أي تسمية الرئيس وضمان التوافق السياسيّ على خطة عمل يتبناها ائتلاف نيابي كافٍ لتسمية رئيس حكومة وتمثيل أغلبية حكومية ونيابية، لم تتحقق في عهد الرئيس عون، ويفترض أن التيار يدرك أن مفهوم الرئيس القوي المستند الى شخصية الرئيس عون وتاريخيته وحجم تمثيل التيار الأكبر نيابياً والتحالف مع حزب الله يومها، الأقوى من اليوم، بما له وما عليه، لم تكن عناصر كافية لضمان نجاح العهد بسبب غياب هذا الائتلاف الذي يشكل غالبية نيابية وحكومية، والملتزم بسلة متكاملة، كانت ما طلبه الرئيس بري للسير بانتخاب العماد ميشال عون ورفضها التيار يومها بداعي أن الرئيس هو السلة بذاته مرة، وأن طلب السلة غير دستوري مرة أخرى، وهو يعلم اليوم أن السلة، التي يسمّيها التيار بالمشروع هي المطلوب، لكن من الائتلاف النيابي الداعم للمرشح الرئاسي، وليس من المرشح الرئاسي.
جرّب التيار الرئيس بدون الائتلاف النيابي، وليس بمقدوره تأمين الرئيس والائتلاف معاً، فماذا سيختار الآن، الائتلاف النيابي الذي يلتزم السلة، أو ما يسمّيه رئيس التيار بالخيار الثاني القائم على أولوية التفاهم على المشروع بمعزل عن اسم الرئيس، الذي يشكل أولوية عند حزب الله من منطلق مفهوم الأمن القومي، فيقع تجديد التفاهم بينهما على هذه القاعدة، أم يختار التيار القفز الى خياره الثالث بترشيح رئيسه لتسجيل موقف يعرف أنه لن يغيّر المعادلة، أم يختار ترجيح كفة البقاء في الفراغ؟ السياسة ذكاء التوقيت، وامتلاك حكمة معرفة كيفية الاختيار بين خسارتين وربحين، وشجاعة الإقدام على الاختيار، ربح الرئيس والمشروع معاً ربحان غير متاحين، وخسارة الرئيس والمشروع خسارتان متاحتان، وربح الرئيس بلا المشروع افتراضي وغير متاح، وعندما تحقق بأفضل وجوهه مع الرئيس عون بدا أنه غير كافٍ، لكن ربح المشروع اليوم وقبول خسارة الرئيس فرضيّة واردة وأمر متاح، والسؤال دائماً أين يكمن ربح البلد ومدى أهمية أن يكون للتيار بصمة في صناعة هذا الربح. وفي السياسة عندما تجعلك الظروف والموازين موضع طلب، عليك أن تعرف أي العروض تطلب؟
لم نخيّر بين فرنجية والفراغ بل بينه وبين مرشح نطالب الآخرين بالاتفاق عليه (هيثم الموسوي)
أكد نائب الأمين العام لحزب الله الشيخ نعيم قاسم أن كل الدول الخارجية مقتنعة بأنها غير قادرة على أن تفرض خياراً رئاسياً على اللبنانيين. وأشار إلى «أننا دعمنا ترشيح الوزير سليمان فرنجية لامتلاكه المواصفات الوطنية والعملية لمصلحة لبنان ودوره وموقعه، وكذلك امتلاكه دعماً إضافياً نابعاً من قناعة خارجية تمثّلها فرنسا بضرورة الوصول إلى تسوية»، لافتاً إلى أنه «يوماً بعد يوم، تزداد الإيجابيات في الوصول إلى انتخاب رئيس للجمهورية»
هو «اتفاق المطمئنَّين» إلى بعضهما بعضاً. هكذا تصف مصادر دبلوماسية عربية المصالحة الإيرانية – السعودية. بمعنى: «الإيراني، على أعلى المستويات، طمأن الرياض بما يبدّد هواجسها. والسعودي، في المقابل، بدّد مخاوف طهران». تضيف المصادر: «هذا ليس اتفاق تهدئة. هو اتفاق كبير جداً. ما بعده، في كل المنطقة، لن يكون كما قبله».
كيف ينعكس ذلك على الاستحقاق الرئاسي في لبنان؟ «السؤال هو متى وليس كيف»، تجيب المصادر، مشيرة إلى أن «الفرنسيين لا يزالون يأملون بتجاوب سعودي للوصول إلى تسوية، وخصوصاً أن الرياض لم تقل لا حاسمة لانتخاب سليمان فرنجية، وإن كانت لم تقل نعم بعد، تحت عنوان عدم الاكتراث بالمسألة اللبنانية. تدرك باريس أن الإحجام السعودي عامل سلبي، فيما الانخراط في محادثات تسوية يسهّل انتخاب الرئيس. لذا تتكرر الزيارات الفرنسية الى السعودية والاتصالات بين المسؤولين في البلدين». لكن التقدير هو أن «لا خيار آخر. ربما يأخذ السعودي وقتاً في انتظار بتّ بعض الخطوات في اليمن وسوريا، وليطمئنّ إلى أن مصلحته في لبنان تكمن في انتظام عمل المؤسسات».
«اتفاق المطمئنَّين» ينعكس اطمئناناً لدى حزب الله. نائب الأمين العام للحزب الشيخ نعيم قاسم يؤكد أن «تنفيذ الاتفاق الإيراني – السعودي يجري بخطوات متسارعة». ويلفت إلى أن «لقاءات وزيري خارجية البلدين واتصالاتهما تنجز الملفات بفعالية. العلاقات بين المصرفين المركزيين في البلدين بدأت في اليوم التالي لتوقيع اتفاق المصالحة في بكين. خطوات الحلّ في اليمن بارزة في إيجابيّتها. هذا كله يؤكد تصميم الطرفين على إنجاح الاتفاق الذي نأمل أن يترك انعكاساته على كل المنطقة، وخصوصاً أن الملفات مترابطة». أما الموقف الأميركي – الإسرائيلي، «فرغم سلبيّته ومحاولاته للتخريب، لن يكون قادراً على تجاوز تصميم البلدين بعد طول افتراق، وخصوصاً أن النظام العالمي على أبواب الانتقال من الأحادية القطبية الأميركية إلى تعدد الأقطاب».
ترابط الملفات يقود إلى لبنان. هذا البلد، بحسب قاسم، «يجب أن يستفيد من انتهاء عقد من التوتر وعدم الاستقرار في المنطقة، بدأ عام 2011، ومن البدء في الاتفاقات والتسويات القائمة على المصالحة وفتح آفاق التعاون، وخصوصاً الاتفاق الإيراني – السعودي». هذه التسويات «مؤشرات إيجابية علينا أن نستثمرها بالحدود الممكنة. وإلا، هل يعقل أن يعود لبنان إلى الأجواء السلبية التي سادت العقد الماضي، في وقت تتحرك فيه المنطقة نحو أجواء إيجابية تساعد على إراحة دولها؟». وعليه، فإن «لبنان أمام محطة تاريخية مهمة جداً، حيث يغلب الاختيار الداخلي على الفرض الخارجي. كل الدول الخارجية مقتنعة بأنها غير قادرة على أن تفرض خياراً معيّناً على اللبنانيين في هذه المرحلة، بسبب تشظّي الكتل في المجلس النيابي، وأيضاً بسبب أولويات أخرى لدى هذه الدول. لذا يتطلّب الأمر تعاوناً بين اللبنانيين لإنجاز الاستحقاق الرئاسي».
يوماً بعد يوم تزداد الإيجابيات في اتجاه التوصل إلى انتخاب رئيس للجمهورية
ويشير قاسم إلى أن «اختيارنا دعم ترشيح رئيس تيار المردة سببه، أولاً، امتلاكه المواصفات الوطنية والعملية لمصلحة لبنان ودوره وموقعه، وثانياً امتلاكه دعماً إضافياً نابعاً من قناعة خارجية تمثّلها فرنسا بضرورة الوصول إلى تسوية، ربما تتحرك فرنسا بفعالية أكبر، ولهذا الأمر علاقة بتقديرها لمصالحها وعلاقتها مع الدول الأخرى. وعلى أية حال، لسنا على علم بوجود اتفاق دولي أو تقاسم أدوار في الملف اللبناني»، مشدداً على «أننا مع أيّ جهد يوصل إلى انتخاب الرئيس المناسب. ويوماً بعد يوم، تزداد الإيجابيات في هذا الاتجاه، وننتظر لحظة الانتخاب».
ولكن، ألا تتناقض هذه الإيجابية مع ما فُهم من كلام قاسم نفسه، قبل أيام، بأن حزب الله يخيّر اللبنانيين بين فرنجية والفراغ؟
يجيب قاسم: «لم نخيّر أحداً بطريقة سلبية، بل كنا نوصّف الواقع. لنوضح الصورة بشكل أدقّ: الحزب يدعو إلى مقاربة إيجابية للاستحقاق الرئاسي، وهذا يعني أن يقدم كل طرف مرشحاً لنكون أمام خيارات متعددة، ونناقش بعضنا بعضاً في حوار بنّاء، علّنا نتمكن من ردم الهوّة وإيجاد قواسم مشتركة وإنجاز الاستحقاق سريعاً. لا أحد يناقش بضرورة إنجاز الاستحقاق الرئاسي لأنه مقوّم نهضة البلد ودعامة دستورية أساسية للانتظام العام، ولا يمكن التصرف بإهمال تجاه هذا المفصل المهم. لذلك، ينبغي الإقلاع عن المقاربة السلبية التي تكتفي برفض الاسم الذي نطرحه، من دون أن يقدم الرافضون اسماً في المقابل. هذه المقاربة السلبية لا تحقّق الإنجاز المطلوب وتوتّر الأجواء السياسية وتبقى في دائرة المماحكة والشعبوية، فيما إنجاز الاستحقاق يتطلّب مقاربات إيجابية».
Iranian foreign minister Hussein Amirabdollahian on Lebanon border eying Occupied Palestine
The Iranian foreign minister Hussein Amirabdollahian visited the Lebanese southern town of Maroun Al-Ras, overlooking the border area with the occupied Palestinian territories.
The two members of the Loyalty to Resistance parliamentary bloc, Hasan Fadlallah and Hasan Ezeddine, in addition to a host of municipal and social figures welcomed the Iranian top diplomat.
Planting an olive tree in Iran’s Park in the town, Amirabdollahian reiterated the Iranian support to the Islamic Resistance in Lebanon.
“We are here in the border town of Maroun Al-Ras to announce again and loudly that we support the Resistance in Lebanon against the Zionist occupation,” Amirabdollahian said.
“The Islamic Resistance in Lebanon has proved that the Zionist entity does not understand but the rhetoric of power.”
The Middle East has started a stage of collaboration, the Iranian foreign minister said, adding that the future of the regional states is bright.
All the developments in the region will lead to the isolation and collapse of the Zionist entity, Amirabdollahian affirmed.
Iranian foreign minister Hussein Amirabdollahian
In turn, MP Hasan Fadlallah thanked the Iranian minister for his country’s renewed power offers to Lebanon, calling on the Lebanon authorities to respond positively to the Iranian initiatives.
Member of Loyalty to Resistance parliamentary bloc MP Hasan Fadlallah
Hezbollah Secretary General Sayyed Hasan Nasrallah received Iranian Foreign Minister Hossein Amir-Abdollahian, the Lebanese party’s Media Relations Office announced on Friday.
Sayyed Nasrallah and the visiting Iranian FM discussed latest developments in the region including the Saud-Iranian deal and its regional repercussions, a statement by the Media Relations Office read.
The two also tackled latest events in Lebanon and occupied Palestine, the statement added, noting that Iranian Ambassador in Beirut Mujtaba Amani was present at the meeting.
Hezbollah S.G. Sayyed Hasan Nasrallah in a meeting with Iranian FM Hussein Amirabdollahian (Friday, April 28, 2023).
Amirabdollahian Meets Nakhallah
Secretary General of the Islamic Jihad Movement of Palestine Ziyad Al-Nakhaleh says that the Israeli regime is on the path of decline and destruction.
Al-Nakhaleh made the remarks in a meeting with Iranian Foreign Minister Hossein Amir-Abdollahian in Beirut on Thursday.
During the meeting, the two sides discussed the latest regional developments, the recent Zionists’ attacks, and the resistance of the Palestinians against the Israeli regime forces.
Referring to the principled policy of the Islamic Republic of Iran in supporting the oppressed Palestinian nation against the Zionist regime, Amir-Abdollahian emphasized the necessity of unification of Palestinian groups as well as the unity of Muslim governments and nations in supporting the Palestinian nation and taking effective and deterrent measures against the aggressive actions of the Zionists against the Palestinians and Islamic holy places.
Al-Nakhaleh, for his part, hailed the political support of the Islamic Republic of Iran to Palestine in regional and international forums, adding that the Palestinian Resistance groups are in their best position now.
Amirabdollahian also held a phone call with Hamas chief in Gaza Yahya Al-Sinwar, reiterating the Iranian support to the Palestinian people and Resistance.
For his part, Al-Sinwar hailed the Iranian support, underlining the importance of the regional reconciliations reached by the Iranian diplomacy.
The top Iranian diplomat arrived in Beirut on Wednesday. He held several meetings with Lebanese caretaker PM Najib Mikati, Speaker Nabih Berri and FM Abdallah Bou Habib.
Breaking the link between the oil and the dollar is a project that has been in the making for quite some time.
Breaking the link between the oil and the dollar is a project that has been in the making for quite some time
On March 10, China brokered a peace agreement between rivals Iran and Saudi Arabia, a move which left the West baffled. Some suggested that the world had witnessed the slow and gradual collapse of the old world order. Although the deal may not necessarily achieve full normalization, still points of contact were restored. Such had vexed policymakers while at the same ushering in an era of Chinese diplomatic victory in the area most crucial to US global dominance. The implications of such an agreement are multiple, but the potential loss of Saudi to the US, and the gradual dissolution of their institutional ties, especially the long-standing agreement by which Saudi sells its oil for dollars, may yet prove to be a world significant event.
This detente is a breakthrough in terms of heralding peace and development in the region. It comes at a time when relations between China and the US have reached all-time lows. After several months of provocations aimed at disrupting Beijing through provocations around Taipei, it appears that China had turned the tables on the US’ most sensitive point, which is its hegemony over the gulf. The ramifications are too broad, but here I address the implications of the petrodollar system.
The petrodollar system was born of an agreement between the US and Saudi Arabia to peg the sales of oil in exchange for security guarantees and Saudi assistance with US foreign policy missions. Aside from petrodollar recycling, the benefit of pricing oil in dollars has all to do with increasing US indebtedness in the dollar, which in turn increases its wealth, since the US prints the ‘paper dollars’ as the equivalent of world wealth. This also means that the US must lay control not only over current world assets, but must also own the future work and assets of humanity to underwrite its massive wealth. For this, The US must be in control of the world’s strategic resources, choke points, and foremost the ideological production that cripples anti-systemic thought. On a more concrete level, since OPEC entities get paid in none other than the dollar, the profits earned from oil revenues are re-invested in US treasuries and other instruments so as to avoid the loss of value in times of economic downturns. The constant flow of dollars channeled into bonds, allows the US to finance its deficits and to be in a position to trade debts against their future values.
The depth of the US financial market, and the ability of the dollar to be a world medium of savings in addition to world means of exchange, are tied to the global demand for dollars. If the dollarization of oil lessens, then demand for dollars lessens, and the dollar as a safe refuge from financial turmoil abroad also lessens. As can be seen, the US must reconstitute its powers in the military and ideological fields to reinstall the dollar and siphon world wealth through it. Incidentally, the China-sponsored deal represents an image or ideological blow to the US because it has shown China as a peace-maker and the US as war monger. The implications of slow de-dollarisation are that the US may no longer be able to build its wealth by borrowing against a world it controls.
Pricing oil to the US dollar has proved efficient to underwrite the wealth of the US-allied financial class. The equation more control equals more wealth meant that the US’s engagement in imperialist politics has always been about power first, especially ideological power wrought by beating and sanctioning people abroad. The US hegemony is first a hegemony over the global mind of defeated people. As the Arab proverb goes, one makes a friend out of beating him first.
The Saudis were pivotal in the ascent of the US. In addition to the many examples, like aiding the contras to fight Abdel-Nasser in Yemen, and the list goes on, they essentially helped the US win the Cold War because the dollarization of oil permitted them to financially contain Eastern European countries as they overburdened them with dollar debts. Lending to cripple an economy is just as good a weapon as any. Not to forget, the Saudis also allowed the price of oil to be listed on the commodity market by weakening OPEC at the behest of the US. Direct producers of oil lost control of oil prices. Saudi pumped oil earned fewer profits than it should have as a part of the power game with the Soviet Union then. This was owed to a meeting held in 1985 between King Fahd and William Casey, the former CIA director, in which both agreed to increase oil production from 2 billion bpd to 10 billion bpd, leading oil prices to fall from $30 to $10 and eventually resulting in the fallout of the Soviet economy.
In the region, the Saudis assisted US aspirations through the numerous wars against more autonomous states across the region. The proliferation of Salafism and the financing of disruptive militias instigated wars that were a win-win situation for the US. It weakened opposing regimes and made money off military spending.
Yet with war waged on Yemen, tensions with Iran, and a balance of forces tilting in favor of the axis of resistance, it is only rational for the Saudis to forfeit the US and seek longer-term stability through negotiated dialogue. The deal that the US provides Saudi with security as Saudi prices its oil in the dollar seems to be no longer valid. The US is retreating around the globe, and while it cannot afford Saudi security, the Saudis will rethink their pricing oil only in dollars. Add to that the personal vilification of MBS and the openly anti-Arab racism practiced daily in Western media and other channels.
On a more detailed level, Saudi security demands are threefold: first, to grant a major non-NATO ally status; second, to receive additional sales of advanced US weapons; and third, to receive US support for a civilian nuclear energy program. With the first condition fulfilled and the second being contested, the third would evoke the possibility for Saudi authorities to develop their own fissile material, hence enabling the capacity of building a nuclear weapon. The US is less concerned with nuclear proliferation than the military autonomization of Saudi Arabia as this would jeopardize the agreement that safeguards the petrodollar system. US reluctance to respond to Saudi Arabia’s security needs was made obvious when Democrat lawmakers urged US President Joe Biden to discourage Saudis from enhancing their own ballistic missiles and drone capabilities in 2022. A letter was issued just a few days prior to Biden’s visit to Saudi Arabia in June 2022, and highlighted concerns from the Pentagon that the Gulf state was planning to manufacture solid fuel missiles with assistance from China.
Another relevant factor to consider is threats issued by the US that it would pull away military support following the announcement of the OPEC cut in October 2022, as well as the introduction of the NOPEC bill which would enable lawsuits to be filed against Saudi Arabia and OPEC entities for controlling oil prices. If such a bill would come to pass, it would highlight the possibility of Saudi Arabia being slapped with sanctions. With the Iran-Saudi deal announced, it appears that China has rocked the foundations on which the petrodollar system rests. This was further evidenced by the introduction of a Privileged Resolution by Senators Murphy and Lee calling for a complete halt of US military assistance to Saudi Arabia, noting that “US weapons do not belong in the hands of human rights abusers.”
Breaking the link between the oil and the dollar is a project that has been in the making for quite some time. Both Russia and China have been buying immense amounts of gold to rid their foreign reserves in US dollars and back their own currencies on the gold standard. With their BRICS allies, they are contemplating a common currency that would shift away from transactions carried out in US dollars. Although many signs seem to be pointing out the gradual decline of the petrodollar system, it is unlikely that it may happen in the short run.
The petrodollar will remain the dominant currency as long as the dollar is recognized as the world reserve currency. As we speak, the global share of foreign reserves denominated in US dollars currently fell to slightly below 60%. States and companies across the world are still required to own dollars in order to purchase oil – the most strategic commodity on the global market. After all that is said and done, the decline of the dollar is tied to the decline of the US’s control of the planet, which until now was de-facto ownership of the planet.
Saudi delegation arrives in Sanaa to discuss details of the final peace plan with member of the Supreme Political Council Mohammad Ali Al-Houthi on Sunday.
A Saudi delegation traveled to Sanaa to meet with high-ranking officials from the Ansar Allah movement to discuss further details of the final ceasefire agreement and the end of the 8-year Saudi-led war on Yemen.
The delegation arrived on Saturday evening and held talks with Mohammad Ali Al-Houthi, a senior member of Yemen’s Supreme Political Council and important figures of the National Salvation Government of Yemen.
Pictures were circulated in Yemeni media outlets today, showing a Saudi official shaking hands with Al-Houthi. The Saudis reportedly asked for their identities to remain secret in the meantime.
According to sources of Yemen’s Saba news agency, issues such as the “removal of the tight naval and air blockade on Yemen, an end to the eight-year-long aggression, the restoration of Yemeni national rights, the payment of civil servant salaries, and payments related to oil and gas revenues,” were discussed with Mahdi Al-Mashat, the Chairman of the Supreme Political Council.
The recent visit adds to the diplomatic efforts taken by both sides.
Omani Mediation
On April 8, Saudi Arabia’s Ambassador to Yemen, Mohammed Saeed Al-Jaber met with members of the National Salvation Government and the Ansar Allah movement under Omani mediation.
Sources told Al Mayadeen on April 8 that the meeting is part of the effort to extend the armistice between the two parties and lift the blockade on Hudaydah port.
The Omani and Saudi team met with the head of the Sanaa delegation, negotiator Mohammad Abdul Salam, who said, “We hope that this will be achieved, that the damage will be remedied, and efforts will be crowned with a peace agreement that meets the demands of our dear Yemeni people, from Saada to Mahra.”
Informed Yemeni sources revealed on Friday that Saudi officials met with the Yemeni Presidential Leadership Council to inform them of their decision to end the war and conclude the Yemeni file permanently.
The officials also detailed a two-year transitional period which includes a future form of the state and the ruling government. The sources added that the Saudi vision for a solution comes in accordance with its understanding of Sanaa which is still being discussed and is almost final.
The UAE is Unbothered
The UAE, which occupies strategic Yemeni territory including the Socotra island, has not made any diplomatic initiative yet.
Mohammad Al Bukhaiti told Al Mayadeen on Friday that Sanaa will “not allow the presence of any UAE forces on any inch of Yemeni territory.”
However, Al Bukhaiti also stated that Sanaa supports “proposals and efforts by Saudi Arabia or other parties to pacify the Yemeni crisis and reach a comprehensive political resolution to the conflict.”
This might indicate a possible rift between the Gulf countries’ approach to the Yemen war.
Improved Saudi Iranian Relations
Regional conflicts have begun to ease after China mediated diplomatic talks between Iran and Saudi Arabia in early March.
Talks between the two countries produced the first meeting between the Foreign Ministers of both countries in 7 years.
China played a crucial role in the restoration of ties between the two countries. However, it is speculated that the success of Ansar Allah in Yemen has pushed Saudi Arabia to the negotiation table after 8 tormenting years of what was supposed to be a quick military victory for the country.
UPROOTED PALESTINIANS: SALAM ALQUDS ALAYKUM 